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16891 occurrences across the corpus
The Jerusalem Talmud
There, you find it possible to say, “it should go grazing”, and here, you say so? There, the Elder eliminates the vow from the start; here, he eliminates only from that moment onwards.
HALAKHAH: “If one of the bloods was sprinkled for her,” etc. He dissolves for her because of her hair. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: It is a decision of Scripture: “He dissolved her vows,” he dissolves what is on her. Whenever he dissolves her vow, he dissolves what is on her. Rebbi Eleazar said, it follows Rebbi Simeon. Rebbi Joḥanan said, it is everybody’s opinion, after she was transferred from the prohibition to the positive commandment. The rabbis say, “afterwards, the nazir shall drink wine,” after all these actions. Rebbi Simeon says, even after a single action. Ḥizqiah said, the Mishnah supports Rebbi (Bevai). “When has this been said? If she shaves in purity. But if she shaves in impurity, he may dissolve since he can say, I cannot stand an unseemly wife.” Therefore, shaving in purity does not make her unseemly. Who holds that shaving does not make unseemly? Rebbi Simeon. Rebbi Yose bar Abun said, even Rebbi thinks so: “Rebbi says, he may dissolve even if she shaves [in purity], since he can say, I cannot stand a shorn wife.” Should he not say, I cannot stand an unseemly and shorn wife? Rebbi Joḥanan said, Rebbi (Jehudah) said that only for the purification sacrifice, since a purification sacrifice would be invalid if not in her name. That means, as long as it is alive it is surrendered to Heaven only by slaughter.
HALAKHAH: “A man can declare his son a nazir,” etc. “A man”. This refers not only to a man; from where for a woman? The verse says, “afflicted with skin disease,” whether man, woman, or minor. If it is so, why is “a man” written? For the next theme, “a man is dishevelled and has open seams, no woman is dishevelled and has open seams.”
So far, if they are equal. If he was nazir once, his son nazir twice? He and his son nazir once, [but] he was a pure nazir, his son an impure nazir, [or] he an impure nazir, his son a pure nazir?
There, you say: “It shall leave and graze with the herd.” And here, you say so? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, there he asked about his vow of nazir. Because of the vow of nazir did his sacrifices become profane.
So far, if he thought that it was the tenth which he called “tenth”. If he knew that it was the ninth and called it “tenth”? The colleagues say, it is sanctified. Rebbi Yudan said, it is not sanctified. The Mishnah supports the colleagues: “The House of Hillel said to the House of Shammai: Do you not agree that it leaves and grazes with the herd? The House of Shammai anwered them, do you not agree that if somebody erred and designated the ninth as the tenth, or the tenth as ninth, or the eleventh as tenth, it is sanctified.” And they do not accept it! Otherwise, they could have answered: Why do you answer us from something which is sanctified only if not in [willful] error about something which will be sanctified both in error and not in error! As Rebbi Immi said, they were rich in answer, or as Rebbi Nasa said, like somebody who has two reasons and he responds by giving one of them.
Rav Zakkai stated before Rebbi Joḥanan: If somebody sacrificed, burned incense, and poured a libation in one forgetting, he is guilty for each action separately. Rebbi Joḥanan told him, Babylonian! You crossed three rivers with your hands and were broken. He is guilty only once! {Before he broke in his hand there is “one” but not “those”; after he broke in his hand there are “those” but not “one”.} Rebbi Abba bar Mamal asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: Should he not be guilty for each action separately? As you say for the Sabbath: “Do not perform any work,” principle. “Do not light fire in any of your dwelling places,” a detail. Was not lighting fire subsumed under the principle, but it is mentioned separately from this principle! Since lighting fire is special in that it is the work of a single individual and one would be guilty for it alone, so everything for which alone one is guilty. Also here: “Do not worship them,” a principle. “Do not prostrate yourself,” a detail. Was not prostrating itself included in the principle and why was it mentioned separately? To infer, to tell you that prostrating oneself is special in that it is the work of a single individual and one would be guilty for it alone, so everything for which alone one is guilty. He answered: For the Sabbath, he mentioned the principle at one place and the details at another place. For idol worship, the principle is found close to the detail. He retorted: Is it not witten: “Do not prostrate yourself before another power”? He did not state the principle and the detail at the same spot! He said, since you do not infer anything from it close up, you cannot infer anything from afar. The colleagues say, it makes no difference; whether He gave the principle at one place and the detail at another, or gave principle and detail at the same place, it is a matter of principle and detail. For the Sabbath, He first gave the principle and then the detail. For idolatry, He gave the detail and only later the principle. Rebbi Yose said, it makes no difference whether [He first gave the principle and then the detail or He gave the detail and only later the principle, or He gave principle, detail, and principle]; it is a matter of principle and detail. For the Sabbath, He gave a general prohibition of work, followed by details; for idolatry, He was indeterminate regarding its worship but detailed the worship of Heaven.
Rav Zakkai stated before Rebbi Joḥanan: If somebody sacrificed, burned incense, and poured a libation in one forgetting, he is guilty for each action separately. Rebbi Joḥanan told him, Babylonian! You crossed three rivers with your hands and were broken. He is guilty only once! {Before he broke in his hand there is “one” but not “those”; after he broke in his hand there are “those” but not “one”.} Rebbi Abba bar Mamal asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: Should he not be guilty for each action separately? As you say for the Sabbath: “Do not perform any work,” principle. “Do not light fire in any of your dwelling places,” a detail. Was not lighting fire subsumed under the principle, but it is mentioned separately from this principle! Since lighting fire is special in that it is the work of a single individual and one would be guilty for it alone, so everything for which alone one is guilty. Also here: “Do not worship them,” a principle. “Do not prostrate yourself,” a detail. Was not prostrating itself included in the principle and why was it mentioned separately? To infer, to tell you that prostrating oneself is special in that it is the work of a single individual and one would be guilty for it alone, so everything for which alone one is guilty. He answered: For the Sabbath, he mentioned the principle at one place and the details at another place. For idol worship, the principle is found close to the detail. He retorted: Is it not witten: “Do not prostrate yourself before another power”? He did not state the principle and the detail at the same spot! He said, since you do not infer anything from it close up, you cannot infer anything from afar. The colleagues say, it makes no difference; whether He gave the principle at one place and the detail at another, or gave principle and detail at the same place, it is a matter of principle and detail. For the Sabbath, He first gave the principle and then the detail. For idolatry, He gave the detail and only later the principle. Rebbi Yose said, it makes no difference whether [He first gave the principle and then the detail or He gave the detail and only later the principle, or He gave principle, detail, and principle]; it is a matter of principle and detail. For the Sabbath, He gave a general prohibition of work, followed by details; for idolatry, He was indeterminate regarding its worship but detailed the worship of Heaven.
Rebbi [Yose] said to the colleagues: You should know that Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagree: If somebody split a limb from a living animal and ate it, everybody agrees that he is free from prosecution. Where do they disagree? If he split it in his mouth before he ate it. Rebbi Joḥanan considers his mouth as inside, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish considers his mouth as outside. They asked him, what do you say? He answered them, I informed you that mighty mountains disagree, and you ask this? If it is so, even if he split it outside and then ate, he should be guilty! Why? That is how one eats. If somebody split an ant in his mouth and ate it, that is the disagreement of Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. Rebbi Maisha asked Rebbi Ze‘ira: If he split a grape in his mouth and ate it, is that the disagreement of Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? He answered, there it is something for which there is a prohibition and impurity. In a circumstance in which its impurity disappeard, its prohibition disappeared. But here is a prohibition and no impurity. Rebbi Abba ben Rebbi Mamal asked: If he split an olive-sized bit of mazzah in his mouth and ate it, is that the disagreement of Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, in the other cases, his palate did not enjoy an olive sized bit. The rabbis of Caesarea said that Rebbi Nisa asked: If he split in his mouth pomegranate berries which are ‘orlah and ate them, is that the disagreement of Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? Where do we hold? If because of fluids, we already did state: “Nothing makes impure as a drink except what comes from olives and grapes.” The rabbis of Caesarea said, explain it if he swallowed them.
“According to the early Mishnah if he drinks a quartarius of wine.” They did explain “liquor”. Since “liquor” mentioned there means a quartarius, so “liquor” mentioned here also means a quartarius. They changed to say “he shall not eat, he shall not drink.” Since eating is defined by an olive’s size so drinking is by an olive’s size.
“According to the early Mishnah if he drinks a quartarius of wine.” They did explain “liquor”. Since “liquor” mentioned there means a quartarius, so “liquor” mentioned here also means a quartarius. They changed to say “he shall not eat, he shall not drink.” Since eating is defined by an olive’s size so drinking is by an olive’s size.
You say about a pure nazir that most of his hair hinders him. If he shaved a third but did not manage to finish until everything grew again: Is it sufficient that he shave the remainder or does he have to shave everything? You say about an impure nazir that two hairs hinder or two hairs make him start again. Similarly, for a pure nazir, do two hairs hinder him or two hairs make him start again? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, so it is, and it was stated: “Rebbi Simeon ben Jehudah said in the name of Rebbi Simeon, just as two hairs hinder him, so two hairs cause him to start again.”
You say about a pure nazir that most of his hair hinders him. If he shaved a third but did not manage to finish until everything grew again: Is it sufficient that he shave the remainder or does he have to shave everything? You say about an impure nazir that two hairs hinder or two hairs make him start again. Similarly, for a pure nazir, do two hairs hinder him or two hairs make him start again? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, so it is, and it was stated: “Rebbi Simeon ben Jehudah said in the name of Rebbi Simeon, just as two hairs hinder him, so two hairs cause him to start again.”
It is written: “The Cohen takes the cooked fore-leg of the ram.” If cooked, I could think separately. The verse says, “from the ram”. How is this? He cuts it off so that only a barley grain’s width remains. Does not the sanctified absorb from the profane, or the profane from the sanctified?.
HALAKHAH: The argument of Rebbi Eliezer seems inverted. There, he says: “he has to repeat only for 30,” and here, he says so? Rebbi Joḥanan says, he has to repeat all his sacrifices. It is obvious, if it would have been valid without him becoming impure, then why is it not valid if later he becomes impure? Rebbi Ḥinena said, is that not Rebbi Eliezer’s? And Rebbi Eliezer follows the Shammaites, as it was stated: Concerning a nazir who lost all his hair, the House of Shammai say, he has to move a shaving knife over his head; the House of Hillel say, he does not need to move a shaving knife over his head.
So is the Mishnah: He shall become pure again and then bring his remaining sacrifices. So is the Mishnah: She shall become pure again and then bring her remaining sacrifices.
So is the Mishnah: He shall become pure again and then bring his remaining sacrifices. So is the Mishnah: She shall become pure again and then bring her remaining sacrifices.
