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The Jerusalem Talmud

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 2:6

Both the rabbis and Rebbi Simeon agree to the following. According to the rabbis, the aspect which “bespeaking” acquires is forbidden in the co-wife, the aspect which “bespeaking” does not acquire is permitted in the co-wife; therefore, the latter has to have ḥalîṣah but not levirate. According to Rebbi Simeon, if “bespeaking” acquires, both are permitted. If “bespeaking” does not acquire, the first one is forbidden but the second one permitted. Out of doubt, she has to have ḥalîṣah but not levirate. What is the difference between them? If he slept with the second one. In the opinion of the rabbis, an incestuous intercourse because he had “bespoken”. Therefore, if he had not “bespoken” she may have levirate and there is no candidacy at all. Rebbi Ḥaggai said, I explained that following what Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: If a woman waiting for her levir died, her mother is permitted to him. He had in her an interest of candidacy. When she died, the candidacy was eliminated. And here, when he died, the candidacy was eliminated.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 2:9

Rebbi Joḥanan said, Rebbi Simeon agrees in the first case. It was found stated, that also is in disagreement. What is the difference between the first and second cases? In the first case he came and found her forbidden, in the second he came and found her permitted. Rebbi Joḥanan asked, if he found his father’s wife married to an outsider, what does Rebbi Simeon say about her? Because he came and found her permitted, is she permitted? Rebbi Simeon said that only relative to paternal brothers. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish asked: His maternal halfbrother’s wife which he found married to an outsider, what does Rebbi Simeon say about her? Because he came and found her permitted, is she permitted? Rebbi Simeon said that only relative to paternal brothers. Rebbi Yudan asked, a co-wife of his maternal aunt which he found married to an outsider? Because he came and found her permitted, is she permitted? Rebbi Abin asked, if a divorcee became a widow? You have to say that Rebbi Simeon referred to the first case.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 2:9

Rebbi Joḥanan said, Rebbi Simeon agrees in the first case. It was found stated, that also is in disagreement. What is the difference between the first and second cases? In the first case he came and found her forbidden, in the second he came and found her permitted. Rebbi Joḥanan asked, if he found his father’s wife married to an outsider, what does Rebbi Simeon say about her? Because he came and found her permitted, is she permitted? Rebbi Simeon said that only relative to paternal brothers. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish asked: His maternal halfbrother’s wife which he found married to an outsider, what does Rebbi Simeon say about her? Because he came and found her permitted, is she permitted? Rebbi Simeon said that only relative to paternal brothers. Rebbi Yudan asked, a co-wife of his maternal aunt which he found married to an outsider? Because he came and found her permitted, is she permitted? Rebbi Abin asked, if a divorcee became a widow? You have to say that Rebbi Simeon referred to the first case.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 2:9

Rebbi Joḥanan said, Rebbi Simeon agrees in the first case. It was found stated, that also is in disagreement. What is the difference between the first and second cases? In the first case he came and found her forbidden, in the second he came and found her permitted. Rebbi Joḥanan asked, if he found his father’s wife married to an outsider, what does Rebbi Simeon say about her? Because he came and found her permitted, is she permitted? Rebbi Simeon said that only relative to paternal brothers. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish asked: His maternal halfbrother’s wife which he found married to an outsider, what does Rebbi Simeon say about her? Because he came and found her permitted, is she permitted? Rebbi Simeon said that only relative to paternal brothers. Rebbi Yudan asked, a co-wife of his maternal aunt which he found married to an outsider? Because he came and found her permitted, is she permitted? Rebbi Abin asked, if a divorcee became a widow? You have to say that Rebbi Simeon referred to the first case.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 2:10

What does Rebbi Simeon say about the “bespoken” woman? Let us hear from the following: “Rebbi Simeon says, the cohabitation or the ḥalîṣah of one of them frees her co-wife but if he performed ḥalîṣah with the “bespoken” woman, her colleague also needs ḥalîṣah. You say, the cohabitation or the ḥalîṣah of one of them frees her co-wife. However one argues, if “bespeaking” acquires, both are his wives and any one of them becomes free by her colleague’s ḥalîṣah. If “bespeaking” does not acquire, the first one does not need ḥalîṣah, but if he performed ḥalîṣah with the “bespoken” one, the second one also needs ḥalîṣah. Maybe “bespeaking” does not acquire, then ḥalîṣah or levirate do not apply to her. Maybe “bespeaking” does acquire; then she is freed by her colleague’s ḥalîṣah. What is the difference between them? If he performed ḥalîṣah with the first and cohabited with the second. In the opinion of the rabbis it was an incestuous cohabitation. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon it was not an incestuous cohabitation. If he cohabited both with the first and the second widow, in the opinion of the rabbis with the first it was incest and the second needs a bill of divorce and ḥalîṣah. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon, both need a bill of divorce. The first one needs a bill of divorce; perhaps the “bespeaking” did acquire. The second one needs a bill of divorce; perhaps levirate did acquire; if “bespeaking” did acquire, she was freed by her colleague’s ḥalîṣah.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 2:10

What does Rebbi Simeon say about the “bespoken” woman? Let us hear from the following: “Rebbi Simeon says, the cohabitation or the ḥalîṣah of one of them frees her co-wife but if he performed ḥalîṣah with the “bespoken” woman, her colleague also needs ḥalîṣah. You say, the cohabitation or the ḥalîṣah of one of them frees her co-wife. However one argues, if “bespeaking” acquires, both are his wives and any one of them becomes free by her colleague’s ḥalîṣah. If “bespeaking” does not acquire, the first one does not need ḥalîṣah, but if he performed ḥalîṣah with the “bespoken” one, the second one also needs ḥalîṣah. Maybe “bespeaking” does not acquire, then ḥalîṣah or levirate do not apply to her. Maybe “bespeaking” does acquire; then she is freed by her colleague’s ḥalîṣah. What is the difference between them? If he performed ḥalîṣah with the first and cohabited with the second. In the opinion of the rabbis it was an incestuous cohabitation. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon it was not an incestuous cohabitation. If he cohabited both with the first and the second widow, in the opinion of the rabbis with the first it was incest and the second needs a bill of divorce and ḥalîṣah. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon, both need a bill of divorce. The first one needs a bill of divorce; perhaps the “bespeaking” did acquire. The second one needs a bill of divorce; perhaps levirate did acquire; if “bespeaking” did acquire, she was freed by her colleague’s ḥalîṣah.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 2:11

Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rav Sheshet: There, one stated: The words of Rebbi Simeon are that both are forbidden. This is difficult. If “bespeaking” acquires, are not both permitted? This is a question of acquiring not by “bespeaking” but by candidacy. This is difficult. If candidacy acquires, both are permitted. If candidacy does not acquire, the first one is forbidden but the second permitted. Maybe candidacy for Rebbi Simeon is like “bespeaking” for the rabbis. Just as the rabbis say, “bespeaking” acquires but leaves a remainder, so Rebbi Simeon says, candidacy acquires but leaves a remainder. This is difficult. That aspect which is acquired by candidacy implies a prohibition of an equal part of the co-wife, that part which is not acquired by candidacy implies permission of an equal aspect of the co-wife! Shammai said, is this kind of argument applicable to incest prohibitions? What does he mean? As Rebbi Aḥa said in the name of Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya, the aspect acquired in any sister-in-law which is not totally inside [the family] is considered to be under the incest prohibition and an incest prohibition frees her co-wife.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 2:13

HALAKHAH: “They formulated a principle about a sister-in-law: Any woman forbidden,” etc. Rebbi Ze‘ira said: When I was still there, we extracted fourteen cases from “her sister which is also her sister-in-law has levirate”, except his daughter. When we came up here, we heard what Rebbi Ḥiyya stated, since Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: His daughter from a woman he raped was married to a paternal halfbrother; she also has a maternal sister from a different father married to a second brother who died childless. His daughter is forbidden to him but her sister, who is her sister-in-law, is permitted to him. That is, “her sister which is also her sister-in-law has levirate”.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 2:17

Rebbi Jehudah ben Pazi said, why did Scripture put the incest chapter next to the holiness chapter? To teach you that every one who shies away from incest is called “holy”. In this sense, the woman of Shunem said to her husband: “ Lo, I know that he is a holy man of God”. Rebbi Jonah said, “he is holy”, but not his student. Rebbi Abin said, that he never looked at her. But the rabbis say that he he never had an involuntary emission. {The slave girl of Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac said, I never saw a bad thing on my master’s garments.} It is written “Geḥazi drew near to push her away”. What is לְהָדְפָהּ? Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, he put his hand on her beauty spot, between her breasts.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 2:21

Rebbi Ḥuna understood all of them from this verse: “The genitals of a woman and her daughter you should not uncover; her son’s daughter or her daughter’s daughter.” Taboo - taboo, for an equal cut. Since there are three generations downwards, so there are three generations upwards. Since there is a prohibition downwards, so there is a prohibition upwards. Since upwards one requires marriage, so downwards one requires marriage. Since upwards they are burned, so downwards they are burned. Since downwards, He gave the male’s daughter the same status as the female’s daughter, so upwards He gave the male’s mother the same status as the female’s mother. What is this about? His father-in-law’s mother and his mother-in-law’s mother. Should not his father’s mother be like his father-in-law’s mother? Should not his mother’s mother be like his mother-in-law’s mother? They forbade his father’s father’s wife because of his father’s mother. They forbade his mother’s father’s wife because of his mother’s mother. Should not his son’s son’s wife be like his wife’s son’s daughter? Should not his daughter’s son’s wife be like his wife’s daughter’s daughter?

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 2:24

There, we have stated: “Rebbi Yose says, if the grandfather transgressed and married her.” What did he transgress? He transgressed the words of the Sopherim. Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Abbahu, he asked Rebbi Joḥanan: Does this mean that secondary prohibitions have no limit? He said to him, did we learn “secondaries to secondaries”? No. Secondaries to the words of the Torah, and all of them because of his son’s daughter-in-law. Rebbi Ḥizqiah in the name of Rebbi Jonah, Rebbi Abbahu did not say so, but Rebbi Eleazar asked Rebbi Joḥanan, did we not learn of eight secondaries, and here they are nine! But all of them because of his son’s daughter-in-law.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 2:30

Jacob from Kefar Naboraia went to Tyre. They came to ask him, may one circumcise the son of a Gentile woman on the Sabbath? He wanted to permit it from the verse: “They determined their genealogies for their families according to their fathers’ houses.” Rebbi Ḥaggai heard it and said, he shall come. They brought him in order to be whipped. He said to him, for what reason do you whip me? He said, from what is written: “Now we shall make a covenant for our God”. He said, you want to whip me based on tradition? He said, “and it should be done according to the Torah.” He said to him, from which teaching? He said, from that which Rebbi Joḥanan said in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Ioḥai, it is written: “You shall not conclude marriage with them”. And it is written: “For he will divert your son from after Me.” Your son from a Jewish woman is called your son; but your son from a Gentile woman is not called your son but her son. He said to him, whip your whipping, because it is good to impress.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 2:30

