then
12745 occurrences across the corpus
The Jerusalem Talmud
A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Ḥaninah: “A vow that no Cohanim or Levites should have any advantage from me, they should take against his will.” He explains it about a person who says, I cannot possibly give them any gifts. You should know that this is so, since we have stated: “These Cohanim and Levites should [not] have any advantage from me, let others take.” A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “An Israel can say to another Israel, here you have a tetradrachma and give this firstling to my daughter’s son, a Cohen.” He explains, if he already wanted to give it to two [Cohanim] and that daughter’s son was one of them; then one said, here you have a tetradrachma and give it whole to my daughter’s son, a Cohen.
MISHNAH: 4: ‘A qônām that I shall not work according to the wishes of my father, or your father, or my brother, or your brother,’ he cannot dissolve. ‘According to your wish,’ he does not have to dissolve. Rebbi Aqiba says, he has to dissolve, maybe she works more than the required minimum. Rebbi Joḥanan ben Nuri said, he shall dissolve since maybe he would divorce her, then she would be forbidden to return to him.
“Rebbi Aqiba said, he has to dissolve.” Rebbi Abba said, if she forbids the yields of her work, [vowing] not to work, he can force her up to the weight of five tetradrachmas. More than that he cannot force, for he has to be afraid that she may work more and it turns out that she profits from what is forbidden. Therefore, Rebbi Aqiba says, he has to dissolve his part. Rebbi Hila said, it is impossible for her to make exactly the weight of five tetradrachmas. He could force her up to the weight of five tetradrachmas; more that that he cannot force. He has to be afraid that she might be over the limit by a minute amount; then he would profit from what is forbidden. Therefore ….
HALAKHAH: “An unspecified nezirut is for thirty days,” etc. Bar Qappara said “ιʼεʼιʼεʼ” is thirty. Rebbi Samuel bar Rav Naḥman in the name of Rebbi Jonathan: Corresponding to the 29 times that in the Chapter about the nazir in the Torah is written “vow, nazir, to vow as nazir”. Are they not 30? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, one has to be removed for its definition. In the opinion of Bar Qappara, if he shaved on the 30th day, he did not fulfill his obligation. In the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan, if he shaved on the 30th day, he fulfilled his obligation. Some want to understand it from here: “To let his head’s hair grow wildly.” How much is a hair growth? 30 days. Some want to understand it from here: “She shall cry for her father and her mother the days of a month.” Since “days” mentioned there are 30, so also “days” mentioned here. Some want to understand it from here: “The prior days shall fall, for his nezirut is impure.” The days which became permitted, which Moses and his court had permitted, and that is no less than 30 days. Some want to understand it from here: “Until the days are fulfilled”. How much are full days? 30 days. Then if he shaved on the 30th day, he did not fulfill his obligation! Rebbi Isaac bar Eleazar said, “days” are written defectively יָמִם, with a letter י missing.
HALAKHAH: “If he said: ‘this cow said,’ ” etc. If he saw a Gentile passing by and said, “look what this Gentile said.” Then he is a nazir. Does this mean that he is a nazir because Gentiles cannot make a vow of nazir? He has not said anything! Let us hear from the following: “If he said: ‘this cow said’ ”. You said this only because he spoke the word nezirut. And here, he spoke the word nezirut. If he saw a Jew passing by and said, “look what this Jew said.” Then he is a nazir. He had not said anything. Does this mean that he is a nazir because Jews make a vow of nazir? Should we say that nevertheless he is a nazir or is he studying the case? So I am saying, “for example, if he was reading the Torah and mentioned nazir,naziq.”
HALAKHAH: “If he said: ‘this cow said,’ ” etc. If he saw a Gentile passing by and said, “look what this Gentile said.” Then he is a nazir. Does this mean that he is a nazir because Gentiles cannot make a vow of nazir? He has not said anything! Let us hear from the following: “If he said: ‘this cow said’ ”. You said this only because he spoke the word nezirut. And here, he spoke the word nezirut. If he saw a Jew passing by and said, “look what this Jew said.” Then he is a nazir. He had not said anything. Does this mean that he is a nazir because Jews make a vow of nazir? Should we say that nevertheless he is a nazir or is he studying the case? So I am saying, “for example, if he was reading the Torah and mentioned nazir,naziq.”
MISHNAH: If a cup of wine was prepared for somebody who then said, “I am a nazir [abstaining] from it”, he is a nazir. It happened that a cup of wine was prepared for a woman who already was drunk, when she said, “I am a nazir [abstaining] from it”. The Sages said that she only intended to say, “it shall be qorban for me.”
HALAKHAH: “I shall be a nazir and obligate myself to shave a nazir,” etc. This “I also”, what do you subsume under it? Does “I also” refer to the entire sentence, or does “I also” only refer to part of the sentence? If “I also” refers to the entire sentence, he says “I also am a nazir.” If “I also” only refers to part of the sentence, he said “I am a nazir.” It was stated in the House of Rebbi: “ ‘I also’ refers to the entire sentence.” Rebbi Yose said, this implies that if some person said, I am a nazir for 100 days, and another person heard him and said, “I also”; the first one is a nazir for 100 days, the other is a nazir for 30 days unless he says, “I am like him, I am the same as he is.” Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: “I am obligated to shave half [a nazir]. Then he said, I am a nazir. If he shaved after 30 days he has fulfilled his obligation.” Rebbi Yose said, the Mishnah implies this: “ ‘I shall be a nazir and obligate myself to shave a nazir,’ if another heard him and said: ‘I also shall be and I obligate myself to shave another nazir,’ if they are clever, they will shave one another.” But not themselves. Because he said, “I shall be a nazir and obligate myself to shave a nazir”. But if he said, “I obligate myself to shave half a nazir” and then he said, “I shall be a nazir,” if he shaved himself he has acquitted himself of his obligation. One understands that the second one can shave the first, but can the first shave the second? Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira: This means that a person can take upon himself the sacrifice of a nazir who only in the future will make his vow. Rebbi Ḥinena in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira inferred three [statements]: It implies that if he shaved himself he acquitted himself. It implies that a person obligates himself for another’s nezirut sacrifices of a future vow. It implies that a person chooses another’s nezirut sacrifices without the other’s knowledge. But he cannot dedicate [the animals] without the other’s knowledge.
HALAKHAH: “I shall be a nazir and obligate myself to shave a nazir,” etc. This “I also”, what do you subsume under it? Does “I also” refer to the entire sentence, or does “I also” only refer to part of the sentence? If “I also” refers to the entire sentence, he says “I also am a nazir.” If “I also” only refers to part of the sentence, he said “I am a nazir.” It was stated in the House of Rebbi: “ ‘I also’ refers to the entire sentence.” Rebbi Yose said, this implies that if some person said, I am a nazir for 100 days, and another person heard him and said, “I also”; the first one is a nazir for 100 days, the other is a nazir for 30 days unless he says, “I am like him, I am the same as he is.” Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: “I am obligated to shave half [a nazir]. Then he said, I am a nazir. If he shaved after 30 days he has fulfilled his obligation.” Rebbi Yose said, the Mishnah implies this: “ ‘I shall be a nazir and obligate myself to shave a nazir,’ if another heard him and said: ‘I also shall be and I obligate myself to shave another nazir,’ if they are clever, they will shave one another.” But not themselves. Because he said, “I shall be a nazir and obligate myself to shave a nazir”. But if he said, “I obligate myself to shave half a nazir” and then he said, “I shall be a nazir,” if he shaved himself he has acquitted himself of his obligation. One understands that the second one can shave the first, but can the first shave the second? Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira: This means that a person can take upon himself the sacrifice of a nazir who only in the future will make his vow. Rebbi Ḥinena in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira inferred three [statements]: It implies that if he shaved himself he acquitted himself. It implies that a person obligates himself for another’s nezirut sacrifices of a future vow. It implies that a person chooses another’s nezirut sacrifices without the other’s knowledge. But he cannot dedicate [the animals] without the other’s knowledge.
MISHNAH: “I am a nazir and a nazir when a son is born to me.” If he started counting for himself when a son was born to him, he finishes his own and then counts for his son. “I am a nazir when a son is born to me, and a nazir.” If he had started counting for himself when a son was born to him he interrupts his own, counts for his son, and then finishes for himself.
MISHNAH: “I am a nazir and a nazir when a son is born to me.” If he started counting for himself when a son was born to him, he finishes his own and then counts for his son. “I am a nazir when a son is born to me, and a nazir.” If he had started counting for himself when a son was born to him he interrupts his own, counts for his son, and then finishes for himself.
HALAKHAH: “ “I am a nazir and a nazir when a son is born to me,” etc. Rebbi Yose asked: If he said, “I am a nazir for these 30 days and those 30 days.” Rebbi Ze‘ira said before Rebbi Mana: Is that not the Mishnah? “He interrupts his own, counts for his son, and then finishes for himself.” Not even if his wife is in the process of giving birth? He said to him, his nezirut is not comparable to his son’s nezirut, but to the case that he said, “I am already a nazir and a nazir after twenty days.” Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina both say: If he finished his nezirut, his son’s nezirut cannot start for him before he was shaving with a sacrifice. About a nazir who became impure, the opinions of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina seem contradictory. There, he says, if a person impure by the impurity of the dead made a vow of nazir, his seventh day is counted. If a nazir becomes impure, his seventh day is not counted. In our case, is he not like a person impure by the impurity of the dead, who made a vow of nazir? And is not the seventh day counted for a person impure by the impurity of the dead, who made a vow of nazir? Would this obligate him to bring a sacrifice for his impurity? But if a nazir who becomes impure, his seventh day is not counted; does it not obligate him to bring a sacrifice for his impurity? And here, because he is obligated to bring a sacrifice (of impurity), the seventh day is [not] counted for him.
If he was born on the eightieth day, he eliminates ten. If he was born on the ninetieth day, he eliminates twenty. If he finished his nezirut and came to complete his son’s nezirut and became impure within the first ten days, he eliminates everything. Within the last twenty days? Rebbi Abba in the name of Rab and Rebbi Joḥanan both say, he eliminates thirty. Rebbi Samuel said, he eliminates seven only. Samuel bar Abba asked before Rebbi Yose: Does Rebbi Joḥanan think that eliminating by a shaving knife is identical with substantial eliminating? Rebbi Ze‘ira said, if Rebbi Joḥanan thought that eliminating by a shaving knife is identical to substantial eliminating, why would he say that he eliminates thirty? Should he not invalidate everything? Rebbi Abin bar Ḥiyya said before Rebbi Ze‘ira: Explain it if he was born on a day unsuitable to bring a sacrifice. Think of it, if he was born in the night, is that not unsuitable to bring a sacrifice? It is suitable; the night caused it. Think of it, if he was born on the Sabbath, is that not unsuitable to bring a sacrifice? It is suitable; the Sabbath caused it. If he had finished his nezirut but did not manage to shave when [the son] was born on the Sabbath, is that not unsuitable to bring a sacrifice? It is suitable; the Sabbath caused it. If he had finished his nezirut but did not manage to shave before his son was born, he celebrates one shaving for both. If he had dedicated his sacrifices but did not manage to shave before his son was born. There, they say that he celebrates one shaving for both. Rebbi Joḥanan said, he shaves and then shaves a second time. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “They asked Rebbi Simeon ben Ioḥai: Assume that he was both a nazir and a sufferer from scale disease, may he shave once and have it counted for his nezirut and his scale disease? He said to them: If he shaved to remove hair, you would be correct. But the nazir shaves to remove hair whereas the sufferer from scale disease shaves to have hair grow. They said to him, if it cannot be counted for the days of his completeness, should it not be counted for the days of his count? Both of them shave to remove hair. (They said to him. If both of them shaved before the sprinkling of the blood, you would be correct. But the nazir shaves before the sprinkling of the blood and the sufferer from scale disease shaves after the sprinkling of the blood! They said to him, if it cannot be counted for the days of his completeness, should it not be counted for the days of his count? Both of them shave before the sprinkling of the blood!) He said to them, if both shaved before they immerse themselves in water, you would be correct. But the nazir shaves before he immerses himself in water and the sufferer from scale disease shaves after he immerses himself in water. They said to him, the matter is settled. It cannot be counted for the days of his completeness, it cannot be counted for the days of his count. It cannot be counted for purification; it cannot be counted for impurity. That is, if he was a nazir and sufferer from scale disease. But if he was a nazir and nazir, he may shave once for both.” What does Rebbi Joḥanan do with this? He explains that they disagree with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish.
