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The Jerusalem Talmud
It was stated: The marriage benedictions are said all seven days. [Rebbi Jeremiah wanted to say that one re-enacts the marriage all seven days.] Rebbi Yose said to him, but did not Rebbi Ḥiyya state: The benedictions of mourners are said all seven days. Can you say that one buries the dead all seven days? How is that? Since here he consoles with him, so there he enjoys with him; as here one remembers, so there one remembers.
It was stated: The marriage benedictions are said all seven days. [Rebbi Jeremiah wanted to say that one re-enacts the marriage all seven days.] Rebbi Yose said to him, but did not Rebbi Ḥiyya state: The benedictions of mourners are said all seven days. Can you say that one buries the dead all seven days? How is that? Since here he consoles with him, so there he enjoys with him; as here one remembers, so there one remembers.
Rebbi Jeremiah was of the opinion to follow the standard of Judea in Galilee. Rebbi Yose said to him, is the standard of Judea in Galilee a testimony by biblical standards? No, [one follows] the standard of Judea in Judea and the standard of Galilee in Galilee. If you say, it is not testimony by biblical standards, why appoint them? That the daughters of Israel should not become wanton in immorality. If it is that the daughters of Israel should not become wanton in immorality, even if one appoints, they should not be trustworthy! Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Hila: A man would not go to all this expense in order to give his wife a bad reputation. If it is that a man would not go to all this expense in order to give his wife a bad reputation, even if one does not appoint, he should be believed. Rebbi Hila said, because of one suspicion, because of one immoral person. Where do we hold? If he investigated and found, he found! If he did not find but investigated, did he not investigate? But we deal with the case that he did not investigate and found. She says, it is blood of virginity. He says no, it is a bird’s blood. His case is damaged since he did not follow the procedures. That means, not to let her lose her ketubah. But he is not permitted to keep her because she might have been unfaithful. It follows what we statedthere: “A virgin and a widow, etc.” All these cases are based on what Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar, if he found the door open, he is forbidden to keep her because she might have been unfaithful.
Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Ada said, even if “a woman’s ketubah” was stated with them, do not all these rabbis disagree? Rebbi Ḥananiah and Rebbi Jonathan both say, circulating coin. Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said, circulating coin. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa, Rebbi Immi, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish in the name of Rebbi Jehudah Neśia: Current coin. Rebbi Joḥanan said, good Severan tetradrachmas, Jerusalem ones. These are saying so, those are saying otherwise! But he also changed his mind and thought like them. Are not always these saying so, those are saying otherwise? Here, even he changed his mind and thought like them.
There came a case before Rebbi Ḥanina of a woman whose ketubah was less than 200 zuz, and he said, she should take what he had written for her. He said to Rebbi Mana, sit down and sign. He answered, follow your argument and sign yourself, did not Rebbi Ḥiyya say in the name of Samuel, by the Temple šeqel? Rebbi Eudaimon of Sepphoris in the name of Rebbi Ḥuna: Because of a renunciation. Now, should a woman whose ketubah was for less than 200 [zuz] not hide her ketubah in order to collect by the Temple šeqel? They said in the name of Rebbi Ḥuna, at a place where one does not write a ketubah. But at a place where one writes a ketubah, what she presents she collects. Rebbi Joḥanan said, it was stated thus: If a deaf-mute man married a hearing wife, she has no claim for support nor ketubah, but if she died, he inherits from her, for she wanted to connect him with her property, but he could not want to connect her with his property. If a hearing male married a deaf-mute woman, she has a claim to support and ketubah, but if she died, he does not inherit, for he wanted to connect her with his property, but she could not want to connect him with her property. But can a deaf-mute woman acquire and have ketubah? Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of Rebbi Eleazar, explain it that at the moment he married her, she was hearing. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Eleazar, he married her when she was hearing but she turned deaf-mute. In any case, did he not marry her when she was hearing? Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Eleazar, explain it that she was deaf-mute and turned hearing; he married her when she was hearing and she turned deaf. That you should not say, because at the start she was deaf-mute she has [no] ketubah, therefore it is necessary to say that she (does not have) [has]. Rebbi Yose does not say so, but since if one has sexual relations with a deaf-mute, is he not liable for a fine? Only if there were no fine would there be no ketubah. Rebbi Yudan said, does that depend on a fine? Look, the adult woman collects no fine but her ketubah is 200, the virgin after marriage collects a fine but her ketubah is a mina!
There came a case before Rebbi Ḥanina of a woman whose ketubah was less than 200 zuz, and he said, she should take what he had written for her. He said to Rebbi Mana, sit down and sign. He answered, follow your argument and sign yourself, did not Rebbi Ḥiyya say in the name of Samuel, by the Temple šeqel? Rebbi Eudaimon of Sepphoris in the name of Rebbi Ḥuna: Because of a renunciation. Now, should a woman whose ketubah was for less than 200 [zuz] not hide her ketubah in order to collect by the Temple šeqel? They said in the name of Rebbi Ḥuna, at a place where one does not write a ketubah. But at a place where one writes a ketubah, what she presents she collects. Rebbi Joḥanan said, it was stated thus: If a deaf-mute man married a hearing wife, she has no claim for support nor ketubah, but if she died, he inherits from her, for she wanted to connect him with her property, but he could not want to connect her with his property. If a hearing male married a deaf-mute woman, she has a claim to support and ketubah, but if she died, he does not inherit, for he wanted to connect her with his property, but she could not want to connect him with her property. But can a deaf-mute woman acquire and have ketubah? Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of Rebbi Eleazar, explain it that at the moment he married her, she was hearing. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Eleazar, he married her when she was hearing but she turned deaf-mute. In any case, did he not marry her when she was hearing? Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Eleazar, explain it that she was deaf-mute and turned hearing; he married her when she was hearing and she turned deaf. That you should not say, because at the start she was deaf-mute she has [no] ketubah, therefore it is necessary to say that she (does not have) [has]. Rebbi Yose does not say so, but since if one has sexual relations with a deaf-mute, is he not liable for a fine? Only if there were no fine would there be no ketubah. Rebbi Yudan said, does that depend on a fine? Look, the adult woman collects no fine but her ketubah is 200, the virgin after marriage collects a fine but her ketubah is a mina!
There came a case before Rebbi Ḥanina of a woman whose ketubah was less than 200 zuz, and he said, she should take what he had written for her. He said to Rebbi Mana, sit down and sign. He answered, follow your argument and sign yourself, did not Rebbi Ḥiyya say in the name of Samuel, by the Temple šeqel? Rebbi Eudaimon of Sepphoris in the name of Rebbi Ḥuna: Because of a renunciation. Now, should a woman whose ketubah was for less than 200 [zuz] not hide her ketubah in order to collect by the Temple šeqel? They said in the name of Rebbi Ḥuna, at a place where one does not write a ketubah. But at a place where one writes a ketubah, what she presents she collects. Rebbi Joḥanan said, it was stated thus: If a deaf-mute man married a hearing wife, she has no claim for support nor ketubah, but if she died, he inherits from her, for she wanted to connect him with her property, but he could not want to connect her with his property. If a hearing male married a deaf-mute woman, she has a claim to support and ketubah, but if she died, he does not inherit, for he wanted to connect her with his property, but she could not want to connect him with her property. But can a deaf-mute woman acquire and have ketubah? Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of Rebbi Eleazar, explain it that at the moment he married her, she was hearing. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Eleazar, he married her when she was hearing but she turned deaf-mute. In any case, did he not marry her when she was hearing? Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Eleazar, explain it that she was deaf-mute and turned hearing; he married her when she was hearing and she turned deaf. That you should not say, because at the start she was deaf-mute she has [no] ketubah, therefore it is necessary to say that she (does not have) [has]. Rebbi Yose does not say so, but since if one has sexual relations with a deaf-mute, is he not liable for a fine? Only if there were no fine would there be no ketubah. Rebbi Yudan said, does that depend on a fine? Look, the adult woman collects no fine but her ketubah is 200, the virgin after marriage collects a fine but her ketubah is a mina!
There came a case before Rebbi Ḥanina of a woman whose ketubah was less than 200 zuz, and he said, she should take what he had written for her. He said to Rebbi Mana, sit down and sign. He answered, follow your argument and sign yourself, did not Rebbi Ḥiyya say in the name of Samuel, by the Temple šeqel? Rebbi Eudaimon of Sepphoris in the name of Rebbi Ḥuna: Because of a renunciation. Now, should a woman whose ketubah was for less than 200 [zuz] not hide her ketubah in order to collect by the Temple šeqel? They said in the name of Rebbi Ḥuna, at a place where one does not write a ketubah. But at a place where one writes a ketubah, what she presents she collects. Rebbi Joḥanan said, it was stated thus: If a deaf-mute man married a hearing wife, she has no claim for support nor ketubah, but if she died, he inherits from her, for she wanted to connect him with her property, but he could not want to connect her with his property. If a hearing male married a deaf-mute woman, she has a claim to support and ketubah, but if she died, he does not inherit, for he wanted to connect her with his property, but she could not want to connect him with her property. But can a deaf-mute woman acquire and have ketubah? Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of Rebbi Eleazar, explain it that at the moment he married her, she was hearing. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Eleazar, he married her when she was hearing but she turned deaf-mute. In any case, did he not marry her when she was hearing? Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Eleazar, explain it that she was deaf-mute and turned hearing; he married her when she was hearing and she turned deaf. That you should not say, because at the start she was deaf-mute she has [no] ketubah, therefore it is necessary to say that she (does not have) [has]. Rebbi Yose does not say so, but since if one has sexual relations with a deaf-mute, is he not liable for a fine? Only if there were no fine would there be no ketubah. Rebbi Yudan said, does that depend on a fine? Look, the adult woman collects no fine but her ketubah is 200, the virgin after marriage collects a fine but her ketubah is a mina!
MISHNAH: If an adult male had sexual relations with an underage girl, or an underage boy with an adult female, or one injured by wood, their ketubot are 200 [zuz], the words of Rebbi Meïr. But the Sages say, the ketubah of one injured by wood is a mina.
HALAKHAH: “If an adult male had sexual relations with an underage girl,” etc. What is an underage boy and what is an underage girl? They said in the name of Rebbi Jehudah ben Ḥagra, an underage boy is younger than nine years and one day, an underage girl is younger than three years and one day. One understands that if an adult male had sexual relations with an underage girl, her hymen repairs itself. If an underage boy has sexual relations with an underage female, her hymen repairs itself. But if an underage boy has sexual relations with an adult female, her hymen does not repair itself! Rebbi Abin, explain it that he had relations with her without penetration. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abin said, you can even say that he had normal relations with her. The relations of an underage boy are relations but he does not have the force to damage her hymen. It was stated thus: It happened that [an adult] became pregnant while her hymen was intact.
They objected to Rebbi Meïr: There is no hymen and you say, her ketubah is 200 [zuz]? He answered them, is that dependent on the hymen? But the adult has no hymen and her ketubah is 200! the virgin widow has a hymen and her ketubah is a mina! What is the reason? The adult still has all her grace; the virgin widow has lost her grace. Where do they disagree? If she was injured by wood. Rebbi Meïr says, she did not lose her grace, but the rabbis say, she lost her grace.
They objected to Rebbi Meïr: There is no hymen and you say, her ketubah is 200 [zuz]? He answered them, is that dependent on the hymen? But the adult has no hymen and her ketubah is 200! the virgin widow has a hymen and her ketubah is a mina! What is the reason? The adult still has all her grace; the virgin widow has lost her grace. Where do they disagree? If she was injured by wood. Rebbi Meïr says, she did not lose her grace, but the rabbis say, she lost her grace.
The blind woman and the she-ram are subject to claims of missing virginity. Symmachos said in the name of Rebbi Meïr that the blind woman is not subject to claims of missing virginity. What is Rebbi Meïr’s reason? I say, he found [her to be a virgin] and destroyed [the evidence]. What is the rabbi’s reason? She can catch him. What does Rebbi Meïr with this argument? He can cleanse it with spittle.
It was stated: A claim of non-virginity may be brought within thirty days, the words of Rebbi Meïr. But the Sages say, immediately. Where do we hold? If he copulated, immediately. If he did not copulate, even after a longer delay. But we must deal with the case that it was not spelled out. Rebbi Meïr said, it is credible that a man may hold himself back for thirty days. But the Sages say, a man does not hold himself back even for one day. Rebbi Jeremiah asked: According to Rebbi Meïr, would a man be believed to assert that he held himself back for thirty days in order to make the child of unknown paternity? Let us hear from the following: “If the sister-in-law claims within thirty days that she was not copulated with, one forces him to perform ḥalîṢah with her. After thirty days, one asks him to perform ḥalîṢah with her.” And Rebbi Eleazar said, this is Rebbi Meïr’s. And Rebbi Eleazar said, that refers only to her, but not to her co-wife. As you say there, she is not believed to damage her co-wife, so here, he is not believed to damage his son.
