sale

Rebbi Hillel bar Pazi asked before Rebbi Yose: If he sold and then she died? He said to him, his sale is invalid; it is as if a son sold during his father’s lifetime and then the father died. If she sold and then he died? He said to him, her sale is valid; it is as if a father sold during his son’s lifetime and then the son died. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Marius asked before Rebbi Jonah: What is the situation if she sold to her husband? He said, since Ḥizqiah said, practice follows Rebbi Judah, this implies that her sale is a sale. It was stated: “If somebody says, my property should be given to X, if X died to Y, [if Y died to Z]. If the first one died the properties should be given to the second, if the second died they should be given to the third. If the second one died during the first’s lifetime; since the second never acquired them, the third cannot acquire them.” He said to him, so did Rebbi Hoshaia, the father of the Mishnah, explain: After him to X, after him to Y; it is as if stated: if the third died during the second’s lifetime, since the second one did not acquire his heirs cannot acquire, one really could say: After him to X, after him to Y. It was stated: “Rebbi says, the first one may sell the real estate and buy movables. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, he has only the usufruct.” Ḥizqiah said, practice follows Rebbi. Rebbi Mana said, since Ḥizqiah said, practice follows Rebbi, that implies that he cannot dispose of it by a death-bed will. So said Rebbi Mana before Rebbi Yose: Since this woman’s upkeep is her husband’s responsibility, is it not like a gift of sick persons? He said to him, her upkeep is what is necessary for her: food, oil, and salt. But she wants to sell and buy chickens. This means that if the first one wanted to sell and buy chickens, he may sell. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, her burial is equal to her upkeep. Since you said there, he may sell real estate and buy food, so he may sell real estate and buy a burial.

Rebbi Hillel bar Pazi asked before Rebbi Yose: If he sold and then she died? He said to him, his sale is invalid; it is as if a son sold during his father’s lifetime and then the father died. If she sold and then he died? He said to him, her sale is valid; it is as if a father sold during his son’s lifetime and then the son died. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Marius asked before Rebbi Jonah: What is the situation if she sold to her husband? He said, since Ḥizqiah said, practice follows Rebbi Judah, this implies that her sale is a sale. It was stated: “If somebody says, my property should be given to X, if X died to Y, [if Y died to Z]. If the first one died the properties should be given to the second, if the second died they should be given to the third. If the second one died during the first’s lifetime; since the second never acquired them, the third cannot acquire them.” He said to him, so did Rebbi Hoshaia, the father of the Mishnah, explain: After him to X, after him to Y; it is as if stated: if the third died during the second’s lifetime, since the second one did not acquire his heirs cannot acquire, one really could say: After him to X, after him to Y. It was stated: “Rebbi says, the first one may sell the real estate and buy movables. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, he has only the usufruct.” Ḥizqiah said, practice follows Rebbi. Rebbi Mana said, since Ḥizqiah said, practice follows Rebbi, that implies that he cannot dispose of it by a death-bed will. So said Rebbi Mana before Rebbi Yose: Since this woman’s upkeep is her husband’s responsibility, is it not like a gift of sick persons? He said to him, her upkeep is what is necessary for her: food, oil, and salt. But she wants to sell and buy chickens. This means that if the first one wanted to sell and buy chickens, he may sell. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, her burial is equal to her upkeep. Since you said there, he may sell real estate and buy food, so he may sell real estate and buy a burial.

Rebbi Hillel bar Pazi asked before Rebbi Yose: If he sold and then she died? He said to him, his sale is invalid; it is as if a son sold during his father’s lifetime and then the father died. If she sold and then he died? He said to him, her sale is valid; it is as if a father sold during his son’s lifetime and then the son died. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Marius asked before Rebbi Jonah: What is the situation if she sold to her husband? He said, since Ḥizqiah said, practice follows Rebbi Judah, this implies that her sale is a sale. It was stated: “If somebody says, my property should be given to X, if X died to Y, [if Y died to Z]. If the first one died the properties should be given to the second, if the second died they should be given to the third. If the second one died during the first’s lifetime; since the second never acquired them, the third cannot acquire them.” He said to him, so did Rebbi Hoshaia, the father of the Mishnah, explain: After him to X, after him to Y; it is as if stated: if the third died during the second’s lifetime, since the second one did not acquire his heirs cannot acquire, one really could say: After him to X, after him to Y. It was stated: “Rebbi says, the first one may sell the real estate and buy movables. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, he has only the usufruct.” Ḥizqiah said, practice follows Rebbi. Rebbi Mana said, since Ḥizqiah said, practice follows Rebbi, that implies that he cannot dispose of it by a death-bed will. So said Rebbi Mana before Rebbi Yose: Since this woman’s upkeep is her husband’s responsibility, is it not like a gift of sick persons? He said to him, her upkeep is what is necessary for her: food, oil, and salt. But she wants to sell and buy chickens. This means that if the first one wanted to sell and buy chickens, he may sell. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, her burial is equal to her upkeep. Since you said there, he may sell real estate and buy food, so he may sell real estate and buy a burial.

HALAKHAH: “If she sold her ketubah entirely or partially,” etc. It was stated: “She sells and writes ‘this I sold for ketubah’ and ‘this I sold for sustenance,’ the words of Rebbi Jehudah. Rebbi Yose said, she sells and writes non-specifically; in this she is empowered.” If a loan before witnesses [comes due], she says, I sold for sustenance. If a loan by contract [comes due], she says, I sold for my ketubah. And even if a loan before witnesses [comes due], she sells for sustenance and turns around and forecloses it for her ketubah; could one not say to her, show your sale? Explain it, if the object increased in value.

MISHNAH: If a widow’s ketubah was 200 and she sold either the worth of a mina for 200 or the worth of 200 for a mina, her ketubah was paid. If her ketubah was for a mina and she sold the worth of a mina and a denar for a mina, her sale is void. Even if she says, I shall return the denar to the heirs, her sale is void.

MISHNAH: If a widow’s ketubah was 200 and she sold either the worth of a mina for 200 or the worth of 200 for a mina, her ketubah was paid. If her ketubah was for a mina and she sold the worth of a mina and a denar for a mina, her sale is void. Even if she says, I shall return the denar to the heirs, her sale is void.

HALAKHAH: “If a widow’s ketubah was 200,” etc. We understand worth a mina for 200 or worth 200 for a mina. In any case, she made the orphans lose a mina. [If it was worth] a mina [and she sold it] for 200, would the sale not be invalidated as erroneous buy? Explain it that the property increased in value. Rebbi Abin said, this supports Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, since Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, real estate buys are never under the laws of overcharging. Rebbi Joḥanan said, if the transaction was excessive, it comes under the law of overcharging. The Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “The following do not fall under the laws of overcharging: Slaves, securities, real estate, and redemptions.” He explains it, unless it was excessive. If he redeemed what was worth a mina by 200, Rebbi Joḥanan said, it is not redeemed, but Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, it is redeemed. A baralta disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: If he said, this toga instead of this donkey, the latter becomes profane. And its end disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: It is necessary to compute the value. Rebbi Yose said, the baraita itself implies that it is necessary to compute the value. Where do they disagree? To bring [a sacrifice to atone for] larceny. Rebbi Joḥanan said, he has to bring a sacrifice for larceny; Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, he does not have to bring a sacrifice for larceny.

MISHNAH: Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, her sale is valid unless there would have been left a field [for sowing] nine qab, and in a garden half a qab, or following the words of Rebbi Aqiba, a fourth. If her ketubah was 400 zuz and she sold to one person worth 100, to a second 100, to a third 100, and to the last the value of a mina and a denar for a mina, the last transaction is invalid but all others are valid.

