specify

There were letters sent in times past unto Onias the high priest from Darius, who reigned then among you, to signify that ye are our brethren, as the copy here underwritten doth specify.

But as Celsus promises to give an account of the manner in which prophecies are delivered in Phœnicia and Palestine, speaking as though it were a matter with which he had a full and personal acquaintance, let us see what he has to say on the subject. First he lays it down that there are several kinds of prophecies, but he does not specify what they are; indeed, he could not do so, and the statement is a piece of pure ostentation. However, let us see what he considers the most perfect kind of prophecy among these nations. “There are many,” he says, “who, although of no name, with the greatest facility and on the slightest occasion, whether within or without temples, assume the motions and gestures of inspired persons; while others do it in cities or among armies, for the purpose of attracting attention and exciting surprise. These are accustomed to say, each for himself, ‘I am God; I am the Son of God; or, I am the Divine Spirit; I have come because the world is perishing, and you, O men, are perishing for your iniquities. But I wish to save you, and you shall see me returning again with heavenly power. Blessed is he who now does me homage. On all the rest I will send down eternal fire, both on cities and on countries. And those who know not the punishments which await them shall repent and grieve in vain; while those who are faithful to me I will preserve eternally.’” Then he goes on to say: “To these promises are added strange, fanatical, and quite unintelligible words, of which no rational person can find the meaning: for so dark are they, as to have no meaning at all; but they give occasion to every fool or impostor to apply them to suit his own purposes.”

When, to his enumeration of those to whom he would send us, he adds, “What saying equal to these did your god utter under sufferings?” we would reply, that the silence of Jesus under scourgings, and amidst all His sufferings, spoke more for His firmness and submission than all that was said by the Greeks when beset by calamity. Perhaps Celsus may believe what was recorded with all sincerity by trustworthy men, who, while giving a truthful account of all the wonders performed by Jesus, specify among these the silence which He preserved when subjected to scourgings; showing the same singular meekness under the insults which were heaped upon Him, when they put upon Him the purple robe, and set the crown of thorns upon His head, and when they put in His hand a reed in place of a sceptre: no unworthy or angry word escaped Him against those who subjected Him to such outrages. Since, then, He received the scourgings with silent firmness, and bore with meekness all the insults of those who outraged Him, it cannot be said, as is said by some, that it was in cowardly weakness that He uttered the words: “Father, if it be possible, let this cup pass from me: nevertheless, not as I will, but as Thou wilt.” The prayer which seems to be contained in these words for the removal of what He calls “the cup” bears a sense which we have elsewhere examined and set forth at large. But taking it in its more obvious sense, consider if it be not a prayer offered to God with all piety. For no man naturally regards anything which may befall him as necessary and inevitable; though he may submit to what is not inevitable, if occasion requires. Besides, these words, “nevertheless, not as I will, but as Thou wilt,” are not the language of one who yielded to necessity, but of one who was contented with what was befalling Him, and who submitted with reverence to the arrangements of Providence.

Celsus then adds, for what reason I know not, that instead of calling Jesus the Son of God, we had better have given that honour to the Sibyl, in whose books he maintains we have interpolated many impious statements, though he does not mention what those interpolations are. He might have proved his assertion by producing some older copies which are free from the interpolations which he attributes to us; but he does not do so even to justify his statement that these passages are of an impious character. Moreover, he again speaks of the life of Jesus as “a most infamous life,” as he has done before, not once or twice, but many times, although he does not stay to specify any of the actions of His life which he thinks most infamous. He seems to think that he may in this way make assertions without proving them, and rail against one of whom he knows nothing. Had he set himself to show what sort of infamy he found in the actions of Jesus, we should have repelled the several charges brought against Him. Jesus did indeed meet with a most sad death; but the same might be said of Socrates, and of Anaxarchus, whom he had just mentioned, and a multitude of others. If the death of Jesus was a miserable one, was not that of the others so too? And if their death was not miserable, can it be said that the death of Jesus was? You see from this, then, that the object of Celsus is to vilify the character of Jesus; and I can only suppose that he is driven to it by some spirit akin to those whose power has been broken and vanquished by Jesus, and which now finds itself deprived of the smoke and blood on which it lived, whilst deceiving those who sought for God here upon earth in images, instead of looking up to the true God, the Governor of all things.