It was stated: A claim of non-virginity may be brought within thirty days, the words of Rebbi Meïr. But the Sages say, immediately. Where do we hold? If he copulated, immediately. If he did not copulate, even after a longer delay. But we must deal with the case that it was not spelled out. Rebbi Meïr said, it is credible that a man may hold himself back for thirty days. But the Sages say, a man does not hold himself back even for one day. Rebbi Jeremiah asked: According to Rebbi Meïr, would a man be believed to assert that he held himself back for thirty days in order to make the child of unknown paternity? Let us hear from the following: “If the sister-in-law claims within thirty days that she was not copulated with, one forces him to perform ḥalîṢah with her. After thirty days, one asks him to perform ḥalîṢah with her.” And Rebbi Eleazar said, this is Rebbi Meïr’s. And Rebbi Eleazar said, that refers only to her, but not to her co-wife. As you say there, she is not believed to damage her co-wife, so here, he is not believed to damage his son.
It was stated: A claim of non-virginity may be brought within thirty days, the words of Rebbi Meïr. But the Sages say, immediately. Where do we hold? If he copulated, immediately. If he did not copulate, even after a longer delay. But we must deal with the case that it was not spelled out. Rebbi Meïr said, it is credible that a man may hold himself back for thirty days. But the Sages say, a man does not hold himself back even for one day. Rebbi Jeremiah asked: According to Rebbi Meïr, would a man be believed to assert that he held himself back for thirty days in order to make the child of unknown paternity? Let us hear from the following: “If the sister-in-law claims within thirty days that she was not copulated with, one forces him to perform ḥalîṢah with her. After thirty days, one asks him to perform ḥalîṢah with her.” And Rebbi Eleazar said, this is Rebbi Meïr’s. And Rebbi Eleazar said, that refers only to her, but not to her co-wife. As you say there, she is not believed to damage her co-wife, so here, he is not believed to damage his son.
It was stated: “And for a widow 200.” It was stated: “This order applies both to a widow of an Israel and a widow of a Cohen”. Rebbi Yose said, it is reasonable that the daughter of a Cohen should collect, for her tribe collects. The daughter of an Israel married to a Cohen should not collect; is it not sufficient that she rose to the priesthood that you say, she should collect? Rebbi Mana said, it is reasonable the other way. The daughter of an Israel married to a Cohen should collect for she rose to the priesthood; the daughter of a Cohen should not collect for she stepped down from the priesthood. Rebbi Yose bar Abun said, in both cases they demanded a fine so that everybody should cling to his tribe and family.
MISHNAH: Somebody married a woman and found that she was no virgin. She says, I was raped after you had married me preliminarily, so your field was flooded. He says not so, but it happened before I married you preliminarily; therefore, my acquisition was made in error. Rabban Gamliel and Rebbi Eliezer say, she is believed. Rebbi Joshua said, we do not live off her mouth but there is a presumption that she had sexual relations before she was preliminarily married unless she provides proof of her statement.
HALAKHAH: “Somebody married a woman and found that she was no virgin”, etc. Rebbi Jeremiah asked: Does this mean that a claim of missing virginity is impossible following Rabban Gamliel and Rebbi Eliezer, only following Rebbi Joshua? He turned around and said, a claim of missing virginity is possible following Rabban Gamliel and Rebbi Eliezer, if she remains silent. And even if you say that she talks, if she said that he found her a virgin and destroyed the evidence. Why should she not be believed? One cannot tolerate it, since Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar, if he found the door open, he is forbidden to keep her because she might have been unfaithful. Here you say, she is believed. There, you say that she is not believed. In this case, both agree that the door was open.
HALAKHAH: “Somebody married a woman and found that she was no virgin”, etc. Rebbi Jeremiah asked: Does this mean that a claim of missing virginity is impossible following Rabban Gamliel and Rebbi Eliezer, only following Rebbi Joshua? He turned around and said, a claim of missing virginity is possible following Rabban Gamliel and Rebbi Eliezer, if she remains silent. And even if you say that she talks, if she said that he found her a virgin and destroyed the evidence. Why should she not be believed? One cannot tolerate it, since Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar, if he found the door open, he is forbidden to keep her because she might have been unfaithful. Here you say, she is believed. There, you say that she is not believed. In this case, both agree that the door was open.
HALAKHAH: “Somebody married a woman and found that she was no virgin”, etc. Rebbi Jeremiah asked: Does this mean that a claim of missing virginity is impossible following Rabban Gamliel and Rebbi Eliezer, only following Rebbi Joshua? He turned around and said, a claim of missing virginity is possible following Rabban Gamliel and Rebbi Eliezer, if she remains silent. And even if you say that she talks, if she said that he found her a virgin and destroyed the evidence. Why should she not be believed? One cannot tolerate it, since Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar, if he found the door open, he is forbidden to keep her because she might have been unfaithful. Here you say, she is believed. There, you say that she is not believed. In this case, both agree that the door was open.
There, we have stated: “If she had bodily defects while still in her father’s house, the father has to bring proof.” Rebbi Eleazar asked Rebbi Joḥanan: Is this Mishnah from Rabban Gamliel and Rebbi Eliezer? Not from Rebbi Joshua? He said to him, those are everybody’s words. There is a difference because bodily defects have a way to appear. Rebbi Yose said, formerly we saw rabbis who compared bodily defects to [defects of] virginity. These can be inferred from those and those can be inferred from these. Bodily defects from claims of missing virginity: For if he slept with her in her father’s house, the father has to provide proof. Claims of missing virginity from bodily defects: For if she developed bodily defects and there is a doubt whether it happened after she entered his domain or before she entered his domain, the husband has to provide proof, from claims of missing virginity. But if she lost her virginity, was it not in her father’s house? Nevertheless, you say, the husband has to provide proof; so here also, the husband has to provide proof.
MISHNAH: She says, I was injured by wood, but he says not so, you were trampled on by a man; Rabban Gamliel and Rebbi Eliezer say, she is believed. Rebbi Joshua said, we do not live off her mouth but there is a presumption that she was trampled on by a man unless she provides proof of her statement.
HALAKHAH: “She says, I was injured by wood,” etc. Rebbi Eleazar said, that follows Rebbi Meïr, since Rebbi Meïr said the ketubah of one injured by wood is 200 [zuz]. Rebbi Yose said, we would think to say, when did Rebbi Meïr disagree with those rabbis? If he took her in assuming she was injured by wood. But if he took her in assuming she was a virgin and it turned out she was injured by wood, then even Rebbi Meïr agrees, since we have stated: “She says, I was injured by wood, but he says not so, you were trampled on by a man.” That means, there is a disagreement even if he took her in assuming she was injured by wood and she turned out to have been injured by wood. Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira did not say so, but: She says, I was injured by wood and my ketubah is 200 [zuz]. He says, it is not so, but you were trampled on by a man and you have no claim on me. What are we talking about? If he married her as a virgin and she turns out to have been injured by wood, Rebbi Meïr will agree. If he married her as one injured by wood and she turns out to have been injured by wood, is there a recognizable difference in the opening of the door between wood or man? Rebbi Huna in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira did not say so, but: She says, I was injured by wood and so I stipulated with you, but he says, it is not so, but you were trampled on by a man and there was no stipulation between you and me.
HALAKHAH: “She says, I was injured by wood,” etc. Rebbi Eleazar said, that follows Rebbi Meïr, since Rebbi Meïr said the ketubah of one injured by wood is 200 [zuz]. Rebbi Yose said, we would think to say, when did Rebbi Meïr disagree with those rabbis? If he took her in assuming she was injured by wood. But if he took her in assuming she was a virgin and it turned out she was injured by wood, then even Rebbi Meïr agrees, since we have stated: “She says, I was injured by wood, but he says not so, you were trampled on by a man.” That means, there is a disagreement even if he took her in assuming she was injured by wood and she turned out to have been injured by wood. Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira did not say so, but: She says, I was injured by wood and my ketubah is 200 [zuz]. He says, it is not so, but you were trampled on by a man and you have no claim on me. What are we talking about? If he married her as a virgin and she turns out to have been injured by wood, Rebbi Meïr will agree. If he married her as one injured by wood and she turns out to have been injured by wood, is there a recognizable difference in the opening of the door between wood or man? Rebbi Huna in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira did not say so, but: She says, I was injured by wood and so I stipulated with you, but he says, it is not so, but you were trampled on by a man and there was no stipulation between you and me.
HALAKHAH: “She says, I was injured by wood,” etc. Rebbi Eleazar said, that follows Rebbi Meïr, since Rebbi Meïr said the ketubah of one injured by wood is 200 [zuz]. Rebbi Yose said, we would think to say, when did Rebbi Meïr disagree with those rabbis? If he took her in assuming she was injured by wood. But if he took her in assuming she was a virgin and it turned out she was injured by wood, then even Rebbi Meïr agrees, since we have stated: “She says, I was injured by wood, but he says not so, you were trampled on by a man.” That means, there is a disagreement even if he took her in assuming she was injured by wood and she turned out to have been injured by wood. Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira did not say so, but: She says, I was injured by wood and my ketubah is 200 [zuz]. He says, it is not so, but you were trampled on by a man and you have no claim on me. What are we talking about? If he married her as a virgin and she turns out to have been injured by wood, Rebbi Meïr will agree. If he married her as one injured by wood and she turns out to have been injured by wood, is there a recognizable difference in the opening of the door between wood or man? Rebbi Huna in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira did not say so, but: She says, I was injured by wood and so I stipulated with you, but he says, it is not so, but you were trampled on by a man and there was no stipulation between you and me.
MISHNAH: If she was seen speaking to a man and one asked her, what kind of man is this? He is Mr. X, a Cohen; Rabban Gamliel and Rebbi Eliezer say, she is believed. Rebbi Joshua said, we do not live off her mouth but there is a presumption that she was lying with a Gibeonite and a bastard unless she provides proof of her statement.
Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joshia: Practice follows Rabban Gamliel and Rebbi Eliezer since two form a majority against one. Rebbi Yose asked: If it is practice, why two? And if two, why practice? Would that mean if Rebbi Joḥanan would hold with Rebbi Joshua that practice would not follow Rabban Gamliel and Rebbi Eliezer but Rebbi Joshua? What about it? It is a testimony for which a woman in empowered. They wanted to say, when does Rebbi Joshua disagree with these rabbis? At a place where most are disabling, but at a place where most are qualified, even Rebbi Joshua will agree. There came Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: There is disagreement even at a place where most are qualified. Does Rebbi Joshua think that immorality runs after the disabling? Rebbi Ze‘ira said, a baraita stated that even qualified people whore, as it was stated: Even the most pious man cannot be appointed guardian for illicit sex.
MISHNAH: If she was pregnant and one asked her, what kind of fetus is this? He is from Mr. X, a Cohen; Rabban Gamliel and Rebbi Eliezer say, she is believed. Rebbi Joshua said, we do not live off her mouth but there is a presumption that she is pregnant from a Gibeonite or a bastard unless she provides proof of her statement.
Rebbi Eleazar said to him: Is not the dough widow qualified but her daughter is disqualified? He said to him, whoever declares her to be qualified, declares her daughter to be qualified. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, did he not say “whoever declares her to be qualified”? This implies that there is another who disqualifies! Who declares qualified? Rebbi Meïr. Who disqualifies? The rabbis. As we have stated: What is qualified dough, anyone about whom there is [no suspicion of descent from] a desecrated, a bastard, or a Gibeonite. Rebbi Meïr says, the daughter of any woman not tainted with one of these is qualified for thepriesthood. But about a family in which a disability had disappeared, Rebbi Meïr says he checks up to four mothers and marries, but the Sages say, he checks forever.
Rebbi Eleazar said to him: Is not the dough widow qualified but her daughter is disqualified? He said to him, whoever declares her to be qualified, declares her daughter to be qualified. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, did he not say “whoever declares her to be qualified”? This implies that there is another who disqualifies! Who declares qualified? Rebbi Meïr. Who disqualifies? The rabbis. As we have stated: What is qualified dough, anyone about whom there is [no suspicion of descent from] a desecrated, a bastard, or a Gibeonite. Rebbi Meïr says, the daughter of any woman not tainted with one of these is qualified for thepriesthood. But about a family in which a disability had disappeared, Rebbi Meïr says he checks up to four mothers and marries, but the Sages say, he checks forever.
Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira had a different version: Rebbi Eleazar asked Rebbi Joḥanan, what is the rule about a dough widow? He said to him, she is qualified. What about her daughter? He said to him, the one who declares her to be qualified, declares her daughter to be qualified. They wanted to say, according to Rebbi Eleazar, a child of unknown paternity is disqualified; according to Rebbi Joḥanan, a child of unknown paternity is qualified. Rebbi Joḥanan also holds that in some cases a child of unknown paternity is disqualified; he answered [Rebbi Eleazar] following the latter’s reasoning: Since you reason that the child is simply of unknown paternity, we find that a child of unknown paternity can be High Priest! How is this possible? A group of Cohanim was passing by, one of them came and had sexual relations; it turns out that the child of unknown paternity can be High Priest.
