rabbis
2007 occurrences across the corpus
The Jerusalem Talmud
Rebbi Joḥanan said: The tertiary comes because of the reptile but it is (forbidden) [permitted] to turn it into heave. They asked before him: Even for Rebbi Aqiba? Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Hila: Even following Rebbi Aqiba. And why? The ṭevul yom makes invalid, secondary impurity makes invalid. Just as the ṭevul yom does not invalidate profane food that it could not be turned into heave, so secondary impurity does not invalidate profane food that it could not be turned into heave. Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The tertiary comes because of the reptile, and it is (forbidden) [permitted] to turn it into heave but (permitted) [forbidden] to turn it into sacrificial food. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Yasa: It defiles sacrifices and you say so? He said to him, because of the distinction. Rebbi Samuel ben Rebbi Isaac said, the source of its impurity is the distinction. Rebbi Yose said, why does it defile sacrifices? Because of the distinction. Rebbi Yudan said, even for the rabbis who say that there is no tertiary in profane food, why is it forbidden? It defiles sacrifices because of the distinction. Rebbi Yose said to him, do we not need to hear this from a great personality?
There, they say, because Rebbi Joshua praised Rebbi Aqiba, it implies that practice follows his argument. The rabbis of Caesarea say, he praised him for his ingenuity, but in fact practice does not follow his argument, since Rebbi Aḥa, Rebbi Maisha, in the name of Rebbi Eleazar said, one whips for tertiary [impurity] for tithes, even according to Rebbi Aqiba. Rebbi Yudan in the name of Rebbi Hilai: Even according to Rebbi Aqiba one does not whip. Why? The ṭevul yom makes invalid, secondary impurity makes invalid. Since the ṭevul yom has no touch for profane food, also secondary impurity has no touch for profane food. Rebbi Eleazar said, as the count for profane food so is the count of tithes. This corresponds to what Rebbi Jonah, Rebbi Immi, said in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: We deal with somebody who ate profane food, and that Chapter deals with tithe. Rebbi Yose said, even its primary [impurity] is not clear. Not “I will not eat” is written, but “I did not eat.” Rebbi Abba Mari said, since it is written “following all Your commandments which You commanded me,” is it as if it were not clear?
“ ‘To save you’, that is the camp of the Ark.” But some say, that is the Name which was given in the Ark, as it was stated’: “Rebbi Jehudah ben Laqish says, two arks were travelling with Israel in the desert; one in which the Torah was deposited and one in which the broken pieces of the tablets were deposited. The one in which the Torah was deposited was put into the Tent of Meeting; that is what is written: “Moses and the Ark of the Eternal’s covenant did not move from the camp.” The one in which the broken pieces of the tablets were deposited was going out and coming in with them. But the Rabbis say, it was only one, and once it went out in the days of Eli and was taken prisoner. A verse supports the Rabbis: “Woe to us, who will save us from this mighty god?” A word [which shows that] they never had seen it before. A verse supports Rebbi Jehudah ben Laqish. “Saul said to Aḥiya: present God’s Ark”. But was the Ark not at Qiryat Ye‘arim? What do the rabbis with it? ‘Present to me the High Priest’s diadem.’ Another verse supports Rebbi Jehudah ben Laqish: “The Ark, Israel, and Jehudah, dwell in huts.”. Was the Ark not in Zion? What do the rabbis with it? The straw roof cover that was in the walls, since the Temple was not yet built.
“ ‘To save you’, that is the camp of the Ark.” But some say, that is the Name which was given in the Ark, as it was stated’: “Rebbi Jehudah ben Laqish says, two arks were travelling with Israel in the desert; one in which the Torah was deposited and one in which the broken pieces of the tablets were deposited. The one in which the Torah was deposited was put into the Tent of Meeting; that is what is written: “Moses and the Ark of the Eternal’s covenant did not move from the camp.” The one in which the broken pieces of the tablets were deposited was going out and coming in with them. But the Rabbis say, it was only one, and once it went out in the days of Eli and was taken prisoner. A verse supports the Rabbis: “Woe to us, who will save us from this mighty god?” A word [which shows that] they never had seen it before. A verse supports Rebbi Jehudah ben Laqish. “Saul said to Aḥiya: present God’s Ark”. But was the Ark not at Qiryat Ye‘arim? What do the rabbis with it? ‘Present to me the High Priest’s diadem.’ Another verse supports Rebbi Jehudah ben Laqish: “The Ark, Israel, and Jehudah, dwell in huts.”. Was the Ark not in Zion? What do the rabbis with it? The straw roof cover that was in the walls, since the Temple was not yet built.
“ ‘To save you’, that is the camp of the Ark.” But some say, that is the Name which was given in the Ark, as it was stated’: “Rebbi Jehudah ben Laqish says, two arks were travelling with Israel in the desert; one in which the Torah was deposited and one in which the broken pieces of the tablets were deposited. The one in which the Torah was deposited was put into the Tent of Meeting; that is what is written: “Moses and the Ark of the Eternal’s covenant did not move from the camp.” The one in which the broken pieces of the tablets were deposited was going out and coming in with them. But the Rabbis say, it was only one, and once it went out in the days of Eli and was taken prisoner. A verse supports the Rabbis: “Woe to us, who will save us from this mighty god?” A word [which shows that] they never had seen it before. A verse supports Rebbi Jehudah ben Laqish. “Saul said to Aḥiya: present God’s Ark”. But was the Ark not at Qiryat Ye‘arim? What do the rabbis with it? ‘Present to me the High Priest’s diadem.’ Another verse supports Rebbi Jehudah ben Laqish: “The Ark, Israel, and Jehudah, dwell in huts.”. Was the Ark not in Zion? What do the rabbis with it? The straw roof cover that was in the walls, since the Temple was not yet built.
“ ‘To save you’, that is the camp of the Ark.” But some say, that is the Name which was given in the Ark, as it was stated’: “Rebbi Jehudah ben Laqish says, two arks were travelling with Israel in the desert; one in which the Torah was deposited and one in which the broken pieces of the tablets were deposited. The one in which the Torah was deposited was put into the Tent of Meeting; that is what is written: “Moses and the Ark of the Eternal’s covenant did not move from the camp.” The one in which the broken pieces of the tablets were deposited was going out and coming in with them. But the Rabbis say, it was only one, and once it went out in the days of Eli and was taken prisoner. A verse supports the Rabbis: “Woe to us, who will save us from this mighty god?” A word [which shows that] they never had seen it before. A verse supports Rebbi Jehudah ben Laqish. “Saul said to Aḥiya: present God’s Ark”. But was the Ark not at Qiryat Ye‘arim? What do the rabbis with it? ‘Present to me the High Priest’s diadem.’ Another verse supports Rebbi Jehudah ben Laqish: “The Ark, Israel, and Jehudah, dwell in huts.”. Was the Ark not in Zion? What do the rabbis with it? The straw roof cover that was in the walls, since the Temple was not yet built.
How were the tablets written? Rebbi Ḥanania ben Gamliel says, five on one tablet each. But the rabbis say, ten on each tablet, as it is written: “He informed you of His covenant which He had commanded you to do, the ten words”, ten on each tablet. Rebbi Simeon ben Ioḥai said, twenty on each tablet, as it is written: “He informed you of His covenant which He had commanded you to do, the ten words”, twenty on each tablet. Rebbi Simai says, forty on each tablet, as it is written, “on each side they were written,” a square Ḥananiah, the son of Rebbi Joshua’s brother, says: Between every two commandments, the details and the letters [of the Torah] were written. “Filled with taršiš”, like the Great Sea. When Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish had occasion to discuss this verse, he said, Ḥananiah, the son of Rebbi Joshua’s brother, did teach us correctly. Just as in the sea there are small waves between a large wave and the next, so between any two commandments there are the details and the letters of the Torah.
When does he redeem it? In the fourth or the fifth [year]? It seems reasonable in the fifth, since in the fourth it costs him money. But the rabbis of Caesarea say, it is only reasonable in the fourth, since it is written: “And in the fourth year, all its fruit shall be holy for praise to the Eternal.”
Rebbi Joḥanan said, usage is between them; Rebbi Jehudah called a war of choice a war of obligation. “But in a war of duty everybody goes out, even a groom from his room and a bride from her bridal chamber.” Rav Ḥisda said, they disagree. The rabbis say, a war of obligation was the war of David. A war of duty was the war of Joshua. Rebbi Jehudah called it a war of obligation if we went out against them; a war of duty if they attacked us. It is written: “King Asa proclaimed in all of Jehudah, nobody is free”. What means “nobody is free”? Rebbi Simon and the rabbis. Rebbi Simon said, nobody is free to return home even for one hour. But the rabbis say, there is no exemption for a scholar, son of a scholar.
Rebbi Joḥanan said, usage is between them; Rebbi Jehudah called a war of choice a war of obligation. “But in a war of duty everybody goes out, even a groom from his room and a bride from her bridal chamber.” Rav Ḥisda said, they disagree. The rabbis say, a war of obligation was the war of David. A war of duty was the war of Joshua. Rebbi Jehudah called it a war of obligation if we went out against them; a war of duty if they attacked us. It is written: “King Asa proclaimed in all of Jehudah, nobody is free”. What means “nobody is free”? Rebbi Simon and the rabbis. Rebbi Simon said, nobody is free to return home even for one hour. But the rabbis say, there is no exemption for a scholar, son of a scholar.
Rebbi Joḥanan said, usage is between them; Rebbi Jehudah called a war of choice a war of obligation. “But in a war of duty everybody goes out, even a groom from his room and a bride from her bridal chamber.” Rav Ḥisda said, they disagree. The rabbis say, a war of obligation was the war of David. A war of duty was the war of Joshua. Rebbi Jehudah called it a war of obligation if we went out against them; a war of duty if they attacked us. It is written: “King Asa proclaimed in all of Jehudah, nobody is free”. What means “nobody is free”? Rebbi Simon and the rabbis. Rebbi Simon said, nobody is free to return home even for one hour. But the rabbis say, there is no exemption for a scholar, son of a scholar.
There, we have stated: The leaning of the hands of the Elders and the breaking of the neck of the calf is done by three [judges]; Rebbi Jehudah says, by five. What is the reason of Rebbi Simeon? “The Elders shall lean,” two. No court has an even number of members; one adds another one, that makes three. What is the reason of Rebbi Jehudah? “They shall lean,” two; “the Elders,” two. No court has an even number of members; one adds another one, that makes five. And for the calf whose neck is broken, what is the reason of Rebbi Simeon? “Your Elders, your judges,” two. No court has an even number of members; one adds another one, that makes three. What is the reason of Rebbi Jehudah? “Your Elders shall go out,” two, “and your judges,” two. No court has an even number of members; one adds, that makes five. Rebbi said, the words of Rebbi Simeon are reasonable for the leaning of the hands and those of Rebbi Jehudah for the breaking of the neck. The words of Rebbi Simeon are reasonable for the leaning of the hands, for he does not refer to “they shall lean”. And those of Rebbi Jehudah for the breaking of the neck, for he does not refer to “they shall go out.” If you would say that the words of Rebbi Jehudah are reasonable for the calf whose neck is broken because he refers to both to “they shall lean” and “they shall go out,” it turns out that you have to say “there shall go out” two, “your Elders” two, “and your judges,” two. No court has an even number of members; one adds another one, that makes seven. How do the rabbis explain “your Elders and your judges”? Your Elders who are your judges. It was stated: Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob says “your Elders,” that is the High Court; “and your judges” these are king and High Priest.