“A person shall be put to death only on the testimony of two witnesses or three witnesses” (Deuteronomy 17:6). If the testimony is sufficiently established by two witnesses, why does Scripture [further] specify three? This is to compare two to three: just as three are competent to incriminate two as perjurers, so are two competent to incriminate three as perjurers. How do we know [that two or three can even incriminate] a hundred? The Torah states “witnesses”. Rabbi Shimon says: “Just as two witnesses are not put to death until both have been incriminated as perjurers, so three are not put to death until all three have been incriminated as perjurers. How do we know [that two or three can even incriminate] a hundred? The Torah states “witnesses”. Rabbi Akiba says: “The third witness was only mentioned in order to be stringent upon him and make his judgement the same as the other two. And if Scripture thus penalizes one who consorts with those who commit a transgression, as [if he is actually] one of those who commits the transgression, how much more so shall he who consorts with those who perform commandments receive a reward as [if he is actually] one of those who performs the commandments!”

HALAKHAH: : Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, one has to specify a stipulation and say: If ṭevel is in my hands, it shall be tithe, but if tithe is in my hands, it shall be heave of the tithe. Rebbi Jonah said, one has to add the converse stipulation and say, otherwise I did not do anything. Rebbi Joḥanan said, one does not have to add the converse stipulation. Either one of them follows his own opinion, since they disagreed: Two heaps of grain, in one of them. Rebbi Joḥanan said, they are both forbidden as dema‘, but Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, they are not forbidden.

Rebbi Eleazar asked: What are the rules for a small field? Let us hear from the following: “ Rebbi Eleazar ben Simeon: Abba Yose ben Joḥanan from Yanoaḥ said for a large field 50 cubits, for a small field along most of it.” Since those who specified a measure for a large field did not do so for a small one, the Sages who did not specify a measure for a large field certainly would not specify a measure for a small field.

Rebbi Eleazar asked: What are the rules for a small field? Let us hear from the following: “ Rebbi Eleazar ben Simeon: Abba Yose ben Joḥanan from Yanoaḥ said for a large field 50 cubits, for a small field along most of it.” Since those who specified a measure for a large field did not do so for a small one, the Sages who did not specify a measure for a large field certainly would not specify a measure for a small field.

So far if he says “contained in it”. What if he said “in it”? Let us hear from the following:“The second tithe in this property shall be redeemed by those coins” and he did not specify, Rebbi Simeon said he gave it its name but the Sages say he did not do anything unless he says, in its Northern part, or in its Southern part.” That means there is no difference between “contained in it” and “in it”.

