vows
586 occurrences across the corpus
The Mishnah
Even though they said: they take pledges from those who owe vows of value, they allow him food for thirty days, clothing for twelve months, bed and bedding, shoes and tefillin. For himself, but not for his wife and children. If he was a craftsman, they leave him two tools of every kind. If he was a carpenter, they leave him two axes and two saws. Rabbi Eliezer says: if he was a farmer, they leave him his yoke [of oxen]. If a donkey driver, they leave him his donkey.
A bird hatat is performed below [the red line], but a beast hatat is performed above [the red line]. A bird olah is performed above, but a beast olah below. If he changed this procedure with either, then the offering is disqualified. The seder [ordered ritual] in the case of kinnim is as follows: In the case of obligatory offerings, one [bird] is a hatat and one an olah. In the case of vows and freewill offerings, however, all are olot. What constitutes a vow? When one says: "It is incumbent upon me to bring an olah." And what constitutes a freewill-offering? When one says: "Behold, this shall be an olah." What is the [practical] difference between vows and freewill offerings? In the case of vows, if they die or are stolen, one is responsible for their replacement; But in the case of freewill offerings, if they die or are stolen, one is not responsible for their replacement.
A bird hatat is performed below [the red line], but a beast hatat is performed above [the red line]. A bird olah is performed above, but a beast olah below. If he changed this procedure with either, then the offering is disqualified. The seder [ordered ritual] in the case of kinnim is as follows: In the case of obligatory offerings, one [bird] is a hatat and one an olah. In the case of vows and freewill offerings, however, all are olot. What constitutes a vow? When one says: "It is incumbent upon me to bring an olah." And what constitutes a freewill-offering? When one says: "Behold, this shall be an olah." What is the [practical] difference between vows and freewill offerings? In the case of vows, if they die or are stolen, one is responsible for their replacement; But in the case of freewill offerings, if they die or are stolen, one is not responsible for their replacement.
A bird hatat is performed below [the red line], but a beast hatat is performed above [the red line]. A bird olah is performed above, but a beast olah below. If he changed this procedure with either, then the offering is disqualified. The seder [ordered ritual] in the case of kinnim is as follows: In the case of obligatory offerings, one [bird] is a hatat and one an olah. In the case of vows and freewill offerings, however, all are olot. What constitutes a vow? When one says: "It is incumbent upon me to bring an olah." And what constitutes a freewill-offering? When one says: "Behold, this shall be an olah." What is the [practical] difference between vows and freewill offerings? In the case of vows, if they die or are stolen, one is responsible for their replacement; But in the case of freewill offerings, if they die or are stolen, one is not responsible for their replacement.
All negaim may be examined by a person, except his own. Rabbi Meir ruled: not even the negaim of his relatives. All vows may be released by a person, except his own. Rabbi Judah says: not even those vows of his wife that affect relationships between her and others. All firstlings may be examined by a person, except his own firstlings.
All negaim may be examined by a person, except his own. Rabbi Meir ruled: not even the negaim of his relatives. All vows may be released by a person, except his own. Rabbi Judah says: not even those vows of his wife that affect relationships between her and others. All firstlings may be examined by a person, except his own firstlings.
A girl of the age of eleven years and one day, her vows must be examined. A girl of the age of twelve years and one day, her vows are valid; And they examine them throughout the whole twelfth year. A boy the age of twelve years and one day, his vows must be examined. A boy the age of thirteen years and one day, is vow are valid. And they examine them throughout the whole thirteenth year. Prior to this age, even though they said, "We know to whom we have made our vow" or "to whom we have made our dedication," their vow is not a valid vow and their dedication is not a valid dedication. Subsequent to this age, even though they said, "We do not know to whom we have made our vow" or "to whom we have made our vow," their vow is a valid vow and their dedication is a valid dedication.
A girl of the age of eleven years and one day, her vows must be examined. A girl of the age of twelve years and one day, her vows are valid; And they examine them throughout the whole twelfth year. A boy the age of twelve years and one day, his vows must be examined. A boy the age of thirteen years and one day, is vow are valid. And they examine them throughout the whole thirteenth year. Prior to this age, even though they said, "We know to whom we have made our vow" or "to whom we have made our dedication," their vow is not a valid vow and their dedication is not a valid dedication. Subsequent to this age, even though they said, "We do not know to whom we have made our vow" or "to whom we have made our vow," their vow is a valid vow and their dedication is a valid dedication.
A girl of the age of eleven years and one day, her vows must be examined. A girl of the age of twelve years and one day, her vows are valid; And they examine them throughout the whole twelfth year. A boy the age of twelve years and one day, his vows must be examined. A boy the age of thirteen years and one day, is vow are valid. And they examine them throughout the whole thirteenth year. Prior to this age, even though they said, "We know to whom we have made our vow" or "to whom we have made our dedication," their vow is not a valid vow and their dedication is not a valid dedication. Subsequent to this age, even though they said, "We do not know to whom we have made our vow" or "to whom we have made our vow," their vow is a valid vow and their dedication is a valid dedication.
The sages spoke of [the physical development of] a woman in a parable: an unripe fig, a fig in its early ripening stage and a ripe fig. "An unripe fig": while she is yet a child; "A fig in its early ripening stage": when she is in her youth (naarut). In both ages her father is entitled to anything she finds and to her handiwork and to the right of invalidating her vows. "A ripe fig" as soon as she becomes of majority age (bogeret), her father has no longer any right over her.
The Jerusalem Talmud
Rebbi Isaac ben Ḥaqolah and Rebbi Joshua ben Levi both say taro is like a vegetable for tithes, the sabbatical year, peah, and first fruits. For vows it is questionable.
MISHNAH: He who accepts upon himself to be a ḥaver will not sell to the am haäreẓ wet or dry and will not buy wet from him, is not guest of an am haäreẓ and does not have him as a guest in his clothing. Rebbi Jehudah says, moreover he should not raise animals of the flock, should not overstep bounds by vows and laughter, should not defile himself with the dead, and be a regular in the house of study. They said to him, these are not included.
MISHNAH: Five [persons] cannot give heave and if they gave it is not heave: the deaf and dumb, the insane, the minor, and one who gives heave from what is not his. The Gentile who gave heave for a Jew’s property, even with the latter’s authorization his heave is not heave. A deaf person who speaks but cannot hear should not give heave, but if he did, his heave is heave. A “deaf person” mentioned anywhere by the Sages is a deaf-mute. Rebbi Jehudah says, the heave given by a minor who has not yet grown two pubic hairs is heave. Rebbi Yose says, before he came to the time of vows, his heave is not heave. After he has reached the time of vows, his heave is heave.
MISHNAH: Five [persons] cannot give heave and if they gave it is not heave: the deaf and dumb, the insane, the minor, and one who gives heave from what is not his. The Gentile who gave heave for a Jew’s property, even with the latter’s authorization his heave is not heave. A deaf person who speaks but cannot hear should not give heave, but if he did, his heave is heave. A “deaf person” mentioned anywhere by the Sages is a deaf-mute. Rebbi Jehudah says, the heave given by a minor who has not yet grown two pubic hairs is heave. Rebbi Yose says, before he came to the time of vows, his heave is not heave. After he has reached the time of vows, his heave is heave.
It was stated: If somebody vows regarding his son to study Torah, he is permitted to fill for him an amphora of water and to light for him. Rebbi Jacob bar Idi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: He also can buy things for him on the market. Do they differ? Here for a man, there for a woman. If he was a known personality they treated him as a woman. “ It happened that somebody vowed regarding his son to study Torah. The case came before Rebbi Yose ben Ḥalaphta and he permitted him to fill an amphora of water and to light for him.”
HALAKHAH: “Because of three sins women die in childbirth,” etc. There are Tannaim who state, as children. There are Tannaim who state, in childbirth. He who said as children, it was stated in the name of Rebbi Jehudah: Children die because of the sin of vows. What is the reason? For the vain I did hit your sons. But he who said in childbirth, from here that Satan accuses only in times of danger.
MISHNAH: One dissolves vows on the Sabbath and one may ask about vows if it is a need for the Sabbath. One plugs the skylight and measures a rag and a miqweh. It happened in the days of Rebbi Ṣadoq’s father and in the days of Abba Shaul ben Botnit, that they plugged the skylight with a jar and tied a dish to bast to know whether a barrel had a hand-breadth width opening or not. From their words we infer that one plugs, and measures, and ties on the Sabbath.
MISHNAH: One dissolves vows on the Sabbath and one may ask about vows if it is a need for the Sabbath. One plugs the skylight and measures a rag and a miqweh. It happened in the days of Rebbi Ṣadoq’s father and in the days of Abba Shaul ben Botnit, that they plugged the skylight with a jar and tied a dish to bast to know whether a barrel had a hand-breadth width opening or not. From their words we infer that one plugs, and measures, and ties on the Sabbath.
MISHNAH: With anything one may make an eruv or participate except with water or salt. Anything may be bought with money of [Second] Tithe except water and salt. One who vows not to eat food is permitted water and salt. One may make an eruv for a nazir with wine and for an Israel with heave. Symmachos says, also with profane food for a Cohen in a bet happeras. Rebbi Jehudah says among the graves since he could be shielded and eat.
