substantial
15 occurrences across the corpus
NT Apocrypha/Pseudepigrapha
For 'super-substantial' bread I found mahar, which means 'of the morrow', so that the sense is: Our bread of the morrow, that is, of the future, give us this day.
The Writings of Origen
After this, Celsus next asserts that “Those herdsmen and shepherds who followed Moses as their leader, had their minds deluded by vulgar deceits, and so supposed that there was one God.” Let him show, then, how, after this irrational departure, as he regards it, of the herdsmen and shepherds from the worship of many gods, he himself is able to establish the multiplicity of deities that are found amongst the Greeks, or among those other nations that are called Barbarian. Let him establish, therefore, the existence of Mnemosyne, the mother of the Muses by Zeus; or of Themis, the parent of the Hours; or let him prove that the ever naked Graces can have a real, substantial existence. But he will not be able to show, from any actions of theirs, that these fictitious representations of the Greeks, which have the appearance of being invested with bodies, are [really] gods. And why should the fables of the Greeks regarding the gods be true, any more than those of the Egyptians for example, who in their language know nothing of a Mnemosyne, mother of the nine Muses; nor of a Themis, parent of the Hours; nor of a Euphrosyne, one of the Graces; nor of any other of these names? How much more manifest (and how much better than all these inventions!) is it that, convinced by what we see, in the admirable order of the world, we should worship the Maker of it as the one Author of one effect, and which, as being wholly in harmony with itself, cannot on that account have been the work of many makers; and that we should believe that the whole heaven is not held together by the movements of many souls, for one is enough, which bears the whole of the non-wandering sphere from east to west, and embraces within it all things which the world requires, and which are not self-existing! For all are parts of the world, while God is no part of the whole. But God cannot be imperfect, as a part is imperfect. And perhaps profounder consideration will show, that as God is not a part, so neither is He properly the whole, since the whole is composed of parts; and reason will not allow us to believe that the God who is over all is composed of parts, each one of which cannot do what all the other parts can.
After this he continues: “Their union is the more wonderful, the more it can be shown to be based on no substantial reason. And yet rebellion is a substantial reason, as well as the advantages which accrue from it, and the fear of external enemies. Such are the causes which give stability to their faith.” To this we answer, that our union does thus rest upon a reason, or rather not upon a reason, but upon the divine working, so that its commencement was God’s teaching men, in the prophetical writings, to expect the advent of Christ, who was to be the Saviour of mankind. For in so far as this point is not really refuted (although it may seem to be by unbelievers), in the same proportion is the doctrine commended as the doctrine of God, and Jesus shown to be the Son of God both before and after His incarnation. I maintain, moreover, that even after His incarnation, He is always found by those who possess the acutest spiritual vision to be most God-like, and to have really come down to us from God, and to have derived His origin or subsequent development not from human wisdom, but from the manifestation of God within Him, who by His manifold wisdom and miracles established Judaism first, and Christianity afterwards; and the assertion that rebellion, and the advantages attending it, were the originating causes of a doctrine which has converted and improved so many men was effectually refuted.
After this he continues: “Their union is the more wonderful, the more it can be shown to be based on no substantial reason. And yet rebellion is a substantial reason, as well as the advantages which accrue from it, and the fear of external enemies. Such are the causes which give stability to their faith.” To this we answer, that our union does thus rest upon a reason, or rather not upon a reason, but upon the divine working, so that its commencement was God’s teaching men, in the prophetical writings, to expect the advent of Christ, who was to be the Saviour of mankind. For in so far as this point is not really refuted (although it may seem to be by unbelievers), in the same proportion is the doctrine commended as the doctrine of God, and Jesus shown to be the Son of God both before and after His incarnation. I maintain, moreover, that even after His incarnation, He is always found by those who possess the acutest spiritual vision to be most God-like, and to have really come down to us from God, and to have derived His origin or subsequent development not from human wisdom, but from the manifestation of God within Him, who by His manifold wisdom and miracles established Judaism first, and Christianity afterwards; and the assertion that rebellion, and the advantages attending it, were the originating causes of a doctrine which has converted and improved so many men was effectually refuted.