The argument of the rabbis seems inverted; there they say to exclude the hidden things, but here they say to include the hidden things. There, “your field,” in the open, to exclude that which is hidden; “your harvest,” in the open, to exclude that which is hidden. It is a restriction after a restriction to add the hidden things. But here, “on the land,” not floating on the water.
What is the reason of the rabbis? As it is written: “It shall be the town close to the slain.” What is the reason of Rebbi Eliezer? As it is written: “They shall measure to the towns which surround the slain.”
HALAKHAH: “One which never had been used for work,” intentionally, “which never had drawn under a yoke,” intentionally or unintentionally. Rebbi Jonah explains the Mishnah: “One which never had been used for work,” intentionally, “which never had drawn under a yoke,” intentionally or unintentionally, if it actually had drawn. Rebbi Yose explained the Mishnah: Intentionally even if it had not drawn, unintentionally if it actually had drawn. It turns out that Rebbi Jonah follows Rebbi Ismael and Rebbi Yose the rabbis. Rebbi Jonah follows Rebbi Ismael, since Rebbi Ismael says, anything which was in a set and left the set to teach leaves its set and stands in its new meaning. Therefore, he has to spell out “one which never had been used for work,” intentionally, “which never had drawn under a yoke,” intentionally or unintentionally, if it actually had drawn. Rebbi Yose follows the rabbis, since the rabbis say, anything which was in a set and left the set to teach remains in its set and in its new meaning. Therefore, he has to spell out: intentionally even if it had not drawn, unintentionally if it actually had drawn.
HALAKHAH: “One which never had been used for work,” intentionally, “which never had drawn under a yoke,” intentionally or unintentionally. Rebbi Jonah explains the Mishnah: “One which never had been used for work,” intentionally, “which never had drawn under a yoke,” intentionally or unintentionally, if it actually had drawn. Rebbi Yose explained the Mishnah: Intentionally even if it had not drawn, unintentionally if it actually had drawn. It turns out that Rebbi Jonah follows Rebbi Ismael and Rebbi Yose the rabbis. Rebbi Jonah follows Rebbi Ismael, since Rebbi Ismael says, anything which was in a set and left the set to teach leaves its set and stands in its new meaning. Therefore, he has to spell out “one which never had been used for work,” intentionally, “which never had drawn under a yoke,” intentionally or unintentionally, if it actually had drawn. Rebbi Yose follows the rabbis, since the rabbis say, anything which was in a set and left the set to teach remains in its set and in its new meaning. Therefore, he has to spell out: intentionally even if it had not drawn, unintentionally if it actually had drawn.
HALAKHAH: “One which never had been used for work,” intentionally, “which never had drawn under a yoke,” intentionally or unintentionally. Rebbi Jonah explains the Mishnah: “One which never had been used for work,” intentionally, “which never had drawn under a yoke,” intentionally or unintentionally, if it actually had drawn. Rebbi Yose explained the Mishnah: Intentionally even if it had not drawn, unintentionally if it actually had drawn. It turns out that Rebbi Jonah follows Rebbi Ismael and Rebbi Yose the rabbis. Rebbi Jonah follows Rebbi Ismael, since Rebbi Ismael says, anything which was in a set and left the set to teach leaves its set and stands in its new meaning. Therefore, he has to spell out “one which never had been used for work,” intentionally, “which never had drawn under a yoke,” intentionally or unintentionally, if it actually had drawn. Rebbi Yose follows the rabbis, since the rabbis say, anything which was in a set and left the set to teach remains in its set and in its new meaning. Therefore, he has to spell out: intentionally even if it had not drawn, unintentionally if it actually had drawn.
An old man asked the rabbis of Caesarea: Does the breaking of its neck clear its ṭerefa from its impurity? They said to him, is that not a Mishnah: “He who cuts the throat and it turns out to be ṭerefa.” He said to them, but I asked about breaking the neck and you answer me cutting the throat! They said to him, but did not Rebbi Yannai say, the words of Rebbi Meïr, even if it was ṭerefa he is guilty? He said to them, you answer me from that of Rebbi Yannai?
HALAKHAH: The rabbis here explain the verse about the murderer, the rabbis there explain the verse about the murder victim. The rabbis here explain the verse about the murderer, "he did not come to our attention and we sent him away," and did not execute him; "or that we did not see him and left him," and muddled his trial. But the rabbis there explain the verse about the murder victim, "he did not come to our attention and we sent him away," without company; "or that we did not see him and left him," without provisions.
HALAKHAH: The rabbis here explain the verse about the murderer, the rabbis there explain the verse about the murder victim. The rabbis here explain the verse about the murderer, "he did not come to our attention and we sent him away," and did not execute him; "or that we did not see him and left him," and muddled his trial. But the rabbis there explain the verse about the murder victim, "he did not come to our attention and we sent him away," without company; "or that we did not see him and left him," without provisions.
HALAKHAH: The rabbis here explain the verse about the murderer, the rabbis there explain the verse about the murder victim. The rabbis here explain the verse about the murderer, "he did not come to our attention and we sent him away," and did not execute him; "or that we did not see him and left him," and muddled his trial. But the rabbis there explain the verse about the murder victim, "he did not come to our attention and we sent him away," without company; "or that we did not see him and left him," without provisions.
HALAKHAH: The rabbis here explain the verse about the murderer, the rabbis there explain the verse about the murder victim. The rabbis here explain the verse about the murderer, "he did not come to our attention and we sent him away," and did not execute him; "or that we did not see him and left him," and muddled his trial. But the rabbis there explain the verse about the murder victim, "he did not come to our attention and we sent him away," without company; "or that we did not see him and left him," without provisions.
Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Ada said, even if “a woman’s ketubah” was stated with them, do not all these rabbis disagree? Rebbi Ḥananiah and Rebbi Jonathan both say, circulating coin. Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said, circulating coin. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa, Rebbi Immi, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish in the name of Rebbi Jehudah Neśia: Current coin. Rebbi Joḥanan said, good Severan tetradrachmas, Jerusalem ones. These are saying so, those are saying otherwise! But he also changed his mind and thought like them. Are not always these saying so, those are saying otherwise? Here, even he changed his mind and thought like them.
They objected to Rebbi Meïr: There is no hymen and you say, her ketubah is 200 [zuz]? He answered them, is that dependent on the hymen? But the adult has no hymen and her ketubah is 200! the virgin widow has a hymen and her ketubah is a mina! What is the reason? The adult still has all her grace; the virgin widow has lost her grace. Where do they disagree? If she was injured by wood. Rebbi Meïr says, she did not lose her grace, but the rabbis say, she lost her grace.
There, we have stated: “If she had bodily defects while still in her father’s house, the father has to bring proof.” Rebbi Eleazar asked Rebbi Joḥanan: Is this Mishnah from Rabban Gamliel and Rebbi Eliezer? Not from Rebbi Joshua? He said to him, those are everybody’s words. There is a difference because bodily defects have a way to appear. Rebbi Yose said, formerly we saw rabbis who compared bodily defects to [defects of] virginity. These can be inferred from those and those can be inferred from these. Bodily defects from claims of missing virginity: For if he slept with her in her father’s house, the father has to provide proof. Claims of missing virginity from bodily defects: For if she developed bodily defects and there is a doubt whether it happened after she entered his domain or before she entered his domain, the husband has to provide proof, from claims of missing virginity. But if she lost her virginity, was it not in her father’s house? Nevertheless, you say, the husband has to provide proof; so here also, the husband has to provide proof.
HALAKHAH: “She says, I was injured by wood,” etc. Rebbi Eleazar said, that follows Rebbi Meïr, since Rebbi Meïr said the ketubah of one injured by wood is 200 [zuz]. Rebbi Yose said, we would think to say, when did Rebbi Meïr disagree with those rabbis? If he took her in assuming she was injured by wood. But if he took her in assuming she was a virgin and it turned out she was injured by wood, then even Rebbi Meïr agrees, since we have stated: “She says, I was injured by wood, but he says not so, you were trampled on by a man.” That means, there is a disagreement even if he took her in assuming she was injured by wood and she turned out to have been injured by wood. Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira did not say so, but: She says, I was injured by wood and my ketubah is 200 [zuz]. He says, it is not so, but you were trampled on by a man and you have no claim on me. What are we talking about? If he married her as a virgin and she turns out to have been injured by wood, Rebbi Meïr will agree. If he married her as one injured by wood and she turns out to have been injured by wood, is there a recognizable difference in the opening of the door between wood or man? Rebbi Huna in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira did not say so, but: She says, I was injured by wood and so I stipulated with you, but he says, it is not so, but you were trampled on by a man and there was no stipulation between you and me.
Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joshia: Practice follows Rabban Gamliel and Rebbi Eliezer since two form a majority against one. Rebbi Yose asked: If it is practice, why two? And if two, why practice? Would that mean if Rebbi Joḥanan would hold with Rebbi Joshua that practice would not follow Rabban Gamliel and Rebbi Eliezer but Rebbi Joshua? What about it? It is a testimony for which a woman in empowered. They wanted to say, when does Rebbi Joshua disagree with these rabbis? At a place where most are disabling, but at a place where most are qualified, even Rebbi Joshua will agree. There came Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: There is disagreement even at a place where most are qualified. Does Rebbi Joshua think that immorality runs after the disabling? Rebbi Ze‘ira said, a baraita stated that even qualified people whore, as it was stated: Even the most pious man cannot be appointed guardian for illicit sex.
Rebbi Eleazar said to him: Is not the dough widow qualified but her daughter is disqualified? He said to him, whoever declares her to be qualified, declares her daughter to be qualified. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, did he not say “whoever declares her to be qualified”? This implies that there is another who disqualifies! Who declares qualified? Rebbi Meïr. Who disqualifies? The rabbis. As we have stated: What is qualified dough, anyone about whom there is [no suspicion of descent from] a desecrated, a bastard, or a Gibeonite. Rebbi Meïr says, the daughter of any woman not tainted with one of these is qualified for thepriesthood. But about a family in which a disability had disappeared, Rebbi Meïr says he checks up to four mothers and marries, but the Sages say, he checks forever.
“And everything found is judged by a majority.” In difficult cases the rabbis compare this to crawling things, as it was stated: “Nine frogs and one crawling thing in a private domain, if somebody touched one of them and it is not known which one he touched, in doubt he is impure. If he transferred to the public domain and touched, in doubt he is pure. If he returned to the private domain and touched, in doubt he is impure. And for what is found one follows the majority.” Rav Ḥisda said, no valiant person can find his hands. Rebbi Immi said, praise to Him Who chose them and their words; do not compare this to a private domain but to the public domain! As it was stated: “Nine crawling things and one frog between them in the public domain, if somebody touched one of them and it is not known which one he touched, in doubt he is pure. If he transferred to a private domain and touched, in doubt he is impure. If he returned to the public domain and touched, in doubt he is pure. And for what is found one follows the majority.” Rav Ḥisda said, no valiant person can find his hands. Rebbi Immi said, praise to Him Who chose them and their words; is the spring of Sepphoris not public domain? Rebbi Yose said, since the two could be alone together it is treated as private domain.