Something happened to Rebbi Immi and he shaved on the 30 day, and something happened to Rebbi Immi and he shaved on the 31 day. Rebbi Zeriqa said, Rebbi Immi learned this from the Mishnah, as we have stated there: “If somebody vowed two neziriot, he shaves for the first on the 31 day, for the second on the 61 day.” Rebbi Yose said, there when it happened, here from the start. Rebbi Jeremiah instructed Rebbi Isaac Aṭoshia, and some say, Rav Ḥiyya bar Rav Isaac Aṭoshia, to shave on the 30th day, following the Mishnah: “Eight days, the decree of 30 days is waived for him.” The eighth has the same status as the 30 day. Rebbi Yose said, there is a difference; there they permitted in order to honor the holiday. You should know this, since Rebbi Ḥelbo bar Ḥuna said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If his eighth day falls on the Sabbath, he shaves Sabbath eve. If you say that they did not permit in order to honor the holiday, then even if his 30 day falls on the Sabbath, he should shave Sabbath eve. In addition, from what Rebbi Joḥanan had said: “For all deceased he stitches together after seven days and mends after 30.” Why should he not stitch on the seventh day and mend on the 30 day? Rebbi Ḥaggai said, this has been transmitted in this way and that has been transmitted in that way.
MISHNAH: If somebody vowed a lengthy nezirut, finished his nezirut, and then came to the Land, the House of Shammai say, he is a nazir for 30 days, but the House of Hillel say, he is a nazir from the start. It happened to Queen Helena that her son went to war and she said, if my son returns from the war, I shall be a nezirah for seven years. Her son returned from war and she was a nezirah for seven years. At the end of seven years, she came to the Land, and the House of Hillel instructed her to be a nezirah for another seven years. At the end of seven years she became impure and was nezirah for a total of 21 years. Rebbi Jehudah said, she was a nezirah only for fourteen years.
What about, “and so am I,” how do you treat this? As “amen, it is confirmed for you,” or “you did well”? The elder [Rebbi] Ḥiyya and the elder Rebbi Hoshaia. It is stated: If a woman made a vow to be anazir; her husband heard and said to her, “why did you make a vow of nazir? What did you do to make a vow of nazir? I would not like that you made a vow of nazir! There is neither vow nor oath here;” he did not say anything. But if he said, “you did well that you did make a vow of nazir; I liked that you did make a vow of nazir; if you had not made a vow of nazir I would have told you to make one”, Rebbi Ḥiyya stated on this, in all of these cases he cannot dissolve. But Rebbi Hoshaia stated: In all these cases, he can dissolve unless he said “amen” or “it is confirmed for you”, then he can no longer dissolve.
HALAKHAH: “A woman who had made a vow of nazir,” etc. Does this mean it became holy by dedication? But if a third person gave her a gift and said, on condition that your husband have no right of disposition over it, then it is hers. Rebbi Mattaniah said, if he gave her power over his properties. If he comes to protest, it did not become holy; otherwise, it became holy.
There, we have stated: “Leftovers for nezirim are for nezirim; what is left over from a nazir is for donation.” Rav Ḥisda said, only if his purification offering was presented last. But if his well-being offering waspresented last, what is left over is for a well-being offering. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, even if his well-being offering was presented last, it is a general rule for a nazir that his leftover be for donation. A baraita supports one and a baraita supports the other. A baraita supports Rebbi Ze‘ira: “The following are undesignated monies: any which contain money for purification offerings that should die. Even if he designated money for purification offerings that should die, it remains undesignated.” A baraita supports Rav Ḥisda: “This is for my purification offering and the rest for my nezirut. Then he died. One commits larceny with all of them but not with part of them.” It does not say, when he died it should be given for donation.
There, we have stated: “If somebody says, ‘I undertake [to bring] on a pan’ and he brought in a deep vessel, in a deep vessel and he brought on a pan.” Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: This is the House of Shammai’s, since the House of Shammai say, “dedication in error is dedication.” Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Yose: Why do we not explain it according to everybody, if he said, “I said, on a pan”? But if he said, “I undertake [to bring] on a pan,” and then he changed his mind and said, “in a deep vessel”, he fulfilled his duty. Rebbi Ḥanina and Rebbi Yasa came in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: it is everybody’s opinion. Rebbi Jeremiah asked: If he said, “I undertake [to bring] on a pan or in a deep vessel,” turned around and said, “on a pan”, and turned around and said, “in a deep vessel”? Rebbi Jehudah bar Pazi in the name of Rebbi Aḥa, Rebbi Hama in the name of Rebbi Yose: He determines even orally. They thought to say, even holidays determine, even vessels determine.
HALAKHAH: “If a person vowed to be a nazir and went to bring his animal,” etc. Where do we hold? If he saw an animal passing on the market and said, I am a nazir on that animal which passed by, he is a nazir even if the animal was stolen. If he thought that he had one and it turned out that he did not, would we say if he was rich and became poor, the nezirut would be invalidated? But we must hold that he said, I am a nazir on the animal I have at home, then went and found it stolen. If he vowed before the animal was stolen he is a nazir, after the animal was stolen he is not a nazir. The students of Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Julianus say: Rebbi Jehudah asked: If the thieves returned it in the night, did his nezirut return to him retroactively or for the future?
“That was the error of Naḥum from Media.” What was his error? That he found for them an opening due to changed circumstances. “Naḥum from Media said to them: ‘Would you have made a vow to become nezirim if you had known that the Temple would be destroyed at some future time?’ ” Rebbi Ze‘ira said, the following he should have said to them: Did you not know that the prophets already had prophesied that eventually the Temple would be destroyed? Then there are no changed circumstances. Rebbi Hila said, still it is changed circumstances. They could have said to him, we knew it, but it seemed to us that this referred to the distant future: “The vision he sees is for many years.”
It has been stated: 300 nezirim came in the days of Rebbi Simeon ben Shetaḥ. For 150 of them he found an opening, for 150 of them he did not find an opening. He came to king Yannai and said to him: There are here 300 nezirim who need 900 sacrifices. You should give half of them from your side, I shall give half from my side. The king sent him 450 animals. An informer went around and said that the other one had not given anything from his own money. King Yannai heard about it and got angry. Simeon ben Shetaḥ heard and fled. After some time, important people from the Persian empire came to king Yannai. They said to him: We remember that there was an old man who gave us a rabbinic discourse. They said to him, send and bring him! He sent and gave him his word; he came and sat between king and queen. He said to him, why did you trick me? He said, I did not trick you; you with your money and I with my learning, as it is written (Eccl. 7:12) “In the shadow of wisdom, in the shadow of money.” He said to him, why did you disappear? He said to him, I heard that my lord was angry with me and I wanted to fulfill the verse (Is. 26:20) “Hide a little bit until the rage passes;” he used about himself (Eccl. 7:12): “Knowledge is an advantage, wisdom lets its possessor live.” He said to him, why did you sit between king and queen? He said to him, it is written in the book of Ben Sirach: “Esteem it and it will raise you and seat you among princes.” He said, bring him a cup that he may recite Grace. They brought him a cup and he said: “Let us give praise for the food that Yannai and his company ate.” He said to him, what should I say, “for the food that we did not eat?” He said, bring him something that he may eat. They brought, he ate and recited: “For the food that we ate.” Rebbi Yoḥanan said, his colleagues disagree with Simeon ben Shetaḥ. Rebbi Jeremiah said, about the first action; Rebbi Abba said, about the second action. Rebbi Jeremiah seems to contradict himself! There he wondered about it and here it is obvious for him! He wondered following the Sages; it is obvious to him following Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel. We have stated about this: If one came, was lying on a couch, and dipped with them, even if he did not eat grain the volume of an olive one ‘invites’ with him, the words of the Sages. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Yoḥanan: One never ‘invites’ anyone unless he has eaten grain the volume of an olive. But did we not formulate, “two [eating] bread and one [eating] vegetable, then one ‘invites’?” This baraita follows Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel.
MISHNAH: If they were walking on the road and a person came towards them when one said, “I am a nazir unless he is Mr. X”, and another said, “I am a nazir if it is not he”; “I am a nazir unless one of you is a nazir”, “unless both of you are nezirim”, “unless all of you are nezirim”. The House of Shammai say, they are all nezirim, but the House of Hillel say, only those whose assertions prove wrong are nezirim. Rebbi Ṭarphon said, none of them is a nazir. If he suddenly returned, no one is a nazir. Rebbi Simeon says, one should say: If it was as I said, I am a nazir by obligation, otherwise I am a nazir voluntarily. If one saw a koy and said, “I am a nazir if this is a wild animal”, “I am a nazir if this is not a wild animal”, “I am a nazir if this is a domestic animal”, “I am a nazir if this is a not a domestic animal”, “I am a nazir if this is a wild and domestic animal”, “I am a nazir if this is neither a wild nor a domestic animal”, “I am a nazir if one of you is a nazir”, “if one of you is not a nazir”, “if both of you are nezirim”, then all of them are nezirim.
Rav Zakkai stated before Rebbi Joḥanan: If somebody sacrificed, burned incense, and poured a libation in one forgetting, he is guilty for each action separately. Rebbi Joḥanan told him, Babylonian! You crossed three rivers with your hands and were broken. He is guilty only once! {Before he broke in his hand there is “one” but not “those”; after he broke in his hand there are “those” but not “one”.} Rebbi Abba bar Mamal asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: Should he not be guilty for each action separately? As you say for the Sabbath: “Do not perform any work,” principle. “Do not light fire in any of your dwelling places,” a detail. Was not lighting fire subsumed under the principle, but it is mentioned separately from this principle! Since lighting fire is special in that it is the work of a single individual and one would be guilty for it alone, so everything for which alone one is guilty. Also here: “Do not worship them,” a principle. “Do not prostrate yourself,” a detail. Was not prostrating itself included in the principle and why was it mentioned separately? To infer, to tell you that prostrating oneself is special in that it is the work of a single individual and one would be guilty for it alone, so everything for which alone one is guilty. He answered: For the Sabbath, he mentioned the principle at one place and the details at another place. For idol worship, the principle is found close to the detail. He retorted: Is it not witten: “Do not prostrate yourself before another power”? He did not state the principle and the detail at the same spot! He said, since you do not infer anything from it close up, you cannot infer anything from afar. The colleagues say, it makes no difference; whether He gave the principle at one place and the detail at another, or gave principle and detail at the same place, it is a matter of principle and detail. For the Sabbath, He first gave the principle and then the detail. For idolatry, He gave the detail and only later the principle. Rebbi Yose said, it makes no difference whether [He first gave the principle and then the detail or He gave the detail and only later the principle, or He gave principle, detail, and principle]; it is a matter of principle and detail. For the Sabbath, He gave a general prohibition of work, followed by details; for idolatry, He was indeterminate regarding its worship but detailed the worship of Heaven.
