rabbis
2007 occurrences across the corpus
The Jerusalem Talmud
It was stated: “The first son could be High Priest, any second son possibly is a bastard. Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob said, there is no such thing as a possible bastard.” Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob agrees in cases of doubt of Samaritans and desecrated persons. This refers to what we have stated there: “Ten classes returned from Babylonia.” In the opinion of Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob, eight. In the opinion of Rabban Gamliel and Rebbi Eliezer, nine. In the opinion of the rabbis, ten.
HALAKHAH: “No sister-in-law should be a party to ḥalîṣah,” etc. How long is it until a pregnancy is recognized? Symmachos said in the name of Rebbi Meїr: After three months. Even though it is no proof, there is a hint: “It was after about three months.” Rebbi Yudan said, even for a phantom pregnancy, “we were pregnant, we were sick, as if we gave birth to wind,” “get pregnant with dry grass, give birth to straw.” Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rebbi Abba bar Zuṭra said, Rebbi Ḥanina in the name of the Great Rebbi Ḥiyya: Even most of the first, most of the last, and the middle one complete. Rav Assi said, a full 90 days. Samuel said, they in their fulness. A case came before the rabbis there; we do not know if thirteen of the first and seventeen of the last or seventeen of the first and thirteen of the last, and five complete ones in the middle; they wanted to touch the child because of a doubt of bastardy. Rav Naḥman bar Jacob told them, such a case came before Abba bar Abba and he declared it acceptable. Does Abba bar Abba disagree with his son Samuel? Rebbi Abba said, there is a difference between recognizing a pregnancy and giving birth. A pregnancy is recognized after full months, a birth can happen after fractional months. There, we have stated: “How long can labor be? Rebbi Meїr said, even 40 to 50 days. Rebbi Jehudah said, her month is sufficient. Rebbi Yose and Rebbi Simeon say, no labor is longer than two weeks”. “Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Abba: This implies that a woman gives birth after fractional months. Since otherwise one should have stated “thirty days”. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Abba: This implies that a woman gives birth after full months. Since we have stated: “Her month is sufficient.”
Rebbi Joḥanan said, everywhere one taught anonymous Mishnaiot, it follows the rabbis unless one’s teacher explains it [differently]. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish says, all anonymous Mishnaiot follow Rebbi Meїr unless one’s teacher explains it [differently]. Rebbi Ze‘ira said before Rebbi Yasa, not that Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagrees, only he saw that most anonymous Mishnaiot follow Rebbi Meїr. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Mana: What kind of teacher? The teacher of the baraita or the teacher of study? Does not the story of Rebbi Eleazar imply, the teacher of the baraita? “Following Rebbi Simeon, he found that Rebbi Ḥiyya stated it in the name of Rebbi Meїr. He said, the old man certainly understands his chapters.” We have to say that he received instruction from the teacher of the baraita when he understood that Rebbi Ḥiyya stated it in the name of Rebbi Meїr.
Since the rabbis say, “bespeaking” acquires but not completely, so they say, a bill of divorce frees but not completely. Should not a bill of divorce completely free a sister-in-law by an argument de minore ad majus? Since ḥalîṣah does not free a wife but a bill of divorce does, is it not logical that a sister-in-law, who is freed by ḥalîṣah, should be freed by a bill of divorce? The verse says, “she shall pull off.” By pulling off she is freed; she is not freed by a bill of divorce. So it should free anything! It is written: “She shall not belong … to a strange man.” Where do we hold? If he came upon her, she is his wife. If he performed ḥalîṣah with her, she should go and marry an outsider. So we must hold that he gave her a bill of divorce. Also Ḥizqiah stated thus: From where that the sister-in-law is forbidden to himself and his brothers if he gave her a bill of divorce? For him, I read “whom he had sent away”. For the brothers, I read “whom he had sent away”. Then should not ḥalîṣah free a wife by an argument de minore ad majus? Since a bill of divorce does not free a sister-in-law but ḥalîṣah does, is it not logical that a wife, who is freed by a bill of divorce, should be freed by ḥalîṣah? The verse says, “ he shall write her a bill of divorce.” By a bill of divorce she is freed; she is not freed by ḥalîṣah. So [ḥalîṣah] should free partially! There, it is written, “she shall not belong … to a strange man.” Here, what do you have?
HALAKHAH: “How? If he ‘bespoke’,” etc. In the opinion of Rebbi, what about his “bespeaking”, may a nine-year-old “bespeak”? The intercourse of an adult is final; his “bespeaking” partially acquires. The intercourse of a minor is final; does his “bespeaking” partially acquire? What is the difference between his intercourse and his “bespeaking”? But some want to formulate: What is the difference between “bespeaking” of an adult and “bespeaking” of a minor? Samuel said, the words of Rebbi Meïr: They made the intercourse of a child of nine years and one day like “bespeaking” of an adult. And as you said, they made the intercourse of a child of nine years and one day like “bespeaking” of an adult, they made the ḥalîṣah of a child of nine years and one day like “bespeaking” of an adult. But the rabbis said, the ḥalîṣah of a child of nine years and one day is nothing. And why did they make the intercourse of a child of nine years and one day like “bespeaking” of an adult? Because the intercourse of an adult acquires whether intentional or not intentional. The ḥalîṣah of a child of nine years and one day was made like a bill of divorce by an adult. But ḥalîṣah by an adult can free only if it is intentional.
HALAKHAH: “If he performed ḥaliṣah with both of them, performed ḥaliṣah and ‘bespoke’,” etc. “If he performed ḥaliṣah and ‘bespoke’,” etc. There, they say: The words of Rebbi Neḥemiah that an improper copulation frees. In the opinion of the rabbis there copulation frees, whether after “bespeaking” or after a bill of divorce. In the opinion of the rabbis here, intercourse after “bespeaking” frees; after a bill of divorce it does not free. They did not hear that Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Rebbi Neḥemiah, Rebbi Simeon, and Rebbi Ismael all said the same. As it was stated: “If there were three sisters-in-law for one levir, he ‘bespoke’ one, copulated with the second, and gave a bill of divorce to the third. Rebbi Neḥemiah says, the first one needs a bill of divorce and ḥalîṣah, but after copulation there is nothing. An argument de minore ad majus. If nothing comes after ḥalîṣah, which excludes her from the priesthood, whether she copulated or performed ḥalîṣah, then it is only logical that nothing should come after intercourse which does not exclude her from the priesthood, whether she copulated or performed ḥalîṣah. But for the rabbis he is forbidden the relatives of all three of them and they need three bills of divorce and ḥalîṣah for one of them.”
HALAKHAH: “If he performed ḥaliṣah with both of them, performed ḥaliṣah and ‘bespoke’,” etc. “If he performed ḥaliṣah and ‘bespoke’,” etc. There, they say: The words of Rebbi Neḥemiah that an improper copulation frees. In the opinion of the rabbis there copulation frees, whether after “bespeaking” or after a bill of divorce. In the opinion of the rabbis here, intercourse after “bespeaking” frees; after a bill of divorce it does not free. They did not hear that Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Rebbi Neḥemiah, Rebbi Simeon, and Rebbi Ismael all said the same. As it was stated: “If there were three sisters-in-law for one levir, he ‘bespoke’ one, copulated with the second, and gave a bill of divorce to the third. Rebbi Neḥemiah says, the first one needs a bill of divorce and ḥalîṣah, but after copulation there is nothing. An argument de minore ad majus. If nothing comes after ḥalîṣah, which excludes her from the priesthood, whether she copulated or performed ḥalîṣah, then it is only logical that nothing should come after intercourse which does not exclude her from the priesthood, whether she copulated or performed ḥalîṣah. But for the rabbis he is forbidden the relatives of all three of them and they need three bills of divorce and ḥalîṣah for one of them.”
HALAKHAH: “If he performed ḥaliṣah with both of them, performed ḥaliṣah and ‘bespoke’,” etc. “If he performed ḥaliṣah and ‘bespoke’,” etc. There, they say: The words of Rebbi Neḥemiah that an improper copulation frees. In the opinion of the rabbis there copulation frees, whether after “bespeaking” or after a bill of divorce. In the opinion of the rabbis here, intercourse after “bespeaking” frees; after a bill of divorce it does not free. They did not hear that Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Rebbi Neḥemiah, Rebbi Simeon, and Rebbi Ismael all said the same. As it was stated: “If there were three sisters-in-law for one levir, he ‘bespoke’ one, copulated with the second, and gave a bill of divorce to the third. Rebbi Neḥemiah says, the first one needs a bill of divorce and ḥalîṣah, but after copulation there is nothing. An argument de minore ad majus. If nothing comes after ḥalîṣah, which excludes her from the priesthood, whether she copulated or performed ḥalîṣah, then it is only logical that nothing should come after intercourse which does not exclude her from the priesthood, whether she copulated or performed ḥalîṣah. But for the rabbis he is forbidden the relatives of all three of them and they need three bills of divorce and ḥalîṣah for one of them.”
HALAKHAH: “A widow to the High Priest,” etc. What is the reason of the rabbis? “Being” is mentioned here and “being” is mentioned there, “if a girl will be betrothed to a man.” Just as “being” there means betrothal, so “being” here means betrothal. What is the reason of Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon? “Being” is mentioned here and “being” is mentioned there, “if the daughter of a Cohen will be an outside man’s”. Just as “being” there means marriage, so “being” here means marriage. Rebbi Yosa said, from where do Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon know that the daughter of a Cohen betrothed to an Israel may not eat heave? Not from that verse, “if the daughter of a Cohen will be an outside man’s”? Here they make it betrothal, there they make it marriage! What is the reason of the rabbis? “A man’s”, the man who enables to eat. Is it not an argument de minore ad majus? Since an Israel, whose intercourse does not disable her from the priesthood, by intercourse will disable her from eating heave, the High Priest, whose intercourse does disable her from the priesthood, it should be logical that his intercourse will disable her from eating heave. No. If you argue about an Israel who cannot enable others to eat, what can you say about the High Priest who can enable others to eat? Since he can enable others to eat, his intercourse should not disable her from eating heave. The argument de minore ad majus is broken, and one has to return to the verse. Therefore, it must say “a man’s”; viz., the man who enables her to eat. What is the reason of Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon, because he may eat or because he may enable to eat? Let us hear from the following: “If he did not know her after his testicles became injured or his penis cut off, these they enable to eat.” Rebbi Eleazar said, this follows Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon. You have to say, here it is because he enables to eat, there because he cannot enable to eat. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, not really from betrothal or marriage. If they had copulated whether betrothed or married, they are disabled; if they had not copulated whether betrothed or married, they are enabled.
HALAKHAH: “A widow to the High Priest,” etc. What is the reason of the rabbis? “Being” is mentioned here and “being” is mentioned there, “if a girl will be betrothed to a man.” Just as “being” there means betrothal, so “being” here means betrothal. What is the reason of Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon? “Being” is mentioned here and “being” is mentioned there, “if the daughter of a Cohen will be an outside man’s”. Just as “being” there means marriage, so “being” here means marriage. Rebbi Yosa said, from where do Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon know that the daughter of a Cohen betrothed to an Israel may not eat heave? Not from that verse, “if the daughter of a Cohen will be an outside man’s”? Here they make it betrothal, there they make it marriage! What is the reason of the rabbis? “A man’s”, the man who enables to eat. Is it not an argument de minore ad majus? Since an Israel, whose intercourse does not disable her from the priesthood, by intercourse will disable her from eating heave, the High Priest, whose intercourse does disable her from the priesthood, it should be logical that his intercourse will disable her from eating heave. No. If you argue about an Israel who cannot enable others to eat, what can you say about the High Priest who can enable others to eat? Since he can enable others to eat, his intercourse should not disable her from eating heave. The argument de minore ad majus is broken, and one has to return to the verse. Therefore, it must say “a man’s”; viz., the man who enables her to eat. What is the reason of Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon, because he may eat or because he may enable to eat? Let us hear from the following: “If he did not know her after his testicles became injured or his penis cut off, these they enable to eat.” Rebbi Eleazar said, this follows Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon. You have to say, here it is because he enables to eat, there because he cannot enable to eat. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, not really from betrothal or marriage. If they had copulated whether betrothed or married, they are disabled; if they had not copulated whether betrothed or married, they are enabled.
Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, there is disagreement about mortmain slaves. Rebbi Joḥanan said, if he sold them, they are not sold. Rebbi Eleazar said to him, they are eating heave by his power and you say so? He answered, do not paraphernalia slaves also eat by his power, and one says that if he sold them, they are not sold. From your own they gave to you. It would be logical that one should not eat heave. But they said that he eats, and they said, if he sold them, they are not sold. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Josiah. A baraita supports one and another baraita supports the other. A baraita supports Rebbi Eleazar: Paraphernalia slaves are freed on account of “tooth and eye” from the wife but not the husband. Mortmain slaves are freed by “tooth and eye” from the husband but not the wife. What does Rebbi Joḥanan do with this? They are quick to manumit, as we have stated: If somebody mortgages a slave and later sold him, he is not sold; if he freed him, he is freed. A baraita supports Rebbi Joḥanan: Neither mortmain slaves nor paraphernalia slaves are under the rules of “one or two days” and are freed by “tooth or eye” from neither the husband nor the wife. Where do they disagree? When he sold them forever or sold them for some time? If you say that he sold them permanently rather than temporarily, does everybody agree that they are sold? If you say that he sold them temporarily rather than permanently, does everybody agree that they are not sold? Let us hear from the following: If somebody mortgages his field to his wife for her ketubah or to a creditor for his claim and then sells it, it is sold and the buyer should beware for himself. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, for the ketubah of the wife it is not sold since it is unthinkable that a woman should run around at courts of law. They said, Rebbi Eleazar parallels the rabbis, Rebbi Joḥanan Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel. That means, we deal with a temporary sale. But if he sold permanently, everybody agrees that they are not sold.