Paragraph. “One who vows not to eat food is permitted water and salt.” There, we have stated: “One who made a vow to abstain from cooked food is permitted roasted and scalded food.” A Mishnah states that scalding is called cooking, as we have stated: “If he cooked the well-being offering or scalded it.” A verse states that “roasted” is called “cooked” as it is said: They cooked the Pesaḥ in fire. If you say, against the rules, Rebbi Jonah from Bostra said, as is the rule. A Mishnah [states] that scalded is called cooked, and a verse that roasted is called cooked; but did we not state: “One who makes a vow to abstain from cooked food is permitted roasted and scalded food”? Rebbi Joḥanan said, in matters of vows one follows common usage. Rebbi Joshia said, in matters of vows one follows biblical usage. What is the difference between them? If one said, a qonam that I shall not taste wine on Tabernacles. In the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan he is forbidden on the last day of the holiday. In the opinion of Rebbi Joshia, is he permitted? Also Rebbi Joshia agrees that he is prohibited. Rebbi Joshia said it only for restrictions.
Paragraph. “One who vows not to eat food is permitted water and salt.” There, we have stated: “One who made a vow to abstain from cooked food is permitted roasted and scalded food.” A Mishnah states that scalding is called cooking, as we have stated: “If he cooked the well-being offering or scalded it.” A verse states that “roasted” is called “cooked” as it is said: They cooked the Pesaḥ in fire. If you say, against the rules, Rebbi Jonah from Bostra said, as is the rule. A Mishnah [states] that scalded is called cooked, and a verse that roasted is called cooked; but did we not state: “One who makes a vow to abstain from cooked food is permitted roasted and scalded food”? Rebbi Joḥanan said, in matters of vows one follows common usage. Rebbi Joshia said, in matters of vows one follows biblical usage. What is the difference between them? If one said, a qonam that I shall not taste wine on Tabernacles. In the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan he is forbidden on the last day of the holiday. In the opinion of Rebbi Joshia, is he permitted? Also Rebbi Joshia agrees that he is prohibited. Rebbi Joshia said it only for restrictions.
Paragraph. “One who vows not to eat food is permitted water and salt.” There, we have stated: “One who made a vow to abstain from cooked food is permitted roasted and scalded food.” A Mishnah states that scalding is called cooking, as we have stated: “If he cooked the well-being offering or scalded it.” A verse states that “roasted” is called “cooked” as it is said: They cooked the Pesaḥ in fire. If you say, against the rules, Rebbi Jonah from Bostra said, as is the rule. A Mishnah [states] that scalded is called cooked, and a verse that roasted is called cooked; but did we not state: “One who makes a vow to abstain from cooked food is permitted roasted and scalded food”? Rebbi Joḥanan said, in matters of vows one follows common usage. Rebbi Joshia said, in matters of vows one follows biblical usage. What is the difference between them? If one said, a qonam that I shall not taste wine on Tabernacles. In the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan he is forbidden on the last day of the holiday. In the opinion of Rebbi Joshia, is he permitted? Also Rebbi Joshia agrees that he is prohibited. Rebbi Joshia said it only for restrictions.
Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said, Rebbi Joḥanan ate bake-meats and said, I did not taste (anything) [food] on that day. But did we not state: “He who made a vow not to eat food is permitted water and salt”? Explain it following Rebbi Joshia, who said, in matters of vows one follows biblical usage. And from where that everything is called food? Rebbi Aḥa bar Ulla said: And tenfemale donkeys carrying grain, bread, and food. Why does the verse say, and food? From here that everything is called food.
Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: Every day the High Priest dresses in his robes, comes, and sacrifices the daily morning sacrifice. If there are vows or voluntary sacrifices, he offers them. Then he goes to his house, and returns to bring the daily evening sacrifice, and comes to stay overnight in the Palhedrin lodge. Rebbi Uqba in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: He did this only on Sabbath and holidays.
Rebbi Joḥanan said, at the start one accepts from them neither definite objects nor non-definite objects, and at the end one accepts from them definite objects but not non-definite objects. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, both at the beginning and at the end one accepts from them neither definite objects nor non-definite objects. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “One does not accept from them voluntary gifts for Temple property for the upkeep of the Temple.” He explains it, both at the start and at the end, if it is for non-definite objects. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Everybody agrees that they make vows and are objects of vows. He explains it for elevation offerings. One understands that he makes a vow to bring an elevation offering. Can he be the object of a vow for an elevation offering? No, if an Israel says, I undertake to bring an elevation offering, when a Gentile hears him and says, I am undertaking what he says. Does he not bring libations with it? Is not the excess money given for libations used for vessels of Service? Then it turns out that he brought {money for} a definite object! Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun objected, did we not state that they may offer their value? Are offerings of one’s value not for the upkeep of the Temple? It is as you are saying there, his intent was for Heaven; automatically it will be used for the upkeep of the Temple; so here you are saying, his intent was for Heaven; automatically it will be used for vessels of Service. How does Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish treat this? He explains, it is not upon you and us to build our God’s House. Rebbi Ḥilkiah said, Rebbi Simon asked: Does this imply that one does not accept from them for an aqueduct, or the city walls, or its towers, because of you have no part, nor rightful claim, nor memorial, in Jerusalem.
Rebbi Joḥanan said, at the start one accepts from them neither definite objects nor non-definite objects, and at the end one accepts from them definite objects but not non-definite objects. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, both at the beginning and at the end one accepts from them neither definite objects nor non-definite objects. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “One does not accept from them voluntary gifts for Temple property for the upkeep of the Temple.” He explains it, both at the start and at the end, if it is for non-definite objects. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Everybody agrees that they make vows and are objects of vows. He explains it for elevation offerings. One understands that he makes a vow to bring an elevation offering. Can he be the object of a vow for an elevation offering? No, if an Israel says, I undertake to bring an elevation offering, when a Gentile hears him and says, I am undertaking what he says. Does he not bring libations with it? Is not the excess money given for libations used for vessels of Service? Then it turns out that he brought {money for} a definite object! Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun objected, did we not state that they may offer their value? Are offerings of one’s value not for the upkeep of the Temple? It is as you are saying there, his intent was for Heaven; automatically it will be used for the upkeep of the Temple; so here you are saying, his intent was for Heaven; automatically it will be used for vessels of Service. How does Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish treat this? He explains, it is not upon you and us to build our God’s House. Rebbi Ḥilkiah said, Rebbi Simon asked: Does this imply that one does not accept from them for an aqueduct, or the city walls, or its towers, because of you have no part, nor rightful claim, nor memorial, in Jerusalem.
HALAKHAH: “Rebbi Joshua ben Ḥanania said, all during the water-drawing festivity they did not at all taste the taste of sleep. At the start they went to sacrifice the daily morning sacrifice; from there they went to sacrifice the musaf sacrifices; from there they went [to sacrifice vows and voluntary offerings; from there they went] to eat and drink. From there they went to study Torah; and from there they went to sacrifice the daily evening sacrifice; and from there they went to the water-drawing festivity.” But was it not stated, “an oath that I shall not sleep for three days,” one whips him and he sleeps immediately? They were dozing.
MISHNAH: On three occasions in a year were all watches equal in the parts of the holiday and in the distribution of the shew-bread; on Pentecost one says to him, here you have maṣsah, here you have leavened. The watch whose time is fixed brings daily sacrifices, vows and voluntary gifts, and all sacrifices of the public, and sacrifices everything. If the holiday is next to the Sabbath either before or after, all watches were equal in the distribution of the shew-bread. If one day fell between them, the watch whose time is fixed takes ten loaves and the one remaining takes two. On all other days of the year the incoming one takes six; Rebbi Jehudah says that the incoming takes seven and the outgoing takes five. The incoming ones distribute in the North and the outgoing in the South. Bilgah always distributes in the South; its ring was fixed and its window closed.
“The House of Hillel said to the House of Shammai: Since at a time when I forbid to the private person I am permitting it for Heaven, when it is permitted for the private person is it not logical that it be permitted for Heaven? The House of Shammai said to them, vows and voluntary gifts are proof, since they are permitted to the private person but forbidden to Heaven. The House of Hillel said to them, no. If you are speaking about vows and voluntary gifts which have no fixed time, what does this imply for the festival offering which has a fixed time? The House of Shammai answered them, the festival offering has no fixed time since if he did not offer it on the first day, he may offer it on the second day, if he did not offer it on the second day, he may offer it on the third day. The House of Hillel told them, the festival offering has a fixed time, for if he did not offer it on the holiday of pilgrimage he may not offer it after the holiday. The House of Shammai said to them, is it not already said: only what can be eaten by any person this alone may be made for you? The House of Hillel answered them, is that a proof? For you it may not be made, [but] it is made for Heaven. Abba Shaul says it was based on another reason: Since when your stove is closed down, your Master’s stove is open, when your stove is open it only is logical that your Master’s stove should be open. Another explanation: It is not in order that your table should be full but the table of your Creator be empty.”
