then
12745 occurrences across the corpus
The Jerusalem Talmud
Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: “One which never had been used for work,” a general statement, “which never had drawn under a yoke,” a detailed statement. If a general statement is followed by a detail, the general does not contain more than the detail. He said to him, if it were written “which never had worked, which never had drawn,” you would be justified; but it is written “one which never had been used for work.” This does not describe general and detail, but the additional reference to “yoke” for an equal cut. Since relative to “yoke” said for the calf He treated all work as a yoke, so for the “yoke” said for the cow we have to treat all work as a yoke. Since relative to “yoke” said for the calf work disables whether intentional or unintentional, so for the “yoke” said for the cow work disables whether intentional or unintentional. Since relative to “yoke” said for the cow, the yoke disables, also for the “yoke” said for the calf the yoke disables. Then since for the “yoke” said for the cow blemishes disable, so also for the “yoke” said for the calf blemishes disable? The verse says, “where this one has no blemish.” Blemishes disable the cow, blemishes do not disable the calf. Then it also says “one which never had been used for work,” for this one work disables, does for the cow work not disable? Can you say there, “where this one has no blemish,” this one is disabled by blemishes, sacrifices are not disabled by blemishes?
Rebbi Mattania said, this is correct. What is written? “The blood shall be purged for them;” then it is silent. Nevertheless, “but you shall eliminate innocent blood from your midst”.
It was stated: Rebbi Jehudah said, what was this shamir? It is a creature that existed from the creation of the world and if one shows it stones those would open themselves like the two boards of a pinax, and Solomon built the Temple with it. That is what is written: “During the building of the House, it was built from whole carried stones, and hammers or axe or any iron implement was not heard in the House when it was built.” Rebbi Nehemiah says, they were sawed. That is what is written: “All these were expensive stones, in the measure of ashlars, sawed with a saw inside and out.” Say now, at the building site they were not treated at all but they were finished outside and then brought inside. Rebbi says, the words of Rebbi Jehudah are convincing for the stones of the Temple and those of Rebbi Nehemiah for the stones of Solomon’s palace. But since nothing can withstand it, and even when it was put on a stone or a box sheet it would split it and fall down, what did they do to restrain it? One was binding it with wool fibers and put it into a lead cylinder filled with barley bran. That is what is written: “He enjoys robbing the strong.”
HALAKHAH: “If somebody eats at his father-in-law’s,” etc. In earlier times they decided on a persecution in Judea because they had a tradition from their forefathers that Jehudah had killed Esaw, as it is written: “Your hand is on your enemies’ neck.” They went and enslaved them and raped their daughters; they decided that a soldier would have sex with her first. They decreed that her husband should come to her when still in her father’s house; for when she knows that her husband’s fear is on her she is drawn after him. But is she not in the end being used for sex by a soldier? She is raped, and a rape victim is permitted to her husband. What did Cohanot do? They were hiding them. Why did they not also hide the daughters of Israel? That becomes talk and the government hears it; then these and those will be taken together. What kind of a sign did they have? The talk of a cook in town: There is a wedding meal, there is a wedding meal; there is light in Beror-Ḥayil: a week for a son, a week for a son. When the persecution ended, the custom did not end. Rebbi Hoshaia’s daughter-in-law was pregnant when she married definitively.
HALAKHAH: “She says, I was injured by wood,” etc. Rebbi Eleazar said, that follows Rebbi Meïr, since Rebbi Meïr said the ketubah of one injured by wood is 200 [zuz]. Rebbi Yose said, we would think to say, when did Rebbi Meïr disagree with those rabbis? If he took her in assuming she was injured by wood. But if he took her in assuming she was a virgin and it turned out she was injured by wood, then even Rebbi Meïr agrees, since we have stated: “She says, I was injured by wood, but he says not so, you were trampled on by a man.” That means, there is a disagreement even if he took her in assuming she was injured by wood and she turned out to have been injured by wood. Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira did not say so, but: She says, I was injured by wood and my ketubah is 200 [zuz]. He says, it is not so, but you were trampled on by a man and you have no claim on me. What are we talking about? If he married her as a virgin and she turns out to have been injured by wood, Rebbi Meïr will agree. If he married her as one injured by wood and she turns out to have been injured by wood, is there a recognizable difference in the opening of the door between wood or man? Rebbi Huna in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira did not say so, but: She says, I was injured by wood and so I stipulated with you, but he says, it is not so, but you were trampled on by a man and there was no stipulation between you and me.
MISHNAH: Rebbi Yose said: It happened that, when a girl was raped while she went to draw water from the spring, Rebbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri said: If most people of the town can marry into the priesthood then she can marry into the priesthood.
Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: He cohabited with her inside of Sepphoris. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Yannai: If he was seen coming out of Sepphoris and he cohabited, the presumption is that he disqualifies since he cohabited there. What about a thoroughfare? Rebbi Jeremiah bar Abba, Rebbi Yose says: By a majority. The force of Rebbi Jeremiah comes from the following which Rebbi Ḥiyya had said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If a wall fell in a dead-end street populated by Gentiles, but where one Jew lived, one digs there because of the Jew; but in a thoroughfare one follows the majority. And what is the interpretation of what Rebbi Abba said in the name of Rebbi Yannai, if he was seen coming out of Sepphoris and he cohabited, the presumption is that he is disqualified since he cohabited there? In the opinion of Rebbi Jeremiah, if one saw him coming out of a house. In the opinion of Rebbi Yose, even in a thoroughfare. If Sepphoris was locked. Rebbi Yose says, until there is proof. But here, Rebbi Yose says, by a majority! The force of Rebbi Yose comes from the following, which Rebbi Ze‘ira had said: Rebbi [Ḥiyya] (Yose) in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If his [box] (bread) was exchanged at the miller’s, if it was established that an am haäreẓ gave [grain] to be milled there that day, he has to worry; otherwise, he does not have to worry. Should he not worry? What is the difference between this and the Saracens? Was it not stated: “If a group of Saracens one day provisioned themselves from forbidden supplies, then that day becomes a proof for all days.” It is impossible for Saracens not to supply themselves. But here it was not established that the am haäreẓ was milling there that day. And here, I am saying that the disqualified person went to draw water only that day, and one has to worry. And here, Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: He cohabited with her inside of Sepphoris. And here, Rebbi Abba said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: If he was seen coming out of Sepphoris and he cohabited, the presumption is that he is disqualified since he cohabited there.
Should one follow the majority, and most women are married as virgins. Say then that she was married as a virgin! This implies that in criminal cases and in money matters one does not apply a majority argument. There, we have stated: “If an ox gored a cow and one finds her fetus beside her.” Do most cows have miscarriages? Say therefore that the goring induced the miscarriage. Rebbi Abbahu said, this implies that in criminal cases and in money matters one does not apply a majority argument. Rebbi Abun said, in one case they applied a majority argument, as Rebbi Aḥa stated: If a camel was in heat among camels and one finds one of them dead, I am saying that the one in heat bit it.
“In the following cases, one is trustworthy to testify as an adult about what he saw in his minority,” etc. They are only trustworthy as adults about what they saw as minors; therefore, not as minors! There, we have stated: “A woman or a minor are trustworthy when they said, from there a swarm of bees left. He then can enter another’s field and take his swarm.” And here, you say so? Rebbi Aḥa, Rebbi Ḥananiah in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Rebbi Joḥanan ben Beroqa said this only about a swarm of bees because taking it is not robbery by biblical standards. Rav Oshaiah stated, only if it is swarming. But not if it clings to a branch. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Mana: Is that not reasonable only when it happens, but not after some time? He said to him, I agree. And we have stated: When is this said? When they testified to what they said. But if they left and came back, I am saying that they speak out of fear or were seduced.
HALAKHAH: “The following adolescent girls,” etc. It is written: “She should be his wife,” one who can be his wife. Can the bastard girl be his wife? Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, “he should weigh silver appropriate for the bride-price of virgins”, that added many virgins. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, if it had said “virgin’s brides-prices”; but it says only “appropriate for the bride-price of virgins”; the verse added them only for the bride-price. But where was this said? As Ḥizqiah stated: “If refusing her father should refuse,” not only if her father refuses; from where even if from Heaven they refuse? The verse says “refusing should refuse”, in any case. But then a man who has intercourse with a slave girl should pay the fine! This is impossible, as it was stated: I could think that one who has intercourse with a Gentile slave-girl should be obligated, the verse says, “by bride-money he should take her as a wife to himself.” Only one whom he can marry; this excludes the Gentile slave whom he cannot marry. But he cannot marry his sister and he pays the fine! There is a difference since she can be married to others. But his daughter can be married to others and he does not pay the fine! There is a difference since it is a capital crime and nobody who commits a capital crime pays money.
Rebbi Mana said before Rebbi Yose: If it is so, he who sleeps with his minor sister should be flogged and have to pay since if he sleeps with his adult sister he is flogged. He reversed himself and said, there death and payment fall on him simultaneously. But here, when he muzzled he is subject to flogging but only later for payment. Rebbi Ze‘ira objected before Rebbi Mana: He who sets fire to his neighbor’s grain stack on the Sabbath is subject to capital punishment from the first ear but only later for payment! One cannot say that because for every single ear there is cautioning for the death penalty. Here also, for every moment of muzzling there is cautioning for flogging. Rebbi Yose bar Abun said, two Amoraïm. One said, if he muzzled for heave which is Temple property. The other one said, if he muzzled through an agent. Then the agent is flogged and he is free (Lev. 17:4): “As a blood guilt it will be charged on this man,” not on his employers.
According to Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, what is between these Tannaïm and those rabbis? Prohibitions without extirpation. Rebbi Judan said, he who sleeps with a bastard girl is between them. Rebbi Ḥananiah said, he who puts fire to the grain stack of his neighbor on a holiday is between them. These Tannaïm think, since there is no extirpation, he pays. Those rabbis think, since there is flogging he does not pay. But then “these are the adolescent girls who can claim a fine” cannot follow the rabbis! Rebbi Mattaniah said, explain it according to everybody if it refers to a bastard male who sleeps with a bastard girl.
HALAKHAH: “The one who comes to his daughter,” etc. If another man had come to her, would the fine not be her father’s? Explain it that another man came to her before her father died and then her father died. That follows Rebbi Yose the Galilean. But following Rebbi Aqiba, she collects a fine and the fine is hers.