The offspring of a paraphernalia animal belongs to the husband, that of a paraphernalia slave girl belongs to the wife. Ḥanania the nephew of Rebbi Joshua said, the offspring of a paraphernalia animal is like that of a paraphernalia slave girl. Rebbi Eleazar said to the colleagues, you should know that Rebbi Joḥanan follows Ḥanania the nephew of Rebbi Joshua. Rav and Samuel, Rav follows the rabbis, but Samuel follows Ḥanania the nephew of Rebbi Joshua. Samuel objected to Rav: According to you who says, they belong to the wife, should the first-born not take a double portion? Think of it, if she brought them when they were small and they grew up, are they not the wife’s, and you agree with me that the first-born takes a double portion!
HALAKHAH: “The fetus, the levir, the betrothal,” etc. Rebbi Simeon said, here the logic is deficient, for if it is action to disable it also should be action to enable, and if it is not action to disable it also should not be action to enable. Rebbi Simeon is correct; what is the reason of the rabbis? “They shall eat”, they shall enable to eat. The one who may eat enables to eat, the one who may not eat cannot enable to eat. They objected: there is the bastard who may not eat and he enables to eat! There is a difference, since it is written “born in the house”. Then the born should enable, the not born should not enable! There is a difference, since it is written “and she returns to her father’s house”, to exclude the one waiting for the levir, “in her youth”, to exclude the pregnant one. Rebbi Yose said, that means that they considered pregnancy to be real to disable but did not consider it real to enable to eat. The words of the rabbis disagree since Ze‘ira said, there they state that the betrothed, the one waiting for the levir, and the pregnant, pay the capital but not the fifth. What are we speaking about? If about the daughter of a Cohen married to an Israel, even if she had children from him she is not an outsider for it. But we must deal with the daughter of an Israel married to a Cohen. If you say, they considered the fetus to be real to disable but did not consider it real to enable to eat, why does she pay the capital but not the fifth, should she not pay capital and fifth?
HALAKHAH: “The fetus, the levir, the betrothal,” etc. Rebbi Simeon said, here the logic is deficient, for if it is action to disable it also should be action to enable, and if it is not action to disable it also should not be action to enable. Rebbi Simeon is correct; what is the reason of the rabbis? “They shall eat”, they shall enable to eat. The one who may eat enables to eat, the one who may not eat cannot enable to eat. They objected: there is the bastard who may not eat and he enables to eat! There is a difference, since it is written “born in the house”. Then the born should enable, the not born should not enable! There is a difference, since it is written “and she returns to her father’s house”, to exclude the one waiting for the levir, “in her youth”, to exclude the pregnant one. Rebbi Yose said, that means that they considered pregnancy to be real to disable but did not consider it real to enable to eat. The words of the rabbis disagree since Ze‘ira said, there they state that the betrothed, the one waiting for the levir, and the pregnant, pay the capital but not the fifth. What are we speaking about? If about the daughter of a Cohen married to an Israel, even if she had children from him she is not an outsider for it. But we must deal with the daughter of an Israel married to a Cohen. If you say, they considered the fetus to be real to disable but did not consider it real to enable to eat, why does she pay the capital but not the fifth, should she not pay capital and fifth?
“If they are unable to marry in Israel they disable.” These are: “A child of nine years and one day, an Ammonite, Moabite, or Egyptian proselyte, or a bastard, desecrated, Gibeonite, Samaritan, and Gentile who had intercourse with the daughter of an Israel, a Cohen, or a Levite, disqualified her for the priesthood. Rebbi Yose said, everybody’s intercourse disqualifies whose descendant would be disqualified; his intercourse does not disqualify those whose descendant would not be disqualified. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, in all cases, if his daughter is permitted to you, so is his widow; if his daughter is not permitted to you, neither is his widow.” In what do they differ? Rebbi Joḥanan says, an Ammonite or Moabite proselyte is between them. For him who says, everybody’s intercourse disqualifies whose descendant would be disqualified, here since his descendant would be disqualified, his intercourse disqualifies. For him who says, if you may marry his daughter you may marry his widow, here since you may marry his daughter you may marry his widow. The words of the Sages? Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of [the rabbis], Rebbi Abba, both say: Regarding the daughter of an Ammonite or Moabite proselyte or the daughter of a second-generation Egyptian, even though his daughter is permitted to you, his widow is forbidden to you. Rebbi Zakkai: Rebbi Alexander sent to ask [about] the daughter of an Ammonite proselyte and the daughter of a second-generation Egyptian. Rebbi Yose said to him, did you not hear that Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of the rabbis, Rebbi Abba, both say: Regarding the daughter of an Ammonite proselyte or the daughter of a second-generation Egyptian, even though his daughter is permitted to you, his widow is forbidden to you. And everybody’s intercourse disqualifies whose descendant would be disqualified. Do we not need it when her mother was from Israel? That you should not say that since her mother was desecrated so her daughter was desecrated. In addition, Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagreed, the daughter of an Ammonite proselyte or the daughter of a second-generation Egyptian, Rebbi Joḥanan said, they are acceptable, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, they are disqualified. Rebbi Yose ben Abun said, they disagree about the old women: Rebbi Joḥanan said, they are acceptable, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, they are disqualified.
“If they are unable to marry in Israel they disable.” These are: “A child of nine years and one day, an Ammonite, Moabite, or Egyptian proselyte, or a bastard, desecrated, Gibeonite, Samaritan, and Gentile who had intercourse with the daughter of an Israel, a Cohen, or a Levite, disqualified her for the priesthood. Rebbi Yose said, everybody’s intercourse disqualifies whose descendant would be disqualified; his intercourse does not disqualify those whose descendant would not be disqualified. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, in all cases, if his daughter is permitted to you, so is his widow; if his daughter is not permitted to you, neither is his widow.” In what do they differ? Rebbi Joḥanan says, an Ammonite or Moabite proselyte is between them. For him who says, everybody’s intercourse disqualifies whose descendant would be disqualified, here since his descendant would be disqualified, his intercourse disqualifies. For him who says, if you may marry his daughter you may marry his widow, here since you may marry his daughter you may marry his widow. The words of the Sages? Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of [the rabbis], Rebbi Abba, both say: Regarding the daughter of an Ammonite or Moabite proselyte or the daughter of a second-generation Egyptian, even though his daughter is permitted to you, his widow is forbidden to you. Rebbi Zakkai: Rebbi Alexander sent to ask [about] the daughter of an Ammonite proselyte and the daughter of a second-generation Egyptian. Rebbi Yose said to him, did you not hear that Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of the rabbis, Rebbi Abba, both say: Regarding the daughter of an Ammonite proselyte or the daughter of a second-generation Egyptian, even though his daughter is permitted to you, his widow is forbidden to you. And everybody’s intercourse disqualifies whose descendant would be disqualified. Do we not need it when her mother was from Israel? That you should not say that since her mother was desecrated so her daughter was desecrated. In addition, Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagreed, the daughter of an Ammonite proselyte or the daughter of a second-generation Egyptian, Rebbi Joḥanan said, they are acceptable, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, they are disqualified. Rebbi Yose ben Abun said, they disagree about the old women: Rebbi Joḥanan said, they are acceptable, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, they are disqualified.
In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba, for which reason were “sojourner or hireling” written for heave? Like what Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Yasa, if somebody bought uncircumcised slaves from a Gentile with the understanding that he would circumcise them. Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, Rebbi Simeon bar Abba in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If somebody bought uncircumcised slaves from a Gentile with the understanding that he would circumcise them, they [still] cannot eat heave even if circumcised. Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, Rebbi Simeon bar Abba in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If somebody bought slaves from a Gentile with the understanding that he would circumcise them but they changed their minds, he keeps them for twelve months. If they accept, it is fine; otherwise, he may sell them to a Gentile. Rebbi Isaac bar Naḥman in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: It happened that somebody bought a village full of uncircumcised slaves from a Gentile with the understanding that he would circumcise them but they changed their minds. He came and asked the rabbis. They said to him, keep them for twelve months. If they accept, it is fine; otherwise one follows the local customs.
It was stated: “A Jew may circumcise a Samaritan but a Samaritan may not circumcise a Jew since he is circumcised in the name of Mount Gerizim, the words of Rebbi Jehudah. Rebbi Yose said to him, where do we find in the Torah that circumcision needs intent? Let him continue to circumcise in the name of Mount Gerizim until he dies!” “The drawn should not circumcise [again] lest he get into danger, the words of Rebbi Jehudah. Rebbi Yose said to him, many drawn ones were in the days of Ben Koziba, they all circumcised, lived, and begat sons and daughters. One has to draw a drop of covenant blood from the drawn [circumcised], the one born circumcised, and the circumcised before he converted. Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar stated: The House of Shammai and the House of Hillel did not disagree that one has to draw a drop of covenant blood from the one born circumcised since that is a compressed prepuce; what did they disagree about? About the convert who converted when already circumcised, for the House of Shammai said one has to draw a drop of covenant blood from him, but the House of Hillel say, one does not have to draw a drop of covenant blood from him.” Rebbi Issac bar Naḥman said in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia: Practice follows the words of the student. There came a case before Rav, who said: Who is he who said that it is a compressed prepuce? That means, he certainly is uncircumcised and one pushes the Sabbath away for him. Rebbi Abbahu said, one does not push the Sabbath away for him but one has to draw a drop of covenant blood from him. A male child was born to Rav Ada bar Aḥawa in that condition. He squeezed it, he died. Rebbi Abin said, his penis was damaged and he fasted for him that he should die. The rabbis of Caesarea said, his testicles became injured and he fasted for him that he should die.
There, we have stated: “Everybody is required to be seen except the deaf-and-dumb, the insane, the minor, the sexless, and the hermaphrodite.” What says Rebbi Jehudah in this respect? Let us hear from the following: Rebbi Joḥanan ben Dahavai said in the name of Rebbi Jehudah, “also the blind one.” Nobody says “also” unless he agrees with the preceding statement. The argument of Rebbi Jehudah seems to be inverted. There he says to exclude, but here he says to include. Rebbi Jehudah and the rabbis explain the same verse. The rabbis explain “uncircumcised”, why does the verse add “male”? Only if he is totally male. Rebbi Jehudah explains “male”, why does the verse add “uncircumcised”? Even if he is partially male. But here, “all your maleness”, that excludes the hermaphrodite.
There, we have stated: “Everybody is required to be seen except the deaf-and-dumb, the insane, the minor, the sexless, and the hermaphrodite.” What says Rebbi Jehudah in this respect? Let us hear from the following: Rebbi Joḥanan ben Dahavai said in the name of Rebbi Jehudah, “also the blind one.” Nobody says “also” unless he agrees with the preceding statement. The argument of Rebbi Jehudah seems to be inverted. There he says to exclude, but here he says to include. Rebbi Jehudah and the rabbis explain the same verse. The rabbis explain “uncircumcised”, why does the verse add “male”? Only if he is totally male. Rebbi Jehudah explains “male”, why does the verse add “uncircumcised”? Even if he is partially male. But here, “all your maleness”, that excludes the hermaphrodite.
Some Tannaïm state: Through human action he is disqualified, through Heaven’s action he is qualified. Some Tannaïm state: He is disqualified both through human or Heaven’s action. He who said, through human action he is disqualified, through Heaven’s action he is qualified, infers it from a bastard. “A bastard may not marry,” “no one with a damaged testicle may marry.” Just as a bastard is created by human action, so the one injured in a testicle is created by human action. He who said, he is disqualified both through human or Heaven’s action, from where does he infer it? Rebbi Mana said, from here: “No one with a damaged testicle may marry,” ever. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, he still infers it from a bastard. “A bastard may not marry,” “no one with a damaged testicle may marry.” Just as a bastard is created by Heaven’s action, so the one injured in a testicle is created by Heaven’s action. Is the bastard created by Heaven’s action? His formation is by Heaven’s action. They wanted to say that he who said, through human action he is disqualified, through Heaven’s action he is qualified, follows Rebbi Ismael the son of Rebbi Joḥanan ben Beroqa; he who said, he is disqualified both through human or Heaven’s action, [follows] the rabbis. Rebbi Aḥai bar Pappaios said before Rebbi Ze‘ira, all follows the rabbis. For instance, if scab developed and he rubbed or squeezed it off, that is human action induced by Heaven’s action.
Some Tannaïm state: Through human action he is disqualified, through Heaven’s action he is qualified. Some Tannaïm state: He is disqualified both through human or Heaven’s action. He who said, through human action he is disqualified, through Heaven’s action he is qualified, infers it from a bastard. “A bastard may not marry,” “no one with a damaged testicle may marry.” Just as a bastard is created by human action, so the one injured in a testicle is created by human action. He who said, he is disqualified both through human or Heaven’s action, from where does he infer it? Rebbi Mana said, from here: “No one with a damaged testicle may marry,” ever. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, he still infers it from a bastard. “A bastard may not marry,” “no one with a damaged testicle may marry.” Just as a bastard is created by Heaven’s action, so the one injured in a testicle is created by Heaven’s action. Is the bastard created by Heaven’s action? His formation is by Heaven’s action. They wanted to say that he who said, through human action he is disqualified, through Heaven’s action he is qualified, follows Rebbi Ismael the son of Rebbi Joḥanan ben Beroqa; he who said, he is disqualified both through human or Heaven’s action, [follows] the rabbis. Rebbi Aḥai bar Pappaios said before Rebbi Ze‘ira, all follows the rabbis. For instance, if scab developed and he rubbed or squeezed it off, that is human action induced by Heaven’s action.