“In hinuma”. There, a veil. The rabbis here say, a phorema.
“He is not trustworthy” if he did not eat the years of legal claim from it. But if he ate the years of legal claim from it, he is trustworthy if [the second person’s] father did not die in possession. But if [the second person’s] father died in possession, he is [not] trustworthy. As the following: Reuben ate from a field claiming that it was his. Simeon brought witnesses that his father died in possession. One removes [the field] from Reuben and hands the title to Simeon. Reuben came back and brought witnesses that [Simeon’s] father did not die in possession. Rebbi Naḥman ben Jacob said, I took it from Reuben, I am returning it to Reuben. That is what the rabbis here think. The rabbis there say, from the time it was removed, by clear testimony it was removed. So the rabbis here say, from the time she married, by clear testimony she married. Rebbi Yose said, the rabbis there agree that if during the first proceedings two [witnesses] say that his father died in possession and two say, he did not die in possession, Reuben’s claim is upheld.
“He is not trustworthy” if he did not eat the years of legal claim from it. But if he ate the years of legal claim from it, he is trustworthy if [the second person’s] father did not die in possession. But if [the second person’s] father died in possession, he is [not] trustworthy. As the following: Reuben ate from a field claiming that it was his. Simeon brought witnesses that his father died in possession. One removes [the field] from Reuben and hands the title to Simeon. Reuben came back and brought witnesses that [Simeon’s] father did not die in possession. Rebbi Naḥman ben Jacob said, I took it from Reuben, I am returning it to Reuben. That is what the rabbis here think. The rabbis there say, from the time it was removed, by clear testimony it was removed. So the rabbis here say, from the time she married, by clear testimony she married. Rebbi Yose said, the rabbis there agree that if during the first proceedings two [witnesses] say that his father died in possession and two say, he did not die in possession, Reuben’s claim is upheld.
“He is not trustworthy” if he did not eat the years of legal claim from it. But if he ate the years of legal claim from it, he is trustworthy if [the second person’s] father did not die in possession. But if [the second person’s] father died in possession, he is [not] trustworthy. As the following: Reuben ate from a field claiming that it was his. Simeon brought witnesses that his father died in possession. One removes [the field] from Reuben and hands the title to Simeon. Reuben came back and brought witnesses that [Simeon’s] father did not die in possession. Rebbi Naḥman ben Jacob said, I took it from Reuben, I am returning it to Reuben. That is what the rabbis here think. The rabbis there say, from the time it was removed, by clear testimony it was removed. So the rabbis here say, from the time she married, by clear testimony she married. Rebbi Yose said, the rabbis there agree that if during the first proceedings two [witnesses] say that his father died in possession and two say, he did not die in possession, Reuben’s claim is upheld.
“He is not trustworthy” if he did not eat the years of legal claim from it. But if he ate the years of legal claim from it, he is trustworthy if [the second person’s] father did not die in possession. But if [the second person’s] father died in possession, he is [not] trustworthy. As the following: Reuben ate from a field claiming that it was his. Simeon brought witnesses that his father died in possession. One removes [the field] from Reuben and hands the title to Simeon. Reuben came back and brought witnesses that [Simeon’s] father did not die in possession. Rebbi Naḥman ben Jacob said, I took it from Reuben, I am returning it to Reuben. That is what the rabbis here think. The rabbis there say, from the time it was removed, by clear testimony it was removed. So the rabbis here say, from the time she married, by clear testimony she married. Rebbi Yose said, the rabbis there agree that if during the first proceedings two [witnesses] say that his father died in possession and two say, he did not die in possession, Reuben’s claim is upheld.
Rebbi Joḥanan said, it was stated thus: “Two [witnesses] say he died, [later] two witnesses say, he did not die. She shall not remarry, but if she has remarried she should not leave. Two [witnesses] say she was divorced, [later] two witnesses say, she was not divorced. She shall not remarry; if she has remarried she must leave.” There, they say, it makes no difference; whether about death or divorce she should not leave. In the opinion of the rabbis there it is understandable, there is no difference between death and divorce. In the opinion of the rabbis here, what is the difference between death and divorce? Rebbi Ze‘ira said it without attribution, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It is reasonable to decide in the case of witnesses of death that if he returns he contradicts them. Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, the rabbis there stick to their opinion since the rabbis there say, when the [first] testimony was accepted, it was accepted as certain. So the rabbis here say, at the moment of her remarriage, she remarried based on certified testimony. Rebbi Yose said, it is reasonable that the rabbis there did not change their argument. Do the rabbis there not agree if two [witnesses] say, his father died while in possession, [and two say his father died while not in possession,] that the field is in Reuben’s possession? Therefore, if two say, she was divorced and remarried, and two say she was not divorced, rightly she should not leave. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If two are saying, she was preliminarily married, and two are saying, she was not preliminarily married, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” Rebbi Hoshaia said, Rebbi Joḥanan may explain it as follows: “If two are saying, she was divorced, and two are saying, she was not divorced, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” What is the difference between this and the first case? There, she was considered a married woman in everybody’s opinion. Here, she is considered a married woman only for two people. If two others came and identified the man who was betrothed to her. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If two are saying, she was kidnapped but is pure, and two are saying, she was kidnapped and is impure, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” Rebbi Yose said, since these say, she is pure, and those say, she is impure, it is as if two said, she was kidnapped, and two said, she was not kidnapped, and we depend on what she says. If two are saying, she had been betrothed and two are saying she had not been betrothed. Rebbi Jonah compares that to fat. If two said, X ate fat, and two said, X did not eat fat, did he not have to bring a “hung” reparation sacrifice because of the doubt? Here, he should give a bill of divorce because of the doubt. Rebbi Yose said to him, do not compare this to fat, because even if he says my conscience bothers me, he brings a “hung” reparation sacrifice. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Yose: If two are saying she had been betrothed and two are saying she had not been betrothed, she should not get married. The end disagrees with Rebbi Jonah: If she married she must leave. Rebbi Mana said, Rebbi Yose did not say that she may marry, nor did Rebbi Jonah say if she married she must leave, he said only, do not compare this to fat, because even if he says my conscience bothers me, he brings a “hung” reparation sacrifice.
Rebbi Joḥanan said, it was stated thus: “Two [witnesses] say he died, [later] two witnesses say, he did not die. She shall not remarry, but if she has remarried she should not leave. Two [witnesses] say she was divorced, [later] two witnesses say, she was not divorced. She shall not remarry; if she has remarried she must leave.” There, they say, it makes no difference; whether about death or divorce she should not leave. In the opinion of the rabbis there it is understandable, there is no difference between death and divorce. In the opinion of the rabbis here, what is the difference between death and divorce? Rebbi Ze‘ira said it without attribution, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It is reasonable to decide in the case of witnesses of death that if he returns he contradicts them. Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, the rabbis there stick to their opinion since the rabbis there say, when the [first] testimony was accepted, it was accepted as certain. So the rabbis here say, at the moment of her remarriage, she remarried based on certified testimony. Rebbi Yose said, it is reasonable that the rabbis there did not change their argument. Do the rabbis there not agree if two [witnesses] say, his father died while in possession, [and two say his father died while not in possession,] that the field is in Reuben’s possession? Therefore, if two say, she was divorced and remarried, and two say she was not divorced, rightly she should not leave. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If two are saying, she was preliminarily married, and two are saying, she was not preliminarily married, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” Rebbi Hoshaia said, Rebbi Joḥanan may explain it as follows: “If two are saying, she was divorced, and two are saying, she was not divorced, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” What is the difference between this and the first case? There, she was considered a married woman in everybody’s opinion. Here, she is considered a married woman only for two people. If two others came and identified the man who was betrothed to her. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If two are saying, she was kidnapped but is pure, and two are saying, she was kidnapped and is impure, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” Rebbi Yose said, since these say, she is pure, and those say, she is impure, it is as if two said, she was kidnapped, and two said, she was not kidnapped, and we depend on what she says. If two are saying, she had been betrothed and two are saying she had not been betrothed. Rebbi Jonah compares that to fat. If two said, X ate fat, and two said, X did not eat fat, did he not have to bring a “hung” reparation sacrifice because of the doubt? Here, he should give a bill of divorce because of the doubt. Rebbi Yose said to him, do not compare this to fat, because even if he says my conscience bothers me, he brings a “hung” reparation sacrifice. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Yose: If two are saying she had been betrothed and two are saying she had not been betrothed, she should not get married. The end disagrees with Rebbi Jonah: If she married she must leave. Rebbi Mana said, Rebbi Yose did not say that she may marry, nor did Rebbi Jonah say if she married she must leave, he said only, do not compare this to fat, because even if he says my conscience bothers me, he brings a “hung” reparation sacrifice.
Rebbi Joḥanan said, it was stated thus: “Two [witnesses] say he died, [later] two witnesses say, he did not die. She shall not remarry, but if she has remarried she should not leave. Two [witnesses] say she was divorced, [later] two witnesses say, she was not divorced. She shall not remarry; if she has remarried she must leave.” There, they say, it makes no difference; whether about death or divorce she should not leave. In the opinion of the rabbis there it is understandable, there is no difference between death and divorce. In the opinion of the rabbis here, what is the difference between death and divorce? Rebbi Ze‘ira said it without attribution, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It is reasonable to decide in the case of witnesses of death that if he returns he contradicts them. Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, the rabbis there stick to their opinion since the rabbis there say, when the [first] testimony was accepted, it was accepted as certain. So the rabbis here say, at the moment of her remarriage, she remarried based on certified testimony. Rebbi Yose said, it is reasonable that the rabbis there did not change their argument. Do the rabbis there not agree if two [witnesses] say, his father died while in possession, [and two say his father died while not in possession,] that the field is in Reuben’s possession? Therefore, if two say, she was divorced and remarried, and two say she was not divorced, rightly she should not leave. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If two are saying, she was preliminarily married, and two are saying, she was not preliminarily married, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” Rebbi Hoshaia said, Rebbi Joḥanan may explain it as follows: “If two are saying, she was divorced, and two are saying, she was not divorced, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” What is the difference between this and the first case? There, she was considered a married woman in everybody’s opinion. Here, she is considered a married woman only for two people. If two others came and identified the man who was betrothed to her. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If two are saying, she was kidnapped but is pure, and two are saying, she was kidnapped and is impure, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” Rebbi Yose said, since these say, she is pure, and those say, she is impure, it is as if two said, she was kidnapped, and two said, she was not kidnapped, and we depend on what she says. If two are saying, she had been betrothed and two are saying she had not been betrothed. Rebbi Jonah compares that to fat. If two said, X ate fat, and two said, X did not eat fat, did he not have to bring a “hung” reparation sacrifice because of the doubt? Here, he should give a bill of divorce because of the doubt. Rebbi Yose said to him, do not compare this to fat, because even if he says my conscience bothers me, he brings a “hung” reparation sacrifice. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Yose: If two are saying she had been betrothed and two are saying she had not been betrothed, she should not get married. The end disagrees with Rebbi Jonah: If she married she must leave. Rebbi Mana said, Rebbi Yose did not say that she may marry, nor did Rebbi Jonah say if she married she must leave, he said only, do not compare this to fat, because even if he says my conscience bothers me, he brings a “hung” reparation sacrifice.