“The House of Hillel said to the House of Shammai: Since at a time when I forbid to the private person I am permitting it for Heaven, when it is permitted for the private person is it not logical that it be permitted for Heaven? The House of Shammai said to them, vows and voluntary gifts are proof, since they are permitted to the private person but forbidden to Heaven. The House of Hillel said to them, no. If you are speaking about vows and voluntary gifts which have no fixed time, what does this imply for the festival offering which has a fixed time? The House of Shammai answered them, the festival offering has no fixed time since if he did not offer it on the first day, he may offer it on the second day, if he did not offer it on the second day, he may offer it on the third day. The House of Hillel told them, the festival offering has a fixed time, for if he did not offer it on the holiday of pilgrimage he may not offer it after the holiday. The House of Shammai said to them, is it not already said: only what can be eaten by any person this alone may be made for you? The House of Hillel answered them, is that a proof? For you it may not be made, [but] it is made for Heaven. Abba Shaul says it was based on another reason: Since when your stove is closed down, your Master’s stove is open, when your stove is open it only is logical that your Master’s stove should be open. Another explanation: It is not in order that your table should be full but the table of your Creator be empty.”
MISHNAH: The only difference between one who is under a vow {not to have} usufruct from another and one who is under a vow about use of food is passing through his real estate and vessels that cannot be used to prepare food. The only difference between vows and voluntary gifts is that for vows one is responsible if they died or were lost, and for voluntary gifts one is not responsible if they died or were lost.
MISHNAH: The only difference between one who is under a vow {not to have} usufruct from another and one who is under a vow about use of food is passing through his real estate and vessels that cannot be used to prepare food. The only difference between vows and voluntary gifts is that for vows one is responsible if they died or were lost, and for voluntary gifts one is not responsible if they died or were lost.
MISHNAH: Israel fulfill their obligation with vows, and voluntary gifts and animal tithe, and the Cohanim with purification sacrifices, and reparation sacrifices, and breast and thigh, and firstlings, but not with birds or cereal sacrifices.
MISHNAH: The dissolution of vows flies in the air and has no support. The rules of the Sabbath, holiday sacrifices, and larceny on sancta are like mountains hanging on a hair, few verses and many rules. Civil law, Temple service, purity and impurity, and forbidden sexual relations have support. All of them are the body of the Torah.
There, we have stated: “Four kinds of vows did the Sages dissolve.” Do not the Sages permit all kinds of vows? It is written: Moses spoke to the heads of the tribes of the Children of Israel. He referred the paragraph to the heads of the tribes that they should dissolve their vows. Rav Jehudah in the name of Samuel: He shall not profane his word. He cannot profane his word; this implies that others can profane his words. Who is that? That is the Sage who dissolves the vow.
There, we have stated: “Four kinds of vows did the Sages dissolve.” Do not the Sages permit all kinds of vows? It is written: Moses spoke to the heads of the tribes of the Children of Israel. He referred the paragraph to the heads of the tribes that they should dissolve their vows. Rav Jehudah in the name of Samuel: He shall not profane his word. He cannot profane his word; this implies that others can profane his words. Who is that? That is the Sage who dissolves the vow.
There, we have stated: “Four kinds of vows did the Sages dissolve.” Do not the Sages permit all kinds of vows? It is written: Moses spoke to the heads of the tribes of the Children of Israel. He referred the paragraph to the heads of the tribes that they should dissolve their vows. Rav Jehudah in the name of Samuel: He shall not profane his word. He cannot profane his word; this implies that others can profane his words. Who is that? That is the Sage who dissolves the vow.
May one appoint Elders for selected topics? Let us hear from the following: Rebbi appointed Rav to invalidate vows and to see stains. After his death, he asked his son for {permission to judge} defects of firstlings. He said to him, I shall not add to what my father gave you. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, he gave him everything: To sit in judgment alone, to invalidate vows, to see stains, and to see outside blemishes. After his death, he asked his son for {permission to judge} hidden defects. He said to him, I shall not add to what my father gave you. Even though you say, one appoints Elders for selected topics, only if he is competent for everything. As the following: Rebbi Joshua ben Levi ordained all his students, but he was sorry about one who (had a defect in his) [had a running] eye and he could not ordain him; could he not have ordained him for selected topics? That implies (that one who is competent in one thing has to be competent in everything, even for one thing he is not competent) [one who is competent in everything is competent in one thing but one who is not competent in everything cannot be declared competent in one thing.]
May one appoint Elders for selected topics? Let us hear from the following: Rebbi appointed Rav to invalidate vows and to see stains. After his death, he asked his son for {permission to judge} defects of firstlings. He said to him, I shall not add to what my father gave you. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, he gave him everything: To sit in judgment alone, to invalidate vows, to see stains, and to see outside blemishes. After his death, he asked his son for {permission to judge} hidden defects. He said to him, I shall not add to what my father gave you. Even though you say, one appoints Elders for selected topics, only if he is competent for everything. As the following: Rebbi Joshua ben Levi ordained all his students, but he was sorry about one who (had a defect in his) [had a running] eye and he could not ordain him; could he not have ordained him for selected topics? That implies (that one who is competent in one thing has to be competent in everything, even for one thing he is not competent) [one who is competent in everything is competent in one thing but one who is not competent in everything cannot be declared competent in one thing.]
May one permit wearing a coat? Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: One permits wearing a coat. Rebbi permitted wearing a coat. Rebbi Joshua ben Levi permitted wearing a coat. Rebbi Ḥuna in the name of Rebbi Jeremiah: At a place where one does not wear a toga. Rebbi Yose ben Abun said, for easy vows.
“The House of Hillel said to the House of Shammai: Since at a time when I forbid to the private person I am permitting it for Heaven, when it is permitted for the private person is it not logical that it be permitted for Heaven? The House of Shammai said to them, vows and voluntary gifts are proof, since they are permitted to the private person but forbidden to Heaven. The House of Hillel said to them, no. If you are speaking about vows and voluntary gifts which have no fixed time, what does this imply for the festival offering which has a fixed time? The House of Shammai answered them, the festival offering has no fixed time since if he did not offer it on the first day, he may offer it on the second day, if he did not offer it on the second day, he may offer it on the third day. The House of Hillel told them, the festival offering has a fixed time, for if he did not offer it on the holiday of pilgrimage he may not offer it after the holiday. The House of Shammai said to them, is it not already said: only what can be eaten by any person this alone may be made for you? The House of Hillel answered them, is that a proof? For you it may not be made, [but] it is made for Heaven. Abba Shaul says it was based on another reason: Since when your stove is closed down, your Master’s stove is open, when your stove is open it only is logical that your Master’s stove should be open. Another explanation: It is not in order that your table should be full but the table of your (Master) [Creator] be empty.”
“The House of Hillel said to the House of Shammai: Since at a time when I forbid to the private person I am permitting it for Heaven, when it is permitted for the private person is it not logical that it be permitted for Heaven? The House of Shammai said to them, vows and voluntary gifts are proof, since they are permitted to the private person but forbidden to Heaven. The House of Hillel said to them, no. If you are speaking about vows and voluntary gifts which have no fixed time, what does this imply for the festival offering which has a fixed time? The House of Shammai answered them, the festival offering has no fixed time since if he did not offer it on the first day, he may offer it on the second day, if he did not offer it on the second day, he may offer it on the third day. The House of Hillel told them, the festival offering has a fixed time, for if he did not offer it on the holiday of pilgrimage he may not offer it after the holiday. The House of Shammai said to them, is it not already said: only what can be eaten by any person this alone may be made for you? The House of Hillel answered them, is that a proof? For you it may not be made, [but] it is made for Heaven. Abba Shaul says it was based on another reason: Since when your stove is closed down, your Master’s stove is open, when your stove is open it only is logical that your Master’s stove should be open. Another explanation: It is not in order that your table should be full but the table of your (Master) [Creator] be empty.”
Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: Every day the High Priest dresses in his robes, comes, and sacrifices the daily morning sacrifice. If there are vows or voluntary sacrifices, he offers them. Then he goes to his house, and returns to bring the daily evening sacrifice, and comes to stay overnight in the Palhedrin lodge. Rebbi Uqba in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: He did this only on Sabbath and holidays. There are Tannaim who state: the diadem propitiates on his forehead. There are Tannaim who state: even in a corner. He who says, the diadem propitiates on his forehead, it always shall be on his forehead. But he who says, even in a corner, from the Day of Atonement. He who says, the diadem propitiates on his forehead, supports Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun; he who says, even in a corner, supports Rebbi Uqba.
“No usufruct.” Rebbi Jeremiah said, that he has from her only the usufruct. Rebbi Yose the Sidonian stated before Rebbi Jeremiah, in disgreement with Rebbi Jeremiah: “He has the right to what she finds and earns, and to dissolve her vows.” What means “no usufruct”? That she cannot reclaim from him the usufruct he had [from her property].