HALAKHAH: “The High Priest and the nazir,” etc. It is written: “He shall not go close to a dead body.” Where do we hold? If to forbid non-relatives, is he not also under the rules of a simple priest? If it cannot refer to non-relatives, refer it to relatives. It is written: “Not to go close to a dead body,” and you say so? Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Gamda said, from here repeated prohibitions in the Torah. But it is to permit the corpse of obligation. Some understand it from the following: “ The man shall not defile himself, in the midst of his people” he may not defile himself. But he defiles himself for a corpse of obligation. Some understand it from the following: “ To profane himself.” He may not defile himself to profane himself; he defiles himself for a corpse of obligation.
Some want to derive it from the following: “For a hanged person is blasphemy.” Anybody warned about blasphemy is warned about a corpse of obligation. Anybody not warned about blasphemy is not warned about a corpse of obligation. They objected, are there not Gentiles? Those executed by hanging, this exludes those executed by the sword. “Bury!” A positive commandment. From where do you add the sword he was killed with, the gallows on which he was hanged, the towel with which he was strangled? Why does the verse say, “you shall bury him”? I could think he alone is buried; the verse says “bury, you shall bury him”, a burial for him, and his gallows, and his stone. How does one do it? One digs down three [handbreadths], so the plough shall not unearth him. “You shall bury him”, whole and not partially. “You shall bury him”, from here that if he left anything [unburied], he did not do anything, for it is said “bury, you shall bury him”. From here that it is not a corpse of obligation unless it consists of his head with most of the body.
Rebbi Yasa stated before Rebbi Joḥanan: Just as one defiles himself for a corpse of obligation, so one defiles himself for a limb of a corpse of obligation. Rebbi Joḥanan answered him: Is that so? Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira: Explain it if he returns. It was stated: Rebbi Yose said, nobody has to defile himself for a limb from his living father, but one has to defile himself for bone the size of a barley corn from his father. Rebbi Jehudah says, just as one has to defile himself for bone the size of a barley corn from his father, so one has to defile himself for a limb from his living father. “It happened that Yose ben Paxas developed a growth on his foot. When the surgeon came to remove it, he told him to inform him when only a hair’s breadth was left. He cut until only a hair’s breadth was left, and informed him. He addressed his son Onias and told him, Onias my son, up to now you had to care for me, but leave now since nobody has to defile himself for a limb from his living father. When this came before the Sages, they said, about him it was said: “It happens that a just man is lost in his merit;” the just is lost and his merit accompanies him.
Rebbi Yasa stated before Rebbi Joḥanan: Just as one defiles himself for a corpse of obligation, so one defiles himself for a limb of a corpse of obligation. Rebbi Joḥanan answered him: Is that so? Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira: Explain it if he returns. It was stated: Rebbi Yose said, nobody has to defile himself for a limb from his living father, but one has to defile himself for bone the size of a barley corn from his father. Rebbi Jehudah says, just as one has to defile himself for bone the size of a barley corn from his father, so one has to defile himself for a limb from his living father. “It happened that Yose ben Paxas developed a growth on his foot. When the surgeon came to remove it, he told him to inform him when only a hair’s breadth was left. He cut until only a hair’s breadth was left, and informed him. He addressed his son Onias and told him, Onias my son, up to now you had to care for me, but leave now since nobody has to defile himself for a limb from his living father. When this came before the Sages, they said, about him it was said: “It happens that a just man is lost in his merit;” the just is lost and his merit accompanies him.
Rebbi Yasa stated before Rebbi Joḥanan: Just as one defiles himself for a corpse of obligation, so one defiles himself for a limb of a corpse of obligation. Rebbi Joḥanan answered him: Is that so? Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira: Explain it if he returns. It was stated: Rebbi Yose said, nobody has to defile himself for a limb from his living father, but one has to defile himself for bone the size of a barley corn from his father. Rebbi Jehudah says, just as one has to defile himself for bone the size of a barley corn from his father, so one has to defile himself for a limb from his living father. “It happened that Yose ben Paxas developed a growth on his foot. When the surgeon came to remove it, he told him to inform him when only a hair’s breadth was left. He cut until only a hair’s breadth was left, and informed him. He addressed his son Onias and told him, Onias my son, up to now you had to care for me, but leave now since nobody has to defile himself for a limb from his living father. When this came before the Sages, they said, about him it was said: “It happens that a just man is lost in his merit;” the just is lost and his merit accompanies him.
May a Cohen defile himself for the Patriarch? When Rebbi Judah the Prince died, Rebbi Yannai proclaimed and said: “There is no priesthood today.” When Rebbi Judah the Prince, grandson of Rebbi Judah the Prince, died, Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba did push Rebbi Zeïra in the Gufna synagogue of Sepphoris and defiled him. When Yehudinai, the sister of Rebbi Judah the Prince, died, Rebbi Ḥanina sent for Rebbi Mana but the latter did not come. He said to him, if one does not defile himself for them during their lifetime, so much less in their death. Rebbi Nassa said, in their death they treated them like a corpse of obligation.
Rebbi Yannai said: A Cohen defiles himself in order to see the King. When King Diocletian visited here, Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba was seen stepping over graves at Tyre in order to see him. Rebbi Ḥizqiah and Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: There is an obligation to see great persons of government, so that when the kingdom of the dynasty of David will return one will know how to distinguish one government from the other.
May [a Cohen] defile himself in honor of his father and mother? Rebbi Yasa heard that his mother had come to Bostra. He went and asked Rebbi Yoḥanan, may I leave? He said to him, if it is because of danger on the road, leave. If it is in order to honor your mother, I do not know. Rebbi Samuel bar Rav Isaac said, Rebbi Yoḥanan still needs to answer. He importuned him, so he said: Since you decided to go, return in peace. Rebbi Eleazar heard this and said: there is no greater permission than that.
May a (person) [Cohen] defile himself in honor of the public? It is stated: When there are two acceptable roads, one long and pure, the other one short and impure: If the public was walking on the long one, he goes on the long one; otherwise, he goes on the short one in honor of the public. That refers to impurity by their words; also for impurity that is from the words of the Torah? From what Rebbi Zeïra said, so great is the honor of the public that it temporarily pushes aside a prohibition, that means even impurity that is from the words of the Torah.
It is stated: The carriers may not wear sandals lest a shoelace of one of them break so he would be prevented from performing a good deed.
A Cohen and a Levite, the Levite shall defile himself. A Levite and an Israel, the Israel shall defile himself. No, is not the Levite like the Israel? Rebbi Abin said, it was taught in the time of the platform. The Sages agree with Rebbi Eliezer that between a High Priest and a nazir, the nazir shall defile himself but not the High Priest. Rebbi Eliezer agrees with the Sages that between a High Priest and a nazir, the nazir shall defile himself but not the High Priest. Think of it, if his father sanctified him from birth. The one is from the Torah, the other is not from the Torah. Rebbi Huna in the name of Rav Joseph: Rebbi Eliezer parallels the House of Shammai. As the House of Shammai say, between holy and frequent the holy has precedence, so Rebbi Eliezer says, between holy and frequent the holy has precedence. A nazir for 30 days and a nazir for 100, the nazir for 30 days shall defile himself. A nazir for 100 days and a nazir forever, the nazir for 100 days shall defile himself. A nazir forever, and a nazir of neziriot, some Tannaïm state, the nazir forever shall defile himself; but some Tannaïm state, the nazir of neziriot shall defile himself. He who says, the nazir forever shall defile himself but not the nazir of neziriot, since he shaves more frequently. He who says, the nazir of neziriot shall defile himself but not the nazir forever, since he brings more sacrifices. If he switched, it should be as Rebbi Immi said in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: He transgressed “do not defile your land.” Here it is the same.
We have stated: “Rebbi Yose said, dried flesh from a corpse which even if soaked will not return to its former status is pure. What is Rebbi Yose’s reason? Did he not infer this from a carcass? From a carcass, since a dried carcass is pure, so also a dried corpse should be pure. Rebbi Immi asked: Since a foul-smelling carcass is pure, would a foul-smelling corpse also be pure? Then there can be no decayed matter for Rebbi Yose! It was found stated in Rebbi Yose’s name that there was decayed matter. The colleagues asked before Rebbi Yose: Since a carcass has no decay, so a corpse should have no decay! He told them that he inferred from an animal only for the flesh, not for the bones. There is no decay from flesh, there is decay from bones, as Bar Qappara stated, “decay of bones is jealousy.” Rebbi Yannai said, “or a grave”, even if one touched the first Adam’s grave. The colleagues say, he transposes the verse: “or a grave qbr” means “or decay rqb”. Bar Qappara stated, “or a grave qbr”, “or decay rqb”.
We have stated: “Rebbi Yose said, dried flesh from a corpse which even if soaked will not return to its former status is pure. What is Rebbi Yose’s reason? Did he not infer this from a carcass? From a carcass, since a dried carcass is pure, so also a dried corpse should be pure. Rebbi Immi asked: Since a foul-smelling carcass is pure, would a foul-smelling corpse also be pure? Then there can be no decayed matter for Rebbi Yose! It was found stated in Rebbi Yose’s name that there was decayed matter. The colleagues asked before Rebbi Yose: Since a carcass has no decay, so a corpse should have no decay! He told them that he inferred from an animal only for the flesh, not for the bones. There is no decay from flesh, there is decay from bones, as Bar Qappara stated, “decay of bones is jealousy.” Rebbi Yannai said, “or a grave”, even if one touched the first Adam’s grave. The colleagues say, he transposes the verse: “or a grave qbr” means “or decay rqb”. Bar Qappara stated, “or a grave qbr”, “or decay rqb”.
Rebbi Jehudah ben Pazi said, the Holy One, praise to Him, took a spoonful from the place of the altar and created Adam from it. He said, he shall have been created from the place of the altar so that he should be able to stand up. That is what is written: “The Eternal Omnipotent formed Adam the first of dust from the earth”, and it is written: “You shall build for me an altar of earth.” Since “earth” there means an altar, here also [it means] an altar. “His days should be a hundred and twenty years.” Adam the first lived close to a thousand years and you say, “his days should be a hundred and twenty years”! But after 120 years he returns to be a spoonful of decay. That is difficult. For Og, the king of Bashan, 120 years, and for a newborn baby 120 years? Og [becomes] a spoonful of decay, and a newborn baby becomes a spoonful of decay. “ The spoonful of decay which they mentioned is from his finger joints and upwards, the words of Rebbi Meïr, but the Sages say, from a fully developed hand.” Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi was illustrating that of Rebbi Meïr one way, that of the rabbis in another way.