Rebbi Joḥanan said, it was stated thus: “Two [witnesses] say he died, [later] two witnesses say, he did not die. She shall not remarry, but if she has remarried she should not leave. Two [witnesses] say she was divorced, [later] two witnesses say, she was not divorced. She shall not remarry; if she has remarried she must leave.” There, they say, it makes no difference; whether about death or divorce she should not leave. In the opinion of the rabbis there it is understandable, there is no difference between death and divorce. In the opinion of the rabbis here, what is the difference between death and divorce? Rebbi Ze‘ira said it without attribution, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It is reasonable to decide in the case of witnesses of death that if he returns he contradicts them. Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, the rabbis there stick to their opinion since the rabbis there say, when the [first] testimony was accepted, it was accepted as certain. So the rabbis here say, at the moment of her remarriage, she remarried based on certified testimony. Rebbi Yose said, it is reasonable that the rabbis there did not change their argument. Do the rabbis there not agree if two [witnesses] say, his father died while in possession, [and two say his father died while not in possession,] that the field is in Reuben’s possession? Therefore, if two say, she was divorced and remarried, and two say she was not divorced, rightly she should not leave. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If two are saying, she was preliminarily married, and two are saying, she was not preliminarily married, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” Rebbi Hoshaia said, Rebbi Joḥanan may explain it as follows: “If two are saying, she was divorced, and two are saying, she was not divorced, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” What is the difference between this and the first case? There, she was considered a married woman in everybody’s opinion. Here, she is considered a married woman only for two people. If two others came and identified the man who was betrothed to her. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If two are saying, she was kidnapped but is pure, and two are saying, she was kidnapped and is impure, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” Rebbi Yose said, since these say, she is pure, and those say, she is impure, it is as if two said, she was kidnapped, and two said, she was not kidnapped, and we depend on what she says. If two are saying, she had been betrothed and two are saying she had not been betrothed. Rebbi Jonah compares that to fat. If two said, X ate fat, and two said, X did not eat fat, did he not have to bring a “hung” reparation sacrifice because of the doubt? Here, he should give a bill of divorce because of the doubt. Rebbi Yose said to him, do not compare this to fat, because even if he says my conscience bothers me, he brings a “hung” reparation sacrifice. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Yose: If two are saying she had been betrothed and two are saying she had not been betrothed, she should not get married. The end disagrees with Rebbi Jonah: If she married she must leave. Rebbi Mana said, Rebbi Yose did not say that she may marry, nor did Rebbi Jonah say if she married she must leave, he said only, do not compare this to fat, because even if he says my conscience bothers me, he brings a “hung” reparation sacrifice.
Rebbi Joḥanan said, it was stated thus: “Two [witnesses] say he died, [later] two witnesses say, he did not die. She shall not remarry, but if she has remarried she should not leave. Two [witnesses] say she was divorced, [later] two witnesses say, she was not divorced. She shall not remarry; if she has remarried she must leave.” There, they say, it makes no difference; whether about death or divorce she should not leave. In the opinion of the rabbis there it is understandable, there is no difference between death and divorce. In the opinion of the rabbis here, what is the difference between death and divorce? Rebbi Ze‘ira said it without attribution, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It is reasonable to decide in the case of witnesses of death that if he returns he contradicts them. Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, the rabbis there stick to their opinion since the rabbis there say, when the [first] testimony was accepted, it was accepted as certain. So the rabbis here say, at the moment of her remarriage, she remarried based on certified testimony. Rebbi Yose said, it is reasonable that the rabbis there did not change their argument. Do the rabbis there not agree if two [witnesses] say, his father died while in possession, [and two say his father died while not in possession,] that the field is in Reuben’s possession? Therefore, if two say, she was divorced and remarried, and two say she was not divorced, rightly she should not leave. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If two are saying, she was preliminarily married, and two are saying, she was not preliminarily married, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” Rebbi Hoshaia said, Rebbi Joḥanan may explain it as follows: “If two are saying, she was divorced, and two are saying, she was not divorced, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” What is the difference between this and the first case? There, she was considered a married woman in everybody’s opinion. Here, she is considered a married woman only for two people. If two others came and identified the man who was betrothed to her. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If two are saying, she was kidnapped but is pure, and two are saying, she was kidnapped and is impure, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” Rebbi Yose said, since these say, she is pure, and those say, she is impure, it is as if two said, she was kidnapped, and two said, she was not kidnapped, and we depend on what she says. If two are saying, she had been betrothed and two are saying she had not been betrothed. Rebbi Jonah compares that to fat. If two said, X ate fat, and two said, X did not eat fat, did he not have to bring a “hung” reparation sacrifice because of the doubt? Here, he should give a bill of divorce because of the doubt. Rebbi Yose said to him, do not compare this to fat, because even if he says my conscience bothers me, he brings a “hung” reparation sacrifice. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Yose: If two are saying she had been betrothed and two are saying she had not been betrothed, she should not get married. The end disagrees with Rebbi Jonah: If she married she must leave. Rebbi Mana said, Rebbi Yose did not say that she may marry, nor did Rebbi Jonah say if she married she must leave, he said only, do not compare this to fat, because even if he says my conscience bothers me, he brings a “hung” reparation sacrifice.
Rebbi Joḥanan said, it was stated thus: “Two [witnesses] say he died, [later] two witnesses say, he did not die. She shall not remarry, but if she has remarried she should not leave. Two [witnesses] say she was divorced, [later] two witnesses say, she was not divorced. She shall not remarry; if she has remarried she must leave.” There, they say, it makes no difference; whether about death or divorce she should not leave. In the opinion of the rabbis there it is understandable, there is no difference between death and divorce. In the opinion of the rabbis here, what is the difference between death and divorce? Rebbi Ze‘ira said it without attribution, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It is reasonable to decide in the case of witnesses of death that if he returns he contradicts them. Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, the rabbis there stick to their opinion since the rabbis there say, when the [first] testimony was accepted, it was accepted as certain. So the rabbis here say, at the moment of her remarriage, she remarried based on certified testimony. Rebbi Yose said, it is reasonable that the rabbis there did not change their argument. Do the rabbis there not agree if two [witnesses] say, his father died while in possession, [and two say his father died while not in possession,] that the field is in Reuben’s possession? Therefore, if two say, she was divorced and remarried, and two say she was not divorced, rightly she should not leave. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If two are saying, she was preliminarily married, and two are saying, she was not preliminarily married, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” Rebbi Hoshaia said, Rebbi Joḥanan may explain it as follows: “If two are saying, she was divorced, and two are saying, she was not divorced, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” What is the difference between this and the first case? There, she was considered a married woman in everybody’s opinion. Here, she is considered a married woman only for two people. If two others came and identified the man who was betrothed to her. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If two are saying, she was kidnapped but is pure, and two are saying, she was kidnapped and is impure, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” Rebbi Yose said, since these say, she is pure, and those say, she is impure, it is as if two said, she was kidnapped, and two said, she was not kidnapped, and we depend on what she says. If two are saying, she had been betrothed and two are saying she had not been betrothed. Rebbi Jonah compares that to fat. If two said, X ate fat, and two said, X did not eat fat, did he not have to bring a “hung” reparation sacrifice because of the doubt? Here, he should give a bill of divorce because of the doubt. Rebbi Yose said to him, do not compare this to fat, because even if he says my conscience bothers me, he brings a “hung” reparation sacrifice. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Yose: If two are saying she had been betrothed and two are saying she had not been betrothed, she should not get married. The end disagrees with Rebbi Jonah: If she married she must leave. Rebbi Mana said, Rebbi Yose did not say that she may marry, nor did Rebbi Jonah say if she married she must leave, he said only, do not compare this to fat, because even if he says my conscience bothers me, he brings a “hung” reparation sacrifice.
Rebbi Joḥanan said, it was stated thus: “Two [witnesses] say he died, [later] two witnesses say, he did not die. She shall not remarry, but if she has remarried she should not leave. Two [witnesses] say she was divorced, [later] two witnesses say, she was not divorced. She shall not remarry; if she has remarried she must leave.” There, they say, it makes no difference; whether about death or divorce she should not leave. In the opinion of the rabbis there it is understandable, there is no difference between death and divorce. In the opinion of the rabbis here, what is the difference between death and divorce? Rebbi Ze‘ira said it without attribution, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It is reasonable to decide in the case of witnesses of death that if he returns he contradicts them. Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, the rabbis there stick to their opinion since the rabbis there say, when the [first] testimony was accepted, it was accepted as certain. So the rabbis here say, at the moment of her remarriage, she remarried based on certified testimony. Rebbi Yose said, it is reasonable that the rabbis there did not change their argument. Do the rabbis there not agree if two [witnesses] say, his father died while in possession, [and two say his father died while not in possession,] that the field is in Reuben’s possession? Therefore, if two say, she was divorced and remarried, and two say she was not divorced, rightly she should not leave. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If two are saying, she was preliminarily married, and two are saying, she was not preliminarily married, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” Rebbi Hoshaia said, Rebbi Joḥanan may explain it as follows: “If two are saying, she was divorced, and two are saying, she was not divorced, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” What is the difference between this and the first case? There, she was considered a married woman in everybody’s opinion. Here, she is considered a married woman only for two people. If two others came and identified the man who was betrothed to her. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If two are saying, she was kidnapped but is pure, and two are saying, she was kidnapped and is impure, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” Rebbi Yose said, since these say, she is pure, and those say, she is impure, it is as if two said, she was kidnapped, and two said, she was not kidnapped, and we depend on what she says. If two are saying, she had been betrothed and two are saying she had not been betrothed. Rebbi Jonah compares that to fat. If two said, X ate fat, and two said, X did not eat fat, did he not have to bring a “hung” reparation sacrifice because of the doubt? Here, he should give a bill of divorce because of the doubt. Rebbi Yose said to him, do not compare this to fat, because even if he says my conscience bothers me, he brings a “hung” reparation sacrifice. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Yose: If two are saying she had been betrothed and two are saying she had not been betrothed, she should not get married. The end disagrees with Rebbi Jonah: If she married she must leave. Rebbi Mana said, Rebbi Yose did not say that she may marry, nor did Rebbi Jonah say if she married she must leave, he said only, do not compare this to fat, because even if he says my conscience bothers me, he brings a “hung” reparation sacrifice.
HALAKHAH: “Rebbi Jehudah says, one does not elevate,” etc. Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: A complaint needs at least two [plaintiffs]. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya asked, how do we hold? If they elevated him on the testimony of one person, they should demote him on the testimony of one person. If they elevated him on the testimony of two persons, even if there are many [opposed] they should not demote him! Rebbi Ḥuna said, it follows the rabbis there. But following the rabbis here and Rav Naḥman bar Jacob, just as one elevates him on the testimony of two persons, one demotes him on the testimony of two persons.
HALAKHAH: “Rebbi Jehudah says, one does not elevate,” etc. Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: A complaint needs at least two [plaintiffs]. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya asked, how do we hold? If they elevated him on the testimony of one person, they should demote him on the testimony of one person. If they elevated him on the testimony of two persons, even if there are many [opposed] they should not demote him! Rebbi Ḥuna said, it follows the rabbis there. But following the rabbis here and Rav Naḥman bar Jacob, just as one elevates him on the testimony of two persons, one demotes him on the testimony of two persons.
Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, even if he was not cautioned should he not pay since when cautioned he would be flogged? A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: “If somebody eats heave in error, he pays principal and fifth,” but if he was cautioned, will he not be flogged? He explains it following Rebbi Meïr since Rebbi Meïr said, he is flogged and pays. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, as we have stated: “The following adolescent girls can claim a fine,” but if he was cautioned, will he not be flogged? He explains it following Rebbi Meïr since Rebbi Meïr said, he is flogged and pays. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Rebbi Meïr learned from the calumniator. (Deut. 22:18) “They shall punish him,” flogging; (Deut. 22:19) “and they shall fine him”, money. But the rabbis say, [the law of] the calumniator is separate because of its novelty; one cannot learn from a novelty! Because nowhere else will a person become guilty by speech, but here he becomes guilty by speech; therefore, nothing can be inferred. Another explanation: one cannot transfer the rules of either payment or flogging. Did not Rebbi Abbahu say in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If he [eats] fat in error but is intentional about the sacrifice, if he was cautioned he will be flogged and has to bring a sacrifice? So here, he is flogged and he pays. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Samuel bar Rav Isaac said, (Deut. 25:2) “Because of his guilt.” If two possibilities are given to the court, one chooses one of them. This excludes matters in the power of Heaven.
Rebbi Immi the Babylonian in the name of the rabbis from there: The reason of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish is “criminal, criminal.” “Criminal” is mentioned in capital cases, “criminal” is mentioned in cases of flogging. Just as for the criminal in capital cases there is no monetary fine, so for the criminal mentioned in flogging cases there is no monetary fine.
Nathan bar Hoshiah said, one speaks about an adolescent girl, the other about an adult woman. The adolescent has a fine but nobody is flogged for her; for the adult he is flogged but pays no fine, she cannot be sold; she has no claim for shame and blemish. The rabbis of Caesarea said, explain it that she seduced him or remitted [the fine] for him. Nathan bar Hoshaiah thinks that in a case of flogging and payment he pays but is not flogged. Why should he not be flogged and have to pay? (Deut. 25:2) “Because of his guilt.” You sentence him for one offence but you may not sentence him for two offences. From perjured witnesses. Just as you say there, perjured witnesses pay but are not flogged, here also he pays and is not flogged. Rebbi Jonah said, the reason of Rebbi Nathan bar Hoshaiah: (Deut. 25:2): “For his evil deed.” It refers to one whose flogging frees him from his guilt, excluding one who is told: get up and pay.
Rebbi Judah bar Pazi asked: What say these Tannaïm about whipping and extirpation? Rebbi Yose said, that is a problem for the rabbis. Rebbi Jonah said, why can we not understand it from what Rebbi Simeon ben Ioḥai stated? As Rebbi Simeon ben Ioḥai stated: “Rebbi Ṭarphon says, extirpation was mentioned for the Sabbath and the Day of Atonement. Since for extirpation mentioned for the Sabbath there is no payment in a case involving the death penalty, so for extirpation mentioned for the Day of Atonement there is no payment in a case involving extirpation.” Rebbi Mana said before Rebbi Yose: When do we need this? Not for Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? But for Rebbi Joḥanan, if he admits flogging in death penalty cases, certainly flogging in extirpation cases, since they disagreed: If somebody slaughters [an animal] and its young for idolatrous purposes. Rebbi Joḥanan says, if he was cautioned about an animal and its young, he is flogged, about idolatry, he is stoned to death. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, even if he was cautioned about an animal and its young, he is not flogged since he would be stoned to death had he been cautioned about idolatry. He said to him, we need it even for Rebbi Joḥanan! Here are two cases, there it is one case.
According to Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, what is between these Tannaïm and those rabbis? Prohibitions without extirpation. Rebbi Judan said, he who sleeps with a bastard girl is between them. Rebbi Ḥananiah said, he who puts fire to the grain stack of his neighbor on a holiday is between them. These Tannaïm think, since there is no extirpation, he pays. Those rabbis think, since there is flogging he does not pay. But then “these are the adolescent girls who can claim a fine” cannot follow the rabbis! Rebbi Mattaniah said, explain it according to everybody if it refers to a bastard male who sleeps with a bastard girl.
According to Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, what is between these Tannaïm and those rabbis? Prohibitions without extirpation. Rebbi Judan said, he who sleeps with a bastard girl is between them. Rebbi Ḥananiah said, he who puts fire to the grain stack of his neighbor on a holiday is between them. These Tannaïm think, since there is no extirpation, he pays. Those rabbis think, since there is flogging he does not pay. But then “these are the adolescent girls who can claim a fine” cannot follow the rabbis! Rebbi Mattaniah said, explain it according to everybody if it refers to a bastard male who sleeps with a bastard girl.
According to Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, what is between these Tannaïm and those rabbis? Prohibitions without extirpation. Rebbi Judan said, he who sleeps with a bastard girl is between them. Rebbi Ḥananiah said, he who puts fire to the grain stack of his neighbor on a holiday is between them. These Tannaïm think, since there is no extirpation, he pays. Those rabbis think, since there is flogging he does not pay. But then “these are the adolescent girls who can claim a fine” cannot follow the rabbis! Rebbi Mattaniah said, explain it according to everybody if it refers to a bastard male who sleeps with a bastard girl.
Rebbi Eleazar asked: Do the daughters of the rape victim have the rights given by the ketubah stipulations? It is clear to me that the rape victim has no [ketubah] of the male children, and that the seduced victim has no [ketubah] of the male children. If you say that he questions in both cases, we could ask, do the daughters of the rape victim and the daughters of the seduced girl have the rights given by the ketubah stipulations? That is a problem following the rabbis, but it is obvious following Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah; as it was stated: Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah says, the rapist gives a mina as ketubah.
HALAKHAH: “Anytime there is a sale,” etc. Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: This is Rebbi Meïr’s. But for the rabbis there can be sale and fine together. Following Rebbi Meïr: From one day old until the age of 3 years and one day there is sale but no fine. From the age of 3 years and one day until she becomes an adult there is a fine but no sale. The adult, neither sale nor fine. Following the rabbis: From one day old until the age of 3 years and one day there is sale and fine together. From the age of 3 years and one day until she grows two pubic hairs there is sale but no fine. After she grows two pubic hairs until she becomes an adult there is a fine but no sale. The adult, neither sale nor fine.
HALAKHAH: “Anytime there is a sale,” etc. Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: This is Rebbi Meïr’s. But for the rabbis there can be sale and fine together. Following Rebbi Meïr: From one day old until the age of 3 years and one day there is sale but no fine. From the age of 3 years and one day until she becomes an adult there is a fine but no sale. The adult, neither sale nor fine. Following the rabbis: From one day old until the age of 3 years and one day there is sale and fine together. From the age of 3 years and one day until she grows two pubic hairs there is sale but no fine. After she grows two pubic hairs until she becomes an adult there is a fine but no sale. The adult, neither sale nor fine.
There, we have stated: “He who comes to a preliminarily married adolescent is guilty only if she was an adolescent, virgin, preliminarily married, in her father’s house. If two came upon her, the first is stoned and the second strangled.” Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: That is Rebbi Meïr’s. But following the rabbis even if she is a minor. What is Rebbi Meïr’s reason? “A lad” is written in the paragraph. How do the rabbis explain “a lad”? Rebbi Abbahu said in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Once in the paragraph it is written “a young woman”; this teaches that in the entire paragraph she is an adult. Rebbi Meïr objected to the rabbis: In the matter of the calumniator, “a lad” is written and she is an adult since a minor is not stoned! What do the rabbis with this? Rebbi Abin said, explain it if he came to her as to a male.
There, we have stated: “He who comes to a preliminarily married adolescent is guilty only if she was an adolescent, virgin, preliminarily married, in her father’s house. If two came upon her, the first is stoned and the second strangled.” Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: That is Rebbi Meïr’s. But following the rabbis even if she is a minor. What is Rebbi Meïr’s reason? “A lad” is written in the paragraph. How do the rabbis explain “a lad”? Rebbi Abbahu said in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Once in the paragraph it is written “a young woman”; this teaches that in the entire paragraph she is an adult. Rebbi Meïr objected to the rabbis: In the matter of the calumniator, “a lad” is written and she is an adult since a minor is not stoned! What do the rabbis with this? Rebbi Abin said, explain it if he came to her as to a male.
There, we have stated: “He who comes to a preliminarily married adolescent is guilty only if she was an adolescent, virgin, preliminarily married, in her father’s house. If two came upon her, the first is stoned and the second strangled.” Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: That is Rebbi Meïr’s. But following the rabbis even if she is a minor. What is Rebbi Meïr’s reason? “A lad” is written in the paragraph. How do the rabbis explain “a lad”? Rebbi Abbahu said in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Once in the paragraph it is written “a young woman”; this teaches that in the entire paragraph she is an adult. Rebbi Meïr objected to the rabbis: In the matter of the calumniator, “a lad” is written and she is an adult since a minor is not stoned! What do the rabbis with this? Rebbi Abin said, explain it if he came to her as to a male.
There, we have stated: “He who comes to a preliminarily married adolescent is guilty only if she was an adolescent, virgin, preliminarily married, in her father’s house. If two came upon her, the first is stoned and the second strangled.” Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: That is Rebbi Meïr’s. But following the rabbis even if she is a minor. What is Rebbi Meïr’s reason? “A lad” is written in the paragraph. How do the rabbis explain “a lad”? Rebbi Abbahu said in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Once in the paragraph it is written “a young woman”; this teaches that in the entire paragraph she is an adult. Rebbi Meïr objected to the rabbis: In the matter of the calumniator, “a lad” is written and she is an adult since a minor is not stoned! What do the rabbis with this? Rebbi Abin said, explain it if he came to her as to a male.
HALAKHAH: “A seduced adolescent girl,” etc. Who stated “adolescent”? Rebbi Meïr. But following the rabbis, even an underage girl.
HALAKHAH: “If she did appear in court before she became an adult,” etc. Rebbi Simeon ben Ioḥai stated: “The man who had lain with her shall give 50 silver pieces to the girl’s father;” this teaches that the father acquires only by handing over. Rebbi Simeon says, the matter depends on the collection, but the rabbis say, the matter depends on the court procedure. Rebbi Simeon treats it as court decrees but the rabbis treat it as a loan. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon, he forecloses from the best land; in the opinion of the rabbis he forecloses from average land. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon, the Sabbatical year does not cancel the debt; in the opinion of the rabbis the Sabbatical year cancels the debt. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon the firstborn takes a double portion; in the opinion of the rabbis the firstborn does not take a double portion.
HALAKHAH: “If she did appear in court before she became an adult,” etc. Rebbi Simeon ben Ioḥai stated: “The man who had lain with her shall give 50 silver pieces to the girl’s father;” this teaches that the father acquires only by handing over. Rebbi Simeon says, the matter depends on the collection, but the rabbis say, the matter depends on the court procedure. Rebbi Simeon treats it as court decrees but the rabbis treat it as a loan. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon, he forecloses from the best land; in the opinion of the rabbis he forecloses from average land. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon, the Sabbatical year does not cancel the debt; in the opinion of the rabbis the Sabbatical year cancels the debt. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon the firstborn takes a double portion; in the opinion of the rabbis the firstborn does not take a double portion.