But it is probable that what is written by Paul in the First Epistle to the Corinthians, as being addressed to Greeks who prided themselves greatly on their Grecian wisdom, has moved some to believe that it was not the object of the gospel to win wise men. Now, let him who is of this opinion understand that the gospel, as censuring wicked men, says of them that they are wise not in things which relate to the understanding, and which are unseen and eternal; but that in busying themselves about things of sense alone, and regarding these as all-important, they are wise men of the world: for as there are in existence a multitude of opinions, some of them espousing the cause of matter and bodies, and asserting that everything is corporeal which has a substantial existence, and that besides these nothing else exists, whether it be called invisible or incorporeal, it says also that these constitute the wisdom of the world, which perishes and fades away, and belongs only to this age, while those opinions which raise the soul from things here to the blessedness which is with God, and to His kingdom, and which teach men to despise all sensible and visible things as existing only for a season, and to hasten on to things invisible, and to have regard to those things which are not seen,—these, it says, constitute the wisdom of God. But Paul, as a lover of truth, says of certain wise men among the Greeks, when their statements are true, that “although they knew God, they glorified Him not as God, neither were thankful.” And he bears witness that they knew God, and says, too, that this did not happen to them without divine permission, in these words: “For God showed it unto them;” dimly alluding, I think, to those who ascend from things of sense to those of the understanding, when he adds, “For the invisible things of God from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even His eternal power and Godhead; so that they are without excuse: because that, when they knew God, they glorified Him not as God, neither were thankful.”
The Mishnah
One who borrows a vessel from his neighbor on the eve of Yom Tov, [it is restricted to the same limits] as the feet of the borrower. [But if he borrowed it] on Yom Tov, it is as the feet of the lender. A woman who borrowed from her neighbor spices, water or salt for her dough, these are [restricted to the same limits] as the feet of both them. Rabbi Judah exempts in the case of water, because it is not substantial.
The Jerusalem Talmud
HALAKHAH: Mishnah: “A donkey may not go out with its saddle cloth,” etc. It was stated, “but it may walk around with it in the courtyard.” Rebbi Samuel in the name of Rebbi Zeˋira: The same applies to the saddle. It was stated: “a donkey may go out with its saddle to get warm but one may not tie the load belt and not lower the strap under its tail.” Rebbi Jeremiah asked before Rebbi Zeˋira: From where these things? As we have stated: “The practices of Sabbath … are like mountains hanging on a hair,” and you are saying so? He could have objected, what is the difference between a ladder and a package of straw? A ladder is substantial, a package of straw is not substantial. Rebbi Ḥanina said, he could have objected, what is the difference between a package of straw and an expert amulet? As we have stated, “it is forbidden that an animal go out with an expert amulet.” Rebbi Eudaimon said, he could have objected, what is the difference between a package of straw and a wound dressing? There are Tannaim who state, they may not go out with a package of straw; there are Tannaim who state, they may go out. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Ada said, this is a tannaitic difference. For him who said, they may go out with a package of straw; they may go out with a wound dressing. But for him who said, they may not go out with a package of straw; they may not go out with a wound dressing.
HALAKHAH: Mishnah: “A donkey may not go out with its saddle cloth,” etc. It was stated, “but it may walk around with it in the courtyard.” Rebbi Samuel in the name of Rebbi Zeˋira: The same applies to the saddle. It was stated: “a donkey may go out with its saddle to get warm but one may not tie the load belt and not lower the strap under its tail.” Rebbi Jeremiah asked before Rebbi Zeˋira: From where these things? As we have stated: “The practices of Sabbath … are like mountains hanging on a hair,” and you are saying so? He could have objected, what is the difference between a ladder and a package of straw? A ladder is substantial, a package of straw is not substantial. Rebbi Ḥanina said, he could have objected, what is the difference between a package of straw and an expert amulet? As we have stated, “it is forbidden that an animal go out with an expert amulet.” Rebbi Eudaimon said, he could have objected, what is the difference between a package of straw and a wound dressing? There are Tannaim who state, they may not go out with a package of straw; there are Tannaim who state, they may go out. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Ada said, this is a tannaitic difference. For him who said, they may go out with a package of straw; they may go out with a wound dressing. But for him who said, they may not go out with a package of straw; they may not go out with a wound dressing.