MISHNAH: A woman’s husband went overseas and some persons came and told her, your husband died. If she remarried and then the husband returned, she has to leave both husbands, she needs a bill of divorce from both of them, she has neither ketubah nor usufruct nor used clothing from either of them, and if she took anything she must return it. Any child from either of the men is a bastard; neither of them may defile himself for her. Neither man has any claim on what she finds or earns, or on invalidation of her vows. If she was the daughter of an Israel, she is disabled from priesthood, the daughter of a Levite from tithe, the daughter of a Cohen from heave. The heirs of neither man inherit her ketubah. If they died, the brothers of both of them perform ḥalîṣah but not levirate.
MISHNAH: Rebbi Yose says, her ketubah is from the property of her first husband. Rebbi Eleazar says, the first [husband] is entitled to what she finds and earns and may annul her vows. Rebbi Simeon says, copulation with her or ḥaliṣah with her by a brother of the first [husband] frees her co-wives and a child from him is not a bastard; if she was married without permission she is permitted to return to him. If she married by a decision of the court, she must leave but is free from the sacrifice; without a decision of the court, she must leave but must bring the sacrifice. The power of the court frees her from the sacrifice. If the court instructed her to marry but she misbehaved, she must bring a sacrifice since they permitted her only to marry.
HALAKHAH: “The House of Shammai say, one permits repudiation,” etc. There, we have stated: “Rebbi Jehudah bar Abba testified to five statements: That one makes underage girls repudiate, … ” Does one disagree with testimony? One disagrees about the essence of the testimony. So was the essence of the testimony: “The House of Shammai say, one makes only betrothed girls repudiate, but the House of Hillel say, betrothed or married”. It is difficult following the House of Hillel! Her marriage permitted her, he has the right to what she finds and earns, to dissolve her vows, and she is his wife in every respect. And you say so? They gave you of your own. By right, her marriage should not be a marriage. They said that her marriage is a marriage and they said that she may repudiate him and leave.
Does a court convene for repudiation? Was it not stated: Flee from three and cling to three. Cling to ḥalîṣah, annulling vows, and making peace. But flee from repudiations, from being a guarantor, and from receiving deposits. Rebbi Simeon bar Abba said, its name is not פקדון “deposit” but פק דון “go to court”. Rebbi Berekhiah said, “My son, if you became guanrantor for your neighbor.” Does a court convene for repudiation? Explain it that they were sitting in another matter and the case came before them.
Rebbi Eliezer says, the actions of an underage girl have no legal standing. He has no right to what she finds or earns, nor may he dissolve her vows; she is as if not his wife in any respect except that she needs repudiation from him. Rebbi Joshua said, he owns what she finds or earns, he may he dissolve her vows; she is his wife in all respects except that she needs a bill of divorce from him. Rebbi Ismael said, I looked around at all logical systems of Sages and did not find anybody who was consistent in the matter of an underage girl except Rebbi Eliezer, only that he requires repudiation from him.
Rebbi Eliezer says, the actions of an underage girl have no legal standing. He has no right to what she finds or earns, nor may he dissolve her vows; she is as if not his wife in any respect except that she needs repudiation from him. Rebbi Joshua said, he owns what she finds or earns, he may he dissolve her vows; she is his wife in all respects except that she needs a bill of divorce from him. Rebbi Ismael said, I looked around at all logical systems of Sages and did not find anybody who was consistent in the matter of an underage girl except Rebbi Eliezer, only that he requires repudiation from him.
Rebbi Yoḥanan had a difficulty with the words of Rebbi Joshua. Is her marriage valid by biblical standards? The dissolution of her vows must be by biblical standards! And you say so! Rebbi Ze‘ira said, there is no dissolution of vows here, because of what Rebbi Joḥanan had against the words of Rebbi Joshua. Rebbi Nissa asked: Would it be the same for prohibitions? Rebbi Joḥanan said, one does not whip for prohibitions. Would that be as we stated there: “Before that time, even though they said, we know for Whom we made a vow or to Whom we dedicated, their vows are no vows and their dedications no dedications. After that time, even though they said, we do not know for Whom we made a vow or to Whom we dedicated, their vows are vows and their dedications dedications.” What is the status of that Mishnah? For Cahana it is in dispute, for Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish it is everybody’s opinion.
Rebbi Yoḥanan had a difficulty with the words of Rebbi Joshua. Is her marriage valid by biblical standards? The dissolution of her vows must be by biblical standards! And you say so! Rebbi Ze‘ira said, there is no dissolution of vows here, because of what Rebbi Joḥanan had against the words of Rebbi Joshua. Rebbi Nissa asked: Would it be the same for prohibitions? Rebbi Joḥanan said, one does not whip for prohibitions. Would that be as we stated there: “Before that time, even though they said, we know for Whom we made a vow or to Whom we dedicated, their vows are no vows and their dedications no dedications. After that time, even though they said, we do not know for Whom we made a vow or to Whom we dedicated, their vows are vows and their dedications dedications.” What is the status of that Mishnah? For Cahana it is in dispute, for Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish it is everybody’s opinion.
Rebbi Yoḥanan had a difficulty with the words of Rebbi Joshua. Is her marriage valid by biblical standards? The dissolution of her vows must be by biblical standards! And you say so! Rebbi Ze‘ira said, there is no dissolution of vows here, because of what Rebbi Joḥanan had against the words of Rebbi Joshua. Rebbi Nissa asked: Would it be the same for prohibitions? Rebbi Joḥanan said, one does not whip for prohibitions. Would that be as we stated there: “Before that time, even though they said, we know for Whom we made a vow or to Whom we dedicated, their vows are no vows and their dedications no dedications. After that time, even though they said, we do not know for Whom we made a vow or to Whom we dedicated, their vows are vows and their dedications dedications.” What is the status of that Mishnah? For Cahana it is in dispute, for Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish it is everybody’s opinion.
Rebbi Yoḥanan had a difficulty with the words of Rebbi Joshua. Is her marriage valid by biblical standards? The dissolution of her vows must be by biblical standards! And you say so! Rebbi Ze‘ira said, there is no dissolution of vows here, because of what Rebbi Joḥanan had against the words of Rebbi Joshua. Rebbi Nissa asked: Would it be the same for prohibitions? Rebbi Joḥanan said, one does not whip for prohibitions. Would that be as we stated there: “Before that time, even though they said, we know for Whom we made a vow or to Whom we dedicated, their vows are no vows and their dedications no dedications. After that time, even though they said, we do not know for Whom we made a vow or to Whom we dedicated, their vows are vows and their dedications dedications.” What is the status of that Mishnah? For Cahana it is in dispute, for Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish it is everybody’s opinion.
Rebbi Yoḥanan had a difficulty with the words of Rebbi Joshua. Is her marriage valid by biblical standards? The dissolution of her vows must be by biblical standards! And you say so! Rebbi Ze‘ira said, there is no dissolution of vows here, because of what Rebbi Joḥanan had against the words of Rebbi Joshua. Rebbi Nissa asked: Would it be the same for prohibitions? Rebbi Joḥanan said, one does not whip for prohibitions. Would that be as we stated there: “Before that time, even though they said, we know for Whom we made a vow or to Whom we dedicated, their vows are no vows and their dedications no dedications. After that time, even though they said, we do not know for Whom we made a vow or to Whom we dedicated, their vows are vows and their dedications dedications.” What is the status of that Mishnah? For Cahana it is in dispute, for Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish it is everybody’s opinion.
Rebbi Yoḥanan had a difficulty with the words of Rebbi Joshua. Is her marriage valid by biblical standards? The dissolution of her vows must be by biblical standards! And you say so! Rebbi Ze‘ira said, there is no dissolution of vows here, because of what Rebbi Joḥanan had against the words of Rebbi Joshua. Rebbi Nissa asked: Would it be the same for prohibitions? Rebbi Joḥanan said, one does not whip for prohibitions. Would that be as we stated there: “Before that time, even though they said, we know for Whom we made a vow or to Whom we dedicated, their vows are no vows and their dedications no dedications. After that time, even though they said, we do not know for Whom we made a vow or to Whom we dedicated, their vows are vows and their dedications dedications.” What is the status of that Mishnah? For Cahana it is in dispute, for Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish it is everybody’s opinion.
Because no blessing is written for creatures? Could she have been married on the Sabbath if a blessing were written for creatures? But was it not stated: “A man should not first have sexual relations on the Sabbath, for he makes a wound.” It must follow “others”, for “others permit it.” But “others” permit only when he is already married, for before he was married he had no right to what she finds, what she earns, and to dissolve her vows. After he married her, he has the right to receive what she finds or earns, and to dissolve her vows. If you say so, he is like someone who acquires on the Sabbath. Rebbi Mana said, this means that those who marry a widow must take her in when it is still daytime on Friday, that he should not be like someone who acquires on the Sabbath.
Because no blessing is written for creatures? Could she have been married on the Sabbath if a blessing were written for creatures? But was it not stated: “A man should not first have sexual relations on the Sabbath, for he makes a wound.” It must follow “others”, for “others permit it.” But “others” permit only when he is already married, for before he was married he had no right to what she finds, what she earns, and to dissolve her vows. After he married her, he has the right to receive what she finds or earns, and to dissolve her vows. If you say so, he is like someone who acquires on the Sabbath. Rebbi Mana said, this means that those who marry a widow must take her in when it is still daytime on Friday, that he should not be like someone who acquires on the Sabbath.