If he came to her before she was preliminarily married, then she was preliminarily married and divorced. Does the statement of Rebbi Aḥai not imply that he pays? Did we not state: “For he had mistreated her,” to include the orphan for the fine, the words of Rebbi Yose the Galilean. Rebbi Aḥai said, explain it that he came to her before her father died; when subsequently her father died he already was obligated to give to her father. One came to her before her father died and subsequently her father died; one came to her before she was preliminarily married, subsequently she was divorced. Rebbi Ze‘ira said that Rav Ḥisda asked: If one came to her before she was married and then she was married? Since you say there, she is under her husband but he has to pay to her father, so in this case she is under her husband but he has to pay to her father.
If he came to her before she was preliminarily married, then she was preliminarily married and divorced. Does the statement of Rebbi Aḥai not imply that he pays? Did we not state: “For he had mistreated her,” to include the orphan for the fine, the words of Rebbi Yose the Galilean. Rebbi Aḥai said, explain it that he came to her before her father died; when subsequently her father died he already was obligated to give to her father. One came to her before her father died and subsequently her father died; one came to her before she was preliminarily married, subsequently she was divorced. Rebbi Ze‘ira said that Rav Ḥisda asked: If one came to her before she was married and then she was married? Since you say there, she is under her husband but he has to pay to her father, so in this case she is under her husband but he has to pay to her father.
HALAKHAH: “How does he drink from his pot,” etc. Rebbi Jeremiah, Rebbi Ḥiyya, in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: It should not have said “she shall be his wife” for the calumniator; it is superfluous since she already is his! Why does the verse say, “she shall be his wife”? You should infer from this by an equal cut. One has to infer from “she shall be his wife”, “she shall be his”. Since “she shall be his” which is said there means a wife appropriate for him, so “she shall be his” which is said here means a wife appropriate for him. Then since “she shall be his” which is said there means a wife appropriate for him and he pays the fine, so “she shall be his” which is said here means a wife appropriate for him and he pays the fine. Rebbi Ze‘ira, Ulla [ben] Ismael, in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: It should not have said “she shall be his wife” for the calumniator; it is superfluous since she already is his! Why does the verse say, “she shall be his wife”? You should infer from this by an equal cut. One has to infer from “she shall be his wife”, “she shall be his”. Since “she shall be” which is said there means that if he divorced her one tells him to take her back, so “she shall be his” which is said here means that if he divorced her one tells him to take her back. Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: “In the cases of both the rapist and the calumniator who divorced, one forces them to take back. If they were Cohanim they absorb the forty.”
As it was stated: “Living married to a husband,” that includes one who had received her husband in her father’s house while preliminarily married; the one who comes after him is strangled. Not only a regular intercourse but even perverse. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan; it is necessary to mention perverse intercourse for if it were regular, why mention her husband? As we have stated: If she was raped by two men, the first is stoned, the second strangled. The preliminarily married adolescent girl. If ten men came upon her perversely and then one regularly, they are all stoned. If they all come upon her regularly, the first is stoned and the remainder strangled. If ten men “touched” her and then one penetrated, they are all stoned. If they all penetrated, the first is stoned and the remainder strangled. A single girl. If ten men came upon her perversely and then one regularly, they all pay the fine. If they all come upon her regularly, the first is stoned and the remainder is free. If she chose one of them, the others were freed from the prohibition. If she said, he is impossible, she repeatedly chooses. If he was married to her sister, he already is freed. If she died, he is freed. If he died, one does not force the levir.
As it was stated: “Living married to a husband,” that includes one who had received her husband in her father’s house while preliminarily married; the one who comes after him is strangled. Not only a regular intercourse but even perverse. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan; it is necessary to mention perverse intercourse for if it were regular, why mention her husband? As we have stated: If she was raped by two men, the first is stoned, the second strangled. The preliminarily married adolescent girl. If ten men came upon her perversely and then one regularly, they are all stoned. If they all come upon her regularly, the first is stoned and the remainder strangled. If ten men “touched” her and then one penetrated, they are all stoned. If they all penetrated, the first is stoned and the remainder strangled. A single girl. If ten men came upon her perversely and then one regularly, they all pay the fine. If they all come upon her regularly, the first is stoned and the remainder is free. If she chose one of them, the others were freed from the prohibition. If she said, he is impossible, she repeatedly chooses. If he was married to her sister, he already is freed. If she died, he is freed. If he died, one does not force the levir.
As it was stated: “Living married to a husband,” that includes one who had received her husband in her father’s house while preliminarily married; the one who comes after him is strangled. Not only a regular intercourse but even perverse. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan; it is necessary to mention perverse intercourse for if it were regular, why mention her husband? As we have stated: If she was raped by two men, the first is stoned, the second strangled. The preliminarily married adolescent girl. If ten men came upon her perversely and then one regularly, they are all stoned. If they all come upon her regularly, the first is stoned and the remainder strangled. If ten men “touched” her and then one penetrated, they are all stoned. If they all penetrated, the first is stoned and the remainder strangled. A single girl. If ten men came upon her perversely and then one regularly, they all pay the fine. If they all come upon her regularly, the first is stoned and the remainder is free. If she chose one of them, the others were freed from the prohibition. If she said, he is impossible, she repeatedly chooses. If he was married to her sister, he already is freed. If she died, he is freed. If he died, one does not force the levir.
HALAKHAH: “About an orphan girl who had been preliminarily married and was divorced,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said, it turns out that Rebbi Eleazar follows the opinion of his teacher Rebbi Aqiba. Just as Rebbi Aqiba said that she can collect the fine and it belongs to her, so Rebbi Eleazar said that she can collect the fine and it belongs to her. Then also for a seduced one? Rebbi Jeremiah said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar, explain it that she remitted it to him. Can anybody remit anthing that does not belong to him? Explain it for an orphan; as it was stated in the House of Rebbi thus: The orphan, Rebbi Eleazar said that the rapist has to pay her but the seducer does not. Can anybody remit something which is not in his possession? Let us hear from the following, as Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya said in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ura: The fine is not due from the first moment on. As we have stated there: “If she came to court before her father died, [the payments due] belong to her father and if the father died they belong to the brothers.” If you say that the fine is due from the first moment, it would belong to the brothers from the first moment! Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav Ḥisda: The Mishnah deals with shame and diminution of value. As Rebbi Mana said, how is it? The rapist is obligated for everything and the seducer is free from everything. Rebbi Abin said, [Rebbi] Shammai asked: What does it mean that the rapist has to pay but the seducer does not? The rapist has to pay everything but the seducer is free [from paying] for shame and diminution of value but is obligated for the fine. That is Rebbi Aqiba’s. Or, the rapist is free [from paying] for shame and diminution of value but is obligated for the fine but the seducer is free from everything? That is Rebbi Yose the Galilean’s.
Jacob bar Abba asked before Rav: What is the law for him who comes to a minor? He said to him, by stoning. What is the law for him who comes to an adult? He said to him, I am reading “an adolescent”, not an adult. Read “an adolescent”, not a minor! “‘Because he mistreated her’, that includes a minor for a fine”, read ‘because he mistreaded her’, that includes an adult for a fine! Rav said, even though Jacob won the logical argument, practice is that he who comes to a minor is [punished] by stoning but she is free. Rebbi Abin in the name of Samuel: Why? He understood it from the following: “The man who had lain with her alone should die.” Did we not know that “the girl has not committed a capital crime”? Then why does the verse say: “Do not do anything to the girl, the girl has not committed a capital crime”? That includes him who comes to a preliminarily married underage girl that he is stoned and she is free.
HALAKHAH: “One who says, I seduced X’s daughter,” etc. Rebbi Isaac asked: Would he have to pay the slave’s value on his own testimony? What is his problem? Are the entire 30 [šeqel] a fine or is only the excess over his value a fine? If you say, the entire 30 [šeqel] are a fine, he does not pay. If you say, the excess over his value is a fine, he pays. There, we have stated: “‘Your ox killed my slave’! The other said, ‘he did not kill’. ‘I want you to swear’ and he said ‘Amen’, he is free.” Rebbi Ḥaggai said before Rebbi Yose, explain it if he killed a slave afflicted with boils. He said to him, what does it say afterwards? “‘Your ox killed my son’! The other said, ‘he did not kill’. ‘I want you to swear’ and he said ‘Amen’, he is obligated.” Why do you not explain it that he was afflicted with boils, then he would be free. Rebbi Ḥaggai said before Rebbi Yose, explain it following him who says “he shall pay the redemption of his person”, the one’s who caused the damage. He said to him, if following him who says “he shall pay the redemption of his person”, the one’s who caused the damage, everything is a fine. Can one say to him, be also in the clear with Heaven? Let us hear from the following: It happened that Rabban Gamliel knocked out his slave Tebi’s tooth. He came to Rebbi Joshua and said to him, I found a reason to free my slave Tebi. He said to him, what do you have in your hand? Fines can be imposed only by witnesses! Could they not say to him, do your duty before Heaven? That means one does not tell him, do your duty before Heaven! Rebbi Gamliel ben Avina asked before Rebbi Mana: Does Rabban Gamliel follow him who said, it is permitted to manumit? He said to him, the story in itself implies that it is forbidden to manumit since, otherwise, he could have freed him immediately!
Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rav Hamnuna in the name of Rav Ada bar Aḥawa: She cannot be executed unless she is an adolescent at the time of the execution. What is the reason? “They shall execute the adolescent at her father’s door.” But did not Rebbi Ḥiyya state: If she whored in her father’s house and [the husband] calumniated her after she became an adult, he is not flogged nor does he pay 100 tetradrachmas but either she or the witnesses are executed by stoning. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav Ada bar Aḥawa: “If he escaped after being sentenced and then his pubic hair grew fully.” There, you can say “they shall execute the adolescent” who whored; can you say here “they shall execute him”, the son?
Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish in the name of Rebbi Jehudah ben Ḥananiah: They voted in Usha that if one writes all his property over to his sons, he and his wife are supported by them. What is the situation of underage children? Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah, but some say it in the name of Rebbi Judah ben Ḥanina: He, his wife and his underage children are supported by them. What about his widow? Rebbi Ze‘ira said, this was asked but not resolved. Rebbi Abba bar Mamal said, it was asked and resolved, Rebbi Abba said, it seems reasonable that if she ate during her husband’s lifetime then she eats; otherwise, she does not eat. It says only “if one writes”; that excludes the seller. If he wrote to his sons and sold to others, what is here reasonable? Rebbi Ḥanina said, I would not give him anything. Rebbi Mana: Is it not reasonable that they hire him a servant and marry a wife to him so she should serve him?