In the opinion of Rebbi Jehudah, may a male bastard not marry a female bastard? Let us hear from the following, as Rebbi Immi said, Rebbi Jacob from Gebal stated before Rebbi Joḥanan, Rebbi Isaac bar Tevele in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Rebbi Jehudah stated that a male bastard should not marry a female bastard so that bastards should disappear from the world. Similarly, is an Ammonite man forbidden to marry an Ammonite woman? Was that needed for the rabbis? For if Rebbi Jehudah would think that disqualified converts form one of the Eternal’s congregations, then [the Ammonite] could not marry an Ammonite woman since for her he would be of the Eternal’s congregation. He could not marry an Egyptian woman since for her he would be of the Eternal’s congregation. Rebbi Mattania said, one frees a slave girl for him. Similarly, could an Egyptian man not marry an Egyptian woman? Let us hear from the following, as Rebbi Abbahu stated before Rebbi Joḥanan: “Rebbi Jehudah said, Benjamin, an Egyptian convert, was a student of Rebbi Aqiba. He said, I am an Egyptian convert married to an Egyptian convert. My son is an Egyptian convert; I shall marry him to an Egyptian convert so that my grandson will be qualified to marry into the congregation. Rebbi Aqiba said to him, my son, it is not so. But you marry him to the daughter of an Egyptian woman convert so that there should be three generations on every side.”
There, we have stated: “If it is doubtful whether [the child is] a nine-month’s child of the first [brother] or a seven-month’s of the second, he has to divorce her, the child is legitimate, and they are obligated for a reparation offering for a possible sin.” It was stated: “The first son could be High Priest, any second son possibly is a bastard. Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob said, there is no such thing as a possible bastard.” Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob agrees in cases of doubt of Samaritans and desecrated persons. This refers to what we have stated there: “Ten classes returned from Babylonia.” In the opinion of Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob, eight. In the opinion of Rabban Gamliel and Rebbi Eliezer, nine. In the opinion of the rabbis, ten.
Rebbi Ḥinena said, the Mishnah does not follow Rebbi Jehudah, since Rebbi Jehudah said that four congregations are called “congregation”, the congregation of Cohanim, the congregation of Levites, the congregation of Israelites, the cogregation of converts. They objected to Rebbi Jehudah, but is it not written, “one injured in his testicles should not come”? That refers to bodily blemishes. But is it not written, “children that will be born to them, the third generation shall come from them”? That is a positive commandment. But the rabbis said, there are three congregations, the congregation of Cohanim, the congregation of Levites, the congregation of Israelites; “they shall not come, they shall not come, they shall not come.”
One verse says, “his name was Yitra the Israelite;” another verse says, “Yeter the Ismaelite.” Rebbi Samuel bar Naḥman said, he was an Ismaelite. And you say, he was an Israelite? But he entered the court of Isaiah and found him sitting and explaining: “turn to me and be saved, all ends of the earth,” and converted. Then he gave him his daughter. But the rabbis say, he was an Israelite, and you say, an Ismaelite? But he girded his loins like an Ismaelite and stuck his sword in the earth in court, to kill or be killed, to support the word of my teacher: I shall kill with this sword anybody who transgresses this practice: “Ammonite,” and not female Ammonite; “Moabite,” and not female Moabite. Rebbi Samuel bar Naḥman said, I have only what I did learn: “Naomi returned with Ruth the Moabite, her daughter-in-law, who returned from the fields of Moab.” She is the one who first returned from the fields of Moab. Afterwards, he told her: “You abandoned your father and your mother.” He said to her: If you had come to us yesterday or the day before, we would not have accepted you.
HALAKHAH: “A woman’s husband went overseas,” etc. As you say there, “these women one separates for three months to see whether they are pregnant. If they were minors not yet able to have a child one returns them at once.” Should one not say the same here? There is a difference, since there others deceived them. Did here not also others deceive them? They instituted a fine so that she should investigate carefully. Then they should fine her with respect to the second [husband] but not with respect to the first! Rebbi Joḥanan said, they touched this case because it looks like adultery. Then she should not need a bill of divorce from him! There is a difference since she was married to him in a lawful manner. Samuel said, I say, maybe he sent her a bill of divorce from overseas. Rebbi Ḥaggai objected before Rebbi Ze‘ira: Did we not state: “If they said to her, your husband has died, she was betrothed and then her husband came, she is permitted to return to him.” If you say, maybe he sent her a bill of divorce from overseas; should she not be forbidden to return to him? But it must follow Rebbi Yose ben Kipper, as Rebbi Yose ben Kipper said, from betrothal it is permitted. Did Rebbi Yose ben Kipper not agree that if the second husband gave her a bill of divorce that she was not disabled from priesthood? As we have stated, “even if the second husband gave her a bill of divorce, she was not disabled from priesthood.” The rabbis of Caesarea in the name of Rebbi Hila: In order to make clear the prohibition of the first.
Rebbi Bisna in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: A promiscuous priestly woman may eat tithe. Is that not the Mishnah: “the daughter of a Cohen from heave,” this implies that she eats tithe. It may follow him who says that tithe is not given to Cohanim. Rebbi Nasa said, the words of the rabbis disagree, since Rebbi Hila, Simeon ben Yosina, in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia said: If a Cohen came upon a divorcee, had a son from her, and died. [If the father died] within thirty days [of the son’s birth], the son must redeem himself. After thirty days, the presumption is that his father redeemed him. If he redeems for others, certainly for his son.
Just as the woman accused of infidelity is forbidden to her husband, so she is forbidden to her paramour. Just as she is forbidden to her husband’s brother, so she is forbidden to her paramour’s brother. I might think that just as the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is forbidden to her husband’s brother, so she should be forbidden to her paramour’s brother. Let us hear from the following: “A woman’s husband went overseas; they came and told her that her husband had died, and she had a levir here; he married her in levirate and died. Then her husband returned. She is forbidden to him but her co-widow is permitted to him; she is forbidden to him but his brother’s wife is permitted to him.” Is his brother’s wife not like the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity? That means that the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is permitted to her paramour’s brother. Rebbi Judan said, this follows the rabbis there, as Rebbi Hila said, one states there, for incestuous relationships no divorce is needed except for a married woman; Rebbi Aqiba says also from his wife’s sister and his brother’s wife (not like the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity? That implies that the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is permitted to her paramour’s brother.) But following the rabbis here? Rebbi Ḥiyya said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, everybody agrees that his brother’s wife needs a bill of divorce from him because of the rule of a married wife. He married a person forbidden by the incest rules, and an incest-prohibited woman frees her co-wife. Rebbi Ḥananiah said, it is accepted even according to the rabbis here. They fined her but not her heirs. Rebbi Ḥananiah, the son of Rebbi Hillel, said, according to the rabbis there, she should be permitted to him. Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is forbidden, the co-wife of a divorcee is permitted. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: All co-wives are permitted except the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity. Samuel said, the divorcee herself is permitted in her house. Does he disagree? Since they were discussing co-wives they did not mention divorcees. Why is the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity forbidden? Rebbi Joḥanan said, they touched this case because it looks like adultery. Rav said, because impurity is written there parallel to incest prohibitions.
Just as the woman accused of infidelity is forbidden to her husband, so she is forbidden to her paramour. Just as she is forbidden to her husband’s brother, so she is forbidden to her paramour’s brother. I might think that just as the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is forbidden to her husband’s brother, so she should be forbidden to her paramour’s brother. Let us hear from the following: “A woman’s husband went overseas; they came and told her that her husband had died, and she had a levir here; he married her in levirate and died. Then her husband returned. She is forbidden to him but her co-widow is permitted to him; she is forbidden to him but his brother’s wife is permitted to him.” Is his brother’s wife not like the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity? That means that the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is permitted to her paramour’s brother. Rebbi Judan said, this follows the rabbis there, as Rebbi Hila said, one states there, for incestuous relationships no divorce is needed except for a married woman; Rebbi Aqiba says also from his wife’s sister and his brother’s wife (not like the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity? That implies that the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is permitted to her paramour’s brother.) But following the rabbis here? Rebbi Ḥiyya said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, everybody agrees that his brother’s wife needs a bill of divorce from him because of the rule of a married wife. He married a person forbidden by the incest rules, and an incest-prohibited woman frees her co-wife. Rebbi Ḥananiah said, it is accepted even according to the rabbis here. They fined her but not her heirs. Rebbi Ḥananiah, the son of Rebbi Hillel, said, according to the rabbis there, she should be permitted to him. Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is forbidden, the co-wife of a divorcee is permitted. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: All co-wives are permitted except the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity. Samuel said, the divorcee herself is permitted in her house. Does he disagree? Since they were discussing co-wives they did not mention divorcees. Why is the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity forbidden? Rebbi Joḥanan said, they touched this case because it looks like adultery. Rav said, because impurity is written there parallel to incest prohibitions.
Just as the woman accused of infidelity is forbidden to her husband, so she is forbidden to her paramour. Just as she is forbidden to her husband’s brother, so she is forbidden to her paramour’s brother. I might think that just as the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is forbidden to her husband’s brother, so she should be forbidden to her paramour’s brother. Let us hear from the following: “A woman’s husband went overseas; they came and told her that her husband had died, and she had a levir here; he married her in levirate and died. Then her husband returned. She is forbidden to him but her co-widow is permitted to him; she is forbidden to him but his brother’s wife is permitted to him.” Is his brother’s wife not like the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity? That means that the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is permitted to her paramour’s brother. Rebbi Judan said, this follows the rabbis there, as Rebbi Hila said, one states there, for incestuous relationships no divorce is needed except for a married woman; Rebbi Aqiba says also from his wife’s sister and his brother’s wife (not like the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity? That implies that the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is permitted to her paramour’s brother.) But following the rabbis here? Rebbi Ḥiyya said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, everybody agrees that his brother’s wife needs a bill of divorce from him because of the rule of a married wife. He married a person forbidden by the incest rules, and an incest-prohibited woman frees her co-wife. Rebbi Ḥananiah said, it is accepted even according to the rabbis here. They fined her but not her heirs. Rebbi Ḥananiah, the son of Rebbi Hillel, said, according to the rabbis there, she should be permitted to him. Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is forbidden, the co-wife of a divorcee is permitted. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: All co-wives are permitted except the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity. Samuel said, the divorcee herself is permitted in her house. Does he disagree? Since they were discussing co-wives they did not mention divorcees. Why is the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity forbidden? Rebbi Joḥanan said, they touched this case because it looks like adultery. Rav said, because impurity is written there parallel to incest prohibitions.
Just as the woman accused of infidelity is forbidden to her husband, so she is forbidden to her paramour. Just as she is forbidden to her husband’s brother, so she is forbidden to her paramour’s brother. I might think that just as the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is forbidden to her husband’s brother, so she should be forbidden to her paramour’s brother. Let us hear from the following: “A woman’s husband went overseas; they came and told her that her husband had died, and she had a levir here; he married her in levirate and died. Then her husband returned. She is forbidden to him but her co-widow is permitted to him; she is forbidden to him but his brother’s wife is permitted to him.” Is his brother’s wife not like the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity? That means that the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is permitted to her paramour’s brother. Rebbi Judan said, this follows the rabbis there, as Rebbi Hila said, one states there, for incestuous relationships no divorce is needed except for a married woman; Rebbi Aqiba says also from his wife’s sister and his brother’s wife (not like the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity? That implies that the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is permitted to her paramour’s brother.) But following the rabbis here? Rebbi Ḥiyya said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, everybody agrees that his brother’s wife needs a bill of divorce from him because of the rule of a married wife. He married a person forbidden by the incest rules, and an incest-prohibited woman frees her co-wife. Rebbi Ḥananiah said, it is accepted even according to the rabbis here. They fined her but not her heirs. Rebbi Ḥananiah, the son of Rebbi Hillel, said, according to the rabbis there, she should be permitted to him. Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is forbidden, the co-wife of a divorcee is permitted. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: All co-wives are permitted except the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity. Samuel said, the divorcee herself is permitted in her house. Does he disagree? Since they were discussing co-wives they did not mention divorcees. Why is the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity forbidden? Rebbi Joḥanan said, they touched this case because it looks like adultery. Rav said, because impurity is written there parallel to incest prohibitions.
HALAKHAH: “If a woman’s husband and son went overseas,” etc. How do you consider this situation, comparing to witnesses of death or witnesses of divorce? If you compare it to witnesses of death, it disagrees with the (rabbis there). If you compare it to witnesses of divorce, it disagrees (both with the rabbis here and those there). Rebbi Joḥanan said, it was stated thus: Two [witnesses] say he died, [later] two witnesses said, he did not die. She shall not remarry, but if she has remarried she should not leave. Two [witnesses] say she was divorced, [later] two witnesses said, she was not divorced. She shall not remarry; if she has remarried she must leave. There, they say, it makes no difference; whether about death or divorce she should not leave. In the opinion of the rabbis there it is understandable, there is no difference between death and divorce. In the opinion of the rabbis here, what is the difference between death and divorce? Rebbi Ze‘ira said it without attribution, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It is reasonable to decide in the case of witnesses of death that if he comes he contradicts them. Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, the rabbis there stick to their opinion since the rabbis there say, when the [first] testimony was accepted, it was accepted as certain. So the rabbis here say, at the moment of her remarriage, she remarried based on certain testimony. Rebbi Yose said, it is reasonable that the rabbis there did not change their argument. Do the rabbis there not agree if two [witnesses] say, his father died while in possession, and two say his father died while not in possession, that the field is in Reuben’s possession? Therefore, if two say, she was married, divorced, and remarried, and two say she was not divorced, rightly she should not leave.
HALAKHAH: “If a woman’s husband and son went overseas,” etc. How do you consider this situation, comparing to witnesses of death or witnesses of divorce? If you compare it to witnesses of death, it disagrees with the (rabbis there). If you compare it to witnesses of divorce, it disagrees (both with the rabbis here and those there). Rebbi Joḥanan said, it was stated thus: Two [witnesses] say he died, [later] two witnesses said, he did not die. She shall not remarry, but if she has remarried she should not leave. Two [witnesses] say she was divorced, [later] two witnesses said, she was not divorced. She shall not remarry; if she has remarried she must leave. There, they say, it makes no difference; whether about death or divorce she should not leave. In the opinion of the rabbis there it is understandable, there is no difference between death and divorce. In the opinion of the rabbis here, what is the difference between death and divorce? Rebbi Ze‘ira said it without attribution, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It is reasonable to decide in the case of witnesses of death that if he comes he contradicts them. Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, the rabbis there stick to their opinion since the rabbis there say, when the [first] testimony was accepted, it was accepted as certain. So the rabbis here say, at the moment of her remarriage, she remarried based on certain testimony. Rebbi Yose said, it is reasonable that the rabbis there did not change their argument. Do the rabbis there not agree if two [witnesses] say, his father died while in possession, and two say his father died while not in possession, that the field is in Reuben’s possession? Therefore, if two say, she was married, divorced, and remarried, and two say she was not divorced, rightly she should not leave.