MISHNAH: The father has the benefit to give his daughter in preliminary marriage by money, contract, or intercourse; he has the right to what she finds and to her earnings, to dissolve her vows, and to receive her bill of divorce, but cannot eat usufruct in her lifetime. If she is definitively married, the husband in addition eats usufruct in her lifetime but is required to pay for her upkeep, her ransom, and her burial. Rebbi Jehudah says, even the poorest in Israel should not provide for her less than two flutes and one wailing woman.
HALAKHAH: “She always remains in the father’s power,” etc. Not only to the bridal chamber but to a house where the bridal chamber is. In which way? A banquet hall and a bedroom, the bridal chamber being the bedroom, and she entered the banquest hall. In which respect? Rebbi Eleazar said, to inherit from her. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, to dissolve her vows. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, even though Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, to dissolve her vows, he agrees that he does not actually dissolve them until she enters the bridal chamber. Rebbi Huna said, a baraita supports Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: “To whore in her father’s house,” that excludes the case that the father’s emissaries entrusted her to the husband’s emissaries, after which she should not be stoned but strangled.
HALAKHAH: “She always remains in the father’s power,” etc. Not only to the bridal chamber but to a house where the bridal chamber is. In which way? A banquet hall and a bedroom, the bridal chamber being the bedroom, and she entered the banquest hall. In which respect? Rebbi Eleazar said, to inherit from her. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, to dissolve her vows. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, even though Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, to dissolve her vows, he agrees that he does not actually dissolve them until she enters the bridal chamber. Rebbi Huna said, a baraita supports Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: “To whore in her father’s house,” that excludes the case that the father’s emissaries entrusted her to the husband’s emissaries, after which she should not be stoned but strangled.
MISHNAH: The following leave without ketubah: Any one violating the laws of Moses or Jews. What is the law of Moses? She feeds him what is not tithed, or makes him sleep with her when she is menstruating, or does not cut ḥallah, or makes vows which she does not keep. And what is the law of Jews: She leaves home with her hair in disorder, or spins in public, or speaks with everybody. Abba Saul says, also one who curses his parents in his presence. Rebbi Tarphon says, also the big-voiced. What is the big-voiced? Any who speaks inside her house and her neighbors hear her voice.
“She feeds him what is not tithed, or makes him sleep with her when she is menstruating, or does not cut ḥallah, or makes vows which she does not keep.” We understand all these because he is involved. “She makes vows which she does not keep,” what is his interest in this? He can say, I cannot live with a vowing wife because she buries her children. It was stated in the name of Rebbi Yudan: Children die for the sin of vows, as it is written: “For vain [vows] I smote your children.
“She feeds him what is not tithed, or makes him sleep with her when she is menstruating, or does not cut ḥallah, or makes vows which she does not keep.” We understand all these because he is involved. “She makes vows which she does not keep,” what is his interest in this? He can say, I cannot live with a vowing wife because she buries her children. It was stated in the name of Rebbi Yudan: Children die for the sin of vows, as it is written: “For vain [vows] I smote your children.
“She feeds him what is not tithed, or makes him sleep with her when she is menstruating, or does not cut ḥallah, or makes vows which she does not keep.” We understand all these because he is involved. “She makes vows which she does not keep,” what is his interest in this? He can say, I cannot live with a vowing wife because she buries her children. It was stated in the name of Rebbi Yudan: Children die for the sin of vows, as it is written: “For vain [vows] I smote your children.
“She feeds him what is not tithed, or makes him sleep with her when she is menstruating, or does not cut ḥallah, or makes vows which she does not keep.” We understand all these because he is involved. “She makes vows which she does not keep,” what is his interest in this? He can say, I cannot live with a vowing wife because she buries her children. It was stated in the name of Rebbi Yudan: Children die for the sin of vows, as it is written: “For vain [vows] I smote your children.
MISHNAH: If somebody performed the preliminary marriage with a woman on condition that she had no obligation of vows on her and it turned out that she had vows to fulfill, she is not preliminarily married. If he married her definitively without inquiry and she had vows to fulfill, she should leave without ketubah. If somebody performed the preliminary marriage with a woman on condition that she had no bodily defects and it turned out that she had bodily defects, she is not preliminarily married. If he married her definitively without inquiry and she had bodily defects, she should leave without ketubah; and all defects which disqualify a priest disqualify a woman. If she had bodily defects, as long as she is in her father’s house, the father has to prove that the defects developed after she was preliminarily married and his field was swamped; once she entered her husband’s domain, the husband has to prove that she had the defects before the preliminary wedding so that his acquisition was in error, the words of Rebbi Meïr. But the Sages say, when was this said? For hidden defects, but he has no claim about visible defects, and if there is a public bathhouse in his town he has no claim for hidden defects since he checks her out through his female relatives.
MISHNAH: If somebody performed the preliminary marriage with a woman on condition that she had no obligation of vows on her and it turned out that she had vows to fulfill, she is not preliminarily married. If he married her definitively without inquiry and she had vows to fulfill, she should leave without ketubah. If somebody performed the preliminary marriage with a woman on condition that she had no bodily defects and it turned out that she had bodily defects, she is not preliminarily married. If he married her definitively without inquiry and she had bodily defects, she should leave without ketubah; and all defects which disqualify a priest disqualify a woman. If she had bodily defects, as long as she is in her father’s house, the father has to prove that the defects developed after she was preliminarily married and his field was swamped; once she entered her husband’s domain, the husband has to prove that she had the defects before the preliminary wedding so that his acquisition was in error, the words of Rebbi Meïr. But the Sages say, when was this said? For hidden defects, but he has no claim about visible defects, and if there is a public bathhouse in his town he has no claim for hidden defects since he checks her out through his female relatives.
MISHNAH: If somebody performed the preliminary marriage with a woman on condition that she had no obligation of vows on her and it turned out that she had vows to fulfill, she is not preliminarily married. If he married her definitively without inquiry and she had vows to fulfill, she should leave without ketubah. If somebody performed the preliminary marriage with a woman on condition that she had no bodily defects and it turned out that she had bodily defects, she is not preliminarily married. If he married her definitively without inquiry and she had bodily defects, she should leave without ketubah; and all defects which disqualify a priest disqualify a woman. If she had bodily defects, as long as she is in her father’s house, the father has to prove that the defects developed after she was preliminarily married and his field was swamped; once she entered her husband’s domain, the husband has to prove that she had the defects before the preliminary wedding so that his acquisition was in error, the words of Rebbi Meïr. But the Sages say, when was this said? For hidden defects, but he has no claim about visible defects, and if there is a public bathhouse in his town he has no claim for hidden defects since he checks her out through his female relatives.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody performed the preliminary marriage with a woman on condition that she had no obligation of vows on her,” etc. “If she had bodily defects, as long as she is in her father’s house,” etc. We have stated defects. Which vows? Rebbi Joḥanan said in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Yoṣadaq: If she vowed not to eat, or not to drink wine, or not to wear dyed garments. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, the fine linen garments which come from Bet She‘an have the status of dyed garments. Rebbi Yose said, the Mishnah deals with the case that he said to her, “on condition that you have no obligation of vows on you.” But if he said, “on condition that you have no obligation of any vow on you,” then even if she made a vow not to eat carob fruit it is a vow.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody performed the preliminary marriage with a woman on condition that she had no obligation of vows on her,” etc. “If she had bodily defects, as long as she is in her father’s house,” etc. We have stated defects. Which vows? Rebbi Joḥanan said in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Yoṣadaq: If she vowed not to eat, or not to drink wine, or not to wear dyed garments. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, the fine linen garments which come from Bet She‘an have the status of dyed garments. Rebbi Yose said, the Mishnah deals with the case that he said to her, “on condition that you have no obligation of vows on you.” But if he said, “on condition that you have no obligation of any vow on you,” then even if she made a vow not to eat carob fruit it is a vow.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody performed the preliminary marriage with a woman on condition that she had no obligation of vows on her,” etc. “If she had bodily defects, as long as she is in her father’s house,” etc. We have stated defects. Which vows? Rebbi Joḥanan said in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Yoṣadaq: If she vowed not to eat, or not to drink wine, or not to wear dyed garments. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, the fine linen garments which come from Bet She‘an have the status of dyed garments. Rebbi Yose said, the Mishnah deals with the case that he said to her, “on condition that you have no obligation of vows on you.” But if he said, “on condition that you have no obligation of any vow on you,” then even if she made a vow not to eat carob fruit it is a vow.