Rav Zakkai stated before Rebbi Joḥanan: If somebody sacrificed, burned incense, and poured a libation in one forgetting, he is guilty for each action separately. Rebbi Joḥanan told him, Babylonian! You crossed three rivers with your hands and were broken. He is guilty only once! {Before he broke in his hand there is “one” but not “those”; after he broke in his hand there are “those” but not “one”.} Rebbi Abba bar Mamal asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: Should he not be guilty for each action separately? As you say for the Sabbath: “Do not perform any work,” principle. “Do not light fire in any of your dwelling places,” a detail. Was not lighting fire subsumed under the principle, but it is mentioned separately from this principle! Since lighting fire is special in that it is the work of a single individual and one would be guilty for it alone, so everything for which alone one is guilty. Also here: “Do not worship them,” a principle. “Do not prostrate yourself,” a detail. Was not prostrating itself included in the principle and why was it mentioned separately? To infer, to tell you that prostrating oneself is special in that it is the work of a single individual and one would be guilty for it alone, so everything for which alone one is guilty. He answered: For the Sabbath, he mentioned the principle at one place and the details at another place. For idol worship, the principle is found close to the detail. He retorted: Is it not witten: “Do not prostrate yourself before another power”? He did not state the principle and the detail at the same spot! He said, since you do not infer anything from it close up, you cannot infer anything from afar. The colleagues say, it makes no difference; whether He gave the principle at one place and the detail at another, or gave principle and detail at the same place, it is a matter of principle and detail. For the Sabbath, He first gave the principle and then the detail. For idolatry, He gave the detail and only later the principle. Rebbi Yose said, it makes no difference whether [He first gave the principle and then the detail or He gave the detail and only later the principle, or He gave principle, detail, and principle]; it is a matter of principle and detail. For the Sabbath, He gave a general prohibition of work, followed by details; for idolatry, He was indeterminate regarding its worship but detailed the worship of Heaven.
But here, skins and seeds were understood in the principle, and were listed separately. Should they not be separate rather than common? But there, the principle is at one place and the details are at another place. But did not the colleagues say: It makes no difference: Whether he stated the principle and then a detail or the detail and after that the principle. And here, he stated the principle and then a detail. But did not Rebbi Yose say, there is no difference whether He gave principle, detail, and principle, it is the principle and then a detail, it is counted as the principle and then a detail. There, the detail was not necessary. Why were they detailed? To exclude leaves and twigs. But was it not stated in the name of Rebbi Eliezer: “From anything coming from the wine-vine, from skins to seeds, he shall not eat;” leaves and twigs are also understood. There, they are mentioned for a need, but here, they are mentioned without need. Why? For additions.
But here, skins and seeds were understood in the principle, and were listed separately. Should they not be separate rather than common? But there, the principle is at one place and the details are at another place. But did not the colleagues say: It makes no difference: Whether he stated the principle and then a detail or the detail and after that the principle. And here, he stated the principle and then a detail. But did not Rebbi Yose say, there is no difference whether He gave principle, detail, and principle, it is the principle and then a detail, it is counted as the principle and then a detail. There, the detail was not necessary. Why were they detailed? To exclude leaves and twigs. But was it not stated in the name of Rebbi Eliezer: “From anything coming from the wine-vine, from skins to seeds, he shall not eat;” leaves and twigs are also understood. There, they are mentioned for a need, but here, they are mentioned without need. Why? For additions.
But here, skins and seeds were understood in the principle, and were listed separately. Should they not be separate rather than common? But there, the principle is at one place and the details are at another place. But did not the colleagues say: It makes no difference: Whether he stated the principle and then a detail or the detail and after that the principle. And here, he stated the principle and then a detail. But did not Rebbi Yose say, there is no difference whether He gave principle, detail, and principle, it is the principle and then a detail, it is counted as the principle and then a detail. There, the detail was not necessary. Why were they detailed? To exclude leaves and twigs. But was it not stated in the name of Rebbi Eliezer: “From anything coming from the wine-vine, from skins to seeds, he shall not eat;” leaves and twigs are also understood. There, they are mentioned for a need, but here, they are mentioned without need. Why? For additions.
But here, skins and seeds were understood in the principle, and were listed separately. Should they not be separate rather than common? But there, the principle is at one place and the details are at another place. But did not the colleagues say: It makes no difference: Whether he stated the principle and then a detail or the detail and after that the principle. And here, he stated the principle and then a detail. But did not Rebbi Yose say, there is no difference whether He gave principle, detail, and principle, it is the principle and then a detail, it is counted as the principle and then a detail. There, the detail was not necessary. Why were they detailed? To exclude leaves and twigs. But was it not stated in the name of Rebbi Eliezer: “From anything coming from the wine-vine, from skins to seeds, he shall not eat;” leaves and twigs are also understood. There, they are mentioned for a need, but here, they are mentioned without need. Why? For additions.
Warning for one who eats carcass meat, from where? “You shall not eat any carcass meat.” That covers carcass meat; from a “torn” animal from where? Rebbi Joḥanan said, “carcass meat” and “any carcass meat”, to include the “torn” animal. If somebody eats flesh from a living animal which is “torn”, Rebbi Yasa said, Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagree. Rebbi Joḥanan said, he is guilty twice, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, he is guilty only once. What is the reason of Rebbi Joḥanan? “You shall not eat any carcass meat;” “you shall not eat of life with the flesh.” What is the reason of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? The colleagues said before Rebbi Yose: The assertion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish parallels what Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob stated: “ ‘Flesh torn on the field you shall not eat’, you shall not tear from an animal and eat in the way you tear from the ground and eat.” What is the reason of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? The colleagues before Rebbi Yose: Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish does not hold with Rebbi Joḥanan about the “torn” animal; if he did hold with him, one should be twice guilty. He said to them, even if he held with him, one should be guilty only once. There is a difference, because He repeated it and combined it. They objected: “Suet you shall not eat,” “and blood you shall not eat,” and it is written: “Any suet and any blood you shall not eat.” Then because He repeated it and combined it, one should be guilty only once! He said to them, if it were written “suet and blood”, you would be correct. But it is written “any suet and any blood,” to declare him guilty for each case separately. But it is not written: “Anything soaked with grapes he shall not drink,” and it is written, “from skins to seeds he shall not eat.” Then because He repeated it and combined it, one should be guilty only once! He said to them, if it were written “skins and seeds”, you would be correct. But it is written “skins unto seeds,” to declare him guilty for each case separately.
Warning for one who eats carcass meat, from where? “You shall not eat any carcass meat.” That covers carcass meat; from a “torn” animal from where? Rebbi Joḥanan said, “carcass meat” and “any carcass meat”, to include the “torn” animal. If somebody eats flesh from a living animal which is “torn”, Rebbi Yasa said, Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagree. Rebbi Joḥanan said, he is guilty twice, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, he is guilty only once. What is the reason of Rebbi Joḥanan? “You shall not eat any carcass meat;” “you shall not eat of life with the flesh.” What is the reason of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? The colleagues said before Rebbi Yose: The assertion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish parallels what Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob stated: “ ‘Flesh torn on the field you shall not eat’, you shall not tear from an animal and eat in the way you tear from the ground and eat.” What is the reason of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? The colleagues before Rebbi Yose: Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish does not hold with Rebbi Joḥanan about the “torn” animal; if he did hold with him, one should be twice guilty. He said to them, even if he held with him, one should be guilty only once. There is a difference, because He repeated it and combined it. They objected: “Suet you shall not eat,” “and blood you shall not eat,” and it is written: “Any suet and any blood you shall not eat.” Then because He repeated it and combined it, one should be guilty only once! He said to them, if it were written “suet and blood”, you would be correct. But it is written “any suet and any blood,” to declare him guilty for each case separately. But it is not written: “Anything soaked with grapes he shall not drink,” and it is written, “from skins to seeds he shall not eat.” Then because He repeated it and combined it, one should be guilty only once! He said to them, if it were written “skins and seeds”, you would be correct. But it is written “skins unto seeds,” to declare him guilty for each case separately.
Rebbi [Yose] said to the colleagues: You should know that Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagree: If somebody split a limb from a living animal and ate it, everybody agrees that he is free from prosecution. Where do they disagree? If he split it in his mouth before he ate it. Rebbi Joḥanan considers his mouth as inside, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish considers his mouth as outside. They asked him, what do you say? He answered them, I informed you that mighty mountains disagree, and you ask this? If it is so, even if he split it outside and then ate, he should be guilty! Why? That is how one eats. If somebody split an ant in his mouth and ate it, that is the disagreement of Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. Rebbi Maisha asked Rebbi Ze‘ira: If he split a grape in his mouth and ate it, is that the disagreement of Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? He answered, there it is something for which there is a prohibition and impurity. In a circumstance in which its impurity disappeard, its prohibition disappeared. But here is a prohibition and no impurity. Rebbi Abba ben Rebbi Mamal asked: If he split an olive-sized bit of mazzah in his mouth and ate it, is that the disagreement of Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, in the other cases, his palate did not enjoy an olive sized bit. The rabbis of Caesarea said that Rebbi Nisa asked: If he split in his mouth pomegranate berries which are ‘orlah and ate them, is that the disagreement of Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? Where do we hold? If because of fluids, we already did state: “Nothing makes impure as a drink except what comes from olives and grapes.” The rabbis of Caesarea said, explain it if he swallowed them.
Rebbi Samuel bar Sosarti asked: Then one who eats a limb from a kosher living animal should be guilty on two counts, because of “you shall not eat any carcass meat;” and because of “you shall not eat of life with the flesh.” Does one argue from kosher abour non-kosher animals? But did not Rebbi Eleazar argue from kosher about non-kosher animals? Then one who eats a limb from a non-kosher living animal should be guilty on three counts, because of “you shall not eat any carcass meat;” and because of “you shall not eat of life with the flesh”; and because of “you shall not eat from their flesh.” Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: If somebody ate five ants together, in one forgetting, he is guilty for each one separately because of “creature”. If he fragmented and ate them, he is guilty only once, if together they amount to the volume of an olive. If he ate of the fragments in the volume of an olive, he is guilty; if he ate of the fragments in the volume of an olive and an ant, he is guilty twice. If this is correct, then if he ate of the fragments less than the volume of an olive and an ant completed the volume of an olive, is he guilty twice? If this is correct, if the ate an ant the size of an olive, is he guilty twice? The same rule applies to combinations of a nazir. If he ate of the combinations in the volume of an olive, he is guilty. If he ate of the combinations in the volume of an olive and a grape berry, is he guilty twice? If this is correct, then if he ate a grape berry for the volume ofan olive, is he guilty twice? Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: All [food] prohibitions combine together to be whipped for the volume of an olive, but for an ant one is guilty twice. Then if he ate prohibited food and an ant completed the volume of an olive, he is guilty twice. Then if he ate an ant the volume of an olive, he is guilty twice.