HALAKHAH: “If one had two children,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said, it is Rebbi Meïr’s who said, for something where there is a commandment performed one is not liable, but if no commandment is performed whether he is liable is disputed. Rebbi Simeon says, where there is a commandment performed one is liable, but if no commandment is performed whether he is not liable is disputed. Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The word of Rebbi Meïr is, on condition that it be a sheep without blemish, a yearling, and a well-being sacrifice fit to be changed into a Passover sacrifice. One understands from this three consequences. One understands something which is not a fixed number. And which is not usually exchanged. And doing something which fulfills a commandment. What means “something which is not a fixed number”? Rebbi Jeremiah wanted to say that the Torah did not specify how many Passover sacrifices should push the Sabbath aside in any given year. Rebbi Yose wanted to say, where you cannot determine the amount. When Rebbi Yose came to these [“children in doubt” he used to say, Rebbi Jeremiah tought us correctly. Could you say that you cannot determine the amount? But the Torah did not] specify how many Passover sacrifices should push the Sabbath aside in any given year. Rav Ḥisda said, one may explain the words of Rebbi Simeon if a group was there which did not slaughter. Rebbi Zeˋira said, the word of Rebbi Yannai implies that he forgot and circumcised the one for the Sabbath on Friday. It he circumcised him in the morning, Rebbi Zeˋira said that Rebbi Yannai was of the opinion that he is not liable. Rebbi Abba said, he is liable. In relation to what did Rebbi Yannai say it? He comes to tell you in which cases can there be a switching of children. In Rebbi Zeˋira’s opinion following Rebbi Yannai Rav followed Rebbi Meïr. Rebbi Mana said before Rebbi Yose, what Rav Ḥisda said follows Rebbi Simeon, and what Rebbi Zeˋira said follows Rebbi Meïr. Can one object anything between Rebbi Meïr and Rebbi Simeon? Do we find a difference between Rebbi Meïr and Rebbi Simeon about the remainder? How do you treat the babies in doubt? Like something which is a fixed amount or something which is not a fixed amount? If you are treating it like something which is a fixed amount … only if there remains another baby to circumcise. Rebbi Yose said, the words of the rabbis make the case like something which is not a fixed amount: only if there remains another baby to circumcise. Come and see: If he anticipated his time he is not liable, if he delayed his time he is liable? Rav Huna said, the Mishnah is the other way around, as it was stated: Rebbi Simeon said, Rebbi Eliezer and Rebbi Joshua did not disagree about one which was to be circumcised after the Sabbath if he circumcised him on the Sabbath that he is liable, but one who was to be circumcised before the Sabbath if he circumcised him on the Sabbath where Rebbi Eliezer makes him liable for a purification sacrifice and Rebbi Joshua declares him not liable. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, because of this objection it was difficult for Rebbi Yannai, only if he forgot and circumcised the one of the Sabbath on Friday. Rebbi Ada bar Ahavah said, these are the words of Rebbi Meïr and Rebbi Simeon, but the words of Rebbi Yose [are]: Even if no commandment is performed he is not liable since he erred on behalf of a commandment.

HALAKHAH: “If one had two children,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said, it is Rebbi Meïr’s who said, for something where there is a commandment performed one is not liable, but if no commandment is performed whether he is liable is disputed. Rebbi Simeon says, where there is a commandment performed one is liable, but if no commandment is performed whether he is not liable is disputed. Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The word of Rebbi Meïr is, on condition that it be a sheep without blemish, a yearling, and a well-being sacrifice fit to be changed into a Passover sacrifice. One understands from this three consequences. One understands something which is not a fixed number. And which is not usually exchanged. And doing something which fulfills a commandment. What means “something which is not a fixed number”? Rebbi Jeremiah wanted to say that the Torah did not specify how many Passover sacrifices should push the Sabbath aside in any given year. Rebbi Yose wanted to say, where you cannot determine the amount. When Rebbi Yose came to these [“children in doubt” he used to say, Rebbi Jeremiah tought us correctly. Could you say that you cannot determine the amount? But the Torah did not] specify how many Passover sacrifices should push the Sabbath aside in any given year. Rav Ḥisda said, one may explain the words of Rebbi Simeon if a group was there which did not slaughter. Rebbi Zeˋira said, the word of Rebbi Yannai implies that he forgot and circumcised the one for the Sabbath on Friday. It he circumcised him in the morning, Rebbi Zeˋira said that Rebbi Yannai was of the opinion that he is not liable. Rebbi Abba said, he is liable. In relation to what did Rebbi Yannai say it? He comes to tell you in which cases can there be a switching of children. In Rebbi Zeˋira’s opinion following Rebbi Yannai Rav followed Rebbi Meïr. Rebbi Mana said before Rebbi Yose, what Rav Ḥisda said follows Rebbi Simeon, and what Rebbi Zeˋira said follows Rebbi Meïr. Can one object anything between Rebbi Meïr and Rebbi Simeon? Do we find a difference between Rebbi Meïr and Rebbi Simeon about the remainder? How do you treat the babies in doubt? Like something which is a fixed amount or something which is not a fixed amount? If you are treating it like something which is a fixed amount … only if there remains another baby to circumcise. Rebbi Yose said, the words of the rabbis make the case like something which is not a fixed amount: only if there remains another baby to circumcise. Come and see: If he anticipated his time he is not liable, if he delayed his time he is liable? Rav Huna said, the Mishnah is the other way around, as it was stated: Rebbi Simeon said, Rebbi Eliezer and Rebbi Joshua did not disagree about one which was to be circumcised after the Sabbath if he circumcised him on the Sabbath that he is liable, but one who was to be circumcised before the Sabbath if he circumcised him on the Sabbath where Rebbi Eliezer makes him liable for a purification sacrifice and Rebbi Joshua declares him not liable. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, because of this objection it was difficult for Rebbi Yannai, only if he forgot and circumcised the one of the Sabbath on Friday. Rebbi Ada bar Ahavah said, these are the words of Rebbi Meïr and Rebbi Simeon, but the words of Rebbi Yose [are]: Even if no commandment is performed he is not liable since he erred on behalf of a commandment.