HALAKHAH: “If she inherited after she was definitively married,” etc. We did state: She may sell or give away and it is valid. Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: She should not sell or give away, but if she sold or gave away it is valid. ”Rebbi Ḥanina ben Aqiba said, that is not what Rabban Gamliel gave as answer, but the following was his argument: No, if you have an argument about a preliminarily married one, where he has rights neither to what she finds, nor to her handiwork, nor to dissolve her vows, what can you say about a definitively married one where he has rights to what she finds, to her handiwork, and to dissolve her vows? Let the proof be the case of one who [inherited] before the definitive marriage and then was definitively married, in which case he has rights to what she finds, to her handiwork, and to dissolve her vows, and you admit to us that she should not sell or give away. He said to them, I agree that she should not sell or give away, but if she sold or gave away it is valid..” There came a case before Rebbi Immi. He said, is not Rabban Gamliel’s an isolated opinion? One cannot rely on it. A baraita supports him and disagrees with him: ”Our teachers took up the case again, voted, and instructed about property which she inherited before the definitive marriage and then was definitively married, that she should not sell or give away, and if she sold or gave away it is invalid.” It disagrees that the sale is invalid. It agrees that our teachers took up the case again, instructed, and voted. Before they voted, they did not disagree with him.
HALAKHAH: “If she inherited after she was definitively married,” etc. We did state: She may sell or give away and it is valid. Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: She should not sell or give away, but if she sold or gave away it is valid. ”Rebbi Ḥanina ben Aqiba said, that is not what Rabban Gamliel gave as answer, but the following was his argument: No, if you have an argument about a preliminarily married one, where he has rights neither to what she finds, nor to her handiwork, nor to dissolve her vows, what can you say about a definitively married one where he has rights to what she finds, to her handiwork, and to dissolve her vows? Let the proof be the case of one who [inherited] before the definitive marriage and then was definitively married, in which case he has rights to what she finds, to her handiwork, and to dissolve her vows, and you admit to us that she should not sell or give away. He said to them, I agree that she should not sell or give away, but if she sold or gave away it is valid..” There came a case before Rebbi Immi. He said, is not Rabban Gamliel’s an isolated opinion? One cannot rely on it. A baraita supports him and disagrees with him: ”Our teachers took up the case again, voted, and instructed about property which she inherited before the definitive marriage and then was definitively married, that she should not sell or give away, and if she sold or gave away it is invalid.” It disagrees that the sale is invalid. It agrees that our teachers took up the case again, instructed, and voted. Before they voted, they did not disagree with him.
HALAKHAH: “If she inherited after she was definitively married,” etc. We did state: She may sell or give away and it is valid. Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: She should not sell or give away, but if she sold or gave away it is valid. ”Rebbi Ḥanina ben Aqiba said, that is not what Rabban Gamliel gave as answer, but the following was his argument: No, if you have an argument about a preliminarily married one, where he has rights neither to what she finds, nor to her handiwork, nor to dissolve her vows, what can you say about a definitively married one where he has rights to what she finds, to her handiwork, and to dissolve her vows? Let the proof be the case of one who [inherited] before the definitive marriage and then was definitively married, in which case he has rights to what she finds, to her handiwork, and to dissolve her vows, and you admit to us that she should not sell or give away. He said to them, I agree that she should not sell or give away, but if she sold or gave away it is valid..” There came a case before Rebbi Immi. He said, is not Rabban Gamliel’s an isolated opinion? One cannot rely on it. A baraita supports him and disagrees with him: ”Our teachers took up the case again, voted, and instructed about property which she inherited before the definitive marriage and then was definitively married, that she should not sell or give away, and if she sold or gave away it is invalid.” It disagrees that the sale is invalid. It agrees that our teachers took up the case again, instructed, and voted. Before they voted, they did not disagree with him.
“No usufruct.” Rebbi Jeremiah said, that he has from her only the usufruct. Rebbi Yose the Sidonian stated before Rebbi Jeremiah, in disgreement with Rebbi Jeremiah: “He has the right to what she finds and earns, and to dissolve her vows.” What means “no usufruct”? That she cannot reclaim from him the usufruct he had [from her property].
As it was stated: “If somebody went overseas and another person provided for his wife.” Rebbi Ḥaggai said, they said only, another. Therefore, the father can recover. Rebbi Yose says, neither the father nor a third party can recover. There is a parallel disagreement, as we have stated there: “He has the right to what she finds and to her earnings, to dissolve her vows, and to receive her bill of divorce, but cannot eat usufruct in her lifetime… He is required to pay for her upkeep, her ransom, and her burial.” Rebbi Ḥaggai said, they said only, the father. Therefore, a third party cannot recover. Rebbi Yose says, both the father or a third party can recover. In the opinion of Rebbi Ḥaggai, both for burial as for upkeep the father can recover, a third party cannot recover. In the opinion of Rebbi Yose, for burial both the father and also a third party can recover because it is unthinkable that his wife should be thrown to the dogs. For sustenance, neither the father nor a third party can recover.
MISHNAH: All substitute names of vows are like vows, of bans like bans, of oaths like oaths, of nazir vows like nazir vows. If one says to another, I am vowed away from you, I am separated from you, I am distanced from you, that I will not eat from yours, that I will not taste from yours, he is forbidden. I am excommunicated from you, Rabbi Aqiba was stringent in that because of a doubt. As vows of the wicked, he vowed as nazir, a sacrifice, and an oath. As vows of the good ones, he did not say anything. As their freewill gifts, he made a vow of nazir and sacrifice.
MISHNAH: All substitute names of vows are like vows, of bans like bans, of oaths like oaths, of nazir vows like nazir vows. If one says to another, I am vowed away from you, I am separated from you, I am distanced from you, that I will not eat from yours, that I will not taste from yours, he is forbidden. I am excommunicated from you, Rabbi Aqiba was stringent in that because of a doubt. As vows of the wicked, he vowed as nazir, a sacrifice, and an oath. As vows of the good ones, he did not say anything. As their freewill gifts, he made a vow of nazir and sacrifice.
MISHNAH: All substitute names of vows are like vows, of bans like bans, of oaths like oaths, of nazir vows like nazir vows. If one says to another, I am vowed away from you, I am separated from you, I am distanced from you, that I will not eat from yours, that I will not taste from yours, he is forbidden. I am excommunicated from you, Rabbi Aqiba was stringent in that because of a doubt. As vows of the wicked, he vowed as nazir, a sacrifice, and an oath. As vows of the good ones, he did not say anything. As their freewill gifts, he made a vow of nazir and sacrifice.
MISHNAH: All substitute names of vows are like vows, of bans like bans, of oaths like oaths, of nazir vows like nazir vows. If one says to another, I am vowed away from you, I am separated from you, I am distanced from you, that I will not eat from yours, that I will not taste from yours, he is forbidden. I am excommunicated from you, Rabbi Aqiba was stringent in that because of a doubt. As vows of the wicked, he vowed as nazir, a sacrifice, and an oath. As vows of the good ones, he did not say anything. As their freewill gifts, he made a vow of nazir and sacrifice.
MISHNAH: All substitute names of vows are like vows, of bans like bans, of oaths like oaths, of nazir vows like nazir vows. If one says to another, I am vowed away from you, I am separated from you, I am distanced from you, that I will not eat from yours, that I will not taste from yours, he is forbidden. I am excommunicated from you, Rabbi Aqiba was stringent in that because of a doubt. As vows of the wicked, he vowed as nazir, a sacrifice, and an oath. As vows of the good ones, he did not say anything. As their freewill gifts, he made a vow of nazir and sacrifice.
MISHNAH: All substitute names of vows are like vows, of bans like bans, of oaths like oaths, of nazir vows like nazir vows. If one says to another, I am vowed away from you, I am separated from you, I am distanced from you, that I will not eat from yours, that I will not taste from yours, he is forbidden. I am excommunicated from you, Rabbi Aqiba was stringent in that because of a doubt. As vows of the wicked, he vowed as nazir, a sacrifice, and an oath. As vows of the good ones, he did not say anything. As their freewill gifts, he made a vow of nazir and sacrifice.
HALAKHAH: “All substitute names of vows are like vows,” etc. It is written “Any person who vows,” why does the verse say “a vow”? From here that substitute names of vows are like vows. “Or he swears,” why does the verse say “an oath”? From here that substitute names of oaths are like oaths. “But any ban,” why does the verse say “which he bans”? From here that substitute names of bans are like bans. “A vow of nazir”, why does the verse say “to be a nazir”? From here that substitute names of nazir vows are like nazir vows. So far for Rebbi Aqiba who says that these are expressions of additions. For Rebbi Ismael who said, these are double expressions in the normal style of the Torah, “going you went, desiring you desired, by stealing I was stolen”, from where? “ Any person who vows a vow to the Eternal or swears an oath to forbid a prohibition on himself shall not profane his word,” why does the verse say “he must fulfill anything coming out of his mouth”? From here that substitute names of vows are like vows and substitute names of oaths are like oaths. And from where that substitute names of bans are like bans? “A vow, a vow”. Since “a vow” at one place means that substitute names of vows are like vows and substitute names of oaths are like oaths, “a vow” at the other place means that substitute names of bans are like bans. And from where that substitute names of being a nazir are like being a nazir? “A vow, a vow”. Since “a vow” at one place means that substitute names of oaths are like oaths, “a vow” at the other place means that substitute names of being a nazir are like being a nazir.