Rebbi Samuel bar Sosarti asked: Then one who eats a limb from a kosher living animal should be guilty on two counts, because of “you shall not eat any carcass meat;” and because of “you shall not eat of life with the flesh.” Does one argue from kosher abour non-kosher animals? But did not Rebbi Eleazar argue from kosher about non-kosher animals? Then one who eats a limb from a non-kosher living animal should be guilty on three counts, because of “you shall not eat any carcass meat;” and because of “you shall not eat of life with the flesh”; and because of “you shall not eat from their flesh.” Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: If somebody ate five ants together, in one forgetting, he is guilty for each one separately because of “creature”. If he fragmented and ate them, he is guilty only once, if together they amount to the volume of an olive. If he ate of the fragments in the volume of an olive, he is guilty; if he ate of the fragments in the volume of an olive and an ant, he is guilty twice. If this is correct, then if he ate of the fragments less than the volume of an olive and an ant completed the volume of an olive, is he guilty twice? If this is correct, if the ate an ant the size of an olive, is he guilty twice? The same rule applies to combinations of a nazir. If he ate of the combinations in the volume of an olive, he is guilty. If he ate of the combinations in the volume of an olive and a grape berry, is he guilty twice? If this is correct, then if he ate a grape berry for the volume ofan olive, is he guilty twice? Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: All [food] prohibitions combine together to be whipped for the volume of an olive, but for an ant one is guilty twice. Then if he ate prohibited food and an ant completed the volume of an olive, he is guilty twice. Then if he ate an ant the volume of an olive, he is guilty twice.
Rebbi Samuel bar Sosarti asked: Then one who eats a limb from a kosher living animal should be guilty on two counts, because of “you shall not eat any carcass meat;” and because of “you shall not eat of life with the flesh.” Does one argue from kosher abour non-kosher animals? But did not Rebbi Eleazar argue from kosher about non-kosher animals? Then one who eats a limb from a non-kosher living animal should be guilty on three counts, because of “you shall not eat any carcass meat;” and because of “you shall not eat of life with the flesh”; and because of “you shall not eat from their flesh.” Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: If somebody ate five ants together, in one forgetting, he is guilty for each one separately because of “creature”. If he fragmented and ate them, he is guilty only once, if together they amount to the volume of an olive. If he ate of the fragments in the volume of an olive, he is guilty; if he ate of the fragments in the volume of an olive and an ant, he is guilty twice. If this is correct, then if he ate of the fragments less than the volume of an olive and an ant completed the volume of an olive, is he guilty twice? If this is correct, if the ate an ant the size of an olive, is he guilty twice? The same rule applies to combinations of a nazir. If he ate of the combinations in the volume of an olive, he is guilty. If he ate of the combinations in the volume of an olive and a grape berry, is he guilty twice? If this is correct, then if he ate a grape berry for the volume ofan olive, is he guilty twice? Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: All [food] prohibitions combine together to be whipped for the volume of an olive, but for an ant one is guilty twice. Then if he ate prohibited food and an ant completed the volume of an olive, he is guilty twice. Then if he ate an ant the volume of an olive, he is guilty twice.
Rebbi Samuel bar Sosarti asked: Then one who eats a limb from a kosher living animal should be guilty on two counts, because of “you shall not eat any carcass meat;” and because of “you shall not eat of life with the flesh.” Does one argue from kosher abour non-kosher animals? But did not Rebbi Eleazar argue from kosher about non-kosher animals? Then one who eats a limb from a non-kosher living animal should be guilty on three counts, because of “you shall not eat any carcass meat;” and because of “you shall not eat of life with the flesh”; and because of “you shall not eat from their flesh.” Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: If somebody ate five ants together, in one forgetting, he is guilty for each one separately because of “creature”. If he fragmented and ate them, he is guilty only once, if together they amount to the volume of an olive. If he ate of the fragments in the volume of an olive, he is guilty; if he ate of the fragments in the volume of an olive and an ant, he is guilty twice. If this is correct, then if he ate of the fragments less than the volume of an olive and an ant completed the volume of an olive, is he guilty twice? If this is correct, if the ate an ant the size of an olive, is he guilty twice? The same rule applies to combinations of a nazir. If he ate of the combinations in the volume of an olive, he is guilty. If he ate of the combinations in the volume of an olive and a grape berry, is he guilty twice? If this is correct, then if he ate a grape berry for the volume ofan olive, is he guilty twice? Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: All [food] prohibitions combine together to be whipped for the volume of an olive, but for an ant one is guilty twice. Then if he ate prohibited food and an ant completed the volume of an olive, he is guilty twice. Then if he ate an ant the volume of an olive, he is guilty twice.
Rebbi Samuel bar Sosarti asked: Then one who eats a limb from a kosher living animal should be guilty on two counts, because of “you shall not eat any carcass meat;” and because of “you shall not eat of life with the flesh.” Does one argue from kosher abour non-kosher animals? But did not Rebbi Eleazar argue from kosher about non-kosher animals? Then one who eats a limb from a non-kosher living animal should be guilty on three counts, because of “you shall not eat any carcass meat;” and because of “you shall not eat of life with the flesh”; and because of “you shall not eat from their flesh.” Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: If somebody ate five ants together, in one forgetting, he is guilty for each one separately because of “creature”. If he fragmented and ate them, he is guilty only once, if together they amount to the volume of an olive. If he ate of the fragments in the volume of an olive, he is guilty; if he ate of the fragments in the volume of an olive and an ant, he is guilty twice. If this is correct, then if he ate of the fragments less than the volume of an olive and an ant completed the volume of an olive, is he guilty twice? If this is correct, if the ate an ant the size of an olive, is he guilty twice? The same rule applies to combinations of a nazir. If he ate of the combinations in the volume of an olive, he is guilty. If he ate of the combinations in the volume of an olive and a grape berry, is he guilty twice? If this is correct, then if he ate a grape berry for the volume ofan olive, is he guilty twice? Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: All [food] prohibitions combine together to be whipped for the volume of an olive, but for an ant one is guilty twice. Then if he ate prohibited food and an ant completed the volume of an olive, he is guilty twice. Then if he ate an ant the volume of an olive, he is guilty twice.
Rebbi Samuel bar Sosarti asked: Then one who eats a limb from a kosher living animal should be guilty on two counts, because of “you shall not eat any carcass meat;” and because of “you shall not eat of life with the flesh.” Does one argue from kosher abour non-kosher animals? But did not Rebbi Eleazar argue from kosher about non-kosher animals? Then one who eats a limb from a non-kosher living animal should be guilty on three counts, because of “you shall not eat any carcass meat;” and because of “you shall not eat of life with the flesh”; and because of “you shall not eat from their flesh.” Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: If somebody ate five ants together, in one forgetting, he is guilty for each one separately because of “creature”. If he fragmented and ate them, he is guilty only once, if together they amount to the volume of an olive. If he ate of the fragments in the volume of an olive, he is guilty; if he ate of the fragments in the volume of an olive and an ant, he is guilty twice. If this is correct, then if he ate of the fragments less than the volume of an olive and an ant completed the volume of an olive, is he guilty twice? If this is correct, if the ate an ant the size of an olive, is he guilty twice? The same rule applies to combinations of a nazir. If he ate of the combinations in the volume of an olive, he is guilty. If he ate of the combinations in the volume of an olive and a grape berry, is he guilty twice? If this is correct, then if he ate a grape berry for the volume ofan olive, is he guilty twice? Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: All [food] prohibitions combine together to be whipped for the volume of an olive, but for an ant one is guilty twice. Then if he ate prohibited food and an ant completed the volume of an olive, he is guilty twice. Then if he ate an ant the volume of an olive, he is guilty twice.
Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: One does not whip for anything imparting taste except imparting taste for the nazir. [Rebbi Ze‘ira said, one does not whip for anything imparting taste until he tasted the forbidden thing itself] except the nazir even if he did not taste the forbidden thing itself. Rebbi Abba bar Mamal said, for food imparting taste what is forbidden and what is permitted is not combined, but for the nazir forbidden and permitted do combine. A baraita supports one and a baraita supports the other. A baraita supports Rebbi Ze‘ira: If wine in the volume of an olive fell into a dish and he ate from it, he cannot be prosecuted unless he ate the entire dish. In the opinion of Rebbi Abba bar Mamal, if he ate the volume of an olive from it he is guilty. A baraita supports Rebbi Abba bar Mamal: “What do we understand when it is said (Num. 6:3): ‘Anything in which grapes were soaked he shall not eat, and fresh or dried grape berries he shall not eat’? What did the verse leave out that was not said? But since it was said (Num. 6:4): ‘anything made from the wine-vine, from grape skins to seeds he should not eat;’ (Num. 6:3) ‘from wine and liquor he shall abstain.’ Why does the verse say ‘anything in which grapes were soaked he should not eat’? It means that if he soaked grapes and then soaked his bread in that, if it adds up to the volume of an olive, he is guilty. From here you argue about all prohibitions of the Torah. Since for all that comes from the vine, whose prohibition is neither permanent, nor a prohibition of usufruct, and whose prohibition can be lifted, He made taste like the thing itself; it is logical that for every prohibition of the Torah which is permanent, is a prohibition of usufruct, whose prohibition cannot be lifted, taste is treated like the thing itself. From here, the Sages inferred that everything imparting taste is forbidden.” This is difficult for Rebbi Ze‘ira: you say everywhere “unless he tasted”, and here you say, “even if he did not taste.”
If before him were two bottles, one of water and one of wine. He took and emptied the water bottle. They said to him, you should know that after you drank the water, if you then drink the wine, since its volume corresponds to ten olives you will be subject to ten whippings; he does not accept warning in this way. But if it was a wine bottle and he started drinking from it when they said to him, you should know that if you then drink it all, since its volume corresponds to ten olives you will be subject to ten whippings; he accepts warning in this way.
If before him were two bottles, one of water and one of wine. He took and emptied the water bottle. They said to him, you should know that after you drank the water, if you then drink the wine, since its volume corresponds to ten olives you will be subject to ten whippings; he does not accept warning in this way. But if it was a wine bottle and he started drinking from it when they said to him, you should know that if you then drink it all, since its volume corresponds to ten olives you will be subject to ten whippings; he accepts warning in this way.
If before him were two roasting spits, one with slaughtered meat and one with carcass meat. He took and ate the slaughtered meat. They said to him, you should know that after you ate the slaughtered meat, if you then ate the carcass meat, since its volume corresponds to ten olives you will be subject to ten whippings; he does not accept warning in this way. But if there was a roasting spit of carcass meat and he started eating from it when they said to him, you should know that if you then ate it all, since its volume corresponds to ten olives you will be subject to ten whippings; he accepts warning in this way.
If before him were two roasting spits, one with slaughtered meat and one with carcass meat. He took and ate the slaughtered meat. They said to him, you should know that after you ate the slaughtered meat, if you then ate the carcass meat, since its volume corresponds to ten olives you will be subject to ten whippings; he does not accept warning in this way. But if there was a roasting spit of carcass meat and he started eating from it when they said to him, you should know that if you then ate it all, since its volume corresponds to ten olives you will be subject to ten whippings; he accepts warning in this way.
MISHNAH: If he shaved for one of the sacrifices and it turned out to be invalid, his shaving is invalid and his sacrifices are not counted for him. If he shaved for the purification offering not in its name but brought the other sacrifices in their names, his shaving is invalid and his sacrifices are not counted for him. If he shaved for the elevation or well-being offerings not in their names but then brought his sacrifices in their names, his shaving is invalid and his sacrifices are not counted for him. Rebbi Simeon says, that sacrifice is not counted for him but the others are counted for him. But if he shaved for all three and one of them is valid, his shaving is valid and he has to repeat the other sacrifices.
