specific
21 occurrences across the corpus
The Mishnah
A man may say [on Yom Tov] to his fellow, “Fill me this vessel,” but not in a specific measure. Rabbi Judah says: if it was a measuring-vessel he may not fill it. It happened that Abba Shaul ben Batnit used to fill up his measures on the eve of Yom Tov and give them to his customers on Yom Tov. Abba Shaul says: he used to do so even during hol hamoed (the intermediate days of the festival), on account of clarifying the measures. But the sages say: he used also to do so on an ordinary day for the sake of the draining of the measures. A man may go to a shopkeeper to whom he generally goes and say to him, “Give me [so many] eggs and nuts” since this is the way of a householder to reckon in his own home.
The Jerusalem Talmud
Rebbi Jeremiah and Rebbi Abba, both in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan. One said, the words of Rebbi Meïr, anything which is specifically for something prohibited is prohibited. But the other one said, anything which one specified for something prohibited is prohibited. We did not know who said what. Since Rebbi (Ḥanina) [Ḥanania] said, Rebbi Jeremiah asked, is this (brick) [lamp] not specifically for something forbidden? This implies that he was the one who said, anything which is specifically for something prohibited is prohibited. The one who said specific, so much more if he specified. But he who said if he specified, not if it is specific.
Rebbi Jeremiah and Rebbi Abba, both in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan. One said, the words of Rebbi Meïr, anything which is specifically for something prohibited is prohibited. But the other one said, anything which one specified for something prohibited is prohibited. We did not know who said what. Since Rebbi (Ḥanina) [Ḥanania] said, Rebbi Jeremiah asked, is this (brick) [lamp] not specifically for something forbidden? This implies that he was the one who said, anything which is specifically for something prohibited is prohibited. The one who said specific, so much more if he specified. But he who said if he specified, not if it is specific.
“An offering of remembrance,” a general statement; “referring to sin”, a detailed statement. If a general statement is followed by a specific one, the general does not mean more than the specific. If you say so, do you not find the argument disadvantaged? If punishment, which is given out sparingly, can refer, then reward, which is given out in abundance, should do so much more! But, “an offering of remembrance,” if she has merit, “referring to sin”, if she has no merit. It was stated: Rebbi Tarphon said, all statements of “remembrance” in the Torah have a good meaning except this one which is for punishment. Rebbi Aqiba said to him: If it only said, “referring to sin”, and then was silent, I would agree with your statement. But since it says “an offering of remembrance,” this must be for a good [purpose].
“An offering of remembrance,” a general statement; “referring to sin”, a detailed statement. If a general statement is followed by a specific one, the general does not mean more than the specific. If you say so, do you not find the argument disadvantaged? If punishment, which is given out sparingly, can refer, then reward, which is given out in abundance, should do so much more! But, “an offering of remembrance,” if she has merit, “referring to sin”, if she has no merit. It was stated: Rebbi Tarphon said, all statements of “remembrance” in the Torah have a good meaning except this one which is for punishment. Rebbi Aqiba said to him: If it only said, “referring to sin”, and then was silent, I would agree with your statement. But since it says “an offering of remembrance,” this must be for a good [purpose].
Rav said, none of these are invalid except for the last which is invalid. Issi said, all are invalid except for the first which is not invalid. Rebbi Abba bar Ḥinena said, all are invalid. The word of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish implied that all are invalid since Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, if he wrote the essential text with the formula, it is invalid. The word of Rebbi Joḥanan implied that none are invalid since Rebbi Joḥanan said, if he wrote the essential text with the formula, it is valid. Does the word of Rebbi Eleazar imply that none are invalid? Since Rebbi Eleazar asked: if one wrote a bill of preliminary marriage not for a specific name, does preliminary marriage take hold? If he had a problem with divorce, would he ask about preliminary marriage? Since in the case of divorce, where the document is required to be for a specific name and he did not write for a specific name, divorce will not touch her, is it not logical that in the case of preliminary marriage, where a specific name is not required and he did not write for a specific name, preliminary marriage take hold with her? That should be obvious to him. Really, the following is obvious to him: Since one inferred the bill of preliminary marriage only from divorce, and in the case of divorce she is not divorced, in the case of preliminary marriage she is not preliminarily married.
