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The Jerusalem Talmud

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 2:11

Rav Ḥisda asked: What is the situation if he entered the Sanctuary thinking it was a synagogue? Rebbi Yose said, the following is what we are saying: One knew that there exists impurity in the world but he did not know whether one is liable for a sacrifice because of it, that certainly is awareness. But the following is where we hold, if it was clear to him that he was impure but he was oblivious of the Sanctuary, and he entered the Sanctuary. And so if it was clear to him that this was the Sanctuary, he was oblivious of the impurity and entered the Sanctuary.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 2:11

Rav Ḥisda asked: What is the situation if he entered the Sanctuary thinking it was a synagogue? Rebbi Yose said, the following is what we are saying: One knew that there exists impurity in the world but he did not know whether one is liable for a sacrifice because of it, that certainly is awareness. But the following is where we hold, if it was clear to him that he was impure but he was oblivious of the Sanctuary, and he entered the Sanctuary. And so if it was clear to him that this was the Sanctuary, he was oblivious of the impurity and entered the Sanctuary.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 2:14

HALAKHAH: “Whether one entered the courtyard,” etc. Rav said, at the start: David ascended following Gad’s word, that is King and Prophet. Solomon started to build the Temple of the Eternal in Jerusalem, these are Urim and Tummim. And his father David, this is the Synhedrion, ask your father and he will tell you. Song, after them went Hoshaia and the officers. Thanksgiving sacrifices, I put up two thanksgiving sacrifices. Rebbi Samuel bar Rebbi Yudan said, what is written, walking? No, being in procession.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 2:19

The measure of prostrating is ten cubits. How is this? If the lengthy path was twenty but the short one ten. He went five. If he went in this direction, five, if in the other, fifteen. Rebbi Yose said, he never becomes liable unless the lengthy path exceed the short one by (ten). How is that? If the lengthy path was thirty but the short one ten. He went five. If he went in this direction, five, if in the other, twenty-five. What is the duration of prostrating? Rebbi Simon in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: up to a greeting from one person to another. Abba bar Huna in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: up to a greeting from a student to his teacher, “peace be with you, my teacher.”

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 2:20

MISHNAH: What is the positive commandment about the menstruating woman? If he was having sex with a pure one and she said to him, I became impure, if he separates immediately he is liable, for his separation is as pleasurable to him as his entry.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 2:21

HALAKHAH: “What is the positive commandment about the menstruating woman,” etc. Cahana said, is it impossible that there was knowledge at the beginning and knowledge at the end and oblivion in between? Rebbi Samuel ben Eudaimon objected before Rebbi Mana: Could that be for the teachers? He told him, we have a problem with those entering and you bring us teachers? What about it? Rebbi Samuel bar Rav Isaac said, commandments, commandments. Since commandments mentioned there are about fixed-value [offerings], here also about fixed-value [offerings].

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 2:21

HALAKHAH: “What is the positive commandment about the menstruating woman,” etc. Cahana said, is it impossible that there was knowledge at the beginning and knowledge at the end and oblivion in between? Rebbi Samuel ben Eudaimon objected before Rebbi Mana: Could that be for the teachers? He told him, we have a problem with those entering and you bring us teachers? What about it? Rebbi Samuel bar Rav Isaac said, commandments, commandments. Since commandments mentioned there are about fixed-value [offerings], here also about fixed-value [offerings].

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 2:23

HALAKHAH: “Rebbi Eliezer says,” etc. Ḥizqiah says, there is disagreement between them. Rebbi Joḥanan said, interpreting the verse is between them; there are Tannaim who state, he is liable for forgetting impurity but is not liable for forgetting the Sanctuary, and there are Tannain who state, he is liable for forgetting the crawling animal but is not liable for forgetting the Sanctuary. The argument of Rebbi Eliezer seems inverted. There he says, even if he did not know. But here he says, not unless he knew. There, by which he sinned, not unless he knew by what he became liable. Here, while he was impure, in all cases. Rebbi Ḥinena said, here “by what” is not written. The argument of Rebbi Joshua seems inverted. There he says, while he was impure, not unless he knew by what he became liable. Here, by which he sinned, in any case. How does Rebbi Eliezer uphold by what? This excludes the one who is occupied.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 2:23

HALAKHAH: “Rebbi Eliezer says,” etc. Ḥizqiah says, there is disagreement between them. Rebbi Joḥanan said, interpreting the verse is between them; there are Tannaim who state, he is liable for forgetting impurity but is not liable for forgetting the Sanctuary, and there are Tannain who state, he is liable for forgetting the crawling animal but is not liable for forgetting the Sanctuary. The argument of Rebbi Eliezer seems inverted. There he says, even if he did not know. But here he says, not unless he knew. There, by which he sinned, not unless he knew by what he became liable. Here, while he was impure, in all cases. Rebbi Ḥinena said, here “by what” is not written. The argument of Rebbi Joshua seems inverted. There he says, while he was impure, not unless he knew by what he became liable. Here, by which he sinned, in any case. How does Rebbi Eliezer uphold by what? This excludes the one who is occupied.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 2:23