HALAKHAH: “If a woman’s husband and son went overseas,” etc. How do you consider this situation, comparing to witnesses of death or witnesses of divorce? If you compare it to witnesses of death, it disagrees with the (rabbis there). If you compare it to witnesses of divorce, it disagrees (both with the rabbis here and those there). Rebbi Joḥanan said, it was stated thus: Two [witnesses] say he died, [later] two witnesses said, he did not die. She shall not remarry, but if she has remarried she should not leave. Two [witnesses] say she was divorced, [later] two witnesses said, she was not divorced. She shall not remarry; if she has remarried she must leave. There, they say, it makes no difference; whether about death or divorce she should not leave. In the opinion of the rabbis there it is understandable, there is no difference between death and divorce. In the opinion of the rabbis here, what is the difference between death and divorce? Rebbi Ze‘ira said it without attribution, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It is reasonable to decide in the case of witnesses of death that if he comes he contradicts them. Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, the rabbis there stick to their opinion since the rabbis there say, when the [first] testimony was accepted, it was accepted as certain. So the rabbis here say, at the moment of her remarriage, she remarried based on certain testimony. Rebbi Yose said, it is reasonable that the rabbis there did not change their argument. Do the rabbis there not agree if two [witnesses] say, his father died while in possession, and two say his father died while not in possession, that the field is in Reuben’s possession? Therefore, if two say, she was married, divorced, and remarried, and two say she was not divorced, rightly she should not leave.
HALAKHAH: “If a woman’s husband and son went overseas,” etc. How do you consider this situation, comparing to witnesses of death or witnesses of divorce? If you compare it to witnesses of death, it disagrees with the (rabbis there). If you compare it to witnesses of divorce, it disagrees (both with the rabbis here and those there). Rebbi Joḥanan said, it was stated thus: Two [witnesses] say he died, [later] two witnesses said, he did not die. She shall not remarry, but if she has remarried she should not leave. Two [witnesses] say she was divorced, [later] two witnesses said, she was not divorced. She shall not remarry; if she has remarried she must leave. There, they say, it makes no difference; whether about death or divorce she should not leave. In the opinion of the rabbis there it is understandable, there is no difference between death and divorce. In the opinion of the rabbis here, what is the difference between death and divorce? Rebbi Ze‘ira said it without attribution, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It is reasonable to decide in the case of witnesses of death that if he comes he contradicts them. Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, the rabbis there stick to their opinion since the rabbis there say, when the [first] testimony was accepted, it was accepted as certain. So the rabbis here say, at the moment of her remarriage, she remarried based on certain testimony. Rebbi Yose said, it is reasonable that the rabbis there did not change their argument. Do the rabbis there not agree if two [witnesses] say, his father died while in possession, and two say his father died while not in possession, that the field is in Reuben’s possession? Therefore, if two say, she was married, divorced, and remarried, and two say she was not divorced, rightly she should not leave.
HALAKHAH: “If a woman’s husband and son went overseas,” etc. How do you consider this situation, comparing to witnesses of death or witnesses of divorce? If you compare it to witnesses of death, it disagrees with the (rabbis there). If you compare it to witnesses of divorce, it disagrees (both with the rabbis here and those there). Rebbi Joḥanan said, it was stated thus: Two [witnesses] say he died, [later] two witnesses said, he did not die. She shall not remarry, but if she has remarried she should not leave. Two [witnesses] say she was divorced, [later] two witnesses said, she was not divorced. She shall not remarry; if she has remarried she must leave. There, they say, it makes no difference; whether about death or divorce she should not leave. In the opinion of the rabbis there it is understandable, there is no difference between death and divorce. In the opinion of the rabbis here, what is the difference between death and divorce? Rebbi Ze‘ira said it without attribution, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It is reasonable to decide in the case of witnesses of death that if he comes he contradicts them. Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, the rabbis there stick to their opinion since the rabbis there say, when the [first] testimony was accepted, it was accepted as certain. So the rabbis here say, at the moment of her remarriage, she remarried based on certain testimony. Rebbi Yose said, it is reasonable that the rabbis there did not change their argument. Do the rabbis there not agree if two [witnesses] say, his father died while in possession, and two say his father died while not in possession, that the field is in Reuben’s possession? Therefore, if two say, she was married, divorced, and remarried, and two say she was not divorced, rightly she should not leave.
HALAKHAH: “If a woman’s husband and son went overseas,” etc. How do you consider this situation, comparing to witnesses of death or witnesses of divorce? If you compare it to witnesses of death, it disagrees with the (rabbis there). If you compare it to witnesses of divorce, it disagrees (both with the rabbis here and those there). Rebbi Joḥanan said, it was stated thus: Two [witnesses] say he died, [later] two witnesses said, he did not die. She shall not remarry, but if she has remarried she should not leave. Two [witnesses] say she was divorced, [later] two witnesses said, she was not divorced. She shall not remarry; if she has remarried she must leave. There, they say, it makes no difference; whether about death or divorce she should not leave. In the opinion of the rabbis there it is understandable, there is no difference between death and divorce. In the opinion of the rabbis here, what is the difference between death and divorce? Rebbi Ze‘ira said it without attribution, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It is reasonable to decide in the case of witnesses of death that if he comes he contradicts them. Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, the rabbis there stick to their opinion since the rabbis there say, when the [first] testimony was accepted, it was accepted as certain. So the rabbis here say, at the moment of her remarriage, she remarried based on certain testimony. Rebbi Yose said, it is reasonable that the rabbis there did not change their argument. Do the rabbis there not agree if two [witnesses] say, his father died while in possession, and two say his father died while not in possession, that the field is in Reuben’s possession? Therefore, if two say, she was married, divorced, and remarried, and two say she was not divorced, rightly she should not leave.
HALAKHAH: “If a woman’s husband and son went overseas,” etc. How do you consider this situation, comparing to witnesses of death or witnesses of divorce? If you compare it to witnesses of death, it disagrees with the (rabbis there). If you compare it to witnesses of divorce, it disagrees (both with the rabbis here and those there). Rebbi Joḥanan said, it was stated thus: Two [witnesses] say he died, [later] two witnesses said, he did not die. She shall not remarry, but if she has remarried she should not leave. Two [witnesses] say she was divorced, [later] two witnesses said, she was not divorced. She shall not remarry; if she has remarried she must leave. There, they say, it makes no difference; whether about death or divorce she should not leave. In the opinion of the rabbis there it is understandable, there is no difference between death and divorce. In the opinion of the rabbis here, what is the difference between death and divorce? Rebbi Ze‘ira said it without attribution, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It is reasonable to decide in the case of witnesses of death that if he comes he contradicts them. Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, the rabbis there stick to their opinion since the rabbis there say, when the [first] testimony was accepted, it was accepted as certain. So the rabbis here say, at the moment of her remarriage, she remarried based on certain testimony. Rebbi Yose said, it is reasonable that the rabbis there did not change their argument. Do the rabbis there not agree if two [witnesses] say, his father died while in possession, and two say his father died while not in possession, that the field is in Reuben’s possession? Therefore, if two say, she was married, divorced, and remarried, and two say she was not divorced, rightly she should not leave.
HALAKHAH: “If a woman’s husband and son went overseas,” etc. How do you consider this situation, comparing to witnesses of death or witnesses of divorce? If you compare it to witnesses of death, it disagrees with the (rabbis there). If you compare it to witnesses of divorce, it disagrees (both with the rabbis here and those there). Rebbi Joḥanan said, it was stated thus: Two [witnesses] say he died, [later] two witnesses said, he did not die. She shall not remarry, but if she has remarried she should not leave. Two [witnesses] say she was divorced, [later] two witnesses said, she was not divorced. She shall not remarry; if she has remarried she must leave. There, they say, it makes no difference; whether about death or divorce she should not leave. In the opinion of the rabbis there it is understandable, there is no difference between death and divorce. In the opinion of the rabbis here, what is the difference between death and divorce? Rebbi Ze‘ira said it without attribution, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It is reasonable to decide in the case of witnesses of death that if he comes he contradicts them. Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, the rabbis there stick to their opinion since the rabbis there say, when the [first] testimony was accepted, it was accepted as certain. So the rabbis here say, at the moment of her remarriage, she remarried based on certain testimony. Rebbi Yose said, it is reasonable that the rabbis there did not change their argument. Do the rabbis there not agree if two [witnesses] say, his father died while in possession, and two say his father died while not in possession, that the field is in Reuben’s possession? Therefore, if two say, she was married, divorced, and remarried, and two say she was not divorced, rightly she should not leave.
HALAKHAH: “If a woman’s husband and son went overseas,” etc. How do you consider this situation, comparing to witnesses of death or witnesses of divorce? If you compare it to witnesses of death, it disagrees with the (rabbis there). If you compare it to witnesses of divorce, it disagrees (both with the rabbis here and those there). Rebbi Joḥanan said, it was stated thus: Two [witnesses] say he died, [later] two witnesses said, he did not die. She shall not remarry, but if she has remarried she should not leave. Two [witnesses] say she was divorced, [later] two witnesses said, she was not divorced. She shall not remarry; if she has remarried she must leave. There, they say, it makes no difference; whether about death or divorce she should not leave. In the opinion of the rabbis there it is understandable, there is no difference between death and divorce. In the opinion of the rabbis here, what is the difference between death and divorce? Rebbi Ze‘ira said it without attribution, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It is reasonable to decide in the case of witnesses of death that if he comes he contradicts them. Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, the rabbis there stick to their opinion since the rabbis there say, when the [first] testimony was accepted, it was accepted as certain. So the rabbis here say, at the moment of her remarriage, she remarried based on certain testimony. Rebbi Yose said, it is reasonable that the rabbis there did not change their argument. Do the rabbis there not agree if two [witnesses] say, his father died while in possession, and two say his father died while not in possession, that the field is in Reuben’s possession? Therefore, if two say, she was married, divorced, and remarried, and two say she was not divorced, rightly she should not leave.
“If he allots her to his son;” he allots her to his son but he may not allot her to his grandson. Samuel bar Abba asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: In matters of inheritance you take the grandson like the son but here you do not take the grandson like the son? Rebbi Ze‘ira said, if anybody explains this matter, I shall pour him spiced wine. Rebbi Tanḥum answered: In matters of inheritance where the brother can take the place of the son and all others can take the place of the son, the grandson takes the place of the son. The rabbis of Caesarea answered: In matters of impurity you consider the brother like the son and all [near] relatives like the son but not the grandson like the son. He said, there went the spiced wine.
HALAKHAH: Samuel said, the words of Rebbi Meïr: They made the intercourse of a child of nine years and one day like “bespeaking” of an adult. And as you said, they made the intercourse of a child of nine years and one day like “bespeaking” of an adult, they made the ḥalîṣah of a child of nine years and one day like a bill of divorce of an adult. But the rabbis said, the ḥalîṣah of a child of nine years and one day is nothing. And why did they make the intercourse of a child of nine years and one day like “bespeaking” of an adult? Because the intercourse of an adult acquires whether intentional or not intentional. The ḥalîṣah of a child of nine years and one day was made like a bill of divorce by an adult. But ḥalîṣah by an adult can free only if it is intentional.
Can a woman waiting for a levir who became available to several brothers-in-law not be married in levirate? Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: The wife of one dead [husband] is married in levirate, not the wife of two dead. Rebbi Eleazar said, this follows Rebbi Meïr, since Rebbi Meïr said, “any one who cannot marry me in levirate, cannot marry my co-wife in levirate.” Rebbi Joḥanan said, Rebbi Eleazar formulated what he had heard from me. Rebbi Yose said, a Mishnah said so: “If [a male] nine years and one day old copulated with his sister-in-law and after he became an adult married another woman and died, if he never had intercourse with the first after he became an adult, the second [wife] either performs ḥalîṣah or levirate, the first performs ḥalîṣah but not levirate. The first one must perform ḥalîṣah and cannot be married in levirate.” Here you say, she performs ḥalîṣah; there you say, she is married in levirate! Where you say she performs ḥalîṣah, Rebbi Meïr and Rebbi Simeon; where you say, she is married in levirate, Rebbi Simeon and the rabbis.
There, we have stated: “If he slaughtered her, her daughter’s daughter, and afterwards her daughter, he absorbs forty [lashes]. Symmachos said in Rebbi Meïr’s name, he absorbs eighty.” Rebbi Eleazar said, [Symmachos] and Rebbi Joḥanan ben Nuri said the same thing, since we stated there: “Rebbi Joḥanan ben Nuri said, he who copulates with his mother-in-law may be guilty because of his mother-in-law, his mother-in-law’s mother and his father-in-law’s mother. They said to him, all three fall under the same law.” Rebbi Jehudah bar Pazi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Symmachos agrees to the earlier [part of the Mishnah]. If was found stated, it still is in dispute. What is Rebbi Joḥanan ben Nuri’s reason? Since a woman and her daughter and a woman and her daughter’s daughter fall under two separate prohibitions, also a woman and her son’s daughter and her daughter’s daughter fall under two separate prohibitions. What is the reason of the rabbis? Since a woman and her daughter and a woman and her daughter’s daughter fall under one and the same prohibition, also a woman and her son’s daughter and her daughter’s daughter fall under one and the same prohibition.
And following Rebbi Meïr? Since Rebbi Meïr said, a gezerah šawah is at the place it comes from, from where is the third generation (below) forbidden? And following the rabbis, who say, a gezerah šawah is said about them, from where that the third generation above is punished by burning? Both for Rebbi Meïr and the rabbis, from where that the third generation above is forbidden? Since it is written “taboo, taboo” for a gezerah šawah, it is as if all were included; all are included.