Rav said, none of these are invalid except for the last which is invalid. Issi said, all are invalid except for the first which is not invalid. Rebbi Abba bar Ḥinena said, all are invalid. The word of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish implied that all are invalid since Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, if he wrote the essential text with the formula, it is invalid. The word of Rebbi Joḥanan implied that none are invalid since Rebbi Joḥanan said, if he wrote the essential text with the formula, it is valid. Does the word of Rebbi Eleazar imply that none are invalid? Since Rebbi Eleazar asked: if one wrote a bill of preliminary marriage not for a specific name, does preliminary marriage take hold? If he had a problem with divorce, would he ask about preliminary marriage? Since in the case of divorce, where the document is required to be for a specific name and he did not write for a specific name, divorce will not touch her, is it not logical that in the case of preliminary marriage, where a specific name is not required and he did not write for a specific name, preliminary marriage take hold with her? That should be obvious to him. Really, the following is obvious to him: Since one inferred the bill of preliminary marriage only from divorce, and in the case of divorce she is not divorced, in the case of preliminary marriage she is not preliminarily married.
Rav said, none of these are invalid except for the last which is invalid. Issi said, all are invalid except for the first which is not invalid. Rebbi Abba bar Ḥinena said, all are invalid. The word of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish implied that all are invalid since Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, if he wrote the essential text with the formula, it is invalid. The word of Rebbi Joḥanan implied that none are invalid since Rebbi Joḥanan said, if he wrote the essential text with the formula, it is valid. Does the word of Rebbi Eleazar imply that none are invalid? Since Rebbi Eleazar asked: if one wrote a bill of preliminary marriage not for a specific name, does preliminary marriage take hold? If he had a problem with divorce, would he ask about preliminary marriage? Since in the case of divorce, where the document is required to be for a specific name and he did not write for a specific name, divorce will not touch her, is it not logical that in the case of preliminary marriage, where a specific name is not required and he did not write for a specific name, preliminary marriage take hold with her? That should be obvious to him. Really, the following is obvious to him: Since one inferred the bill of preliminary marriage only from divorce, and in the case of divorce she is not divorced, in the case of preliminary marriage she is not preliminarily married.
Rav said, none of these are invalid except for the last which is invalid. Issi said, all are invalid except for the first which is not invalid. Rebbi Abba bar Ḥinena said, all are invalid. The word of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish implied that all are invalid since Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, if he wrote the essential text with the formula, it is invalid. The word of Rebbi Joḥanan implied that none are invalid since Rebbi Joḥanan said, if he wrote the essential text with the formula, it is valid. Does the word of Rebbi Eleazar imply that none are invalid? Since Rebbi Eleazar asked: if one wrote a bill of preliminary marriage not for a specific name, does preliminary marriage take hold? If he had a problem with divorce, would he ask about preliminary marriage? Since in the case of divorce, where the document is required to be for a specific name and he did not write for a specific name, divorce will not touch her, is it not logical that in the case of preliminary marriage, where a specific name is not required and he did not write for a specific name, preliminary marriage take hold with her? That should be obvious to him. Really, the following is obvious to him: Since one inferred the bill of preliminary marriage only from divorce, and in the case of divorce she is not divorced, in the case of preliminary marriage she is not preliminarily married.
Rav said, none of these are invalid except for the last which is invalid. Issi said, all are invalid except for the first which is not invalid. Rebbi Abba bar Ḥinena said, all are invalid. The word of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish implied that all are invalid since Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, if he wrote the essential text with the formula, it is invalid. The word of Rebbi Joḥanan implied that none are invalid since Rebbi Joḥanan said, if he wrote the essential text with the formula, it is valid. Does the word of Rebbi Eleazar imply that none are invalid? Since Rebbi Eleazar asked: if one wrote a bill of preliminary marriage not for a specific name, does preliminary marriage take hold? If he had a problem with divorce, would he ask about preliminary marriage? Since in the case of divorce, where the document is required to be for a specific name and he did not write for a specific name, divorce will not touch her, is it not logical that in the case of preliminary marriage, where a specific name is not required and he did not write for a specific name, preliminary marriage take hold with her? That should be obvious to him. Really, the following is obvious to him: Since one inferred the bill of preliminary marriage only from divorce, and in the case of divorce she is not divorced, in the case of preliminary marriage she is not preliminarily married.