If his foot was cut off, from above the joint there is no “decay”, from below the joint there is “decay”. If it was buried together with him, from below the joint it becomes an attachment to him, from above the joint it does not become an attachment to him. The colleagues asked before Rebbi Samuel ben Eudaimon: If he bound from below the joint as attachment? He said to them, if it were so, even if it was not cut I should consider it as if cut and it should be an attachment! Since it is connected to him, it forms one body. If there is something missing, can it have “decay”? Let us hear from the following: If it is imcomplete, there is no “decay”, it does not require the surrounding earth, and it is not part of a row of graves. Rebbi Joḥanan asked, how much must be missing that it have no “decay”? Might it follow what we have stated there: “That he will die if it was removed.” Is it the same here? Think of it, if the esophagus was perforated, nothing was missing but he could not survive. You have only the following: If his foot was cut off, from below the joint there is “decay”, from above the joint there is no “decay”. If it was buried together with him, from below the joint it becomes an attachment to him, from above the joint it does not become an attachment to him.
“They shall fall away, for his vow of nazir is impure.” From here that the days of impurity fall away. Then should he invalidate? He invalidates only the days of [impurity of] the dead. Why should they not be counted? If you say that days in which he causes [impurity to] couch and seat are counted, days in which he does not cause [impurity to] couch and seat are certainly counted! What did you see to say that they are not counted? Rebbi [] said in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: “For a wild growth of his head’s hair”. Days of hair growth are counted, days preparing for shaving are not counted. So far in his days of counting; in the days of his definite status? Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai: “Please do not let her be like a corpse.” Since the days of a corpse are not counted, the days of quarantine are not counted. A student quoted this saying cf Rebbi Joḥanan’s before Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, who did not accept it. He said to him: Here, you call it quarantine, but there, you want to call it absolute; you cannot do that. For Rebbi Joḥanan said in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: “Please do not let her be like a corpse; let her be quarantined.” Just as the days of the dead are seven, so the days of quarantine are seven.
“They shall fall away, for his vow of nazir is impure.” From here that the days of impurity fall away. Then should he invalidate? He invalidates only the days of [impurity of] the dead. Why should they not be counted? If you say that days in which he causes [impurity to] couch and seat are counted, days in which he does not cause [impurity to] couch and seat are certainly counted! What did you see to say that they are not counted? Rebbi [] said in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: “For a wild growth of his head’s hair”. Days of hair growth are counted, days preparing for shaving are not counted. So far in his days of counting; in the days of his definite status? Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai: “Please do not let her be like a corpse.” Since the days of a corpse are not counted, the days of quarantine are not counted. A student quoted this saying cf Rebbi Joḥanan’s before Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, who did not accept it. He said to him: Here, you call it quarantine, but there, you want to call it absolute; you cannot do that. For Rebbi Joḥanan said in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: “Please do not let her be like a corpse; let her be quarantined.” Just as the days of the dead are seven, so the days of quarantine are seven.
HALAKHAH: “Rebbi Eleazar said in the name of Rebbi Joshua,” etc. There, we have stated: “Two are impure from the dead, one is impure for seven days and one is impure by the impurity of evening. Three are impure from the dead, two are impure for seven days and one is impure until nightfall. Four are impure from the dead, three are impure for seven days and one is impure until nightfall. How is it for two? Any person who touches a corpse is impure for seven days; a person who touches him is impure until nightfall,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai: All are biblically [impure] for heave, but for entering the Sanctuary only the second impure who touched the first impure. What is the reason? “A person who would be impure and did not purify himself;” anybody needing purification is guilty for entering the Sanctuary; anybody not needing purification is not guilty for entering the Sanctuary. They objected: But a person who touches objects which touched a corpse needs purification, but is he the second? Rebbi Abin bar Ḥiyya said, for impurity of a person from a person, not for impurity of a person from objects. The statement of Rebbi Abin bar Ḥiyya [implies that] only the first is guilty. Since [for impurity of] a person from a person only the first is guilty, so here the first is guilty. Rebbi Yose said, only if he immersed himself. That is a statement of Rebbi, since Rebbi said, all impure persons remain impure until the are immersed in water.
HALAKHAH: “If a person said to two nezirim,” etc. Not only if he said to one of them, “I saw one of you becoming impure but I do not know which one of you it was,” but even if he said, “I saw one of you vowing to be a nazir but I do not know which one of you it was,” both of them have to follow the rules of nazir because of his testimony. If they do not contradict him. But if they contradict him, this does not apply. If both of them contradict, it parallels the following: “If one witness says, he became impure, but he says, I did not become impure, he is pure. If two witnesses say, he became impure, but he says, I did not become impure, the two are believed more than he is, the words of Rebbi Meïr. But the Sages say, everybody is believed about himself.” Rav Jehudah in the name of Rav: So is the Mishnah: Rebbi Meïr declares impure, Rebbi Jehudah and the Sages declare pure. Rebbi Joḥanan said, so is the Mishnah: Rebbi Meïr declares impure, Rebbi Jehudah declares pure. The rabbis’ words support Rebbi Joḥanan, since Rebbi Gurion said in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: Rebbi Jehudah said this only about an old impurity, for he can say to them, I had been impure but I purified myself, and we have stated: The same holds for eating suet; the same holds for entering the Sanctuary. Should they not accept his position for impurity? Because of the impurity of a nazir, could they not say, where is the sacrifice which you brought? Then should they not accept his position for heave? So far the questions of Rebbi Ḥanina.
HALAKHAH: “If a person said to two nezirim,” etc. Not only if he said to one of them, “I saw one of you becoming impure but I do not know which one of you it was,” but even if he said, “I saw one of you vowing to be a nazir but I do not know which one of you it was,” both of them have to follow the rules of nazir because of his testimony. If they do not contradict him. But if they contradict him, this does not apply. If both of them contradict, it parallels the following: “If one witness says, he became impure, but he says, I did not become impure, he is pure. If two witnesses say, he became impure, but he says, I did not become impure, the two are believed more than he is, the words of Rebbi Meïr. But the Sages say, everybody is believed about himself.” Rav Jehudah in the name of Rav: So is the Mishnah: Rebbi Meïr declares impure, Rebbi Jehudah and the Sages declare pure. Rebbi Joḥanan said, so is the Mishnah: Rebbi Meïr declares impure, Rebbi Jehudah declares pure. The rabbis’ words support Rebbi Joḥanan, since Rebbi Gurion said in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: Rebbi Jehudah said this only about an old impurity, for he can say to them, I had been impure but I purified myself, and we have stated: The same holds for eating suet; the same holds for entering the Sanctuary. Should they not accept his position for impurity? Because of the impurity of a nazir, could they not say, where is the sacrifice which you brought? Then should they not accept his position for heave? So far the questions of Rebbi Ḥanina.
HALAKHAH: “If a person said to two nezirim,” etc. Not only if he said to one of them, “I saw one of you becoming impure but I do not know which one of you it was,” but even if he said, “I saw one of you vowing to be a nazir but I do not know which one of you it was,” both of them have to follow the rules of nazir because of his testimony. If they do not contradict him. But if they contradict him, this does not apply. If both of them contradict, it parallels the following: “If one witness says, he became impure, but he says, I did not become impure, he is pure. If two witnesses say, he became impure, but he says, I did not become impure, the two are believed more than he is, the words of Rebbi Meïr. But the Sages say, everybody is believed about himself.” Rav Jehudah in the name of Rav: So is the Mishnah: Rebbi Meïr declares impure, Rebbi Jehudah and the Sages declare pure. Rebbi Joḥanan said, so is the Mishnah: Rebbi Meïr declares impure, Rebbi Jehudah declares pure. The rabbis’ words support Rebbi Joḥanan, since Rebbi Gurion said in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: Rebbi Jehudah said this only about an old impurity, for he can say to them, I had been impure but I purified myself, and we have stated: The same holds for eating suet; the same holds for entering the Sanctuary. Should they not accept his position for impurity? Because of the impurity of a nazir, could they not say, where is the sacrifice which you brought? Then should they not accept his position for heave? So far the questions of Rebbi Ḥanina.
If he drank wine within the first 30 days, he is (not) whipped; within the last 30 days, he is [] whipped. The one coming from the general population cannot be whipped, either for the (second) or the last period. So far, if he was warned separately for each period. If they warned him for both together this is the disagreement between Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish who disagreed about the two days of holiday in the diaspora. Rebbi Joḥanan said, one accepts warning in case of a doubt; Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, one does not accept warning in case of a doubt.
Does the obligatory shaving push aside the rules of voluntary shaving? Let us hear from the following: “He shaves his head, his beard, and his eyebrows in the way sufferers from skin disease shave.” But there one could say, maybe it was an obligatory shaving. Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rebbi Yudan: The Mishnah says so; “for Rebbi Simeon says, when one of the bloods was sprinkled, the nazir is permitted to drink wine and to defile himself with the dead.” Is he not forbidden because of “do not destroy”? Samuel bar Abba said, explain it if he was a eunuch. But did we not state “the beard”? How can you say, a eunuch? You have only what Rebbi Jacob said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If he removed it from bottom to top it is forbidden. Rebbi Yose bar Abin said, there is no difference between bottom to top or top to bottom.
So far for the people celebrating Passover. From where the nazir? Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi [Yannai]: “If a person dies suddenly on him”. Since on him it is in the open, so everything in the open. This eliminates the grave in the abyss which is not in the open.
So far for the people celebrating Passover. From where the nazir? Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi [Yannai]: “If a person dies suddenly on him”. Since on him it is in the open, so everything in the open. This eliminates the grave in the abyss which is not in the open.
If the public became publicly impure in a doubtful case of a grave in the abyss, does the diadem make it acceptable? It is a conclusion de minore ad maius. Since in the case of a single person, whose position you clarified to his disadvantage in the case of known impurity, you clarified to his advantage in the case of a grave in the abyss, it should be only logical that for the public, whose position you clarified to its advantage in the case of known impurity, you should clarify it to its advantage in the case of a grave in the abyss. A leniency which you apply to a single person you treat as a restriction for the public. A leniency which you apply to a single person, so that if it became known to him after sprinkling he should be treated as if he became impure before sprinkling, that he should eat the meat. The leniency which you apply to the pure nazir is a restriction for the impure nazir. The leniency which you apply to the pure nazir, so that if it became known to him after sprinkling he is treated as impure after sprinkling, that he should bring a sacrifice of impurity. You treat it as a restriction for the impure nazir, that if it became known to him after sprinkling he is treated as somebody repeatedly becoming impure so that he has to bring a sacrifice of impurity for each single case. As it was stated: If he repeatedly became impure, he has to bring a sacrifice for each single case. If somebody is officiating for the Passover sacrifice, does the diadem make it acceptable? It is a conclusion de minore ad maius. Since for the owners [of the Passover sacrifice] whose position you clarified to their disadvantage in the case of the infirm and the aged, you clarified to their advantage in the case of a grave in the abyss, it should be only logical that for the officiating, whose position you clarified to his advantage in the case of the infirm and the aged, you should clarify it to his advantage in the case of a grave in the abyss. No. For the owners [of sacrifices] you clarify to their disadvantage in the case of impurity during the rest of the year; you also say for the officiating that you clarify their position to their disadvantage in the case of impurity during the rest of the year. Since you clarify their position to their disadvantage in the case of impurity during the rest of the year, you also clarify their position to their disadvantage in the case of the impurity of the dead on Passover. How is it really? “For you”, whether for him or for the one officiating for him. So far for the people celebrating Passover. From where the nazir? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rav Ḥisda: We thought, “on him”, not on the one officiating for him. Since we stated that the same rules apply to the nazir and to those celebrating Passover, it means that what holds for the one holds for the other.