And following Rebbi Meïr? Since Rebbi Meïr said, a gezerah šawah is at the place it comes from, from where is the third generation (below) forbidden? And following the rabbis, who say, a gezerah šawah is said about them, from where that the third generation above is punished by burning? Both for Rebbi Meïr and the rabbis, from where that the third generation above is forbidden? Since it is written “taboo, taboo” for a gezerah šawah, it is as if all were included; all are included.
What is the reason of Rebbi Jehudah? “ A man may not take his father’s wife,” that refers to his father’s wife; “and he should not uncover his father’s wing,” that is his rape victim. How do the rabbis explain “his father’s wing”? There, they say and they do not know the origin of the tradition, that refers to a wing which leans on his father. Would he not anyhow be guilty for her because of his father’s wife? Rebbi Hila said, because of forewarning, that if he was warned because of his father’s wife, he will be whipped, and because of his father’s wing, he will be whipped. Rebbi Jehudah agrees about whipping. Rebbi Jehudah agrees about sacrifice. Rebbi Jehudah agrees about all other doubtful cases that he is free. Rebbi Jehudah agrees that if he gave her qiddušin that these qiddušin are legally valid.
HALAKHAH: “[A woman] did not wait three months,” etc. “If both were Cohanim, he has to mourn intensely for them,” etc. Where do we hold? It is impossible after death [of the first] since we have stated: “He has to mourn intensely for them and they for him.” One understands that he does not defile himself for the second [husband], I say that he is the son of the first. But why does he not defile himself for the first one? It must be that he divorced. Then, as you take it, if he is his son, he should defile himself for him. If he is not his son, he is desecrated, and what happens if he defiles himself? It must be that he raped. Did not Rebbi Abba say in the name of Abba bar Jeremiah that a rape victim does not have to wait three months? Should we say, following the rabbis, but we follow Rebbi Yose!
An eight months’ child is like a stone and one does not move him on the Sabbath, but his mother lies down beside him and nurses him. Rebbi Yose asked: May one push aside the Sabbath for babies that are in doubt? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, it is fine. How you take it, if he is a nine months’ child, he must be circumcised. If he is an eight months’ child, it is as if he cut flesh without need. The rabbis of Caesarea said, Rebbi Jacob ben Dositheos asked, who permitted to cut flesh without need?
“With a sandal having a heel it is valid.” There, they say, for example those קנסרוס. But the rabbis here say, like ours. Rav said, if I had not seen my uncle, the elder Rebbi Ḥiyya, performing a ḥalîṣah with a sandal with plaited straps, I would not feel competent to do so. The maternal uncle of Rav Cahana performed ḥalîṣah in the night, as single judge, on Friday night, with a cork sandal, and standing; (Rabbi Zeriqa said) and she did not spit. Rav heard that and said, who would ever do that except the maternal uncle of Rav Cahana?
“ A sandal whose holes, edges, or loops are torn or one of whose soles fell off is pure. If one of its holes, edges, or loops is torn or most of it soles fell of it is impure. Rebbi Jehudah says, on the inside it is impure, on the outside it is pure.” Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa, Rebbi Tevele, Ḥanin bar Abba in the name of Rav: Practice follows Rebbi Jehuda as far as the Sabbath is concerned. A case came before Rebbi Samuel bar Rav Isaac. He sent Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa to ask Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba. He said to him, just as they disagree about impurity so they disagree about the Sabbath, and instructed him following the rabbis. Rebbi Samuel bar Rav Isaac asked himself: One heard saying, practice follows Rebbi Jehuda, and he instructed him following the rabbis? A case came before Rebbi Aḥa bar Isaac. He sent to ask Rebbi Ze‘ira and Rebbi Ze‘ira asked Rebbi Immi. The latter said to him: Following the words of him who declares impure, it is permitted to go out on it on the Sabbath. Following the words of him who declares pure, it is forbidden to go out on it on the Sabbath. He did not get anything out of him.
“ A sandal whose holes, edges, or loops are torn or one of whose soles fell off is pure. If one of its holes, edges, or loops is torn or most of it soles fell of it is impure. Rebbi Jehudah says, on the inside it is impure, on the outside it is pure.” Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa, Rebbi Tevele, Ḥanin bar Abba in the name of Rav: Practice follows Rebbi Jehuda as far as the Sabbath is concerned. A case came before Rebbi Samuel bar Rav Isaac. He sent Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa to ask Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba. He said to him, just as they disagree about impurity so they disagree about the Sabbath, and instructed him following the rabbis. Rebbi Samuel bar Rav Isaac asked himself: One heard saying, practice follows Rebbi Jehuda, and he instructed him following the rabbis? A case came before Rebbi Aḥa bar Isaac. He sent to ask Rebbi Ze‘ira and Rebbi Ze‘ira asked Rebbi Immi. The latter said to him: Following the words of him who declares impure, it is permitted to go out on it on the Sabbath. Following the words of him who declares pure, it is forbidden to go out on it on the Sabbath. He did not get anything out of him.
What is the reason of Rebbi Eliezer? “Before the Elders’ eyes.” How do the rabbis uphold “before the Elders’ eyes”? That excludes a court of blind people. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the argument of Rebbi Eliezer seems to be inverted. There, he says that the right hand is obligatory, but here, he says that the right hand is not obligatory. Rebbi Yose said, there it is written “the right hand”, the right hand is obl;igatory, but here, where “the right hand” is not written, the right hand is notobligatory. Rebbi Yose from Sidon stated before Rebbi Jeremiah: “His ear”, “his ear”. Since “his ear” mentioned there refers to the right ear, so “his ear” mentioned here means the right ear. It also says “his foot”, “his foot”. He who infers from “his ear”, “his ear” infers from “his foot”, “his foot”; he who does not infer from “his ear”, “his ear” does not infer from “his foot”, “his foot”. But it was stated in the name of Rebbi Eliezer: “his foot”, “his foot”. That means, there are two statements about the words of Rebbi Eliezer. He who argues from “his ear”, “his ear” argues from “his foot”, “his foot”; he who does not argue from “his ear”, “his ear” does not argue from “his foot”. And this Mishnah accepts neither “his ear”, “his ear” nor “his foot”, “his foot”.
Rebbi Aḥa bar Ḥinena in the name of Cahana: Following the opinion that someone who cannot give heave cannot dedicate to the Temple. Why did he not say: following the opinion that he can give heave, can he dedicate to the Temple? Because of Rebbi Jehudah, for Rebbi Jehudah says he can give heave but cannot dedicate. Rebbi Joḥanan says, even following the opinion that he cannot give heave, he can dedicate. What can he dedicate? Holocaust and well-being offerings. He cannot bring a sin sacrifice for fat because he is not obligated to a sin sacrifice for fat. He cannot bring a sin sacrifice for blood because he is not obligated to a sin sacrifice for blood. May he bring a sacrifice relating to gonorrhea and skin disease? Since it is obligatory can’t he bring it, or since he becomes impure by these can he bring it? If it is obvious for you that he brings, can he become an agent for these? Since he may become impure by these, may he become an agent, or since he cannot become an agent for anything else, can’t he become an agent for these? Rebbi Yudan objected: His produce is ṭevel from the Torah but he can free his ṭevel by Torah law! But here, even though he may become impure by them, he cannot become an agent. May he bring First Fruits following Rebbi Jehudah, for Rebbi Jehudah says that First Fruits have the status of territorial consecrated things? He may not bring following the rabbis who say they have the status of things consecrated to the Temple. May he bring a sacrifice of pilgrimage? Since it is obligatory can’t he bring it, or since he may change its name to well-being offering, may he bring it? May he bring a Passover sacrifice? Since it is obligatory can’t he bring it, or since Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia, a person may bring a Passover sacrifice any day of the year when he changes its name to well-being offering, may he bring it? May he bring tithes of cereals? If he holds with Rebbi Meïr, since Rebbi Meïr said (Num.18:28): “From all your tithes,” that all tithes were bracketed together, then since he cannot bring tithes of grain he cannot bring tithes of animals. May he make substitutions? If Rebbi Meïr is of the opinion that all tithes were bracketed together, then since he cannot bring tithes of grain he cannot bring tithes of animals; since he cannot bring tithes of animals he cannot make substitutions. One may hold with Rebbi Simeon, since Rebbi Simeon says that tithes of animals teach you for all sacrifices about substitutions. That means, since he cannot bring tithes of grain he cannot bring tithes of animals; since he cannot bring tithes of animals he cannot make substitutions; since he cannot make substitutions for these he cannot make substitutions for any sacrifices. Is one guilty sacrificing for him outside the Temple? Cahana said, one cannot be guilty sacrificing for him outside the Temple. Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both say, one is guilty sacrificing for him outside the Temple. The statement of Cahana disagrees with Rebbi Jehudah, since Rebbi Jehudah frees his ṭevel as biblical law. And you say so? We can say he [Cahana] is following him who says they accepted tithes voluntarily.
What is the status of her co-wife? Rav said, her co-wife is forbidden. Rebbi Joḥanan said, her co-wife is forbidden. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, her co-wife is permitted. Rebbi Eleazar said, I looked around at the rabbis here and at the rabbis there and did not find anybody agreeing with me except Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish who says, her co-wife is permitted.Rav Hamnuna was sitting before Rav Ada bar Ahava and said, what is the status of her co-wife? He said to him, she is permitted. He asked, divorce? He answered, forbidden. He said, go around. Rebbi Abba bar Mamal said, it is reasonable following him who said that her co-wife is permitted. But following him who said, her co-wife is forbidden, as you take it: The aspect he acquired in her makes the corresponding aspect forbidden in her co-wife, the aspect he did not acquire in her makes the corresponding aspect permitted in her co-wife! Rebbi Shammai said, does one admit that kind of argument in matters of incest prohibitions? What about it? For any sister-in-law who is not totally outside [the family], the acquired aspect of her belongs to an incest prohibition and an incest prohibition forbids the co-wife.
What is the status of her co-wife? Rav said, her co-wife is forbidden. Rebbi Joḥanan said, her co-wife is forbidden. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, her co-wife is permitted. Rebbi Eleazar said, I looked around at the rabbis here and at the rabbis there and did not find anybody agreeing with me except Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish who says, her co-wife is permitted.Rav Hamnuna was sitting before Rav Ada bar Ahava and said, what is the status of her co-wife? He said to him, she is permitted. He asked, divorce? He answered, forbidden. He said, go around. Rebbi Abba bar Mamal said, it is reasonable following him who said that her co-wife is permitted. But following him who said, her co-wife is forbidden, as you take it: The aspect he acquired in her makes the corresponding aspect forbidden in her co-wife, the aspect he did not acquire in her makes the corresponding aspect permitted in her co-wife! Rebbi Shammai said, does one admit that kind of argument in matters of incest prohibitions? What about it? For any sister-in-law who is not totally outside [the family], the acquired aspect of her belongs to an incest prohibition and an incest prohibition forbids the co-wife.
“Rebbi Jehudah says, she is never believed unless she comes crying with torn clothes.” They objected to Rebbi Jehudah: Think of it, if one came crying, the other did not cry. To this one you forbid, to that one you permit. Rebbi Ḥananiah, the colleague of the rabbis, objected: Think of it, maybe her son went overseas and died there, she remembers that and cries.
HALAKHAH: “The House of Hillel say, we heard only,” etc. The House of Shammai said to them: Is there not harvest the entire year? How is that? At the end of barley harvest starts wheat harvest. At the end of wheat harvest starts grape harvest. At the end of grape harvest starts olive harvest. That means, there is some harvest the year round. They accepted this argument. And why the grain harvest? Rebbi Mana said, because there accidents are frequent, for the sun only hits a person’s head at grain harvest time. That is what is written: “The child grew and some day it went to his father, to the harvesters. He said to his father, ‘my head, my head’; who said to the servant, ‘carry him to his mother’. He carried him and brought him to his mother where he sat on her knees until noontime, when he died.” But the rabbis say, because snakes are abundant. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, “You shielded my head at the day of kissing,” at the day summer and winter are kissing. Another explanation: “At the day of weaponry,” that is Gog’s weaponry. Another explanation, on a day when two worlds kiss one another, when this world leaves and the future world enters.
“If one witness says,” etc. “If one witness says that he died and she remarried, then another comes and says that he is not dead, she shall not leave.” Because he said that after she had remarried. Therefore if [the second witness came] before she remarried, if she remarried she has to leave. Rebbi Joḥanan said, these are the words of Rebbi Menaḥem ben Rebbi Yose. But the words of the Sages [are], whether he testified after she remarried or before she remarried, she should not remarry, but if she remarried she shall not leave. Rav Naḥman bar Jacob said in the name of Rav, if she was married by the testimony of two witnesses, even if he returns, one says to him, “you are not he.” Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac asked, think of it, if he is a famous person like Immi? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, is there nobody who would look like Rebbi Immi? There came a case before the rabbis there. They said to him, “you are not he.” Abba bar Abba got up and whispered in his ear saying, by your life, give her a bill of divorce because of the doubt. Rav’s students got up and beat him. Somebody said, the whip is burning and the footstool is burning. Samuel said, I was there, no whip was burning and no footstool was burning, but my father was hit and got up. There came a case before Rebbi Immi. He said to him, yes, it is sure that she is permitted to you but you should know that the child of this man is a bastard before Heaven. Rebbi Ze‘ira was praising him because he made the situation clear.
The colleagues in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The reason of the rabbis: “When [brothers] dwell,” certainly, not in a case of doubt.