The word of Rebbi Zera implies that a child of unknown paternity is qualified, for Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Yasa: Is it the same for families? He said to him, so says Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: There, for families, but here for sanctified food in the country. The word of Rebbi Samuel ben [Rav] Isaac implies that a child of unknown paternity is disqualified, for Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac asked: Does this mean that a child of unknown paternity is does not exist following Rabban Gamliel and Rebbi Eliezer, only following Rebbi Joshua? He turned around and said, a child of unknown paternity is possible following Rabban Gamliel and Rebbi Eliezer, if she remains silent. And even if you say that she talks, if she said that she does not know.
Both Rebbi Jeremiah, Rebbi Ḥama bar Uqba, say in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Rebbi Joshua agrees in the case of the rape victim. Rebbi Ḥizqiah, Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Rebbi Joshua agrees in the case of the rape victim. Rav Ḥiyya bar Ashi said in the name of Rav: Practice follows Rebbi Yose who said in the name of Rebbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Yasa: How does one act in a practical case? He said to him, following Rebbi Yose who spoke in the name of Rebbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri.
It happened that a baby girl was noticed who had been thrown on a garbage heap. The case came before Rebbi Ismael ben Rebbi Yose, who said, she should be adjoined to dough. Rebbi Jeremiah thought to say, to qualified dough, would Rebbi Ismael ben Rebbi Yose disagree with his father? Rebbi Yose said, even if you say to disqualified dough, Rebbi Ismael ben Rebbi Yose would not disagree with his father. Why? While the qualified whore, only the disqualified throw away.
It happened that a baby girl was noticed who had been thrown on a garbage heap. The case came before Rebbi Ismael ben Rebbi Yose, who said, she should be adjoined to dough. Rebbi Jeremiah thought to say, to qualified dough, would Rebbi Ismael ben Rebbi Yose disagree with his father? Rebbi Yose said, even if you say to disqualified dough, Rebbi Ismael ben Rebbi Yose would not disagree with his father. Why? While the qualified whore, only the disqualified throw away.
Should one follow the majority, and most women are married as virgins. Say then that she was married as a virgin! This implies that in criminal cases and in money matters one does not apply a majority argument. There, we have stated: “If an ox gored a cow and one finds her fetus beside her.” Do most cows have miscarriages? Say therefore that the goring induced the miscarriage. Rebbi Abbahu said, this implies that in criminal cases and in money matters one does not apply a majority argument. Rebbi Abun said, in one case they applied a majority argument, as Rebbi Aḥa stated: If a camel was in heat among camels and one finds one of them dead, I am saying that the one in heat bit it.
Should one follow the majority, and most women are married as virgins. Say then that she was married as a virgin! This implies that in criminal cases and in money matters one does not apply a majority argument. There, we have stated: “If an ox gored a cow and one finds her fetus beside her.” Do most cows have miscarriages? Say therefore that the goring induced the miscarriage. Rebbi Abbahu said, this implies that in criminal cases and in money matters one does not apply a majority argument. Rebbi Abun said, in one case they applied a majority argument, as Rebbi Aḥa stated: If a camel was in heat among camels and one finds one of them dead, I am saying that the one in heat bit it.
If somebody claimed a mina, the [defendant] denied it, and the [claimant] produced witnesses that the [defendant] owes him 50 [zuz]. The older Rebbi Ḥiyya said, [the defendant] has to swear about the remainder. Rebbi Joḥanan says, he does not have to swear. The older Rebbi Ḥiyya learned it from two who are grabbing a toga, as we have stated there: “Two are grabbing a toga, one says, I found it, and the other says, I found it.” The one who grabs half of it is as if he brought witnesses that that half belongs to him. The other says, “it belongs to me entirely”, and the fact that he grabs half of it is as if he brought witnesses that this half belongs to him. The one who says, “it belongs to me entirely”, swears that not the entire [toga] is the other’s. But he did not hear that Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan that this oath is a rabbinic institution, that a man should not see another in the market and tell him, the toga which you are wearing is mine, come and split your toga with me! Rebbi Abin in the name of Rav: My uncle agrees in the case of a document. How is that? He claimed a mina, the [defendant] denied it, and the [claimant] produced a document that the [defendant] owed him 50 [zuz]. He has only fifty. And Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, we can understand it from the following: “‘The amount of … tetradrachmas’ and it was illegible, he owes no less than two. “If it is more, if the lender says five but the borrower says three, Ben Azzay says since he partially agreed to the claim, he has to swear, but the Sages say, what he agreed to is not of the kind which was claimed. Because it was not of the kind which was claimed! Therefore, if it were of the kind which was claimed, he would be obligated. And is it not here that the agreed sum was part of the claim? Everybody agrees that he owes her a mina. But she claimsanother mina from him, to which he does not agree. The burden of proof is on the claimant.
“In hinuma”. There, a veil. The rabbis here say, a phorema.
“He is not trustworthy” if he did not eat the years of legal claim from it. But if he ate the years of legal claim from it, he is trustworthy if [the second person’s] father did not die in possession. But if [the second person’s] father died in possession, he is [not] trustworthy. As the following: Reuben ate from a field claiming that it was his. Simeon brought witnesses that his father died in possession. One removes [the field] from Reuben and hands the title to Simeon. Reuben came back and brought witnesses that [Simeon’s] father did not die in possession. Rebbi Naḥman ben Jacob said, I took it from Reuben, I am returning it to Reuben. That is what the rabbis here think. The rabbis there say, from the time it was removed, by clear testimony it was removed. So the rabbis here say, from the time she married, by clear testimony she married. Rebbi Yose said, the rabbis there agree that if during the first proceedings two [witnesses] say that his father died in possession and two say, he did not die in possession, Reuben’s claim is upheld.
“He is not trustworthy” if he did not eat the years of legal claim from it. But if he ate the years of legal claim from it, he is trustworthy if [the second person’s] father did not die in possession. But if [the second person’s] father died in possession, he is [not] trustworthy. As the following: Reuben ate from a field claiming that it was his. Simeon brought witnesses that his father died in possession. One removes [the field] from Reuben and hands the title to Simeon. Reuben came back and brought witnesses that [Simeon’s] father did not die in possession. Rebbi Naḥman ben Jacob said, I took it from Reuben, I am returning it to Reuben. That is what the rabbis here think. The rabbis there say, from the time it was removed, by clear testimony it was removed. So the rabbis here say, from the time she married, by clear testimony she married. Rebbi Yose said, the rabbis there agree that if during the first proceedings two [witnesses] say that his father died in possession and two say, he did not die in possession, Reuben’s claim is upheld.
“He is not trustworthy” if he did not eat the years of legal claim from it. But if he ate the years of legal claim from it, he is trustworthy if [the second person’s] father did not die in possession. But if [the second person’s] father died in possession, he is [not] trustworthy. As the following: Reuben ate from a field claiming that it was his. Simeon brought witnesses that his father died in possession. One removes [the field] from Reuben and hands the title to Simeon. Reuben came back and brought witnesses that [Simeon’s] father did not die in possession. Rebbi Naḥman ben Jacob said, I took it from Reuben, I am returning it to Reuben. That is what the rabbis here think. The rabbis there say, from the time it was removed, by clear testimony it was removed. So the rabbis here say, from the time she married, by clear testimony she married. Rebbi Yose said, the rabbis there agree that if during the first proceedings two [witnesses] say that his father died in possession and two say, he did not die in possession, Reuben’s claim is upheld.
“He is not trustworthy” if he did not eat the years of legal claim from it. But if he ate the years of legal claim from it, he is trustworthy if [the second person’s] father did not die in possession. But if [the second person’s] father died in possession, he is [not] trustworthy. As the following: Reuben ate from a field claiming that it was his. Simeon brought witnesses that his father died in possession. One removes [the field] from Reuben and hands the title to Simeon. Reuben came back and brought witnesses that [Simeon’s] father did not die in possession. Rebbi Naḥman ben Jacob said, I took it from Reuben, I am returning it to Reuben. That is what the rabbis here think. The rabbis there say, from the time it was removed, by clear testimony it was removed. So the rabbis here say, from the time she married, by clear testimony she married. Rebbi Yose said, the rabbis there agree that if during the first proceedings two [witnesses] say that his father died in possession and two say, he did not die in possession, Reuben’s claim is upheld.
Rebbi Joḥanan said, it was stated thus: “Two [witnesses] say he died, [later] two witnesses say, he did not die. She shall not remarry, but if she has remarried she should not leave. Two [witnesses] say she was divorced, [later] two witnesses say, she was not divorced. She shall not remarry; if she has remarried she must leave.” There, they say, it makes no difference; whether about death or divorce she should not leave. In the opinion of the rabbis there it is understandable, there is no difference between death and divorce. In the opinion of the rabbis here, what is the difference between death and divorce? Rebbi Ze‘ira said it without attribution, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It is reasonable to decide in the case of witnesses of death that if he returns he contradicts them. Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, the rabbis there stick to their opinion since the rabbis there say, when the [first] testimony was accepted, it was accepted as certain. So the rabbis here say, at the moment of her remarriage, she remarried based on certified testimony. Rebbi Yose said, it is reasonable that the rabbis there did not change their argument. Do the rabbis there not agree if two [witnesses] say, his father died while in possession, [and two say his father died while not in possession,] that the field is in Reuben’s possession? Therefore, if two say, she was divorced and remarried, and two say she was not divorced, rightly she should not leave. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If two are saying, she was preliminarily married, and two are saying, she was not preliminarily married, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” Rebbi Hoshaia said, Rebbi Joḥanan may explain it as follows: “If two are saying, she was divorced, and two are saying, she was not divorced, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” What is the difference between this and the first case? There, she was considered a married woman in everybody’s opinion. Here, she is considered a married woman only for two people. If two others came and identified the man who was betrothed to her. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If two are saying, she was kidnapped but is pure, and two are saying, she was kidnapped and is impure, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” Rebbi Yose said, since these say, she is pure, and those say, she is impure, it is as if two said, she was kidnapped, and two said, she was not kidnapped, and we depend on what she says. If two are saying, she had been betrothed and two are saying she had not been betrothed. Rebbi Jonah compares that to fat. If two said, X ate fat, and two said, X did not eat fat, did he not have to bring a “hung” reparation sacrifice because of the doubt? Here, he should give a bill of divorce because of the doubt. Rebbi Yose said to him, do not compare this to fat, because even if he says my conscience bothers me, he brings a “hung” reparation sacrifice. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Yose: If two are saying she had been betrothed and two are saying she had not been betrothed, she should not get married. The end disagrees with Rebbi Jonah: If she married she must leave. Rebbi Mana said, Rebbi Yose did not say that she may marry, nor did Rebbi Jonah say if she married she must leave, he said only, do not compare this to fat, because even if he says my conscience bothers me, he brings a “hung” reparation sacrifice.
Rebbi Joḥanan said, it was stated thus: “Two [witnesses] say he died, [later] two witnesses say, he did not die. She shall not remarry, but if she has remarried she should not leave. Two [witnesses] say she was divorced, [later] two witnesses say, she was not divorced. She shall not remarry; if she has remarried she must leave.” There, they say, it makes no difference; whether about death or divorce she should not leave. In the opinion of the rabbis there it is understandable, there is no difference between death and divorce. In the opinion of the rabbis here, what is the difference between death and divorce? Rebbi Ze‘ira said it without attribution, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It is reasonable to decide in the case of witnesses of death that if he returns he contradicts them. Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, the rabbis there stick to their opinion since the rabbis there say, when the [first] testimony was accepted, it was accepted as certain. So the rabbis here say, at the moment of her remarriage, she remarried based on certified testimony. Rebbi Yose said, it is reasonable that the rabbis there did not change their argument. Do the rabbis there not agree if two [witnesses] say, his father died while in possession, [and two say his father died while not in possession,] that the field is in Reuben’s possession? Therefore, if two say, she was divorced and remarried, and two say she was not divorced, rightly she should not leave. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If two are saying, she was preliminarily married, and two are saying, she was not preliminarily married, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” Rebbi Hoshaia said, Rebbi Joḥanan may explain it as follows: “If two are saying, she was divorced, and two are saying, she was not divorced, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” What is the difference between this and the first case? There, she was considered a married woman in everybody’s opinion. Here, she is considered a married woman only for two people. If two others came and identified the man who was betrothed to her. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If two are saying, she was kidnapped but is pure, and two are saying, she was kidnapped and is impure, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” Rebbi Yose said, since these say, she is pure, and those say, she is impure, it is as if two said, she was kidnapped, and two said, she was not kidnapped, and we depend on what she says. If two are saying, she had been betrothed and two are saying she had not been betrothed. Rebbi Jonah compares that to fat. If two said, X ate fat, and two said, X did not eat fat, did he not have to bring a “hung” reparation sacrifice because of the doubt? Here, he should give a bill of divorce because of the doubt. Rebbi Yose said to him, do not compare this to fat, because even if he says my conscience bothers me, he brings a “hung” reparation sacrifice. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Yose: If two are saying she had been betrothed and two are saying she had not been betrothed, she should not get married. The end disagrees with Rebbi Jonah: If she married she must leave. Rebbi Mana said, Rebbi Yose did not say that she may marry, nor did Rebbi Jonah say if she married she must leave, he said only, do not compare this to fat, because even if he says my conscience bothers me, he brings a “hung” reparation sacrifice.