If the public became publicly impure in a doubtful case of a grave in the abyss, does the diadem make it acceptable? It is a conclusion de minore ad maius. Since in the case of a single person, whose position you clarified to his disadvantage in the case of known impurity, you clarified to his advantage in the case of a grave in the abyss, it should be only logical that for the public, whose position you clarified to its advantage in the case of known impurity, you should clarify it to its advantage in the case of a grave in the abyss. A leniency which you apply to a single person you treat as a restriction for the public. A leniency which you apply to a single person, so that if it became known to him after sprinkling he should be treated as if he became impure before sprinkling, that he should eat the meat. The leniency which you apply to the pure nazir is a restriction for the impure nazir. The leniency which you apply to the pure nazir, so that if it became known to him after sprinkling he is treated as impure after sprinkling, that he should bring a sacrifice of impurity. You treat it as a restriction for the impure nazir, that if it became known to him after sprinkling he is treated as somebody repeatedly becoming impure so that he has to bring a sacrifice of impurity for each single case. As it was stated: If he repeatedly became impure, he has to bring a sacrifice for each single case. If somebody is officiating for the Passover sacrifice, does the diadem make it acceptable? It is a conclusion de minore ad maius. Since for the owners [of the Passover sacrifice] whose position you clarified to their disadvantage in the case of the infirm and the aged, you clarified to their advantage in the case of a grave in the abyss, it should be only logical that for the officiating, whose position you clarified to his advantage in the case of the infirm and the aged, you should clarify it to his advantage in the case of a grave in the abyss. No. For the owners [of sacrifices] you clarify to their disadvantage in the case of impurity during the rest of the year; you also say for the officiating that you clarify their position to their disadvantage in the case of impurity during the rest of the year. Since you clarify their position to their disadvantage in the case of impurity during the rest of the year, you also clarify their position to their disadvantage in the case of the impurity of the dead on Passover. How is it really? “For you”, whether for him or for the one officiating for him. So far for the people celebrating Passover. From where the nazir? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rav Ḥisda: We thought, “on him”, not on the one officiating for him. Since we stated that the same rules apply to the nazir and to those celebrating Passover, it means that what holds for the one holds for the other.
If the public became publicly impure in a doubtful case of a grave in the abyss, does the diadem make it acceptable? It is a conclusion de minore ad maius. Since in the case of a single person, whose position you clarified to his disadvantage in the case of known impurity, you clarified to his advantage in the case of a grave in the abyss, it should be only logical that for the public, whose position you clarified to its advantage in the case of known impurity, you should clarify it to its advantage in the case of a grave in the abyss. A leniency which you apply to a single person you treat as a restriction for the public. A leniency which you apply to a single person, so that if it became known to him after sprinkling he should be treated as if he became impure before sprinkling, that he should eat the meat. The leniency which you apply to the pure nazir is a restriction for the impure nazir. The leniency which you apply to the pure nazir, so that if it became known to him after sprinkling he is treated as impure after sprinkling, that he should bring a sacrifice of impurity. You treat it as a restriction for the impure nazir, that if it became known to him after sprinkling he is treated as somebody repeatedly becoming impure so that he has to bring a sacrifice of impurity for each single case. As it was stated: If he repeatedly became impure, he has to bring a sacrifice for each single case. If somebody is officiating for the Passover sacrifice, does the diadem make it acceptable? It is a conclusion de minore ad maius. Since for the owners [of the Passover sacrifice] whose position you clarified to their disadvantage in the case of the infirm and the aged, you clarified to their advantage in the case of a grave in the abyss, it should be only logical that for the officiating, whose position you clarified to his advantage in the case of the infirm and the aged, you should clarify it to his advantage in the case of a grave in the abyss. No. For the owners [of sacrifices] you clarify to their disadvantage in the case of impurity during the rest of the year; you also say for the officiating that you clarify their position to their disadvantage in the case of impurity during the rest of the year. Since you clarify their position to their disadvantage in the case of impurity during the rest of the year, you also clarify their position to their disadvantage in the case of the impurity of the dead on Passover. How is it really? “For you”, whether for him or for the one officiating for him. So far for the people celebrating Passover. From where the nazir? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rav Ḥisda: We thought, “on him”, not on the one officiating for him. Since we stated that the same rules apply to the nazir and to those celebrating Passover, it means that what holds for the one holds for the other.
If the public became publicly impure in a doubtful case of a grave in the abyss, does the diadem make it acceptable? It is a conclusion de minore ad maius. Since in the case of a single person, whose position you clarified to his disadvantage in the case of known impurity, you clarified to his advantage in the case of a grave in the abyss, it should be only logical that for the public, whose position you clarified to its advantage in the case of known impurity, you should clarify it to its advantage in the case of a grave in the abyss. A leniency which you apply to a single person you treat as a restriction for the public. A leniency which you apply to a single person, so that if it became known to him after sprinkling he should be treated as if he became impure before sprinkling, that he should eat the meat. The leniency which you apply to the pure nazir is a restriction for the impure nazir. The leniency which you apply to the pure nazir, so that if it became known to him after sprinkling he is treated as impure after sprinkling, that he should bring a sacrifice of impurity. You treat it as a restriction for the impure nazir, that if it became known to him after sprinkling he is treated as somebody repeatedly becoming impure so that he has to bring a sacrifice of impurity for each single case. As it was stated: If he repeatedly became impure, he has to bring a sacrifice for each single case. If somebody is officiating for the Passover sacrifice, does the diadem make it acceptable? It is a conclusion de minore ad maius. Since for the owners [of the Passover sacrifice] whose position you clarified to their disadvantage in the case of the infirm and the aged, you clarified to their advantage in the case of a grave in the abyss, it should be only logical that for the officiating, whose position you clarified to his advantage in the case of the infirm and the aged, you should clarify it to his advantage in the case of a grave in the abyss. No. For the owners [of sacrifices] you clarify to their disadvantage in the case of impurity during the rest of the year; you also say for the officiating that you clarify their position to their disadvantage in the case of impurity during the rest of the year. Since you clarify their position to their disadvantage in the case of impurity during the rest of the year, you also clarify their position to their disadvantage in the case of the impurity of the dead on Passover. How is it really? “For you”, whether for him or for the one officiating for him. So far for the people celebrating Passover. From where the nazir? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rav Ḥisda: We thought, “on him”, not on the one officiating for him. Since we stated that the same rules apply to the nazir and to those celebrating Passover, it means that what holds for the one holds for the other.
Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said that Bar Piqa asked Rebbi: So far in a cave that had a ceiling. Even in a cave without ceiling? Does Bar Piqa think that if there is a doubt regarding floating impurity, it is pure? Rebbi told him, Bar Piqa remains in his stupidity: No case of doubt regarding floating impurity is declared pure except a reptile; but a corpse is like something fixed in place. As it was stated: “Anything thrown is pure in case of a doubt except an olive-sized piece from a corpse, [and] also those covers which induce impurity on bottom and top.”
Rebbi Isaac bar Gufta asked before Rebbi Mana: In a statement you say, “he collects every single bone and everything is pure;” and here, you say so? He answered him, say what comes afterwards: “If he prepared it from the start as a grave, it has surroundings.”
There, we have stated: “He makes a courtyard in front of the cave six cubits square as a place for the bier.” And here, he says so? There for a bier standing, here for the width of a turning bier. How far? For the carriers of the bier, their replacements, and the replacements of their replacements.
It is written: “The unwell woman in her separation and the sufferer from flux in his flux.” Since the menstruating woman may become impure also by accident, so the sufferer from flux may become impure also by accident. Then even at his first episode? Rebbi Ze‘ira said, from the moment he becomes like a menstruating woman.
HALAKHAH: So is the Mishnah: Rebbi Neḥemia declares him not prosecutable but the Sages declare him guilty since it is not unsubstantiated. The Sages say, two estimations have precedence over one estimation; Rebbi Neḥemiah says, the intermediate estimation has precedence over the two. What is Rebbi Neḥemiah’s reason? “ ‘If he gets up and walks outside on his cane, the attacker is exonerated.’ Could you think that this one walks in the market and the other is executed because of him? But even if he died according to the first estimation he cannot be prosecuted.” What is the rabbi’s reason? “If he does not die but is bedridden.” Would we not know that even if he does not die that he will be bedridden? But if they estimated that he would die. If they estimated that he would die, that is what is written: “If he gets up and walks outside on his cane.” Therefore, if he does not get up, [the attacker] is guilty. But if they did not estimate that he would die? If they did not estimate that he would die, that is what is written: “But he has to pay for his disability.” Rebbi Ila in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: It is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he has to pay. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: It was an erroneous estimation. What is the difference between them? If his state improved. For him who says, it is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he has to pay; if he paid, he paid. If he did not pay, the verse makes him pay. A baraita supports one and a baraita supports the other. A baraita supports Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: If they estimated that he would die, when does he have to pay him? From the moment he improves. For him who says, it was an erroneous estimation; if he did not pay one does not order him to pay. If he paid, can he take it back? This supports Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: If they estimated that he would live but he died. From when does one have to pay him? From the moment he turns worse. Rebbi Yose said, it does not say here, “from the moment he turns worse” but “from the moment he turns better.”
If he hit him on his hand and it withered. The physicians said, if it is amputated he will live. Does he have to pay for the [hand]? Let us hear from the following: “If people quarrel,” “if people brawl.” Is not quarrel brawl and brawl quarrel? Why does the verse say, “if people quarrel, if people brawl”? To apply the rules of the unintended to the intended and of the intended to the unintended. It must be the following: If he hit him on his hand and it withered. The physicians said, if it is amputated he will live. Does he have to pay for the [hand]? Since you say there, it is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he pay for the hand, so here it is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he pay for the hand.
MISHNAH: Samuel was a nazir following the words of Rebbi Nahorai, as it is said: “A shaving knife shall not come on his head.” It is said about Samson “a shaving knife”, and it is said about Samuel “a shaving knife”. Since “a shaving knife” mentioned for Samson refers to nazir, so “a shaving knife” mentioned for Samuel refers to nazir. Rebbi Yose said, but fear is only of flesh and blood! Rebbi Nahorai answered him: Was it not said: “Samuel said, how can I go? Will not Saul hear of it and kill me?” The fear of flesh and blood already was on him.