Jacob from Kefar Naboraia went to Tyre. They came to ask him, may one circumcise the son of a Gentile woman on the Sabbath? He wanted to permit it from the verse: “They determined their genealogies for their families according to their fathers’ houses.” Rebbi Ḥaggai heard it and said, he shall come. They brought him in order to be whipped. He said to him, for what reason do you whip me? He said, from what is written: “Now we shall make a covenant for our God”. He said, you want to whip me based on tradition? He said, “and it should be done according to the Torah.” He said to him, from which teaching? He said, from that which Rebbi Joḥanan said in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Ioḥai, it is written: “You shall not conclude marriage with them”. And it is written: “For he will divert your son from after Me.” Your son from a Jewish woman is called your son; but your son from a Gentile woman is not called your son but her son. He said to him, whip your whipping, because it is good to impress.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 2:40

“If somebody is accused in matters of a slave woman and she was manumitted, or of a Gentile and she converted, he should not marry her but if he married her one does not remove her from him.” If he agreed lawfully not to marry her and [nevertheless] married her, she is forcibly removed from him. If he divorced her, may he take her back? If you would say that, would you not defame her children? “If somebody is accused in matters of a married woman,” Rav said, that is, he was accused by witnesses. Rebbi Yose asked, if he was accused by witnesses, is that what was stated: If he divorced her, even if he married her, he must divorce her? If somebody else divorced her, he can keep her! If he was accused by witnesses, even if somebody else divorced her, he must divorce her! But that is what we deal with: If he was accused not by witnesses, if somebody else divorced her, he may keep her.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 2:40

“If somebody is accused in matters of a slave woman and she was manumitted, or of a Gentile and she converted, he should not marry her but if he married her one does not remove her from him.” If he agreed lawfully not to marry her and [nevertheless] married her, she is forcibly removed from him. If he divorced her, may he take her back? If you would say that, would you not defame her children? “If somebody is accused in matters of a married woman,” Rav said, that is, he was accused by witnesses. Rebbi Yose asked, if he was accused by witnesses, is that what was stated: If he divorced her, even if he married her, he must divorce her? If somebody else divorced her, he can keep her! If he was accused by witnesses, even if somebody else divorced her, he must divorce her! But that is what we deal with: If he was accused not by witnesses, if somebody else divorced her, he may keep her.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 2:42

HALAKHAH: “If somebody brings a bill of divorce from overseas and says”, etc. About what is he trustworthy? Samuel says, he is trusted to give a bill of divorce. Assi said, he is trusted to marry. Rav Huna said in the name of Rav: He is trusted to marry. Rebbi Joḥanan said, he is trusted to marry but one does not infer from this ruling anything for another case. What means, one does not infer from this ruling anything for another case? I sold one of my fields but I do not remember to whom I sold it. If someone comes and says, I bought it, he is not trusted in any way. In qiddushin, the same holds. “ I betrothed one of my daughters but I do not remember to whom I betrothed her. If someone comes and says, I gave her qiddushin,” he is not trusted in any way. The Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “If somebody brings a bill of divorce from overseas and says, it was written and signed in my presence, he shall not marry the wife.” There, she is considered by everybody to be a married woman. Here, she is considered to be a married woman only by two persons. One waits until these two come and say, this is the man who gave her qiddushin. The Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “ This one says, I gave her qiddushin, and that one says, I gave her qiddushin. Both of them give a bill of divorce, but if they agree, one gives a bill of divorce and the other one marries.” He explains this, if [the father] says, I did betroth her to one of these two but I do not remember which one it was. Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rebbi Yasa, in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If one of them jumped the gun and married her, one does remove her from him. That is, if this one says, I gave her qiddushin, and that one says. I gave her qiddushin and one of them jumped the gun and married her. But if he said, I gave her qiddushin and married her, and another one comes and says, I gave her qiddushin, he is not trusted in any way. It was stated thus: If after the marriage another man comes and says, I gave her qiddushin, he is not trusted in any way.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 2:42

HALAKHAH: “If somebody brings a bill of divorce from overseas and says”, etc. About what is he trustworthy? Samuel says, he is trusted to give a bill of divorce. Assi said, he is trusted to marry. Rav Huna said in the name of Rav: He is trusted to marry. Rebbi Joḥanan said, he is trusted to marry but one does not infer from this ruling anything for another case. What means, one does not infer from this ruling anything for another case? I sold one of my fields but I do not remember to whom I sold it. If someone comes and says, I bought it, he is not trusted in any way. In qiddushin, the same holds. “ I betrothed one of my daughters but I do not remember to whom I betrothed her. If someone comes and says, I gave her qiddushin,” he is not trusted in any way. The Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “If somebody brings a bill of divorce from overseas and says, it was written and signed in my presence, he shall not marry the wife.” There, she is considered by everybody to be a married woman. Here, she is considered to be a married woman only by two persons. One waits until these two come and say, this is the man who gave her qiddushin. The Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “ This one says, I gave her qiddushin, and that one says, I gave her qiddushin. Both of them give a bill of divorce, but if they agree, one gives a bill of divorce and the other one marries.” He explains this, if [the father] says, I did betroth her to one of these two but I do not remember which one it was. Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rebbi Yasa, in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If one of them jumped the gun and married her, one does remove her from him. That is, if this one says, I gave her qiddushin, and that one says. I gave her qiddushin and one of them jumped the gun and married her. But if he said, I gave her qiddushin and married her, and another one comes and says, I gave her qiddushin, he is not trusted in any way. It was stated thus: If after the marriage another man comes and says, I gave her qiddushin, he is not trusted in any way.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 2:46

HALAKHAH: “A rabbi who forbade a woman to her husband because of a vow”, etc. “A rabbi who forbade a woman to her husband because of a vow cannot marry her.” I would say, that was his intention from the start. “If she repudiated or performed ḥalîṣah before him he may marry her since he acts as a court”, because two will not usually sin for the benefit of a third. There, we have stated: “If somebody deposits fruit with another person, that one should not touch it even if it spoils. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel said, he shall sell it under the supervision of a court because one is obliged to return a find to its owners.” Rebbi Abba bar Jacob said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, practice follows Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel. What does one do with the money? Rav Jehudah said, the disagreement of Rebbi Aqiba and Rebbi Ṭarphon. It is a condition that the members of the court cannot buy. Rebbi Aqiba said, Rebbi Ḥiyya ben Rebbi Sabbatai asked: Here, you say, “if she repudiated or performed ḥalîṣah before him he may marry her since he acts as a court,” and here, you say so? Rebbi Yose said, there, the buy could be in thirds, but here, two will not usually sin for the benefit of a third.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 3:4

Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina asked before Rebbi Joḥanan: Here, you say, if his sister-in-law died, his wife is permitted to him, if his wife died, his sister-in-law is permitted to him, and here you say so? He said to him, I do not know the reason for [the rule regarding] sisters. Rebbi Abba, Rebbi Ḥiyya, in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: I do not know the reason for [the rule regarding] sisters who are sisters-in-law. Rebbi Hila, Rebbi Yasa, in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The prohibition of sisters who are sisters-in-law cannot be compared to the prohibition of sisters who are not sisters-in-law. Rebbi Jeremiah said, explain it that the house fell on both [brothers] at the same time. Rebbi Yose asked, did Rebbi Joḥanan say, I do not know the reason for [the rule regarding] sisters who are sisters-in-law if the house fell on both [brothers] at the same time? Only if they died one after the other. They wanted to say, what was the problem of Rebbi Joḥanan? If the second one died, why should the first one not be permitted to him? But if the first one died, the second should be forbidden to him. Rebbi Yudan said, both cases are the same problem for him. And candidacy counts for nothing since if there are three brothers,two of them paternal but not maternal halfbrothers, and two maternal but not paternal halfbrothers. If the paternal halfbrother died first and the second brother had no time to perform ḥalîṣah or levirate before he died, and she became eligible for his maternal halfbrother, may he not take her? This shows that candidacy is nothing, [otherwise] she should be forbidden as the maternal halfbrother’s wife.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 3:5

What if there is a co-wife? Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Avina: It is an inference de minore ad majus. If the Sages gave a co-wife to the sister of a woman with whom one performed ḥalîṣah, which is rabbinic, here, where there is the prohibition of sisters, not so much more? It is obvious that the rule of co-wives applies to his daughter. Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Avina: One has stated there, “if the co-wives performed ḥalîṣah, the sisters were freed; if the sisters performed ḥalîṣah, the co-wives were not freed.” But as you say, if the co-wives performed ḥalîṣah, the sisters were freed, so it should be that even if the sisters performed ḥalîṣah, the co-wives should be freed. But it must follow Rebbi Joḥanan ben Nuri, since Rebbi Joḥanan ben Nuri said, come and let us institute that the co-wife perform ḥalîṣah without being admitted to levirate. Did they institute that? Was it not stated: They did not manage to institute this before the time became unsuitable. But it must follow the House of Shammai since the House of Shammai permit the co-wives to the brothers. Rebbi Phineas said to Rebbi Yose: If it follows the House of Shammai, even if the co-wives performed ḥalîṣah, the sistersshould not be freed! But we have stated: Rebbi Eliezer said, the House of Shammai say, they shall keep them, but the House of Hillel say, they have to divorce. There are two Tannaïm interpreting the House of Shammai, one said if the co-wives performed ḥalîṣah, the sisters were freed, the other one said if the co-wives performed ḥalîṣah, the sisters were not freed.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 3:6

It was stated: “Abba Shaul says, the House of Hillel made this easy.” Is that a criticism? It is a praise, since people were saying, what is the prohibition here? It was found stated in the name of Rebbi Simeon: “If they jumped the gun and married, they should keep them.” But that is only if they had intercourse at the same time. In the opinion of Abba Shaul it is permitted to have intercourse without asking. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon only if he transgressed and had intercourse. If the first [brother] married and had intercourse, he tells the second also to have intercourse. If that one did not have intercourse, the first [brother] is forbidden to have intercourse a second time; maybe one of them will die and it turns out that he had intercourse with the sister of his sister-in-law. It was stated: If the second [brother] died, the first one had to divorce his wife with a bill of divorce and his brother’s wife by ḥalîṣah. Even if the second one died? Does this not follow Rebbi Simeon? But Rebbi Simeon frees the second [sister] from ḥalîṣah and levirate! Rebbi Ze‘ira said, I confirmed this: Any sister-in-law who was to be freed by ḥalîṣah will never be permitted without ḥalîṣah.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 3:9

If there were five brothers of whom three married three sisters and died: Rav said, each one [of the remaining brothers] performs ḥalîṣah for one of them, and the third [sister] performs ḥalîṣah with whom she wants. Samuel says, each one [of the remaining brothers] performs ḥalîṣah for one of them, and the third performs ḥalîṣah with both of them. Rav said that ḥalîṣah is acquisition. Samuel said that ḥalîṣah is freeing. Rebbi Ze‘ira said that ḥalîṣah is acquisition. Rebbi Hila said that ḥalîṣah is freeing. The words of the rabbis mean that ḥalîṣah is freeing. Simeon bar Abba asked before Rebbi Joḥanan: What is the difference between having ḥalîṣah and divorcing? He said to him: You think that ḥalîṣah is acquisiton, but it is only freeing. The brothers are not guilty for her under the category of “wife of the one acting in ḥalîṣah” but they are guilty under the category of “wife of the deceased”. Levi said, candidacy is acquisition and each [sister] has to perform ḥalîṣah with both [brothers].