There, they instruct that practice everywhere follows Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel except for the guarantor, Sidon, and the last proof. They say, only in the Mishnah. Rebbi Immi bar Qorḥa in the name of Rav: Why did they say, practice everywhere follows Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel? For he pronounced specific practices decided by his court.
HALAKHAH: “The order of the strangled,” etc. Strangling? You do not find it. This refers to death penalty in the Torah. For any death penalty mentioned in the Torah with no particular indication, you are not empowered to try to make it more stringent, only to make it less so, the words of Rebbi Josia. Rebbi Jonathan said to him, not because it is the least painful, but because it is mentioned in the Torah with no specific indication. For any death penalty mentioned in the Torah with no particular indication, you are not empowered to try to make it more stringent but only to make it less so; they ascribed this to strangling.
The Babylonian Talmud
[Tzitzit are] different, since Scripture says, "You shalt make for yourself twisted cords" (Deuteronomy 22:12): "for yourself" [means] for the specific purpose of your obligation But here also [Scripture says], "The festival of Sukkot you shall make for yourself," "for yourself" for the specific purpose of your obligation
[Tzitzit are] different, since Scripture says, "You shalt make for yourself twisted cords" (Deuteronomy 22:12): "for yourself" [means] for the specific purpose of your obligation But here also [Scripture says], "The festival of Sukkot you shall make for yourself," "for yourself" for the specific purpose of your obligation
Abaye said: Whatever had different names prior to the giving of the Torah, and yet the Torah made specific mention of the general name [the intention is to exclude such of the species which] have special names. But these did not have different names before the giving of the Torah at all.
GEMARA. [Is not our Mishnah] self-contradictory? It says, if made for reclining upon is susceptible to [ritual] uncleanliness and is invalid as skhakh The reason then is because it was made specifically for reclining upon, but if it was made without specific purpose, [it would be assumed that it was] for skhakh.
And then it is taught: if made for a covering it is valid as skhakh and is not susceptible to [ritual] uncleanliness. The reason then is because it was made specifically for a covering, but if it was made without specific purpose [it would be assumed that it was] made for reclining upon?
But read the latter portion [of the Mishnah]. R Rabbi Eliezer says: whether small or large: If it was made for reclining upon, it is susceptible to uncleanliness and is invalid as skhakh. The reason is that he made it for reclining, but if made without a specific purpose it can be used as skhakh
But [again] read the later portion [of the Mishnah] If made for a covering, it is valid as a skhakh and is not susceptible to uncleanliness. The reason then is that it was made specifically for covering, but if made without specific purpose, [it would be assumed that it was] for reclining upon?
Rather Rava said: In the case of a large [mat] all agree that if made without specific purpose [it is assumed to be intended] for a covering. They only differ in the case of a small [mat]. The first Tanna holds that ordinarily a small one is for reclining upon, and R. Eliezer holds that ordinarily a small one is for a covering as well.
And this is what was meant: If a large mat of reeds is made specifically for reclining upon, it is susceptible to [ritual] uncleanliness and is invalid as skhakh. The reason is that it was made specifically for reclining upon, but ordinarily it is regarded as though it was made for a covering, and is valid as skhakh. A small [mat], if made for a covering, is valid as skhakh. The reason is that it was made specifically for covering, but ordinarily it is regarded as though made for reclining upon, and is invalid for a Sukkah-covering. [This is the view of the first Tanna] And R. Eliezer comes to say that whether it is small, or large, if made without specific purpose, it is valid as skhakh.