HALAKHAH: Rebbi Yannai said: It is written: “To all the hills which are to be worked by the harrow the fear of worm and snail will not come.” Just as the stalk fears the iron, so the hair fears the iron.
If [the bill of divorce] contained documentation of a gift and [the messenger] said, it was written and signed before me, is [the husband’s] protest about the gift void since it is void about the divorce? Or, since his protest is void [only] about the divorce, is it valid about the gift? We have stated later: “Bills of divorce for wives and documents of manumission are equal in the rules of carrying and bringing.” If [the document of manumission] contained documentation of a gift and [the messenger] said, it was written and signed before me, is [the master’s] protest about the gift void since it is void about the manumission? Or since his protest is void [only] about the manumission, is it valid about the gift? If somebody signed all his property over to his slave, you say that the gift is the document of manumission. How do you treat this? Is it a document of manumission and his protest is void or is it a gift and his protest is valid? This can be compared to the following: If somebody signed all his property over to two persons in one document and the testimony of the witnesses was valid for one but invalid for the other. Rebbi Ila in the name of Rebbi Immi: Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagreed; one said, since it is invalid for one it is invalid for the other, but the other said, it is valid for one and invalid for the other. Rebbi Mana did not specify; Rebbi Abin specified: Rebbi Joḥanan said, since it is invalid for one it is invalid for the other; but Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, it is valid for one and invalid for the other. Rebbi Eleazar said, a Mishnah supports Rebbi Joḥanan: “Since testimony of two [witnesses] is invalid if one of them turns out to be related or disqualified, so also of three [witnesses] it is invalid if one of them turns out to be related or disqualified”. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, Rebbi Ḥanina the colleague of the rabbis and the rabbis disagree. One says, the argument of Rebbi Eleazar is correct, but the other says, Rebbi Eleazar is not correct. For him who says, the argument of Rebbi Eleazar is correct, it is a testimony about one person; as testimony it is totally invalid if it is partially invalid. For him who says, the argument of Rebbi Eleazar is not correct, it is as if two groups of witnesses came, valid for one and disqualified for the other.
Only if he says, it was written before me during the day and signed during the day; only if he says, it was written before me especially for her and signed expressly for her. It was asked before Rebbi Joḥanan: Does he have to know the names of the witnesses at the moment of their signing? He said to them, did the Gentiles Luciani sign it? And you say so? A baraita supports Rebbi Joḥanan: “All bills of divorce coming from overseas are valid even if their names sound Gentile since Jews outside the Land of Israel bear Gentile names.” He said only, outside the Land; therefore not in the Land of Israel. What about this? Rebbi Bevai in the name of Rebbi Issi: unless he writes, at a Jewish place. If there is no Jewish place, in the synagogue. If there is no synagogue, he assembles there ten people. Rebbi Abun said, it would be better to certify the signatures than to assemble there ten people. What about this? Even in a Jewish store.
A case came before Rebbi Joshua ben Levi. He said to him, it is unnecessary. The opinion of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi seems inverted. There, Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said, there is a difference because they are not conversant with the fine points of bills of divorce, but here, he says so? The colleagues in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: What you said was in earlier times when no Fellows were found outside the Land, but now that there are Fellows found outside the Land, they are competent. But did we not state, “and one who brings there”? And even if you say that no Fellows are found outside the Land, are we not found in the Land of Israel? In order not to make a distinction in the bills of divorce from outside the Land. But then one who brings from overseas should not have to say: “It was written before me and signed before me.” Not to make a distinction in the bills of divorce in the Land of Israel. What about it? One is restrictive in a simple case because of the complicated one and one is not permissive in the complicated because of the easy one. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Simeon bar Abba: This of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi, if it was done. But from the start even Rebbi Joshua ben Levi agrees.
Rebbi Eliezer objected to the rabbis: Just as you hold that one who brings a bill of divorce from one province to another overseas has to say, “it was written and signed before me,” so I hold that one who brings a bill of divorce from one province to another in the Land of Israel has to say, “it was written and signed before me.” Rebbi Jacob bar Zavdi said, it happened that one brought a bill of divorce from the harbor of Caesarea. The case came before Rebbi Abbahu who said yes, he has to say that it was written and signed before him. But is the harbor of Caesarea not part of Caesarea? Rebbi Abin said, it was from a departing ship, and it was stated thus: One who brings a bill of divorce from a ship is like one who brings from outside the Land and has to say that it was written and signed before him.
It was stated: A student who gave instructions about practice in front of his teacher has committed a deadly sin. It was stated in the name of Rebbi Eliezer: Nadab and Abihu died only because they determined practice in the presence of their teacher Moses. It happened that a student gave instructions about practice in front of his teacher Rebbi Eliezer. The latter said to his wife Imma Shalom: That one will not live out his week. The week was not completed when he died. His students said to him: Rebbi, you are a prophet. He said to them (Amos 7:14) “I am neither a prophet nor the disciple of a prophet” but I have received a tradition that any student who gives instructions about practice in front of his teacher has committed a deadly sin. It was stated: A student is forbidden to give instructions about practice during the lifetime of his teacher unless he be at a distance of at least 12 mil from him, [the breadth of] the camp of Israel. What is the reason? (Num. 33:49) “They encamped along the Jordan from Bet Hayyešimot to Abel Haššiṭṭim in the plains of Moab”; how far is this? Twelve mil. Like this: Rebbi Tanḥum ben Jeremiah was in Ḥefer; they asked him and he gave instructions about practice. They said to him, did the Rabbi not teach us that a student may not give instructions about practice during the lifetime of his teacher unless he be at a distance of at least 12 mil from him, [the breadth of] the camp of Israel; and your teacher Rebbi Ḥana sits at Sepphoris! He said to them, so it should come over me that I did not know! From that moment on he did no longer give instructions.
HALAKHAH: “Somebody who brings a bill of divorce from the Land of Israel,” etc. Who protests? Rav Ḥisda said, the husband protests. Rebbi Yose said, the buyers protest, lest she repossess from them. Rebbi asked: So far a protest which does not concern the text of the bill. A protest which concerns the text of the bill is in dispute between Rebbi Joḥanan and the rabbis there. In the opinion of the rabbis there, there is no difference to a protest concerning or not concerning the body of the bill. A protest not concerning the text of the bill is void, a protest concerning the text of the bill is valid.
As it was stated: “If somebody brings a bill of divorce from overseas which was not written and signed in his presence, he returns the bill to its place of origin, presents it to a court and has its signatures notarized. Then he does not have so say, ‘it was written and signed before me’, but he says, ‘I am deputized by the court.’ ”
Rebbi Aḥa said, the acts of a Gentile court are public knowledge. Then even if both [witnesses] are Samaritan? Did one not say that they are not conversant with the fine points in writing bills of divorce? But Rebbi Simeon validates their bills of divorce! Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira: It turns out that Rebbi Simeon agrees with Rebbi Eleazar. Just as Rebbi Eleazar said, even if no witnesses signed on it, it is valid, so Rebbi Simeon said, even if no witnesses signed on it, it is valid. But then even if it was made by private persons? This shows that it was necessary that Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, the acts of a Gentile court are public knowledge. A bond was executed in Bet Shean, whose witnesses were Gentiles. Rebbi Yose says, Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagree, one said it is invalid, the other said it is valid. Rebbi Abbahu explained: Rebbi Joḥanan said it is invalid, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said it is valid. What is Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish’s reason? That a Jew should not lose money. But if that one would not lose money, the other would lose money! Rebbi Yudan said, it must be in order not to close the door before people, for tomorrow one would look to borrow but does not succeed.
MISHNAH: If one says, “give this bill of divorce to my wife or this document of manumission to my slave,” if he wants to change his mind in either case he can retract, the words of Rebbi Meïr. But the Sages say, only for women’s bills of divorce but not for slaves’ documents of manumission because one may bestow benefit on a person in his absence but put a detriment on him only in his presence; for if one chooses not to sustain his slave, he has the right not to do so, but not to sustain his wife he has no right. He said to them, but he disqualifies his slave for heave the same way he disqualifies his wife! They answered him, because he is his property. If one says, “give this bill of divorce to my wife or this document of manumission to my slave” and dies, they shall not be delivered after his death; “give this mina to Mr. X” and dies, they shall deliver it after his death.
HALAKHAH: If one says, “give this bill of divorce to my wife,” etc. Elsewhere you say that “give” means “bring”, but here you say that “give” means “acquire”! So is the Mishnah: “Acquire this bill of divorce for my wife; acquire this document of manumission for my slave.” The formulation of the Mishnah says so: “Because one may bestow benefit on a person in his absence but put a detriment on a person only in his presence.” Rebbi Meïr says, it is a detriment for either of them, but the Sages say it is a benefit for the slave but a detriment for the wife. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said, Rebbi Joḥanan asked: Think of it, if he was the slave of a rich person, would it not be a detriment for the slave? The colleagues said, Rebbi Joḥanan asked: Think of it, if she was the wife of a man suffering from boils, would it not be a benefit for the woman? You have only the following: If one sells his slave without the latter’s knowledge, is the sale of the slave not valid? If one divorces his wife without her knowledge, is the divorce valid because she was acquired by him? Rebbi Abin said, he is his property but he disqualifies him for heave.
HALAKHAH: If one says, “give this bill of divorce to my wife,” etc. Elsewhere you say that “give” means “bring”, but here you say that “give” means “acquire”! So is the Mishnah: “Acquire this bill of divorce for my wife; acquire this document of manumission for my slave.” The formulation of the Mishnah says so: “Because one may bestow benefit on a person in his absence but put a detriment on a person only in his presence.” Rebbi Meïr says, it is a detriment for either of them, but the Sages say it is a benefit for the slave but a detriment for the wife. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said, Rebbi Joḥanan asked: Think of it, if he was the slave of a rich person, would it not be a detriment for the slave? The colleagues said, Rebbi Joḥanan asked: Think of it, if she was the wife of a man suffering from boils, would it not be a benefit for the woman? You have only the following: If one sells his slave without the latter’s knowledge, is the sale of the slave not valid? If one divorces his wife without her knowledge, is the divorce valid because she was acquired by him? Rebbi Abin said, he is his property but he disqualifies him for heave.