It is written: “Abijah and his people inflicted a very great slaughter on them.” Rebbi Abba bar Cahana said, he destroyed the face recognition of the men of Israel. That is what is written, “the recognition of their faces testified about them,” etc. That refers to the nose. Rebbi Immi said, he put up guards for three days until appearance was disfigured. That is what is written: “Your widows are more for me than the sand of the oceans.” It was stated in this respect: One testifies only on the appearance of the face with the nose. It is written: “Jeroboam was powerless for the rest of Aijah’s days; the Eternal smote him and he died.” Rebbi Samuel said, you think that this refers to Jeroboam, but it is Abijah. Why was he smitten? Rebbi Joḥanan said, because he insulted Jeroboam in public. That is what is written: “You are a great multitude and with you are the golden calves that Jeroboam made for you as gods.” Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, because he denigrated his teacher Aḥijah from Shiloh. That is what is written: “And men, rascals, joined him,” that he called Aḥijah from Shiloh a rascal. But the rabbis say, because an idol fell into his hand and he did not destroy it, that is what is written: “Abijah pursued Jeroboam and took from him cities, Beth El and its dependencies …” and it is written: “He set up one in Beth El and one he dedicated in Dan.”
“Rebbi Judah ben Baba.” Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rebbi Ḥananel in the name of Rav: Practice follows Rebbi Judah ben Baba. The words of the rabbis disagree, since Rebbi Jeremiah said that it happened that someone fell into the Jordan and surfaced after seventeen days when he was recognized because the cold had shrunk him so that they permitted his wife to remarry.
Rav Jehudah in the name of Rav: Practice does not follow Rebbi Jehudah ben Baba in the case of an Israel. The words of the Rabbis say the same since Rebbi Samuel, Rebbi Abbahu, Rebbi (Aqiba) [Jacob] bar Aḥa said in the name of Rebbi Yasa, one does not subject witnesses to a death to cross-examination. It happened that somebody came before Rebbi Tarphon about a woman who wanted to remarry. He said to him, my son, how can you testify for the woman that she can remarry? He said to him, Rabbi, he was with us in a caravan when we were attacked by an armed gang. He hung himself at a branch of an olive tree, tore it off, ran after the armed gang and returned. I said to him, my son, I am praising you as a lion. He said to me, you got my name well; in my city I am called Joḥanan ben Jonathan the lion from Kefar Shiḥla. I said to him, my son, you said very well Joḥanan ben Jonathan the lion from Kefar Shiḥla. He said to me, no, what I said was Joḥanan ben Jonathan the lion from Kefar Shiḥla. I said to him, did you not say Jonathan ben Joḥanan the lion from Kefar Shiḥla? He said to me, no, what I said was Joḥanan ben Jonathan the lion from Kefar Shiḥla. After some time he became sick and died; Rebbi Tarphon checked out his testimony and let his widow remarry. It was found stated: “One does not subject witnesses to a death to cross-examination, against Rebbi Tarphon, since Rebbi Tarphon said, one subjects witnesses to a death to cross-examination.
There, we have stated: “If somebody was bringing a bill of divorce and lost it, if he found it again immediately, it is valid; otherwise it is invalid.” What is immediately? Rebbi Joḥanan said, as long as less than three people passed by. If a Gentile passed by, what is the rule? Let us hear from the following: Abba bar bar Ḥana was bringing a bill of divorce when he lost it. A Saracen found it. The case came before the rabbis and they declared [the bill] valid. That means, if a Gentile passed by, it is valid. May we say that he had an identifying mark on [the bill]? But was it not stated that there are no identifying marks on bills of divorce? That means, two or three lines. But here it had a heh which was pointed. Rebbi Ezra asked before Rebbi Mana, why should it be invalid in that case? I would say, it was another bill executed for a person with the same name. Think of it, if they investigated and did not find there another person with the same name! It must be that one is very strict in matters of possible incest. But did we not state: “They went and found nobody but let his wife remarry; they went there, did not recognize him, and let his wife remarry?” Rebbi Mana said to him: So says Rebbi Shammai, Rebbi Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya: This man had two bills of divorce in his hand, one valid and one invalid. He lost the valid one after he had thrown away the invalid one. When he found it, I am saying that he found the invalid one.
“They asked Ben Zoma: Why is a doubt in a private domain considered impure? He said to them: Where is the suspected wife? In a private domain. He said to them, we find that she is forbidden for her house.” The words of the rabbis disagree, since Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rebbi Yasa said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: An underage girl who whored has no will to be forbidden to her husband. But did we not state: “In any case where there is no mind to be asked, the doubtful case is pure”? Therefore, if there is a mind to be asked, the doubtful case is impure. But here, even while there is a mind to be asked, the doubtful case is pure! “Why is a doubt in a public domain considered pure? He said to them: We find that the public prepare their Passah [as in] purity when most of them are impure. If known impurity was permitted in public, so much more for a case of doubtful impurity.”
Just as the woman accused of infidelity is forbidden to her husband, so she is forbidden to her paramour. Just as she is forbidden to her husband’s brother, so she is forbidden to her paramour’s brother. I might think that just as the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is forbidden to her husband’s brother, so she should be forbidden to her paramour’s brother. Let us hear from the following: “A woman’s husband went overseas; they came and told her that her husband had died, and she had a levir here; he married her in levirate and died. Then her husband returned. She is forbidden to him but her co-widow is permitted to him; she is forbidden to him but his brother’s wife is permitted to him.” Is his brother’s wife not like the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity? That means that the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is permitted to her paramour’s brother. Rebbi Judan said, this follows the rabbis there, as Rebbi Hila said, one states there, for incestuous relationships no divorce is needed except for a married woman; Rebbi Aqiba says also from his wife’s sister. But following the rabbis here? Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: everybody agrees that his brother’s wife needs a bill of divorce from him because of the rule of a married wife. She is forbidden by the incest rules, and an incest-prohibited woman frees her co-wife. Rebbi Ḥinenah said, it is accepted even according to the rabbis here. They fined her but not her heirs. Rebbi Ḥananiah, the son of Rebbi Hillel, said, according to the rabbis there, she should be permitted to him. Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is forbidden, the co-wife of a divorcee is permitted. Rebbi Jacob [bar Aḥa] in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: All co-wives are permitted except the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity. Samuel said, the divorcee herself is permitted to her house. Does he disagree? Since they were discussing co-wives they did not mention divorcees. Why is the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity forbidden? Rebbi Joḥanan said, they touched this case because it looks like adultery. Rav said, because impurity is written there parallel to incest prohibitions.
Just as the woman accused of infidelity is forbidden to her husband, so she is forbidden to her paramour. Just as she is forbidden to her husband’s brother, so she is forbidden to her paramour’s brother. I might think that just as the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is forbidden to her husband’s brother, so she should be forbidden to her paramour’s brother. Let us hear from the following: “A woman’s husband went overseas; they came and told her that her husband had died, and she had a levir here; he married her in levirate and died. Then her husband returned. She is forbidden to him but her co-widow is permitted to him; she is forbidden to him but his brother’s wife is permitted to him.” Is his brother’s wife not like the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity? That means that the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is permitted to her paramour’s brother. Rebbi Judan said, this follows the rabbis there, as Rebbi Hila said, one states there, for incestuous relationships no divorce is needed except for a married woman; Rebbi Aqiba says also from his wife’s sister. But following the rabbis here? Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: everybody agrees that his brother’s wife needs a bill of divorce from him because of the rule of a married wife. She is forbidden by the incest rules, and an incest-prohibited woman frees her co-wife. Rebbi Ḥinenah said, it is accepted even according to the rabbis here. They fined her but not her heirs. Rebbi Ḥananiah, the son of Rebbi Hillel, said, according to the rabbis there, she should be permitted to him. Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is forbidden, the co-wife of a divorcee is permitted. Rebbi Jacob [bar Aḥa] in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: All co-wives are permitted except the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity. Samuel said, the divorcee herself is permitted to her house. Does he disagree? Since they were discussing co-wives they did not mention divorcees. Why is the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity forbidden? Rebbi Joḥanan said, they touched this case because it looks like adultery. Rav said, because impurity is written there parallel to incest prohibitions.
Just as the woman accused of infidelity is forbidden to her husband, so she is forbidden to her paramour. Just as she is forbidden to her husband’s brother, so she is forbidden to her paramour’s brother. I might think that just as the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is forbidden to her husband’s brother, so she should be forbidden to her paramour’s brother. Let us hear from the following: “A woman’s husband went overseas; they came and told her that her husband had died, and she had a levir here; he married her in levirate and died. Then her husband returned. She is forbidden to him but her co-widow is permitted to him; she is forbidden to him but his brother’s wife is permitted to him.” Is his brother’s wife not like the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity? That means that the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is permitted to her paramour’s brother. Rebbi Judan said, this follows the rabbis there, as Rebbi Hila said, one states there, for incestuous relationships no divorce is needed except for a married woman; Rebbi Aqiba says also from his wife’s sister. But following the rabbis here? Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: everybody agrees that his brother’s wife needs a bill of divorce from him because of the rule of a married wife. She is forbidden by the incest rules, and an incest-prohibited woman frees her co-wife. Rebbi Ḥinenah said, it is accepted even according to the rabbis here. They fined her but not her heirs. Rebbi Ḥananiah, the son of Rebbi Hillel, said, according to the rabbis there, she should be permitted to him. Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is forbidden, the co-wife of a divorcee is permitted. Rebbi Jacob [bar Aḥa] in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: All co-wives are permitted except the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity. Samuel said, the divorcee herself is permitted to her house. Does he disagree? Since they were discussing co-wives they did not mention divorcees. Why is the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity forbidden? Rebbi Joḥanan said, they touched this case because it looks like adultery. Rav said, because impurity is written there parallel to incest prohibitions.
Just as the woman accused of infidelity is forbidden to her husband, so she is forbidden to her paramour. Just as she is forbidden to her husband’s brother, so she is forbidden to her paramour’s brother. I might think that just as the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is forbidden to her husband’s brother, so she should be forbidden to her paramour’s brother. Let us hear from the following: “A woman’s husband went overseas; they came and told her that her husband had died, and she had a levir here; he married her in levirate and died. Then her husband returned. She is forbidden to him but her co-widow is permitted to him; she is forbidden to him but his brother’s wife is permitted to him.” Is his brother’s wife not like the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity? That means that the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is permitted to her paramour’s brother. Rebbi Judan said, this follows the rabbis there, as Rebbi Hila said, one states there, for incestuous relationships no divorce is needed except for a married woman; Rebbi Aqiba says also from his wife’s sister. But following the rabbis here? Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: everybody agrees that his brother’s wife needs a bill of divorce from him because of the rule of a married wife. She is forbidden by the incest rules, and an incest-prohibited woman frees her co-wife. Rebbi Ḥinenah said, it is accepted even according to the rabbis here. They fined her but not her heirs. Rebbi Ḥananiah, the son of Rebbi Hillel, said, according to the rabbis there, she should be permitted to him. Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is forbidden, the co-wife of a divorcee is permitted. Rebbi Jacob [bar Aḥa] in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: All co-wives are permitted except the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity. Samuel said, the divorcee herself is permitted to her house. Does he disagree? Since they were discussing co-wives they did not mention divorcees. Why is the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity forbidden? Rebbi Joḥanan said, they touched this case because it looks like adultery. Rav said, because impurity is written there parallel to incest prohibitions.
The argument of Rebbi Jehudah seems inverted. There, he says: “One covers a man in front and a woman front and back.” And here, he says so? There, she goes to her death anyhow, but here, maybe she will be found to be pure and the young priests would attack her. The argument of the rabbis seems inverted. There, they say: “A man is stoned naked but no woman is stoned naked.” And here, they say so? There, “you shall love your neighbor as yourself,” choose for him the easiest death. But here, “all women should be taught and not do as your whoring.”
It is written: “No man in Israel was beautiful like Absalom, to be very much praised.” I could think, in everything. The verse says, “from his foot sole to the top of his forehead”. It is written: “He had a son whose name was Saul, select and good, no one of the Children of Israel was better than he.” I could think, in everything. The verse says, “from his shoulder on he was higher than all the people.” But about Abner, what is written? “You should know that a leader and great man fell today in Israel.” Why was Abner killed? Rebbi Joshua ben Levi, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, and the rabbis. Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said, because he made fun of the lives of his squires as it is said (2Sam. 2:14): “Let the squires get up and play before us.” R. Simeon ben Laqish said, because he prefaced his name before that of David; that is what is written (2Sam. 3:12) “Abner sent messengers to David the underling, saying: Whose is the land?” He wrote: From Abner to David. The rabbis say, because he did not let Shaul make peace with David. That is what is written (1Sam. 24:5): “My father, see, but see the corner of your coat in my hand!” He said to him, what do you want from the prattling of this one, it was torn off by thorns. But when they came to the circle, he said to him (1Sam. 26:14): “Can you answer, Abner?” About the corner, you said it was torn off by a thorn; were spear and pitcher cut off by a thorn? But some say, because he had it in his power to intervene for Nob, the city of priests, and he did not intervene.
It is written: “No man in Israel was beautiful like Absalom, to be very much praised.” I could think, in everything. The verse says, “from his foot sole to the top of his forehead”. It is written: “He had a son whose name was Saul, select and good, no one of the Children of Israel was better than he.” I could think, in everything. The verse says, “from his shoulder on he was higher than all the people.” But about Abner, what is written? “You should know that a leader and great man fell today in Israel.” Why was Abner killed? Rebbi Joshua ben Levi, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, and the rabbis. Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said, because he made fun of the lives of his squires as it is said (2Sam. 2:14): “Let the squires get up and play before us.” R. Simeon ben Laqish said, because he prefaced his name before that of David; that is what is written (2Sam. 3:12) “Abner sent messengers to David the underling, saying: Whose is the land?” He wrote: From Abner to David. The rabbis say, because he did not let Shaul make peace with David. That is what is written (1Sam. 24:5): “My father, see, but see the corner of your coat in my hand!” He said to him, what do you want from the prattling of this one, it was torn off by thorns. But when they came to the circle, he said to him (1Sam. 26:14): “Can you answer, Abner?” About the corner, you said it was torn off by a thorn; were spear and pitcher cut off by a thorn? But some say, because he had it in his power to intervene for Nob, the city of priests, and he did not intervene.