Rebbi Joḥanan said, it is Rebbi Meïr’s, since Rebbi Meïr said, for something where there is a commandment performed one is not liable, but if no commandment is performed whether he is liable is disputed. Rebbi Simeon says, where there is a commandment performed one is liable, but if no commandment is performed whether he is not liable is disputed. Rebbi Yose, Rebbi Joḥanan: The words of Rebbi Meïr are, on condition that it be a sheep without blemish, a yearling, and a well-being sacrifice fit to be changed into a Passover sacrifice. One understands from this three consequences. One understands something which is not a fixed number. And which is not usually exchanged. And doing something which fulfills a commandment. What means “something which is not a fixed number”? Rebbi Jeremiah wanted to say that the Torah did not specify how many Pesaḥ sacrifices should push the Sabbath aside in any given year. Rebbi Yose wanted to say, where you cannot determine the amount. When Rebbi Yose came to these “children in doubt” he used to say, Rebbi Jeremiah taught us correctly. Could you say that you cannot determine the amount? But the Torah did not specify how many Pesaḥ sacrifices should push the Sabbath aside in any given year. Rav Ḥisda said, one may explain the words of Rebbi Simeon if a group was there which did not slaughter. Rebbi Zeˋira said, the word of Rebbi Yannai implies that he forgot and circumcised the one for the Sabbath on Friday. It he circumcised him in the morning, Rebbi Zeˋira said that Rebbi Yannai was of the opinion that he is not liable. Rebbi Abba said, he is liable. In relation to what did Rebbi Yannai say it? He comes to tell you in which cases can there be a switching of children. In Rebbi Zeˋira’s opinion following Rebbi Yannai Rav followed Rebbi Meïr. Rebbi Mana said before Rebbi Yose, what Rav Ḥisda said follows Rebbi Simeon, and what Rebbi Yannai said follows Rebbi Meïr. Can one object anything between Rebbi Meïr and Rebbi Simeon? Do we find a difference between Rebbi Meïr and Rebbi Simeon about the remainder? How do you treat the babies in doubt? Like something which is a fixed amount or something which is not a fixed amount? If you are treating it like something which is a fixed amount, even if there is no (one) [other] baby to circumcise. If you are treating it like something which is not a fixed amount, only if there remains (one) [another] baby to circumcise. Come and see: If he anticipated his time he is not liable, if he delayed his time he is liable? Rav Ḥuna said, the Mishnah is the other way around, as it was stated: Rebbi Simeon said, Rebbi Eliezer and Rebbi Joshua did not disagree about one which was to be circumcised after the Sabbath if he circumcised him on the Sabbath that he is liable, but one who was to be circumcised before the Sabbath if he circumcised him on the Sabbath where Rebbi Eliezer makes him liable for a purification sacrifice and Rebbi Joshua declares him not liable. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, because of this objection it was difficult for Rebbi Yannai, only if he forgot and circumcised the one of the Sabbath on Friday. Rebbi Ada bar Ahawah said, these are the words of Rebbi Meïr and Rebbi Simeon, but the words of Rebbi Yose [are]: Even if no commandment is performed he is not liable since he erred on behalf of a commandment.