“If somebody says, give this mina to X because I owe it to him, bring this mina to X for the pledge which he has from me, if he wants to change his mind he cannot do so but he himself is responsible until X receives his due.” Rebbi Ila said, a gift is like a debt. “Give this mina to X, bring this mina to X, give this gift document to X, if he wants to change his mind he can(not) do so. If he went and found that X had died, he should return it to the sender, and if that one had died he should give it to the latter’s heirs.” “Acquire this mina for X, accept this mina for X, acquire this gift document for X, accept this gift document for X, if he wants to change his mind he cannot do so. If he went and found that X had died, he should deliver it to his heirs. But if he acquired after [X’s] death he should return it to the sender since nobody can acquire documents after his death.” “If somebody says, this mina is for X, take this mina for X, this mina shall be in your hand for X, if he wants to change his mind he cannot do so” because if somebody acquires for another person it cannot be changed.
“If somebody says, give this mina to X because I owe it to him, bring this mina to X for the pledge which he has from me, if he wants to change his mind he cannot do so but he himself is responsible until X receives his due.” Rebbi Ila said, a gift is like a debt. “Give this mina to X, bring this mina to X, give this gift document to X, if he wants to change his mind he can(not) do so. If he went and found that X had died, he should return it to the sender, and if that one had died he should give it to the latter’s heirs.” “Acquire this mina for X, accept this mina for X, acquire this gift document for X, accept this gift document for X, if he wants to change his mind he cannot do so. If he went and found that X had died, he should deliver it to his heirs. But if he acquired after [X’s] death he should return it to the sender since nobody can acquire documents after his death.” “If somebody says, this mina is for X, take this mina for X, this mina shall be in your hand for X, if he wants to change his mind he cannot do so” because if somebody acquires for another person it cannot be changed.
“If somebody says, give this mina to X because I owe it to him, bring this mina to X for the pledge which he has from me, if he wants to change his mind he cannot do so but he himself is responsible until X receives his due.” Rebbi Ila said, a gift is like a debt. “Give this mina to X, bring this mina to X, give this gift document to X, if he wants to change his mind he can(not) do so. If he went and found that X had died, he should return it to the sender, and if that one had died he should give it to the latter’s heirs.” “Acquire this mina for X, accept this mina for X, acquire this gift document for X, accept this gift document for X, if he wants to change his mind he cannot do so. If he went and found that X had died, he should deliver it to his heirs. But if he acquired after [X’s] death he should return it to the sender since nobody can acquire documents after his death.” “If somebody says, this mina is for X, take this mina for X, this mina shall be in your hand for X, if he wants to change his mind he cannot do so” because if somebody acquires for another person it cannot be changed.
“If somebody says, give this mina to X because I owe it to him, bring this mina to X for the pledge which he has from me, if he wants to change his mind he cannot do so but he himself is responsible until X receives his due.” Rebbi Ila said, a gift is like a debt. “Give this mina to X, bring this mina to X, give this gift document to X, if he wants to change his mind he can(not) do so. If he went and found that X had died, he should return it to the sender, and if that one had died he should give it to the latter’s heirs.” “Acquire this mina for X, accept this mina for X, acquire this gift document for X, accept this gift document for X, if he wants to change his mind he cannot do so. If he went and found that X had died, he should deliver it to his heirs. But if he acquired after [X’s] death he should return it to the sender since nobody can acquire documents after his death.” “If somebody says, this mina is for X, take this mina for X, this mina shall be in your hand for X, if he wants to change his mind he cannot do so” because if somebody acquires for another person it cannot be changed.
“ ‘Give this mina to X,’ then he died. If the heirs want to hinder [the delivery] they are powerless. It is unnecessary to say that it is so if he said, acquire for him, if he said, accept by my orders.” Rebbi Abba barMamal said, this baraita refers to a sick person. If he is sick, does he not have to say: acquire for him, accept for him? Rebbi Mana said, I confirmed this by what Rebbi Abba bar Rav Huna said in the name of Rav: They treated verbal instructions by a sick person as if they were written and delivered. But only if he died from that sickness, not if he recovered, he did not have to say: acquire for him, accept for him.
Rebbi Eleazar said, Rebbi Abun asked: If he said “it was written and one witness signed before me,” and two testify about the signature of the second witness. Rebbi Immi the Babylonian said, nothing can be more valid than this. Rebbi Abba did not say so but: If he said “it was written and one witness signed before me, and I am the second witness.” He is like a party interested in his testimony.
Rebbi Joḥanan said, Rebbi Simeon stated this only for the night; but on the next day even Rebbi Simeon will agree. But Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, there is no difference, whether night, or the next day, or after many days. What is the next day? Rebbi Ḥanania and Rebbi Mana, one said the next day, the other said the day after the next. The statement of Rebbi Joḥanan about Rebbi Simeon (ben Laqish) is difficult! So says Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira: It turns out that Rebbi Simeon (ben Laqish) agrees with Rebbi Eleazar. Just as Rebbi Eleazar said, even if there are no witnesses signed on it, it is valid, so Rebbi Simeon said, even if there are no witnesses signed on it, it is valid. Rebbi Samuel, the brother of Rebbi Berekhiah, said: Here, if he wants the document to be signed, there if she does not want the document to be signed. If he said to ten people, sign the bill of divorce, and some signed today and some the next day. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, it is valid for the remainder [are signing] only because of the condition. Rebbi Joḥanan said it is invalid unless all sign on the same day. Rebbi Jacob bar Idi in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: There was a case that one said to ten people, sign the bill of divorce, and some signed on that day and some the next day. The case came before the rabbis who reluctantly declared it valid. This supports Rebbi Joḥanan from the position of the rabbis and disagrees with Rebbi Simeon. This supports Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish from the position of Rebbi Simeon and disagrees with the rabbis.
Rebbi Joḥanan said, Rebbi Simeon stated this only for the night; but on the next day even Rebbi Simeon will agree. But Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, there is no difference, whether night, or the next day, or after many days. What is the next day? Rebbi Ḥanania and Rebbi Mana, one said the next day, the other said the day after the next. The statement of Rebbi Joḥanan about Rebbi Simeon (ben Laqish) is difficult! So says Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira: It turns out that Rebbi Simeon (ben Laqish) agrees with Rebbi Eleazar. Just as Rebbi Eleazar said, even if there are no witnesses signed on it, it is valid, so Rebbi Simeon said, even if there are no witnesses signed on it, it is valid. Rebbi Samuel, the brother of Rebbi Berekhiah, said: Here, if he wants the document to be signed, there if she does not want the document to be signed. If he said to ten people, sign the bill of divorce, and some signed today and some the next day. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, it is valid for the remainder [are signing] only because of the condition. Rebbi Joḥanan said it is invalid unless all sign on the same day. Rebbi Jacob bar Idi in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: There was a case that one said to ten people, sign the bill of divorce, and some signed on that day and some the next day. The case came before the rabbis who reluctantly declared it valid. This supports Rebbi Joḥanan from the position of the rabbis and disagrees with Rebbi Simeon. This supports Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish from the position of Rebbi Simeon and disagrees with the rabbis.
“On a cow’s horn.” The Mishnah in case he says to her, here is your bill of divorce. But if he says to her, here is your bill of divorce and the remainder is for your ketubah, her bill of divorce and the payment of her ketubah were received together. If he said to her, here is your bill of divorce and the payment of your ketubah together? Rebbi Ezra asked before Rebbi Mana: If he delivered the halter to her, what? In commercial law, the buy is acquired, do you say so here? Or is it a difference since it is written: “he shall deliver into her hand,” until it is completely in her hand!
What is Rebbi Yose the Galilean’s reason? “Scroll.” Since a scroll is special in not being a living being, so no living being. Since a scroll is not food, so no food. What is the rabbis’ reason? “Scroll.” Since a scroll is detached, so everything detached. Are stalks of food in Rebbi Yose the Galilean’s opinion like food? Let us hear from the following: If he wrote it on a deer’s antlers, shaved it off, had it signed, and gave it to him, it is valid. Because he shaved it off before he had it signed. Therefore, not if he had it signed and afterwards shaved it off. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Miasha: Only if he wrote on the male horn. But if he wrote on the sheath it is as if separated and is valid. Rebbi Jonah asked: Is that the same for preparation of produce? If he desired that it should rain on an animal and [the rain] dropped from the animal on food. There, Rebbi Yose said “a scroll”, since a scroll is special in not being a living being, so no living being; and here, does he say so? There is a difference since it is written, “any drinkable drink in any vessel shall be impure”. Then also if it rained into cisterns, ditches and caves? There is a difference here, for it is written: “a vessel”.
What is Rebbi Yose the Galilean’s reason? “Scroll.” Since a scroll is special in not being a living being, so no living being. Since a scroll is not food, so no food. What is the rabbis’ reason? “Scroll.” Since a scroll is detached, so everything detached. Are stalks of food in Rebbi Yose the Galilean’s opinion like food? Let us hear from the following: If he wrote it on a deer’s antlers, shaved it off, had it signed, and gave it to him, it is valid. Because he shaved it off before he had it signed. Therefore, not if he had it signed and afterwards shaved it off. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Miasha: Only if he wrote on the male horn. But if he wrote on the sheath it is as if separated and is valid. Rebbi Jonah asked: Is that the same for preparation of produce? If he desired that it should rain on an animal and [the rain] dropped from the animal on food. There, Rebbi Yose said “a scroll”, since a scroll is special in not being a living being, so no living being; and here, does he say so? There is a difference since it is written, “any drinkable drink in any vessel shall be impure”. Then also if it rained into cisterns, ditches and caves? There is a difference here, for it is written: “a vessel”.
What is Rebbi Yose the Galilean’s reason? “Scroll.” Since a scroll is special in not being a living being, so no living being. Since a scroll is not food, so no food. What is the rabbis’ reason? “Scroll.” Since a scroll is detached, so everything detached. Are stalks of food in Rebbi Yose the Galilean’s opinion like food? Let us hear from the following: If he wrote it on a deer’s antlers, shaved it off, had it signed, and gave it to him, it is valid. Because he shaved it off before he had it signed. Therefore, not if he had it signed and afterwards shaved it off. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Miasha: Only if he wrote on the male horn. But if he wrote on the sheath it is as if separated and is valid. Rebbi Jonah asked: Is that the same for preparation of produce? If he desired that it should rain on an animal and [the rain] dropped from the animal on food. There, Rebbi Yose said “a scroll”, since a scroll is special in not being a living being, so no living being; and here, does he say so? There is a difference since it is written, “any drinkable drink in any vessel shall be impure”. Then also if it rained into cisterns, ditches and caves? There is a difference here, for it is written: “a vessel”.
What is Rebbi Yose the Galilean’s reason? “Scroll.” Since a scroll is special in not being a living being, so no living being. Since a scroll is not food, so no food. What is the rabbis’ reason? “Scroll.” Since a scroll is detached, so everything detached. Are stalks of food in Rebbi Yose the Galilean’s opinion like food? Let us hear from the following: If he wrote it on a deer’s antlers, shaved it off, had it signed, and gave it to him, it is valid. Because he shaved it off before he had it signed. Therefore, not if he had it signed and afterwards shaved it off. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Miasha: Only if he wrote on the male horn. But if he wrote on the sheath it is as if separated and is valid. Rebbi Jonah asked: Is that the same for preparation of produce? If he desired that it should rain on an animal and [the rain] dropped from the animal on food. There, Rebbi Yose said “a scroll”, since a scroll is special in not being a living being, so no living being; and here, does he say so? There is a difference since it is written, “any drinkable drink in any vessel shall be impure”. Then also if it rained into cisterns, ditches and caves? There is a difference here, for it is written: “a vessel”.