HALAKHAH: “Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, her sale is valid,” etc. That is, if she sold them in four contracts. If she sold them in one contract, there is disagreement between Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, as they disagreed: If somebody wrote all his property over to two persons in one document and the testimony of the witnesses was valid for one but invalid for the other. Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Yasa: Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagreed; one said, since it is invalid for one it is invalid for the other, but the other said, it is valid for one and invalid for the other. Rebbi Mana did not specify; Rebbi Abin specified: Rebbi Joḥanan said, since it is invalid for one it is invalid for the other; but Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, it is valid for one and invalid for the other. Rebbi Elazar said, a Mishnah supports Rebbi Joḥanan: “Since testimony of two [witnesses] is invalid if one of them turns out to be related or disqualified, so also of three [witnesses] it is invalid if one of them turns out to be related or disqualified. From where even 100? The verse says, ‘witnesses’”. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, Rebbi Ḥananiah the colleague of the rabbis and the rabbis disagree. One says, the argument of Rebbi Eleazar is correct, but the other says, the argument of Rebbi Eleazar is not correct. For him who says, the argument of Rebbi Eleazar is correct, it is as if there was one testimony about one person. For him who says, the argument of Rebbi Eleazar is not correct, it is as if two groups of witnesses came, valid for one and disqualified for the other.

MISHNAH: If the judges estimated one sixth too little or too much, their sale is invalid. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, their sale is valid; otherwise, what is the court’s power worth? But if they offered public tender, even if they sold either the worth of a mina for 200 or the worth of 200 for a mina, their sale is valid.

MISHNAH: If the judges estimated one sixth too little or too much, their sale is invalid. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, their sale is valid; otherwise, what is the court’s power worth? But if they offered public tender, even if they sold either the worth of a mina for 200 or the worth of 200 for a mina, their sale is valid.

MISHNAH: If the judges estimated one sixth too little or too much, their sale is invalid. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, their sale is valid; otherwise, what is the court’s power worth? But if they offered public tender, even if they sold either the worth of a mina for 200 or the worth of 200 for a mina, their sale is valid.

“And one announces mornings and evenings,” at the time when [agricultural] workers go out or come back, and he mentions the field and its description. Rebbi Yose said, if they do not get their estimated price, they can conclude the sale. Is that the Mishnah, “if the judges estimated one sixth too little or too much, their sale is invalid”? Becausethey sold too low or too high, but if they found their estimate they close the deal. Rebbi Ḥananiah said before Rebbi Mana: What can you say, we deal with the case that they did not announce in public! From what is said afterwards: “Except if they offered public tender.” What is public tender? Rebbi Jehudah bar Pazi said, announcement.

“And one announces mornings and evenings,” at the time when [agricultural] workers go out or come back, and he mentions the field and its description. Rebbi Yose said, if they do not get their estimated price, they can conclude the sale. Is that the Mishnah, “if the judges estimated one sixth too little or too much, their sale is invalid”? Becausethey sold too low or too high, but if they found their estimate they close the deal. Rebbi Ḥananiah said before Rebbi Mana: What can you say, we deal with the case that they did not announce in public! From what is said afterwards: “Except if they offered public tender.” What is public tender? Rebbi Jehudah bar Pazi said, announcement.

There, we have stated: “The public sale of orphans’ property goes on for 30 days, the public sale of Temple property goes on for 30 days, and they are publicly announed mornings and evenings.” Rebbi Mana said, Rebbi Eliezer is afraid of trickery, Rebbi Joshua is not afraid of trickery. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, Rebbi Eliezer follows the House of Shammai and Rebbi Joshua the House of Hillel. Rebbi Eliezer follows the House of Shammai, since the House of Shammai say, a person may ask about his dedication; could he say that he does not have to vow usufruct? Rebbi Joshua follows the House of Hillel, since the House of Hillel say, a person may not ask about his dedication; could he say that he has to vow usufruct? In any case, could not a man ask about his vow of usufruct? Rebbi Joshua agrees that a guarantor must execute a vow of usufruct. What does Rebbi Joshua say about a gift? Since he gives voluntarily, he does not have to vow usufruct, or since [the recipient’s] power is small and [the donor] may change his mind, does he have to vow usufruct? Let us hear from the following: The husband of a relative of Rebbi Ḥaggai owed on a document. The creditor came and foreclosed. The case came before Rebbi Aḥa, who said, he owes a vow of usufruct. Rebbi Yose said, he does not have to vow usufruct. The colleagues said before Rebbi Aḥa [and] Rebbi Yose: Does Rebbi Aḥa say it correctly? Since if he takes her back, does not the creditor come and foreclose? Rebbi Yose said to them, she turns it into jewelry or keeps it as additions to her dowry. Rebbi Ḥaggai said, by Moses! Rebbi Yose says it correctly. It was executed following Rebbi Aḥa.

There, we have stated: “The public sale of orphans’ property goes on for 30 days, the public sale of Temple property goes on for 30 days, and they are publicly announed mornings and evenings.” Rebbi Mana said, Rebbi Eliezer is afraid of trickery, Rebbi Joshua is not afraid of trickery. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, Rebbi Eliezer follows the House of Shammai and Rebbi Joshua the House of Hillel. Rebbi Eliezer follows the House of Shammai, since the House of Shammai say, a person may ask about his dedication; could he say that he does not have to vow usufruct? Rebbi Joshua follows the House of Hillel, since the House of Hillel say, a person may not ask about his dedication; could he say that he has to vow usufruct? In any case, could not a man ask about his vow of usufruct? Rebbi Joshua agrees that a guarantor must execute a vow of usufruct. What does Rebbi Joshua say about a gift? Since he gives voluntarily, he does not have to vow usufruct, or since [the recipient’s] power is small and [the donor] may change his mind, does he have to vow usufruct? Let us hear from the following: The husband of a relative of Rebbi Ḥaggai owed on a document. The creditor came and foreclosed. The case came before Rebbi Aḥa, who said, he owes a vow of usufruct. Rebbi Yose said, he does not have to vow usufruct. The colleagues said before Rebbi Aḥa [and] Rebbi Yose: Does Rebbi Aḥa say it correctly? Since if he takes her back, does not the creditor come and foreclose? Rebbi Yose said to them, she turns it into jewelry or keeps it as additions to her dowry. Rebbi Ḥaggai said, by Moses! Rebbi Yose says it correctly. It was executed following Rebbi Aḥa.

HALAKHAH: If one says, “give this bill of divorce to my wife,” etc. Elsewhere you say that “give” means “bring”, but here you say that “give” means “acquire”! So is the Mishnah: “Acquire this bill of divorce for my wife; acquire this document of manumission for my slave.” The formulation of the Mishnah says so: “Because one may bestow benefit on a person in his absence but put a detriment on a person only in his presence.” Rebbi Meïr says, it is a detriment for either of them, but the Sages say it is a benefit for the slave but a detriment for the wife. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said, Rebbi Joḥanan asked: Think of it, if he was the slave of a rich person, would it not be a detriment for the slave? The colleagues said, Rebbi Joḥanan asked: Think of it, if she was the wife of a man suffering from boils, would it not be a benefit for the woman? You have only the following: If one sells his slave without the latter’s knowledge, is the sale of the slave not valid? If one divorces his wife without her knowledge, is the divorce valid because she was acquired by him? Rebbi Abin said, he is his property but he disqualifies him for heave.