HALAKHAH: “All substitute names of vows are like vows,” etc. It is written “Any person who vows,” why does the verse say “a vow”? From here that substitute names of vows are like vows. “Or he swears,” why does the verse say “an oath”? From here that substitute names of oaths are like oaths. “But any ban,” why does the verse say “which he bans”? From here that substitute names of bans are like bans. “A vow of nazir”, why does the verse say “to be a nazir”? From here that substitute names of nazir vows are like nazir vows. So far for Rebbi Aqiba who says that these are expressions of additions. For Rebbi Ismael who said, these are double expressions in the normal style of the Torah, “going you went, desiring you desired, by stealing I was stolen”, from where? “ Any person who vows a vow to the Eternal or swears an oath to forbid a prohibition on himself shall not profane his word,” why does the verse say “he must fulfill anything coming out of his mouth”? From here that substitute names of vows are like vows and substitute names of oaths are like oaths. And from where that substitute names of bans are like bans? “A vow, a vow”. Since “a vow” at one place means that substitute names of vows are like vows and substitute names of oaths are like oaths, “a vow” at the other place means that substitute names of bans are like bans. And from where that substitute names of being a nazir are like being a nazir? “A vow, a vow”. Since “a vow” at one place means that substitute names of oaths are like oaths, “a vow” at the other place means that substitute names of being a nazir are like being a nazir.
HALAKHAH: “All substitute names of vows are like vows,” etc. It is written “Any person who vows,” why does the verse say “a vow”? From here that substitute names of vows are like vows. “Or he swears,” why does the verse say “an oath”? From here that substitute names of oaths are like oaths. “But any ban,” why does the verse say “which he bans”? From here that substitute names of bans are like bans. “A vow of nazir”, why does the verse say “to be a nazir”? From here that substitute names of nazir vows are like nazir vows. So far for Rebbi Aqiba who says that these are expressions of additions. For Rebbi Ismael who said, these are double expressions in the normal style of the Torah, “going you went, desiring you desired, by stealing I was stolen”, from where? “ Any person who vows a vow to the Eternal or swears an oath to forbid a prohibition on himself shall not profane his word,” why does the verse say “he must fulfill anything coming out of his mouth”? From here that substitute names of vows are like vows and substitute names of oaths are like oaths. And from where that substitute names of bans are like bans? “A vow, a vow”. Since “a vow” at one place means that substitute names of vows are like vows and substitute names of oaths are like oaths, “a vow” at the other place means that substitute names of bans are like bans. And from where that substitute names of being a nazir are like being a nazir? “A vow, a vow”. Since “a vow” at one place means that substitute names of oaths are like oaths, “a vow” at the other place means that substitute names of being a nazir are like being a nazir.
HALAKHAH: “All substitute names of vows are like vows,” etc. It is written “Any person who vows,” why does the verse say “a vow”? From here that substitute names of vows are like vows. “Or he swears,” why does the verse say “an oath”? From here that substitute names of oaths are like oaths. “But any ban,” why does the verse say “which he bans”? From here that substitute names of bans are like bans. “A vow of nazir”, why does the verse say “to be a nazir”? From here that substitute names of nazir vows are like nazir vows. So far for Rebbi Aqiba who says that these are expressions of additions. For Rebbi Ismael who said, these are double expressions in the normal style of the Torah, “going you went, desiring you desired, by stealing I was stolen”, from where? “ Any person who vows a vow to the Eternal or swears an oath to forbid a prohibition on himself shall not profane his word,” why does the verse say “he must fulfill anything coming out of his mouth”? From here that substitute names of vows are like vows and substitute names of oaths are like oaths. And from where that substitute names of bans are like bans? “A vow, a vow”. Since “a vow” at one place means that substitute names of vows are like vows and substitute names of oaths are like oaths, “a vow” at the other place means that substitute names of bans are like bans. And from where that substitute names of being a nazir are like being a nazir? “A vow, a vow”. Since “a vow” at one place means that substitute names of oaths are like oaths, “a vow” at the other place means that substitute names of being a nazir are like being a nazir.
HALAKHAH: “All substitute names of vows are like vows,” etc. It is written “Any person who vows,” why does the verse say “a vow”? From here that substitute names of vows are like vows. “Or he swears,” why does the verse say “an oath”? From here that substitute names of oaths are like oaths. “But any ban,” why does the verse say “which he bans”? From here that substitute names of bans are like bans. “A vow of nazir”, why does the verse say “to be a nazir”? From here that substitute names of nazir vows are like nazir vows. So far for Rebbi Aqiba who says that these are expressions of additions. For Rebbi Ismael who said, these are double expressions in the normal style of the Torah, “going you went, desiring you desired, by stealing I was stolen”, from where? “ Any person who vows a vow to the Eternal or swears an oath to forbid a prohibition on himself shall not profane his word,” why does the verse say “he must fulfill anything coming out of his mouth”? From here that substitute names of vows are like vows and substitute names of oaths are like oaths. And from where that substitute names of bans are like bans? “A vow, a vow”. Since “a vow” at one place means that substitute names of vows are like vows and substitute names of oaths are like oaths, “a vow” at the other place means that substitute names of bans are like bans. And from where that substitute names of being a nazir are like being a nazir? “A vow, a vow”. Since “a vow” at one place means that substitute names of oaths are like oaths, “a vow” at the other place means that substitute names of being a nazir are like being a nazir.
HALAKHAH: “All substitute names of vows are like vows,” etc. It is written “Any person who vows,” why does the verse say “a vow”? From here that substitute names of vows are like vows. “Or he swears,” why does the verse say “an oath”? From here that substitute names of oaths are like oaths. “But any ban,” why does the verse say “which he bans”? From here that substitute names of bans are like bans. “A vow of nazir”, why does the verse say “to be a nazir”? From here that substitute names of nazir vows are like nazir vows. So far for Rebbi Aqiba who says that these are expressions of additions. For Rebbi Ismael who said, these are double expressions in the normal style of the Torah, “going you went, desiring you desired, by stealing I was stolen”, from where? “ Any person who vows a vow to the Eternal or swears an oath to forbid a prohibition on himself shall not profane his word,” why does the verse say “he must fulfill anything coming out of his mouth”? From here that substitute names of vows are like vows and substitute names of oaths are like oaths. And from where that substitute names of bans are like bans? “A vow, a vow”. Since “a vow” at one place means that substitute names of vows are like vows and substitute names of oaths are like oaths, “a vow” at the other place means that substitute names of bans are like bans. And from where that substitute names of being a nazir are like being a nazir? “A vow, a vow”. Since “a vow” at one place means that substitute names of oaths are like oaths, “a vow” at the other place means that substitute names of being a nazir are like being a nazir.
HALAKHAH: “All substitute names of vows are like vows,” etc. It is written “Any person who vows,” why does the verse say “a vow”? From here that substitute names of vows are like vows. “Or he swears,” why does the verse say “an oath”? From here that substitute names of oaths are like oaths. “But any ban,” why does the verse say “which he bans”? From here that substitute names of bans are like bans. “A vow of nazir”, why does the verse say “to be a nazir”? From here that substitute names of nazir vows are like nazir vows. So far for Rebbi Aqiba who says that these are expressions of additions. For Rebbi Ismael who said, these are double expressions in the normal style of the Torah, “going you went, desiring you desired, by stealing I was stolen”, from where? “ Any person who vows a vow to the Eternal or swears an oath to forbid a prohibition on himself shall not profane his word,” why does the verse say “he must fulfill anything coming out of his mouth”? From here that substitute names of vows are like vows and substitute names of oaths are like oaths. And from where that substitute names of bans are like bans? “A vow, a vow”. Since “a vow” at one place means that substitute names of vows are like vows and substitute names of oaths are like oaths, “a vow” at the other place means that substitute names of bans are like bans. And from where that substitute names of being a nazir are like being a nazir? “A vow, a vow”. Since “a vow” at one place means that substitute names of oaths are like oaths, “a vow” at the other place means that substitute names of being a nazir are like being a nazir.
HALAKHAH: “All substitute names of vows are like vows,” etc. It is written “Any person who vows,” why does the verse say “a vow”? From here that substitute names of vows are like vows. “Or he swears,” why does the verse say “an oath”? From here that substitute names of oaths are like oaths. “But any ban,” why does the verse say “which he bans”? From here that substitute names of bans are like bans. “A vow of nazir”, why does the verse say “to be a nazir”? From here that substitute names of nazir vows are like nazir vows. So far for Rebbi Aqiba who says that these are expressions of additions. For Rebbi Ismael who said, these are double expressions in the normal style of the Torah, “going you went, desiring you desired, by stealing I was stolen”, from where? “ Any person who vows a vow to the Eternal or swears an oath to forbid a prohibition on himself shall not profane his word,” why does the verse say “he must fulfill anything coming out of his mouth”? From here that substitute names of vows are like vows and substitute names of oaths are like oaths. And from where that substitute names of bans are like bans? “A vow, a vow”. Since “a vow” at one place means that substitute names of vows are like vows and substitute names of oaths are like oaths, “a vow” at the other place means that substitute names of bans are like bans. And from where that substitute names of being a nazir are like being a nazir? “A vow, a vow”. Since “a vow” at one place means that substitute names of oaths are like oaths, “a vow” at the other place means that substitute names of being a nazir are like being a nazir.