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 3:11

MISHNAH: If one of them was forbidden to one of them by an incest prohibition, that one is forbidden for him but her sister is permitted to him. Both are forbidden to the second [brother]. In case of a commandment prohibition or a holiness prohibition, they have ḥalîṣah but not levirate. If one of [the sisters] was forbidden to that one [brother] by an incest prohition and the other [sister] was forbidden to the [other brother] by an incest prohition, the one who is forbidden for one might be permitted to the other and vice-versa. That is what they said, “Her sister who is her sister-in-law can have ḥalîṣah or be married in levirate.”

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 3:15

HALAKHAH: “Three brothers, two of them married to two sisters,” etc. Ulla bar Ismael said, so explained Rebbi Hoshaia, the father of the Mishnah: Rebbi Simeon frees the second one from ḥalîṣah and levirate. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the group asked, would anybody think that a man could acquire two sisters together? Rebbi Ḥanina said before Rebbi Mana and disagreed: Why does Rebbi Simeon free the second one from ḥalîṣah and levirate? He said to him, because nobody thinks that a man could acquire two sisters together. There they said, the words of Rebbi Simeon imply that no candidacy can come after another candidacy. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: Only if he sinned and had intercourse. What is the difference? If somebody from the market gave qiddushin to the second sister. Following the rabbis, perfect qiddushin. Following Rebbi Eleazar, suspended qiddushin. When he has intercourse with the first, the qiddushin become valid for the second. If he had intercourse with the second, following the rabbis it is an incestuous act. Following Rebbi Eleazar, it is not an incestuous act. If the first one died, following the rabbis the second is permitted to him.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 3:17

The argument of Rebbi Simeon seems to be inverted. There, he says, “he marries in levirate the one he wants and performs ḥalîṣah with the other,” and here, he says so? Rebbi Ze‘ira said, when I was still there, I learned the reason: There, the candidacy for two brothers-in-law does not interfere and one candidacy can be added to another, but here it is candidacy for one levir and no candidacy can come after a “bespeaking”. Rebbi Mattania said, are not sisters different from unrelated women? If you want a difficulty, find it in what Rebbi Ze‘ira said in the name of RavSheshet: They stated there that Rebbi Simeon forbade both of them. The argument of Rebbi Simeon seems to be inverted. There he says, both are forbidden, and here you says, both are permitted.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 3:18

MISHNAH: Three brothers, two of whom are married to two sisters and the third is a bachelor. One of the sisters’ husbands died; the bachelor “bespoke” her; then the second brother died. The House of Shammai say, his wife is with him and the other one should leave as the wife’s sister. The House of Hillel say, he divorces his wife with a bill of divorce, and his wife’s sister with ḥalîṣah. That is what people say, he is unlucky with his wife and with his brother’s wife.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 3:20

Rebbi Yudan asked: If somebody gave qiddushin to a woman “from now and after thirty days” and her sister became a candidate for levirate with him during these thirty days, is even in this “his wife with him and the other one should leave as the wife’s sister”? He said, the House of Shammai said that only after candidacy and “bespeaking”. But that what Rebbi Abbahu said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, even a hundred qiddushin are valid for her, does not follow the House of Shammai.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 3:26

HALAKHAH: “Of three brothers,” etc. Rebbi Avina said, that is what Rebbi Yose said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The prohibition of sisters who are sisters-in-law does not compare with the prohibition of sisters who not are sisters-in-law.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 3:27

MISHNAH: Of three brothers, two are married to two sisters and one to an unrelated woman. If one of the sisters’ husbands divorced his wife, when the one married to an unrelated woman died and the divorcer married her and then died, that is what they said: Of all of these, if they died, or repudiated, or were divorced, or turned out to be she-rams, the co-wives are permitted.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 3:28

HALAKHAH: “Of three brothers,” etc. Rebbi Ḥaggai said in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira, not only if he divorced and after that married, but even if he married and after that divorced. That is what we had stated: “Of all of these, if they died or were divorced, their co-wives are permitted.”

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 3:30

MISHNAH: In all cases in which there were questionable qiddushin or divorces, the [co-wives] must perform ḥalîṣah but cannot have levirate. What are questionable qiddushin? If he threw the betrothal gift to her and there is a doubt whether it fell closer to him or to her, that are questionable qiddushin. What is a questionable divorce? If [the divorce document] was written in his handwriting but without witnesses, or there are witnesses but no date, or there is a date but only one witness, these are questionable divorces.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 3:30

MISHNAH: In all cases in which there were questionable qiddushin or divorces, the [co-wives] must perform ḥalîṣah but cannot have levirate. What are questionable qiddushin? If he threw the betrothal gift to her and there is a doubt whether it fell closer to him or to her, that are questionable qiddushin. What is a questionable divorce? If [the divorce document] was written in his handwriting but without witnesses, or there are witnesses but no date, or there is a date but only one witness, these are questionable divorces.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 3:31

HALAKHAH: “In all cases in which there were questionable qiddushin or divorces, the [co-wives] must perform ḥalîṣah but cannot have levirate,” etc. There really is no questionable divorce here. What are questionable qiddushin? If he threw the betrothal gift to her and there is a doubt whether it fell closer to him or to her, that are questionable qiddushin. And here, if he threw the divorce document to her and there is a doubt whether it fell closer to him or to her, that is a questionable divorce.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 3:35

HALAKHAH: “Three brothers married to three women,” etc. Can a woman waiting for a levir who became available to several brothers-in-law not be married in levirate? Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: The wife of one [dead husband] is married in levirate, not the wife of two dead. One understands that he has to perform ḥalîṣah with the “bespoken” because the wife of one [dead husband] is married in levirate, not the wife of two dead. Why can the other one not be married in levirate? Rebbi Eleazar said, this follows Rebbi Meïr, since Rebbi Meïr said, of any one you cannot marry in levirate, you cannot marry the co-wife in levirate. Rebbi Joḥanan said, if Rebbi Eleazar formulated this, he formulated what he had heard from me. Rebbi Yose said, a Mishnah said so: “ A boy at least nine years and one day old who had intercourse with his sister-in-law and when he grew up he married another wife; if he never had intercourse with the first again after he became an adult, the second [wife] may perform ḥalîṣah or be married in levirate. The first one must perform ḥalîṣah and cannot be married in levirate.” Here you say, she performs ḥalîṣah; there you say, she is married in levirate! Where you say she performs ḥalîṣah, Rebbi Meïr and Rebbi Simeon; where you say, she is married in levirate, Rebbi Simeon and the rabbis. Rebbi Abun bar Bisna in the name of Rebbi Aḥa, but only if first he married in levirate and then performed ḥalîṣah. But if he performed ḥalîṣah first, it is forbidden; perhaps “bespeaking” acquired and she was freed by her co-wife’s ḥalîṣah.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 3:37

HALAKHAH: “Two brothers married to two sisters,” etc. Rebbi Avina said, that is what Rebbi Hila, Rebbi Yose, said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The prohibition of sisters who are sisters-in-law does not compare with the prohibition of sisters who not are sisters-in-law.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 4:2

HALAKHAH: “If somebody performed ḥalîṣah with his sister-in-law but she turns out to have been pregnant,” etc. If he transgressed, but not from the start. That follows the Mishnah: “The widow should not perform ḥalîṣah or have levirate until after three months.” Why can she not have ḥalîṣah immediately? As you take it, if she has a live birth, ḥalîṣah did not affect her. If she has a still birth, she holds ḥalîṣah in her hand. Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rebbi Ḥiyya, Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, that she should not need a proclamation for the priesthood. Rebbi Abba, Rebbi Jacob bar Idi, in the name of Rebbi Hoshaiah, that she should not need a proclamation for the priesthood. Rebbi Hoshaiah stated: “My levir refuses.” To the one to whom one says: perform levirate, to him one says: perform ḥalîṣah; but to the one to whom one cannot say: perform levirate, to him one cannot say: perform ḥalîṣah! What is the difference between them? If she had been acceptable and was desecrated, e. g., a widow for the High Priest or a divorcee or one who had performed ḥalîṣah for a common priest. According to him who says that she should not need a proclamation for the priesthood; that one, who does not need a proclamation for the priesthood, should have ḥalîṣah. According to him who says that to the one to whom one says: perform levirate, to him does one say: perform ḥalîṣah?

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 4:6

Samuel said, one can transfer benefits to fetuses; Rebbi Eleazar said, one cannot transfer benefits to fetuses. Rebbi Yose said, even though Samuel said, one can transfer benefits to fetuses, he agrees that most of [the fetus’s] head and body must come out alive. That is the Mishnah, “if somebody performed ḥalîṣah with his sister-in-law but she turns out to have been pregnant,” as you say here, retroactively ḥalîṣah did not touch her, so retroactively the child is a son and receives the benefit. There, we have stated: “If somebody says, if my wife gives birth to a male, he shall take a mina, if she gave birth to a male, [the male baby] will take a mina. If a female, 200 [drachmae], if she gave birth to a female, that one will take 200.” Rebbi Eleazar said, this is only for his son, but not for any other. Rebbi Yasa said, even any other. In the opinion of Rebbi Eleazar, only from a sick person, but not a healthy one; only movables but not real estate. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Eleazar. “ If a proselyte died and Jews plundered his estate, then it became known that he had a son overseas or that [his wife] was pregnant, everybody is required to return [what he took].” What does Rebbi Eleazar do with this? There is a difference because it is his child. The second part [of the Mishnah] disagrees with Samuel in the interpretation of Rebbi Yose: “If they returned everything and then the son died or she had a miscarriage, anybody who takes first after that acquires it.” The first group did not acquire. Even at the beginning they should not have acquired! Did not Rebbi Yose say, even though Samuel said, one can transfer benefits to fetuses, he agrees that most of [the fetus’s] head and body must come out alive. He was not living! Rebbi Isaac bar Eleazar said, because of abandoning. The rabbis of Caesarea, R. Ḥiyya bar Abba, Rebbi Abba bar Natan: Rebbi Natan changed his mind because of that Mishnah: “If a male, a mina, if a female, 200.” Is a female in this situation not like an outsider? Bar Qappara stated: “On transfers benefit to a one day old.”

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 4:6

Samuel said, one can transfer benefits to fetuses; Rebbi Eleazar said, one cannot transfer benefits to fetuses. Rebbi Yose said, even though Samuel said, one can transfer benefits to fetuses, he agrees that most of [the fetus’s] head and body must come out alive. That is the Mishnah, “if somebody performed ḥalîṣah with his sister-in-law but she turns out to have been pregnant,” as you say here, retroactively ḥalîṣah did not touch her, so retroactively the child is a son and receives the benefit. There, we have stated: “If somebody says, if my wife gives birth to a male, he shall take a mina, if she gave birth to a male, [the male baby] will take a mina. If a female, 200 [drachmae], if she gave birth to a female, that one will take 200.” Rebbi Eleazar said, this is only for his son, but not for any other. Rebbi Yasa said, even any other. In the opinion of Rebbi Eleazar, only from a sick person, but not a healthy one; only movables but not real estate. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Eleazar. “ If a proselyte died and Jews plundered his estate, then it became known that he had a son overseas or that [his wife] was pregnant, everybody is required to return [what he took].” What does Rebbi Eleazar do with this? There is a difference because it is his child. The second part [of the Mishnah] disagrees with Samuel in the interpretation of Rebbi Yose: “If they returned everything and then the son died or she had a miscarriage, anybody who takes first after that acquires it.” The first group did not acquire. Even at the beginning they should not have acquired! Did not Rebbi Yose say, even though Samuel said, one can transfer benefits to fetuses, he agrees that most of [the fetus’s] head and body must come out alive. He was not living! Rebbi Isaac bar Eleazar said, because of abandoning. The rabbis of Caesarea, R. Ḥiyya bar Abba, Rebbi Abba bar Natan: Rebbi Natan changed his mind because of that Mishnah: “If a male, a mina, if a female, 200.” Is a female in this situation not like an outsider? Bar Qappara stated: “On transfers benefit to a one day old.”