HALAKHAH: “Joseph had the merit to bury his father and none of his brothers was greater than he,” etc. Rebbi Isaac said: The glory of the Lifegiver of the Worlds was with them. It is written: “They came to the threshing place of the brambles.” Since when does the bramble-bush have a threshing place? Rebbi Samuel ben Naḥman said, we checked in all of Scripture and did not find a place called “brambles”. What are “brambles”? These are the Canaanites who should have been threshed like brambles. By which merit were they saved? By the merit of: “The inhabitants of the land, the Canaanites, saw the mourning at the threshing place of the brambles.” What act of kindness did they do for him? Rebbi Eleazar said, they unbelted. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, they undid the knots on their shoulders. The rabbis said, they stood up. Rebbi Yudan bar Shalom said, they pointed with their fingers and said, “a heavy mourning is that for Egypt”. Now these who did no act of kindness with their hands or feet; look what the Holy One, praise to Him, did reward them with; Israel who are used to do acts of kindness with their hands or feet for their great and their little ones, [they deserve] so much more!
HALAKHAH: “He brought a bowl,” etc. It was stated: “A new one.” Our Mishnah follows Rebbi Eliezer, as we have stated there: “He brought a new earthenware bowl.” Who stated “a new one”? Rebbi Eliezer! Since he explains: “Into an earthenware vessel on fresh water.” Just as the water had no prior use, so the earthenware vessel should not have had any prior use. It is understandable there because he explains: “Into an earthenware vessel on fresh water;” but what may one say here? Rebbi Joḥanan said, because he agrees with Rebbi Ismael. It was stated: From the wash basin. Rebbi Ismael says, water from a fountain. But the Sages approve of all kinds of water. Therefore, Rebbi Eliezer holds with Rebbi Ismael about the water and Rebbi Ismael with Rebbi Eliezer about the earthenware vessel. It was found stated: Rebbi Ismael says, into a new earthenware vessel. Some Tannaїm state: Into an earthenware vessel but not into a maqqēdah. Some Tannaїm state: Even into a maqqēdah. They wanted to say, he who says, into an earthenware vessel but not into a maqqēdah, is Rebbi Eliezer but those who say, even into a maqqēdah, are the rabbis. It all is the rabbis’. He who says, into an earthenware vessel but not into a maqqēdah, if most of it was removed but a small part was left; he who says, even into a maqqēdah, if a small part was removed but most of it was left.
HALAKHAH: “He brought a bowl,” etc. It was stated: “A new one.” Our Mishnah follows Rebbi Eliezer, as we have stated there: “He brought a new earthenware bowl.” Who stated “a new one”? Rebbi Eliezer! Since he explains: “Into an earthenware vessel on fresh water.” Just as the water had no prior use, so the earthenware vessel should not have had any prior use. It is understandable there because he explains: “Into an earthenware vessel on fresh water;” but what may one say here? Rebbi Joḥanan said, because he agrees with Rebbi Ismael. It was stated: From the wash basin. Rebbi Ismael says, water from a fountain. But the Sages approve of all kinds of water. Therefore, Rebbi Eliezer holds with Rebbi Ismael about the water and Rebbi Ismael with Rebbi Eliezer about the earthenware vessel. It was found stated: Rebbi Ismael says, into a new earthenware vessel. Some Tannaїm state: Into an earthenware vessel but not into a maqqēdah. Some Tannaїm state: Even into a maqqēdah. They wanted to say, he who says, into an earthenware vessel but not into a maqqēdah, is Rebbi Eliezer but those who say, even into a maqqēdah, are the rabbis. It all is the rabbis’. He who says, into an earthenware vessel but not into a maqqēdah, if most of it was removed but a small part was left; he who says, even into a maqqēdah, if a small part was removed but most of it was left.
Some Tannaїm state: “In an earthenware vessel”, not if it is sooty. Some Tannaїm state: “In an earthenware vessel”, even if it is sooty. They wanted to say, he who says “in an earthenware vessel”, not if it is sooty, is Rebbi Eliezer, but he who says, “in an earthenware vessel”, even if it is sooty, follows the rabbis. All is of the rabbis: He who says “in an earthenware vessel”, not if it is sooty, follows the rabbis, and he who says, “in an earthenware vessel”, even if it is sooty, follows the rabbis.
Some Tannaїm state: “In an earthenware vessel”, not if it is sooty. Some Tannaїm state: “In an earthenware vessel”, even if it is sooty. They wanted to say, he who says “in an earthenware vessel”, not if it is sooty, is Rebbi Eliezer, but he who says, “in an earthenware vessel”, even if it is sooty, follows the rabbis. All is of the rabbis: He who says “in an earthenware vessel”, not if it is sooty, follows the rabbis, and he who says, “in an earthenware vessel”, even if it is sooty, follows the rabbis.
Some Tannaїm state: “In an earthenware vessel”, not if it is sooty. Some Tannaїm state: “In an earthenware vessel”, even if it is sooty. They wanted to say, he who says “in an earthenware vessel”, not if it is sooty, is Rebbi Eliezer, but he who says, “in an earthenware vessel”, even if it is sooty, follows the rabbis. All is of the rabbis: He who says “in an earthenware vessel”, not if it is sooty, follows the rabbis, and he who says, “in an earthenware vessel”, even if it is sooty, follows the rabbis.
Some Tannaїm state: “In an earthenware vessel”, not if it is sooty. Some Tannaїm state: “In an earthenware vessel”, even if it is sooty. They wanted to say, he who says “in an earthenware vessel”, not if it is sooty, is Rebbi Eliezer, but he who says, “in an earthenware vessel”, even if it is sooty, follows the rabbis. All is of the rabbis: He who says “in an earthenware vessel”, not if it is sooty, follows the rabbis, and he who says, “in an earthenware vessel”, even if it is sooty, follows the rabbis.
Rebbi Abba bar Mamal said, who stated “the one waiting for her levir”? Rebbi Aqiba! For Rebbi Aqiba said, there exists a bastard from a sister-in-law. Rebbi Ilai said to him, why should a bastard be relevant for jealousy? The Torah said: “He shall declare his jealousy to his wife”, even a partial wife. Rebbi Shammai said, did not Rebbi Yannai say the following: More than 30 Elders voted, from where that qiddushin have no legal effect on a sister-in-law? The verse says, “the wife of the deceased may not belong to any outside unrelated man, her levir shall come to her”, that she cannot have any existence with another man. Rebbi Joḥanan said to him, is that not a Mishnah? “Or after your levir will have performed ḥalîṣah with you, she is not preliminarily married.” And Rebbi Yannai praised him “those who pour out gold from the wallet,” “my son, they should not be removed from your eyes,” “get wise, my son, and make me happy”, “give to the wise that he shall become wiser,” “let the wise listen that he increase in knowledge.” Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, after all these praises I can explain it following Rebbi Aqiba since Rebbi Aqiba said that there exists a bastard from a sister-in-law! Could he not object: Why should a bastard be relevant for jealousy? The Torah said: “He shall declare his jealousy to his wife”, even a partial wife. A woman waiting for her levir who whored, Rebbi Eleazar said she is permitted to her house, Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said she is forbidden to her house. What do the rabbis say? Rebbi Mana said, did not Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa say in the name of Rebbi Eleazar, if a woman waiting for her levir died, her mother is permitted to [the levir], since we have stated: “This is the rule: He cannot stipulate about any intercourse she could have had and would not be forbidden to him.”
How could one state this Mishnah? Not the rabbis nor Rebbi Aqiba! But it is as follows. He who says that she is permitted to her house [follows] the rabbis against Rebbi Aqiba. He who says that she is forbidden to her house [follows] Rebbi Aqiba against the rabbis. Rebbi Yannai said, a woman waiting for her levir who whored is permitted to her house. One had stated this: “It was hidden from her husband’s eyes,” not from her levir’s eyes. Rebbi Jacob bar Zavdi in the name of Rebbi Abbahu: It happened, she was the wife of a Cohen, and they permitted her to her house. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, no whipping is involved.
How could one state this Mishnah? Not the rabbis nor Rebbi Aqiba! But it is as follows. He who says that she is permitted to her house [follows] the rabbis against Rebbi Aqiba. He who says that she is forbidden to her house [follows] Rebbi Aqiba against the rabbis. Rebbi Yannai said, a woman waiting for her levir who whored is permitted to her house. One had stated this: “It was hidden from her husband’s eyes,” not from her levir’s eyes. Rebbi Jacob bar Zavdi in the name of Rebbi Abbahu: It happened, she was the wife of a Cohen, and they permitted her to her house. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, no whipping is involved.
How could one state this Mishnah? Not the rabbis nor Rebbi Aqiba! But it is as follows. He who says that she is permitted to her house [follows] the rabbis against Rebbi Aqiba. He who says that she is forbidden to her house [follows] Rebbi Aqiba against the rabbis. Rebbi Yannai said, a woman waiting for her levir who whored is permitted to her house. One had stated this: “It was hidden from her husband’s eyes,” not from her levir’s eyes. Rebbi Jacob bar Zavdi in the name of Rebbi Abbahu: It happened, she was the wife of a Cohen, and they permitted her to her house. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, no whipping is involved.
Rebbi Yose said: In all cases, the following is an open question for the rabbis: What does he present? The body of the flour offering or the body of the vessel?
HALAKHAH: “He gives her to drink and after that he sacrifices her offering,” etc. What is the reason of the rabbis? “They shall come into her.” What is the reason of Rebbi Simeon? “After that he shall give to the woman to drink.” How does Rebbi Simeon explain the rabbis’ reason, “they shall come into her”? All of them, not part only How do the rabbis explain Rebbi Simeon’s reason, “after that he shall give the water to the woman to drink”? Against her will, without her agreement. Rebbi Simeon agrees with the rabbis that if he gave her to drink and after that presented her offering, it is valid. The rabbis agree with Rebbi Simeon that if he presented her offering and after that gave her to drink, it is valid. What is the difference between them? The commandment. The rabbis say that the flour offering checks her out but Rebbi Simeon says, the water is what checks her out. What is the reason of the Sages? “A flour offering of remembrance remembering iniquity.” What is the reason of Rebbi Simeon? “They shall come into her.” How do the rabbis explain Rebbi Simeon’s reason, “they shall come into her”? This teaches that it shakes all her limbs. How does Rebbi Simeon explain the rabbis’ reason, “a flour offering of remembrance remembering iniquity”? This teaches that all iniquities she has committed are remembered at that time.
HALAKHAH: “He gives her to drink and after that he sacrifices her offering,” etc. What is the reason of the rabbis? “They shall come into her.” What is the reason of Rebbi Simeon? “After that he shall give to the woman to drink.” How does Rebbi Simeon explain the rabbis’ reason, “they shall come into her”? All of them, not part only How do the rabbis explain Rebbi Simeon’s reason, “after that he shall give the water to the woman to drink”? Against her will, without her agreement. Rebbi Simeon agrees with the rabbis that if he gave her to drink and after that presented her offering, it is valid. The rabbis agree with Rebbi Simeon that if he presented her offering and after that gave her to drink, it is valid. What is the difference between them? The commandment. The rabbis say that the flour offering checks her out but Rebbi Simeon says, the water is what checks her out. What is the reason of the Sages? “A flour offering of remembrance remembering iniquity.” What is the reason of Rebbi Simeon? “They shall come into her.” How do the rabbis explain Rebbi Simeon’s reason, “they shall come into her”? This teaches that it shakes all her limbs. How does Rebbi Simeon explain the rabbis’ reason, “a flour offering of remembrance remembering iniquity”? This teaches that all iniquities she has committed are remembered at that time.
HALAKHAH: “He gives her to drink and after that he sacrifices her offering,” etc. What is the reason of the rabbis? “They shall come into her.” What is the reason of Rebbi Simeon? “After that he shall give to the woman to drink.” How does Rebbi Simeon explain the rabbis’ reason, “they shall come into her”? All of them, not part only How do the rabbis explain Rebbi Simeon’s reason, “after that he shall give the water to the woman to drink”? Against her will, without her agreement. Rebbi Simeon agrees with the rabbis that if he gave her to drink and after that presented her offering, it is valid. The rabbis agree with Rebbi Simeon that if he presented her offering and after that gave her to drink, it is valid. What is the difference between them? The commandment. The rabbis say that the flour offering checks her out but Rebbi Simeon says, the water is what checks her out. What is the reason of the Sages? “A flour offering of remembrance remembering iniquity.” What is the reason of Rebbi Simeon? “They shall come into her.” How do the rabbis explain Rebbi Simeon’s reason, “they shall come into her”? This teaches that it shakes all her limbs. How does Rebbi Simeon explain the rabbis’ reason, “a flour offering of remembrance remembering iniquity”? This teaches that all iniquities she has committed are remembered at that time.
HALAKHAH: “He gives her to drink and after that he sacrifices her offering,” etc. What is the reason of the rabbis? “They shall come into her.” What is the reason of Rebbi Simeon? “After that he shall give to the woman to drink.” How does Rebbi Simeon explain the rabbis’ reason, “they shall come into her”? All of them, not part only How do the rabbis explain Rebbi Simeon’s reason, “after that he shall give the water to the woman to drink”? Against her will, without her agreement. Rebbi Simeon agrees with the rabbis that if he gave her to drink and after that presented her offering, it is valid. The rabbis agree with Rebbi Simeon that if he presented her offering and after that gave her to drink, it is valid. What is the difference between them? The commandment. The rabbis say that the flour offering checks her out but Rebbi Simeon says, the water is what checks her out. What is the reason of the Sages? “A flour offering of remembrance remembering iniquity.” What is the reason of Rebbi Simeon? “They shall come into her.” How do the rabbis explain Rebbi Simeon’s reason, “they shall come into her”? This teaches that it shakes all her limbs. How does Rebbi Simeon explain the rabbis’ reason, “a flour offering of remembrance remembering iniquity”? This teaches that all iniquities she has committed are remembered at that time.