HALAKHAH: Is it counted for him and his shaving? If you would say that it is not counted for him and his shaving, then his sacrifices count for nothing. Rebbi Joḥanan asked: Following Rebbi Simeon, may he shave for his holiday well-being offerings? Is that not the Mishnah? “Rebbi Simeon says, that sacrifice is not counted for him but the others are counted for him.” When he slaughtered them are they not like voluntary well-being offerings? This means that he may shave for voluntary well-being offerings following Rebbi Simeon. Rebbi Yose bar Abun said, Rav Ada bar Aḥawa and Rebbi Joḥanan. For Rav Ada bar Aḥawa it is problematic, but for Rebbi Joḥanan it is obvious.
MISHNAH: If one of the bloods had been sprinkled for him when he became impure, Rebbi Eliezer says, he has to repeat everything. But the Sages say, he shall bring his remaining sacrifices once he became pure again. They told him, it happened with Miriam the Palmyrene, that one of the bloods had been sprinkled for her when she was informed that her daughter was dying; she went and found her dead; then the Sages said, she shall bring her remaining sacrifices once she becomes pure again.
HALAKHAH: The argument of Rebbi Eliezer seems inverted. There, he says: “he has to repeat only for 30,” and here, he says so? Rebbi Joḥanan says, he has to repeat all his sacrifices. It is obvious, if it would have been valid without him becoming impure, then why is it not valid if later he becomes impure? Rebbi Ḥinena said, is that not Rebbi Eliezer’s? And Rebbi Eliezer follows the Shammaites, as it was stated: Concerning a nazir who lost all his hair, the House of Shammai say, he has to move a shaving knife over his head; the House of Hillel say, he does not need to move a shaving knife over his head.
So is the Mishnah: He shall become pure again and then bring his remaining sacrifices. So is the Mishnah: She shall become pure again and then bring her remaining sacrifices.
So is the Mishnah: He shall become pure again and then bring his remaining sacrifices. So is the Mishnah: She shall become pure again and then bring her remaining sacrifices.
HALAKHAH: “The nazir shaves for the following impurities,” etc. An old man asked Rebbi Joḥanan: If the volume of an olive from a corpse makes impure, then certainly all of it also? He said to him, to include the stillbirth which did not reach the volume of an olive. He continued to ask: If a limb of a corpse makes impure, then certainly all of it also? He said to him, to include the stillbirth whose limbs did not yet jell. Rebbi Yose said, was that old man wise? His questions were not wise since after he asked the first question, it was not necessary to ask the second. If he wanted to ask both, he should have asked the second and after that the first. The students of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥalaphta asked the second but did not ask the first because it was obvious for them that if he did not reach the volume of an olive it is certain that his limbs did not yet jell. Rebbi Mana bar Ḥizqiah said, do you remember when Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa was here, were not both questions by that old man [asked] about Ahilut that the nazir shaves for them? In addition, from what Rebbi Joḥanan said, I thought that the stillbirths were not Torah. But since he makes his mother sit days of purity, it is implied that [the rules of] stillbirths are Torah.
HALAKHAH: “The nazir shaves for the following impurities,” etc. An old man asked Rebbi Joḥanan: If the volume of an olive from a corpse makes impure, then certainly all of it also? He said to him, to include the stillbirth which did not reach the volume of an olive. He continued to ask: If a limb of a corpse makes impure, then certainly all of it also? He said to him, to include the stillbirth whose limbs did not yet jell. Rebbi Yose said, was that old man wise? His questions were not wise since after he asked the first question, it was not necessary to ask the second. If he wanted to ask both, he should have asked the second and after that the first. The students of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥalaphta asked the second but did not ask the first because it was obvious for them that if he did not reach the volume of an olive it is certain that his limbs did not yet jell. Rebbi Mana bar Ḥizqiah said, do you remember when Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa was here, were not both questions by that old man [asked] about Ahilut that the nazir shaves for them? In addition, from what Rebbi Joḥanan said, I thought that the stillbirths were not Torah. But since he makes his mother sit days of purity, it is implied that [the rules of] stillbirths are Torah.
What is decayed matter? Flesh of the corpse which was separated and fluid that coagulated. Therefore not when it is still mashed? Did not Rebbi Ḥanina say in the name of Rebbi: Fat from a corpse which was melted remains impure; if he cut it and then melted it, it is pure. Rebbi Yudan and Rebbi Yose, one says to exclude the fluid in the flesh; the other says that if it will fill the volume of an olive when congealed, it will be impure when still mashed.
We have stated: “Rebbi Yose said, dried flesh from a corpse which even if soaked will not return to its former status is pure. What is Rebbi Yose’s reason? Did he not infer this from a carcass? From a carcass, since a dried carcass is pure, so also a dried corpse should be pure. Rebbi Immi asked: Since a foul-smelling carcass is pure, would a foul-smelling corpse also be pure? Then there can be no decayed matter for Rebbi Yose! It was found stated in Rebbi Yose’s name that there was decayed matter. The colleagues asked before Rebbi Yose: Since a carcass has no decay, so a corpse should have no decay! He told them that he inferred from an animal only for the flesh, not for the bones. There is no decay from flesh, there is decay from bones, as Bar Qappara stated, “decay of bones is jealousy.” Rebbi Yannai said, “or a grave”, even if one touched the first Adam’s grave. The colleagues say, he transposes the verse: “or a grave qbr” means “or decay rqb”. Bar Qappara stated, “or a grave qbr”, “or decay rqb”.
“They shall fall away, for his vow of nazir is impure.” From here that the days of impurity fall away. Then should he invalidate? He invalidates only the days of [impurity of] the dead. Why should they not be counted? If you say that days in which he causes [impurity to] couch and seat are counted, days in which he does not cause [impurity to] couch and seat are certainly counted! What did you see to say that they are not counted? Rebbi [] said in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: “For a wild growth of his head’s hair”. Days of hair growth are counted, days preparing for shaving are not counted. So far in his days of counting; in the days of his definite status? Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai: “Please do not let her be like a corpse.” Since the days of a corpse are not counted, the days of quarantine are not counted. A student quoted this saying cf Rebbi Joḥanan’s before Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, who did not accept it. He said to him: Here, you call it quarantine, but there, you want to call it absolute; you cannot do that. For Rebbi Joḥanan said in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: “Please do not let her be like a corpse; let her be quarantined.” Just as the days of the dead are seven, so the days of quarantine are seven.
MISHNAH: If a person said to two nezirim: I saw one of you becoming impure but I do not know which one of you it was, they bring one sacrifice of impurity and one of purity. One of them says, if I am impure, the sacrifice of impurity is mine and that of purity is yours; otherwise the sacrifice of purity is mine and that of impurity is yours. Then they count another thirty days and bring one sacrifice of purity; (Mishnah 2) one of them says, if I was impure, the sacrifice of impurity was mine and that of purity was yours, hence this is my sacrifice of purity; otherwise the sacrifice of purity was mine and that of impurity was yours, hence this is your sacrifice of purity. If one of them died, Rebbi Joshua said, he should seek out a person from the general public who would make a vow of nazir corresponding to his needs and say: If I was impure, you are a nazir immediately, but if I was pure, you are a nazir after 30 days. They count 30 days and bring one sacrifice of impurity and one of purity (Mishnah 3) and he says: If I am impure, the sacrifice of impurity is mine and that of purity is yours; otherwise the sacrifice of purity is mine and that of impurity is questionable. Then they count another thirty days, bring one sacrifice of purity (Mishnah 4) and he says: If I was impure, the sacrifice of impurity was mine and that of purity was yours, hence this is my sacrifice of purity; otherwise the sacrifice of purity was mine and that of impurity was questionable; hence this is your sacrifice of purity. Ben Zoma said to him, who would accommodate him to make a vow of nazir corresponding to his needs? But he brings a bird as purification offering and an animal as elevation offering and says: If I was impure, the purification offering is for my obligation and the elevation offering is voluntary. But if I was pure, the elevation offering is for my obligation and the purification offering is questionable. Then he counts 30 days and brings one sacrifice (of impurity and one) of purity (Mishnah 5) and says: If I was impure, the first elevation offering was voluntary and the one now is for my obligation. But if I was pure, the first elevation offering was for my obligation and now I am bringing the remainder of my sacrifices. Rebbi Joshua said, then it turns out that he brings his sacrifices piecemeal! But the Sages accepted the words of Ben Zoma.
MISHNAH: If a person said to two nezirim: I saw one of you becoming impure but I do not know which one of you it was, they bring one sacrifice of impurity and one of purity. One of them says, if I am impure, the sacrifice of impurity is mine and that of purity is yours; otherwise the sacrifice of purity is mine and that of impurity is yours. Then they count another thirty days and bring one sacrifice of purity; (Mishnah 2) one of them says, if I was impure, the sacrifice of impurity was mine and that of purity was yours, hence this is my sacrifice of purity; otherwise the sacrifice of purity was mine and that of impurity was yours, hence this is your sacrifice of purity. If one of them died, Rebbi Joshua said, he should seek out a person from the general public who would make a vow of nazir corresponding to his needs and say: If I was impure, you are a nazir immediately, but if I was pure, you are a nazir after 30 days. They count 30 days and bring one sacrifice of impurity and one of purity (Mishnah 3) and he says: If I am impure, the sacrifice of impurity is mine and that of purity is yours; otherwise the sacrifice of purity is mine and that of impurity is questionable. Then they count another thirty days, bring one sacrifice of purity (Mishnah 4) and he says: If I was impure, the sacrifice of impurity was mine and that of purity was yours, hence this is my sacrifice of purity; otherwise the sacrifice of purity was mine and that of impurity was questionable; hence this is your sacrifice of purity. Ben Zoma said to him, who would accommodate him to make a vow of nazir corresponding to his needs? But he brings a bird as purification offering and an animal as elevation offering and says: If I was impure, the purification offering is for my obligation and the elevation offering is voluntary. But if I was pure, the elevation offering is for my obligation and the purification offering is questionable. Then he counts 30 days and brings one sacrifice (of impurity and one) of purity (Mishnah 5) and says: If I was impure, the first elevation offering was voluntary and the one now is for my obligation. But if I was pure, the first elevation offering was for my obligation and now I am bringing the remainder of my sacrifices. Rebbi Joshua said, then it turns out that he brings his sacrifices piecemeal! But the Sages accepted the words of Ben Zoma.