Reuben robbed a field from Simeon and sold it to Levi; Levi went and gave it to Jehudah as a gift. Then Simeon foreclosed it from Jehudah. Jehudah has no regress on Levi since it was a gift. Levi has regress on Reuben since it was a sale. Did he not give it away as a gift? He can say to him, it was my intention to give it to him so he would return me favors. Reuben robbed a field from Simeon and gave it to Levi as a gift; Levi sold it to Jehudah. Jehudah has regress on Levi since he sold it; Levi has no regress on Reuben since it was a gift; as Rebbi Yose said in the name of the rabbis: No easement is created by a gift.

Reuben robbed a field from Simeon and sold it to Levi, and he did not have time to write the foreclosure document before he died: whose is it? Rav Huna and Ḥiyya the son of Rav: One said, if he wrote the foreclosure document, it is Reuben’s, if not, it is Levi’s. The other one said, whether he wrote or did not write, it belongs to Levi. Rebbi Mana said, it is reasonable that it does not belong to Reuben since he can say to him, I sold you something which was not mine. Rebbi Yose said, it is not reasonable that it should not be Levi’s, since Reuben can tell him, is this not before you? You are good to confirm the sale.

So far, if there were two contracts. If there was one contract? Rebbi Ze‘ira and Rebbi Ila both say, certainly the sale is invalid; i. e., if he bought from the wife and then bought from the husband. Rebbi Ḥanina and Rebbi Bevon both said, certainly the sale is valid; i. e., if he bought from the husband and then bought from the wife. But is not all the wife’s property administered by the husband? For the yield.

So far, if there were two contracts. If there was one contract? Rebbi Ze‘ira and Rebbi Ila both say, certainly the sale is invalid; i. e., if he bought from the wife and then bought from the husband. Rebbi Ḥanina and Rebbi Bevon both said, certainly the sale is valid; i. e., if he bought from the husband and then bought from the wife. But is not all the wife’s property administered by the husband? For the yield.

MISHNAH: A deaf-mute communicates in sign language, and Ben Bathyra says, in pantomimes, referring to movables. Underage children: their buy is a buy and their sale is a sale, referring to movables.

MISHNAH: A deaf-mute communicates in sign language, and Ben Bathyra says, in pantomimes, referring to movables. Underage children: their buy is a buy and their sale is a sale, referring to movables.

There, we have stated: “A judicial oath, for a claim of two silver pieces and a judicial acknowlegdment of a peruṭah. The claim, the House of Shammai say, an obolus, but the House of Hillel say, two obols.” The argument of the House of Shammai seems inverted. There, they say, “silver” is a denar, but here, they say that “silver” is an obolus. The argument of the House of Hillel seems inverted. There, they say, “money” is a peruṭah, but here, they say that “money” is two obols. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina: The house of Shammai learn from the initial sale of a Hebrew girl. Since her initial sale was by [at least] a denar, so her preliminary marriage is by [at least] a denar. The House of Hillel learn from the end of her diminution. Since the end of her diminution is a peruṭah, so her preliminary marriage is by a peruṭah. What is the reason of the House of Shammai? As it is said: “She leaves gratis, without silver.” Would we not know that it is without money? Why does the verse say, “without silver”? From there, that she is sold for more than silver. And what is more than silver? A denar. But maybe “silver” is a peruṭah, more than silver two peruṭot? The smallest silver coin is an obolus. So why is it not an obolus? Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Judah bar Pazi: For if she wants to diminish, she diminishes every year by an obolus and leaves. Could she not diminish by a peruṭah? Rebbi Abun said, think of it. If she wanted to compute the diminution at the start of the sixth year, there would be a peruṭah left, and at the end of the sixth year, there would be a peruṭah left. But the start of the diminution must be an obolus, the end of the diminution a peruṭah. If there is only one peruṭah left, can she not pay the diminished amount and leave? Just as the last diminished amount is a peruṭah, so her preliminary marriage should be a peruṭah! What is the reason of the House of Hillel? Since her last diminished amount is a peruṭah, you know that her preliminary marriage is by a peruṭah.

There, we have stated: “A judicial oath, for a claim of two silver pieces and a judicial acknowlegdment of a peruṭah. The claim, the House of Shammai say, an obolus, but the House of Hillel say, two obols.” The argument of the House of Shammai seems inverted. There, they say, “silver” is a denar, but here, they say that “silver” is an obolus. The argument of the House of Hillel seems inverted. There, they say, “money” is a peruṭah, but here, they say that “money” is two obols. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina: The house of Shammai learn from the initial sale of a Hebrew girl. Since her initial sale was by [at least] a denar, so her preliminary marriage is by [at least] a denar. The House of Hillel learn from the end of her diminution. Since the end of her diminution is a peruṭah, so her preliminary marriage is by a peruṭah. What is the reason of the House of Shammai? As it is said: “She leaves gratis, without silver.” Would we not know that it is without money? Why does the verse say, “without silver”? From there, that she is sold for more than silver. And what is more than silver? A denar. But maybe “silver” is a peruṭah, more than silver two peruṭot? The smallest silver coin is an obolus. So why is it not an obolus? Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Judah bar Pazi: For if she wants to diminish, she diminishes every year by an obolus and leaves. Could she not diminish by a peruṭah? Rebbi Abun said, think of it. If she wanted to compute the diminution at the start of the sixth year, there would be a peruṭah left, and at the end of the sixth year, there would be a peruṭah left. But the start of the diminution must be an obolus, the end of the diminution a peruṭah. If there is only one peruṭah left, can she not pay the diminished amount and leave? Just as the last diminished amount is a peruṭah, so her preliminary marriage should be a peruṭah! What is the reason of the House of Hillel? Since her last diminished amount is a peruṭah, you know that her preliminary marriage is by a peruṭah.

HALAKHAH: “A Hebrew slave is acquired by money,” etc. It is written: “If your Hebrew brother or sister be sold to you,” he bracketed the male Hebrew with the female. Since the female Hebrew can be acquired by money or contract, also the male Hebrew can be acquired by money or contract. One understands money since it is written: “She leaves gratis, without money [due].” From where by contract? The female Hebrew is inferred from the free woman, and the male Hebrew from the female. This is a combination of inferences. That follows Rebbi Aqiba who accepts combination of inferences. Following Rebbi Ismael who rejects combination of inferences? It was found that Rebbi Ismael stated: In the case of the word חֻפְשָׁה, “free” is inferred from חֻפְשָׁה. Everywhere Rebbi Ismael rejects combination of inferences and here, he accepts combination of inferences? Rebbi Ismael stated it in the name of the Sages. From where is it derived for Rebbi Ismael? “Sending away, sending away.” Since “sending away” mentioned there means by a contract, also “sending away” here means by a contract. But it does not compare. There it is to gain autonomy, here it is to be acquired by others! Rebbi Mattaniah said, “sale, sale”. Since “sale” mentioned there means by a contract, “sale” here also means by a contract. But since there it is possible by possession, then here it should be possible by possession. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Ada said, the male Hebrew is like the female Hebrew.

HALAKHAH: “A Hebrew slave is acquired by money,” etc. It is written: “If your Hebrew brother or sister be sold to you,” he bracketed the male Hebrew with the female. Since the female Hebrew can be acquired by money or contract, also the male Hebrew can be acquired by money or contract. One understands money since it is written: “She leaves gratis, without money [due].” From where by contract? The female Hebrew is inferred from the free woman, and the male Hebrew from the female. This is a combination of inferences. That follows Rebbi Aqiba who accepts combination of inferences. Following Rebbi Ismael who rejects combination of inferences? It was found that Rebbi Ismael stated: In the case of the word חֻפְשָׁה, “free” is inferred from חֻפְשָׁה. Everywhere Rebbi Ismael rejects combination of inferences and here, he accepts combination of inferences? Rebbi Ismael stated it in the name of the Sages. From where is it derived for Rebbi Ismael? “Sending away, sending away.” Since “sending away” mentioned there means by a contract, also “sending away” here means by a contract. But it does not compare. There it is to gain autonomy, here it is to be acquired by others! Rebbi Mattaniah said, “sale, sale”. Since “sale” mentioned there means by a contract, “sale” here also means by a contract. But since there it is possible by possession, then here it should be possible by possession. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Ada said, the male Hebrew is like the female Hebrew.