HALAKHAH: “If she did appear in court before she became an adult,” etc. Rebbi Simeon ben Ioḥai stated: “The man who had lain with her shall give 50 silver pieces to the girl’s father;” this teaches that the father acquires only by handing over. Rebbi Simeon says, the matter depends on the collection, but the rabbis say, the matter depends on the court procedure. Rebbi Simeon treats it as court decrees but the rabbis treat it as a loan. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon, he forecloses from the best land; in the opinion of the rabbis he forecloses from average land. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon, the Sabbatical year does not cancel the debt; in the opinion of the rabbis the Sabbatical year cancels the debt. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon the firstborn takes a double portion; in the opinion of the rabbis the firstborn does not take a double portion.
HALAKHAH: “If she did appear in court before she became an adult,” etc. Rebbi Simeon ben Ioḥai stated: “The man who had lain with her shall give 50 silver pieces to the girl’s father;” this teaches that the father acquires only by handing over. Rebbi Simeon says, the matter depends on the collection, but the rabbis say, the matter depends on the court procedure. Rebbi Simeon treats it as court decrees but the rabbis treat it as a loan. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon, he forecloses from the best land; in the opinion of the rabbis he forecloses from average land. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon, the Sabbatical year does not cancel the debt; in the opinion of the rabbis the Sabbatical year cancels the debt. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon the firstborn takes a double portion; in the opinion of the rabbis the firstborn does not take a double portion.
HALAKHAH: “If she did appear in court before she became an adult,” etc. Rebbi Simeon ben Ioḥai stated: “The man who had lain with her shall give 50 silver pieces to the girl’s father;” this teaches that the father acquires only by handing over. Rebbi Simeon says, the matter depends on the collection, but the rabbis say, the matter depends on the court procedure. Rebbi Simeon treats it as court decrees but the rabbis treat it as a loan. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon, he forecloses from the best land; in the opinion of the rabbis he forecloses from average land. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon, the Sabbatical year does not cancel the debt; in the opinion of the rabbis the Sabbatical year cancels the debt. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon the firstborn takes a double portion; in the opinion of the rabbis the firstborn does not take a double portion.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody gives his daughter in preliminary marriage,” etc. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya said, the reason of Rebbi Jehudah is to encourage a man to give an ample dowry to his daughter. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Isaac: Rebbi (Meïr) learned from the calumniator. Did not Rebbi Ḥiyya state: If she whored while in her father’s house and he calumniated her after she became an adult, he is not flogged nor does he pay 100 tetradrachmas but either she or the false witnesses are executed by stoning? Rebbi Mana asked before Rebbi Yose: Think of it, if he calumniated her when she was an adolescent and now she is an adult? He said to him, we heard that he pays to her father. Rebbi Jeremiah said before Rebbi Ze‘ira: I am wondering how could the rabbis compare a ketubah to a fine when they are not comparable! For the ketubah is an obligation from the first hour but the fine is only at the end; and you say so? He said to him, who says that to you? Even the [obligation of the] fine is from the first moment. It turns out that Rebbi Mana is like Rebbi Jeremiah and (like Rebbi Yose ben Ze‘ira).
Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: If the father brought witnesses to prove the perjury of the husband’s witnesses; but the father’s witnesses were proven perjurers, is he flogged and pays 100 tetradrachmas by the judgment of three and the witnesses are stoned by the judgment of 23? He said to him, if the father’s witnesses are not proven perjurers, is not the husband flogged and pays 100 tetradrachmas by the judgment of three and the witnesses are stoned by the judgment of 23? Rebbi Ze‘ira is of the opinion that there are two different proceedings. Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of Rebbi Abbahu: There is only one proceeding. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Abbahu: “To the town’s Elders”, that is a court of three members; “to the gate”, that is a court of 23. He explains it following Rebbi Meïr, since Rebbi Meïr says that he is flogged and pays. There, we have stated: “The seducer, the rapist, and the calumniator [are judged] by three [judges], the words of Rebbi Meïr; but the Sages say, the calumniator by 23 since it is a potential capital case.” Rebbi Mana said, they disagree about the preliminarily married adolescent. Rebbi Meïr says, she loses her ketubah in a court of three and is stoned by a court of 23; but the Sages say, at the same place which sentences her to be stoned she loses her ketubah. But in the case of the calumniator, everybody agrees that by the court in which the witnesses are stoned, the husband is flogged and pays 100 tetradrachmas. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said to him, would they differ where it was not stated? But they differ about the calumniator! Rebbi Meïr says, he is flogged and pays 100 tetradrachmas by the judgment of three and the witnesses are stoned by the judgment of 23; but the rabbis say, by the court in which the witnesses are stoned, the husband is flogged and pays 100 tetradrachmas. But by the case of the preliminarily married adolescent, everybody agrees that at the same place which sentences her to be stoned she loses her ketubah. [It turns out that Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun follows Rebbi Ze‘ira and Rebbi Mana [follows] Rebbi Abbahu].
There, we have stated: “Rebbi Joḥanan ben Beroqa says, if he speaks about somebody who is a legal heir, his statements are valid, but about somebody who is not a legal heir, his statements are invalid.” Rebbi Joḥanan said, Ben Beroqa spoke only about a son among sons or a (daughter) son among daughters, not about a daughter and brother or a brother among daughters. Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: There was a case and Rebbi decided following Rebbi Joḥanan ben Beroqa. Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Rebbi asked Nathan the Babylonian, why did they say that practice follows Rebbi Joḥanan ben Beroqa? Rebbi Abba, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: What is the reason? He asked Nathan the Babylonian, why did the Sages say that practice follows Rebbi Joḥanan ben Beroqa? Are you not the one who stated “shall inherit”? (He said to him, you stated “shall take”; he came to him). He said to him, there is no “shall inherit” but “shall take”. When he came to his father, he said to him: you disadvantaged Nathan the Bablylonian; there is no “shall take” but “shall inherit”. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, this is what he told him: I made an error in what I taught you; there is no “shall take” but “shall inherit”. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, this is one of the leniencies of the ketubah stipulations. In general, a person can transfer rights only by a document; here even verbally. In general, a person cannot transfer rights to somebody not yet existing; here to the non-existing. Rebbi Jeremiah said before Rebbi Ze‘ira: I am wondering how the rabbis can compare ketubah to inheritance, for inheritance is a biblical law but ketubah is from their words; how can one argue this? Even if you say that ketubah is a biblical law, do they not agree that the stipulations of the ketubah are from their words?
Rebbi Abba bar Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: “How much are you giving to your son? Such and such. How much are you giving to your daughter? Such and such. When he preliminarily married her, the daughter acquired among the daughters and the son among the sons,” but only if it is a first marriage. This follows what Rebbi Ḥanania said: If somebody definitively married off his son in a house, the latter acquired the house, but only if it is a first marriage. Rebbi Hoshaia said, she acquired movables but did not acquire the house. Do they disagree? Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of Rebbi Abbahu: Explain it that his father used it for storage. Rebbi Ḥizqiah in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: It is needed in case what was stored was borrowed from the market. Rebbi Abbahu said, if he said it is loaned, he did not acquire it. There came a case before Rebbi Jacob ben Rebbi Abun and he instructed following Rebbi Abbahu. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, essentialy this has no basis but the rabbis build and add to it!
Rebbi Jeremiah asked: If somebody dedicated his slave’s earnings and the latter was a hunter, what are the rules? Let us hear from the following: If somebody dedicates his slave, that one is dedicated but his earnings are profane. His [slave’s] earnings, he is profane and his earnings are dedicated. Rebbi Joḥanan said, if somebody cuts off the hands of another person’s slave, that one’s owner collects the payments for his injuries, his pain, his shame, and impairment but he shall go out and subsist on alms. Did we not state: If somebody dedicates his slave, that one takes out his provisions but the remainder is dedicated. Rebbi Abba bar Mamal said, nobody thinks that he should die. [ ] more than for slaves. Did not Rebbi Joḥanan say, if somebody cuts off the hands of another person’s slave, that one’s owner collects the payments for his damages, his pain, his shame, and impairment but he shall go out and subsist on alms. The rabbis of Caesarea in the name of Rebbi Aḥa: Jews are obligated to care for amputees, even slaves. Rebbi Joḥanan gave to his slave from everything he himself ate and quoted for this: “Did not his Maker make me in the belly and formed me likewise in a womb?”
“If he said to her I require that you tell Mr. X what you said to me,” alone, “or I said to you”, alone, “or that she should fill [vessels] and pour them out on garbage heaps, he has to divorce her and pay the ketubah.” There, they say, like Er’s action, but the rabbis here say, senseless things.
“If she went to an Elder and her dissolved her vow, she is preliminarily married. To a doctor and he healed her, she is not preliminarily married.” What is the difference between the Elder and the doctor? The elder uproots the vow from its start; the doctor heals only for the future. Some Tannaïm state: Even if she went to an Elder and her dissolved her vow, she is not preliminarily married. The baraita follows Rebbi Eleazar, as we have stated there: “Rebbi Eleazar said, they forbade this only because of the other.” What is the reason of Rebbi Eleazar? It would have been logical about a vow which has to be investigated by a Sage … because a vow which does not have to be investigated by a Sage. Some Tannaïm state: She is allowed to marry without a bill of divorce. Some Tannaïm state: She is forbidden to marry without a bill of divorce. They wanted to say that he who says, she is allowed to marry without a bill of divorce, is Rebbi Eleazar, and he who says, she is forbidden to marry without a bill of divorce, are the rabbis. Everything follows the rabbis. He who says, she is allowed to marry without a bill of divorce: Since she knows that if she went to an Elder, he would dissolve her vow, since she does not go therefore she can be married without a bill of divorce. But he who says, she is forbidden to marry without a bill of divorce, that she should not go to an Elder who would dissolve her vow, then the preliminary marriage would become retroactively valid for her and it would turn out that her children become bastards. Therefore she is forbidden to marry without a bill of divorce.
“If she went to an Elder and her dissolved her vow, she is preliminarily married. To a doctor and he healed her, she is not preliminarily married.” What is the difference between the Elder and the doctor? The elder uproots the vow from its start; the doctor heals only for the future. Some Tannaïm state: Even if she went to an Elder and her dissolved her vow, she is not preliminarily married. The baraita follows Rebbi Eleazar, as we have stated there: “Rebbi Eleazar said, they forbade this only because of the other.” What is the reason of Rebbi Eleazar? It would have been logical about a vow which has to be investigated by a Sage … because a vow which does not have to be investigated by a Sage. Some Tannaïm state: She is allowed to marry without a bill of divorce. Some Tannaïm state: She is forbidden to marry without a bill of divorce. They wanted to say that he who says, she is allowed to marry without a bill of divorce, is Rebbi Eleazar, and he who says, she is forbidden to marry without a bill of divorce, are the rabbis. Everything follows the rabbis. He who says, she is allowed to marry without a bill of divorce: Since she knows that if she went to an Elder, he would dissolve her vow, since she does not go therefore she can be married without a bill of divorce. But he who says, she is forbidden to marry without a bill of divorce, that she should not go to an Elder who would dissolve her vow, then the preliminary marriage would become retroactively valid for her and it would turn out that her children become bastards. Therefore she is forbidden to marry without a bill of divorce.
Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, the Mishnah deals with the case that he married her preliminarily conditionally but definitively silently. But if he married her preliminarily silently and definitively silently, she can claim her ketubah. Rebbi Joḥanan said, even if he married her preliminarily silently and definitively silently, she has no ketubah. Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: But she needs a bill of divorce from him even if he married her preliminarily conditionally but definitively silently. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Mana: In case he married her preliminarily silently and divorced her after the preliminary marriage, what does Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish say? Let us hear from the following: “If she had bodily defects, as long as she is in her father’s house, the father has to prove.” This implies that if the father proved his case, she can claim her ketubah. What do you see to say, if he married her preliminarily silently and divorced her after the preliminary marriage! Where do we hold? Since afterwards [it is stated]: “When was this said? For hidden defects, but he has no claim about visible defects.” If he [made it conditional], could he not also claim for visible ones? But did not the colleagues say before Rebbi Yose: Should we say that the following statement disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? “Once she entered her husband’s domain, the husband has to prove.” This implies that if the husband proved his case, she has no claim to ketubah. But by the statement of Rebbi Simeon ban Laqish, she has a claim to ketubah. Rebbi Cohen in the name of the rabbis of Caesarea: The Mishnah deals with the case that he definitively married her but did not sleep with her; Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish speaks about the case that he definitively married her and slept with her; I am saying that she was acceptable to him since he took her to bed.
HALAKHAH: “If a man developed defects,” etc. Rav Jehudah in the name of Rav: So is the Mishnah, “if he had.” But if they developed newly, one forces him to divorce. Rebbi Abba bar Cahana in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Practice follows Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel. There came a case before Rebbi Jeremiah about a kopeaḥ, and he forced him. It turns out that following Rav if he did not become so, following Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel if he became so. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel follows Rebbi Meïr. Which [statement of] Rebbi Meïr? The former or the later? If the former, until she made a condition. If the later, even if he made a condition it is nothing. But this Mishnah turns out following Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel; does “the following one forces to divorce” [follows] the rabbis? Let us hear from the following: “Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, if it was a major defect, e. g., blind in one eye, amputated of one of his hands, lame in one of his legs, immediately he shall divorce and pay the ketubah.” This Mishnah turns out following Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel; “the following one forces to divorce” [follows] the rabbis.
HALAKHAH: “If a man developed defects,” etc. Rav Jehudah in the name of Rav: So is the Mishnah, “if he had.” But if they developed newly, one forces him to divorce. Rebbi Abba bar Cahana in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Practice follows Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel. There came a case before Rebbi Jeremiah about a kopeaḥ, and he forced him. It turns out that following Rav if he did not become so, following Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel if he became so. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel follows Rebbi Meïr. Which [statement of] Rebbi Meïr? The former or the later? If the former, until she made a condition. If the later, even if he made a condition it is nothing. But this Mishnah turns out following Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel; does “the following one forces to divorce” [follows] the rabbis? Let us hear from the following: “Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, if it was a major defect, e. g., blind in one eye, amputated of one of his hands, lame in one of his legs, immediately he shall divorce and pay the ketubah.” This Mishnah turns out following Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel; “the following one forces to divorce” [follows] the rabbis.
HALAKHAH: “If she inherited old vines or olive trees,” etc. Rav Abun in the name of the rabbis there: The Mishnah deals with the case that she inherited olive trees but not their ground, vines but not their ground. But if she inherited olive trees with their ground, vines with their ground, she does not have to sell since her father’s house’s glory still exists. But the rabbis here say, even if she inherited olive trees with their ground, vines with their ground, did she not inherit the value of the olive grove, did she not inherit the value of the vineyard? A baraita supports the rabbis there: “ ‘I am selling you the vineyard’, this is a valid sale even if there are no vines since he sells him [the real estate] by description. ‘I am selling you the grove’, this is a valid sale even if there are no trees since he sells him [the real estate] by description.”
HALAKHAH: “If she inherited old vines or olive trees,” etc. Rav Abun in the name of the rabbis there: The Mishnah deals with the case that she inherited olive trees but not their ground, vines but not their ground. But if she inherited olive trees with their ground, vines with their ground, she does not have to sell since her father’s house’s glory still exists. But the rabbis here say, even if she inherited olive trees with their ground, vines with their ground, did she not inherit the value of the olive grove, did she not inherit the value of the vineyard? A baraita supports the rabbis there: “ ‘I am selling you the vineyard’, this is a valid sale even if there are no vines since he sells him [the real estate] by description. ‘I am selling you the grove’, this is a valid sale even if there are no trees since he sells him [the real estate] by description.”
HALAKHAH: “If she inherited old vines or olive trees,” etc. Rav Abun in the name of the rabbis there: The Mishnah deals with the case that she inherited olive trees but not their ground, vines but not their ground. But if she inherited olive trees with their ground, vines with their ground, she does not have to sell since her father’s house’s glory still exists. But the rabbis here say, even if she inherited olive trees with their ground, vines with their ground, did she not inherit the value of the olive grove, did she not inherit the value of the vineyard? A baraita supports the rabbis there: “ ‘I am selling you the vineyard’, this is a valid sale even if there are no vines since he sells him [the real estate] by description. ‘I am selling you the grove’, this is a valid sale even if there are no trees since he sells him [the real estate] by description.”
It is reasonable according to Rebbi Jehudah, if he wrote: “I shall have nothing to do with your properties and the revenues,” that he cannot take the revenues. Even if he wrote: “I shall have nothing to do with this field and its yield,” he cannot eat its yield. It is reasonable according to the rabbis; if he wrote: “I shall have nothing to do with this field and its yield,” can he eat its yield? Even if he wrote, “I shall have nothing to do with your properties and its yields,” can he eat its yield? Let us hear from the following, as Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rav Jehudah said in the name of Rav: If somebody writes a field over to his wife, he has no right to its yield. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, a baraita says so “What are revenues derived from revenues? He sells the produce, buys real estate, and eats its revenue.” Since he wrote, “I shall have nothing to do with your properties and their yields,” is that not as if he wrote a field over to his wife, and you say, he has neither revenue nor revenue from revenue! That means, there is no difference in the opinion of Rebbi Jehudah whether he wrote “I shall have nothing to do with this field and its yield,” or he wrote “I shall have nothing to do with your properties and their revenues,” he cannot take any revenue. Similarly, for the rabbis it makes no difference whether he wrote “I shall have nothing to do with your properties and their revenues,” or he wrote “I shall have nothing to do with this field and its yield,” he can take its yield.
It is reasonable according to Rebbi Jehudah, if he wrote: “I shall have nothing to do with your properties and the revenues,” that he cannot take the revenues. Even if he wrote: “I shall have nothing to do with this field and its yield,” he cannot eat its yield. It is reasonable according to the rabbis; if he wrote: “I shall have nothing to do with this field and its yield,” can he eat its yield? Even if he wrote, “I shall have nothing to do with your properties and its yields,” can he eat its yield? Let us hear from the following, as Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rav Jehudah said in the name of Rav: If somebody writes a field over to his wife, he has no right to its yield. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, a baraita says so “What are revenues derived from revenues? He sells the produce, buys real estate, and eats its revenue.” Since he wrote, “I shall have nothing to do with your properties and their yields,” is that not as if he wrote a field over to his wife, and you say, he has neither revenue nor revenue from revenue! That means, there is no difference in the opinion of Rebbi Jehudah whether he wrote “I shall have nothing to do with this field and its yield,” or he wrote “I shall have nothing to do with your properties and their revenues,” he cannot take any revenue. Similarly, for the rabbis it makes no difference whether he wrote “I shall have nothing to do with your properties and their revenues,” or he wrote “I shall have nothing to do with this field and its yield,” he can take its yield.
Rebbi Justinus had a case and he asked the rabbis who told him, leave you properties. He asked Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, who told him, enter your properties. Rebbi Jeremiah asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: Who are those rabbis? What about Rav, Rebbi Joḥanan, and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? He said to him, Rebbi Justinus’s rabbis.
Rebbi Justinus had a case and he asked the rabbis who told him, leave you properties. He asked Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, who told him, enter your properties. Rebbi Jeremiah asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: Who are those rabbis? What about Rav, Rebbi Joḥanan, and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? He said to him, Rebbi Justinus’s rabbis.
Rebbi Justinus had a case and he asked the rabbis who told him, leave you properties. He asked Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, who told him, enter your properties. Rebbi Jeremiah asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: Who are those rabbis? What about Rav, Rebbi Joḥanan, and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? He said to him, Rebbi Justinus’s rabbis.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody engages his wife as grocer,” etc. Is Rebbi Eliezer not correct? What is the rabbis’ reason? If you say so, there never would be peace in his house. If she broke vessels, is she responsible as an unpaid or a paid trustee? It would be reasonable to consider her a paid trustee. They said, she is not even an unpaid trustee, for if you say so, there never would be peace in his house.
How is that? If he preliminarily married Rachel, definitively married Leah, and only then definitively married Rachel. In the opinion of the rabbis, Rachel has precedence; in the opinion of Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah she does not have precedence. They say, even Rebbi Eleazar will agree that since in the end he definitively married Rachel, Rachel has precedence. To what can this be compared? To one who took out a loan from another person and said to him, if I have not paid it back by twelve months, all my properties shall be mortgaged to you. If the twelfth month arrived and he has not paid back, his properties become mortgaged from that moment on. But if he said, all my properties shall be mortgaged to you only after twelve months, they become mortgaged only after twelve months. The status of the days in between is in dispute between Rebbi Meïr and the rabbis. In Rebbi Meïr’s opinion, the properties became pledged by the document. In the rabbis’ opinion, the properties became pledged by the money.
How is that? If he preliminarily married Rachel, definitively married Leah, and only then definitively married Rachel. In the opinion of the rabbis, Rachel has precedence; in the opinion of Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah she does not have precedence. They say, even Rebbi Eleazar will agree that since in the end he definitively married Rachel, Rachel has precedence. To what can this be compared? To one who took out a loan from another person and said to him, if I have not paid it back by twelve months, all my properties shall be mortgaged to you. If the twelfth month arrived and he has not paid back, his properties become mortgaged from that moment on. But if he said, all my properties shall be mortgaged to you only after twelve months, they become mortgaged only after twelve months. The status of the days in between is in dispute between Rebbi Meïr and the rabbis. In Rebbi Meïr’s opinion, the properties became pledged by the document. In the rabbis’ opinion, the properties became pledged by the money.
How is that? If he preliminarily married Rachel, definitively married Leah, and only then definitively married Rachel. In the opinion of the rabbis, Rachel has precedence; in the opinion of Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah she does not have precedence. They say, even Rebbi Eleazar will agree that since in the end he definitively married Rachel, Rachel has precedence. To what can this be compared? To one who took out a loan from another person and said to him, if I have not paid it back by twelve months, all my properties shall be mortgaged to you. If the twelfth month arrived and he has not paid back, his properties become mortgaged from that moment on. But if he said, all my properties shall be mortgaged to you only after twelve months, they become mortgaged only after twelve months. The status of the days in between is in dispute between Rebbi Meïr and the rabbis. In Rebbi Meïr’s opinion, the properties became pledged by the document. In the rabbis’ opinion, the properties became pledged by the money.