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 4:9

Rav said, in any case where the true fact can never be established, one does not have to bring a reparation offering for the doubt. How is that? If there were before him two olive-sized pieces, one of suet and one of fat, he ate one of them, and then a raven ate the other. Since he cannot ascertain the true fact, one does not have to bring a reparation offering for this doubt. But if the raven ate first and then he ate, since he could have ascertained the true fact, one has to bring a reparation offering for the doubt. But did not Rav say, only if he made sure that it certainly was suet? Even though Rav said, only if he made sure that it certainly was suet, he agrees here that he could have ascertained the true fact. A baraita disagrees with Rav: “As Rebbi Eleazar says, one must bring a reparation offering for the doubt of suet.” What does Rav do with that? They disagree with the words of Rebbi Eleazar. A baraita disagrees with Rav: “If there were both a piece of profane [meat] and a piece of sacrificial [meat], he ate one of them and it is not known which one, he brings a reparation offering for the doubt. If he [then] ate the second piece, he brings a reparation offering for a certain transgression. If he ate the first piece and another person came and ate the second, each one brings a reparation offering for the doubt.” One understands that the first brings a reparation offering for the doubt. Why the second? Rebbi Yose said, explain it that the piece was large, he ate half of it and left the other half. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “If it is doubtful whether [the child is] a nine-month child of the first [brother] or a seven-month of the second, he has to divorce her, the child is legitimate, and they are obligated for a reparation offering for the doubt.” Here it is impossible to ascertain the true fact and they are obligated for a reparation offering for the doubt! Rebbi Yose said, Rebbi Ze‘ira explained it before Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba; Rebbi Ḥizqiah, Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba: Rebbi Ze‘ira explained it before us. Since he could just have touched her and then separated, he could have known whether it is his or the other’s, it is as if he could have ascertained the true fact!

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 4:13

It was stated: “The first son could be High Priest, any second son possibly is a bastard. Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob said, there is no such thing as a possible bastard.” Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob agrees in cases of doubt of Samaritans and desecrated persons. This refers to what we have stated there: “Ten classes returned from Babylonia.” In the opinion of Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob, eight. In the opinion of Rabban Gamliel and Rebbi Eliezer, nine. In the opinion of the rabbis, ten.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 4:14

MISHNAH: If property came to a woman waiting for her levir, the House of Shammai agree with the House of Hillel that she may sell or give away and it is valid. If she dies, what does one do with her ketubah and property that enters and leaves with her? The House of Shammai say, the husband’s heirs should split with her father’s heirs. But the House of Hillel say that all property remains where it is; the ketubah in the hands of the husband’s heirs and property that enters and leaves with her in the hands of her father’s heirs.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 4:15

HALAKHAH: “If property came to a woman waiting for her levir,” etc. Here, you say “she may sell or give away and it is valid. If she dies, what does one do with her ketubah?” And you also say “the husband’s heirs should split with her father’s heirs!” Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, when do you say “she may sell or give away and it is valid”? If they came to her before she became a woman waiting for her levir. When do you say “the husband’s heirs should split with her father’s heirs”? If they came to her after she became a woman waiting for her levir. If they came to her before she became a woman waiting for her levir and produced revenue after she became a woman waiting for her levir, [that revenue is as if] they came to her after she became a woman waiting for her levir. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, the levir in this situation is a problem for the House of Shammai. If he is a husband, he inherits everything. If he is not a husband, he inherits nothing. Because of the doubt, “the husband’s heirs should split with her father’s heirs.” For the House of Hillel it is obvious that he is a husband and inherits everything. For even his brother had only the usufruct.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 4:18

HALAKHAH: “If he married her, she is his wife in every respect”, etc. What does he do? “He marries her, he may divorce her and take her back, and she writes him a receipt for her ketubah.” Rebbi Yose said, the baraita has two possibilities. “Or she writes him a receipt for her ketubah.” Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rav Hamnuna: If he married her, divorced her, and took her back, if he wrote her a new ketubah, the lien is on his property; otherwise, it is on the property of her first husband. Rebbi Yose said in the name of Rav Ḥisda, a Mishnah said so: “For he who takes back his wife, takes her back under the terms of her first ketubah.” At the end, if he married her, divorced her, and took her back? He tells you something new. Even if he married her, divorced her, and took her back, if he wrote her a new ketubah, the lien is on his property; otherwise, it is on the property of her first husband.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 4:27

HALAKHAH: “He who performs ḥalîṣah with his sister-in-law,” etc. Because he performed ḥalîṣah with her. Therefore, if he did not perform ḥalîṣah with her but she died, her mother is permitted to him. That is what Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: If a woman waiting for her levir died, her mother is permitted to him. He had in her an interest of candidacy. When she died, the candidacy was eliminated. And here, when he died, the candidacy was eliminated. Rebbi Abun understood it from what follows: “And her sister as long as she is alive, but the brothers are permitted.” Is her sister’s position relative to the brothers not as if she herself had died?

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 4:27

HALAKHAH: “He who performs ḥalîṣah with his sister-in-law,” etc. Because he performed ḥalîṣah with her. Therefore, if he did not perform ḥalîṣah with her but she died, her mother is permitted to him. That is what Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: If a woman waiting for her levir died, her mother is permitted to him. He had in her an interest of candidacy. When she died, the candidacy was eliminated. And here, when he died, the candidacy was eliminated. Rebbi Abun understood it from what follows: “And her sister as long as she is alive, but the brothers are permitted.” Is her sister’s position relative to the brothers not as if she herself had died?

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 4:31

HALAKHAH: “Similarly, if somebody divorces his wife,” etc. Simeon bar Abba asked before Rebbi Joḥanan: What is the difference between having ḥalîṣah and divorcing? He said to him: You think that ḥalîṣah is acquisiton, but it is only freeing. The brothers are not guilty for her under the category of “wife of the one acting in ḥalîṣah” but they are guilty under the category of “wife of the deceased”.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 4:38

Rab Ḥiyya bar Ashi was sitting before Rav who saw him disturbed. He said to him, what is the matter? He said to him, my female donkey is pregnant and will give birth; then I have to get her to copulate before she is out of heat. He said to him, when did the male mount her? He said, on day X. He calculated and said, she still has some time until then. It was stated so: A quick female donkey does not need less than the days of the moon and one who is late is not later than the days of the sun. The words of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi disagree, since Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said, the cattle herd of the government was there for copulating and those of the house of Rebbi took bulls from them to copulate. Some of them gave birth soon and some of them later. Here it is about a pure animal, there about an impure animal. But is it not written, “do you know the time the mountain goats will give birth, etc.” “Count months, make them complete, you will know the time of their giving birth.” “Do you know the time of giving birth?” A pure wild animal is like a domestic impure animal.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 4:39

Rebbi Meїr is suspicious about bills of divorce. Rebbi Jehudah is suspicious about a child. Rebbi Yose is suspicious about bills of divorce and a child. Could you say that Rebbi Meїr is not suspicious about bills of divorce, as we have stated: “Those that had received qiddushin can be married.” Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rebbi Gedula: The one who repudiates does not have to wait three months; the one who leaves by a bill of divorce needs to wait three months. This supports Rebbi Me‘ir since Rebbi Meїr is suspicious about bills of divorce. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Abba bar Jeremiah: A woman who has been raped does not have to wait three months. This supports Rebbi Yose, since Rebbi Yose is suspicious about bills of divorce and a child. It was stated: The proselyte, the captive, and the slave woman who were redeemed, or converted, or freed, have to wait three months, the words of Rebbi Judah. Rebbi Yose says, they do not have to wait. Their blood, Rebbi Jehudah says, makes impure 24 hours retroactively; Rebbi Yose says, from its moment onwards. Rebbi said, the words of Rebbi Judah are reasonable for the blood, and the words of Rebbi Yose for the child. Rebbi Ḥanina ben Rebbi Abbahu said, my father had a case and he asked Rebbi Ḥiyya, Rebbi Yasa, and Rebbi Immi, and they instructed him following Rebbi Yose for the child. For if it were not so, what could we say? Between Rebbi Jehudah and Rebbi Yose, practice does not follow Rebbi Yose? But because Rebbi said, “they are reasonable”. Did not Rebbi Abba say in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira, every time Rebbi taught “they are reasonable”, the disagreement is unresolved except in the case of the fig cake where each party to the controversy accepts the opposition’s argument. Rebbi Yose said, I stated a difficulty before Rebbi Ḥanina ben Rebbi Abbahu: Even if it is certain that they had sex? He said to him, is a normal Gentile not like one who had sex? Simeon bar Abba said, there came a case before Rebbi Joḥanan and he instructed following Rebbi Yose. Rebbi Eleazar was sorry about this; he said, one disregards the anonymous [Mishnah] and follows an isolated opinion! He found that Rebbi Ḥiyya stated it in the name of Rebbi Meїr. He understood that following Rebbi Simeon, he found that Rebbi Ḥiyya stated it in the name of Rebbi Meїr. He said, the old man certainly understands the chapters about bills of divorce.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 4:41

Rebbi Joḥanan said, everywhere one taught anonymous Mishnaiot, it follows the rabbis unless one’s teacher explains it [differently]. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish says, all anonymous Mishnaiot follow Rebbi Meїr unless one’s teacher explains it [differently]. Rebbi Ze‘ira said before Rebbi Yasa, not that Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagrees, only he saw that most anonymous Mishnaiot follow Rebbi Meїr. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Mana: What kind of teacher? The teacher of the baraita or the teacher of study? Does not the story of Rebbi Eleazar imply, the teacher of the baraita? “Following Rebbi Simeon, he found that Rebbi Ḥiyya stated it in the name of Rebbi Meїr. He said, the old man certainly understands his chapters.” We have to say that he received instruction from the teacher of the baraita when he understood that Rebbi Ḥiyya stated it in the name of Rebbi Meїr.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 4:42

The woman who performs ḥalîṣah counts from the moment of death. The one who leaves by a bill of divorce counts from the moment of delivery of her bill. Rebbi Ḥanina said, from the moment of delivery of her bill. Rebbi Joḥanan said, from the moment of writing. Rav and Samuel, Rav like Rebbi Ḥanina, Samuel like Rebbi Joḥanan. Samuel objected to Rav: According to you, since you say from the moment of delivery, about what are you suspicious? Because in the meantime she was alone with him! Then one should worry about an old bill of divorce! Rebbi Ḥanina objected to Rebbi Joḥanan: According to you, since you say from the moment of writing, if there were two bills of divorce, one written now and one later, and both delivered on the same day. This one you prohibit and that one you permit! What Rav objected to Samuel, Rebbi Ḥanina objected to Rebbi Joḥanan. What Rebbi Joḥanan objected to Rebbi Ḥanina, Samuel objected to Rav. Practice: She counts from the time of writing if he never was alone with her.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 4:42