Rebbi Joḥanan said, it was stated thus: “Two [witnesses] say he died, [later] two witnesses say, he did not die. She shall not remarry, but if she has remarried she should not leave. Two [witnesses] say she was divorced, [later] two witnesses say, she was not divorced. She shall not remarry; if she has remarried she must leave.” There, they say, it makes no difference; whether about death or divorce she should not leave. In the opinion of the rabbis there it is understandable, there is no difference between death and divorce. In the opinion of the rabbis here, what is the difference between death and divorce? Rebbi Ze‘ira said it without attribution, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It is reasonable to decide in the case of witnesses of death that if he returns he contradicts them. Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, the rabbis there stick to their opinion since the rabbis there say, when the [first] testimony was accepted, it was accepted as certain. So the rabbis here say, at the moment of her remarriage, she remarried based on certified testimony. Rebbi Yose said, it is reasonable that the rabbis there did not change their argument. Do the rabbis there not agree if two [witnesses] say, his father died while in possession, [and two say his father died while not in possession,] that the field is in Reuben’s possession? Therefore, if two say, she was divorced and remarried, and two say she was not divorced, rightly she should not leave. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If two are saying, she was preliminarily married, and two are saying, she was not preliminarily married, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” Rebbi Hoshaia said, Rebbi Joḥanan may explain it as follows: “If two are saying, she was divorced, and two are saying, she was not divorced, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” What is the difference between this and the first case? There, she was considered a married woman in everybody’s opinion. Here, she is considered a married woman only for two people. If two others came and identified the man who was betrothed to her. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If two are saying, she was kidnapped but is pure, and two are saying, she was kidnapped and is impure, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” Rebbi Yose said, since these say, she is pure, and those say, she is impure, it is as if two said, she was kidnapped, and two said, she was not kidnapped, and we depend on what she says. If two are saying, she had been betrothed and two are saying she had not been betrothed. Rebbi Jonah compares that to fat. If two said, X ate fat, and two said, X did not eat fat, did he not have to bring a “hung” reparation sacrifice because of the doubt? Here, he should give a bill of divorce because of the doubt. Rebbi Yose said to him, do not compare this to fat, because even if he says my conscience bothers me, he brings a “hung” reparation sacrifice. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Yose: If two are saying she had been betrothed and two are saying she had not been betrothed, she should not get married. The end disagrees with Rebbi Jonah: If she married she must leave. Rebbi Mana said, Rebbi Yose did not say that she may marry, nor did Rebbi Jonah say if she married she must leave, he said only, do not compare this to fat, because even if he says my conscience bothers me, he brings a “hung” reparation sacrifice.
Rebbi Joḥanan said, it was stated thus: “Two [witnesses] say he died, [later] two witnesses say, he did not die. She shall not remarry, but if she has remarried she should not leave. Two [witnesses] say she was divorced, [later] two witnesses say, she was not divorced. She shall not remarry; if she has remarried she must leave.” There, they say, it makes no difference; whether about death or divorce she should not leave. In the opinion of the rabbis there it is understandable, there is no difference between death and divorce. In the opinion of the rabbis here, what is the difference between death and divorce? Rebbi Ze‘ira said it without attribution, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It is reasonable to decide in the case of witnesses of death that if he returns he contradicts them. Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, the rabbis there stick to their opinion since the rabbis there say, when the [first] testimony was accepted, it was accepted as certain. So the rabbis here say, at the moment of her remarriage, she remarried based on certified testimony. Rebbi Yose said, it is reasonable that the rabbis there did not change their argument. Do the rabbis there not agree if two [witnesses] say, his father died while in possession, [and two say his father died while not in possession,] that the field is in Reuben’s possession? Therefore, if two say, she was divorced and remarried, and two say she was not divorced, rightly she should not leave. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If two are saying, she was preliminarily married, and two are saying, she was not preliminarily married, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” Rebbi Hoshaia said, Rebbi Joḥanan may explain it as follows: “If two are saying, she was divorced, and two are saying, she was not divorced, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” What is the difference between this and the first case? There, she was considered a married woman in everybody’s opinion. Here, she is considered a married woman only for two people. If two others came and identified the man who was betrothed to her. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If two are saying, she was kidnapped but is pure, and two are saying, she was kidnapped and is impure, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” Rebbi Yose said, since these say, she is pure, and those say, she is impure, it is as if two said, she was kidnapped, and two said, she was not kidnapped, and we depend on what she says. If two are saying, she had been betrothed and two are saying she had not been betrothed. Rebbi Jonah compares that to fat. If two said, X ate fat, and two said, X did not eat fat, did he not have to bring a “hung” reparation sacrifice because of the doubt? Here, he should give a bill of divorce because of the doubt. Rebbi Yose said to him, do not compare this to fat, because even if he says my conscience bothers me, he brings a “hung” reparation sacrifice. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Yose: If two are saying she had been betrothed and two are saying she had not been betrothed, she should not get married. The end disagrees with Rebbi Jonah: If she married she must leave. Rebbi Mana said, Rebbi Yose did not say that she may marry, nor did Rebbi Jonah say if she married she must leave, he said only, do not compare this to fat, because even if he says my conscience bothers me, he brings a “hung” reparation sacrifice.
Rebbi Joḥanan said, it was stated thus: “Two [witnesses] say he died, [later] two witnesses say, he did not die. She shall not remarry, but if she has remarried she should not leave. Two [witnesses] say she was divorced, [later] two witnesses say, she was not divorced. She shall not remarry; if she has remarried she must leave.” There, they say, it makes no difference; whether about death or divorce she should not leave. In the opinion of the rabbis there it is understandable, there is no difference between death and divorce. In the opinion of the rabbis here, what is the difference between death and divorce? Rebbi Ze‘ira said it without attribution, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It is reasonable to decide in the case of witnesses of death that if he returns he contradicts them. Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, the rabbis there stick to their opinion since the rabbis there say, when the [first] testimony was accepted, it was accepted as certain. So the rabbis here say, at the moment of her remarriage, she remarried based on certified testimony. Rebbi Yose said, it is reasonable that the rabbis there did not change their argument. Do the rabbis there not agree if two [witnesses] say, his father died while in possession, [and two say his father died while not in possession,] that the field is in Reuben’s possession? Therefore, if two say, she was divorced and remarried, and two say she was not divorced, rightly she should not leave. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If two are saying, she was preliminarily married, and two are saying, she was not preliminarily married, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” Rebbi Hoshaia said, Rebbi Joḥanan may explain it as follows: “If two are saying, she was divorced, and two are saying, she was not divorced, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” What is the difference between this and the first case? There, she was considered a married woman in everybody’s opinion. Here, she is considered a married woman only for two people. If two others came and identified the man who was betrothed to her. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If two are saying, she was kidnapped but is pure, and two are saying, she was kidnapped and is impure, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” Rebbi Yose said, since these say, she is pure, and those say, she is impure, it is as if two said, she was kidnapped, and two said, she was not kidnapped, and we depend on what she says. If two are saying, she had been betrothed and two are saying she had not been betrothed. Rebbi Jonah compares that to fat. If two said, X ate fat, and two said, X did not eat fat, did he not have to bring a “hung” reparation sacrifice because of the doubt? Here, he should give a bill of divorce because of the doubt. Rebbi Yose said to him, do not compare this to fat, because even if he says my conscience bothers me, he brings a “hung” reparation sacrifice. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Yose: If two are saying she had been betrothed and two are saying she had not been betrothed, she should not get married. The end disagrees with Rebbi Jonah: If she married she must leave. Rebbi Mana said, Rebbi Yose did not say that she may marry, nor did Rebbi Jonah say if she married she must leave, he said only, do not compare this to fat, because even if he says my conscience bothers me, he brings a “hung” reparation sacrifice.
Rebbi Joḥanan said, it was stated thus: “Two [witnesses] say he died, [later] two witnesses say, he did not die. She shall not remarry, but if she has remarried she should not leave. Two [witnesses] say she was divorced, [later] two witnesses say, she was not divorced. She shall not remarry; if she has remarried she must leave.” There, they say, it makes no difference; whether about death or divorce she should not leave. In the opinion of the rabbis there it is understandable, there is no difference between death and divorce. In the opinion of the rabbis here, what is the difference between death and divorce? Rebbi Ze‘ira said it without attribution, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It is reasonable to decide in the case of witnesses of death that if he returns he contradicts them. Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, the rabbis there stick to their opinion since the rabbis there say, when the [first] testimony was accepted, it was accepted as certain. So the rabbis here say, at the moment of her remarriage, she remarried based on certified testimony. Rebbi Yose said, it is reasonable that the rabbis there did not change their argument. Do the rabbis there not agree if two [witnesses] say, his father died while in possession, [and two say his father died while not in possession,] that the field is in Reuben’s possession? Therefore, if two say, she was divorced and remarried, and two say she was not divorced, rightly she should not leave. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If two are saying, she was preliminarily married, and two are saying, she was not preliminarily married, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” Rebbi Hoshaia said, Rebbi Joḥanan may explain it as follows: “If two are saying, she was divorced, and two are saying, she was not divorced, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” What is the difference between this and the first case? There, she was considered a married woman in everybody’s opinion. Here, she is considered a married woman only for two people. If two others came and identified the man who was betrothed to her. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If two are saying, she was kidnapped but is pure, and two are saying, she was kidnapped and is impure, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” Rebbi Yose said, since these say, she is pure, and those say, she is impure, it is as if two said, she was kidnapped, and two said, she was not kidnapped, and we depend on what she says. If two are saying, she had been betrothed and two are saying she had not been betrothed. Rebbi Jonah compares that to fat. If two said, X ate fat, and two said, X did not eat fat, did he not have to bring a “hung” reparation sacrifice because of the doubt? Here, he should give a bill of divorce because of the doubt. Rebbi Yose said to him, do not compare this to fat, because even if he says my conscience bothers me, he brings a “hung” reparation sacrifice. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Yose: If two are saying she had been betrothed and two are saying she had not been betrothed, she should not get married. The end disagrees with Rebbi Jonah: If she married she must leave. Rebbi Mana said, Rebbi Yose did not say that she may marry, nor did Rebbi Jonah say if she married she must leave, he said only, do not compare this to fat, because even if he says my conscience bothers me, he brings a “hung” reparation sacrifice.
Rebbi Joḥanan said, it was stated thus: “Two [witnesses] say he died, [later] two witnesses say, he did not die. She shall not remarry, but if she has remarried she should not leave. Two [witnesses] say she was divorced, [later] two witnesses say, she was not divorced. She shall not remarry; if she has remarried she must leave.” There, they say, it makes no difference; whether about death or divorce she should not leave. In the opinion of the rabbis there it is understandable, there is no difference between death and divorce. In the opinion of the rabbis here, what is the difference between death and divorce? Rebbi Ze‘ira said it without attribution, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It is reasonable to decide in the case of witnesses of death that if he returns he contradicts them. Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, the rabbis there stick to their opinion since the rabbis there say, when the [first] testimony was accepted, it was accepted as certain. So the rabbis here say, at the moment of her remarriage, she remarried based on certified testimony. Rebbi Yose said, it is reasonable that the rabbis there did not change their argument. Do the rabbis there not agree if two [witnesses] say, his father died while in possession, [and two say his father died while not in possession,] that the field is in Reuben’s possession? Therefore, if two say, she was divorced and remarried, and two say she was not divorced, rightly she should not leave. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If two are saying, she was preliminarily married, and two are saying, she was not preliminarily married, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” Rebbi Hoshaia said, Rebbi Joḥanan may explain it as follows: “If two are saying, she was divorced, and two are saying, she was not divorced, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” What is the difference between this and the first case? There, she was considered a married woman in everybody’s opinion. Here, she is considered a married woman only for two people. If two others came and identified the man who was betrothed to her. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If two are saying, she was kidnapped but is pure, and two are saying, she was kidnapped and is impure, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” Rebbi Yose said, since these say, she is pure, and those say, she is impure, it is as if two said, she was kidnapped, and two said, she was not kidnapped, and we depend on what she says. If two are saying, she had been betrothed and two are saying she had not been betrothed. Rebbi Jonah compares that to fat. If two said, X ate fat, and two said, X did not eat fat, did he not have to bring a “hung” reparation sacrifice because of the doubt? Here, he should give a bill of divorce because of the doubt. Rebbi Yose said to him, do not compare this to fat, because even if he says my conscience bothers me, he brings a “hung” reparation sacrifice. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Yose: If two are saying she had been betrothed and two are saying she had not been betrothed, she should not get married. The end disagrees with Rebbi Jonah: If she married she must leave. Rebbi Mana said, Rebbi Yose did not say that she may marry, nor did Rebbi Jonah say if she married she must leave, he said only, do not compare this to fat, because even if he says my conscience bothers me, he brings a “hung” reparation sacrifice.