““And you shall dwell in my house”. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: If he slept with her when she still was in her father’s house, did he then activate all ketubah stipulations or is that only by definitive marriage? Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: If she renounced her ketubah, what is the situation? She renounced her rights but not those of her children.
HALAKHAH: “One gives a virgin twelve months.” It was stated: Adulthood in its time is twelve months. Rebbi Hila said, state: One gives an adult twelve months and one gives her a preliminary wedding, and thirty days to a widow. We have stated: “One gives a virgin twelve months,” and you say so? Rebbi Abin in the name of Rebbi Hila: After she was an adult for twelve months one gives her the preliminary marriage and afterwards thirty days. If she spent twelve months for the first and then the second one came. If he says to her, did you not wait already? She can say to him, I love you better than the young one. He is a widower, she is a virgin, and he wants to definitively marry. She can say, I love you better than a bachelor. If he is a bachelor and she a widow, and she wants to be definitively married. He can say, I love you better than a virgin. If she is underage and wants to grow up one listens to her.
Following Rebbi Eliezer, how far can he deduct? Let us hear from the following: Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: One writes a bill of rebellion for the husband of a preliminarily married woman, or a sick one, a menstruating woman or one who is waiting for her levir. Where do we hold? If she rebelled against him when she was having her period, the Torah made her rebel against him! But we must hold that she rebelled against him before she had her period and now she has it. At that moment she would not be able to rebel but you say one writes, therefore one also deducts. From where does one deduct? From the additions to her ketubah. Let us hear from the following: “Rebbi Yose says, he continues to reduce, for maybe an inheritance will come to her from outside and he would be able to collect from it.” He mentioned only inheritance, which is infrequent. That means he deducts from the additions to he ketubah. Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Samuel: One writes a bill of rebellion for a preliminarily married woman, but one does not write a bill of rebellion for one who is waiting for her levir. But did not Rebbi Ḥiyya state that one writes a bill of rebellion on the ketubah of a menstruating woman or a sick one, a preliminarily married woman or one who is waiting for her levir? There, according to the first Mishnah, here according to the later Mishnah. Rebbi Yose bar Abun said, even if you say according to the later Mishnah, ”the later Court [instituted that] one warns her for four weeks, then she writes a receipt for her ketubah and leaves.”
Rebbi Ze‘ira asked Rav Naḥman bar Jacob and Rav Ammi bar Pappai, who is the Tanna of “a tenth of the estate”? Rebbi Ze‘ura said to him in the name of Rav Jeremiah: A tenth of the estate following Rebbi. They asked before Rebbi: If there were ten daughters. Then if the first one took a tenth of the estate, the second took a tenth of the estate, the third, the fourth, the fifth, and so on up to the tenth, there is nothing left for the son! He said to them: The first one takes a tenth of the estate and leaves; the second takes a tenth of the remainder, the third from what then is left, the fourth of what then is left, up to the tenth from what then is left. It turns out that the daughters take two thirds less a little, and the son takes one third plus a little.
Rebbi Ze‘ira asked Rav Naḥman bar Jacob and Rav Ammi bar Pappai, who is the Tanna of “a tenth of the estate”? Rebbi Ze‘ura said to him in the name of Rav Jeremiah: A tenth of the estate following Rebbi. They asked before Rebbi: If there were ten daughters. Then if the first one took a tenth of the estate, the second took a tenth of the estate, the third, the fourth, the fifth, and so on up to the tenth, there is nothing left for the son! He said to them: The first one takes a tenth of the estate and leaves; the second takes a tenth of the remainder, the third from what then is left, the fourth of what then is left, up to the tenth from what then is left. It turns out that the daughters take two thirds less a little, and the son takes one third plus a little.
Rebbi Ze‘ira asked Rav Naḥman bar Jacob and Rav Ammi bar Pappai, who is the Tanna of “a tenth of the estate”? Rebbi Ze‘ura said to him in the name of Rav Jeremiah: A tenth of the estate following Rebbi. They asked before Rebbi: If there were ten daughters. Then if the first one took a tenth of the estate, the second took a tenth of the estate, the third, the fourth, the fifth, and so on up to the tenth, there is nothing left for the son! He said to them: The first one takes a tenth of the estate and leaves; the second takes a tenth of the remainder, the third from what then is left, the fourth of what then is left, up to the tenth from what then is left. It turns out that the daughters take two thirds less a little, and the son takes one third plus a little.
Rebbi Ze‘ira asked Rav Naḥman bar Jacob and Rav Ammi bar Pappai, who is the Tanna of “a tenth of the estate”? Rebbi Ze‘ura said to him in the name of Rav Jeremiah: A tenth of the estate following Rebbi. They asked before Rebbi: If there were ten daughters. Then if the first one took a tenth of the estate, the second took a tenth of the estate, the third, the fourth, the fifth, and so on up to the tenth, there is nothing left for the son! He said to them: The first one takes a tenth of the estate and leaves; the second takes a tenth of the remainder, the third from what then is left, the fourth of what then is left, up to the tenth from what then is left. It turns out that the daughters take two thirds less a little, and the son takes one third plus a little.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody makes a vow that his wife should not have any usufruct from him,” etc. There, we have stated: “If somebody by a vow bars his wife from sexual intercourse,” and here you say so? There, he makes a vow to separate her from his body, but here he makes a vow to separate her from his property. But can anybody make a vow not to pay his debt? Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, since in the future he will divorce her, pay her the ketubah, and stop her food supply, it is as if there was no debt. Why could she not sit there and wait; if he divorced her everything would be in order, otherwise let him provide her with food? It follows him who said that the wife’s food is not from words of the Torah, as it was stated: The court will not determine food for the wife from Sabbatical money, but she may be given Sabbatical produce to eat at her husband’s. Then should she not be considered as a worker not worth a peruṭah? This proves that she is not considered as a worker not worth a peruṭah.
He could appoint a provider, as the following: “X is forbidden any profit from me by a vow and I do not know what to do.” Let him appoint a provider! A woman has the right to say, it is impossible for me to be provided for by anybody other than my husband. But did we not state: “If somebody provides for his wife through a third party.” There, if she accepted it; here, if she did not accept it. If she did not accept it then he should not appoint even for one day! She continues with him for one month, perhaps he will find an opening for his vow. Samuel says, if he vowed for thirty days. But if he vowed forever, he shall divorce immediately and pay the ketubah. Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rebbi Avina in the name of Rav: Even if he vowed forever, she continues with him for one month, perhaps he will find an opening for his vow.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody performed the preliminary marriage with a woman on condition that she had no obligation of vows on her,” etc. “If she had bodily defects, as long as she is in her father’s house,” etc. We have stated defects. Which vows? Rebbi Joḥanan said in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Yoṣadaq: If she vowed not to eat, or not to drink wine, or not to wear dyed garments. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, the fine linen garments which come from Bet She‘an have the status of dyed garments. Rebbi Yose said, the Mishnah deals with the case that he said to her, “on condition that you have no obligation of vows on you.” But if he said, “on condition that you have no obligation of any vow on you,” then even if she made a vow not to eat carob fruit it is a vow.
“If she went to an Elder and her dissolved her vow, she is preliminarily married. To a doctor and he healed her, she is not preliminarily married.” What is the difference between the Elder and the doctor? The elder uproots the vow from its start; the doctor heals only for the future. Some Tannaïm state: Even if she went to an Elder and her dissolved her vow, she is not preliminarily married. The baraita follows Rebbi Eleazar, as we have stated there: “Rebbi Eleazar said, they forbade this only because of the other.” What is the reason of Rebbi Eleazar? It would have been logical about a vow which has to be investigated by a Sage … because a vow which does not have to be investigated by a Sage. Some Tannaïm state: She is allowed to marry without a bill of divorce. Some Tannaïm state: She is forbidden to marry without a bill of divorce. They wanted to say that he who says, she is allowed to marry without a bill of divorce, is Rebbi Eleazar, and he who says, she is forbidden to marry without a bill of divorce, are the rabbis. Everything follows the rabbis. He who says, she is allowed to marry without a bill of divorce: Since she knows that if she went to an Elder, he would dissolve her vow, since she does not go therefore she can be married without a bill of divorce. But he who says, she is forbidden to marry without a bill of divorce, that she should not go to an Elder who would dissolve her vow, then the preliminary marriage would become retroactively valid for her and it would turn out that her children become bastards. Therefore she is forbidden to marry without a bill of divorce.
HALAKHAH: “If she inherited after she was definitively married,” etc. We did state: She may sell or give away and it is valid. Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: She should not sell or give away, but if she sold or gave away it is valid. ”Rebbi Ḥanina ben Aqiba said, that is not what Rabban Gamliel gave as answer, but the following was his argument: No, if you have an argument about a preliminarily married one, where he has rights neither to what she finds, nor to her handiwork, nor to dissolve her vows, what can you say about a definitively married one where he has rights to what she finds, to her handiwork, and to dissolve her vows? Let the proof be the case of one who [inherited] before the definitive marriage and then was definitively married, in which case he has rights to what she finds, to her handiwork, and to dissolve her vows, and you admit to us that she should not sell or give away. He said to them, I agree that she should not sell or give away, but if she sold or gave away it is valid..” There came a case before Rebbi Immi. He said, is not Rabban Gamliel’s an isolated opinion? One cannot rely on it. A baraita supports him and disagrees with him: ”Our teachers took up the case again, voted, and instructed about property which she inherited before the definitive marriage and then was definitively married, that she should not sell or give away, and if she sold or gave away it is invalid.” It disagrees that the sale is invalid. It agrees that our teachers took up the case again, instructed, and voted. Before they voted, they did not disagree with him.
HALAKHAH: “If she inherited after she was definitively married,” etc. We did state: She may sell or give away and it is valid. Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: She should not sell or give away, but if she sold or gave away it is valid. ”Rebbi Ḥanina ben Aqiba said, that is not what Rabban Gamliel gave as answer, but the following was his argument: No, if you have an argument about a preliminarily married one, where he has rights neither to what she finds, nor to her handiwork, nor to dissolve her vows, what can you say about a definitively married one where he has rights to what she finds, to her handiwork, and to dissolve her vows? Let the proof be the case of one who [inherited] before the definitive marriage and then was definitively married, in which case he has rights to what she finds, to her handiwork, and to dissolve her vows, and you admit to us that she should not sell or give away. He said to them, I agree that she should not sell or give away, but if she sold or gave away it is valid..” There came a case before Rebbi Immi. He said, is not Rabban Gamliel’s an isolated opinion? One cannot rely on it. A baraita supports him and disagrees with him: ”Our teachers took up the case again, voted, and instructed about property which she inherited before the definitive marriage and then was definitively married, that she should not sell or give away, and if she sold or gave away it is invalid.” It disagrees that the sale is invalid. It agrees that our teachers took up the case again, instructed, and voted. Before they voted, they did not disagree with him.