The woman who performs ḥalîṣah counts from the moment of death. The one who leaves by a bill of divorce counts from the moment of delivery of her bill. Rebbi Ḥanina said, from the moment of delivery of her bill. Rebbi Joḥanan said, from the moment of writing. Rav and Samuel, Rav like Rebbi Ḥanina, Samuel like Rebbi Joḥanan. Samuel objected to Rav: According to you, since you say from the moment of delivery, about what are you suspicious? Because in the meantime she was alone with him! Then one should worry about an old bill of divorce! Rebbi Ḥanina objected to Rebbi Joḥanan: According to you, since you say from the moment of writing, if there were two bills of divorce, one written now and one later, and both delivered on the same day. This one you prohibit and that one you permit! What Rav objected to Samuel, Rebbi Ḥanina objected to Rebbi Joḥanan. What Rebbi Joḥanan objected to Rebbi Ḥanina, Samuel objected to Rav. Practice: She counts from the time of writing if he never was alone with her.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 4:42

The woman who performs ḥalîṣah counts from the moment of death. The one who leaves by a bill of divorce counts from the moment of delivery of her bill. Rebbi Ḥanina said, from the moment of delivery of her bill. Rebbi Joḥanan said, from the moment of writing. Rav and Samuel, Rav like Rebbi Ḥanina, Samuel like Rebbi Joḥanan. Samuel objected to Rav: According to you, since you say from the moment of delivery, about what are you suspicious? Because in the meantime she was alone with him! Then one should worry about an old bill of divorce! Rebbi Ḥanina objected to Rebbi Joḥanan: According to you, since you say from the moment of writing, if there were two bills of divorce, one written now and one later, and both delivered on the same day. This one you prohibit and that one you permit! What Rav objected to Samuel, Rebbi Ḥanina objected to Rebbi Joḥanan. What Rebbi Joḥanan objected to Rebbi Ḥanina, Samuel objected to Rav. Practice: She counts from the time of writing if he never was alone with her.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 4:45

HALAKHAH: “Four of the brothers,” etc. Explanation: There were thirteen brothers, of whom twelve died childless. They [the widows] came and wanted to be married in levirate before Rebbi. He said to him, go and take in levirate. He said to him, it overtaxes my means. But each one of them said, I will support during my month. He said, and who will support during that intercalary month? Rebbi said, I shall support during that intercalary month. He prayed for them and they went from him. After three years they came, carrying 36 toddlers. They came and stood in front of Rebbi’s dwelling. [People] went in and told [Rebbi], outside are rural toddlers who want to greet you. Rebbi looked down from the window and saw them. He asked them, for what are you here? They said to him, we beg that you give us [support for] that intercalary month; he gave them [support for] that intercalary month.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 4:46

It is written: “ The ark of the Eternal dwelt in the house of Obed Edom for three months, and the Eternal blessed,” etc. By what did he bless him? With sons. That is what is written: “ All these were from the sons of Obed Edom, they, their sons and relatives, strong men for the service, sixty” etc., because each one of them gave birth to two every month. How was that? She was impure for seven days, pure for seven days, and gave birth, was impure for seven days, pure for seven days, and gave birth. Sixteen every month, in three months 48. And he, six. This makes 54 together. And those eight, sum total 62. That is what was written: “62 for Obed Edom”.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 4:46

It is written: “ The ark of the Eternal dwelt in the house of Obed Edom for three months, and the Eternal blessed,” etc. By what did he bless him? With sons. That is what is written: “ All these were from the sons of Obed Edom, they, their sons and relatives, strong men for the service, sixty” etc., because each one of them gave birth to two every month. How was that? She was impure for seven days, pure for seven days, and gave birth, was impure for seven days, pure for seven days, and gave birth. Sixteen every month, in three months 48. And he, six. This makes 54 together. And those eight, sum total 62. That is what was written: “62 for Obed Edom”.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 4:46

It is written: “ The ark of the Eternal dwelt in the house of Obed Edom for three months, and the Eternal blessed,” etc. By what did he bless him? With sons. That is what is written: “ All these were from the sons of Obed Edom, they, their sons and relatives, strong men for the service, sixty” etc., because each one of them gave birth to two every month. How was that? She was impure for seven days, pure for seven days, and gave birth, was impure for seven days, pure for seven days, and gave birth. Sixteen every month, in three months 48. And he, six. This makes 54 together. And those eight, sum total 62. That is what was written: “62 for Obed Edom”.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 4:47

Rebbi Abba bar Zavda said, it is written: “His house should be called in Israel the house of the shoe-stripped.” A house which was permitted by one stripping. The same is true for intercourse. Stripping frees and intercourse frees. What you say about stripping you say about intercourse.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 4:50

HALAKHAH: “He who takes back his divorcee,” etc. Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: He who takes back his divorcee after she had remarried makes her blemished for the priesthood. Without that, is she not blemished for the priesthood? But, she is blemished in that she cannot eat heave. Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The daughet of a man who takes back his divorcee after she had remarried is acceptable for the priesthood. What is the reason? “She is an abomination”. She is an abomination, the child is not an abomination.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 4:51

MISHNAH: And what is a bastard? Any [child of a] blood-relation to whom he is forbidden to come, the words of Rebbi Aqiba. Simeon from Timna says, any [child of a relation] for which one is subject to extirpation by heaven’s action, and practice follows him. Rebbi Joshua said, any [child of a relation] which is a capital crime.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 4:53

HALAKHAH: “What is a bastard,” etc; “Rebbi Simeon ben Azai said,” etc. Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, all of them learned from the father’s wife. “A man shall not take his father’s wife and not uncover his father’s garment’s wing.” Rebbi Aqiba explains: Just as his father’s wife is special in that she is a forbidden relation from which the child is a bastard, so in any case there is a forbidden relation, the child is a bastard. They objected, is there not a widow for the High Priest? There is a difference, since desecration is spelled out. Simeon from Timna explained: Just as his father’s wife is special in that one is subject to extirpation for her, the child is a bastard, so in any case that one is subject to extirpation for her, the child is a bastard. They objected, is there not the menstruating woman? There is a difference, since “blood-relation” is not written in reference to her. Rebbi Joshua explained: Just as his father’s wife is special in that one is subject to the death penalty for her, the child is a bastard, so in any case that one is subject to the death penalty for her, the child is a bastard.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 4:55

Why did they say, practice follows Rebbi Simeon from Timna? Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, from a place where all incest prohibitions were taken as one set [of sins] causing extirpation, the father’s wife came out to tell you about the bastard. The method of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina seems inverted. There, he infers from the set and here he infers from one of its members. As we have stated: “The commandments of the Eternal,” I could think that this includes also those who eat abominations and crawling things. You argue, saying that here it says “from the eyes” and there it says “from the eyes”. Just as “from the eyes” mentioned there means something for which one is obligated for a purification sacrifice in case of inadvertent sin and extirpation in case of intentional sin, also “from the eyes” mentioned here means something for which one is obligated for a purification sacrifice in case of inadvertent sin and extirpation in case of intentional sin. But since “from the eyes” mentioned there is a case involving the death penalty, does “from the eyes” mentioned here involve the death penalty? Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, from the place from which idolatry was singled out to teach about all who are subject to extirpation, there was no mention of anything but extirpation. But the death penalty is written elsewhere. The method of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina seems inverted. There, he infers from the set and here he infers from one of its members! There, all incest prohibitions were taken together as to the duty of sacrifice. Idolatry was singled out to teach who is obligated for a sacrifice. What can you say? Here, all incest prohibitions were taken together concerning of bastards. The father’s wife was singled out to teach about the bastard.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 5:2

HALAKHAH: “Her levir shall come upon her”, that is cohabitation. “And take her as a wife for himself”, that is “bespeaking”. I might think that just as cohabitation is final so “bespeaking” is final; the verse says “her levir shall come upon her.” This directs the entire paragraph towards levirate. Cohabitation is final, “bespeaking” is not final. Then what is “bespeaking” good for? To forbid her to the brothers.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 5:3

Rebbi Simeon says, “bespeaking” either acquires or does not acquire. What is the argument of Rebbi Simeon? “Her levir shall come upon her”, that is cohabitation. “And take her for himself”, that is “bespeaking”. Just as cohabitation is final so “bespeaking” is final. Or “her levir shall come upon her”, then she has been acquired by him and “bespeaking” was of no use to her.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 5:4

Rebbi Eleazar ben Arakh says, “bespeaking” acquires a sister-in-law completely. What is the argument of Rebbi Eleazar ben Arakh? “And take her as wife for himself”, the same expression is used as for qiddushin of a woman. Just as qiddushin acquire completely, so “bespeaking” acquires a sister-in-law completely. What is the formula for “bespeaking” a sister-in-law? “You are betrothed to me by money or money’s worth.”

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 5:4

Rebbi Eleazar ben Arakh says, “bespeaking” acquires a sister-in-law completely. What is the argument of Rebbi Eleazar ben Arakh? “And take her as wife for himself”, the same expression is used as for qiddushin of a woman. Just as qiddushin acquire completely, so “bespeaking” acquires a sister-in-law completely. What is the formula for “bespeaking” a sister-in-law? “You are betrothed to me by money or money’s worth.”

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 5:5

Since the rabbis say, “bespeaking” acquires but not completely, so they say, a bill of divorce frees but not completely. Should not a bill of divorce completely free a sister-in-law by an argument de minore ad majus? Since ḥalîṣah does not free a wife but a bill of divorce does, is it not logical that a sister-in-law, who is freed by ḥalîṣah, should be freed by a bill of divorce? The verse says, “she shall pull off.” By pulling off she is freed; she is not freed by a bill of divorce. So it should free anything! It is written: “She shall not belong … to a strange man.” Where do we hold? If he came upon her, she is his wife. If he performed ḥalîṣah with her, she should go and marry an outsider. So we must hold that he gave her a bill of divorce. Also Ḥizqiah stated thus: From where that the sister-in-law is forbidden to himself and his brothers if he gave her a bill of divorce? For him, I read “whom he had sent away”. For the brothers, I read “whom he had sent away”. Then should not ḥalîṣah free a wife by an argument de minore ad majus? Since a bill of divorce does not free a sister-in-law but ḥalîṣah does, is it not logical that a wife, who is freed by a bill of divorce, should be freed by ḥalîṣah? The verse says, “ he shall write her a bill of divorce.” By a bill of divorce she is freed; she is not freed by ḥalîṣah. So [ḥalîṣah] should free partially! There, it is written, “she shall not belong … to a strange man.” Here, what do you have?