Rebbi Joḥanan said, it is Rebbi Meïr’s, since Rebbi Meïr said, for something where there is a commandment performed one is not liable, but if no commandment is performed whether he is liable is disputed. Rebbi Simeon says, where there is a commandment performed one is liable, but if no commandment is performed whether he is not liable is disputed. Rebbi Yose, Rebbi Joḥanan: The words of Rebbi Meïr are, on condition that it be a sheep without blemish, a yearling, and a well-being sacrifice fit to be changed into a Passover sacrifice. One understands from this three consequences. One understands something which is not a fixed number. And which is not usually exchanged. And doing something which fulfills a commandment. What means “something which is not a fixed number”? Rebbi Jeremiah wanted to say that the Torah did not specify how many Pesaḥ sacrifices should push the Sabbath aside in any given year. Rebbi Yose wanted to say, where you cannot determine the amount. When Rebbi Yose came to these “children in doubt” he used to say, Rebbi Jeremiah taught us correctly. Could you say that you cannot determine the amount? But the Torah did not specify how many Pesaḥ sacrifices should push the Sabbath aside in any given year. Rav Ḥisda said, one may explain the words of Rebbi Simeon if a group was there which did not slaughter. Rebbi Zeˋira said, the word of Rebbi Yannai implies that he forgot and circumcised the one for the Sabbath on Friday. It he circumcised him in the morning, Rebbi Zeˋira said that Rebbi Yannai was of the opinion that he is not liable. Rebbi Abba said, he is liable. In relation to what did Rebbi Yannai say it? He comes to tell you in which cases can there be a switching of children. In Rebbi Zeˋira’s opinion following Rebbi Yannai Rav followed Rebbi Meïr. Rebbi Mana said before Rebbi Yose, what Rav Ḥisda said follows Rebbi Simeon, and what Rebbi Yannai said follows Rebbi Meïr. Can one object anything between Rebbi Meïr and Rebbi Simeon? Do we find a difference between Rebbi Meïr and Rebbi Simeon about the remainder? How do you treat the babies in doubt? Like something which is a fixed amount or something which is not a fixed amount? If you are treating it like something which is a fixed amount, even if there is no (one) [other] baby to circumcise. If you are treating it like something which is not a fixed amount, only if there remains (one) [another] baby to circumcise. Come and see: If he anticipated his time he is not liable, if he delayed his time he is liable? Rav Ḥuna said, the Mishnah is the other way around, as it was stated: Rebbi Simeon said, Rebbi Eliezer and Rebbi Joshua did not disagree about one which was to be circumcised after the Sabbath if he circumcised him on the Sabbath that he is liable, but one who was to be circumcised before the Sabbath if he circumcised him on the Sabbath where Rebbi Eliezer makes him liable for a purification sacrifice and Rebbi Joshua declares him not liable. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, because of this objection it was difficult for Rebbi Yannai, only if he forgot and circumcised the one of the Sabbath on Friday. Rebbi Ada bar Ahawah said, these are the words of Rebbi Meïr and Rebbi Simeon, but the words of Rebbi Yose [are]: Even if no commandment is performed he is not liable since he erred on behalf of a commandment.