Rebbi Joḥanan said, it was stated thus: “Two [witnesses] say he died, [later] two witnesses say, he did not die. She shall not remarry, but if she has remarried she should not leave. Two [witnesses] say she was divorced, [later] two witnesses say, she was not divorced. She shall not remarry; if she has remarried she must leave.” There, they say, it makes no difference; whether about death or divorce she should not leave. In the opinion of the rabbis there it is understandable, there is no difference between death and divorce. In the opinion of the rabbis here, what is the difference between death and divorce? Rebbi Ze‘ira said it without attribution, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It is reasonable to decide in the case of witnesses of death that if he returns he contradicts them. Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, the rabbis there stick to their opinion since the rabbis there say, when the [first] testimony was accepted, it was accepted as certain. So the rabbis here say, at the moment of her remarriage, she remarried based on certified testimony. Rebbi Yose said, it is reasonable that the rabbis there did not change their argument. Do the rabbis there not agree if two [witnesses] say, his father died while in possession, [and two say his father died while not in possession,] that the field is in Reuben’s possession? Therefore, if two say, she was divorced and remarried, and two say she was not divorced, rightly she should not leave. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If two are saying, she was preliminarily married, and two are saying, she was not preliminarily married, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” Rebbi Hoshaia said, Rebbi Joḥanan may explain it as follows: “If two are saying, she was divorced, and two are saying, she was not divorced, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” What is the difference between this and the first case? There, she was considered a married woman in everybody’s opinion. Here, she is considered a married woman only for two people. If two others came and identified the man who was betrothed to her. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If two are saying, she was kidnapped but is pure, and two are saying, she was kidnapped and is impure, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” Rebbi Yose said, since these say, she is pure, and those say, she is impure, it is as if two said, she was kidnapped, and two said, she was not kidnapped, and we depend on what she says. If two are saying, she had been betrothed and two are saying she had not been betrothed. Rebbi Jonah compares that to fat. If two said, X ate fat, and two said, X did not eat fat, did he not have to bring a “hung” reparation sacrifice because of the doubt? Here, he should give a bill of divorce because of the doubt. Rebbi Yose said to him, do not compare this to fat, because even if he says my conscience bothers me, he brings a “hung” reparation sacrifice. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Yose: If two are saying she had been betrothed and two are saying she had not been betrothed, she should not get married. The end disagrees with Rebbi Jonah: If she married she must leave. Rebbi Mana said, Rebbi Yose did not say that she may marry, nor did Rebbi Jonah say if she married she must leave, he said only, do not compare this to fat, because even if he says my conscience bothers me, he brings a “hung” reparation sacrifice.
Rebbi Joḥanan said, it was stated thus: “Two [witnesses] say he died, [later] two witnesses say, he did not die. She shall not remarry, but if she has remarried she should not leave. Two [witnesses] say she was divorced, [later] two witnesses say, she was not divorced. She shall not remarry; if she has remarried she must leave.” There, they say, it makes no difference; whether about death or divorce she should not leave. In the opinion of the rabbis there it is understandable, there is no difference between death and divorce. In the opinion of the rabbis here, what is the difference between death and divorce? Rebbi Ze‘ira said it without attribution, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It is reasonable to decide in the case of witnesses of death that if he returns he contradicts them. Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, the rabbis there stick to their opinion since the rabbis there say, when the [first] testimony was accepted, it was accepted as certain. So the rabbis here say, at the moment of her remarriage, she remarried based on certified testimony. Rebbi Yose said, it is reasonable that the rabbis there did not change their argument. Do the rabbis there not agree if two [witnesses] say, his father died while in possession, [and two say his father died while not in possession,] that the field is in Reuben’s possession? Therefore, if two say, she was divorced and remarried, and two say she was not divorced, rightly she should not leave. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If two are saying, she was preliminarily married, and two are saying, she was not preliminarily married, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” Rebbi Hoshaia said, Rebbi Joḥanan may explain it as follows: “If two are saying, she was divorced, and two are saying, she was not divorced, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” What is the difference between this and the first case? There, she was considered a married woman in everybody’s opinion. Here, she is considered a married woman only for two people. If two others came and identified the man who was betrothed to her. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If two are saying, she was kidnapped but is pure, and two are saying, she was kidnapped and is impure, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” Rebbi Yose said, since these say, she is pure, and those say, she is impure, it is as if two said, she was kidnapped, and two said, she was not kidnapped, and we depend on what she says. If two are saying, she had been betrothed and two are saying she had not been betrothed. Rebbi Jonah compares that to fat. If two said, X ate fat, and two said, X did not eat fat, did he not have to bring a “hung” reparation sacrifice because of the doubt? Here, he should give a bill of divorce because of the doubt. Rebbi Yose said to him, do not compare this to fat, because even if he says my conscience bothers me, he brings a “hung” reparation sacrifice. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Yose: If two are saying she had been betrothed and two are saying she had not been betrothed, she should not get married. The end disagrees with Rebbi Jonah: If she married she must leave. Rebbi Mana said, Rebbi Yose did not say that she may marry, nor did Rebbi Jonah say if she married she must leave, he said only, do not compare this to fat, because even if he says my conscience bothers me, he brings a “hung” reparation sacrifice.
Rebbi Joḥanan said, it was stated thus: “Two [witnesses] say he died, [later] two witnesses say, he did not die. She shall not remarry, but if she has remarried she should not leave. Two [witnesses] say she was divorced, [later] two witnesses say, she was not divorced. She shall not remarry; if she has remarried she must leave.” There, they say, it makes no difference; whether about death or divorce she should not leave. In the opinion of the rabbis there it is understandable, there is no difference between death and divorce. In the opinion of the rabbis here, what is the difference between death and divorce? Rebbi Ze‘ira said it without attribution, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It is reasonable to decide in the case of witnesses of death that if he returns he contradicts them. Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, the rabbis there stick to their opinion since the rabbis there say, when the [first] testimony was accepted, it was accepted as certain. So the rabbis here say, at the moment of her remarriage, she remarried based on certified testimony. Rebbi Yose said, it is reasonable that the rabbis there did not change their argument. Do the rabbis there not agree if two [witnesses] say, his father died while in possession, [and two say his father died while not in possession,] that the field is in Reuben’s possession? Therefore, if two say, she was divorced and remarried, and two say she was not divorced, rightly she should not leave. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If two are saying, she was preliminarily married, and two are saying, she was not preliminarily married, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” Rebbi Hoshaia said, Rebbi Joḥanan may explain it as follows: “If two are saying, she was divorced, and two are saying, she was not divorced, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” What is the difference between this and the first case? There, she was considered a married woman in everybody’s opinion. Here, she is considered a married woman only for two people. If two others came and identified the man who was betrothed to her. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If two are saying, she was kidnapped but is pure, and two are saying, she was kidnapped and is impure, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” Rebbi Yose said, since these say, she is pure, and those say, she is impure, it is as if two said, she was kidnapped, and two said, she was not kidnapped, and we depend on what she says. If two are saying, she had been betrothed and two are saying she had not been betrothed. Rebbi Jonah compares that to fat. If two said, X ate fat, and two said, X did not eat fat, did he not have to bring a “hung” reparation sacrifice because of the doubt? Here, he should give a bill of divorce because of the doubt. Rebbi Yose said to him, do not compare this to fat, because even if he says my conscience bothers me, he brings a “hung” reparation sacrifice. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Yose: If two are saying she had been betrothed and two are saying she had not been betrothed, she should not get married. The end disagrees with Rebbi Jonah: If she married she must leave. Rebbi Mana said, Rebbi Yose did not say that she may marry, nor did Rebbi Jonah say if she married she must leave, he said only, do not compare this to fat, because even if he says my conscience bothers me, he brings a “hung” reparation sacrifice.
Rebbi Joḥanan said, it was stated thus: “Two [witnesses] say he died, [later] two witnesses say, he did not die. She shall not remarry, but if she has remarried she should not leave. Two [witnesses] say she was divorced, [later] two witnesses say, she was not divorced. She shall not remarry; if she has remarried she must leave.” There, they say, it makes no difference; whether about death or divorce she should not leave. In the opinion of the rabbis there it is understandable, there is no difference between death and divorce. In the opinion of the rabbis here, what is the difference between death and divorce? Rebbi Ze‘ira said it without attribution, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It is reasonable to decide in the case of witnesses of death that if he returns he contradicts them. Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, the rabbis there stick to their opinion since the rabbis there say, when the [first] testimony was accepted, it was accepted as certain. So the rabbis here say, at the moment of her remarriage, she remarried based on certified testimony. Rebbi Yose said, it is reasonable that the rabbis there did not change their argument. Do the rabbis there not agree if two [witnesses] say, his father died while in possession, [and two say his father died while not in possession,] that the field is in Reuben’s possession? Therefore, if two say, she was divorced and remarried, and two say she was not divorced, rightly she should not leave. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If two are saying, she was preliminarily married, and two are saying, she was not preliminarily married, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” Rebbi Hoshaia said, Rebbi Joḥanan may explain it as follows: “If two are saying, she was divorced, and two are saying, she was not divorced, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” What is the difference between this and the first case? There, she was considered a married woman in everybody’s opinion. Here, she is considered a married woman only for two people. If two others came and identified the man who was betrothed to her. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If two are saying, she was kidnapped but is pure, and two are saying, she was kidnapped and is impure, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” Rebbi Yose said, since these say, she is pure, and those say, she is impure, it is as if two said, she was kidnapped, and two said, she was not kidnapped, and we depend on what she says. If two are saying, she had been betrothed and two are saying she had not been betrothed. Rebbi Jonah compares that to fat. If two said, X ate fat, and two said, X did not eat fat, did he not have to bring a “hung” reparation sacrifice because of the doubt? Here, he should give a bill of divorce because of the doubt. Rebbi Yose said to him, do not compare this to fat, because even if he says my conscience bothers me, he brings a “hung” reparation sacrifice. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Yose: If two are saying she had been betrothed and two are saying she had not been betrothed, she should not get married. The end disagrees with Rebbi Jonah: If she married she must leave. Rebbi Mana said, Rebbi Yose did not say that she may marry, nor did Rebbi Jonah say if she married she must leave, he said only, do not compare this to fat, because even if he says my conscience bothers me, he brings a “hung” reparation sacrifice.
Rebbi Joḥanan said, it was stated thus: “Two [witnesses] say he died, [later] two witnesses say, he did not die. She shall not remarry, but if she has remarried she should not leave. Two [witnesses] say she was divorced, [later] two witnesses say, she was not divorced. She shall not remarry; if she has remarried she must leave.” There, they say, it makes no difference; whether about death or divorce she should not leave. In the opinion of the rabbis there it is understandable, there is no difference between death and divorce. In the opinion of the rabbis here, what is the difference between death and divorce? Rebbi Ze‘ira said it without attribution, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It is reasonable to decide in the case of witnesses of death that if he returns he contradicts them. Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, the rabbis there stick to their opinion since the rabbis there say, when the [first] testimony was accepted, it was accepted as certain. So the rabbis here say, at the moment of her remarriage, she remarried based on certified testimony. Rebbi Yose said, it is reasonable that the rabbis there did not change their argument. Do the rabbis there not agree if two [witnesses] say, his father died while in possession, [and two say his father died while not in possession,] that the field is in Reuben’s possession? Therefore, if two say, she was divorced and remarried, and two say she was not divorced, rightly she should not leave. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If two are saying, she was preliminarily married, and two are saying, she was not preliminarily married, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” Rebbi Hoshaia said, Rebbi Joḥanan may explain it as follows: “If two are saying, she was divorced, and two are saying, she was not divorced, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” What is the difference between this and the first case? There, she was considered a married woman in everybody’s opinion. Here, she is considered a married woman only for two people. If two others came and identified the man who was betrothed to her. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If two are saying, she was kidnapped but is pure, and two are saying, she was kidnapped and is impure, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” Rebbi Yose said, since these say, she is pure, and those say, she is impure, it is as if two said, she was kidnapped, and two said, she was not kidnapped, and we depend on what she says. If two are saying, she had been betrothed and two are saying she had not been betrothed. Rebbi Jonah compares that to fat. If two said, X ate fat, and two said, X did not eat fat, did he not have to bring a “hung” reparation sacrifice because of the doubt? Here, he should give a bill of divorce because of the doubt. Rebbi Yose said to him, do not compare this to fat, because even if he says my conscience bothers me, he brings a “hung” reparation sacrifice. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Yose: If two are saying she had been betrothed and two are saying she had not been betrothed, she should not get married. The end disagrees with Rebbi Jonah: If she married she must leave. Rebbi Mana said, Rebbi Yose did not say that she may marry, nor did Rebbi Jonah say if she married she must leave, he said only, do not compare this to fat, because even if he says my conscience bothers me, he brings a “hung” reparation sacrifice.