What is Rebbi Yose the Galilean’s reason? “Scroll.” Since a scroll is special in not being a living being, so no living being. Since a scroll is not food, so no food. What is the rabbis’ reason? “Scroll.” Since a scroll is detached, so everything detached. Are stalks of food in Rebbi Yose the Galilean’s opinion like food? Let us hear from the following: If he wrote it on a deer’s antlers, shaved it off, had it signed, and gave it to him, it is valid. Because he shaved it off before he had it signed. Therefore, not if he had it signed and afterwards shaved it off. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Miasha: Only if he wrote on the male horn. But if he wrote on the sheath it is as if separated and is valid. Rebbi Jonah asked: Is that the same for preparation of produce? If he desired that it should rain on an animal and [the rain] dropped from the animal on food. There, Rebbi Yose said “a scroll”, since a scroll is special in not being a living being, so no living being; and here, does he say so? There is a difference since it is written, “any drinkable drink in any vessel shall be impure”. Then also if it rained into cisterns, ditches and caves? There is a difference here, for it is written: “a vessel”.
After it was delivered to her, could it not be considered as if written in her name from the start? Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi [Abin bar Ḥiyya]: It follows Rebbi Simeon, as it was stated: “If one said to a craftsman, make me two bells, one for the ground and one for an animal, make me two mats, one to sit on and one for a tent, make me two sheets, one to lie on and one for [a pattern], only if he designated them in purity. Rebbi Simeon declares them pure unless he designated them for impurity.” As he said there, only if it was a utensil from the start, so he says, unless it was a divorce in her name from the start.
Rebbi Ḥanania in the name of Rebbi Abin bar Ḥiyya, [this is Rebbi’s opinion.] Rebbi Joḥanan said, and it was stated so: “All conditions invalidate a bill of divorce, the words of Rebbi. But the Sages say, what invalidates orally invalidates in writing, and what does not invalidate orally does not invalidate in writing.” “You are permitted to marry anybody except Mr. X,” because this invalidates orally it invalidates in writing. “This is your bill of divorce on condition that you give me 200 zuz”; because this does not invalidate orally it does not invalidate in writing. Rebbi Yudan said, when do they disagree? If he rescinded his condition. But if he did nor rescind his condition, even Rebbi agrees. Otherwise, we would have to say that all conditions which were stated for bills of divorce do not follow Rebbi. Rebbi Ḥinena said, there when he writes “on condition,” here if he gives “on condition.” Rebbi Ezra asked before Rebbi Mana: Does this imply that Rebbi does not recognize formulaic texts? He answered him, about whom do you ask? About Rebbi! He follows Rebbi Jehudah, for Rebbi Jehudah invalidates formulaic texts. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, everybody agrees that all conditions invalidate a bill of divorce. There came a case before Rebbi Jeremiah and he acted following Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. Rebbi Yose said to him, does one neglect Rebbi Joḥanan and act following Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? He answered him, is Rebbi Joḥanan’s instruction an instruction but Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish’s instruction not an instruction? Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, it is not that Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan, but he understood a baraita and acted accordingly. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, not that Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish fights against Rebbi Joḥanan when he disagrees with him only to extract a ruling from him. If he finds a baraita, he depends on it; if he does not find a baraita, he retracts his opinion before Rebbi Joḥanan’s opinion.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody writes formulaic texts of bills of divorce,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said, writing the essential text with the formula is valid. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, writing the essential text with the formula is invalid. The Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If somebody writes formulaic texts of bills of divorce he has to leave space for the man, the woman, and the time.” He explains it, with the essential text. It is difficult for Rebbi Joḥanan: Do the Sages declare valid in case he wrote the essential text with the formulaic text? Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira: From its invalidity you learn its validity. If he wrote everything in her name but the husband’s and the wife’s names not in her name, would that be valid? Similarly, if he wrote everything not in her name but the husband’s and the wife’s names in her name, it is valid. Rebbi Yose asked Rebbi Jeremiah: Think of it, if it was paired? He said, so said his teacher Rebbi Ze‘ira to him: Since pairing is infrequent, even if there was pairing it is as if there was no pairing. Then it is difficult for Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Even if he did not write the essential text in the formula, Rebbi Jehudah declares invalid! Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Ze‘ira: Rebbi Jehudah refers to something else; it follows what Simeon bar Abba said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: An empty space of two lines about one subject is invalid in any case.
What is “the good order”? Rebbi Sabbatai in the name of Ḥizqiah: Because of the good order of Jewish women, lest they frequently be divorced. Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac asked Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba: It is valid, and you say so? If it were invalid, then [the explanation] would be acceptable. Rebbi Abun said, for the good order of the scribe, that his livelihood be guaranteed.
There is no “he does not worry,” since he has to worry lest the poor became rich. It was stated so: “If somebody lends money to a poor and rich person he cannot separate for him, for one does not separate for what was lost.”
Does this not disagree with Rav? Since Rav said, an heir is like a holder of encumbered property. Just as a loan given before witnesses cannot be collected from encumbered property, so it cannot be collected from heirs. He explains it for a documented loan. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: A loan given before witnesses can be collected from heirs, on condition that they inherited real estate. As those from the house of Rav Neḥemiah, who lent money to the public. The case came before the rabbis who said, the public is neither all rich nor all poor.
There, we have stated: “If someone buys wine from Samaritans.” It was stated: “Rebbi Yose and Rebbi Simeon prohibit to do so, for the wine bag might spring a leak and it may turn out retroactively that he drank ṭevel.” Does the Mishnah here not follow Rebbi Yose and Rebbi Simeon? Rebbi Ze‘ira said, there it was not in order from the start. But here it is not in order from now to the future.
For freshly pressed wine one can allow for up to forty days presuming that it is wine; Rebbi Jehudah says, up to a break point. You find that there is a leniency and a restriction following Rebbi Jehudah, and a leniency and a restriction following the rabbis. A leniency following Rebbi Jehudah, if a break point arrived before forty days had passed, and a restriction if forty days passed without break point that he cannot give heave. A leniency following the rabbis, if forty days passed without break point that he cannot give heave, and a restriction, if a break point arrived before forty days had passed that he cannot give heave. Rebbi Simon asked: If the fortieth day arrived and he did not check. He was lazy for two or three days, then he came and found it to be vinegar. Is it retroactively considered to be vinegar or only from there on to the future? What is the difference? If he had transgressed and given heave. If you say that retroactively it is considered to be vinegar, his heave is heave. From there on to the future it is not heave. If he had checked an amphora to continuously give heave from it. When he returned, he found it to be vinegar. Rebbi Simon in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: The first three days it certainly is wine, the last vinegar, and the middle ones are in doubt. Rebbi Abbahu said, I heard that from Rebbi Joshua ben Levi; Rebbi Joḥanan did not say so but the first three days it certainly is wine, after that it is in doubt. Do they differ in the treatment of doubt? What Rebbi Joḥanan said refers to the case that he came and found it to be stale vinegar. What Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said refers to the case that he came and found it to be strong vinegar. Or their difference equals another difference, for what we have stated there: “A rusty or broken needle is pure.” It was stated: He put it down smooth, then he came and found it rusty. Rebbi Simon in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: The first three days it certainly is impure, the last pure, and the middle ones are in doubt. Rebbi Abbahu said, that is what Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said; Rebbi Joḥanan did not say so but the first three days it certainly is impure, after that it is in doubt. Rebbi Ila, Rebbi Abba and Rebbi Eleazar in the name of all rabbis who are frequenting the House of Study: Concerning wine and needle practice follows Rebbi Joshua ben Levi.
For freshly pressed wine one can allow for up to forty days presuming that it is wine; Rebbi Jehudah says, up to a break point. You find that there is a leniency and a restriction following Rebbi Jehudah, and a leniency and a restriction following the rabbis. A leniency following Rebbi Jehudah, if a break point arrived before forty days had passed, and a restriction if forty days passed without break point that he cannot give heave. A leniency following the rabbis, if forty days passed without break point that he cannot give heave, and a restriction, if a break point arrived before forty days had passed that he cannot give heave. Rebbi Simon asked: If the fortieth day arrived and he did not check. He was lazy for two or three days, then he came and found it to be vinegar. Is it retroactively considered to be vinegar or only from there on to the future? What is the difference? If he had transgressed and given heave. If you say that retroactively it is considered to be vinegar, his heave is heave. From there on to the future it is not heave. If he had checked an amphora to continuously give heave from it. When he returned, he found it to be vinegar. Rebbi Simon in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: The first three days it certainly is wine, the last vinegar, and the middle ones are in doubt. Rebbi Abbahu said, I heard that from Rebbi Joshua ben Levi; Rebbi Joḥanan did not say so but the first three days it certainly is wine, after that it is in doubt. Do they differ in the treatment of doubt? What Rebbi Joḥanan said refers to the case that he came and found it to be stale vinegar. What Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said refers to the case that he came and found it to be strong vinegar. Or their difference equals another difference, for what we have stated there: “A rusty or broken needle is pure.” It was stated: He put it down smooth, then he came and found it rusty. Rebbi Simon in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: The first three days it certainly is impure, the last pure, and the middle ones are in doubt. Rebbi Abbahu said, that is what Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said; Rebbi Joḥanan did not say so but the first three days it certainly is impure, after that it is in doubt. Rebbi Ila, Rebbi Abba and Rebbi Eleazar in the name of all rabbis who are frequenting the House of Study: Concerning wine and needle practice follows Rebbi Joshua ben Levi.
Rav Huna said, why did they require a date on the bill of divorce? Because of an actual case. It so happened that a man was married to his sister’s daughter who committed adultery when she was still married. He predated the bill of divorce and said, it is better she should be judged as single rather than as a married woman.
HALAKHAH: “If a slave was kidnapped and ransomed,” etc. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Ḥizqiah: It would be logical that even as a slave he should not have to serve. And why did they say, he has to serve? That a slave should not run away to the kidnappers. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, a baraita implies this: “His master pays his ransom and frees him.” They said that only about his master, not anybody else. Rebbi Ila in the name of Rebbi Yasa: It would be logical that even as a free person he should have to serve. Why did they say that he does not have to serve? Not to damage the reputations of free persons. Rebbi Yose said, but it is so: “Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, in any case he shall serve; just as Israel are obligated to ransom free persons so they are obligated to ransom slaves.” The first Tanna is of the opinion that they are obligated to ransom free persons but they are not obligated to ransom slaves. Rebbi Jacob bar Idi in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Practice follows Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel.