In earlier times, her ketubah was deposited with her family; then it was easy for him to divorce her. They then instituted that her ketubah had to be deposited with her husband; even so it was easy for him to divorce her. Then they instituted that a man should buy with his wife’s ketubah cups, plates, and bowls; that is what we did state: “He should not say to her ‘here your ketubah is lying on the table’ but all his properties are pledged for her ketubah.” Finally they instituted that a person should use his wife’s ketubah in business, then because he uses his wife’s ketubah in his business dealings he loses track of it and it becomes difficult for him to divorce her.
In earlier times, her ketubah was deposited with her family; then it was easy for him to divorce her. They then instituted that her ketubah had to be deposited with her husband; even so it was easy for him to divorce her. Then they instituted that a man should buy with his wife’s ketubah cups, plates, and bowls; that is what we did state: “He should not say to her ‘here your ketubah is lying on the table’ but all his properties are pledged for her ketubah.” Finally they instituted that a person should use his wife’s ketubah in business, then because he uses his wife’s ketubah in his business dealings he loses track of it and it becomes difficult for him to divorce her.
In earlier times, her ketubah was deposited with her family; then it was easy for him to divorce her. They then instituted that her ketubah had to be deposited with her husband; even so it was easy for him to divorce her. Then they instituted that a man should buy with his wife’s ketubah cups, plates, and bowls; that is what we did state: “He should not say to her ‘here your ketubah is lying on the table’ but all his properties are pledged for her ketubah.” Finally they instituted that a person should use his wife’s ketubah in business, then because he uses his wife’s ketubah in his business dealings he loses track of it and it becomes difficult for him to divorce her.
In earlier times, her ketubah was deposited with her family; then it was easy for him to divorce her. They then instituted that her ketubah had to be deposited with her husband; even so it was easy for him to divorce her. Then they instituted that a man should buy with his wife’s ketubah cups, plates, and bowls; that is what we did state: “He should not say to her ‘here your ketubah is lying on the table’ but all his properties are pledged for her ketubah.” Finally they instituted that a person should use his wife’s ketubah in business, then because he uses his wife’s ketubah in his business dealings he loses track of it and it becomes difficult for him to divorce her.
Rebbi Hillel bar Pazi asked before Rebbi Yose: If he sold and then she died? He said to him, his sale is invalid; it is as if a son sold during his father’s lifetime and then the father died. If she sold and then he died? He said to him, her sale is valid; it is as if a father sold during his son’s lifetime and then the son died. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Marius asked before Rebbi Jonah: What is the situation if she sold to her husband? He said, since Ḥizqiah said, practice follows Rebbi Judah, this implies that her sale is a sale. It was stated: “If somebody says, my property should be given to X, if X died to Y, [if Y died to Z]. If the first one died the properties should be given to the second, if the second died they should be given to the third. If the second one died during the first’s lifetime; since the second never acquired them, the third cannot acquire them.” He said to him, so did Rebbi Hoshaia, the father of the Mishnah, explain: After him to X, after him to Y; it is as if stated: if the third died during the second’s lifetime, since the second one did not acquire his heirs cannot acquire, one really could say: After him to X, after him to Y. It was stated: “Rebbi says, the first one may sell the real estate and buy movables. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, he has only the usufruct.” Ḥizqiah said, practice follows Rebbi. Rebbi Mana said, since Ḥizqiah said, practice follows Rebbi, that implies that he cannot dispose of it by a death-bed will. So said Rebbi Mana before Rebbi Yose: Since this woman’s upkeep is her husband’s responsibility, is it not like a gift of sick persons? He said to him, her upkeep is what is necessary for her: food, oil, and salt. But she wants to sell and buy chickens. This means that if the first one wanted to sell and buy chickens, he may sell. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, her burial is equal to her upkeep. Since you said there, he may sell real estate and buy food, so he may sell real estate and buy a burial.
Rebbi Hillel bar Pazi asked before Rebbi Yose: If he sold and then she died? He said to him, his sale is invalid; it is as if a son sold during his father’s lifetime and then the father died. If she sold and then he died? He said to him, her sale is valid; it is as if a father sold during his son’s lifetime and then the son died. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Marius asked before Rebbi Jonah: What is the situation if she sold to her husband? He said, since Ḥizqiah said, practice follows Rebbi Judah, this implies that her sale is a sale. It was stated: “If somebody says, my property should be given to X, if X died to Y, [if Y died to Z]. If the first one died the properties should be given to the second, if the second died they should be given to the third. If the second one died during the first’s lifetime; since the second never acquired them, the third cannot acquire them.” He said to him, so did Rebbi Hoshaia, the father of the Mishnah, explain: After him to X, after him to Y; it is as if stated: if the third died during the second’s lifetime, since the second one did not acquire his heirs cannot acquire, one really could say: After him to X, after him to Y. It was stated: “Rebbi says, the first one may sell the real estate and buy movables. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, he has only the usufruct.” Ḥizqiah said, practice follows Rebbi. Rebbi Mana said, since Ḥizqiah said, practice follows Rebbi, that implies that he cannot dispose of it by a death-bed will. So said Rebbi Mana before Rebbi Yose: Since this woman’s upkeep is her husband’s responsibility, is it not like a gift of sick persons? He said to him, her upkeep is what is necessary for her: food, oil, and salt. But she wants to sell and buy chickens. This means that if the first one wanted to sell and buy chickens, he may sell. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, her burial is equal to her upkeep. Since you said there, he may sell real estate and buy food, so he may sell real estate and buy a burial.
Rebbi Hillel bar Pazi asked before Rebbi Yose: If he sold and then she died? He said to him, his sale is invalid; it is as if a son sold during his father’s lifetime and then the father died. If she sold and then he died? He said to him, her sale is valid; it is as if a father sold during his son’s lifetime and then the son died. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Marius asked before Rebbi Jonah: What is the situation if she sold to her husband? He said, since Ḥizqiah said, practice follows Rebbi Judah, this implies that her sale is a sale. It was stated: “If somebody says, my property should be given to X, if X died to Y, [if Y died to Z]. If the first one died the properties should be given to the second, if the second died they should be given to the third. If the second one died during the first’s lifetime; since the second never acquired them, the third cannot acquire them.” He said to him, so did Rebbi Hoshaia, the father of the Mishnah, explain: After him to X, after him to Y; it is as if stated: if the third died during the second’s lifetime, since the second one did not acquire his heirs cannot acquire, one really could say: After him to X, after him to Y. It was stated: “Rebbi says, the first one may sell the real estate and buy movables. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, he has only the usufruct.” Ḥizqiah said, practice follows Rebbi. Rebbi Mana said, since Ḥizqiah said, practice follows Rebbi, that implies that he cannot dispose of it by a death-bed will. So said Rebbi Mana before Rebbi Yose: Since this woman’s upkeep is her husband’s responsibility, is it not like a gift of sick persons? He said to him, her upkeep is what is necessary for her: food, oil, and salt. But she wants to sell and buy chickens. This means that if the first one wanted to sell and buy chickens, he may sell. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, her burial is equal to her upkeep. Since you said there, he may sell real estate and buy food, so he may sell real estate and buy a burial.
Rebbi Hillel bar Pazi asked before Rebbi Yose: If he sold and then she died? He said to him, his sale is invalid; it is as if a son sold during his father’s lifetime and then the father died. If she sold and then he died? He said to him, her sale is valid; it is as if a father sold during his son’s lifetime and then the son died. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Marius asked before Rebbi Jonah: What is the situation if she sold to her husband? He said, since Ḥizqiah said, practice follows Rebbi Judah, this implies that her sale is a sale. It was stated: “If somebody says, my property should be given to X, if X died to Y, [if Y died to Z]. If the first one died the properties should be given to the second, if the second died they should be given to the third. If the second one died during the first’s lifetime; since the second never acquired them, the third cannot acquire them.” He said to him, so did Rebbi Hoshaia, the father of the Mishnah, explain: After him to X, after him to Y; it is as if stated: if the third died during the second’s lifetime, since the second one did not acquire his heirs cannot acquire, one really could say: After him to X, after him to Y. It was stated: “Rebbi says, the first one may sell the real estate and buy movables. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, he has only the usufruct.” Ḥizqiah said, practice follows Rebbi. Rebbi Mana said, since Ḥizqiah said, practice follows Rebbi, that implies that he cannot dispose of it by a death-bed will. So said Rebbi Mana before Rebbi Yose: Since this woman’s upkeep is her husband’s responsibility, is it not like a gift of sick persons? He said to him, her upkeep is what is necessary for her: food, oil, and salt. But she wants to sell and buy chickens. This means that if the first one wanted to sell and buy chickens, he may sell. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, her burial is equal to her upkeep. Since you said there, he may sell real estate and buy food, so he may sell real estate and buy a burial.
That widow took a slave girl. The case came before Rebbi Isaac who said, what she took, she took. Rebbi Immi took her away, for she thought that she was hers but she was not hers. A similar case: The father of the sons of Shammai died and bequeathed a goat to them. The creditor came and took it. The case came before Rebbi Abbahu who said, he took his own property. Did we not state that if either an heir or a creditor came and took, one does [not] remove from his hand; for they thought they were theirs but they were not theirs. Rebbi Jacob bar Zabdi said, Rebbi Abbahu agrees that if they sold it, or gave it as a pledge, or moved it to another place, if then the creditor came and took it one removes it from his possession.
Alexis said before Rebbi Mana: We act much better than you do. We send edicts. If he comes, it is good. If he does not come, we irrevocably give away his properties. He answered him, we also act in this way, we have the herald announce for thirty days. If he comes, it is good. If he does not come, we irrevocably give away his properties. He said to him, think of it, if he was in distant corners. He said to him, we send three letters, one after thirty days, one after the next thirty days, and one after the next thirty days. If he comes, it is good. If he does not come, we irrevocably give away his properties. Rebbi Ḥanina said, that is, if he was present at the trial and then fled. But if he was not present at the trial, we cannot irrevocably give away, but only announce.