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 5:6

Since Rebbi Simeon says, “bespeaking” either acquires or does not acquire, does he say similarly that a bill of divorce frees or does not free? Let us hear from the following: Rebbi Simeon says, there is nothing after copulation if it is primary. Therefore, if it is secondary, there is something afterwards. That must deal with copulation after a bill of divorce. For if it were copulation after “bespeaking”, what could you say? If “bespeaking” acquired, there is nothing after that. If “bespeaking” did not acquire, intercourse will acquire and there is nothing after that. So we must speak about copulation after a bill of divorce. This implies that a bill of divorce frees partially.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 5:8

Is there a possibility of a bill of divorce after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking” or of “bespeaking” after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking” for Rabban Gamliel? What is a bill of divorce after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking”? If there were two sisters-in-law, he “bespoke” one of them and gave her a bill of divorce; then he gave a bill of divorce to the second. If you say that a bill of divorce frees, anything “bespeaking” had acquired is subject to the bill of divorce; there is no bill of divorce after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking”. If you say that a bill of divorce does not free, for anything “bespeaking” had acquired there is no bill of divorce; there is a bill of divorce after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking”. What is “bespeaking” after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking”? If there were two sisters-in-law, he “bespoke” one of them and gave her a bill of divorce; then he “bespoke” the second. If you say that a bill of divorce frees more than anything “bespeaking” had acquired, it is as if there were no “bespeaking” and there may be “bespeaking” after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking”. But if you say that a bill of divorce does not free more than he had acquired by “bespeaking”, there is “bespeaking” but no “bespeaking” after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking”.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 5:8

Is there a possibility of a bill of divorce after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking” or of “bespeaking” after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking” for Rabban Gamliel? What is a bill of divorce after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking”? If there were two sisters-in-law, he “bespoke” one of them and gave her a bill of divorce; then he gave a bill of divorce to the second. If you say that a bill of divorce frees, anything “bespeaking” had acquired is subject to the bill of divorce; there is no bill of divorce after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking”. If you say that a bill of divorce does not free, for anything “bespeaking” had acquired there is no bill of divorce; there is a bill of divorce after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking”. What is “bespeaking” after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking”? If there were two sisters-in-law, he “bespoke” one of them and gave her a bill of divorce; then he “bespoke” the second. If you say that a bill of divorce frees more than anything “bespeaking” had acquired, it is as if there were no “bespeaking” and there may be “bespeaking” after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking”. But if you say that a bill of divorce does not free more than he had acquired by “bespeaking”, there is “bespeaking” but no “bespeaking” after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking”.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 5:10

Rebbi Yudan asked: If somebody gave qiddushin to a woman “from now and after thirty days” and her sister became a candidate for levirate with him during these thirty days, is there even in this case no “bespeaking” after “bespeaking? He said, Rabban Gamliel said only “after a bill of divorce and ‘bespeaking’ ”. But what Rebbi Abbahu said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, even a hundred qiddushin are valid for her, does not follow Rabban Gamliel.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 5:12

HALAKHAH: “How? If he “bespoke” his sister-in-law,” etc. That means that a bill of divorce frees more than anything “bespeaking” had acquired. If you would say that a bill of divorce does not free more than “bespeaking” had acquired, the levir could say: My bill of divorce shall not free more than my “bespeaking” had acquired. But then the bill of divorce did not even free what my “bespeaking” had acquired! “Cutting off.” That is no cutting off!

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 5:20

“If he gave a bill of divorce, and ḥalîṣah, nothing is valid after ḥalîṣah,” etc. Did we not state already “there is nothing after ḥalîṣah”? Because we stated after that, “whether there is one sister-in-law or two sisters-in-law”. If somebody gave qiddushin to the one with whom he performed ḥalîṣah, would they not lay hold on her? Explain it either following Rebbi if he did not intend it or according to everybody if he intended to acquire as “bespeaking” of a sister-in-law but she was not his sister-in-law. Rebbi Abba said, this was stated: “ ‘Bespeaking’ acquires whether intentional or not intentional, the words of Rebbi. But the Sages say, it acquires only with intention. Rebbi agrees that qiddushin acquire only with intention.” What is Rebbi’s reason? Intercourse acquires, “bespeaking” acquires. Just as intercourse acquires whether intentional or not intentional, so “bespeaking” acquires whether intentional or not intentional. And just as Rebbi says, “bespeaking” acquires whether intentional or not intentional, so he says the bill of divorce frees whether intentional or not intentional. And why does Rebbi say that “bespeaking” acquires whether intentional or not intentional? Since intercourse of an adult acquires whether intentional or not intentional. Even if the bill of divorce would free even if not intentional, ḥalîṣah can free only if it is intentional.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 5:23

HALAKHAH: “How? If he ‘bespoke’,” etc. In the opinion of Rebbi, what about his “bespeaking”, may a nine-year-old “bespeak”? The intercourse of an adult is final; his “bespeaking” partially acquires. The intercourse of a minor is final; does his “bespeaking” partially acquire? What is the difference between his intercourse and his “bespeaking”? But some want to formulate: What is the difference between “bespeaking” of an adult and “bespeaking” of a minor? Samuel said, the words of Rebbi Meïr: They made the intercourse of a child of nine years and one day like “bespeaking” of an adult. And as you said, they made the intercourse of a child of nine years and one day like “bespeaking” of an adult, they made the ḥalîṣah of a child of nine years and one day like “bespeaking” of an adult. But the rabbis said, the ḥalîṣah of a child of nine years and one day is nothing. And why did they make the intercourse of a child of nine years and one day like “bespeaking” of an adult? Because the intercourse of an adult acquires whether intentional or not intentional. The ḥalîṣah of a child of nine years and one day was made like a bill of divorce by an adult. But ḥalîṣah by an adult can free only if it is intentional.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 5:23

HALAKHAH: “How? If he ‘bespoke’,” etc. In the opinion of Rebbi, what about his “bespeaking”, may a nine-year-old “bespeak”? The intercourse of an adult is final; his “bespeaking” partially acquires. The intercourse of a minor is final; does his “bespeaking” partially acquire? What is the difference between his intercourse and his “bespeaking”? But some want to formulate: What is the difference between “bespeaking” of an adult and “bespeaking” of a minor? Samuel said, the words of Rebbi Meïr: They made the intercourse of a child of nine years and one day like “bespeaking” of an adult. And as you said, they made the intercourse of a child of nine years and one day like “bespeaking” of an adult, they made the ḥalîṣah of a child of nine years and one day like “bespeaking” of an adult. But the rabbis said, the ḥalîṣah of a child of nine years and one day is nothing. And why did they make the intercourse of a child of nine years and one day like “bespeaking” of an adult? Because the intercourse of an adult acquires whether intentional or not intentional. The ḥalîṣah of a child of nine years and one day was made like a bill of divorce by an adult. But ḥalîṣah by an adult can free only if it is intentional.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 5:23

HALAKHAH: “How? If he ‘bespoke’,” etc. In the opinion of Rebbi, what about his “bespeaking”, may a nine-year-old “bespeak”? The intercourse of an adult is final; his “bespeaking” partially acquires. The intercourse of a minor is final; does his “bespeaking” partially acquire? What is the difference between his intercourse and his “bespeaking”? But some want to formulate: What is the difference between “bespeaking” of an adult and “bespeaking” of a minor? Samuel said, the words of Rebbi Meïr: They made the intercourse of a child of nine years and one day like “bespeaking” of an adult. And as you said, they made the intercourse of a child of nine years and one day like “bespeaking” of an adult, they made the ḥalîṣah of a child of nine years and one day like “bespeaking” of an adult. But the rabbis said, the ḥalîṣah of a child of nine years and one day is nothing. And why did they make the intercourse of a child of nine years and one day like “bespeaking” of an adult? Because the intercourse of an adult acquires whether intentional or not intentional. The ḥalîṣah of a child of nine years and one day was made like a bill of divorce by an adult. But ḥalîṣah by an adult can free only if it is intentional.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 6:4

What is touching? Rav Jehudah in the name of Samuel: That the finger should be seen between the lips. Rebbi Joḥanan said, until the gland enters. Rebbi Abba bar Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: When the gland has entered that is completion of intercourse. What are we dealing with? If about incest prohibitions, He made the one who touches equal to him who finishes. If for a bound slave girl, until he ejaculates, since Rebbi Jeremiah, Rebbi Abba bar Mamal, said in the name of Rav: “Flow of semen”, until he ejaculates. But we must deal with a widow for the High Priest. When he touched her, he became guilty for desecrating her. When the gland entered, he became guilty for having intercourse. When he ejaculated, he became guilty because “he shall not desecrate his semen in his people.”

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 6:4

What is touching? Rav Jehudah in the name of Samuel: That the finger should be seen between the lips. Rebbi Joḥanan said, until the gland enters. Rebbi Abba bar Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: When the gland has entered that is completion of intercourse. What are we dealing with? If about incest prohibitions, He made the one who touches equal to him who finishes. If for a bound slave girl, until he ejaculates, since Rebbi Jeremiah, Rebbi Abba bar Mamal, said in the name of Rav: “Flow of semen”, until he ejaculates. But we must deal with a widow for the High Priest. When he touched her, he became guilty for desecrating her. When the gland entered, he became guilty for having intercourse. When he ejaculated, he became guilty because “he shall not desecrate his semen in his people.”

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 6:5

There, we have stated: “All women become impure in the outer cavity.” What is the outer cavity? Rebbi Joḥanan said, up to the place which is seen when girls sit down to urinate. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said to him, but in all impurities particular to her, she becomes impure only up to the place of teeth. Rebbi Zakkai stated: Up to the place of teeth, and from between the teeth to the inside. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Samuel: The entire genitals are called “outer cavity”.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 6:6

“He acquired her and there is no difference between intercourse and intercourse.” What did he acquire? Samuel said, he acquired only the things spelled out in the paragraph: To inherit the deceased’s property, (to be betrothed by a brother), and to permit her co-wife to the outside. Rebbi Joḥanan said, he acquired everything. Rebbi Isaac ben Eleazar said, when do they disagree? If he touched her. But if he completed the intercourse, everybody agrees that he acquired everything. Rebbi Mattaniah said, when do they disagree? If he had intercourse with her still in her father’s house. But if he had intercourse with her still in her husband’s house, everybody agrees that he acquired everything. Rebbi Yose said, the Mishnah said: If he married her, she is his wife in every respect.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 6:11

HALAKHAH: “A widow to the High Priest,” etc. What is the reason of the rabbis? “Being” is mentioned here and “being” is mentioned there, “if a girl will be betrothed to a man.” Just as “being” there means betrothal, so “being” here means betrothal. What is the reason of Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon? “Being” is mentioned here and “being” is mentioned there, “if the daughter of a Cohen will be an outside man’s”. Just as “being” there means marriage, so “being” here means marriage. Rebbi Yosa said, from where do Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon know that the daughter of a Cohen betrothed to an Israel may not eat heave? Not from that verse, “if the daughter of a Cohen will be an outside man’s”? Here they make it betrothal, there they make it marriage! What is the reason of the rabbis? “A man’s”, the man who enables to eat. Is it not an argument de minore ad majus? Since an Israel, whose intercourse does not disable her from the priesthood, by intercourse will disable her from eating heave, the High Priest, whose intercourse does disable her from the priesthood, it should be logical that his intercourse will disable her from eating heave. No. If you argue about an Israel who cannot enable others to eat, what can you say about the High Priest who can enable others to eat? Since he can enable others to eat, his intercourse should not disable her from eating heave. The argument de minore ad majus is broken, and one has to return to the verse. Therefore, it must say “a man’s”; viz., the man who enables her to eat. What is the reason of Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon, because he may eat or because he may enable to eat? Let us hear from the following: “If he did not know her after his testicles became injured or his penis cut off, these they enable to eat.” Rebbi Eleazar said, this follows Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon. You have to say, here it is because he enables to eat, there because he cannot enable to eat. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, not really from betrothal or marriage. If they had copulated whether betrothed or married, they are disabled; if they had not copulated whether betrothed or married, they are enabled.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 6:11