HALAKHAH: “If a slave was kidnapped and ransomed,” etc. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Ḥizqiah: It would be logical that even as a slave he should not have to serve. And why did they say, he has to serve? That a slave should not run away to the kidnappers. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, a baraita implies this: “His master pays his ransom and frees him.” They said that only about his master, not anybody else. Rebbi Ila in the name of Rebbi Yasa: It would be logical that even as a free person he should have to serve. Why did they say that he does not have to serve? Not to damage the reputations of free persons. Rebbi Yose said, but it is so: “Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, in any case he shall serve; just as Israel are obligated to ransom free persons so they are obligated to ransom slaves.” The first Tanna is of the opinion that they are obligated to ransom free persons but they are not obligated to ransom slaves. Rebbi Jacob bar Idi in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Practice follows Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel.
Rebbi Simon in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: Yossi ben Shaul said in the name of Rebbi: A person who had given up hope to recover his slave is not entitled to enslave him but has to write him a bill of manumission. Rebbi Joḥanan heard this and said, Rebbi Joshua ben Levi taught us that correctly. Did they not infer the rules of a bill of manumission from women? Just as a woman is not freed if [the husband] has given up hope, but she needs a bill of divorce from him, so a slave is not freed if [the master] has given up hope, but he needs a bill of manumission.
If a convert died and Jews plundered his property, if there were slaves, either adult or underage, they gain their freedom. Abba Shaul said, the adults gain their freedom, the minors do not become free. Why? They are no longer property after their owner’s death. Then even adults? Rebbi Abba said, since adults are competent to acquire themselves, they gain their freedom. Minors, who are not competent to acquire for themselves, do not gain their freedom. Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said, practice follows Abba Shaul. The opinions of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi are contradictory. There, Rebbi Simon in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi and Rebbi Yossi ben Shaul in the name of Rebbi said: A person who has given up hope to recover his slave is not entitled to enslave him. They said, what Rebbi Joshua said about enslaving, if he did not give, he did not give; perhaps practice would be to enslave him, therefore he has to write him a bill of manumission. And here, he says so! We heard that Rebbi Joḥanan said, Rebbi Joshua ben Levi taught us that correctly, perhaps practice follows Abba Shaul. The slave girl of Rabba bar Zuṭra ran away and he gave up hope to recover her. He went to ask Rebbi Ḥanina and Rebbi Joshua ben Levi. They said, he is not entitled to enslave her. How is it to write her a bill of manumission? They said to him, if you wrote, you did the right thing. Rebbi Ḥanina in the name of Rebbi Ismael ben Rebbi Yose: A slave who married as a free person in the presence of his master gained his freedom. Rebbi Joḥanan said, yesterday I was sitting and formulating: If somebody writes a document of preliminary marriage for his slave or a document of definitive marriage for his girl slave, Rebbi says, they acquired, but the Sages say, they did not acquire. The first Tanna follows Rebbi: he acquired.
Who frees? Rav says, either his first or his second master. Rebbi Joḥanan says, only his first master alone is able to free. Rebbi Ḥaggai objected before Rebbi Yose: Does not a baraita disagree with Rav? If a Jew gave a loan to a Gentile on the latter’s leavened matter, it is permitted after Passover. If you say that the Jew has property rights in it, it would be forbidden. What does Rav do with this? Rebbi Yudan said, manumission is made easy, as it was stated: If somebody gives his slave as mortgage, if he sold him, he is not sold; if he freed him, he is freed. The strength of Rebbi Joḥanan is from the following: Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, only the manumittor writes. If somebody mortgaged his field to another, then went and sold it, can the creditor not come and foreclose? Rebbi Abbahu said, in this matter Rebbi Joḥanan opened for us a door to illuminate. We do not find that a slave can again be enslaved after having been freed. If that is so, he should not have to write a bond for his value! Rebbi Ila said, it is better that a person say to him, give me the 200 zuz which you owe me than say to him, you are my slave! The rabbis of Caesarea say in Rebbi Nasa’s name: Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel follows Rebbi Meïr. Just as Rebbi Meїr imposes a fine for words, so Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel imposes a fine for words. As it was stated: With a bond documenting both principal and interest one can collect neither principal nor interest, the words of Rebbi Meїr. But the Sages say, one collects the principal but not the interest.
Who frees? Rav says, either his first or his second master. Rebbi Joḥanan says, only his first master alone is able to free. Rebbi Ḥaggai objected before Rebbi Yose: Does not a baraita disagree with Rav? If a Jew gave a loan to a Gentile on the latter’s leavened matter, it is permitted after Passover. If you say that the Jew has property rights in it, it would be forbidden. What does Rav do with this? Rebbi Yudan said, manumission is made easy, as it was stated: If somebody gives his slave as mortgage, if he sold him, he is not sold; if he freed him, he is freed. The strength of Rebbi Joḥanan is from the following: Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, only the manumittor writes. If somebody mortgaged his field to another, then went and sold it, can the creditor not come and foreclose? Rebbi Abbahu said, in this matter Rebbi Joḥanan opened for us a door to illuminate. We do not find that a slave can again be enslaved after having been freed. If that is so, he should not have to write a bond for his value! Rebbi Ila said, it is better that a person say to him, give me the 200 zuz which you owe me than say to him, you are my slave! The rabbis of Caesarea say in Rebbi Nasa’s name: Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel follows Rebbi Meïr. Just as Rebbi Meїr imposes a fine for words, so Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel imposes a fine for words. As it was stated: With a bond documenting both principal and interest one can collect neither principal nor interest, the words of Rebbi Meїr. But the Sages say, one collects the principal but not the interest.
“Rebbi Jehudah says, he cannot take her back,” and you say so? Rebbi Joḥanan said, there is no Rebbi Jehudah but Rebbi Meїr. It was stated thus in Rebbi Meїr’s name: Your silence would be better than your talking.
The Mishnah is Rebbi Meїr’s, since Rebbi Meїr says that a Gentile may not acquire real estate in the Land of Israel to remove it from tithes; Rebbi Jehudah and Rebbi Simeon say, a Gentile may acquire real estate in the Land of Israel to free it from tithes. Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: The reason of Rebbi Meïr (Lev. 25:46): “You shall transmit them by inheritance to your sons after you, to inherit by the rules of real estate.” This brackets slaves with real estate. Just as you may buy slaves from them but they cannot buy from you, so real estate you may buy from them but they cannot buy from you. Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Yose said before Rebbi Yasa, the following supports Rebbi Meїr (Lev. 25:23): “The land shall not be sold permanently,” absolutely. He said to him, that in itself supports Rebbi Simeon. “It shall not be sold”, because if it was sold, it would be sold absolutely. Rebbi Huna from Sepphoris said, Rebbi Ḥanina instituted in Sepphoris following Rebbi Simeon.
“The best of his field and the best of his vineyard he shall pay,” i. e., the party responsible for the damage, the words of Rebbi Ismael. Rebbi Aqiba says, “the best of his field and the best of his vineyard”, of the person suffering the damage. It is difficult for Rebbi Aqiba, he suffered damage, and you say so? But the court see what the field was worth before it was damaged and estimates accordingly. As it was stated, it is possible if the grazing was on best quality land, one estimates from best quality, from lowest quality one estimates from lowest quality. How is this? The best of the lowest quality is quite good. If you say so you provide a windfall for the person suffering the damage. One looks at the field as if it was full of first quality [produce] and estimates for him from the best quality land; least quality one estimates from least quality land. It turns out that he pays with best quality for best quality and from least quality for least quality. From where has Rebbi Aqiba that “for tort victims one estimates with best quality land”? It is not from the Torah, it is a decree. “Why did they say, ‘for tort victims one estimates with best quality land’? Because of the robbers. That a man should say, why should I have robbed [land] in my hand, or land subject to a suit for damages on my hand? Tomorrow, the court will see my good field, take it from me, and support it by the verse, ‘the best of his field and the best of his vineyard he shall pay.’ ” So far his real estate. His pledge was inferred from his real estate. Since his real estate [is taken] from the best quality, also his pledge [is taken] from the best.
“The best of his field and the best of his vineyard he shall pay,” i. e., the party responsible for the damage, the words of Rebbi Ismael. Rebbi Aqiba says, “the best of his field and the best of his vineyard”, of the person suffering the damage. It is difficult for Rebbi Aqiba, he suffered damage, and you say so? But the court see what the field was worth before it was damaged and estimates accordingly. As it was stated, it is possible if the grazing was on best quality land, one estimates from best quality, from lowest quality one estimates from lowest quality. How is this? The best of the lowest quality is quite good. If you say so you provide a windfall for the person suffering the damage. One looks at the field as if it was full of first quality [produce] and estimates for him from the best quality land; least quality one estimates from least quality land. It turns out that he pays with best quality for best quality and from least quality for least quality. From where has Rebbi Aqiba that “for tort victims one estimates with best quality land”? It is not from the Torah, it is a decree. “Why did they say, ‘for tort victims one estimates with best quality land’? Because of the robbers. That a man should say, why should I have robbed [land] in my hand, or land subject to a suit for damages on my hand? Tomorrow, the court will see my good field, take it from me, and support it by the verse, ‘the best of his field and the best of his vineyard he shall pay.’ ” So far his real estate. His pledge was inferred from his real estate. Since his real estate [is taken] from the best quality, also his pledge [is taken] from the best.
“The best of his field and the best of his vineyard he shall pay,” i. e., the party responsible for the damage, the words of Rebbi Ismael. Rebbi Aqiba says, “the best of his field and the best of his vineyard”, of the person suffering the damage. It is difficult for Rebbi Aqiba, he suffered damage, and you say so? But the court see what the field was worth before it was damaged and estimates accordingly. As it was stated, it is possible if the grazing was on best quality land, one estimates from best quality, from lowest quality one estimates from lowest quality. How is this? The best of the lowest quality is quite good. If you say so you provide a windfall for the person suffering the damage. One looks at the field as if it was full of first quality [produce] and estimates for him from the best quality land; least quality one estimates from least quality land. It turns out that he pays with best quality for best quality and from least quality for least quality. From where has Rebbi Aqiba that “for tort victims one estimates with best quality land”? It is not from the Torah, it is a decree. “Why did they say, ‘for tort victims one estimates with best quality land’? Because of the robbers. That a man should say, why should I have robbed [land] in my hand, or land subject to a suit for damages on my hand? Tomorrow, the court will see my good field, take it from me, and support it by the verse, ‘the best of his field and the best of his vineyard he shall pay.’ ” So far his real estate. His pledge was inferred from his real estate. Since his real estate [is taken] from the best quality, also his pledge [is taken] from the best.