Rebbi Ḥanaiah said before Rebbi Mana: Does this not mean that if a person borrows from another, and then he borrows again, he has to declare “in addition to the first paper you have on me”? It is frequent that a woman says, my ketubah is lost, write me another. Is it frequent that a man say, my paper is lost, write me another? But it is possible that he should declare for him.
MISHNAH: If somebody was married to two women when he died, the first one precedes the second, and the heirs of the first precede the heirs of the second. If the first one he had married died, then he married the second one and he himself died, the second and her heirs precede the heirs of the first.
How is that? If he preliminarily married Rachel, definitively married Leah, and only then definitively married Rachel. In the opinion of the rabbis, Rachel has precedence; in the opinion of Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah she does not have precedence. They say, even Rebbi Eleazar will agree that since in the end he definitively married Rachel, Rachel has precedence. To what can this be compared? To one who took out a loan from another person and said to him, if I have not paid it back by twelve months, all my properties shall be mortgaged to you. If the twelfth month arrived and he has not paid back, his properties become mortgaged from that moment on. But if he said, all my properties shall be mortgaged to you only after twelve months, they become mortgaged only after twelve months. The status of the days in between is in dispute between Rebbi Meïr and the rabbis. In Rebbi Meïr’s opinion, the properties became pledged by the document. In the rabbis’ opinion, the properties became pledged by the money.
MISHNAH: If somebody was married to two women who both died, and then he died, and the orphans demand their mothers’ ketubot, if [the estate] is sufficient only for both ketubot they split evenly. If there was an excess denar, these take their mother’s ketubah and those take their mother’s ketubah. If the orphans say, we accept the properties of our father for the value of an extra denar in order to take their mother’s ketubah; one does not listen to them but one appraises the properties in court.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody was married to two women,” etc. That refers to what Rebbi Immi said, that a man should be induced to give generously to his daughter. If that is so, then even if there is no excess denar? Rebbi Abun said, in case you can uphold their words with the words of the Torah, you uphold their words with the words of the Torah. But in case you cannot uphold their words with the words of the Torah, you disregard their words and uphold the words of the Torah.
HALAKHAH: “If the judges estimated one sixth too little or too much,” etc. As you say for a private person, in real estate up to one third, in movables up to one sixth. And similarly, for Temple property, in real estate up to one sixth, in movables up to [one in] twelve. There, we have stated: “The estimation for orphans is thirty days, the estimation for Temple property sixty days, and one publicly announces mornings and evenings.” And why thirty? In order to empower the orphans. Why should they not announce longer? Up to thirty days you empower the orphans, more than that you diminish their power. Why do you not say that for Temple property? Temple property is different because each offer made is firm. Then they should announce forever! If suffices for the Temple that it should be twice that of a private person. Rebbi Yudan said, since you say that Temple property is different because each offer made is firm, this implies that if they find their estimation they do not continue but close the deal.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody marries a woman and had contracted with her,” etc. How does he become indebted to her? Do not Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both say, if somebody writes a debenture for another person under the assumption that he owes him and it turns out that he does not owe, he does not have to give to him! Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, they gave it the status of an addition to the ketubah. Then he should have to pay in the end! They gave it the status of the gift for a woman’s preliminary marriage. Then he should pay up front! They treated it as when one marries a woman preliminarily by promising to give her twelve silver denars within one year by delivering one silver denar’s worth every month.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody marries a woman and had contracted with her,” etc. How does he become indebted to her? Do not Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both say, if somebody writes a debenture for another person under the assumption that he owes him and it turns out that he does not owe, he does not have to give to him! Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, they gave it the status of an addition to the ketubah. Then he should have to pay in the end! They gave it the status of the gift for a woman’s preliminary marriage. Then he should pay up front! They treated it as when one marries a woman preliminarily by promising to give her twelve silver denars within one year by delivering one silver denar’s worth every month.
Rebbi Jonah in the name of Rebbi Ḥama bar Ḥanina: A human’s feet bring him to where he is wanted. It is written (1K. 22:20) “The Eternal said, who will seduce Ahab that he should go and fall in Ramot Gilead?” Might he not die in his house rather than there? Eliḥoref and Aḥiah were two of Solomon’s secretaries. He [Solomon] saw the Angel of Death looking at them and grinding his teeth. He said a word and put them into space. He [the Angel of Death] went and took them from there, then he came laughing before him [Solomon]. He said to him, just before you were grinding your teeth and now you are laughing at us? He said to him, the Merciful told me to take Eliḥoref and Aḥiah from space and I was wondering who would put them there where I was sent to take them; He put it into your mind to do so that I could complete my mission. I went and dealt with them there. The two sons of Rebbi Reuben ben Strobilos were students of Rebbi. He [Rebbi] saw the Angel of Death looking at them and grinding his teeth and said, let us exile them to the South, maybe the exile atones. He [the angel of death] went and took them from there.
Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, not only that she claims, but even if she mentions [her claims], as we have stated there: “If she died, her heirs can mention her ketubah for up to 25 years.” He tells you more: Even if she let 25 years minus one day go by before claiming, and then claimed, one gives her another 25 years.
If somebody together with his wife left for overseas, then she returns and says, my husband died, she shall be supported and collect her ketubah. My husband divorced me, she shall be supported from her ketubah since, as you take it, if she be a married woman, she must be supported from her husband’s; if she is no longer a married woman, she can be supported from her ketubah. “If somebody returns from overseas and his wife requests support but he says, let her earnings cover her sustenance, one listens to him. But if the court had allotted, what they allotted, they have allotted.” Rebbi Jeremiah said, if her earnings are not enough for her support. In this case, does one listen to him? Following him who says, there is no support for the wife in biblical law, as we have stated: “The court will not determine food for a wife from Sabbatical money, but she may be given Sabbatical produce to eat at her husband’s.” Rebbi Yose says, if her earnings are sufficient for her support. In that case, why what they allotted, they have allotted? Explain it, if they allotted excess.
When does one appraise for them? Rebbi Mana said, one appraises at the end. Rebbi Ḥanina said to him, the words of the rabbis imply that one does not listen to you, for Nathan bar Hoshaia asked before Rebbi Joḥanan, if there was sustenance for twelve months but the estate diminished in value? He answered him, since the heirs started to eat with permission, they continue to eat until the last coin is gone! Therefore, one appraises at the start. Rav Ḥisda asked: If there was sustenance for twelve months and then the property increased in value? Let us hear from the following, for Rebbi Ḥanina, Rebbi Yasa said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If the heirs sold, they sold from their own property. So here, if it increased in value, their property value increased. If the estate was not sufficient for twelve months’ sustenance, may the sons say to the daughters, take what is yours and leave! Rebbi Abba said, is that a question? The Mishnah says that they cannot say so to them, as we have stated there: “If the orphans say, we accept the properties of our father for the value of an extra denar in order to take their mother’s ketubah; one does not listen to them but one appraises the properties in court.”
MISHNAH: If somebody obligates himself about money for his son-in-law but then goes bankrupt, she must wait until her hair grows white. Admon says: “If I had obligated myself, I would have to wait until my hair grows white. My father obligated himself, what can I do? Marry definitively or divorce!” Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel said, I am convinced by Admon’s statement.
Rebbi Jeremiah said, both Admon and Rebbi Aqiba said the same thing, as we have stated there: “If he sold them to another person, Rebbi Aqiba said, he does not have to buy access, but the Sages say, he has to buy access.” He had not heard that Rebbi Hila said, Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: They disagree when nothing was mentioned. Where do we hold? If it is obvious that access was included, everybody agrees that he does not have to pay for access. If it is obvious that access was not included, everybody agrees that he has to pay for access. But we must hold that nothing was mentioned. Then Rebbi Aqiba said, he does not have to buy access, but the rabbis say, he has to buy access. But in the case here, even while it is clear that he had access, everybody agrees that he has to pay for access.
HALAKHAH: “If two people mutually produced promissory notes of one on the other,” etc. If one borrowed a mina from the other, but the other borrowed from him 200 [zuz]. Rav Huna said, Rav Naḥman bar Jacob and Rab Sheshet disagree. One says, one counts one mina against the other mina, but the other says, each one collects the amount of his note. He who says, one counts one mina against the other mina, learns it from tame oxen who injured one another, where half of the excess damage is paid. He who says, each one collects the amount of his note, learns it from the Sages and Admon. Can the Sages and Admon not agree that one counts one mina against the other mina? Because we have stated: Admon says: “If I owed you, how come you borrowed from me?” Therefore it was necessary to say, each one collects the amount of his note. If the holder of the note of 200 forgave a mina, but the holder of the note of a mina did not forgive. For him who says, one counts one mina against the other mina, already one mina against the other mina was counted. But for him who says, each one collects the amount of his note, then what he forgave he cannot collect but what was not forgiven he can collect. If the note for 200 was written in a document but the loan for a mina was not written. For him who says, one counts one mina against the other mina, already one mina against the other mina was counted. But for him who says, each one collects the amount of his note, the holder of the written note can collect but the recipient of the oral promise cannot collect.
“ ‘Prohibition’, is an oath. ‘Expression’, is an oath. If you say prohibition is an oath, he is guilty for every single prohibition and for every single oath. If you say prohibition is a kind of oath, he is guilty for this separately and that separately.” “Prohibition is an oath”, and you say “if you say so”? Rebbi Eleazar said, these are two Tannaїm. Rebbi Jeremiah said, it is from one Tanna. If he said it in the language of a vow you catch him in the language of a vow. If he said it in the language of an oath you catch him in the language of an oath. If you say, prohibition is a kind of oath, he is guilty for every single prohibition and for every single oath. Rebbi Yose said, this comes only for five loaves. But for a single loaf, from the moment he mentioned “oath” for it, he made it a cadaver. Furthermore, he may want to have oaths apply to prohibited items, but oaths cannot apply to prohibitited items. Rebbi Ḥananiah said, it applies even to a single loaf. As we have stated, “in that the past is more stringent than the future, if he said I did not eat, I did not eat, he is guilty for every statement; I shall not eat, I shall not eat, he is guilty only once.” Rebbi Yudan said, only if he first mentioned “vow” and then mentioned “oath”. But if he mentioned oath and then vow, vows can apply to prohibitions but oaths cannot apply to prohibitions.