MISHNAH: If a person said to two nezirim: I saw one of you becoming impure but I do not know which one of you it was, they bring one sacrifice of impurity and one of purity. One of them says, if I am impure, the sacrifice of impurity is mine and that of purity is yours; otherwise the sacrifice of purity is mine and that of impurity is yours. Then they count another thirty days and bring one sacrifice of purity; (Mishnah 2) one of them says, if I was impure, the sacrifice of impurity was mine and that of purity was yours, hence this is my sacrifice of purity; otherwise the sacrifice of purity was mine and that of impurity was yours, hence this is your sacrifice of purity. If one of them died, Rebbi Joshua said, he should seek out a person from the general public who would make a vow of nazir corresponding to his needs and say: If I was impure, you are a nazir immediately, but if I was pure, you are a nazir after 30 days. They count 30 days and bring one sacrifice of impurity and one of purity (Mishnah 3) and he says: If I am impure, the sacrifice of impurity is mine and that of purity is yours; otherwise the sacrifice of purity is mine and that of impurity is questionable. Then they count another thirty days, bring one sacrifice of purity (Mishnah 4) and he says: If I was impure, the sacrifice of impurity was mine and that of purity was yours, hence this is my sacrifice of purity; otherwise the sacrifice of purity was mine and that of impurity was questionable; hence this is your sacrifice of purity. Ben Zoma said to him, who would accommodate him to make a vow of nazir corresponding to his needs? But he brings a bird as purification offering and an animal as elevation offering and says: If I was impure, the purification offering is for my obligation and the elevation offering is voluntary. But if I was pure, the elevation offering is for my obligation and the purification offering is questionable. Then he counts 30 days and brings one sacrifice (of impurity and one) of purity (Mishnah 5) and says: If I was impure, the first elevation offering was voluntary and the one now is for my obligation. But if I was pure, the first elevation offering was for my obligation and now I am bringing the remainder of my sacrifices. Rebbi Joshua said, then it turns out that he brings his sacrifices piecemeal! But the Sages accepted the words of Ben Zoma.
MISHNAH: If a person said to two nezirim: I saw one of you becoming impure but I do not know which one of you it was, they bring one sacrifice of impurity and one of purity. One of them says, if I am impure, the sacrifice of impurity is mine and that of purity is yours; otherwise the sacrifice of purity is mine and that of impurity is yours. Then they count another thirty days and bring one sacrifice of purity; (Mishnah 2) one of them says, if I was impure, the sacrifice of impurity was mine and that of purity was yours, hence this is my sacrifice of purity; otherwise the sacrifice of purity was mine and that of impurity was yours, hence this is your sacrifice of purity. If one of them died, Rebbi Joshua said, he should seek out a person from the general public who would make a vow of nazir corresponding to his needs and say: If I was impure, you are a nazir immediately, but if I was pure, you are a nazir after 30 days. They count 30 days and bring one sacrifice of impurity and one of purity (Mishnah 3) and he says: If I am impure, the sacrifice of impurity is mine and that of purity is yours; otherwise the sacrifice of purity is mine and that of impurity is questionable. Then they count another thirty days, bring one sacrifice of purity (Mishnah 4) and he says: If I was impure, the sacrifice of impurity was mine and that of purity was yours, hence this is my sacrifice of purity; otherwise the sacrifice of purity was mine and that of impurity was questionable; hence this is your sacrifice of purity. Ben Zoma said to him, who would accommodate him to make a vow of nazir corresponding to his needs? But he brings a bird as purification offering and an animal as elevation offering and says: If I was impure, the purification offering is for my obligation and the elevation offering is voluntary. But if I was pure, the elevation offering is for my obligation and the purification offering is questionable. Then he counts 30 days and brings one sacrifice (of impurity and one) of purity (Mishnah 5) and says: If I was impure, the first elevation offering was voluntary and the one now is for my obligation. But if I was pure, the first elevation offering was for my obligation and now I am bringing the remainder of my sacrifices. Rebbi Joshua said, then it turns out that he brings his sacrifices piecemeal! But the Sages accepted the words of Ben Zoma.
HALAKHAH: “If a person said to two nezirim,” etc. Not only if he said to one of them, “I saw one of you becoming impure but I do not know which one of you it was,” but even if he said, “I saw one of you vowing to be a nazir but I do not know which one of you it was,” both of them have to follow the rules of nazir because of his testimony. If they do not contradict him. But if they contradict him, this does not apply. If both of them contradict, it parallels the following: “If one witness says, he became impure, but he says, I did not become impure, he is pure. If two witnesses say, he became impure, but he says, I did not become impure, the two are believed more than he is, the words of Rebbi Meïr. But the Sages say, everybody is believed about himself.” Rav Jehudah in the name of Rav: So is the Mishnah: Rebbi Meïr declares impure, Rebbi Jehudah and the Sages declare pure. Rebbi Joḥanan said, so is the Mishnah: Rebbi Meïr declares impure, Rebbi Jehudah declares pure. The rabbis’ words support Rebbi Joḥanan, since Rebbi Gurion said in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: Rebbi Jehudah said this only about an old impurity, for he can say to them, I had been impure but I purified myself, and we have stated: The same holds for eating suet; the same holds for entering the Sanctuary. Should they not accept his position for impurity? Because of the impurity of a nazir, could they not say, where is the sacrifice which you brought? Then should they not accept his position for heave? So far the questions of Rebbi Ḥanina.
From what Rebbi Yose said, “X ate suet, and they warned him,” he is not whipped. If one person said to him, you are a nazir, and based on this testimony he behaved like a nazir, when then he drank wine or became impure in the impurity of the dead, if two warned him, he is whipped. Is not the main testimony given by a single witness? From what Rebbi Mana said, “X is the wife of a Cohen and whored; her husband, a Cohen, then had relations with her but I had warned him;” he is [not] whipped. If she went to a secluded place in the presence of two, and one said, I saw her that she became impure; when her husband, the Cohen, had relations with her but two had warned him, he is whipped. Is not the main testimony given by a single witness?
From what Rebbi Yose said, “X ate suet, and they warned him,” he is not whipped. If one person said to him, you are a nazir, and based on this testimony he behaved like a nazir, when then he drank wine or became impure in the impurity of the dead, if two warned him, he is whipped. Is not the main testimony given by a single witness? From what Rebbi Mana said, “X is the wife of a Cohen and whored; her husband, a Cohen, then had relations with her but I had warned him;” he is [not] whipped. If she went to a secluded place in the presence of two, and one said, I saw her that she became impure; when her husband, the Cohen, had relations with her but two had warned him, he is whipped. Is not the main testimony given by a single witness?
HALAKHAH: Who is doubtfully definitely [suffering]? Two who came to him. He declared one of them definitively affected but before he could declare the second one definitively affected, they were changed for him. That is a doubtfully definitely [suffering person]. This is the one about whom Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: A nazir, in doubt whether impure or pure, but certainly he was a nazir. A sufferer from skin disease, in doubt whether impure or pure, but certainly he was a sufferer from skin disease. He eats from sacrificial meat after 60 days, drinks wine and defiles himself for the dead after 120 days. How is that? One said to him, you are an impure nazir, go count seven [days]. He sprinkled, repeated, shaved, and brought. He then counted seven [days] and wanted to shave. One said to him, impure nazir, go count seven [days] and continue for 30. He counted 30 [days] and wanted to shave. One said to him, you are a pure nazir, does not a pure nazir shave on kinds of blood? He brings an elevation offering and shaves on it, a bird purification offering and stipulates, saying: “If I was impure, the purification offering is my obligation and the elevation offering is voluntary. If I was pure, the elevation offering is my obligation and the purification offering is in doubt.” He shaves his head, his beard, and his eyebrows in the way the sufferer from skin disease shaves.
What is the status of his hair? Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa: Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagreed. Rebbi Joḥanan said, his hair is forbidden; Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, his hair is permitted. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked: Do they disagree about a sufferer from skin disease who made a vow of nazir or do they disagree about a nazir who became a sufferer from skin disease? If you say that they disagree about a sufferer from skin disease who made a vow of nazir, then for a nazir who became a sufferer from skin disease everybody agrees that it is forbidden. If you say that they disagree about a nazir who became a sufferer from skin disease, then for a sufferer from skin disease who made a vow of nazir everybody agrees that it is permitted. For Rebbi Jeremiah it was obvious that they disagreed about a sufferer from skin disease who made a vow of nazir. Therefore, for a nazir who became a sufferer from skin disease everybody agrees that it is permitted
What is the status of his hair? Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa: Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagreed. Rebbi Joḥanan said, his hair is forbidden; Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, his hair is permitted. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked: Do they disagree about a sufferer from skin disease who made a vow of nazir or do they disagree about a nazir who became a sufferer from skin disease? If you say that they disagree about a sufferer from skin disease who made a vow of nazir, then for a nazir who became a sufferer from skin disease everybody agrees that it is forbidden. If you say that they disagree about a nazir who became a sufferer from skin disease, then for a sufferer from skin disease who made a vow of nazir everybody agrees that it is permitted. For Rebbi Jeremiah it was obvious that they disagreed about a sufferer from skin disease who made a vow of nazir. Therefore, for a nazir who became a sufferer from skin disease everybody agrees that it is permitted
The following is obvious: If he became impure and then was manumitted, he brings a sacrifice of impurity. When is that, if his master forced him or if his master did not force him? If you say that he forced him, how can be bring a sacrifice of impurity? If you say he did not force him, should he not count for his master as long as he still is in the latter’s power? Rebbi Yose said, we are dealing with the case that his master forced him. You should not say that because he was manumitted, the nezirut in impurity was lifted from him. Therefore, it was necessary to say that he counts nezirut in impurity.
It is written: “The unwell woman in her separation and the sufferer from flux in his flux.” Since the menstruating woman may become impure also by accident, so the sufferer from flux may become impure also by accident. Then even at his first episode? Rebbi Ze‘ira said, from the moment he becomes like a menstruating woman.
MISHNAH: If somebody injured another person who was judged dying and then this person’s state improved but later he died, he is guilty. Rebbi Neḥemiah says, he cannot be prosecuted since it is not unsubstantiated.
A case came before Rebbi Joshua ben Levi. He said to him, it is unnecessary. The opinion of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi seems inverted. There, Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said, there is a difference because they are not conversant with the fine points of bills of divorce, but here, he says so? The colleagues in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: What you said was in earlier times when no Fellows were found outside the Land, but now that there are Fellows found outside the Land, they are competent. But did we not state, “and one who brings there”? And even if you say that no Fellows are found outside the Land, are we not found in the Land of Israel? In order not to make a distinction in the bills of divorce from outside the Land. But then one who brings from overseas should not have to say: “It was written before me and signed before me.” Not to make a distinction in the bills of divorce in the Land of Israel. What about it? One is restrictive in a simple case because of the complicated one and one is not permissive in the complicated because of the easy one. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Simeon bar Abba: This of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi, if it was done. But from the start even Rebbi Joshua ben Levi agrees.
Everybody agrees that if [the husband] comes and protests, his protest is invalid. That is, if he protested after she remarried. If he protested before she remarried and then she remarried? Let us hear from the following: It happened that somebody brought a bill of divorce before Rebbi Ismael. He asked him, from where are you? He answered, from Kefar Simai in the region of Acco. He said to him, then you have to say, “it was written and signed in my presence;” you do not need witnesses. After [that person] left, Rebbi Ilai said to him, my teacher, is not Kefar Simai in the Land of Israel, closer to Sepphoris than to Acco? He answered, since the matter was resolved in a permissive way; it stands. What means “since the matter was resolved in a permissive way; it stands”? Rebbi Ze‘ira said, that if [the husband] came and protested, his protest would be invalid. But does a person who brings a bill of divorce from the Land of Israel for delivery in the Land of Israel have to say, “it was written and signed in my presence”? Therefore, there cannot be any difference whether he protested after she remarried or before she remarried and then she remarried.