HALAKHAH: “All substitute names of vows are like vows,” etc. It is written “Any person who vows,” why does the verse say “a vow”? From here that substitute names of vows are like vows. “Or he swears,” why does the verse say “an oath”? From here that substitute names of oaths are like oaths. “But any ban,” why does the verse say “which he bans”? From here that substitute names of bans are like bans. “A vow of nazir”, why does the verse say “to be a nazir”? From here that substitute names of nazir vows are like nazir vows. So far for Rebbi Aqiba who says that these are expressions of additions. For Rebbi Ismael who said, these are double expressions in the normal style of the Torah, “going you went, desiring you desired, by stealing I was stolen”, from where? “ Any person who vows a vow to the Eternal or swears an oath to forbid a prohibition on himself shall not profane his word,” why does the verse say “he must fulfill anything coming out of his mouth”? From here that substitute names of vows are like vows and substitute names of oaths are like oaths. And from where that substitute names of bans are like bans? “A vow, a vow”. Since “a vow” at one place means that substitute names of vows are like vows and substitute names of oaths are like oaths, “a vow” at the other place means that substitute names of bans are like bans. And from where that substitute names of being a nazir are like being a nazir? “A vow, a vow”. Since “a vow” at one place means that substitute names of oaths are like oaths, “a vow” at the other place means that substitute names of being a nazir are like being a nazir.
HALAKHAH: “All substitute names of vows are like vows,” etc. It is written “Any person who vows,” why does the verse say “a vow”? From here that substitute names of vows are like vows. “Or he swears,” why does the verse say “an oath”? From here that substitute names of oaths are like oaths. “But any ban,” why does the verse say “which he bans”? From here that substitute names of bans are like bans. “A vow of nazir”, why does the verse say “to be a nazir”? From here that substitute names of nazir vows are like nazir vows. So far for Rebbi Aqiba who says that these are expressions of additions. For Rebbi Ismael who said, these are double expressions in the normal style of the Torah, “going you went, desiring you desired, by stealing I was stolen”, from where? “ Any person who vows a vow to the Eternal or swears an oath to forbid a prohibition on himself shall not profane his word,” why does the verse say “he must fulfill anything coming out of his mouth”? From here that substitute names of vows are like vows and substitute names of oaths are like oaths. And from where that substitute names of bans are like bans? “A vow, a vow”. Since “a vow” at one place means that substitute names of vows are like vows and substitute names of oaths are like oaths, “a vow” at the other place means that substitute names of bans are like bans. And from where that substitute names of being a nazir are like being a nazir? “A vow, a vow”. Since “a vow” at one place means that substitute names of oaths are like oaths, “a vow” at the other place means that substitute names of being a nazir are like being a nazir.
HALAKHAH: “All substitute names of vows are like vows,” etc. It is written “Any person who vows,” why does the verse say “a vow”? From here that substitute names of vows are like vows. “Or he swears,” why does the verse say “an oath”? From here that substitute names of oaths are like oaths. “But any ban,” why does the verse say “which he bans”? From here that substitute names of bans are like bans. “A vow of nazir”, why does the verse say “to be a nazir”? From here that substitute names of nazir vows are like nazir vows. So far for Rebbi Aqiba who says that these are expressions of additions. For Rebbi Ismael who said, these are double expressions in the normal style of the Torah, “going you went, desiring you desired, by stealing I was stolen”, from where? “ Any person who vows a vow to the Eternal or swears an oath to forbid a prohibition on himself shall not profane his word,” why does the verse say “he must fulfill anything coming out of his mouth”? From here that substitute names of vows are like vows and substitute names of oaths are like oaths. And from where that substitute names of bans are like bans? “A vow, a vow”. Since “a vow” at one place means that substitute names of vows are like vows and substitute names of oaths are like oaths, “a vow” at the other place means that substitute names of bans are like bans. And from where that substitute names of being a nazir are like being a nazir? “A vow, a vow”. Since “a vow” at one place means that substitute names of oaths are like oaths, “a vow” at the other place means that substitute names of being a nazir are like being a nazir.
HALAKHAH: “All substitute names of vows are like vows,” etc. It is written “Any person who vows,” why does the verse say “a vow”? From here that substitute names of vows are like vows. “Or he swears,” why does the verse say “an oath”? From here that substitute names of oaths are like oaths. “But any ban,” why does the verse say “which he bans”? From here that substitute names of bans are like bans. “A vow of nazir”, why does the verse say “to be a nazir”? From here that substitute names of nazir vows are like nazir vows. So far for Rebbi Aqiba who says that these are expressions of additions. For Rebbi Ismael who said, these are double expressions in the normal style of the Torah, “going you went, desiring you desired, by stealing I was stolen”, from where? “ Any person who vows a vow to the Eternal or swears an oath to forbid a prohibition on himself shall not profane his word,” why does the verse say “he must fulfill anything coming out of his mouth”? From here that substitute names of vows are like vows and substitute names of oaths are like oaths. And from where that substitute names of bans are like bans? “A vow, a vow”. Since “a vow” at one place means that substitute names of vows are like vows and substitute names of oaths are like oaths, “a vow” at the other place means that substitute names of bans are like bans. And from where that substitute names of being a nazir are like being a nazir? “A vow, a vow”. Since “a vow” at one place means that substitute names of oaths are like oaths, “a vow” at the other place means that substitute names of being a nazir are like being a nazir.
How does Rebbi Aqiba explain “he must fulfill anything coming out of his mouth”? From here that if part of a vow is invalid, all of it is invalid. Does Rebbi Ismael not agree with this? Everything derives from there. It follows from there that substitute names of vows are like vows and substitute names of oaths are like oaths and it follows from there that if part of a vow is invalid, all of it is invalid. How does Rebbi Ismael explain “any person who vows a vow of nazir”? From there that a person can obligate himself as nazir while he currently is a nazir. Does Rebbi Aqiba not agree with this? He agrees and everything derives from there. He agrees that from there a person can obligate himself as nazir while he currently is a nazir.
How does Rebbi Aqiba explain “he must fulfill anything coming out of his mouth”? From here that if part of a vow is invalid, all of it is invalid. Does Rebbi Ismael not agree with this? Everything derives from there. It follows from there that substitute names of vows are like vows and substitute names of oaths are like oaths and it follows from there that if part of a vow is invalid, all of it is invalid. How does Rebbi Ismael explain “any person who vows a vow of nazir”? From there that a person can obligate himself as nazir while he currently is a nazir. Does Rebbi Aqiba not agree with this? He agrees and everything derives from there. He agrees that from there a person can obligate himself as nazir while he currently is a nazir.
How does Rebbi Aqiba explain “he must fulfill anything coming out of his mouth”? From here that if part of a vow is invalid, all of it is invalid. Does Rebbi Ismael not agree with this? Everything derives from there. It follows from there that substitute names of vows are like vows and substitute names of oaths are like oaths and it follows from there that if part of a vow is invalid, all of it is invalid. How does Rebbi Ismael explain “any person who vows a vow of nazir”? From there that a person can obligate himself as nazir while he currently is a nazir. Does Rebbi Aqiba not agree with this? He agrees and everything derives from there. He agrees that from there a person can obligate himself as nazir while he currently is a nazir.
Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Eleazar disagree, for Rebbi Joḥanan said, one whips for prohibitions and Rebbi Eleazar said, one does not whip. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, so did Rebbi Joḥanan answer Rebbi Eleazar: According to you, who says one does not whip on prohibitions, did we not state: “If somebody has vowed not to have any usufruct from another and he goes to visit him,” let him not enter! Rebbi Jeremiah said, there is a difference there because of the ways of peace. Rebbi Yose asked: If it is because of the ways of peace, should he not also be permitted in case of an oath? But we have stated: “Vows are forbidden, oaths permitted.”
“ ‘Prohibition’, is an oath. ‘Expression’, is an oath. If you say prohibition is an oath, he is guilty for every single prohibition and for every single oath. If you say prohibition is a kind of oath, he is guilty for this separately and that separately.” “Prohibition is an oath”, and you say “if you say so”? Rebbi Eleazar said, these are two Tannaїm. Rebbi Jeremiah said, it is from one Tanna. If he said it in the language of a vow you catch him in the language of a vow. If he said it in the language of an oath you catch him in the language of an oath. If you say, prohibition is a kind of oath, he is guilty for every single prohibition and for every single oath. Rebbi Yose said, this comes only for five loaves. But for a single loaf, from the moment he mentioned “oath” for it, he made it a cadaver. Furthermore, he may want to have oaths apply to prohibited items, but oaths cannot apply to prohibitited items. Rebbi Ḥananiah said, it applies even to a single loaf. As we have stated, “in that the past is more stringent than the future, if he said I did not eat, I did not eat, he is guilty for every statement; I shall not eat, I shall not eat, he is guilty only once.” Rebbi Yudan said, only if he first mentioned “vow” and then mentioned “oath”. But if he mentioned oath and then vow, vows can apply to prohibitions but oaths cannot apply to prohibitions.