“ ‘Prohibition’, is an oath. ‘Expression’, is an oath. If you say prohibition is an oath, he is guilty for every single prohibition and for every single oath. If you say prohibition is a kind of oath, he is guilty for this separately and that separately.” “Prohibition is an oath”, and you say “if you say so”? Rebbi Eleazar said, these are two Tannaїm. Rebbi Jeremiah said, it is from one Tanna. If he said it in the language of a vow you catch him in the language of a vow. If he said it in the language of an oath you catch him in the language of an oath. If you say, prohibition is a kind of oath, he is guilty for every single prohibition and for every single oath. Rebbi Yose said, this comes only for five loaves. But for a single loaf, from the moment he mentioned “oath” for it, he made it a cadaver. Furthermore, he may want to have oaths apply to prohibited items, but oaths cannot apply to prohibitited items. Rebbi Ḥananiah said, it applies even to a single loaf. As we have stated, “in that the past is more stringent than the future, if he said I did not eat, I did not eat, he is guilty for every statement; I shall not eat, I shall not eat, he is guilty only once.” Rebbi Yudan said, only if he first mentioned “vow” and then mentioned “oath”. But if he mentioned oath and then vow, vows can apply to prohibitions but oaths cannot apply to prohibitions.
“As vows of the wicked, he vowed as nazir, a sacrifice, and an oath.” Samuel said, the Mishnah speaks about several cases, either as nazir, or a sacrifice, or an oath. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, he is a nazir in all three of them. Rebbi Abin said, if somebody wants to explain that of Rebbi Ze‘ira, it is such: There was before him a bunch of grapes and another person came and said, there is an oath on me, then there is an oath on him. Another person came and said, that is qorbān for me, it is qorbān for him. Another person came and said, there is an oath on me, then there is an oath on him. Another person came and said, what these three said is on me, does it not turn out that this one is obligated for qorbān and oath?
“As vows of the wicked, he vowed as nazir, a sacrifice, and an oath.” Samuel said, the Mishnah speaks about several cases, either as nazir, or a sacrifice, or an oath. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, he is a nazir in all three of them. Rebbi Abin said, if somebody wants to explain that of Rebbi Ze‘ira, it is such: There was before him a bunch of grapes and another person came and said, there is an oath on me, then there is an oath on him. Another person came and said, that is qorbān for me, it is qorbān for him. Another person came and said, there is an oath on me, then there is an oath on him. Another person came and said, what these three said is on me, does it not turn out that this one is obligated for qorbān and oath?
“An oath that I shall not sleep for three days,” one whips him and he can sleep immediately. “An oath that I shall not eat for three days,” one waits until he eats and then whips him.
HALAKHAH: “A vow inside a vow is possible,” etc. Rebbi Yose asked: An oath, an oath, an oath that I shall not eat, but he ate? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, let us hear from the following: “An oath that I shall not eat this loaf, an oath that I shall not eat, an oath that I shall not eat. If he ate, he is guilty only once.” Because he said this. Therefore, if he had not said this, he would be guilty for each of the oaths. Avime the brother of Ḥefa said, I studied vows, I studied oaths. Ḥefa wanted to examine him: There were five loaves before him and he said, an oath that I shall not eat this loaf. Then he said, these two loaves. Then he said, these three loaves. Then he said, these four loaves. Then he said, these five loaves. Then he ate the first, what are the rules? He said to him, he is guilty for each [oath] separately. He said to him, he is guilty only once. From the moment he mentioned “oath” about it, he made it like carcass meat. From there on he is as if he wanted to apply oaths to prohibitions, but no oath can be applied to prohibitions. He examined him a second time. There were five loaves and he said, an oath about these five loaves. Then he said, these four. Then he said, these three. Then he said, these two. Then he said, this single one. Then he ate all of them? He said to him, he is guilty only once. He said to him, he is guilty for each [oath] separately. If somebody had said, an oath that I shall not eat five, and he ate four, would he be free from punishment? Rebbi Yose said, it is reasonable following Ḥefa’s brother in the last case, following Ḥefa in the first.
HALAKHAH: “A vow inside a vow is possible,” etc. Rebbi Yose asked: An oath, an oath, an oath that I shall not eat, but he ate? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, let us hear from the following: “An oath that I shall not eat this loaf, an oath that I shall not eat, an oath that I shall not eat. If he ate, he is guilty only once.” Because he said this. Therefore, if he had not said this, he would be guilty for each of the oaths. Avime the brother of Ḥefa said, I studied vows, I studied oaths. Ḥefa wanted to examine him: There were five loaves before him and he said, an oath that I shall not eat this loaf. Then he said, these two loaves. Then he said, these three loaves. Then he said, these four loaves. Then he said, these five loaves. Then he ate the first, what are the rules? He said to him, he is guilty for each [oath] separately. He said to him, he is guilty only once. From the moment he mentioned “oath” about it, he made it like carcass meat. From there on he is as if he wanted to apply oaths to prohibitions, but no oath can be applied to prohibitions. He examined him a second time. There were five loaves and he said, an oath about these five loaves. Then he said, these four. Then he said, these three. Then he said, these two. Then he said, this single one. Then he ate all of them? He said to him, he is guilty only once. He said to him, he is guilty for each [oath] separately. If somebody had said, an oath that I shall not eat five, and he ate four, would he be free from punishment? Rebbi Yose said, it is reasonable following Ḥefa’s brother in the last case, following Ḥefa in the first.
HALAKHAH: “A vow inside a vow is possible,” etc. Rebbi Yose asked: An oath, an oath, an oath that I shall not eat, but he ate? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, let us hear from the following: “An oath that I shall not eat this loaf, an oath that I shall not eat, an oath that I shall not eat. If he ate, he is guilty only once.” Because he said this. Therefore, if he had not said this, he would be guilty for each of the oaths. Avime the brother of Ḥefa said, I studied vows, I studied oaths. Ḥefa wanted to examine him: There were five loaves before him and he said, an oath that I shall not eat this loaf. Then he said, these two loaves. Then he said, these three loaves. Then he said, these four loaves. Then he said, these five loaves. Then he ate the first, what are the rules? He said to him, he is guilty for each [oath] separately. He said to him, he is guilty only once. From the moment he mentioned “oath” about it, he made it like carcass meat. From there on he is as if he wanted to apply oaths to prohibitions, but no oath can be applied to prohibitions. He examined him a second time. There were five loaves and he said, an oath about these five loaves. Then he said, these four. Then he said, these three. Then he said, these two. Then he said, this single one. Then he ate all of them? He said to him, he is guilty only once. He said to him, he is guilty for each [oath] separately. If somebody had said, an oath that I shall not eat five, and he ate four, would he be free from punishment? Rebbi Yose said, it is reasonable following Ḥefa’s brother in the last case, following Ḥefa in the first.
HALAKHAH: “A vow inside a vow is possible,” etc. Rebbi Yose asked: An oath, an oath, an oath that I shall not eat, but he ate? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, let us hear from the following: “An oath that I shall not eat this loaf, an oath that I shall not eat, an oath that I shall not eat. If he ate, he is guilty only once.” Because he said this. Therefore, if he had not said this, he would be guilty for each of the oaths. Avime the brother of Ḥefa said, I studied vows, I studied oaths. Ḥefa wanted to examine him: There were five loaves before him and he said, an oath that I shall not eat this loaf. Then he said, these two loaves. Then he said, these three loaves. Then he said, these four loaves. Then he said, these five loaves. Then he ate the first, what are the rules? He said to him, he is guilty for each [oath] separately. He said to him, he is guilty only once. From the moment he mentioned “oath” about it, he made it like carcass meat. From there on he is as if he wanted to apply oaths to prohibitions, but no oath can be applied to prohibitions. He examined him a second time. There were five loaves and he said, an oath about these five loaves. Then he said, these four. Then he said, these three. Then he said, these two. Then he said, this single one. Then he ate all of them? He said to him, he is guilty only once. He said to him, he is guilty for each [oath] separately. If somebody had said, an oath that I shall not eat five, and he ate four, would he be free from punishment? Rebbi Yose said, it is reasonable following Ḥefa’s brother in the last case, following Ḥefa in the first.
HALAKHAH: “A vow inside a vow is possible,” etc. Rebbi Yose asked: An oath, an oath, an oath that I shall not eat, but he ate? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, let us hear from the following: “An oath that I shall not eat this loaf, an oath that I shall not eat, an oath that I shall not eat. If he ate, he is guilty only once.” Because he said this. Therefore, if he had not said this, he would be guilty for each of the oaths. Avime the brother of Ḥefa said, I studied vows, I studied oaths. Ḥefa wanted to examine him: There were five loaves before him and he said, an oath that I shall not eat this loaf. Then he said, these two loaves. Then he said, these three loaves. Then he said, these four loaves. Then he said, these five loaves. Then he ate the first, what are the rules? He said to him, he is guilty for each [oath] separately. He said to him, he is guilty only once. From the moment he mentioned “oath” about it, he made it like carcass meat. From there on he is as if he wanted to apply oaths to prohibitions, but no oath can be applied to prohibitions. He examined him a second time. There were five loaves and he said, an oath about these five loaves. Then he said, these four. Then he said, these three. Then he said, these two. Then he said, this single one. Then he ate all of them? He said to him, he is guilty only once. He said to him, he is guilty for each [oath] separately. If somebody had said, an oath that I shall not eat five, and he ate four, would he be free from punishment? Rebbi Yose said, it is reasonable following Ḥefa’s brother in the last case, following Ḥefa in the first.
HALAKHAH: “A vow inside a vow is possible,” etc. Rebbi Yose asked: An oath, an oath, an oath that I shall not eat, but he ate? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, let us hear from the following: “An oath that I shall not eat this loaf, an oath that I shall not eat, an oath that I shall not eat. If he ate, he is guilty only once.” Because he said this. Therefore, if he had not said this, he would be guilty for each of the oaths. Avime the brother of Ḥefa said, I studied vows, I studied oaths. Ḥefa wanted to examine him: There were five loaves before him and he said, an oath that I shall not eat this loaf. Then he said, these two loaves. Then he said, these three loaves. Then he said, these four loaves. Then he said, these five loaves. Then he ate the first, what are the rules? He said to him, he is guilty for each [oath] separately. He said to him, he is guilty only once. From the moment he mentioned “oath” about it, he made it like carcass meat. From there on he is as if he wanted to apply oaths to prohibitions, but no oath can be applied to prohibitions. He examined him a second time. There were five loaves and he said, an oath about these five loaves. Then he said, these four. Then he said, these three. Then he said, these two. Then he said, this single one. Then he ate all of them? He said to him, he is guilty only once. He said to him, he is guilty for each [oath] separately. If somebody had said, an oath that I shall not eat five, and he ate four, would he be free from punishment? Rebbi Yose said, it is reasonable following Ḥefa’s brother in the last case, following Ḥefa in the first.