Rebbi Joḥanan said, it was stated thus: “Two [witnesses] say he died, [later] two witnesses say, he did not die. She shall not remarry, but if she has remarried she should not leave. Two [witnesses] say she was divorced, [later] two witnesses say, she was not divorced. She shall not remarry; if she has remarried she must leave.” There, they say, it makes no difference; whether about death or divorce she should not leave. In the opinion of the rabbis there it is understandable, there is no difference between death and divorce. In the opinion of the rabbis here, what is the difference between death and divorce? Rebbi Ze‘ira said it without attribution, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It is reasonable to decide in the case of witnesses of death that if he returns he contradicts them. Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, the rabbis there stick to their opinion since the rabbis there say, when the [first] testimony was accepted, it was accepted as certain. So the rabbis here say, at the moment of her remarriage, she remarried based on certified testimony. Rebbi Yose said, it is reasonable that the rabbis there did not change their argument. Do the rabbis there not agree if two [witnesses] say, his father died while in possession, [and two say his father died while not in possession,] that the field is in Reuben’s possession? Therefore, if two say, she was divorced and remarried, and two say she was not divorced, rightly she should not leave. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If two are saying, she was preliminarily married, and two are saying, she was not preliminarily married, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” Rebbi Hoshaia said, Rebbi Joḥanan may explain it as follows: “If two are saying, she was divorced, and two are saying, she was not divorced, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” What is the difference between this and the first case? There, she was considered a married woman in everybody’s opinion. Here, she is considered a married woman only for two people. If two others came and identified the man who was betrothed to her. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If two are saying, she was kidnapped but is pure, and two are saying, she was kidnapped and is impure, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” Rebbi Yose said, since these say, she is pure, and those say, she is impure, it is as if two said, she was kidnapped, and two said, she was not kidnapped, and we depend on what she says. If two are saying, she had been betrothed and two are saying she had not been betrothed. Rebbi Jonah compares that to fat. If two said, X ate fat, and two said, X did not eat fat, did he not have to bring a “hung” reparation sacrifice because of the doubt? Here, he should give a bill of divorce because of the doubt. Rebbi Yose said to him, do not compare this to fat, because even if he says my conscience bothers me, he brings a “hung” reparation sacrifice. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Yose: If two are saying she had been betrothed and two are saying she had not been betrothed, she should not get married. The end disagrees with Rebbi Jonah: If she married she must leave. Rebbi Mana said, Rebbi Yose did not say that she may marry, nor did Rebbi Jonah say if she married she must leave, he said only, do not compare this to fat, because even if he says my conscience bothers me, he brings a “hung” reparation sacrifice.
Rebbi Joḥanan said, it was stated thus: “Two [witnesses] say he died, [later] two witnesses say, he did not die. She shall not remarry, but if she has remarried she should not leave. Two [witnesses] say she was divorced, [later] two witnesses say, she was not divorced. She shall not remarry; if she has remarried she must leave.” There, they say, it makes no difference; whether about death or divorce she should not leave. In the opinion of the rabbis there it is understandable, there is no difference between death and divorce. In the opinion of the rabbis here, what is the difference between death and divorce? Rebbi Ze‘ira said it without attribution, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It is reasonable to decide in the case of witnesses of death that if he returns he contradicts them. Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, the rabbis there stick to their opinion since the rabbis there say, when the [first] testimony was accepted, it was accepted as certain. So the rabbis here say, at the moment of her remarriage, she remarried based on certified testimony. Rebbi Yose said, it is reasonable that the rabbis there did not change their argument. Do the rabbis there not agree if two [witnesses] say, his father died while in possession, [and two say his father died while not in possession,] that the field is in Reuben’s possession? Therefore, if two say, she was divorced and remarried, and two say she was not divorced, rightly she should not leave. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If two are saying, she was preliminarily married, and two are saying, she was not preliminarily married, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” Rebbi Hoshaia said, Rebbi Joḥanan may explain it as follows: “If two are saying, she was divorced, and two are saying, she was not divorced, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” What is the difference between this and the first case? There, she was considered a married woman in everybody’s opinion. Here, she is considered a married woman only for two people. If two others came and identified the man who was betrothed to her. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If two are saying, she was kidnapped but is pure, and two are saying, she was kidnapped and is impure, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” Rebbi Yose said, since these say, she is pure, and those say, she is impure, it is as if two said, she was kidnapped, and two said, she was not kidnapped, and we depend on what she says. If two are saying, she had been betrothed and two are saying she had not been betrothed. Rebbi Jonah compares that to fat. If two said, X ate fat, and two said, X did not eat fat, did he not have to bring a “hung” reparation sacrifice because of the doubt? Here, he should give a bill of divorce because of the doubt. Rebbi Yose said to him, do not compare this to fat, because even if he says my conscience bothers me, he brings a “hung” reparation sacrifice. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Yose: If two are saying she had been betrothed and two are saying she had not been betrothed, she should not get married. The end disagrees with Rebbi Jonah: If she married she must leave. Rebbi Mana said, Rebbi Yose did not say that she may marry, nor did Rebbi Jonah say if she married she must leave, he said only, do not compare this to fat, because even if he says my conscience bothers me, he brings a “hung” reparation sacrifice.
Rebbi Joḥanan said, it was stated thus: “Two [witnesses] say he died, [later] two witnesses say, he did not die. She shall not remarry, but if she has remarried she should not leave. Two [witnesses] say she was divorced, [later] two witnesses say, she was not divorced. She shall not remarry; if she has remarried she must leave.” There, they say, it makes no difference; whether about death or divorce she should not leave. In the opinion of the rabbis there it is understandable, there is no difference between death and divorce. In the opinion of the rabbis here, what is the difference between death and divorce? Rebbi Ze‘ira said it without attribution, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It is reasonable to decide in the case of witnesses of death that if he returns he contradicts them. Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, the rabbis there stick to their opinion since the rabbis there say, when the [first] testimony was accepted, it was accepted as certain. So the rabbis here say, at the moment of her remarriage, she remarried based on certified testimony. Rebbi Yose said, it is reasonable that the rabbis there did not change their argument. Do the rabbis there not agree if two [witnesses] say, his father died while in possession, [and two say his father died while not in possession,] that the field is in Reuben’s possession? Therefore, if two say, she was divorced and remarried, and two say she was not divorced, rightly she should not leave. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If two are saying, she was preliminarily married, and two are saying, she was not preliminarily married, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” Rebbi Hoshaia said, Rebbi Joḥanan may explain it as follows: “If two are saying, she was divorced, and two are saying, she was not divorced, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” What is the difference between this and the first case? There, she was considered a married woman in everybody’s opinion. Here, she is considered a married woman only for two people. If two others came and identified the man who was betrothed to her. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If two are saying, she was kidnapped but is pure, and two are saying, she was kidnapped and is impure, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” Rebbi Yose said, since these say, she is pure, and those say, she is impure, it is as if two said, she was kidnapped, and two said, she was not kidnapped, and we depend on what she says. If two are saying, she had been betrothed and two are saying she had not been betrothed. Rebbi Jonah compares that to fat. If two said, X ate fat, and two said, X did not eat fat, did he not have to bring a “hung” reparation sacrifice because of the doubt? Here, he should give a bill of divorce because of the doubt. Rebbi Yose said to him, do not compare this to fat, because even if he says my conscience bothers me, he brings a “hung” reparation sacrifice. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Yose: If two are saying she had been betrothed and two are saying she had not been betrothed, she should not get married. The end disagrees with Rebbi Jonah: If she married she must leave. Rebbi Mana said, Rebbi Yose did not say that she may marry, nor did Rebbi Jonah say if she married she must leave, he said only, do not compare this to fat, because even if he says my conscience bothers me, he brings a “hung” reparation sacrifice.
HALAKHAH: “If witnesses said, this is our signature,” etc. It was stated: And similarly, the witnesses who testified whether to declare impure or pure, or to remove or include, or to forbid or permit, or to obligate or absolve, if they say we did invent this before their testimony was investigated by the court, they can be believed; after their testimony was investigated by the court, they are not trustworthy.” Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, they considered witnesses who signed a document as if their testimony had been investigated by the court. If they say, these are our signatures, and others say, these are their signatures, Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: Their [testimony] does not add and does not detract. Rebbi Yose said, our Mishnah says so, “if there are witnesses to identify their signatures, or if their signatures are confirmed from another document, they are not trustworthy.”
HALAKHAH: “If witnesses said, this is our signature,” etc. It was stated: And similarly, the witnesses who testified whether to declare impure or pure, or to remove or include, or to forbid or permit, or to obligate or absolve, if they say we did invent this before their testimony was investigated by the court, they can be believed; after their testimony was investigated by the court, they are not trustworthy.” Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, they considered witnesses who signed a document as if their testimony had been investigated by the court. If they say, these are our signatures, and others say, these are their signatures, Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: Their [testimony] does not add and does not detract. Rebbi Yose said, our Mishnah says so, “if there are witnesses to identify their signatures, or if their signatures are confirmed from another document, they are not trustworthy.”
HALAKHAH: “If witnesses said, this is our signature,” etc. It was stated: And similarly, the witnesses who testified whether to declare impure or pure, or to remove or include, or to forbid or permit, or to obligate or absolve, if they say we did invent this before their testimony was investigated by the court, they can be believed; after their testimony was investigated by the court, they are not trustworthy.” Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, they considered witnesses who signed a document as if their testimony had been investigated by the court. If they say, these are our signatures, and others say, these are their signatures, Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: Their [testimony] does not add and does not detract. Rebbi Yose said, our Mishnah says so, “if there are witnesses to identify their signatures, or if their signatures are confirmed from another document, they are not trustworthy.”
They say, these are our signatures, but others say, not their signatures. Rebbi Mana said, that becomes a document which has been put under acloud. Issi said, only if it had been put under a cloud but was confirmed by the court. Rebbi Eleazar said, if it was not confirmed by a court. Rebbi Ila said, the reason of Rebbi Eleazar is, that after the witnesses were confirmed as the signatories of the document, it is as if their testimony had been investigated by the court.
They say, these are our signatures, but others say, not their signatures. Rebbi Mana said, that becomes a document which has been put under acloud. Issi said, only if it had been put under a cloud but was confirmed by the court. Rebbi Eleazar said, if it was not confirmed by a court. Rebbi Ila said, the reason of Rebbi Eleazar is, that after the witnesses were confirmed as the signatories of the document, it is as if their testimony had been investigated by the court.
Rav Ḥana said, one learns from a corrected scroll, like those who say, Issi’s scribe. From letters it is problematic. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, only from three documents in the hands of three people.
Rav Huna in the name of Rav: The witnesses can be trusted if they say, that is a document given in good faith, or a document in trust. But Rav said, it is forbidden to sign a document given in good faith, or a document in trust. Does this contradict what they say in the name of Rav, the witnesses can be trusted if they say, that is a document given in good faith, or a document in trust? One word of Rav contradicts a word of Rav! Rebbi Ḥaggai said, Rav did not say it is forbidden to sign but it is forbidden to keep. As the following, “if evil is in your hand, remove it,” that is a document given in good faith, or a document in trust, “do not let injustice dwell in your house,” that is a document of indebtedness which was paid.
Rav Huna in the name of Rav: The witnesses can be trusted if they say, that is a document given in good faith, or a document in trust. But Rav said, it is forbidden to sign a document given in good faith, or a document in trust. Does this contradict what they say in the name of Rav, the witnesses can be trusted if they say, that is a document given in good faith, or a document in trust? One word of Rav contradicts a word of Rav! Rebbi Ḥaggai said, Rav did not say it is forbidden to sign but it is forbidden to keep. As the following, “if evil is in your hand, remove it,” that is a document given in good faith, or a document in trust, “do not let injustice dwell in your house,” that is a document of indebtedness which was paid.
Rav Huna in the name of Rav: The witnesses can be trusted if they say, that is a document given in good faith, or a document in trust. But Rav said, it is forbidden to sign a document given in good faith, or a document in trust. Does this contradict what they say in the name of Rav, the witnesses can be trusted if they say, that is a document given in good faith, or a document in trust? One word of Rav contradicts a word of Rav! Rebbi Ḥaggai said, Rav did not say it is forbidden to sign but it is forbidden to keep. As the following, “if evil is in your hand, remove it,” that is a document given in good faith, or a document in trust, “do not let injustice dwell in your house,” that is a document of indebtedness which was paid.
Rav Huna in the name of Rav: The witnesses can be trusted if they say, that is a document given in good faith, or a document in trust. But Rav said, it is forbidden to sign a document given in good faith, or a document in trust. Does this contradict what they say in the name of Rav, the witnesses can be trusted if they say, that is a document given in good faith, or a document in trust? One word of Rav contradicts a word of Rav! Rebbi Ḥaggai said, Rav did not say it is forbidden to sign but it is forbidden to keep. As the following, “if evil is in your hand, remove it,” that is a document given in good faith, or a document in trust, “do not let injustice dwell in your house,” that is a document of indebtedness which was paid.