HALAKHAH: “A Hebrew slave is acquired by money,” etc. It is written: “If your Hebrew brother or sister be sold to you,” he bracketed the male Hebrew with the female. Since the female Hebrew can be acquired by money or contract, also the male Hebrew can be acquired by money or contract. One understands money since it is written: “She leaves gratis, without money [due].” From where by contract? The female Hebrew is inferred from the free woman, and the male Hebrew from the female. This is a combination of inferences. That follows Rebbi Aqiba who accepts combination of inferences. Following Rebbi Ismael who rejects combination of inferences? It was found that Rebbi Ismael stated: In the case of the word חֻפְשָׁה, “free” is inferred from חֻפְשָׁה. Everywhere Rebbi Ismael rejects combination of inferences and here, he accepts combination of inferences? Rebbi Ismael stated it in the name of the Sages. From where is it derived for Rebbi Ismael? “Sending away, sending away.” Since “sending away” mentioned there means by a contract, also “sending away” here means by a contract. But it does not compare. There it is to gain autonomy, here it is to be acquired by others! Rebbi Mattaniah said, “sale, sale”. Since “sale” mentioned there means by a contract, “sale” here also means by a contract. But since there it is possible by possession, then here it should be possible by possession. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Ada said, the male Hebrew is like the female Hebrew.

HALAKHAH: “A Hebrew slave is acquired by money,” etc. It is written: “If your Hebrew brother or sister be sold to you,” he bracketed the male Hebrew with the female. Since the female Hebrew can be acquired by money or contract, also the male Hebrew can be acquired by money or contract. One understands money since it is written: “She leaves gratis, without money [due].” From where by contract? The female Hebrew is inferred from the free woman, and the male Hebrew from the female. This is a combination of inferences. That follows Rebbi Aqiba who accepts combination of inferences. Following Rebbi Ismael who rejects combination of inferences? It was found that Rebbi Ismael stated: In the case of the word חֻפְשָׁה, “free” is inferred from חֻפְשָׁה. Everywhere Rebbi Ismael rejects combination of inferences and here, he accepts combination of inferences? Rebbi Ismael stated it in the name of the Sages. From where is it derived for Rebbi Ismael? “Sending away, sending away.” Since “sending away” mentioned there means by a contract, also “sending away” here means by a contract. But it does not compare. There it is to gain autonomy, here it is to be acquired by others! Rebbi Mattaniah said, “sale, sale”. Since “sale” mentioned there means by a contract, “sale” here also means by a contract. But since there it is possible by possession, then here it should be possible by possession. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Ada said, the male Hebrew is like the female Hebrew.

“By money”. “The money of his sale price shall be;” he can be redeemed by money, not by produce nor by vessels. Everywhere you treat money’s worth like money, but here you do not treat money’s worth like money. Rebbi Abba Mari said, there is a difference, because the verse repeated “money, of money”. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Ada said, but if he wants to reduce, he can leave for the reduced amount even for produce, even for vessels. Rebbi Yudan, Rebbi Mattaniah’s father, said that this is only if he did not give them their money’s worth. But if he gave them their money’s worth, it is like money.

The order of sale is the following: I X sold my daughter to Y. The order of preliminary marriage is the following: I X gave my daughter to Y in preliminary marriage. Rebbi Ḥaggai asked before Rebbi Yose: If he switched and said, I Y acquired X’s daughter, I Y took X’s daughter in preliminary marriage? He said to him, what is the difference? But if he changed the language of sale to that of preliminary marriage or vice-versa, he did not do anything.

The order of sale is the following: I X sold my daughter to Y. The order of preliminary marriage is the following: I X gave my daughter to Y in preliminary marriage. Rebbi Ḥaggai asked before Rebbi Yose: If he switched and said, I Y acquired X’s daughter, I Y took X’s daughter in preliminary marriage? He said to him, what is the difference? But if he changed the language of sale to that of preliminary marriage or vice-versa, he did not do anything.

It is written: “Six years he shall work.” How much does he work? I could think that he leaves at the end of six [years]. The verse says, “and in the seventh he shall leave.” I could think that he leave at the end of seven [years]. The verse says, “six years he shall work.” How is that? He works the entire six and leaves at the start of the seventh. “And in the seventh he shall leave.” The seventh from the sale and not the Seventh of the world. Do you say, the seventh from the sale and not the Seventh of the world? Since it says, “six years he shall work,” this spells out six years. How can I confirm “and in the seventh he shall leave?” The seventh from the sale and not the Seventh of the world. Say it is the opposite. Rebbi Ze‘ira said in the name of Rav Huna: It is written: “and in the seventh,” “and in the seventh”. Rebbi Ḥuna said, if you say, in the Seventh of the world, what would the Jubilee free? Rebbi Joḥanan bar Marius said, this follows him who said that the Jubilee does not become part of a Sabbatical period. But following him who said that the Jubilee becomes part of a Sabbatical period, sometimes it falls in the middle of a Sabbatical period. The rabbis of Caesarea say, even following him who said that the Jubilee becomes part of a Sabbatical period, we could deduce from here that the Sabbatical year frees the slaves and the Jubilee the pierced ones.

It is written: “Six years he shall work.” How much does he work? I could think that he leaves at the end of six [years]. The verse says, “and in the seventh he shall leave.” I could think that he leave at the end of seven [years]. The verse says, “six years he shall work.” How is that? He works the entire six and leaves at the start of the seventh. “And in the seventh he shall leave.” The seventh from the sale and not the Seventh of the world. Do you say, the seventh from the sale and not the Seventh of the world? Since it says, “six years he shall work,” this spells out six years. How can I confirm “and in the seventh he shall leave?” The seventh from the sale and not the Seventh of the world. Say it is the opposite. Rebbi Ze‘ira said in the name of Rav Huna: It is written: “and in the seventh,” “and in the seventh”. Rebbi Ḥuna said, if you say, in the Seventh of the world, what would the Jubilee free? Rebbi Joḥanan bar Marius said, this follows him who said that the Jubilee does not become part of a Sabbatical period. But following him who said that the Jubilee becomes part of a Sabbatical period, sometimes it falls in the middle of a Sabbatical period. The rabbis of Caesarea say, even following him who said that the Jubilee becomes part of a Sabbatical period, we could deduce from here that the Sabbatical year frees the slaves and the Jubilee the pierced ones.

It is written: “Six years he shall work.” How much does he work? I could think that he leaves at the end of six [years]. The verse says, “and in the seventh he shall leave.” I could think that he leave at the end of seven [years]. The verse says, “six years he shall work.” How is that? He works the entire six and leaves at the start of the seventh. “And in the seventh he shall leave.” The seventh from the sale and not the Seventh of the world. Do you say, the seventh from the sale and not the Seventh of the world? Since it says, “six years he shall work,” this spells out six years. How can I confirm “and in the seventh he shall leave?” The seventh from the sale and not the Seventh of the world. Say it is the opposite. Rebbi Ze‘ira said in the name of Rav Huna: It is written: “and in the seventh,” “and in the seventh”. Rebbi Ḥuna said, if you say, in the Seventh of the world, what would the Jubilee free? Rebbi Joḥanan bar Marius said, this follows him who said that the Jubilee does not become part of a Sabbatical period. But following him who said that the Jubilee becomes part of a Sabbatical period, sometimes it falls in the middle of a Sabbatical period. The rabbis of Caesarea say, even following him who said that the Jubilee becomes part of a Sabbatical period, we could deduce from here that the Sabbatical year frees the slaves and the Jubilee the pierced ones.