HALAKHAH: “A vow inside a vow is possible,” etc. Rebbi Yose asked: An oath, an oath, an oath that I shall not eat, but he ate? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, let us hear from the following: “An oath that I shall not eat this loaf, an oath that I shall not eat, an oath that I shall not eat. If he ate, he is guilty only once.” Because he said this. Therefore, if he had not said this, he would be guilty for each of the oaths. Avime the brother of Ḥefa said, I studied vows, I studied oaths. Ḥefa wanted to examine him: There were five loaves before him and he said, an oath that I shall not eat this loaf. Then he said, these two loaves. Then he said, these three loaves. Then he said, these four loaves. Then he said, these five loaves. Then he ate the first, what are the rules? He said to him, he is guilty for each [oath] separately. He said to him, he is guilty only once. From the moment he mentioned “oath” about it, he made it like carcass meat. From there on he is as if he wanted to apply oaths to prohibitions, but no oath can be applied to prohibitions. He examined him a second time. There were five loaves and he said, an oath about these five loaves. Then he said, these four. Then he said, these three. Then he said, these two. Then he said, this single one. Then he ate all of them? He said to him, he is guilty only once. He said to him, he is guilty for each [oath] separately. If somebody had said, an oath that I shall not eat five, and he ate four, would he be free from punishment? Rebbi Yose said, it is reasonable following Ḥefa’s brother in the last case, following Ḥefa in the first.
HALAKHAH: “A vow inside a vow is possible,” etc. Rebbi Yose asked: An oath, an oath, an oath that I shall not eat, but he ate? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, let us hear from the following: “An oath that I shall not eat this loaf, an oath that I shall not eat, an oath that I shall not eat. If he ate, he is guilty only once.” Because he said this. Therefore, if he had not said this, he would be guilty for each of the oaths. Avime the brother of Ḥefa said, I studied vows, I studied oaths. Ḥefa wanted to examine him: There were five loaves before him and he said, an oath that I shall not eat this loaf. Then he said, these two loaves. Then he said, these three loaves. Then he said, these four loaves. Then he said, these five loaves. Then he ate the first, what are the rules? He said to him, he is guilty for each [oath] separately. He said to him, he is guilty only once. From the moment he mentioned “oath” about it, he made it like carcass meat. From there on he is as if he wanted to apply oaths to prohibitions, but no oath can be applied to prohibitions. He examined him a second time. There were five loaves and he said, an oath about these five loaves. Then he said, these four. Then he said, these three. Then he said, these two. Then he said, this single one. Then he ate all of them? He said to him, he is guilty only once. He said to him, he is guilty for each [oath] separately. If somebody had said, an oath that I shall not eat five, and he ate four, would he be free from punishment? Rebbi Yose said, it is reasonable following Ḥefa’s brother in the last case, following Ḥefa in the first.
HALAKHAH: “A vow inside a vow is possible,” etc. Rebbi Yose asked: An oath, an oath, an oath that I shall not eat, but he ate? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, let us hear from the following: “An oath that I shall not eat this loaf, an oath that I shall not eat, an oath that I shall not eat. If he ate, he is guilty only once.” Because he said this. Therefore, if he had not said this, he would be guilty for each of the oaths. Avime the brother of Ḥefa said, I studied vows, I studied oaths. Ḥefa wanted to examine him: There were five loaves before him and he said, an oath that I shall not eat this loaf. Then he said, these two loaves. Then he said, these three loaves. Then he said, these four loaves. Then he said, these five loaves. Then he ate the first, what are the rules? He said to him, he is guilty for each [oath] separately. He said to him, he is guilty only once. From the moment he mentioned “oath” about it, he made it like carcass meat. From there on he is as if he wanted to apply oaths to prohibitions, but no oath can be applied to prohibitions. He examined him a second time. There were five loaves and he said, an oath about these five loaves. Then he said, these four. Then he said, these three. Then he said, these two. Then he said, this single one. Then he ate all of them? He said to him, he is guilty only once. He said to him, he is guilty for each [oath] separately. If somebody had said, an oath that I shall not eat five, and he ate four, would he be free from punishment? Rebbi Yose said, it is reasonable following Ḥefa’s brother in the last case, following Ḥefa in the first.
HALAKHAH: “A vow inside a vow is possible,” etc. Rebbi Yose asked: An oath, an oath, an oath that I shall not eat, but he ate? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, let us hear from the following: “An oath that I shall not eat this loaf, an oath that I shall not eat, an oath that I shall not eat. If he ate, he is guilty only once.” Because he said this. Therefore, if he had not said this, he would be guilty for each of the oaths. Avime the brother of Ḥefa said, I studied vows, I studied oaths. Ḥefa wanted to examine him: There were five loaves before him and he said, an oath that I shall not eat this loaf. Then he said, these two loaves. Then he said, these three loaves. Then he said, these four loaves. Then he said, these five loaves. Then he ate the first, what are the rules? He said to him, he is guilty for each [oath] separately. He said to him, he is guilty only once. From the moment he mentioned “oath” about it, he made it like carcass meat. From there on he is as if he wanted to apply oaths to prohibitions, but no oath can be applied to prohibitions. He examined him a second time. There were five loaves and he said, an oath about these five loaves. Then he said, these four. Then he said, these three. Then he said, these two. Then he said, this single one. Then he ate all of them? He said to him, he is guilty only once. He said to him, he is guilty for each [oath] separately. If somebody had said, an oath that I shall not eat five, and he ate four, would he be free from punishment? Rebbi Yose said, it is reasonable following Ḥefa’s brother in the last case, following Ḥefa in the first.
So is the Mishnah: “Any vow which I make in the future shall be void, [it is void] if he remembers at the moment he makes the vow,” if he did not stipulate a reservation. But if he stipulated a reservation, then even if he does not remember. That is for vows; but for oaths? There are reservations for vows, there are no reservations for oaths, as it was stated about oaths imposed by judges: “According to our understanding, not according to your understanding.” Rebbi Jehudah said, he makes him swear according to his understanding. Why does he stipulate with him? Because of the uneducated, lest they say that there may be mental reservations for oaths.
It was stated: “Just as vows of exaggeration are permitted so oaths of exaggeration are permitted.” But was it not stated: Vows of exaggeration are forbidden? Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of Rebbi Pedat: Here about those who insist, there about those who do not insist. Rebbi Abba said, you may even say in either case if they insist or if they do not insist; here about one who intends that his oath should fall on his property, “an oath that my property [should be forbidden] to me.” Then his property is forbidden [to him]. But in the matter of whipping, he cannot be whipped. Just as speeding-up vows are permitted so speeding-up oaths are permitted. It is the same case; if he intends that his oath should fall on his property then his property is forbidden [to him]. But concerning the matter of whipping, he cannot be whipped.
It was stated: “Just as vows of exaggeration are permitted so oaths of exaggeration are permitted.” But was it not stated: Vows of exaggeration are forbidden? Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of Rebbi Pedat: Here about those who insist, there about those who do not insist. Rebbi Abba said, you may even say in either case if they insist or if they do not insist; here about one who intends that his oath should fall on his property, “an oath that my property [should be forbidden] to me.” Then his property is forbidden [to him]. But in the matter of whipping, he cannot be whipped. Just as speeding-up vows are permitted so speeding-up oaths are permitted. It is the same case; if he intends that his oath should fall on his property then his property is forbidden [to him]. But concerning the matter of whipping, he cannot be whipped.
Because Moses was lazy for circumcision, the angel tried to kill kim. That is what is written: “The Eternal met him and wanted to kill him.” Rebbi Yose said, far be the thought that Moses was lazy for circumcision but he argued on his own: To perform circumcision and leave would be dangerous. To wait, the Holy One, praise to Him, told him: “Go, return to Egypt.” But because he was lazy in preparing for the overnight stay before circumcision; that is what is written: “It was on the way, at the overnight stay.” Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel said, far be the thought that the angel wanted to kill Moses; it was the baby. Come and see, who is called ḥātān? Moses or the baby? There are Tannaïm who state that Moses is called ḥātān. There are Tannaïm who state that the baby is called ḥātān. He who said that Moses is called ḥātān: Ḥātān, blood is required from you. And he said that the baby is called ḥātān: Ḥātān, in blood you are preserved for me. “Ṣippora took a flintstone and cut her son’s prepuce and touched his feet.” Rebbi Jehudah, Rebbi Neḥemiah, and the rabbis. One said, Moses’s feet. Another said, the angel’s feet. Another said, the baby’s feet. He who said Moses’s feet: Here I cut your obligation for you. He who said, the angel’s feet: Here your mission was accomplished. He who said the baby’s feet, she touched the baby’s body. “He left off from him; then she said, a blood ḥātān for circumcisions.” From here that there are two circumcisions; one for baring the gland and one for the fibers.
“The flesh of his prepuce should be circumcized.” Even if it has white skin disease. How can I confirm: “Beware of skin disease to watch it carefully and to do …”? Also at a circumcision. Then how can I confirm: “The flesh of his prepuce should be circumcized”? If there is no white skin disease? The verse says, “the flesh”, even if it has white skin disease. This is simple in the opinion of Rebbi Jonah, who says that a positive commandment supersedes a prohibition even if they are not written together. But in the opinion of Rebbi Yose, who says that a positive commandment supersedes a prohibition only if they are written together? Since it is written “the flesh of his prepuce,” it is as if it were written together.
Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira: Because it is as if he gave him money to buy a loaf with. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya asked: Then is it forbidden to borrow money from him, for it is as if he gave him money to buy a loaf with? Rebbi Abina said, Rebbi Ze‘ira asked: That jewellery on them, is it forbidden to lend to them?
MISHNAH: If somebody is forbidden any profit from another person by a vow and he has nothing to eat, the other person goes to the grocer and tells him, X is forbidden any profit from me by a vow and I do not know what to do. Then he pays him and X comes and takes from him.