MISHNAH: If one says, this is my signature and that is my colleague’s signature, and the other says, this is my signature and that is my colleague’s signature, they are trustworthy. If each of them says, that ismy signature, each of them needs another with him, the words of Rebbi, but the Sages say, everybody is trustworthy to confirm his own signature.
Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rav Ḥuna, in the name of Rav: One witness and someone from the market place cannot together certify the signature of the second witness. How is that? If one identified his own signature and that of his colleague, but that second witness’s signature was not known to anybody except his colleague, may that colleague together with somebody from the market place testify on that signature? That is what Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rav Ḥuna, said in the name of Rav: One witness and someone from the market cannot together certify the signature of the second witness. Another case where there are no two persons: The signature of one is known by everybody, but that second witness’s signature is not known to anybody except his colleague. Can that colleague testify on his signature as if he were someone from the market place? If you say so, the entire testimony is confirmed by one witness. Rebbi Yudan said, that is correct. If two people come from a town that is mostly Gentile, like Hippos. One is known by everybody as a Jew, but the other is not known by anybody except his companion. Can the latter be considered one from the market place to testify about him? If you say so, the entire testimony would be confirmed by one witness! And in the prior case, the entire testimony would be confirmed by one witness.
Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rav Ḥuna, in the name of Rav: One witness and someone from the market place cannot together certify the signature of the second witness. How is that? If one identified his own signature and that of his colleague, but that second witness’s signature was not known to anybody except his colleague, may that colleague together with somebody from the market place testify on that signature? That is what Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rav Ḥuna, said in the name of Rav: One witness and someone from the market cannot together certify the signature of the second witness. Another case where there are no two persons: The signature of one is known by everybody, but that second witness’s signature is not known to anybody except his colleague. Can that colleague testify on his signature as if he were someone from the market place? If you say so, the entire testimony is confirmed by one witness. Rebbi Yudan said, that is correct. If two people come from a town that is mostly Gentile, like Hippos. One is known by everybody as a Jew, but the other is not known by anybody except his companion. Can the latter be considered one from the market place to testify about him? If you say so, the entire testimony would be confirmed by one witness! And in the prior case, the entire testimony would be confirmed by one witness.
Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Jeremiah. The same holds for testimony regarding signs. In that case, it is obvious if one says, I saw two hairs on his back and the other says, I saw two hairs on his back. If one says, I saw one hair on his back and the other says, I saw one hair on his belly, that is nothing; similarly on his back and on his back. If two say, we saw one hair on his back and two others say, we saw one hair on his belly? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun and Rebbi Hoshaia ben Rebbi Shammai, one said, it is invalid, but the other said, it is valid. He who saysid it is invalid considers him as one who testifies to half a sign. He who said it is valid? Maybe they were rubbed off. One says, I saw two hairs on his back and one says, I saw two hairs on his belly. Rebbi Abba said, everybody agrees that this is valid [testimony]. Rebbi Ḥaggai said, everybody agrees that this is invalid. Rebbi Yose said, this is in disagreement. Rebbi Yose said to Rebbi Ḥaggai, does not Rebbi Yudan follow my opinion? He answered, I am disagreeing with his teacher, so much more with him. Rebbi Mana said, Rebbi Ḥaggai was correct. If a document was signed by four witnesses and it was disputed, if one person verified the signature of two [witnesses] and another that of the other two, is that worth anything? Does not every single signature need two witnesses? And here, every single hair needs two witnesses. Rebbi Ḥanania learns it from the years of possession. If one [witness] testified that he ate from the property the first, second, and third years and another [witness] testified that he ate from it the fourth, fifth, and sixth, is that worth anything? Does not every single year need two witnesses? And here, ever single hair needs two witnesses.
Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Jeremiah. The same holds for testimony regarding signs. In that case, it is obvious if one says, I saw two hairs on his back and the other says, I saw two hairs on his back. If one says, I saw one hair on his back and the other says, I saw one hair on his belly, that is nothing; similarly on his back and on his back. If two say, we saw one hair on his back and two others say, we saw one hair on his belly? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun and Rebbi Hoshaia ben Rebbi Shammai, one said, it is invalid, but the other said, it is valid. He who saysid it is invalid considers him as one who testifies to half a sign. He who said it is valid? Maybe they were rubbed off. One says, I saw two hairs on his back and one says, I saw two hairs on his belly. Rebbi Abba said, everybody agrees that this is valid [testimony]. Rebbi Ḥaggai said, everybody agrees that this is invalid. Rebbi Yose said, this is in disagreement. Rebbi Yose said to Rebbi Ḥaggai, does not Rebbi Yudan follow my opinion? He answered, I am disagreeing with his teacher, so much more with him. Rebbi Mana said, Rebbi Ḥaggai was correct. If a document was signed by four witnesses and it was disputed, if one person verified the signature of two [witnesses] and another that of the other two, is that worth anything? Does not every single signature need two witnesses? And here, every single hair needs two witnesses. Rebbi Ḥanania learns it from the years of possession. If one [witness] testified that he ate from the property the first, second, and third years and another [witness] testified that he ate from it the fourth, fifth, and sixth, is that worth anything? Does not every single year need two witnesses? And here, ever single hair needs two witnesses.
HALAKHAH: “If a woman said, I was married,” etc. It was stated: If the witnesses came after she remarried, she should not leave. Rav Ḥuna and Rebbi Ḥanina both say, not only after she remarried but even after the court authorized her to remarry. As the following: A woman came to Rebbi Joḥanan and said to him, I was married but I am divorced, and he permitted her. After she left, they said to him, are not her witnesses at Lod? He said, so I am saying: Should she wait even if her witnesses are at קסוסנון? Rebbi Yose bar Rebbi Abun said, there were two cases. In one case, they said to him, are not her witnesses at Lod? In the other case, they said to him, are not her witnesses at Caesarea? And so it was!He said to them, so I am saying: Should she wait even if her witnesses are at קסוסנון?
Rebbi Yudan asked: “I had been married but I was divorced at place X”; if two [witnesses] come and say, no woman was divorced at place X, do they contradict her? Rebbi Yose asked, if she said, I had been married but I was divorced at place X at a certain date,” and two came and said, a woman was divorced at that place, but two [others] came and said, no woman was divorced at that place? That is a contradiction of the essence of the testimony; we live off her mouth.
One day, she said, I am married. The next day, she said, I am divorced. We asked her, yesterday you said this, today you say otherwise? She said to them, because of a group of amoral people who wanted to start up with me. Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Ila: Since she provided an explanation for her words, she can be believed. A similar case: Samuel wanted to sleep with his wife, but she said to him, I am impure. The next day, she said, I am pure. He said to her, yesterday, you said impure, today pure? She said to him, I did not feel well enough at that moment. He came and asked Rav, who told him, since she provided an explanation for her words, she can be believed.
Women were kidnapped and brought there. The case came before Abba bar Abba, and Samuel. They ordered and gave them over to chaperones who were to return them to the Land of Israel. He said to him: What did we do for the earlier times when they were alone with them? Abba bar Abba said to him, would you say so if they were your daughters? Samuel’s daughters were kidnapped, “like an error which comes from the ruler”. When they were brought here, their kidnappers came with them. They came before Rebbi Ḥanina and left their kidnappers outside. They said to him, we were kidnapped but we are pure. He permitted them. After they left, their kidnappers sent after them. He said, it is obvious that these are the daughters of a Sage. When they came to know who they were, they said to Simeon bar Abba, take care of your relatives. He married the first one, but she died. The second one and she died. Why? Because they lied? God forbid, they did not lie. But because of the sin of Ḥanania, Rebbi Joshua’s nephew, who intercalated the year outside the Land.
Rebbi Ismael ben Rebbi Yose said, I never testified except once, when I raised a slave to priestly status. Rebbi Isaac Ḥaqula and Rebbi Simeon ben Rebbi, one raised a brother on the testimony of his brother, the other a son on the testimony of his father; one to the priesthood, the other to levitic status. A person came before Rebbi Hila; he said to him, this is my son and he is a Cohen. He answered him, he is your son but he is no Cohen. Rebbi Ḥiyya the elder said to him, if you believe him that he is his son, believe him that he is a Cohen. If you do not believe him that he is his son, do not believe him that he is a Cohen. He answered, he is his son but I say that he is the son of a divorcee or one who had performed ḥalîṣah. Rebbi Abin said, so he said to him: If you believe him that he is his son, believe him that he is a Cohen. If you do not believe him that he is a Cohen, do not believe him that he is his son. In that case, he would be unrelated and trustworthy in his testimony! He answered, he is his son but I say that he is the son of a divorcee or one who had performed ḥalîṣah. Did they not say, Rebbi Isaac Ḥaqula and Rebbi Simeon ben Rebbi, one raised a brother on the testimony of his brother, the other a son on the testimony of his father? Let us say that Rebbi elevated a brother on the testimony of his brother. You may even say, a son on the testimony of his father, to levitic status.
Rebbi Ismael ben Rebbi Yose said, I never testified except once, when I raised a slave to priestly status. Rebbi Isaac Ḥaqula and Rebbi Simeon ben Rebbi, one raised a brother on the testimony of his brother, the other a son on the testimony of his father; one to the priesthood, the other to levitic status. A person came before Rebbi Hila; he said to him, this is my son and he is a Cohen. He answered him, he is your son but he is no Cohen. Rebbi Ḥiyya the elder said to him, if you believe him that he is his son, believe him that he is a Cohen. If you do not believe him that he is his son, do not believe him that he is a Cohen. He answered, he is his son but I say that he is the son of a divorcee or one who had performed ḥalîṣah. Rebbi Abin said, so he said to him: If you believe him that he is his son, believe him that he is a Cohen. If you do not believe him that he is a Cohen, do not believe him that he is his son. In that case, he would be unrelated and trustworthy in his testimony! He answered, he is his son but I say that he is the son of a divorcee or one who had performed ḥalîṣah. Did they not say, Rebbi Isaac Ḥaqula and Rebbi Simeon ben Rebbi, one raised a brother on the testimony of his brother, the other a son on the testimony of his father? Let us say that Rebbi elevated a brother on the testimony of his brother. You may even say, a son on the testimony of his father, to levitic status.
Rebbi Ismael ben Rebbi Yose said, I never testified except once, when I raised a slave to priestly status. Rebbi Isaac Ḥaqula and Rebbi Simeon ben Rebbi, one raised a brother on the testimony of his brother, the other a son on the testimony of his father; one to the priesthood, the other to levitic status. A person came before Rebbi Hila; he said to him, this is my son and he is a Cohen. He answered him, he is your son but he is no Cohen. Rebbi Ḥiyya the elder said to him, if you believe him that he is his son, believe him that he is a Cohen. If you do not believe him that he is his son, do not believe him that he is a Cohen. He answered, he is his son but I say that he is the son of a divorcee or one who had performed ḥalîṣah. Rebbi Abin said, so he said to him: If you believe him that he is his son, believe him that he is a Cohen. If you do not believe him that he is a Cohen, do not believe him that he is his son. In that case, he would be unrelated and trustworthy in his testimony! He answered, he is his son but I say that he is the son of a divorcee or one who had performed ḥalîṣah. Did they not say, Rebbi Isaac Ḥaqula and Rebbi Simeon ben Rebbi, one raised a brother on the testimony of his brother, the other a son on the testimony of his father? Let us say that Rebbi elevated a brother on the testimony of his brother. You may even say, a son on the testimony of his father, to levitic status.
Rebbi Ismael ben Rebbi Yose said, I never testified except once, when I raised a slave to priestly status. Rebbi Isaac Ḥaqula and Rebbi Simeon ben Rebbi, one raised a brother on the testimony of his brother, the other a son on the testimony of his father; one to the priesthood, the other to levitic status. A person came before Rebbi Hila; he said to him, this is my son and he is a Cohen. He answered him, he is your son but he is no Cohen. Rebbi Ḥiyya the elder said to him, if you believe him that he is his son, believe him that he is a Cohen. If you do not believe him that he is his son, do not believe him that he is a Cohen. He answered, he is his son but I say that he is the son of a divorcee or one who had performed ḥalîṣah. Rebbi Abin said, so he said to him: If you believe him that he is his son, believe him that he is a Cohen. If you do not believe him that he is a Cohen, do not believe him that he is his son. In that case, he would be unrelated and trustworthy in his testimony! He answered, he is his son but I say that he is the son of a divorcee or one who had performed ḥalîṣah. Did they not say, Rebbi Isaac Ḥaqula and Rebbi Simeon ben Rebbi, one raised a brother on the testimony of his brother, the other a son on the testimony of his father? Let us say that Rebbi elevated a brother on the testimony of his brother. You may even say, a son on the testimony of his father, to levitic status.