HALAKHAH: “A widow to the High Priest,” etc. What is the reason of the rabbis? “Being” is mentioned here and “being” is mentioned there, “if a girl will be betrothed to a man.” Just as “being” there means betrothal, so “being” here means betrothal. What is the reason of Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon? “Being” is mentioned here and “being” is mentioned there, “if the daughter of a Cohen will be an outside man’s”. Just as “being” there means marriage, so “being” here means marriage. Rebbi Yosa said, from where do Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon know that the daughter of a Cohen betrothed to an Israel may not eat heave? Not from that verse, “if the daughter of a Cohen will be an outside man’s”? Here they make it betrothal, there they make it marriage! What is the reason of the rabbis? “A man’s”, the man who enables to eat. Is it not an argument de minore ad majus? Since an Israel, whose intercourse does not disable her from the priesthood, by intercourse will disable her from eating heave, the High Priest, whose intercourse does disable her from the priesthood, it should be logical that his intercourse will disable her from eating heave. No. If you argue about an Israel who cannot enable others to eat, what can you say about the High Priest who can enable others to eat? Since he can enable others to eat, his intercourse should not disable her from eating heave. The argument de minore ad majus is broken, and one has to return to the verse. Therefore, it must say “a man’s”; viz., the man who enables her to eat. What is the reason of Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon, because he may eat or because he may enable to eat? Let us hear from the following: “If he did not know her after his testicles became injured or his penis cut off, these they enable to eat.” Rebbi Eleazar said, this follows Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon. You have to say, here it is because he enables to eat, there because he cannot enable to eat. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, not really from betrothal or marriage. If they had copulated whether betrothed or married, they are disabled; if they had not copulated whether betrothed or married, they are enabled.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 6:11

HALAKHAH: “A widow to the High Priest,” etc. What is the reason of the rabbis? “Being” is mentioned here and “being” is mentioned there, “if a girl will be betrothed to a man.” Just as “being” there means betrothal, so “being” here means betrothal. What is the reason of Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon? “Being” is mentioned here and “being” is mentioned there, “if the daughter of a Cohen will be an outside man’s”. Just as “being” there means marriage, so “being” here means marriage. Rebbi Yosa said, from where do Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon know that the daughter of a Cohen betrothed to an Israel may not eat heave? Not from that verse, “if the daughter of a Cohen will be an outside man’s”? Here they make it betrothal, there they make it marriage! What is the reason of the rabbis? “A man’s”, the man who enables to eat. Is it not an argument de minore ad majus? Since an Israel, whose intercourse does not disable her from the priesthood, by intercourse will disable her from eating heave, the High Priest, whose intercourse does disable her from the priesthood, it should be logical that his intercourse will disable her from eating heave. No. If you argue about an Israel who cannot enable others to eat, what can you say about the High Priest who can enable others to eat? Since he can enable others to eat, his intercourse should not disable her from eating heave. The argument de minore ad majus is broken, and one has to return to the verse. Therefore, it must say “a man’s”; viz., the man who enables her to eat. What is the reason of Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon, because he may eat or because he may enable to eat? Let us hear from the following: “If he did not know her after his testicles became injured or his penis cut off, these they enable to eat.” Rebbi Eleazar said, this follows Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon. You have to say, here it is because he enables to eat, there because he cannot enable to eat. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, not really from betrothal or marriage. If they had copulated whether betrothed or married, they are disabled; if they had not copulated whether betrothed or married, they are enabled.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 6:11

HALAKHAH: “A widow to the High Priest,” etc. What is the reason of the rabbis? “Being” is mentioned here and “being” is mentioned there, “if a girl will be betrothed to a man.” Just as “being” there means betrothal, so “being” here means betrothal. What is the reason of Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon? “Being” is mentioned here and “being” is mentioned there, “if the daughter of a Cohen will be an outside man’s”. Just as “being” there means marriage, so “being” here means marriage. Rebbi Yosa said, from where do Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon know that the daughter of a Cohen betrothed to an Israel may not eat heave? Not from that verse, “if the daughter of a Cohen will be an outside man’s”? Here they make it betrothal, there they make it marriage! What is the reason of the rabbis? “A man’s”, the man who enables to eat. Is it not an argument de minore ad majus? Since an Israel, whose intercourse does not disable her from the priesthood, by intercourse will disable her from eating heave, the High Priest, whose intercourse does disable her from the priesthood, it should be logical that his intercourse will disable her from eating heave. No. If you argue about an Israel who cannot enable others to eat, what can you say about the High Priest who can enable others to eat? Since he can enable others to eat, his intercourse should not disable her from eating heave. The argument de minore ad majus is broken, and one has to return to the verse. Therefore, it must say “a man’s”; viz., the man who enables her to eat. What is the reason of Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon, because he may eat or because he may enable to eat? Let us hear from the following: “If he did not know her after his testicles became injured or his penis cut off, these they enable to eat.” Rebbi Eleazar said, this follows Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon. You have to say, here it is because he enables to eat, there because he cannot enable to eat. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, not really from betrothal or marriage. If they had copulated whether betrothed or married, they are disabled; if they had not copulated whether betrothed or married, they are enabled.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 6:11

HALAKHAH: “A widow to the High Priest,” etc. What is the reason of the rabbis? “Being” is mentioned here and “being” is mentioned there, “if a girl will be betrothed to a man.” Just as “being” there means betrothal, so “being” here means betrothal. What is the reason of Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon? “Being” is mentioned here and “being” is mentioned there, “if the daughter of a Cohen will be an outside man’s”. Just as “being” there means marriage, so “being” here means marriage. Rebbi Yosa said, from where do Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon know that the daughter of a Cohen betrothed to an Israel may not eat heave? Not from that verse, “if the daughter of a Cohen will be an outside man’s”? Here they make it betrothal, there they make it marriage! What is the reason of the rabbis? “A man’s”, the man who enables to eat. Is it not an argument de minore ad majus? Since an Israel, whose intercourse does not disable her from the priesthood, by intercourse will disable her from eating heave, the High Priest, whose intercourse does disable her from the priesthood, it should be logical that his intercourse will disable her from eating heave. No. If you argue about an Israel who cannot enable others to eat, what can you say about the High Priest who can enable others to eat? Since he can enable others to eat, his intercourse should not disable her from eating heave. The argument de minore ad majus is broken, and one has to return to the verse. Therefore, it must say “a man’s”; viz., the man who enables her to eat. What is the reason of Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon, because he may eat or because he may enable to eat? Let us hear from the following: “If he did not know her after his testicles became injured or his penis cut off, these they enable to eat.” Rebbi Eleazar said, this follows Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon. You have to say, here it is because he enables to eat, there because he cannot enable to eat. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, not really from betrothal or marriage. If they had copulated whether betrothed or married, they are disabled; if they had not copulated whether betrothed or married, they are enabled.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 6:14

“He shall not marry an adult; Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon enable the adult.” They agree that he shall not marry one injured by a piece of wood. What is the difference between the adult and the one injured by a piece of wood? The hymen of an adult dissolved in her body. The hymen of one injured by a piece of wood came outside. Some switch: He shall not marry one injured by a piece of wood; Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon enable one injured by a piece of wood.” They agree that he shall not marry an adult. What is the difference between the adult and the one injured by a piece of wood? An adult is no longer young. The one injured by a piece of wood is still young.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 6:14

“He shall not marry an adult; Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon enable the adult.” They agree that he shall not marry one injured by a piece of wood. What is the difference between the adult and the one injured by a piece of wood? The hymen of an adult dissolved in her body. The hymen of one injured by a piece of wood came outside. Some switch: He shall not marry one injured by a piece of wood; Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon enable one injured by a piece of wood.” They agree that he shall not marry an adult. What is the difference between the adult and the one injured by a piece of wood? An adult is no longer young. The one injured by a piece of wood is still young.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 6:15

A sister injured by a piece of wood, Rebbi Meїr and Rebbi Simeon say, he shall not defile himself for her, but the Sages say, he must defile himself for her. Rebbi Meїr and Rebbi Simeon follow well what they have stated, but the argument of Sages seems inverted. There, they say “a girl”, not an adult, “a virgin”, not one injured by a piece of wood; and here, they say so? Rebbi Hila said, every interpretation follows its context. There, “and for his virgin sister”, that excludes the raped and the seduced one. Or maybe I should exclude the one injured by a piece of wood? The verse says, “who had not been a man’s.” Who became [deflowered] through the action of a man, not one who became it through something else. “The close one”, to include the betrothed one. “To him”, to include the adult. The argument of Sages seems inverted. There, they say “the close one”, to exclude the betrothed one, “to him”, to exclude the divorcee. And here, they say so? Rebbi Hila said, every interpretation follows its context. “His sister” is always inside [the family] until she leaves; his betrothed is always outside until she enters.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 6:30

Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Zimra: The reason of that Tanna: “Be fruitful and multiply, fill the earth and conquer it.” It is written “he shall conquer it.” Who usually conquers? The man, not the woman. Rebbi Jeremiah, Rebbi Abbahu, Rebbi Isaac bar Marion, in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina: Practice follows Rebbi Joḥanan ben Beroqa. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa and Rebbi Jacob bar Idi, Rebbi Isaac bar Ḥaqula in the name of Rebbi Jehudah Neśia: If she requests to be married, she has the law on her side. Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina: Practice follows Rebbi Joḥanan ben Beroqa. Rebbi Abba bar Zavda said to him, I was with you and it was only said that if she requests to be married, she has the law on her side. In a similar case, referring to what we have stated there: “In the week in which the Ninth of Av falls, it is forbidden to get a haircut and to wash. But on Thursday one is permitted, in preparation for the Sabbath.” Rebbi Abba bar Zavda in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina: Rebbi wanted to do away with the Ninth of Av but they did not let him. Rebbi Eleazar said to him, I was with you and it was only said that Rebbi wanted to do away with the Ninth of Av which happened to be on the Sabbath but they did not let him. He said, since it is pushed away, let it be pushed away. They said to him, it should be pushed to the next day. He recited on these: “Two are better than one.”