“By money.” Rebbi Abba was of the opinion, by money if there was no intention to write a deed. But if money was given with the intention to write a deed for him, possession was transferred only when the deed was written. Rebbi Jonah and Rebbi Yose disagree. It follows that Rebbi Abba parallels Samuel and Rav Huna Rebbi Joḥanan. Rebbi Abba parallels Samuel. Samuel asked Rav Ḥuna: He was slaughtering sacrifices while being occupied? He answered, “for your intention,” this excludes one otherwise occupied. If one wrote a gift in the language of a sale? He answered, he made it ride on two racing horses; Rebbi Abba said this; Samuel did not accept it. What means “he made it ride on two shining racing horses”? They wanted to say, one brings two crazy horses and makes it ride on both. One goes in one direction and the other in another; he has nothing in his hand. Rebbi Yose from Mamelia said, he doubly empowered him, for there is a title guarantee in a sale but none for a gift; the seller did not sell everything but the giver of a gift gave everything. And Rav Ḥuna parallels Rebbi Joḥanan. A person, when he lay dying, said: my property should be given to X. Afterwards he said: write and deliver. Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon bar Yaqim brought the case before Rebbi Joḥanan who said: If he said to transfer to him, everybody agrees that he entered into possession. If the transfer was to be in writing, everybody agrees that nobody transfers rights in writing after his death. Who would notify the greatness? Explain it if witnesses know. Think of it, if no witnesses know it? Rebbi Yose said, the field remains in the hand of its proprietors; the burden of proof is on the claimant.

“By money.” Rebbi Abba was of the opinion, by money if there was no intention to write a deed. But if money was given with the intention to write a deed for him, possession was transferred only when the deed was written. Rebbi Jonah and Rebbi Yose disagree. It follows that Rebbi Abba parallels Samuel and Rav Huna Rebbi Joḥanan. Rebbi Abba parallels Samuel. Samuel asked Rav Ḥuna: He was slaughtering sacrifices while being occupied? He answered, “for your intention,” this excludes one otherwise occupied. If one wrote a gift in the language of a sale? He answered, he made it ride on two racing horses; Rebbi Abba said this; Samuel did not accept it. What means “he made it ride on two shining racing horses”? They wanted to say, one brings two crazy horses and makes it ride on both. One goes in one direction and the other in another; he has nothing in his hand. Rebbi Yose from Mamelia said, he doubly empowered him, for there is a title guarantee in a sale but none for a gift; the seller did not sell everything but the giver of a gift gave everything. And Rav Ḥuna parallels Rebbi Joḥanan. A person, when he lay dying, said: my property should be given to X. Afterwards he said: write and deliver. Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon bar Yaqim brought the case before Rebbi Joḥanan who said: If he said to transfer to him, everybody agrees that he entered into possession. If the transfer was to be in writing, everybody agrees that nobody transfers rights in writing after his death. Who would notify the greatness? Explain it if witnesses know. Think of it, if no witnesses know it? Rebbi Yose said, the field remains in the hand of its proprietors; the burden of proof is on the claimant.

A person gave a pledge to another; the other reneged on it. Rebbi Abba, Rebbi Hila, and Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa all three say it was a deal about flax seed and he had given partial payment. The case came before Rebbi Joḥanan, who said: Either he delivers the entire contract or one may turn him over to “Him Who exacted retribution.” Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Joseph said, either he delivers for the amount of the pledge or ome may turn him over to “Him Who exacted retribution.” Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Joseph agrees with Rebbi Joḥanan in a sale which is not usually split, such as of a cow or a stole. Is a woman usually acquired split? Rebbi Ḥaggai and Rebbi Yudan both said, a sale usually may be split, the acquisition of a wife cannot be split.

A person gave a pledge to another; the other reneged on it. Rebbi Abba, Rebbi Hila, and Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa all three say it was a deal about flax seed and he had given partial payment. The case came before Rebbi Joḥanan, who said: Either he delivers the entire contract or one may turn him over to “Him Who exacted retribution.” Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Joseph said, either he delivers for the amount of the pledge or ome may turn him over to “Him Who exacted retribution.” Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Joseph agrees with Rebbi Joḥanan in a sale which is not usually split, such as of a cow or a stole. Is a woman usually acquired split? Rebbi Ḥaggai and Rebbi Yudan both said, a sale usually may be split, the acquisition of a wife cannot be split.

MISHNAH: One was convicted of theft on the testimony of two witnesses and of slaughtering or selling on their testimony; if they are found perjured they pay everything to him. If he was convicted of theft on the testimony of two witnesses and of slaughtering or selling on the testimony of two others who all were found perjured, the first group pays double restitution and the second group triple. If the second group were found perjured, he pays double restitution while they pay triple. If one of the second group was found perjured, the second testimony is invalidated. If one of the first group is found perjured, the entire testimony is invalidated since if there is no theft there is no slaughter or sale.

There is a rule about the slaughterer which does not apply to the seller and to the seller which does not apply to the slaughterer, for he who slaughters on the Sabbath is criminally liable but he who sells on the Sabbath cannot be prosecuted. Rebbi Yannai ben Rebbi Ismael said, we find a case of sale for which one is criminally liable on the Sabbath. Think of it, if somebody said to another: tear something off from this ground to acquire, did he not acquire? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, the tearing makes him liable, not the sale.

There is a rule about the slaughterer which does not apply to the seller and to the seller which does not apply to the slaughterer, for he who slaughters on the Sabbath is criminally liable but he who sells on the Sabbath cannot be prosecuted. Rebbi Yannai ben Rebbi Ismael said, we find a case of sale for which one is criminally liable on the Sabbath. Think of it, if somebody said to another: tear something off from this ground to acquire, did he not acquire? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, the tearing makes him liable, not the sale.

Rav Hamnuna said, if the sale contract was written on the first of Nisan but payment was only on the tenth of Nisan, they have to write: Even though we wrote the document on the first of Nisan it was agreed that payment be made on the tenth of Nisan.

Rebbi Ḥanina said, practice follows Rebbi Simeon, but we do not say this in all cases. Rav Jeremiah in the name of Rav: A case came before Rebbi and he instructed following Rebbi Simeon. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Joseph gave a denar for salt. That one reneged. He said, does he not know that already a sickle is put on the thigh of that man, “He Who exacted retribution from the people of the Flood will in the future collect from him who does not keep his word”? A person paid for raw silk. He reneged. The case came before Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Joseph and Rebbi Joḥanan. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Joseph said, either he delivers for the amount of the pledge or one may turn him over to “Him Who exacted retribution.”. Rebbi Joḥanan said, either he delivers the entire contract or one may turn him over to “Him Who exacted retribution.” Rebbi La said, it was a case of a pledge; Rebbi Ze‘ira said, he had given him partial payment. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Joseph agrees with Rebbi Joḥanan in a sale which is not usually split, such as of a cow or a stole.