That is what is written, it was in the second year in the second month on the twentieth of the month, etc. And it is written, they travelled from the Eternal’s mountain a distance of three days. Rebbi Zacharia, the son-in-law of Rebbi Levi: {a parable} like children who are freed from <school> (books) and leave to run. On that very day they desired a desire; up to a month, until it will come out of your noses. And the seven days of Miriam; Miriam was secluded outside the camp. And the 40 days of the scouts, they returned from scouting the Land at the end of 40 days. They walked and came to Moses and Aaron etc. They came and found them occupied with the rules for ḥallah and orlah. They said to them, you are not going to enter the Land and you are studying the rules for ḥallah and orlah? Immediately, the entire congregation raised their voices; the people cried in that night. He said to them, you cried before Me a pointless crying. By My life, in the future you shall cry a substantial crying. Crying she will cry in the night. Rebbi Simeon ben Yoḥai stated: It is written, Moses heard the people crying for its families, etc. About the six incest prohibitions which Moses forbade them.
If he was born on the eightieth day, he eliminates ten. If he was born on the ninetieth day, he eliminates twenty. If he finished his nezirut and came to complete his son’s nezirut and became impure within the first ten days, he eliminates everything. Within the last twenty days? Rebbi Abba in the name of Rab and Rebbi Joḥanan both say, he eliminates thirty. Rebbi Samuel said, he eliminates seven only. Samuel bar Abba asked before Rebbi Yose: Does Rebbi Joḥanan think that eliminating by a shaving knife is identical with substantial eliminating? Rebbi Ze‘ira said, if Rebbi Joḥanan thought that eliminating by a shaving knife is identical to substantial eliminating, why would he say that he eliminates thirty? Should he not invalidate everything? Rebbi Abin bar Ḥiyya said before Rebbi Ze‘ira: Explain it if he was born on a day unsuitable to bring a sacrifice. Think of it, if he was born in the night, is that not unsuitable to bring a sacrifice? It is suitable; the night caused it. Think of it, if he was born on the Sabbath, is that not unsuitable to bring a sacrifice? It is suitable; the Sabbath caused it. If he had finished his nezirut but did not manage to shave when [the son] was born on the Sabbath, is that not unsuitable to bring a sacrifice? It is suitable; the Sabbath caused it. If he had finished his nezirut but did not manage to shave before his son was born, he celebrates one shaving for both. If he had dedicated his sacrifices but did not manage to shave before his son was born. There, they say that he celebrates one shaving for both. Rebbi Joḥanan said, he shaves and then shaves a second time. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “They asked Rebbi Simeon ben Ioḥai: Assume that he was both a nazir and a sufferer from scale disease, may he shave once and have it counted for his nezirut and his scale disease? He said to them: If he shaved to remove hair, you would be correct. But the nazir shaves to remove hair whereas the sufferer from scale disease shaves to have hair grow. They said to him, if it cannot be counted for the days of his completeness, should it not be counted for the days of his count? Both of them shave to remove hair. (They said to him. If both of them shaved before the sprinkling of the blood, you would be correct. But the nazir shaves before the sprinkling of the blood and the sufferer from scale disease shaves after the sprinkling of the blood! They said to him, if it cannot be counted for the days of his completeness, should it not be counted for the days of his count? Both of them shave before the sprinkling of the blood!) He said to them, if both shaved before they immerse themselves in water, you would be correct. But the nazir shaves before he immerses himself in water and the sufferer from scale disease shaves after he immerses himself in water. They said to him, the matter is settled. It cannot be counted for the days of his completeness, it cannot be counted for the days of his count. It cannot be counted for purification; it cannot be counted for impurity. That is, if he was a nazir and sufferer from scale disease. But if he was a nazir and nazir, he may shave once for both.” What does Rebbi Joḥanan do with this? He explains that they disagree with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish.