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 7:3

Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: “They shall eat”, they shall enable to eat. The one who may eat enables to eat, the one who may not eat cannot enable to eat. Rebbi Joḥanan says, because of a fine. What is the difference between them? If an uncircumcised slave buys slaves. If you say, it is a fine, here there is no fine. If you say the one who may eat enables to eat, this one, since he is not able to eat, cannot enable to eat.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 7:4

Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, there is disagreement about mortmain slaves. Rebbi Joḥanan said, if he sold them, they are not sold. Rebbi Eleazar said to him, they are eating heave by his power and you say so? He answered, do not paraphernalia slaves also eat by his power, and one says that if he sold them, they are not sold. From your own they gave to you. It would be logical that one should not eat heave. But they said that he eats, and they said, if he sold them, they are not sold. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Josiah. A baraita supports one and another baraita supports the other. A baraita supports Rebbi Eleazar: Paraphernalia slaves are freed on account of “tooth and eye” from the wife but not the husband. Mortmain slaves are freed by “tooth and eye” from the husband but not the wife. What does Rebbi Joḥanan do with this? They are quick to manumit, as we have stated: If somebody mortgages a slave and later sold him, he is not sold; if he freed him, he is freed. A baraita supports Rebbi Joḥanan: Neither mortmain slaves nor paraphernalia slaves are under the rules of “one or two days” and are freed by “tooth or eye” from neither the husband nor the wife. Where do they disagree? When he sold them forever or sold them for some time? If you say that he sold them permanently rather than temporarily, does everybody agree that they are sold? If you say that he sold them temporarily rather than permanently, does everybody agree that they are not sold? Let us hear from the following: If somebody mortgages his field to his wife for her ketubah or to a creditor for his claim and then sells it, it is sold and the buyer should beware for himself. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, for the ketubah of the wife it is not sold since it is unthinkable that a woman should run around at courts of law. They said, Rebbi Eleazar parallels the rabbis, Rebbi Joḥanan Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel. That means, we deal with a temporary sale. But if he sold permanently, everybody agrees that they are not sold.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 7:7

Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Ada asked Rebbi Mana: What is the etymology of “mĕlōg slaves”? He said to him, as you say: strip off, strip off!

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 7:16

HALAKHAH: “The fetus, the levir, the betrothal,” etc. Rebbi Simeon said, here the logic is deficient, for if it is action to disable it also should be action to enable, and if it is not action to disable it also should not be action to enable. Rebbi Simeon is correct; what is the reason of the rabbis? “They shall eat”, they shall enable to eat. The one who may eat enables to eat, the one who may not eat cannot enable to eat. They objected: there is the bastard who may not eat and he enables to eat! There is a difference, since it is written “born in the house”. Then the born should enable, the not born should not enable! There is a difference, since it is written “and she returns to her father’s house”, to exclude the one waiting for the levir, “in her youth”, to exclude the pregnant one. Rebbi Yose said, that means that they considered pregnancy to be real to disable but did not consider it real to enable to eat. The words of the rabbis disagree since Ze‘ira said, there they state that the betrothed, the one waiting for the levir, and the pregnant, pay the capital but not the fifth. What are we speaking about? If about the daughter of a Cohen married to an Israel, even if she had children from him she is not an outsider for it. But we must deal with the daughter of an Israel married to a Cohen. If you say, they considered the fetus to be real to disable but did not consider it real to enable to eat, why does she pay the capital but not the fifth, should she not pay capital and fifth?

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 7:16

HALAKHAH: “The fetus, the levir, the betrothal,” etc. Rebbi Simeon said, here the logic is deficient, for if it is action to disable it also should be action to enable, and if it is not action to disable it also should not be action to enable. Rebbi Simeon is correct; what is the reason of the rabbis? “They shall eat”, they shall enable to eat. The one who may eat enables to eat, the one who may not eat cannot enable to eat. They objected: there is the bastard who may not eat and he enables to eat! There is a difference, since it is written “born in the house”. Then the born should enable, the not born should not enable! There is a difference, since it is written “and she returns to her father’s house”, to exclude the one waiting for the levir, “in her youth”, to exclude the pregnant one. Rebbi Yose said, that means that they considered pregnancy to be real to disable but did not consider it real to enable to eat. The words of the rabbis disagree since Ze‘ira said, there they state that the betrothed, the one waiting for the levir, and the pregnant, pay the capital but not the fifth. What are we speaking about? If about the daughter of a Cohen married to an Israel, even if she had children from him she is not an outsider for it. But we must deal with the daughter of an Israel married to a Cohen. If you say, they considered the fetus to be real to disable but did not consider it real to enable to eat, why does she pay the capital but not the fifth, should she not pay capital and fifth?

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 7:22

This supports what Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: The wife of the deaf-and-dumb or the insane immerses herself from her husband’s bosom and eats, against Rebbi Eleazar, since Rebbi Eleazar said, also if an unmarried man had intercourse with an unmarried woman not for the purpose of marriage it is copulation of harlotry.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 7:24

“If they are unable to marry in Israel they disable.” These are: “A child of nine years and one day, an Ammonite, Moabite, or Egyptian proselyte, or a bastard, desecrated, Gibeonite, Samaritan, and Gentile who had intercourse with the daughter of an Israel, a Cohen, or a Levite, disqualified her for the priesthood. Rebbi Yose said, everybody’s intercourse disqualifies whose descendant would be disqualified; his intercourse does not disqualify those whose descendant would not be disqualified. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, in all cases, if his daughter is permitted to you, so is his widow; if his daughter is not permitted to you, neither is his widow.” In what do they differ? Rebbi Joḥanan says, an Ammonite or Moabite proselyte is between them. For him who says, everybody’s intercourse disqualifies whose descendant would be disqualified, here since his descendant would be disqualified, his intercourse disqualifies. For him who says, if you may marry his daughter you may marry his widow, here since you may marry his daughter you may marry his widow. The words of the Sages? Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of [the rabbis], Rebbi Abba, both say: Regarding the daughter of an Ammonite or Moabite proselyte or the daughter of a second-generation Egyptian, even though his daughter is permitted to you, his widow is forbidden to you. Rebbi Zakkai: Rebbi Alexander sent to ask [about] the daughter of an Ammonite proselyte and the daughter of a second-generation Egyptian. Rebbi Yose said to him, did you not hear that Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of the rabbis, Rebbi Abba, both say: Regarding the daughter of an Ammonite proselyte or the daughter of a second-generation Egyptian, even though his daughter is permitted to you, his widow is forbidden to you. And everybody’s intercourse disqualifies whose descendant would be disqualified. Do we not need it when her mother was from Israel? That you should not say that since her mother was desecrated so her daughter was desecrated. In addition, Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagreed, the daughter of an Ammonite proselyte or the daughter of a second-generation Egyptian, Rebbi Joḥanan said, they are acceptable, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, they are disqualified. Rebbi Yose ben Abun said, they disagree about the old women: Rebbi Joḥanan said, they are acceptable, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, they are disqualified.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 8:3

Rebbi Abun asked: Should not heave be forbidden to the mourner by an inference de minore ad majus? Since tithe, which is permitted to outsiders, is forbidden to the mourner, should not heave, which is forbidden to outsiders, be forbidden to the mourner? No. If you said it about tithe which needs an enclosure, what can you say about heave which does not need an enclosure? Therefore, since each of them has an aspect missing in the other, they cannot teach an inference from one to the other.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 8:6

In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba, for which reason were “sojourner or hireling” written for heave? Like what Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Yasa, if somebody bought uncircumcised slaves from a Gentile with the understanding that he would circumcise them. Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, Rebbi Simeon bar Abba in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If somebody bought uncircumcised slaves from a Gentile with the understanding that he would circumcise them, they [still] cannot eat heave even if circumcised. Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, Rebbi Simeon bar Abba in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If somebody bought slaves from a Gentile with the understanding that he would circumcise them but they changed their minds, he keeps them for twelve months. If they accept, it is fine; otherwise, he may sell them to a Gentile. Rebbi Isaac bar Naḥman in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: It happened that somebody bought a village full of uncircumcised slaves from a Gentile with the understanding that he would circumcise them but they changed their minds. He came and asked the rabbis. They said to him, keep them for twelve months. If they accept, it is fine; otherwise one follows the local customs.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 8:8

A slave may be a permanent sojourner. A sojourner is like a Gentile in every respect. Rebbi Samuel bar Ḥiyya bar Jehudah in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina: One keeps the sojourner for twelve months. If he changes his mind, that is fine; otherwise he is like a Gentile in all respects. Rebbi Samuel bar Ḥiyya bar Jehudah, Rebbi Ḥanina in the name of Rebbi: The sojourner has to accept on condition that he may eat cadaver meat. Rebbi Hila said, one would then say, the words are [interpreted] as they are written. What does it mean, the words are [interpreted] as they are written? Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, “You shall not eat any cadaver; to the sojourner in your midst you shall give it that he eat it.” Some Tannaim state: One does not receive a sojourner unless he accepts all commandments written in the Torah. Some Tannaim state: One does not receive a sojourner unless he renounces his idolatry. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Ashi: One does not receive a sojourner unless he renounces his idolatry as a Gentile. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, from their consensus: unless he renounces his idolatry as a Gentile. For if it were not so, what would we say? Since he is forbidden idolatry he cannot render profane. But are Gentiles not also forbidden idolatry and they do render profane? Rebbi Yose said, that you should not say, since he is equal to an Israel in three respects, do not oppress, do not cheat, and he is exiled like an Israel, that he has no power to render profane. Therefore, it was necessary to spell out that he renders idols profane like a Gentile. Who is the Tanna who includes “do not oppress”? He is Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah, as it was stated: The sojourner is protected by the prohibition, the words of Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 8:8

A slave may be a permanent sojourner. A sojourner is like a Gentile in every respect. Rebbi Samuel bar Ḥiyya bar Jehudah in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina: One keeps the sojourner for twelve months. If he changes his mind, that is fine; otherwise he is like a Gentile in all respects. Rebbi Samuel bar Ḥiyya bar Jehudah, Rebbi Ḥanina in the name of Rebbi: The sojourner has to accept on condition that he may eat cadaver meat. Rebbi Hila said, one would then say, the words are [interpreted] as they are written. What does it mean, the words are [interpreted] as they are written? Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, “You shall not eat any cadaver; to the sojourner in your midst you shall give it that he eat it.” Some Tannaim state: One does not receive a sojourner unless he accepts all commandments written in the Torah. Some Tannaim state: One does not receive a sojourner unless he renounces his idolatry. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Ashi: One does not receive a sojourner unless he renounces his idolatry as a Gentile. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, from their consensus: unless he renounces his idolatry as a Gentile. For if it were not so, what would we say? Since he is forbidden idolatry he cannot render profane. But are Gentiles not also forbidden idolatry and they do render profane? Rebbi Yose said, that you should not say, since he is equal to an Israel in three respects, do not oppress, do not cheat, and he is exiled like an Israel, that he has no power to render profane. Therefore, it was necessary to spell out that he renders idols profane like a Gentile. Who is the Tanna who includes “do not oppress”? He is Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah, as it was stated: The sojourner is protected by the prohibition, the words of Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 8:10

It is written: “Any slave who is a man bought by money.” You circumcise by force a slave who is a man, you do not circumcise by force a son who is a man. Rebbi Joḥanan asked, does this imply that you may circumcise a minor by force? Even like one of undescended testicles? Rebbi Ḥizqiah in the name of Rebbi Abba: It is so. “If he found there a foundling. If he immersed him as a slave, he circumcises him as a slave; [if he immersed him] as a free person, he circumcises him as a free person.” Rebbi Joḥanan asked, as a slave, he circumcises him as a slave; even like one of undescended testicles? Rebbi Abbahu and Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia did not say so, but “any slave who is a man bought by money.” If your slave is a man, you circumcise him by force. If your son is a man, you do not circumcise him by force. This refers to what Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Yasa: If somebody buys uncircumcised slaves from Gentiles on condition that he will circumcise them, in any case if they are slaves who are men, you circumcise them by force. On condition that he will not circumcise them, he is like a son who is a man, you do not circumcise him by force.