MISHNAH: Cheating is four obols per tetradrachma of 24 obols, one sixth of the sale price. Until when may one return [the merchandise]? Until one can show it to a trader or a relative. Rebbi Tarphon instructed in Lydda that cheating is eight obols per tetradrachma, a third of the sale price, and the traders of Lydda were rejoicing. He told them, one may return [the merchandise] the entire day; they said, let Rebbi Tarphon keep our place quiet; they returned to the words of the Sages. Just as a private person can be cheated, so a trader can be cheated. Rebbi Jehudah says, a trader has no claim of being cheated. The person overcharged has the advantage; if he so desires, he says, give me my money back, or give me back by what you overcharged me.

MISHNAH: Cheating is four obols per tetradrachma of 24 obols, one sixth of the sale price. Until when may one return [the merchandise]? Until one can show it to a trader or a relative. Rebbi Tarphon instructed in Lydda that cheating is eight obols per tetradrachma, a third of the sale price, and the traders of Lydda were rejoicing. He told them, one may return [the merchandise] the entire day; they said, let Rebbi Tarphon keep our place quiet; they returned to the words of the Sages. Just as a private person can be cheated, so a trader can be cheated. Rebbi Jehudah says, a trader has no claim of being cheated. The person overcharged has the advantage; if he so desires, he says, give me my money back, or give me back by what you overcharged me.

HALAKHAH: “Cheating is four obols,” etc. Rav said, this is the rate; Rebbi Joḥanan said, it is not the rate. Rav said, if somebody trades on condition that the rules of cheating not apply to him, the rules of cheating do apply to him. Rebbi Levi stated: Cheating applies to a peruṭah, cheating can be by a peruṭah. But what is the status of cheating? It was stated: The item was acquired, he returns the overcharge, the words of Rebbi Jehudah the Prince; Rebbi Joḥanan said, the sale is annulled.

If he sold him what was worth five for six; [the buyer] did not have time to ask around until it appreciated to be worth seven. Rebbi Jacob bar Idi, Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Since the sale is annulled for one, it also is annulled for the other. There, we have stated: “Four situations in sales. If he sold him high quality wheat and it turned out to be low quality, the buyer can annul the transaction. Low quality and it turned out to be high quality, the seller can annul the transaction.” [Therefore, the buyer cannot annul the transaction.] Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, it follows this Tanna: “Nobody dealing in words only may one deliver to “Him Who exacted retribution”.

MISHNAH: One may increase rental fees but not sale price. How is this? He leased a courtyard saying to him, if [you pay] now it is yours for ten tetradrachmas a year but if paid monthly it is a tetradrachma per month; this is permitted. He sold his field and said to him, if [you pay] now it is yours for 1’000 zuz, but if after the threshing floor it is twelve mina; this is forbidden. If one sold his field, [the buyer] made a partial payment and [the seller] said, anytime you wish bring the remainder and take yours; this is forbidden. If one lent money on a field and said, if you do not repay me in three years from now, it will be mine, it is his; Boethos ben Zenon acted thus following the Sages.

HALAKHAH: “One may increase rental fees,” etc. It was stated: “If somebody sells a field to another and stipulates, on condition that I shall work it as a sharecropper, on condition that I shall be part owner, on condition that the tithes shall be mine, on condition that if you sell it, you will sell it only to me, that anytime I want I may pay you back and take it; this is permitted.” “If he owed him money and wrote his field over to him as a sale, any time the seller eats the yield it is permitted; any time the buyer eats the yield, it is forbidden. Rebbi Jehudah says, in any case it is permitted. Rebbi Jehudah said, that is what Boethos ben Zenon did following the Sages. They said to him, is that a proof? The seller was eating the yield.” Rebbi Joḥanan, Rebbi Eleazar, and Rebbi Hoshaia said, Rebbi Jehudah learned from the houses of walled cities. As it was stated: The year mentioned in the Torah regarding walled cities is like interest but it is not interest. Another Tanna stated: This is interest but the Torah permitted it. He who said, it is like interest but it is not interest, Rebbi Meïr. He who said, this is interest but the Torah permitted it, Rebbi Jehudah. Rebbi Idi said, when I came from the Diaspora, I found that a case was before Rebbi Immi of “it is like interest but it is not interest.” Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, they only said that “this is interest but the Torah permitted it.” There, the Torah permitted it, therefore not in any other case. Nevertheless, Rebbi Immi did not consider it, for he said: a house dwells with its inhabitants.

As we have stated: If somebody sells a field to another but the buyer was lazy and did not enter into possession when the seller went and legally took possession, the taking possession invalidates the sale or the gift.

Samuel asked Rav Huna: if one wrote a gift in the language of a sale? He answered, he made it ride on two racing horses; Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, they only said that one brings two white horses and makes it ride on both. One goes in one direction and the other in another; it turns out that he caught nothing.

There, we have stated: “Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel said, if she dies, he should inherit from her since he made a condition contradicting what is written in the Torah.” Rav Jeremiah in the name of Rav: “Since he made a condition contradicting what is written in the Torah and anybody’s condition contradicting what is written in the Torah is invalid”? Conditions other than for money matters. But here we are dealing with a money matter! What is Rav’s reason? Because in the end he acquired it. Rebbi Joḥanan said, practice follows Rebbi Joḥanan ben Beroqa, for Rebbi Joḥanan said, if she sold or gave away, the rule should be that it is valid. Then why did they say that her sale is invalid? Lest she smuggle away her properties from her husband and say, they are mine. Rebbi Justinus had a case before the rabbis and they obligated him. He came before Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish who told him, enter your properties. Rebbi Jeremiah asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: Did not Rav say, because in the end he acquired it. Did not Rebbi Joḥanan say, practice follows Rebbi Joḥanan ben Beroqa? Did not Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish say, go and enter your properties? Who are these rabbis? The rabbis of Rebbi Justinus.

HALAKHAH: “The witnesses to an open document are inside,” etc. From where that a document can be knotted? Rebbi Immi said: “I took the sale document and the sealed”, that is the knotted [document]. “And the open,” that is the simple, part of the knotted. “And the orders and the rules”; orders and rules differ between these, for one is with two [witnesses], the other with three; one in it, the other on its back.

But the rabbis of Caesarea say, “I took the sale document”, that is the simple one. “And the sealed”, that is the knotted [document]. “And the open,” that is the simple, part of the knotted. “And the orders and the rules”; orders and rules differ between these, for one is with two [witnesses], the other with three; one in it, the other on its back.

MISHNAH: One writes a bill of divorce for a man even though his wife not be present, and a receipt for the wife even though he husband not be present on condition that he know her. The husband pays the fee. One writes a document of indebtedness for the borrower even though the creditor not be present, but one does not write a document of indebtedness for the creditor if the borrower not be present. The borrower pays the fee. One writes a sale contract for the seller even though the buyer not be present, but one does not write a sale contract for the buyer if the seller not be present. The buyer pays the fee. Documents of preliminary and definitive marriage one only writes on the orders of both parties; the groom pays the fee. Documents of share-cropping and leases one only writes on the orders of both parties; the tenant pays the fee. Documents of arbitration and court decisions one only writes on the orders of both parties; both of them pay the fee. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, one writes them in duplicate, one for each party.

MISHNAH: One writes a bill of divorce for a man even though his wife not be present, and a receipt for the wife even though he husband not be present on condition that he know her. The husband pays the fee. One writes a document of indebtedness for the borrower even though the creditor not be present, but one does not write a document of indebtedness for the creditor if the borrower not be present. The borrower pays the fee. One writes a sale contract for the seller even though the buyer not be present, but one does not write a sale contract for the buyer if the seller not be present. The buyer pays the fee. Documents of preliminary and definitive marriage one only writes on the orders of both parties; the groom pays the fee. Documents of share-cropping and leases one only writes on the orders of both parties; the tenant pays the fee. Documents of arbitration and court decisions one only writes on the orders of both parties; both of them pay the fee. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, one writes them in duplicate, one for each party.