Rebbi Abba bar Mamal objected: Does not a baraita disagree? “ lf somebody says, I am taking on me the obligation to bring 100 esronim in two vessels, he shall bring 50 in one vessel each. But if he brought 60 in one vessel and 40 in the other, he has fulfilled his obligation.” Somebody could say, I am taking on me the obligation to bring 100 esronim, simply, without specifying the number of vessels in which be brings them; why does he specify “to bring them in two vessels”? To bring them 50 in one vessel each/ And we have stated on this, if he brought 60 in one vessel and 40 in the other, he has fulfilled his obligation! Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, since up to 60 they can be mixed, it is as if from the start he fixed it at 60. It would be necessary to say, “if somebody says, I am taking on me the obligation to bring 60 esronim in two vessels, he shall bring 30 in one vessel each. But if he brought 40 in one vessel and 20 in the other, he has fulfilled his obligation.” It was found stated thus.

Rebbi Ze`ira, Rav Huna in the name of Rav: They disagree about one who gives his property to the Temple. But if he gives his flock to the Temple, everybody agrees that it is for the altar. Rebbi Abba, Rav Huna in the name of Rav: Where do they disagree? About one who gives his flock to the Temple, but if he gave his property to the Temple, everybody agrees that it is for the upkeep of the Temple. The opinion of Rebbi Ze`ira can be understood. It is difficult for Rebbi Abba. Is an animal not for the altar? An animal is for the altar. But why did this man not specify? It is as if he said, it only should be for the upkeep of the Temple. Rebbi Joḥanan said, there is no difference. The disagreement is both about one who gives his property to the Temple as about one who gives his flock to the Temple.

MISHNAH: A person may say to the grocer, fill me this vessel, but he may not specify the measure. Rebbi Jehudah says, if it was a measuring cup he shall not fill it. It happened that Shaul ben Botnit filled his measures on the eve of the holiday and gave it to the customers on the holiday. Abba Shaul says, that is what one does on a holiday, but the Sages say one acts thus also on a weekday because of the emptying of the measuring vessels.

HALAKHAH: “These are the kinds of work a woman does for her husband,” etc. It was stated: Seven main labors did they enumerate; the rest the Sages did not need to specify.

HALAKHAH: “Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, her sale is valid,” etc. That is, if she sold them in four contracts. If she sold them in one contract, there is disagreement between Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, as they disagreed: If somebody wrote all his property over to two persons in one document and the testimony of the witnesses was valid for one but invalid for the other. Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Yasa: Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagreed; one said, since it is invalid for one it is invalid for the other, but the other said, it is valid for one and invalid for the other. Rebbi Mana did not specify; Rebbi Abin specified: Rebbi Joḥanan said, since it is invalid for one it is invalid for the other; but Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, it is valid for one and invalid for the other. Rebbi Elazar said, a Mishnah supports Rebbi Joḥanan: “Since testimony of two [witnesses] is invalid if one of them turns out to be related or disqualified, so also of three [witnesses] it is invalid if one of them turns out to be related or disqualified. From where even 100? The verse says, ‘witnesses’”. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, Rebbi Ḥananiah the colleague of the rabbis and the rabbis disagree. One says, the argument of Rebbi Eleazar is correct, but the other says, the argument of Rebbi Eleazar is not correct. For him who says, the argument of Rebbi Eleazar is correct, it is as if there was one testimony about one person. For him who says, the argument of Rebbi Eleazar is not correct, it is as if two groups of witnesses came, valid for one and disqualified for the other.

MISHNAH: Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, if he brought three animals but did not specify, the one proper for the purification offering shall be brought as purification offering, for the elevation offering shall be brought as elevation offering, for the well-being offering shall be brought as well-being offering. He took the hair shorn from his nazir head and sent it under the cooking pot; even if he shaved in the countryside he sent it under the cooking pot. When has this been said? If he shaved in purity. But if he shaved in impurity, he does not send it under the cooking pot. Rebbi Meïr says, all send under the cooking pot except the impure in the countryside.

HALAKHAH: They wanted to say, if he did not specify, but in his house he did specify. They said, even in his house he need not specify. Why? The animal which at the start has the rules of the indeterminate.

HALAKHAH: They wanted to say, if he did not specify, but in his house he did specify. They said, even in his house he need not specify. Why? The animal which at the start has the rules of the indeterminate.