HALAKHAH: “If the estate contained expected property,” etc. Rebbi Mana said, they disagree about the basic claim of the two ketubot. Rebbi Simeon says, real estate, but the rabbis say, movables. But for the excess denar everybody agrees that it is movable. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, everybody agrees about the basic claim of the two ketubot that it must be real estate. Where do they disagree? About the excess denar, where Rebbi Simeon says, real estate, but the rabbis say, movables. Rebbi Abba bar Zavda in the name of Rav: But in Syria they routinely collect from bronze and bedspreads. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Only from bedspreads of that night. Rav Samuel bar Naḥman in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The people in Arabia routinely collect from camels and spices. Similarly, only from spices of that night? Rebbi Ḥuna’s widow collected from movables following her place’s custom.
HALAKHAH: “If the estate contained expected property,” etc. Rebbi Mana said, they disagree about the basic claim of the two ketubot. Rebbi Simeon says, real estate, but the rabbis say, movables. But for the excess denar everybody agrees that it is movable. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, everybody agrees about the basic claim of the two ketubot that it must be real estate. Where do they disagree? About the excess denar, where Rebbi Simeon says, real estate, but the rabbis say, movables. Rebbi Abba bar Zavda in the name of Rav: But in Syria they routinely collect from bronze and bedspreads. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Only from bedspreads of that night. Rav Samuel bar Naḥman in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The people in Arabia routinely collect from camels and spices. Similarly, only from spices of that night? Rebbi Ḥuna’s widow collected from movables following her place’s custom.
Rav said, if a dying person said, do not bury me, he is buried as a charge on public charity. Rebbi Immi asked, how could one think that others are provided for by his property and he is buried as a charge on public charity? The Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “Her heirs, the heirs of her ketubah, are obligated to bury her.” Explain it, if they inherited real estate. As it was stated: “If he left male and female slaves, mortgages, and movables, anybody who takes them first acquires them and he shall be buried by public charity.” Because he took it first. Therefore, if he did not take it first one removes from his hand. Explain it, if he said, bury me. As Rebbi Yose said in the name of the rabbis: If a dead person was buried who had not said “bury me”, even though others came and took [of his property] one removes from their hands. If they took real estate. In fact, what you say, one removes from their hands, if they took real estate. But if they took movables, one does not remove from their hands, if it was a loan by witnesses. But for a documented loan, whether they took real estate or movables one does not remove from their hands. For Rebbi Abba, the son of Rav Huna, said: They made the words of a bedridden person equal to those of a healthy person who wrote and delivered. But only if he died from that illness, not if he recovered. And if he was explicit and said, give field X to Y. If he said, give field X to Y? Is it as if he was explicit or only if he said, the Northern half, the Southern half? Rebbi Yudan asked: If he said, burn me by pagan rites and give half of field X to Y. Since they do not burn, do they give? Rebbi Ḥaggai asked: A sick person who said, my daughters shall be supported. Would the daughters not be supported anyway? No, it is necessary, for otherwise would they be supported from pledged real estate or would they be supported from movables? Rebbi Yudan [ ] there came a case before Rebbi Yose about a bedridden person who had said, my documents shall be given to X. He said to him, the bedridden can only transfer property which is acquired either by a document or by taking hold. But these are acquired by a document and by taking hold. As it was stated: “A ship is acquired by taking hold in the opinion of everybody. Rebbi Nathan says a ship and documents are acquired by a document and by taking hold. If he wrote and did not take hold, or took hold without writing [a transfer document] he did not do anything unless he both writes and takes hold.”
HALAKHAH: “Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, her sale is valid,” etc. That is, if she sold them in four contracts. If she sold them in one contract, there is disagreement between Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, as they disagreed: If somebody wrote all his property over to two persons in one document and the testimony of the witnesses was valid for one but invalid for the other. Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Yasa: Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagreed; one said, since it is invalid for one it is invalid for the other, but the other said, it is valid for one and invalid for the other. Rebbi Mana did not specify; Rebbi Abin specified: Rebbi Joḥanan said, since it is invalid for one it is invalid for the other; but Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, it is valid for one and invalid for the other. Rebbi Elazar said, a Mishnah supports Rebbi Joḥanan: “Since testimony of two [witnesses] is invalid if one of them turns out to be related or disqualified, so also of three [witnesses] it is invalid if one of them turns out to be related or disqualified. From where even 100? The verse says, ‘witnesses’”. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, Rebbi Ḥananiah the colleague of the rabbis and the rabbis disagree. One says, the argument of Rebbi Eleazar is correct, but the other says, the argument of Rebbi Eleazar is not correct. For him who says, the argument of Rebbi Eleazar is correct, it is as if there was one testimony about one person. For him who says, the argument of Rebbi Eleazar is not correct, it is as if two groups of witnesses came, valid for one and disqualified for the other.
HALAKHAH: “Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, her sale is valid,” etc. That is, if she sold them in four contracts. If she sold them in one contract, there is disagreement between Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, as they disagreed: If somebody wrote all his property over to two persons in one document and the testimony of the witnesses was valid for one but invalid for the other. Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Yasa: Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagreed; one said, since it is invalid for one it is invalid for the other, but the other said, it is valid for one and invalid for the other. Rebbi Mana did not specify; Rebbi Abin specified: Rebbi Joḥanan said, since it is invalid for one it is invalid for the other; but Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, it is valid for one and invalid for the other. Rebbi Elazar said, a Mishnah supports Rebbi Joḥanan: “Since testimony of two [witnesses] is invalid if one of them turns out to be related or disqualified, so also of three [witnesses] it is invalid if one of them turns out to be related or disqualified. From where even 100? The verse says, ‘witnesses’”. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, Rebbi Ḥananiah the colleague of the rabbis and the rabbis disagree. One says, the argument of Rebbi Eleazar is correct, but the other says, the argument of Rebbi Eleazar is not correct. For him who says, the argument of Rebbi Eleazar is correct, it is as if there was one testimony about one person. For him who says, the argument of Rebbi Eleazar is not correct, it is as if two groups of witnesses came, valid for one and disqualified for the other.
Ḥananiah bar Šelemiah in the name of Rav: A case came before Rebbi, who wanted to act following the rabbis. Rebbi Eleazar ben Proteus, the grandson of Rebbi Eleazar ben Proteus, said to him: Did you not teach us in your old man’s name, “except if they offered public tender”? He accepted it; Rebbi changed his mind and acted following Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel.
Rebbi commanded three things on his death-bed: My widow should not move from my house; do not eulogize me in small towns; and he who served me during my lifetime should also serve me in death. “My widow should not move from my house,” is that not a Mishnah? “The widow who said, I cannot possibly move from my husband’s house …” Rebbi Dositheos said, that they should not say, this is the house of the patriarchate and must serve the patriarchate. Rebbi Eleazar bar Yose said, as we have stated: “She lives in the houses just as she lived while her husband was overseas, she uses silver and gold vessels just as she used to while her husband was overseas, she is fed just as she was fed while her husband was overseas.” “Do not eulogize me in small towns” because of the quarrels. “He who served me during my lifetime should also serve me in death;” Rebbi Ḥananiah from Sepphoris said, for example Yose Ephrati and Joseph from Haifa. Rebbi Ḥizqiah added, do not use many shrouds on me and let my coffin have holes at the bottom. These words say that Rebbi was buried in a single shroud since Rebbi said, not as a man left, he will come. But the rabbis say, just as a man left, he will come. It was stated in the name of Rebbi Nathan: The garment that went with a person to the grave will come back with him. What is the reason? (Job 38:14) “The seal turns itself around like clay, they appear in dress.” Antoninus asked Rebbi, what is the meaning of what is written: “The seal turns itself around like clay?” He said to him, He Who brings the generation clothes it.
“Seven seas surround the Land of Israel: The ocean, lake Tiberias, lake Samkho, the salt sea, lake Ḥolata, lake Sheliat, lake Apamea.” But does there not also exist the lake of Ḥomṣ? Diocletian dammed up rivers and created it. It is written (Num. 21:20): “Looking down on the desert.” Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said, if one ascends the desert mountain one finds the likeness of a sieve in lake Tiberias, that is the well of Miryam. Rebbi Joḥanan bar Mara said, the rabbis estimated it and it is assessed opposite the middle gate of the old synagogue of Imdvtgyn.
When does one appraise for them? Rebbi Mana said, one appraises at the end. Rebbi Ḥanina said to him, the words of the rabbis imply that one does not listen to you, for Nathan bar Hoshaia asked before Rebbi Joḥanan, if there was sustenance for twelve months but the estate diminished in value? He answered him, since the heirs started to eat with permission, they continue to eat until the last coin is gone! Therefore, one appraises at the start. Rav Ḥisda asked: If there was sustenance for twelve months and then the property increased in value? Let us hear from the following, for Rebbi Ḥanina, Rebbi Yasa said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If the heirs sold, they sold from their own property. So here, if it increased in value, their property value increased. If the estate was not sufficient for twelve months’ sustenance, may the sons say to the daughters, take what is yours and leave! Rebbi Abba said, is that a question? The Mishnah says that they cannot say so to them, as we have stated there: “If the orphans say, we accept the properties of our father for the value of an extra denar in order to take their mother’s ketubah; one does not listen to them but one appraises the properties in court.”
HALAKHAH: “If somebody obligates himself about money for his son-in-law,” etc. The Mishnah [deals with the case] that he obligated himself in her presence. But if he obligated himself not in her presence, even the rabbis will agree.
It was stated: Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah said, Admon and the rabbis did not disagree about one for whom the father had promised money but went bankrupt that she may sit until her hair grows white. Where did they disagree? If she promised herself. Admon says, she might say, “I was of the opinion that my father wants to give, but now my father does not want to give, what can I do? Marry definitively or divorce!” Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel said, I am convinced by Admon’s statement.
Rebbi Jeremiah said, both Admon and Rebbi Aqiba said the same thing, as we have stated there: “If he sold them to another person, Rebbi Aqiba said, he does not have to buy access, but the Sages say, he has to buy access.” He had not heard that Rebbi Hila said, Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: They disagree when nothing was mentioned. Where do we hold? If it is obvious that access was included, everybody agrees that he does not have to pay for access. If it is obvious that access was not included, everybody agrees that he has to pay for access. But we must hold that nothing was mentioned. Then Rebbi Aqiba said, he does not have to buy access, but the rabbis say, he has to buy access. But in the case here, even while it is clear that he had access, everybody agrees that he has to pay for access.
“I am excommunicated from you, Rabbi Aqiba was stringent in that because of a doubt.” To forbid all his possessions. As you say, “all his property should be banned and he should be separated from the community of the diaspora.” What do the rabbis do with this? An excommunication by the court is weightier.
“Like a sheep.” Rebbi Joḥanan said, like the sheep of the daily offering. There, they say, like the young of a purification offering. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, like our father Abraham’s ram. What Rebbi Ḥiyya stated supports Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Like a sheep which never suckled. Following the opinions of the rabbis there, one could state: Like the Temple courtyard. Rebbi Abin said, following the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish one could state: Like the sacrifices on the altar. Rebbi Yose ben Abun said, following Rebbi Joḥanan one could state: Like the cleansing of the inner altar and the candelabra.