HALAKHAH: Does Rebbi Aqiba think “I found, I did not find”? Then one who forbids meat to himself should be forbidden fish and grasshopper meat since, if a man says to another, buy meat for us, he will return and say, I found only fish! But Rebbi Aqiba must think that squash are vegetables, but the rabbis think that squash are not vegetables. That applies to legal situations. “The vegetables of this garden are sold;” if squash were there, they would be sold in the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba, not sold in the opinion of the rabbis. The same applies to declarations of abandonment or dedications.
He who makes a vow not to use bread or produce is forbidden them, the words of Rebbi Meїr. Therefore, is he who makes a vow not to use bread or produce forbidden everything according to the rabbis? Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, so is the Mishnah: “He who makes a vow not to use flour is only forbidden these.” How do we hold? If he uses “bread” in the biblical sense, then also if he says “produce” it is meant in the biblical sense. He should be forbidden everything since it is written (Deut. 22:9): “The produce of the vineyard.” If he simply says “bread”; only from wheat or barley is it simply called “bread”. Rebbi Yose said, I confirmed it, at a place where one eats bread from all [kinds], only from the five kinds it is simply called “bread”.
Rebbi Aḥa, Rebbi Abbahu, in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: On the Sabbath, a person is forbidden to fast until the sixth hour. Rebbi Yose said, a Mishnah states this: “If they fasted when it started to rain, before noon they should not finish,” because until then it is morning; “after noon they should finish,” since most of the day already was spent in holiness.
Rebbi Abin in the name of Rebbi Hila: That is only if he vowed before they intercalated. But if they intercalated and then he vowed, that is not so. Is it no different for rent of houses? If one said, the First Adar, and the other one says, the Second Adar, they should split the intercalary month. Come and see, for vows you have no problem but for money matters you have a problem? Rebbi Hila said, that is, if they intercalated and after that he leased. But if he leased and after that they intercalated, that is not so. And in matters of documents one writes First Adar, Second Adar, only that for Second Adar one writes תניין. Rebbi Jehudah says, for Second Adar one writes ת̇ and that is enough.
MISHNAH: Rebbi Eliezer says, one opens for a man by the honor of his father and mother, but the Sages forbid it. Rebbi Ṣadoq said, before one opens by the honor of his father and mother one should open by the honor of the Omnipresent; then there are no vows. The Sages agree with Rebbi Eliezer that if was a matter between a man and his father and mother, that one opens for him by the honor of his father and mother.
“Then there are no vows.” Let there be no vows! But is it not written: “Moses spoke to the heads of the tribes.” He hung the chapter on the heads of the tribes, that they could dissolve their vows. If you say so, it turns out that you uproot the chapter of vows from the Torah.
MISHNAH: In addition, Rebbi Eliezer said, one finds an opening in changed circumstances, but the Sages forbid it. How is this? If he said, a qônām that I shall not benefit from Mr. X, who then becomes a public scribe or who marries off his son to one of [the vower’s] relatives, and he said, if I had known that he will become a public scribe or marry off his son to a relative, I would not have vowed; or if he said, a qônām that I shall not enter this house and it was turned into a synagogue and he said, if I had known that it would become a synagogue, I would not have vowed; Rebbi Eliezer permits but the Sages prohibit.
Rebbi Jeremiah said, what you say is only that there are changed circumstances before the matter is discussed. The force of Rebbi Yose is from the following: “That was the error of Naḥum the Mede.” What was his error? That he found them an opening by changed circumstances. “Naḥum the Mede said to them: ‘Would you have made a vow to become nezirim if you had known that the Temple would be destroyed at some future time?’ ” Rebbi Ze‘ira said, the following he should have said to them: Did you not know that the earlier prophets had prophesied while the Temple was standing that eventually it would be destroyed? Then there are no changed circumstances. Rebbi Hila said, still it is changed circumstances. They could have said to him, we knew it, but it seemed to us that this referred to the far future: “The vision he sees is for many years; for faraway times he prophesies.” It turns out that Rebbi Jeremiah parallels Rebbi Ze‘ira and Rebbi Yose parallels Rebbi Hila.
(As) we have stated there: “One sells a synagogue only conditionally”. So far if it was built as a synagogue. How is the situation if the building was first built for profane use and then dedicated? Let us hear from the following: “A qônām that I shall not enter this house and it was turned into a synagogue.” That implies that if it was built as a courtyard and afterwards was dedicated that it becomes holy. How? When does it become holy, immediately or when it is used? Let us hear from the following: “If somebody makes a chest for a Torah scroll, or wrappings for a Torah scroll, before they were used for a Torah scroll they may be used for private use; after they were used for a Torah scroll they may not be used for private use.” Since these were made for holy use but became holy only when used, that which was built as a courtyard not so much more? What is the status of those if they were made for profane use and then dedicated? They become holy.
(As) we have stated there: “One sells a synagogue only conditionally”. So far if it was built as a synagogue. How is the situation if the building was first built for profane use and then dedicated? Let us hear from the following: “A qônām that I shall not enter this house and it was turned into a synagogue.” That implies that if it was built as a courtyard and afterwards was dedicated that it becomes holy. How? When does it become holy, immediately or when it is used? Let us hear from the following: “If somebody makes a chest for a Torah scroll, or wrappings for a Torah scroll, before they were used for a Torah scroll they may be used for private use; after they were used for a Torah scroll they may not be used for private use.” Since these were made for holy use but became holy only when used, that which was built as a courtyard not so much more? What is the status of those if they were made for profane use and then dedicated? They become holy.
MISHNAH: One finds an opening for a man with his own honor and that of his children. One tells him, if you had known that tomorrow one will say of you, it is the habit of this man to divorce his wife, and about your daughters one will say, they are daughters of a divorcee, what did the mother of these do to get herself divorced? If he said, if I had known that it is so I would not have made the vow, then it is dissolved.
It was stated in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: “If she should be a man’s”, the verse speaks about a preliminarily married adult girl. The colleagues say, Rebbi Eleazar says it correctly. Is it not difficult for Rebbi Eleazar: Did she not leave her father’s power the moment she became an adult? Who may dissolve the vows of an orphan whose father had died? The husband dissolves. It is difficult for the rabbis: If he may dissolve before she entered his power, is it not obvious [that he may dissolve] after she entered? How do the rabbis explain “with her vows on her”? What are we talking about? If about vows which she made before she was preliminarily married and she became preliminarily married, already the father and the husband had the power to dissolve. But we must talk about a vow which she made before her father died, then the father died and she became an adult. From where does Rebbi Eleazar obtain: “The father and the husband dissolve the vows of a preliminarily married adolescent girl.” “Between a man and his wife.” That deals with the husband. The father? “Between a father and his daughter.” How do the rabbis interpret “between a man and his wife”? Not what is between her and others. “Between a father and his daughter,” not what is between her and others. Does Rebbi Eleazar not agree with this? He agrees; he understands everything from there: “Between a man and his wife”, not what is between her and others; “between a father and his daughter,” not what is between her and others.
HALAKHAH: “Rebbi Eliezer said,” etc. “Rebbi Eliezer said, since a woman on whom I had no claim before she entered into my domain, becomes absolutely mine after she entered my domain, is it not logical that a woman on whom I had some claim before she entered my domain, shall become absolutely mine when she enters my domain? Rebbi Aqiba told him, no. If you speak about a woman on whom you had no claim before she entered into your domain, but after she entered your domain she became absolutely yours, then just as you had no part in her so no other man had any part in her. What can you conclude about a woman on whom you had some claim before she entered your domain, and after she entered your domain she became absolutely yours, but just as you had some rights to her so others had the same rights to her! Rebbi Joshua told him, Aqiba, your argument holds for two levirs. What do you respond in the case of a single levir? He said to him, just as you make no difference in the rules of one waiting for one levir or for two levirs, whether he ‘bespoke’ her or did not ‘bespeak’ her, can it not be the same for vows and oaths? He said to him, that is true. He said to him, if you had lived in the times of Rebbi Eleazar ben Arakh, he would have said that ‘bespeaking’ does not acquire completely since he would agree that he cannot dissolve until she enters his domain.
HALAKHAH: “The dissolution of vows may take place the entire day,” etc. It was stated: “Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah and Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon say, the dissolution of vows may take place from time to time.” What is the reason of the rabbis? “From day to day.” What is the reason of Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah? “On the day of his hearing.” How do the rabbis explain Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah’s reason, “on the day of his hearing”? Explain it that she made the vow on the start of the night. How does Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah explain the rabbis’ reason, “from day to day”? Explain it that she made the vow at the start of Friday night, he became paralyzed, and then his power of speech returned. In the opinion of Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah one gives him 24 hours. In the opinion of the rabbis he has only that day. If he became paralyzed, and later his power of speech returned, in the opinion of Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah one adds up to a total of 24 hours. In the opinion of the rabbis he always can dissolve when his speech returns. But if it happened one hour before sundown, he can no longer dissolve.
There, we have stated: “One dissolves vows on the Sabbath.” It was stated: Both vows that intrude on the Sabbath and vows that do not intrude on the Sabbath. “And one asks about vows that intrude on the Sabbath,” therefore not if there is no need for the Sabbath. The Elder can dissolve the next day. Then for Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah and Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon who say that the dissolution of vows is from time to time, he should not dissolve even vows that intrude on the Sabbath! Explain it according to everybody, if she made the vow at the start of Friday night.
Rebbi Ze‘ira explained the Mishnah: “These are the vows which he can dissolve: Matters connected with mortification. [E. g.], ‘if I wash, if I do not wash; if I shall wear jewels, if I do not wear jewels.’ Rebbi Yose said, these are not vows of mortification” but vows between him and her. “The following are vows of mortification” following Rebbi Yose. For example, “she said, all produce of the world is qônām for me, he may dissolve.” The rabbis say, if he dissolves vows of mortification, they are permanently dissolved. Vows between him and her are only dissolved as long as she is married to him. Rebbi Yose says, both vows of mortification and vows between him and her, if he dissolved them they are permanently dissolved. That means, the rabbis say, if he dissolves vows of mortification, they are permanently dissolved. Rebi Yose says, if he dissolves vows between him and her, they are permanently dissolved. What is the difference between them? If she said, any benefit from me shall be qônām for you when I leave your domain. Why can he not dissolve that? Because she did not say, any benefit from my body shall be qônām for you when I leave your domain. Rebbi Ze‘ira and Rebbi Hila, both of them say: That is the essence of vows between him and her. In the opinion of Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rebbi Yose and Rebbi Joḥanan ben Nuri said the same thing since we stated there: “Rebbi Joḥanan said, he shall dissolve it since maybe he would divorce her, then she would be forbidden to return to him.”