HALAKHAH: They wanted to say, if he did not specify, but in his house he did specify. They said, even in his house he need not specify. Why? The animal which at the start has the rules of the indeterminate.

If [the bill of divorce] contained documentation of a gift and [the messenger] said, it was written and signed before me, is [the husband’s] protest about the gift void since it is void about the divorce? Or, since his protest is void [only] about the divorce, is it valid about the gift? We have stated later: “Bills of divorce for wives and documents of manumission are equal in the rules of carrying and bringing.” If [the document of manumission] contained documentation of a gift and [the messenger] said, it was written and signed before me, is [the master’s] protest about the gift void since it is void about the manumission? Or since his protest is void [only] about the manumission, is it valid about the gift? If somebody signed all his property over to his slave, you say that the gift is the document of manumission. How do you treat this? Is it a document of manumission and his protest is void or is it a gift and his protest is valid? This can be compared to the following: If somebody signed all his property over to two persons in one document and the testimony of the witnesses was valid for one but invalid for the other. Rebbi Ila in the name of Rebbi Immi: Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagreed; one said, since it is invalid for one it is invalid for the other, but the other said, it is valid for one and invalid for the other. Rebbi Mana did not specify; Rebbi Abin specified: Rebbi Joḥanan said, since it is invalid for one it is invalid for the other; but Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, it is valid for one and invalid for the other. Rebbi Eleazar said, a Mishnah supports Rebbi Joḥanan: “Since testimony of two [witnesses] is invalid if one of them turns out to be related or disqualified, so also of three [witnesses] it is invalid if one of them turns out to be related or disqualified”. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, Rebbi Ḥanina the colleague of the rabbis and the rabbis disagree. One says, the argument of Rebbi Eleazar is correct, but the other says, Rebbi Eleazar is not correct. For him who says, the argument of Rebbi Eleazar is correct, it is a testimony about one person; as testimony it is totally invalid if it is partially invalid. For him who says, the argument of Rebbi Eleazar is not correct, it is as if two groups of witnesses came, valid for one and disqualified for the other.

“If somebody says, I freed my slave Ṭabi, I shall free him, he is free, he acquired.” Rebbi Inaia in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: But only by a document. “He should be freed, Rebbi says, he acquired, but for the Sages he did not acquire. Give this document of manumission, and he died, Rebbi says, he did not acquire but the Sages say, he did acquire; one forces the heirs to fulfill the instructions of the deceased.” Rebbi Ze‘ira said, they disagree if he did not specify. How do we hold? If he said, “free him”, Rebbi will agree. If he said, “write and deliver,” the Sages will agree. But we deal with the case that he said “give”. Rebbi says, one who says “give” is like one who said “write and deliver,” but the Sages say, one who says “give” is like one who said “free him”.

“If somebody said that all his property should be given to X, a Cohen, and [the estate] contained slaves, even if [the Cohen] said ‘I cannot have them’ they eat heave. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel said, since he said ‘I cannot have them’, the heirs acquired them.” Rebbi Ze‘ira said, they disagree if he did not specify. How do we hold? If he accepted at the first moment, Rabban Gamliel will agree. If he did refuse at the first moment, the rabbis will agree. But we deal with the case that he did not specify. Rebbi says, nobody says ‘it is impossible’ unless he had accepted. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel said, since he said ‘it is impossible’, the end is proof for the start.

“If somebody said that all his property should be given to X, a Cohen, and [the estate] contained slaves, even if [the Cohen] said ‘I cannot have them’ they eat heave. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel said, since he said ‘I cannot have them’, the heirs acquired them.” Rebbi Ze‘ira said, they disagree if he did not specify. How do we hold? If he accepted at the first moment, Rabban Gamliel will agree. If he did refuse at the first moment, the rabbis will agree. But we deal with the case that he did not specify. Rebbi says, nobody says ‘it is impossible’ unless he had accepted. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel said, since he said ‘it is impossible’, the end is proof for the start.