Everybody agrees that if [the husband] comes and protests, his protest is invalid. That is, if he protested after she remarried. If he protested before she remarried and then she remarried? Let us hear from the following: It happened that somebody brought a bill of divorce before Rebbi Ismael. He asked him, from where are you? He answered, from Kefar Simai in the region of Acco. He said to him, then you have to say, “it was written and signed in my presence;” you do not need witnesses. After [that person] left, Rebbi Ilai said to him, my teacher, is not Kefar Simai in the Land of Israel, closer to Sepphoris than to Acco? He answered, since the matter was resolved in a permissive way; it stands. What means “since the matter was resolved in a permissive way; it stands”? Rebbi Ze‘ira said, that if [the husband] came and protested, his protest would be invalid. But does a person who brings a bill of divorce from the Land of Israel for delivery in the Land of Israel have to say, “it was written and signed in my presence”? Therefore, there cannot be any difference whether he protested after she remarried or before she remarried and then she remarried.
Everybody agrees that if [the husband] comes and protests, his protest is invalid. That is, if he protested after she remarried. If he protested before she remarried and then she remarried? Let us hear from the following: It happened that somebody brought a bill of divorce before Rebbi Ismael. He asked him, from where are you? He answered, from Kefar Simai in the region of Acco. He said to him, then you have to say, “it was written and signed in my presence;” you do not need witnesses. After [that person] left, Rebbi Ilai said to him, my teacher, is not Kefar Simai in the Land of Israel, closer to Sepphoris than to Acco? He answered, since the matter was resolved in a permissive way; it stands. What means “since the matter was resolved in a permissive way; it stands”? Rebbi Ze‘ira said, that if [the husband] came and protested, his protest would be invalid. But does a person who brings a bill of divorce from the Land of Israel for delivery in the Land of Israel have to say, “it was written and signed in my presence”? Therefore, there cannot be any difference whether he protested after she remarried or before she remarried and then she remarried.
As it was stated: “If somebody brings a bill of divorce from overseas which was not written and signed in his presence, he returns the bill to its place of origin, presents it to a court and has its signatures notarized. Then he does not have so say, ‘it was written and signed before me’, but he says, ‘I am deputized by the court.’ ”
HALAKHAH: “Any document signed by a Samaritan is invalid,” etc. They are suspected about money; about money they were disqualified.They are not suspected about incest and adultery. And testimony in capital criminal cases has the same status as testimony about incest and adultery. Then even if both of them are Samaritans? There is a difference, for they are not conversant with the fine points of bills of divorce. Then even one Samaritan witness should be disqualified! Rebbi Abin said, explain it if a Jew signed last. Rebbi Yose said, that is according to the opinion that the witnesses may sign separately, not in the presence of each other. But according to him who says that witnesses may sign only in the presence of each other, it is valid even if the Samaritan signed last.
HALAKHAH: “Any document signed by a Samaritan is invalid,” etc. They are suspected about money; about money they were disqualified.They are not suspected about incest and adultery. And testimony in capital criminal cases has the same status as testimony about incest and adultery. Then even if both of them are Samaritans? There is a difference, for they are not conversant with the fine points of bills of divorce. Then even one Samaritan witness should be disqualified! Rebbi Abin said, explain it if a Jew signed last. Rebbi Yose said, that is according to the opinion that the witnesses may sign separately, not in the presence of each other. But according to him who says that witnesses may sign only in the presence of each other, it is valid even if the Samaritan signed last.
Why are Samaritans disqualified? Rebbi Joḥanan said, because they are lions’ proselytes. But if somebody converted not for Heaven’s sake and then converted for Heaven’s sake, does one not accept him? Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: Because the child is a bastard if a Gentile or a slave have intercourse with a Jewish woman. But did not Rebbi Aqiba say, they are genuine proselytes? Because they require levirate marriage from the preliminarily married and free the definitively married. But do not the rabbis say, there is no bastard from a sister-in-law? Because they are not conversant with the fine points in writing bills of divorce. But does not Rabban Gamliel accept their bills of divorce? Rebbi Jacob bar Idi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Because they intermingled with the priests of the High Places: “He chose priests from the borderline of the people,”. Rebbi Ila said, from the “thorns” of the people, i. e., from the disqualified of the people.
Rebbi Aḥa said, the acts of a Gentile court are public knowledge. Then even if both [witnesses] are Samaritan? Did one not say that they are not conversant with the fine points in writing bills of divorce? But Rebbi Simeon validates their bills of divorce! Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira: It turns out that Rebbi Simeon agrees with Rebbi Eleazar. Just as Rebbi Eleazar said, even if no witnesses signed on it, it is valid, so Rebbi Simeon said, even if no witnesses signed on it, it is valid. But then even if it was made by private persons? This shows that it was necessary that Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, the acts of a Gentile court are public knowledge. A bond was executed in Bet Shean, whose witnesses were Gentiles. Rebbi Yose says, Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagree, one said it is invalid, the other said it is valid. Rebbi Abbahu explained: Rebbi Joḥanan said it is invalid, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said it is valid. What is Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish’s reason? That a Jew should not lose money. But if that one would not lose money, the other would lose money! Rebbi Yudan said, it must be in order not to close the door before people, for tomorrow one would look to borrow but does not succeed.
Rebbi Aḥa said, the acts of a Gentile court are public knowledge. Then even if both [witnesses] are Samaritan? Did one not say that they are not conversant with the fine points in writing bills of divorce? But Rebbi Simeon validates their bills of divorce! Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira: It turns out that Rebbi Simeon agrees with Rebbi Eleazar. Just as Rebbi Eleazar said, even if no witnesses signed on it, it is valid, so Rebbi Simeon said, even if no witnesses signed on it, it is valid. But then even if it was made by private persons? This shows that it was necessary that Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, the acts of a Gentile court are public knowledge. A bond was executed in Bet Shean, whose witnesses were Gentiles. Rebbi Yose says, Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagree, one said it is invalid, the other said it is valid. Rebbi Abbahu explained: Rebbi Joḥanan said it is invalid, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said it is valid. What is Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish’s reason? That a Jew should not lose money. But if that one would not lose money, the other would lose money! Rebbi Yudan said, it must be in order not to close the door before people, for tomorrow one would look to borrow but does not succeed.
“ ‘Give this mina to X,’ then he died. If the heirs want to hinder [the delivery] they are powerless. It is unnecessary to say that it is so if he said, acquire for him, if he said, accept by my orders.” Rebbi Abba barMamal said, this baraita refers to a sick person. If he is sick, does he not have to say: acquire for him, accept for him? Rebbi Mana said, I confirmed this by what Rebbi Abba bar Rav Huna said in the name of Rav: They treated verbal instructions by a sick person as if they were written and delivered. But only if he died from that sickness, not if he recovered, he did not have to say: acquire for him, accept for him.
HALAKHAH: “If it was written during daytime and signed during daytime,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said, it is invalid because of the usufruct. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish told him, then you should also be suspicious of the bills of divorce brought from overseas; maybe they were written during daytime and signed in the night! He answered him, there the forgery is intrinsic, here it is extrinsic.
What is Rebbi Yose the Galilean’s reason? “Scroll.” Since a scroll is special in not being a living being, so no living being. Since a scroll is not food, so no food. What is the rabbis’ reason? “Scroll.” Since a scroll is detached, so everything detached. Are stalks of food in Rebbi Yose the Galilean’s opinion like food? Let us hear from the following: If he wrote it on a deer’s antlers, shaved it off, had it signed, and gave it to him, it is valid. Because he shaved it off before he had it signed. Therefore, not if he had it signed and afterwards shaved it off. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Miasha: Only if he wrote on the male horn. But if he wrote on the sheath it is as if separated and is valid. Rebbi Jonah asked: Is that the same for preparation of produce? If he desired that it should rain on an animal and [the rain] dropped from the animal on food. There, Rebbi Yose said “a scroll”, since a scroll is special in not being a living being, so no living being; and here, does he say so? There is a difference since it is written, “any drinkable drink in any vessel shall be impure”. Then also if it rained into cisterns, ditches and caves? There is a difference here, for it is written: “a vessel”.
HALAKHAH: “One does not write on anything connected to the ground,” etc. This does not disagree with Rebbi Joḥanan, since Rebbi Joḥanan said, writing the essential text with the formula is valid. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, writing the essential text with the formula is invalid. Samuel bar Abba asked: If he wrote and signed it when detached, then he connected it again, detached it, and delivered it to her; what does Rebbi Jehudah say? Rebbi Eleazar said, Rebbi Abin asked: If he wrote and signed it when detached, then he connected again, signed, and detached it, and delivered it to her; what do the rabbis say?
HALAKHAH: “One does not write on anything connected to the ground,” etc. This does not disagree with Rebbi Joḥanan, since Rebbi Joḥanan said, writing the essential text with the formula is valid. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, writing the essential text with the formula is invalid. Samuel bar Abba asked: If he wrote and signed it when detached, then he connected it again, detached it, and delivered it to her; what does Rebbi Jehudah say? Rebbi Eleazar said, Rebbi Abin asked: If he wrote and signed it when detached, then he connected again, signed, and detached it, and delivered it to her; what do the rabbis say?
MISHNAH: If the minor received it and became an adult, the deaf-and-dumb and started talking, the blind and became seeing, the insane and became sane, the Gentile and converted, it remains invalid. But if a hearing person became deaf-and-dumb, then regained his hearing, a seeing person became blind, then regained his vision, a sane person became insane, then regained his sanity, it is valid. This is the principle: Whenever the beginning and the end was in full competence, it is valid.
MISHNAH: If the minor received it and became an adult, the deaf-and-dumb and started talking, the blind and became seeing, the insane and became sane, the Gentile and converted, it remains invalid. But if a hearing person became deaf-and-dumb, then regained his hearing, a seeing person became blind, then regained his vision, a sane person became insane, then regained his sanity, it is valid. This is the principle: Whenever the beginning and the end was in full competence, it is valid.
MISHNAH: If the minor received it and became an adult, the deaf-and-dumb and started talking, the blind and became seeing, the insane and became sane, the Gentile and converted, it remains invalid. But if a hearing person became deaf-and-dumb, then regained his hearing, a seeing person became blind, then regained his vision, a sane person became insane, then regained his sanity, it is valid. This is the principle: Whenever the beginning and the end was in full competence, it is valid.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody writes formulaic texts of bills of divorce,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said, writing the essential text with the formula is valid. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, writing the essential text with the formula is invalid. The Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If somebody writes formulaic texts of bills of divorce he has to leave space for the man, the woman, and the time.” He explains it, with the essential text. It is difficult for Rebbi Joḥanan: Do the Sages declare valid in case he wrote the essential text with the formulaic text? Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira: From its invalidity you learn its validity. If he wrote everything in her name but the husband’s and the wife’s names not in her name, would that be valid? Similarly, if he wrote everything not in her name but the husband’s and the wife’s names in her name, it is valid. Rebbi Yose asked Rebbi Jeremiah: Think of it, if it was paired? He said, so said his teacher Rebbi Ze‘ira to him: Since pairing is infrequent, even if there was pairing it is as if there was no pairing. Then it is difficult for Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Even if he did not write the essential text in the formula, Rebbi Jehudah declares invalid! Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Ze‘ira: Rebbi Jehudah refers to something else; it follows what Simeon bar Abba said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: An empty space of two lines about one subject is invalid in any case.
What is “the good order”? Rebbi Sabbatai in the name of Ḥizqiah: Because of the good order of Jewish women, lest they frequently be divorced. Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac asked Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba: It is valid, and you say so? If it were invalid, then [the explanation] would be acceptable. Rebbi Abun said, for the good order of the scribe, that his livelihood be guaranteed.
Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Uqba in the name of Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina: The Mishnah speaks of the heirs in priesthood and Levitic status. But concerning the poor, the poor has no inheritance. Bar Qappara stated: No person is immune from this; if not he then his son, if not his son then his grandson. This means, he can change the terms. Can the creditor change the terms? Let us hear from the following: “If somebody lends money to a first rich and then poor person he cannot separate for him, for one does not separate for what was lost and the poor acquired what is in his hand.” This implies that the creditor cannot change the terms.
Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Uqba in the name of Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina: The Mishnah speaks of the heirs in priesthood and Levitic status. But concerning the poor, the poor has no inheritance. Bar Qappara stated: No person is immune from this; if not he then his son, if not his son then his grandson. This means, he can change the terms. Can the creditor change the terms? Let us hear from the following: “If somebody lends money to a first rich and then poor person he cannot separate for him, for one does not separate for what was lost and the poor acquired what is in his hand.” This implies that the creditor cannot change the terms.
Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Uqba in the name of Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina: The Mishnah speaks of the heirs in priesthood and Levitic status. But concerning the poor, the poor has no inheritance. Bar Qappara stated: No person is immune from this; if not he then his son, if not his son then his grandson. This means, he can change the terms. Can the creditor change the terms? Let us hear from the following: “If somebody lends money to a first rich and then poor person he cannot separate for him, for one does not separate for what was lost and the poor acquired what is in his hand.” This implies that the creditor cannot change the terms.
For freshly pressed wine one can allow for up to forty days presuming that it is wine; Rebbi Jehudah says, up to a break point. You find that there is a leniency and a restriction following Rebbi Jehudah, and a leniency and a restriction following the rabbis. A leniency following Rebbi Jehudah, if a break point arrived before forty days had passed, and a restriction if forty days passed without break point that he cannot give heave. A leniency following the rabbis, if forty days passed without break point that he cannot give heave, and a restriction, if a break point arrived before forty days had passed that he cannot give heave. Rebbi Simon asked: If the fortieth day arrived and he did not check. He was lazy for two or three days, then he came and found it to be vinegar. Is it retroactively considered to be vinegar or only from there on to the future? What is the difference? If he had transgressed and given heave. If you say that retroactively it is considered to be vinegar, his heave is heave. From there on to the future it is not heave. If he had checked an amphora to continuously give heave from it. When he returned, he found it to be vinegar. Rebbi Simon in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: The first three days it certainly is wine, the last vinegar, and the middle ones are in doubt. Rebbi Abbahu said, I heard that from Rebbi Joshua ben Levi; Rebbi Joḥanan did not say so but the first three days it certainly is wine, after that it is in doubt. Do they differ in the treatment of doubt? What Rebbi Joḥanan said refers to the case that he came and found it to be stale vinegar. What Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said refers to the case that he came and found it to be strong vinegar. Or their difference equals another difference, for what we have stated there: “A rusty or broken needle is pure.” It was stated: He put it down smooth, then he came and found it rusty. Rebbi Simon in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: The first three days it certainly is impure, the last pure, and the middle ones are in doubt. Rebbi Abbahu said, that is what Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said; Rebbi Joḥanan did not say so but the first three days it certainly is impure, after that it is in doubt. Rebbi Ila, Rebbi Abba and Rebbi Eleazar in the name of all rabbis who are frequenting the House of Study: Concerning wine and needle practice follows Rebbi Joshua ben Levi.
For freshly pressed wine one can allow for up to forty days presuming that it is wine; Rebbi Jehudah says, up to a break point. You find that there is a leniency and a restriction following Rebbi Jehudah, and a leniency and a restriction following the rabbis. A leniency following Rebbi Jehudah, if a break point arrived before forty days had passed, and a restriction if forty days passed without break point that he cannot give heave. A leniency following the rabbis, if forty days passed without break point that he cannot give heave, and a restriction, if a break point arrived before forty days had passed that he cannot give heave. Rebbi Simon asked: If the fortieth day arrived and he did not check. He was lazy for two or three days, then he came and found it to be vinegar. Is it retroactively considered to be vinegar or only from there on to the future? What is the difference? If he had transgressed and given heave. If you say that retroactively it is considered to be vinegar, his heave is heave. From there on to the future it is not heave. If he had checked an amphora to continuously give heave from it. When he returned, he found it to be vinegar. Rebbi Simon in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: The first three days it certainly is wine, the last vinegar, and the middle ones are in doubt. Rebbi Abbahu said, I heard that from Rebbi Joshua ben Levi; Rebbi Joḥanan did not say so but the first three days it certainly is wine, after that it is in doubt. Do they differ in the treatment of doubt? What Rebbi Joḥanan said refers to the case that he came and found it to be stale vinegar. What Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said refers to the case that he came and found it to be strong vinegar. Or their difference equals another difference, for what we have stated there: “A rusty or broken needle is pure.” It was stated: He put it down smooth, then he came and found it rusty. Rebbi Simon in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: The first three days it certainly is impure, the last pure, and the middle ones are in doubt. Rebbi Abbahu said, that is what Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said; Rebbi Joḥanan did not say so but the first three days it certainly is impure, after that it is in doubt. Rebbi Ila, Rebbi Abba and Rebbi Eleazar in the name of all rabbis who are frequenting the House of Study: Concerning wine and needle practice follows Rebbi Joshua ben Levi.
“Because of the public good.” They say in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: That she should not risk bastardy. Some say in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: That she should not remain anchored. He who said, that she should not remain anchored, [is afraid that] she turns out to be anchored if she thought that he annulled when he did not annul. He who said, that she should not risk bastardy, [is afraid that] her children will be bastards if she thought that he did not annul when he annulled, she goes and marries without a bill of divorce. If she thought that he annulled when he did not annul, another man comes and marries her preliminarily; the preliminary marriage is valid but she thinks it is invalid. She waits until her first husband dies, then she goes and marries [another man]; the result is that her children will be bastards. Rebbi Mana said, I went with a caravan and heard Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa and Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: That she should not risk bastardy. Rav Huna said, even the one who said that she should not remain anchored also agrees that she should not risk bastardy.
MISHNAH: If a slave was kidnapped and ransomed, if it was as a slave he shall serve, if as a free person he shall not serve; Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, in any case he shall serve. A slave whom his master gave as mortgage to others and then freed in strict law does not owe anything, but for the public good one forces the master to formally manumit him and he writes a bond for his own value. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, only the one who manumits writes.
If a convert died and Jews plundered his property, if there were slaves, either adult or underage, they gain their freedom. Abba Shaul said, the adults gain their freedom, the minors do not become free. Why? They are no longer property after their owner’s death. Then even adults? Rebbi Abba said, since adults are competent to acquire themselves, they gain their freedom. Minors, who are not competent to acquire for themselves, do not gain their freedom. Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said, practice follows Abba Shaul. The opinions of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi are contradictory. There, Rebbi Simon in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi and Rebbi Yossi ben Shaul in the name of Rebbi said: A person who has given up hope to recover his slave is not entitled to enslave him. They said, what Rebbi Joshua said about enslaving, if he did not give, he did not give; perhaps practice would be to enslave him, therefore he has to write him a bill of manumission. And here, he says so! We heard that Rebbi Joḥanan said, Rebbi Joshua ben Levi taught us that correctly, perhaps practice follows Abba Shaul. The slave girl of Rabba bar Zuṭra ran away and he gave up hope to recover her. He went to ask Rebbi Ḥanina and Rebbi Joshua ben Levi. They said, he is not entitled to enslave her. How is it to write her a bill of manumission? They said to him, if you wrote, you did the right thing. Rebbi Ḥanina in the name of Rebbi Ismael ben Rebbi Yose: A slave who married as a free person in the presence of his master gained his freedom. Rebbi Joḥanan said, yesterday I was sitting and formulating: If somebody writes a document of preliminary marriage for his slave or a document of definitive marriage for his girl slave, Rebbi says, they acquired, but the Sages say, they did not acquire. The first Tanna follows Rebbi: he acquired.
Who frees? Rav says, either his first or his second master. Rebbi Joḥanan says, only his first master alone is able to free. Rebbi Ḥaggai objected before Rebbi Yose: Does not a baraita disagree with Rav? If a Jew gave a loan to a Gentile on the latter’s leavened matter, it is permitted after Passover. If you say that the Jew has property rights in it, it would be forbidden. What does Rav do with this? Rebbi Yudan said, manumission is made easy, as it was stated: If somebody gives his slave as mortgage, if he sold him, he is not sold; if he freed him, he is freed. The strength of Rebbi Joḥanan is from the following: Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, only the manumittor writes. If somebody mortgaged his field to another, then went and sold it, can the creditor not come and foreclose? Rebbi Abbahu said, in this matter Rebbi Joḥanan opened for us a door to illuminate. We do not find that a slave can again be enslaved after having been freed. If that is so, he should not have to write a bond for his value! Rebbi Ila said, it is better that a person say to him, give me the 200 zuz which you owe me than say to him, you are my slave! The rabbis of Caesarea say in Rebbi Nasa’s name: Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel follows Rebbi Meïr. Just as Rebbi Meїr imposes a fine for words, so Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel imposes a fine for words. As it was stated: With a bond documenting both principal and interest one can collect neither principal nor interest, the words of Rebbi Meїr. But the Sages say, one collects the principal but not the interest.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody divorces his wife because of bad reputation,” etc. And it was stated: “Why did the Sages say that he who divorces his wife because of bad reputation cannot take her back? For if he divorced his wife because of bad reputation, when she went, married another, and bore him children, after some time it turned out that the accusations were baseless and he said, if I had known that the accusations were baseless, even if somebody had offered me a hundred minas for my wife I would not have divorced her, then the bill of divorce would be invalidated and her children bastards. But since he knows that if he divorces her, she will be forbidden to return to him, from the start he gives her a perfect bill of divorce.”
It was stated: “Why did they say that he who divorces his wife because of a vow cannot take her back? For if he divorced his wife because of a vow, when she went, married another, and bore him children, after some time it turned out that the vow was void and he said, if I had known that the vow was void, even if somebody had offered me a hundred minas for my wife I would not have divorced her, then the bill of divorce would be invalidated and her child a bastard. But since he knows that if he divorces her, she will be forbidden to return to him, from the start he gives her a perfect bill of divorce.” Rebbi Ze‘ira said, you can see that he was looking for a pretext to divorce her since it must have been a vow which does not need investigation by a Sage! Rebbi Ze‘ira said, you can see that he was looking for a pretext to divorce her since it must have been a vow which was not public knowledge! “Rebbi Eleazar said, they forbade one because of the other.” The law should be that he can take her back even if it was a vow which needs investigation by a Sage, for the Elder uproots the vow. Why did they forbid a vow which needs investigation by a Sage? Because of a vow which does not need investigation by a Sage.
HALAKHAH: It was stated: “Why did they say that he who divorces his wife as a she-ram cannot take her back? For if he divorced his wife as a she-ram, when she went, married another man, and bore him children, and he said, if I had known that she can have children, even if somebody had offered me a hundred minas for my wife I would not have divorced her, then the bill of divorce would be invalidated and her child a bastard. But since he knows that if he divorces her, she will be forbidden to return to him, from the start he gives her a perfect bill of divorce.” Rebbi Ze‘ira said, you can see that he was looking for a pretext to divorce her since there are women she-rams who are married and since [their husbands] are satisfied with them they keep them.
MISHNAH: If somebody sells himself and his children to Gentiles, one does not buy him back, but one buys his children back after their father’s death. If somebody sold his field to a Gentile and then a Jew bought it back from him, the buyer brings first fruits because of the public good.