HALAKHAH: “He gives her to drink and after that he sacrifices her offering,” etc. What is the reason of the rabbis? “They shall come into her.” What is the reason of Rebbi Simeon? “After that he shall give to the woman to drink.” How does Rebbi Simeon explain the rabbis’ reason, “they shall come into her”? All of them, not part only How do the rabbis explain Rebbi Simeon’s reason, “after that he shall give the water to the woman to drink”? Against her will, without her agreement. Rebbi Simeon agrees with the rabbis that if he gave her to drink and after that presented her offering, it is valid. The rabbis agree with Rebbi Simeon that if he presented her offering and after that gave her to drink, it is valid. What is the difference between them? The commandment. The rabbis say that the flour offering checks her out but Rebbi Simeon says, the water is what checks her out. What is the reason of the Sages? “A flour offering of remembrance remembering iniquity.” What is the reason of Rebbi Simeon? “They shall come into her.” How do the rabbis explain Rebbi Simeon’s reason, “they shall come into her”? This teaches that it shakes all her limbs. How does Rebbi Simeon explain the rabbis’ reason, “a flour offering of remembrance remembering iniquity”? This teaches that all iniquities she has committed are remembered at that time.
HALAKHAH: “He gives her to drink and after that he sacrifices her offering,” etc. What is the reason of the rabbis? “They shall come into her.” What is the reason of Rebbi Simeon? “After that he shall give to the woman to drink.” How does Rebbi Simeon explain the rabbis’ reason, “they shall come into her”? All of them, not part only How do the rabbis explain Rebbi Simeon’s reason, “after that he shall give the water to the woman to drink”? Against her will, without her agreement. Rebbi Simeon agrees with the rabbis that if he gave her to drink and after that presented her offering, it is valid. The rabbis agree with Rebbi Simeon that if he presented her offering and after that gave her to drink, it is valid. What is the difference between them? The commandment. The rabbis say that the flour offering checks her out but Rebbi Simeon says, the water is what checks her out. What is the reason of the Sages? “A flour offering of remembrance remembering iniquity.” What is the reason of Rebbi Simeon? “They shall come into her.” How do the rabbis explain Rebbi Simeon’s reason, “they shall come into her”? This teaches that it shakes all her limbs. How does Rebbi Simeon explain the rabbis’ reason, “a flour offering of remembrance remembering iniquity”? This teaches that all iniquities she has committed are remembered at that time.
HALAKHAH: “He gives her to drink and after that he sacrifices her offering,” etc. What is the reason of the rabbis? “They shall come into her.” What is the reason of Rebbi Simeon? “After that he shall give to the woman to drink.” How does Rebbi Simeon explain the rabbis’ reason, “they shall come into her”? All of them, not part only How do the rabbis explain Rebbi Simeon’s reason, “after that he shall give the water to the woman to drink”? Against her will, without her agreement. Rebbi Simeon agrees with the rabbis that if he gave her to drink and after that presented her offering, it is valid. The rabbis agree with Rebbi Simeon that if he presented her offering and after that gave her to drink, it is valid. What is the difference between them? The commandment. The rabbis say that the flour offering checks her out but Rebbi Simeon says, the water is what checks her out. What is the reason of the Sages? “A flour offering of remembrance remembering iniquity.” What is the reason of Rebbi Simeon? “They shall come into her.” How do the rabbis explain Rebbi Simeon’s reason, “they shall come into her”? This teaches that it shakes all her limbs. How does Rebbi Simeon explain the rabbis’ reason, “a flour offering of remembrance remembering iniquity”? This teaches that all iniquities she has committed are remembered at that time.
HALAKHAH: “He gives her to drink and after that he sacrifices her offering,” etc. What is the reason of the rabbis? “They shall come into her.” What is the reason of Rebbi Simeon? “After that he shall give to the woman to drink.” How does Rebbi Simeon explain the rabbis’ reason, “they shall come into her”? All of them, not part only How do the rabbis explain Rebbi Simeon’s reason, “after that he shall give the water to the woman to drink”? Against her will, without her agreement. Rebbi Simeon agrees with the rabbis that if he gave her to drink and after that presented her offering, it is valid. The rabbis agree with Rebbi Simeon that if he presented her offering and after that gave her to drink, it is valid. What is the difference between them? The commandment. The rabbis say that the flour offering checks her out but Rebbi Simeon says, the water is what checks her out. What is the reason of the Sages? “A flour offering of remembrance remembering iniquity.” What is the reason of Rebbi Simeon? “They shall come into her.” How do the rabbis explain Rebbi Simeon’s reason, “they shall come into her”? This teaches that it shakes all her limbs. How does Rebbi Simeon explain the rabbis’ reason, “a flour offering of remembrance remembering iniquity”? This teaches that all iniquities she has committed are remembered at that time.
The rabbis say, he writes, erases, gives to drink, and sacrifices [the flour offering]. Rebbi Simeon says, he writes, sacrifices, erases, and gives to drink. Everybody agrees that erasing immediately precedes drinking; only that the rabbis say, he writes, erases, gives to drink, and sacrifices, while Rebbi Simeon says, he writes, sacrifices, erases, and gives to drink. It was stated: “She may always change her mind as long as her offering was not sacrificed. If her offering was sacrificed and she said I do not want to drink’ one makes her gargle and forces her to drink”. Following Rebbi Simeon. But following the rabbis she already drank. We have stated: “She did not finish drinking”. Some Tannaïm state: She did not move from there. He who says, she did not finish drinking, Rebbi Simeon. He who says, she did not move from there, the rabbis.
The rabbis say, he writes, erases, gives to drink, and sacrifices [the flour offering]. Rebbi Simeon says, he writes, sacrifices, erases, and gives to drink. Everybody agrees that erasing immediately precedes drinking; only that the rabbis say, he writes, erases, gives to drink, and sacrifices, while Rebbi Simeon says, he writes, sacrifices, erases, and gives to drink. It was stated: “She may always change her mind as long as her offering was not sacrificed. If her offering was sacrificed and she said I do not want to drink’ one makes her gargle and forces her to drink”. Following Rebbi Simeon. But following the rabbis she already drank. We have stated: “She did not finish drinking”. Some Tannaïm state: She did not move from there. He who says, she did not finish drinking, Rebbi Simeon. He who says, she did not move from there, the rabbis.
The rabbis say, he writes, erases, gives to drink, and sacrifices [the flour offering]. Rebbi Simeon says, he writes, sacrifices, erases, and gives to drink. Everybody agrees that erasing immediately precedes drinking; only that the rabbis say, he writes, erases, gives to drink, and sacrifices, while Rebbi Simeon says, he writes, sacrifices, erases, and gives to drink. It was stated: “She may always change her mind as long as her offering was not sacrificed. If her offering was sacrificed and she said I do not want to drink’ one makes her gargle and forces her to drink”. Following Rebbi Simeon. But following the rabbis she already drank. We have stated: “She did not finish drinking”. Some Tannaïm state: She did not move from there. He who says, she did not finish drinking, Rebbi Simeon. He who says, she did not move from there, the rabbis.
The rabbis say, he writes, erases, gives to drink, and sacrifices [the flour offering]. Rebbi Simeon says, he writes, sacrifices, erases, and gives to drink. Everybody agrees that erasing immediately precedes drinking; only that the rabbis say, he writes, erases, gives to drink, and sacrifices, while Rebbi Simeon says, he writes, sacrifices, erases, and gives to drink. It was stated: “She may always change her mind as long as her offering was not sacrificed. If her offering was sacrificed and she said I do not want to drink’ one makes her gargle and forces her to drink”. Following Rebbi Simeon. But following the rabbis she already drank. We have stated: “She did not finish drinking”. Some Tannaïm state: She did not move from there. He who says, she did not finish drinking, Rebbi Simeon. He who says, she did not move from there, the rabbis.
We have stated there: “Rebbi Simeon says, a fistful is taken from the sinner’s flour offering of a Cohen. The fistful is sacrificed separately and the rest is sacrificed separately.” Both of them explained the same verse: “It shall be the Cohen’s as a flour offering.” The rabbis say, it is like his voluntary flour offering. Since his voluntary flour offering is brought entire, that one also is brought entire. Rebbi Simeon says, the tenth of an epha of a Cohen is like the tenth of an epha of an Israel. Since a fistful is taken from the tenth of an epha of an Israel, so a fistful is taken from the tenth of an epha of a Cohen. Maybe, since this one is eaten, the other is also eaten? The verse says, “Any flour offering of a Cohen shall be totally burned; it shall not be eaten.” The rest, under which category is it brought, under the rules of a fistful or under the rules of remainders? If you want to say, under the rules of a fistful, one cannot bring them during the night, one cannot bring them after death, and he is forbidden to think about them. If you want to say, under the rules of a remainder, one can bring them during the night, one can bring them after death. Is he forbidden to think about them? Let us hear from the following: Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon says, the fistful is sacrificed separately and the rest dispersed over the ashes. Rebbi Joḥanan asked, where are we holding? If the upper ashes, Rebbi Simeon already said it. If it cannot refer to the upper ashes, let it refer to the lower ashes. That means, one can bring them during the night, one can bring them after death, and he can think about them. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, he is forbidden to think about them since they are not qualified as food either for humans or for the altar. Rebbi Abba bar Mamal asked: Does Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon follow the rules of his father or the rules of the rabbis? According to the rules of his father, it should be brought on top [of the altar]. According to the rules of the rabbis, why should he take a fistful? He follows his father’s rules. Rebbi Simeon says, the tenth of an epha of a Cohen is like the tenth of an epha of an Israel. Since a fistful is taken from the tenth of an epha of an Israel, so a fistful is taken from the tenth of an epha of a Cohen. Maybe, since this one is eaten, the other is also eaten? The verse says, “Any flour offering of a Cohen shall be totally burned; it shall not be eaten.” Then it should be burned totally! You bound it to “it shall not be eaten”; you did not bind it to “it has to be sacrificed in its entirety.”
We have stated there: “Rebbi Simeon says, a fistful is taken from the sinner’s flour offering of a Cohen. The fistful is sacrificed separately and the rest is sacrificed separately.” Both of them explained the same verse: “It shall be the Cohen’s as a flour offering.” The rabbis say, it is like his voluntary flour offering. Since his voluntary flour offering is brought entire, that one also is brought entire. Rebbi Simeon says, the tenth of an epha of a Cohen is like the tenth of an epha of an Israel. Since a fistful is taken from the tenth of an epha of an Israel, so a fistful is taken from the tenth of an epha of a Cohen. Maybe, since this one is eaten, the other is also eaten? The verse says, “Any flour offering of a Cohen shall be totally burned; it shall not be eaten.” The rest, under which category is it brought, under the rules of a fistful or under the rules of remainders? If you want to say, under the rules of a fistful, one cannot bring them during the night, one cannot bring them after death, and he is forbidden to think about them. If you want to say, under the rules of a remainder, one can bring them during the night, one can bring them after death. Is he forbidden to think about them? Let us hear from the following: Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon says, the fistful is sacrificed separately and the rest dispersed over the ashes. Rebbi Joḥanan asked, where are we holding? If the upper ashes, Rebbi Simeon already said it. If it cannot refer to the upper ashes, let it refer to the lower ashes. That means, one can bring them during the night, one can bring them after death, and he can think about them. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, he is forbidden to think about them since they are not qualified as food either for humans or for the altar. Rebbi Abba bar Mamal asked: Does Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon follow the rules of his father or the rules of the rabbis? According to the rules of his father, it should be brought on top [of the altar]. According to the rules of the rabbis, why should he take a fistful? He follows his father’s rules. Rebbi Simeon says, the tenth of an epha of a Cohen is like the tenth of an epha of an Israel. Since a fistful is taken from the tenth of an epha of an Israel, so a fistful is taken from the tenth of an epha of a Cohen. Maybe, since this one is eaten, the other is also eaten? The verse says, “Any flour offering of a Cohen shall be totally burned; it shall not be eaten.” Then it should be burned totally! You bound it to “it shall not be eaten”; you did not bind it to “it has to be sacrificed in its entirety.”
We have stated there: “Rebbi Simeon says, a fistful is taken from the sinner’s flour offering of a Cohen. The fistful is sacrificed separately and the rest is sacrificed separately.” Both of them explained the same verse: “It shall be the Cohen’s as a flour offering.” The rabbis say, it is like his voluntary flour offering. Since his voluntary flour offering is brought entire, that one also is brought entire. Rebbi Simeon says, the tenth of an epha of a Cohen is like the tenth of an epha of an Israel. Since a fistful is taken from the tenth of an epha of an Israel, so a fistful is taken from the tenth of an epha of a Cohen. Maybe, since this one is eaten, the other is also eaten? The verse says, “Any flour offering of a Cohen shall be totally burned; it shall not be eaten.” The rest, under which category is it brought, under the rules of a fistful or under the rules of remainders? If you want to say, under the rules of a fistful, one cannot bring them during the night, one cannot bring them after death, and he is forbidden to think about them. If you want to say, under the rules of a remainder, one can bring them during the night, one can bring them after death. Is he forbidden to think about them? Let us hear from the following: Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon says, the fistful is sacrificed separately and the rest dispersed over the ashes. Rebbi Joḥanan asked, where are we holding? If the upper ashes, Rebbi Simeon already said it. If it cannot refer to the upper ashes, let it refer to the lower ashes. That means, one can bring them during the night, one can bring them after death, and he can think about them. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, he is forbidden to think about them since they are not qualified as food either for humans or for the altar. Rebbi Abba bar Mamal asked: Does Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon follow the rules of his father or the rules of the rabbis? According to the rules of his father, it should be brought on top [of the altar]. According to the rules of the rabbis, why should he take a fistful? He follows his father’s rules. Rebbi Simeon says, the tenth of an epha of a Cohen is like the tenth of an epha of an Israel. Since a fistful is taken from the tenth of an epha of an Israel, so a fistful is taken from the tenth of an epha of a Cohen. Maybe, since this one is eaten, the other is also eaten? The verse says, “Any flour offering of a Cohen shall be totally burned; it shall not be eaten.” Then it should be burned totally! You bound it to “it shall not be eaten”; you did not bind it to “it has to be sacrificed in its entirety.”