“If somebody said that all his property should be given to X, a Cohen, and [the estate] contained slaves, even if [the Cohen] said ‘I cannot have them’ they eat heave. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel said, since he said ‘I cannot have them’, the heirs acquired them.” Rebbi La said, they disagree if he did not specify. How do we hold? If it is clear that he wants them, everybody agrees that his slaves may eat heave. If it is clear that he does not want them, everybody agrees that the heirs acquired them. But we deal with the case that he did not specify, where the rabbis think that at the start he wanted them and then he changed his mind. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel said, since he said ‘it is impossible for me’, the heirs acquired them.

“If somebody said that all his property should be given to X, a Cohen, and [the estate] contained slaves, even if [the Cohen] said ‘I cannot have them’ they eat heave. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel said, since he said ‘I cannot have them’, the heirs acquired them.” Rebbi La said, they disagree if he did not specify. How do we hold? If it is clear that he wants them, everybody agrees that his slaves may eat heave. If it is clear that he does not want them, everybody agrees that the heirs acquired them. But we deal with the case that he did not specify, where the rabbis think that at the start he wanted them and then he changed his mind. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel said, since he said ‘it is impossible for me’, the heirs acquired them.

“Whose sentence was passed,” etc. If somebody wrote all his property over to two persons in one document and the testimony of the witnesses was valid for one but invalid for the other. Rebbi Hila said, Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagreed; one said, since it is invalid for one it is invalid for the other, but the other said, it is valid for one and invalid for the other. Rebbi Mana did not specify; Rebbi Abun specified: Rebbi Joḥanan said, since it is invalid for one it is invalid for the other; but Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, it is valid for one and invalid for the other. Rebbi Eleazar said, the Mishnah supports Rebbi Joḥanan: “Since the testimony of two [witnesses] is invalid if one of them is found to be a relative or a disqualified person, the same holds for three if one of them is found to be a relative or a disqualified person. From where even for a hundred? The verse says, witnesses.” Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, Rebbi Ḥanina the colleague of the rabbis and the rabbis disagree. One says, the argument of Rebbi Eleazar is correct, but the other says, the argument of Rebbi Eleazar is not correct. For him who says, the argument of Rebbi Eleazar is correct, it is a single testimony and a single warning, and any testimony which is partially disqualified is totally disqualified. For him who says, the argument of Rebbi Eleazar is not correct, it is as if two groups of witnesses came, valid for one and invalid for the other.

Rab Judah said : It is forbidden to read the Shema' in the presence of a naked gentile. Why is a gentile specified ? Even by a naked Israelite it is likewise [forbidden] ! [That it is forbidden with an Israelite is obvious] ; but it was necessary to specify the case of a gentile. For thou mightest have said : Since it is written with reference to the gentiles, "Whose flesh is as the flesh of asses" (Ezek. xxiii. 20), argue that [in this matter the naked gentile is to be considered] only like an ass ; therefore he informs us that to them also [when exposed] is "nakedness" attributed ; for it is written, "And they saw not their father's nakedness" (Gen. ix. 23).

Why specify Purim? The same rule applies to festivals also, as it has been taught: Moses established for all of Israel that they should ask questions and offer derashot on the subject of the day — the laws of Pesah on Pesah, the laws of Shavuot on Shavuot, and the laws of Sukkot on Sukkot!

MISHNA: (Deuteronomy 17,6) "By the mouth [the testimony] of two witnesses or three witnesses the [perpetrator] shall surely be put to death." If the testimony can be established with two [witnesses], why does the Torah specify three? Rather, the Torah is juxtaposing (three to two). Just as three [witnesses] can make two [witnesses] into zomemim, so too two [witnesses] can make three [witnesses] into zomemim. And from where do we know [that two witnesses can] even [make] one hundred [witnesses into zomemim]? The Torah teaches us this with the word "Witnesses".