“One writes a sale contract for the seller,” etc. Rebbi Uqba said, it was stated in Ketubot of the school of Levi: If one said, my document was lost, the court writes him a confirmation. It was stated: Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel said, even for documents of arbitration one writes him a confirmation.

HALAKHAH: “A judicial oath,” etc. The claim, the House of Shammai say, an obolos, but the House of Hillel say, two oboloi. The argument of the House of Shammai seems inverted. There, they say, “silver” is a denar, but here, they say that “silver” is an obolos. The argument of the House of Hillel seems inverted. There, they say that “money” is a peruṭah but here, they say that “money” is two oboloi. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina: The House of Shammai learn from the initial sale of a Hebrew girl. Since her initial sale was by [at least] a denar, so her preliminary marriage is by [at least] a denar. The House of Hillel learn from the end of her diminution. Since the end of her diminution is a peruṭah, so her preliminary marriage is by a peruṭah. What is the reason of the House of Shammai? As it is said, she leaves gratis, without silver. Would we not know that it is without money? Why does the verse say, without silver? From there, that she is sold for more than silver. And what is more than silver? A denar. But maybe “silver” is a peruṭah, more than silver two peruṭot. The smallest silver coin is an obolos. So why is it not an obolos? Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Judah bar Pazi: For if she wants to diminish, she diminishes every year by an obolos and leaves. Could she not diminish by a peruṭah? Rebbi Abun said, think of it. If she wanted to compute the diminution at the start of the sixth year, there would be a peruṭah left. But the start of the diminution must be an obolos, the end of the diminution a peruṭah. If there is only one peruṭah left, can she not pay the diminished amount and leave? Just as the last diminished amount is a peruṭah, so her preliminary marriage should be a peruṭah! What is the reason of the House of Hillel? Since her last diminished amount is a peruṭah, you know that her preliminary marriage is by a peruṭah. Think of it, if there is only one peruṭah’s worth left, can she not pay the diminished amount and leave? Just as the last diminished amount is a peruṭah, so her preliminary marriage is by a peruṭah.

HALAKHAH: “A judicial oath,” etc. The claim, the House of Shammai say, an obolos, but the House of Hillel say, two oboloi. The argument of the House of Shammai seems inverted. There, they say, “silver” is a denar, but here, they say that “silver” is an obolos. The argument of the House of Hillel seems inverted. There, they say that “money” is a peruṭah but here, they say that “money” is two oboloi. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina: The House of Shammai learn from the initial sale of a Hebrew girl. Since her initial sale was by [at least] a denar, so her preliminary marriage is by [at least] a denar. The House of Hillel learn from the end of her diminution. Since the end of her diminution is a peruṭah, so her preliminary marriage is by a peruṭah. What is the reason of the House of Shammai? As it is said, she leaves gratis, without silver. Would we not know that it is without money? Why does the verse say, without silver? From there, that she is sold for more than silver. And what is more than silver? A denar. But maybe “silver” is a peruṭah, more than silver two peruṭot. The smallest silver coin is an obolos. So why is it not an obolos? Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Judah bar Pazi: For if she wants to diminish, she diminishes every year by an obolos and leaves. Could she not diminish by a peruṭah? Rebbi Abun said, think of it. If she wanted to compute the diminution at the start of the sixth year, there would be a peruṭah left. But the start of the diminution must be an obolos, the end of the diminution a peruṭah. If there is only one peruṭah left, can she not pay the diminished amount and leave? Just as the last diminished amount is a peruṭah, so her preliminary marriage should be a peruṭah! What is the reason of the House of Hillel? Since her last diminished amount is a peruṭah, you know that her preliminary marriage is by a peruṭah. Think of it, if there is only one peruṭah’s worth left, can she not pay the diminished amount and leave? Just as the last diminished amount is a peruṭah, so her preliminary marriage is by a peruṭah.

If somebody produced both a document and ḥazaqah. Rebbi says, it should be judged by the document. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, it should be judged by ḥazaqah. Rebbi Ze`ira in the name of Rav Jeremiah: A case came before Rebbi Jehudah following Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel. Rebbi Jeremiah asked before Rebbi Ze`ira: How? Did Rebbi switch his opinion? There he said, it should be judged by the document. But here he said it should be judged by ḥazaqah. Would we say, before he changed his opinion? Even if you say, after he changed his opinion. Rebbi only wanted to determine the truth of the matter. “If somebody occupied real estate on the basis of a document of sale and it was found invalid, this is not ḥazaqah.” Rebbi Jeremiah said, in dispute. Rebbi Samuel said, Rebbi Ze`ira, Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Abinna: it is everybody’s opinion. Rebbi Yose said, there if one produced both a document and ḥazaqah. Here if he came with a document. Rebbi Yudan said, there if he presented two groups of witnesses; here one who contradicts his own proofs.

“He said to the recipient of a fee,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said, one who claims before his neighbor a claim of thief in a case of loss is liable. “Where is my lost object?” He told him, “it was stolen.” Rebbi Joḥanan said, one who claims before his neighbor a claim of thief is liable only after an oath. What is the reason? It is said here “grabbing” and it says there “grabbing.” Since “grabbing” mentioned there only applies after an oath, so also “grabbing” mentioned here only applies after an oath. Rebbi Joḥanan said, one who claims a claim of loss, swore to him, and afterwards claimed a claim of thief is not liable. Rebbi Joḥanan asked: May one be liable for a blurted oath in case of an oath regarding a claim of thief? The argument of Rebbi Joḥanan seems to be inverted. There he said, if he claimed a claim of loss, swore to him, and afterwards claimed a claim of thief is not liable. And here he says so? There it is obvious to him, here it is problematic for him. What is problematic for him? He saw and found it simple. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Joseph said, one who claims before his neighbor a claim of thief is liable only after he denied in court. Where do we hold? If about him who already owes an oath to his neighbor, even if he was swearing out of court he is liable. But we must hold about him who saw them coming. They wanted to make him swear but he jumped in and swore. Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: When it was standing at his feeding trough. Rebbi Ze`ira asked: how was it said? “If it was standing” or “even if it was standing”? If you say “even if it was standing,” it makes no difference. If you say “if it was standing,” then the argument of Rebbi Joḥanan is inverted. There, he said, if he claimed before him a claim of loss, had been swearing to him, selected a sacrifice, and then claimed a claim of duress, he is not liable. But here you are saying so? Rebbi La said, there is a difference since he absolved himself of confession by the oath. They objected to the opinion of Rebbi Ze`ira: “‘Where is my ox?’ He told him, ‘it was stolen.’ ‘I want you to swear;’ he answered ‘Amen’. Witnesses testify that he stole it: he has to pay double restitution. If he confessed himself he pays the value, and a fifth, and a reparation sacrifice.” But here when he moved it by claiming that it was lost. Afterwards he claimed a claim of thief and is not liable. Explain it that he swore to him but slaughtered it afterwards. The students of Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Julianus say, explain it that he slaughtered it when it was lying down. Is there slaughter without sale? Following Symmachos who said, there can be slaughter and sale without theft. Samuel said, if there came no witnesses of the theft, but there came witnesses of the slaughter; he is liable.