If he was born on the eightieth day, he eliminates ten. If he was born on the ninetieth day, he eliminates twenty. If he finished his nezirut and came to complete his son’s nezirut and became impure within the first ten days, he eliminates everything. Within the last twenty days? Rebbi Abba in the name of Rab and Rebbi Joḥanan both say, he eliminates thirty. Rebbi Samuel said, he eliminates seven only. Samuel bar Abba asked before Rebbi Yose: Does Rebbi Joḥanan think that eliminating by a shaving knife is identical with substantial eliminating? Rebbi Ze‘ira said, if Rebbi Joḥanan thought that eliminating by a shaving knife is identical to substantial eliminating, why would he say that he eliminates thirty? Should he not invalidate everything? Rebbi Abin bar Ḥiyya said before Rebbi Ze‘ira: Explain it if he was born on a day unsuitable to bring a sacrifice. Think of it, if he was born in the night, is that not unsuitable to bring a sacrifice? It is suitable; the night caused it. Think of it, if he was born on the Sabbath, is that not unsuitable to bring a sacrifice? It is suitable; the Sabbath caused it. If he had finished his nezirut but did not manage to shave when [the son] was born on the Sabbath, is that not unsuitable to bring a sacrifice? It is suitable; the Sabbath caused it. If he had finished his nezirut but did not manage to shave before his son was born, he celebrates one shaving for both. If he had dedicated his sacrifices but did not manage to shave before his son was born. There, they say that he celebrates one shaving for both. Rebbi Joḥanan said, he shaves and then shaves a second time. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “They asked Rebbi Simeon ben Ioḥai: Assume that he was both a nazir and a sufferer from scale disease, may he shave once and have it counted for his nezirut and his scale disease? He said to them: If he shaved to remove hair, you would be correct. But the nazir shaves to remove hair whereas the sufferer from scale disease shaves to have hair grow. They said to him, if it cannot be counted for the days of his completeness, should it not be counted for the days of his count? Both of them shave to remove hair. (They said to him. If both of them shaved before the sprinkling of the blood, you would be correct. But the nazir shaves before the sprinkling of the blood and the sufferer from scale disease shaves after the sprinkling of the blood! They said to him, if it cannot be counted for the days of his completeness, should it not be counted for the days of his count? Both of them shave before the sprinkling of the blood!) He said to them, if both shaved before they immerse themselves in water, you would be correct. But the nazir shaves before he immerses himself in water and the sufferer from scale disease shaves after he immerses himself in water. They said to him, the matter is settled. It cannot be counted for the days of his completeness, it cannot be counted for the days of his count. It cannot be counted for purification; it cannot be counted for impurity. That is, if he was a nazir and sufferer from scale disease. But if he was a nazir and nazir, he may shave once for both.” What does Rebbi Joḥanan do with this? He explains that they disagree with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish.
MISHNAH: If sentence was passed, one brings him out to be stoned. The place for stoning was outside the court as it is said: Bring the blasphemer outside the camp. One person was standing outside the court building with towels in his hand; a horse was standing ready at a distance but so he could see him. If one said, I have an argument in his favor, that one waves his towels, the horse gallops and stops him. Even if he himself says, I have an exculpatory argument for myself, one returns him even four or five times, on condition that his argument be substantial.
Rebbi Joḥanan said, the first time one listens to him whether or not his arguments are substantial. After that, if his arguments are substantial one listens to him, otherwise one does not listen to him. They said, only if his later arguments are substantial. Ḥizqiah asked: If he was led out to be executed when he became paralyzed, do we say that had he not become paralyzed, he would have argued for his acquittal? Rebbi Joḥanan heard this and said, this is a donkey’s question. But it must be: If he was led out to be executed and said, I have to argue for my acquittal: when he became paralyzed, do we say that had he not become paralyzed, he would have argued for his acquittal? He said, that is a statement.
Rebbi Joḥanan said, the first time one listens to him whether or not his arguments are substantial. After that, if his arguments are substantial one listens to him, otherwise one does not listen to him. They said, only if his later arguments are substantial. Ḥizqiah asked: If he was led out to be executed when he became paralyzed, do we say that had he not become paralyzed, he would have argued for his acquittal? Rebbi Joḥanan heard this and said, this is a donkey’s question. But it must be: If he was led out to be executed and said, I have to argue for my acquittal: when he became paralyzed, do we say that had he not become paralyzed, he would have argued for his acquittal? He said, that is a statement.
Rebbi Joḥanan said, the first time one listens to him whether or not his arguments are substantial. After that, if his arguments are substantial one listens to him, otherwise one does not listen to him. They said, only if his later arguments are substantial. Ḥizqiah asked: If he was led out to be executed when he became paralyzed, do we say that had he not become paralyzed, he would have argued for his acquittal? Rebbi Joḥanan heard this and said, this is a donkey’s question. But it must be: If he was led out to be executed and said, I have to argue for my acquittal: when he became paralyzed, do we say that had he not become paralyzed, he would have argued for his acquittal? He said, that is a statement.