Rebbi Ismael ben Rebbi Yose said, I never testified except once, when I raised a slave to priestly status. Rebbi Isaac Ḥaqula and Rebbi Simeon ben Rebbi, one raised a brother on the testimony of his brother, the other a son on the testimony of his father; one to the priesthood, the other to levitic status. A person came before Rebbi Hila; he said to him, this is my son and he is a Cohen. He answered him, he is your son but he is no Cohen. Rebbi Ḥiyya the elder said to him, if you believe him that he is his son, believe him that he is a Cohen. If you do not believe him that he is his son, do not believe him that he is a Cohen. He answered, he is his son but I say that he is the son of a divorcee or one who had performed ḥalîṣah. Rebbi Abin said, so he said to him: If you believe him that he is his son, believe him that he is a Cohen. If you do not believe him that he is a Cohen, do not believe him that he is his son. In that case, he would be unrelated and trustworthy in his testimony! He answered, he is his son but I say that he is the son of a divorcee or one who had performed ḥalîṣah. Did they not say, Rebbi Isaac Ḥaqula and Rebbi Simeon ben Rebbi, one raised a brother on the testimony of his brother, the other a son on the testimony of his father? Let us say that Rebbi elevated a brother on the testimony of his brother. You may even say, a son on the testimony of his father, to levitic status.
MISHNAH: In the following cases, one is trustworthy to testify as an adult about what one saw in one’s minority. A man is trustworthy to say, this is my father’s handwriting, my teacher’s handwriting, my brother’s handwriting; I remember that this person went out in hinuma and uncovered hair, or that this man left school to immerse himself to eat heave, or that he took his part with us on the threshing floor, or that this place is bet happeras, or this far we went on the Sabbath. But a person is not trustworthy to say that X had a right of way at this place, or that X had a space for eulogies at this place.
MISHNAH: In the following cases, one is trustworthy to testify as an adult about what one saw in one’s minority. A man is trustworthy to say, this is my father’s handwriting, my teacher’s handwriting, my brother’s handwriting; I remember that this person went out in hinuma and uncovered hair, or that this man left school to immerse himself to eat heave, or that he took his part with us on the threshing floor, or that this place is bet happeras, or this far we went on the Sabbath. But a person is not trustworthy to say that X had a right of way at this place, or that X had a space for eulogies at this place.
Should one not worry that he might be a slave? This supports what Rebbi Ḥama bar Uqba said in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Ḥanina: It is forbidden for a man to teach Torah to his slave. But did not Rebbi Ze‘ira say in the name of Rav Jeremiah: A slave is counted as one of the seven readers; wayedabber is counted as one of three verses! Explain it, if he learned it by himself or his master taught him like Tebi. Should one not worry that he might be a slave? This supports what Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: Women and slaves cannot share in the distribution on the threshing floor, but one gives them the gifts of priesthood and levitic status from the house.
Would they be trustworthy to say, we went out to collect unripe figs in the sabbatical year and heard X talking about his wife Y, or woman Z talking about her children?
“In the following cases, one is trustworthy to testify as an adult about what he saw in his minority,” etc. They are only trustworthy as adults about what they saw as minors; therefore, not as minors! There, we have stated: “A woman or a minor are trustworthy when they said, from there a swarm of bees left. He then can enter another’s field and take his swarm.” And here, you say so? Rebbi Aḥa, Rebbi Ḥananiah in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Rebbi Joḥanan ben Beroqa said this only about a swarm of bees because taking it is not robbery by biblical standards. Rav Oshaiah stated, only if it is swarming. But not if it clings to a branch. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Mana: Is that not reasonable only when it happens, but not after some time? He said to him, I agree. And we have stated: When is this said? When they testified to what they said. But if they left and came back, I am saying that they speak out of fear or were seduced.
“The Gibeonite.” Rebbi Yose said, they were worried about them only because of the detriment to the families. Could you not say, because of the disability of slaves? If that were true, one who cohabits with a Gibeonite would not be subject to a fine; but we have stated: One who cohabits with a Gibeonite is subject to a fine.
“A Samaritan.” That follows him who said, a Samaritan is a like full Jew. But for him who says that a Samaritan is like a Gentile, it is not so. As they disagreed: A Samaritan is like a Gentile, the words of Rebbi. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel said, a Samaritan is like a Jew in every respect. Even if you say, a Samaritan is like a Gentile, why are Samaritans disqualified? Not because of a Gentile and a slave? If a Gentile or a slave has intercourse with a Jewish woman, the child is a bastard. But a bastard girl can claim a fine! For restrictions or family relations you consider him a Gentile or a slave who had intercourse with a Jewish woman; the child is a bastard. But for a fine you consider this as a Jew having intercourse with a Gentile woman, in which case the child is a Gentile.
There, we have stated: “If somebody eats heave intentionally, he pays the principal but not the fifth.” And we have stated: “The following are flogged.” Here you say, he is flogged, and there you say, he pays. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the Mishnah is two-sided: If he was cautioned, he is flogged; if he was not cautioned, he pays. Rebbi Joḥanan is of the opinion that in a case where there is flogging or restitution, when he pays he is not flogged. Why should he not be flogged and have to pay? (Deut. 25:2) “Corresponding to his guilt.” You sentence him for one offence but you may not sentence him for two offences. The verse speaks of one who may incur two punishments (Deut. 25:2): “The judge shall have him laid down and flogged in his presence a number [of times] because of his guilt.”
There, we have stated: “If somebody eats heave intentionally, he pays the principal but not the fifth.” And we have stated: “The following are flogged.” Here you say, he is flogged, and there you say, he pays. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the Mishnah is two-sided: If he was cautioned, he is flogged; if he was not cautioned, he pays. Rebbi Joḥanan is of the opinion that in a case where there is flogging or restitution, when he pays he is not flogged. Why should he not be flogged and have to pay? (Deut. 25:2) “Corresponding to his guilt.” You sentence him for one offence but you may not sentence him for two offences. The verse speaks of one who may incur two punishments (Deut. 25:2): “The judge shall have him laid down and flogged in his presence a number [of times] because of his guilt.”
Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, even if he was not cautioned should he not pay since when cautioned he would be flogged? A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: “If somebody eats heave in error, he pays principal and fifth,” but if he was cautioned, will he not be flogged? He explains it following Rebbi Meïr since Rebbi Meïr said, he is flogged and pays. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, as we have stated: “The following adolescent girls can claim a fine,” but if he was cautioned, will he not be flogged? He explains it following Rebbi Meïr since Rebbi Meïr said, he is flogged and pays. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Rebbi Meïr learned from the calumniator. (Deut. 22:18) “They shall punish him,” flogging; (Deut. 22:19) “and they shall fine him”, money. But the rabbis say, [the law of] the calumniator is separate because of its novelty; one cannot learn from a novelty! Because nowhere else will a person become guilty by speech, but here he becomes guilty by speech; therefore, nothing can be inferred. Another explanation: one cannot transfer the rules of either payment or flogging. Did not Rebbi Abbahu say in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If he [eats] fat in error but is intentional about the sacrifice, if he was cautioned he will be flogged and has to bring a sacrifice? So here, he is flogged and he pays. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Samuel bar Rav Isaac said, (Deut. 25:2) “Because of his guilt.” If two possibilities are given to the court, one chooses one of them. This excludes matters in the power of Heaven.
Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, even if he was not cautioned should he not pay since when cautioned he would be flogged? A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: “If somebody eats heave in error, he pays principal and fifth,” but if he was cautioned, will he not be flogged? He explains it following Rebbi Meïr since Rebbi Meïr said, he is flogged and pays. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, as we have stated: “The following adolescent girls can claim a fine,” but if he was cautioned, will he not be flogged? He explains it following Rebbi Meïr since Rebbi Meïr said, he is flogged and pays. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Rebbi Meïr learned from the calumniator. (Deut. 22:18) “They shall punish him,” flogging; (Deut. 22:19) “and they shall fine him”, money. But the rabbis say, [the law of] the calumniator is separate because of its novelty; one cannot learn from a novelty! Because nowhere else will a person become guilty by speech, but here he becomes guilty by speech; therefore, nothing can be inferred. Another explanation: one cannot transfer the rules of either payment or flogging. Did not Rebbi Abbahu say in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If he [eats] fat in error but is intentional about the sacrifice, if he was cautioned he will be flogged and has to bring a sacrifice? So here, he is flogged and he pays. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Samuel bar Rav Isaac said, (Deut. 25:2) “Because of his guilt.” If two possibilities are given to the court, one chooses one of them. This excludes matters in the power of Heaven.
Nathan bar Hoshiah said, one speaks about an adolescent girl, the other about an adult woman. The adolescent has a fine but nobody is flogged for her; for the adult he is flogged but pays no fine, she cannot be sold; she has no claim for shame and blemish. The rabbis of Caesarea said, explain it that she seduced him or remitted [the fine] for him. Nathan bar Hoshaiah thinks that in a case of flogging and payment he pays but is not flogged. Why should he not be flogged and have to pay? (Deut. 25:2) “Because of his guilt.” You sentence him for one offence but you may not sentence him for two offences. From perjured witnesses. Just as you say there, perjured witnesses pay but are not flogged, here also he pays and is not flogged. Rebbi Jonah said, the reason of Rebbi Nathan bar Hoshaiah: (Deut. 25:2): “For his evil deed.” It refers to one whose flogging frees him from his guilt, excluding one who is told: get up and pay.
Rebbi Mana said before Rebbi Yose: If it is so, he who sleeps with his minor sister should be flogged and have to pay since if he sleeps with his adult sister he is flogged. He reversed himself and said, there death and payment fall on him simultaneously. But here, when he muzzled he is subject to flogging but only later for payment. Rebbi Ze‘ira objected before Rebbi Mana: He who sets fire to his neighbor’s grain stack on the Sabbath is subject to capital punishment from the first ear but only later for payment! One cannot say that because for every single ear there is cautioning for the death penalty. Here also, for every moment of muzzling there is cautioning for flogging. Rebbi Yose bar Abun said, two Amoraïm. One said, if he muzzled for heave which is Temple property. The other one said, if he muzzled through an agent. Then the agent is flogged and he is free (Lev. 17:4): “As a blood guilt it will be charged on this man,” not on his employers.
Rebbi Judah bar Pazi asked: What say these Tannaïm about whipping and extirpation? Rebbi Yose said, that is a problem for the rabbis. Rebbi Jonah said, why can we not understand it from what Rebbi Simeon ben Ioḥai stated? As Rebbi Simeon ben Ioḥai stated: “Rebbi Ṭarphon says, extirpation was mentioned for the Sabbath and the Day of Atonement. Since for extirpation mentioned for the Sabbath there is no payment in a case involving the death penalty, so for extirpation mentioned for the Day of Atonement there is no payment in a case involving extirpation.” Rebbi Mana said before Rebbi Yose: When do we need this? Not for Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? But for Rebbi Joḥanan, if he admits flogging in death penalty cases, certainly flogging in extirpation cases, since they disagreed: If somebody slaughters [an animal] and its young for idolatrous purposes. Rebbi Joḥanan says, if he was cautioned about an animal and its young, he is flogged, about idolatry, he is stoned to death. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, even if he was cautioned about an animal and its young, he is not flogged since he would be stoned to death had he been cautioned about idolatry. He said to him, we need it even for Rebbi Joḥanan! Here are two cases, there it is one case.
Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: We understand that, since it said “if there is no case of murder, a fine shall be imposed”, that if it is a case of murder, you shall take life for life? Why does the verse say, it is a case of murder? To add the case of premeditation and warning. Rebbi Yose said, is that not a Mishnah, “for anybody committing a capital crime does not pay cash”, that it deals not only with cases of error. Ḥizqiah said, one states a baraita: “The slayer of an animal must pay for it but the slayer of a human shall be put to death.” Just as you did not make a difference between unintentional and intentional action of a slayer of an animal to force him to pay money, so you should not make a difference between unintentional and intentional action of a slayer of a human to free him from paying money.
If he came to her before she was preliminarily married, then she was preliminarily married and divorced. Does the statement of Rebbi Aḥai not imply that he pays? Did we not state: “For he had mistreated her,” to include the orphan for the fine, the words of Rebbi Yose the Galilean. Rebbi Aḥai said, explain it that he came to her before her father died; when subsequently her father died he already was obligated to give to her father. One came to her before her father died and subsequently her father died; one came to her before she was preliminarily married, subsequently she was divorced. Rebbi Ze‘ira said that Rav Ḥisda asked: If one came to her before she was married and then she was married? Since you say there, she is under her husband but he has to pay to her father, so in this case she is under her husband but he has to pay to her father.
Rebbi Eleazar asked: Do the daughters of the rape victim have the rights given by the ketubah stipulations? It is clear to me that the rape victim has no [ketubah] of the male children, and that the seduced victim has no [ketubah] of the male children. If you say that he questions in both cases, we could ask, do the daughters of the rape victim and the daughters of the seduced girl have the rights given by the ketubah stipulations? That is a problem following the rabbis, but it is obvious following Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah; as it was stated: Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah says, the rapist gives a mina as ketubah.