“He said to the recipient of a fee,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said, one who claims before his neighbor a claim of thief in a case of loss is liable. “Where is my lost object?” He told him, “it was stolen.” Rebbi Joḥanan said, one who claims before his neighbor a claim of thief is liable only after an oath. What is the reason? It is said here “grabbing” and it says there “grabbing.” Since “grabbing” mentioned there only applies after an oath, so also “grabbing” mentioned here only applies after an oath. Rebbi Joḥanan said, one who claims a claim of loss, swore to him, and afterwards claimed a claim of thief is not liable. Rebbi Joḥanan asked: May one be liable for a blurted oath in case of an oath regarding a claim of thief? The argument of Rebbi Joḥanan seems to be inverted. There he said, if he claimed a claim of loss, swore to him, and afterwards claimed a claim of thief is not liable. And here he says so? There it is obvious to him, here it is problematic for him. What is problematic for him? He saw and found it simple. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Joseph said, one who claims before his neighbor a claim of thief is liable only after he denied in court. Where do we hold? If about him who already owes an oath to his neighbor, even if he was swearing out of court he is liable. But we must hold about him who saw them coming. They wanted to make him swear but he jumped in and swore. Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: When it was standing at his feeding trough. Rebbi Ze`ira asked: how was it said? “If it was standing” or “even if it was standing”? If you say “even if it was standing,” it makes no difference. If you say “if it was standing,” then the argument of Rebbi Joḥanan is inverted. There, he said, if he claimed before him a claim of loss, had been swearing to him, selected a sacrifice, and then claimed a claim of duress, he is not liable. But here you are saying so? Rebbi La said, there is a difference since he absolved himself of confession by the oath. They objected to the opinion of Rebbi Ze`ira: “‘Where is my ox?’ He told him, ‘it was stolen.’ ‘I want you to swear;’ he answered ‘Amen’. Witnesses testify that he stole it: he has to pay double restitution. If he confessed himself he pays the value, and a fifth, and a reparation sacrifice.” But here when he moved it by claiming that it was lost. Afterwards he claimed a claim of thief and is not liable. Explain it that he swore to him but slaughtered it afterwards. The students of Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Julianus say, explain it that he slaughtered it when it was lying down. Is there slaughter without sale? Following Symmachos who said, there can be slaughter and sale without theft. Samuel said, if there came no witnesses of the theft, but there came witnesses of the slaughter; he is liable.

What is uncut triton? Any where heads and spines exist. Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina: It happened that on a ship of the House of Rebbi there were more than 300 amphoras. Rebbi checked them all out and found only one where heads and spines were found. He permitted all of them. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, Rebbi Assi asked, would it not be reasonable that one amphora be permitted but the other amphoras be forbidden? But it was by a pretext. (A sale) was mixed up. Rebbi Ḥaggai asked Rebbi Abba bar Zavda who said to him, the property of the public cannot be forbidden. Rebbi Jacob bar Zavdi said, Rebbi Isaac asked: Is not Cajus Lycus written on these documents, and you say, by a pretext?

R. Elazar said: Sabbatical year produce is redeemed only by way of sale. But R. Yohanan said: Either by way of sale or by way of exchange. What is the reason of R. Elazar? As it is written, "In this year of Jubilee" (Leviticus 25:13) and then comes the following verse, "And if you sell something to your neighbor" [implying,] only by way of sale, but not by way of exchange.

R. Elazar said: Sabbatical year produce is redeemed only by way of sale. But R. Yohanan said: Either by way of sale or by way of exchange. What is the reason of R. Elazar? As it is written, "In this year of Jubilee" (Leviticus 25:13) and then comes the following verse, "And if you sell something to your neighbor" [implying,] only by way of sale, but not by way of exchange.

R. Elazar said: Sabbatical year produce is redeemed only by way of sale. But R. Yohanan said: Either by way of sale or by way of exchange. What is the reason of R. Elazar? As it is written, "In this year of Jubilee" (Leviticus 25:13) and then comes the following verse, "And if you sell something to your neighbor" [implying,] only by way of sale, but not by way of exchange.

And what is the reason of R. Yohanan? — Since it is written, "For it is a Jubilee, it shall be holy" (Leviticus 25:12); just as sacred objects can be redeemed either by way of sale or by way of exchange, so the produce of the Sabbatical Year can be redeemed either by way of sale or by way of exchange.

And what is the reason of R. Yohanan? — Since it is written, "For it is a Jubilee, it shall be holy" (Leviticus 25:12); just as sacred objects can be redeemed either by way of sale or by way of exchange, so the produce of the Sabbatical Year can be redeemed either by way of sale or by way of exchange.

How so? The last object [purchased] assumes [the sanctity] of the Sabbatical Year, but the produce itself always remains prohibited. Now since the term "purchased" is repeatedly used, it is evident that only by way of sale [does it become redeemed], but not by way of exchange.

R. Ashi said: The dispute concerns only the original produce itself, but with regard to secondary produce, both agree that [it can be redeemed] either by way of sale or by way of exchange. And the reason that the term ‘purchased’ was repeated is that since in the first clause the term ‘purchased’ was used it was used in the latter clause also.

Ravina raised an objection against R. Ashi: [It has been taught]: If a man has a sela [gained through selling the produce of] the Sabbatical Year, and wishes to purchase with it a shirt, what should he do? Let him go to his regular shopkeeper and say to him, ‘Give me a sela worth of fruit’ and give it to him. Then he tells him, ‘Behold this fruit is given [back]] to you as a gift’, and [the shopkeeper] answers him, ‘And here is a gift for you of a sela.' And then he may purchase with it whatsoever he desires. Now here, surely, the sela is a secondary produce, and yet it teaches [that it may be redeemed only] by way of sale, and not by way of exchange?

Rather R. Ashi said: The dispute [of R. Elazar and R. Yohanan] is over secondary produce, but with regard to the original produce all agree that [it may be redeemed] only by way of sale, and not by way of exchange. "Both the produce of the Sabbatical Year and of the Second Tithe [may be redeemed by exchange]"— his refers to the money for which the produce is exchanged.

R. Judah, seeing two men who were using bread in a wasteful manner, said: "It seems that there is too great plenty in the world." He cast an angry look about him and a famine came. Said the Rabbis to R. Kahana, son of R. Neḥunya, the disciple of R. Judah: "Try thou, who art his disciple, to prevail upon him (R. Judah) that he should go out to the market-place." He (R. Kahana) prevailed upon him. R. Judah went to the market, and noticing people crowding together, he asked: "What is the matter?" He was told that they were standing around a mass of offals of ground dates which was for sale. "There is evidently a famine in the country," said R. Judah, and ordered his disciple to pull his shoes from his feet. The disciple pulled off one of his master's shoes, and when he was about to pull off the other, Elijah appeared to him saying: "If you pull off the other shoe, you will destroy the world."

[With regard to a synagogue which has been made] a gift, R. Aha and Ravina disagree, one forbids [it to be used for secular purposes] and one permits. The one who forbade—how is its sanctity removed? While the one who permitted if the giver [the giver] did not derive some benefit from the act he would not give it, so that in the end the gift is equivalent to a sale.

Come and hear: But if they sell, a Torah they may not buy scrolls; it is scrolls that they may not buy, but if they buy a Torah with the proceeds from the sale of a Torah it is okay! [No.] The Mishnah refers to something already done, and the question we asked was whether it is permitted?

The same applies to any money left over. Rava said: They taught this only if they had money left over from a sale; but if they had money left over from a collection, it is permitted [to use it for any purpose].

as it has been taught: ‘If a man lent another a man a 100 zuz and the latter made a [conditional] sale to him of his field, if the seller takes the produce, this is permitted, but if the purchaser takes the produce, it is forbidden.

Judah said: Even if the purchaser takes the produce it is permitted. Judah further said: It happened once that Baitus b. Zunin made a sale of his field with the permission of R. Elazar b. Azariah, and the purchaser took the produce. They said to him: Do you cite that as a proof? It was in fact the seller who took the produce and not the purchaser.