HALAKHAH: “Rebbi Eliezer says,” etc. Ḥizqiah says, there is disagreement between them. Rebbi Joḥanan said, interpreting the verse is between them; there are Tannaim who state, he is liable for forgetting impurity but is not liable for forgetting the Sanctuary, and there are Tannain who state, he is liable for forgetting the crawling animal but is not liable for forgetting the Sanctuary. The argument of Rebbi Eliezer seems inverted. There he says, even if he did not know. But here he says, not unless he knew. There, by which he sinned, not unless he knew by what he became liable. Here, while he was impure, in all cases. Rebbi Ḥinena said, here “by what” is not written. The argument of Rebbi Joshua seems inverted. There he says, while he was impure, not unless he knew by what he became liable. Here, by which he sinned, in any case. How does Rebbi Eliezer uphold by what? This excludes the one who is occupied.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 2:23

HALAKHAH: “Rebbi Eliezer says,” etc. Ḥizqiah says, there is disagreement between them. Rebbi Joḥanan said, interpreting the verse is between them; there are Tannaim who state, he is liable for forgetting impurity but is not liable for forgetting the Sanctuary, and there are Tannain who state, he is liable for forgetting the crawling animal but is not liable for forgetting the Sanctuary. The argument of Rebbi Eliezer seems inverted. There he says, even if he did not know. But here he says, not unless he knew. There, by which he sinned, not unless he knew by what he became liable. Here, while he was impure, in all cases. Rebbi Ḥinena said, here “by what” is not written. The argument of Rebbi Joshua seems inverted. There he says, while he was impure, not unless he knew by what he became liable. Here, by which he sinned, in any case. How does Rebbi Eliezer uphold by what? This excludes the one who is occupied.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:3

Where do we hold? If about one who said, an oath that I shall eat according to Torah standards, even Rebbi Aqiba will agree. And if about one who says, an oath that I shall not taste, even the rabbis will agree. But we hold, about minute amounts. Are minute amounts eating? Explain it following Rebbi Aqiba who said that a minute amount is eating. What is the difference between them? “An oath that I shall eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba he is liable, in the opinion of the rabbis he is not liable. “That I shall not eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba he is not liable, in the opinion of the rabbis he is liable. Also for blurted oaths it is so: “An oath that my wife may not have any usufruct from me if I shall eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba his wife is forbidden [to have usufruct], in the opinion of the rabbis his wife is permitted. “That I shall not eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba his wife is permitted [to have usufruct], in the opinion of the rabbis his wife is forbidden. Also with property it is the same. “An oath that my properties be forbidden to me if I shall eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba they are forbidden, in the opinion of the rabbis his properties are permitted. “That I shall not eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba his properties are permitted, in the opinion of the rabbis they are forbidden.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:6

HALAKHAH: “An oath that I shall not eat; when he ate,” etc. Drinking is subsumed under eating but eating is not subsumed under drinking. Rebbi Jonah understood all this from: Therefore, I told the Children of Israel, none of you shall eat blood. Where do we hold? If about congealed blood, was it not stated that congealed blood is neither food nor drink? (But we hold, about minute amounts. Are minute amounts eating? Explain it following Rebbi Aqiba who said that a minute amount is eating.) And was it not stated: If one liquefied the blood and swallowed it, or froze fat and ate it, if there is the volume of an olive he is liable. What does Rebbi Jonah do with this? It is not food to become impure in the impurity of food, or fluid to become impure in the impurity of fluids. Rebbi Jonah changed and explained the Mishnah: You shall spend the money for anything you desire. Where do we hold? If about one who gives the taste of wine into a cooked dish, is that not spoiling the taste? But we hold with everything and the Merciful called it “eating.” The rabbis of Caesarea said, explain if about gomraya and orzaraya, since anything that is auxiliary to food is like food.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:15

HALAKHAH: “An oath that I shall not drink,” etc. In this case, Rebbi Simeon declares not liable. Rebbi Simeon follows his own opinion, as we have stated there: “How much does he have to eat from ṭevel to be liable? Rebbi Simeon says, anything; but the Sages say, the volume of an olive. Rebbi Simeon told them, do you not agree that one who eats an ant is liable? They told him, because it is a creature. He answered them, also a grain of wheat is a creature.” In Rebbi Joḥanan’s opinion, why does Rebbi Simeon declare not liable? Rebbi Ze`ira said, Rebbi Simeon follows his own opinion. It was stated in the name of Rebbi Simeon: You shall deprive yourselves, of what is permitted to you, not of what is forbidden to you.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:15

HALAKHAH: “An oath that I shall not drink,” etc. In this case, Rebbi Simeon declares not liable. Rebbi Simeon follows his own opinion, as we have stated there: “How much does he have to eat from ṭevel to be liable? Rebbi Simeon says, anything; but the Sages say, the volume of an olive. Rebbi Simeon told them, do you not agree that one who eats an ant is liable? They told him, because it is a creature. He answered them, also a grain of wheat is a creature.” In Rebbi Joḥanan’s opinion, why does Rebbi Simeon declare not liable? Rebbi Ze`ira said, Rebbi Simeon follows his own opinion. It was stated in the name of Rebbi Simeon: You shall deprive yourselves, of what is permitted to you, not of what is forbidden to you.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:18

Rebbi Ḥinena asked: Why did he not say, “an oath if I would eat of X” without detail? Because of Rebbi Simeon. But if following Rebbi Simeon, how could we state the Day of Atonement, since Rebbi Simeon stated, you shall deprive yourselves, of what is (forbidden) to you, not of what is (permitted) to you. Only one has a fixed rate sacrifice, the other a variable one.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:18

Rebbi Ḥinena asked: Why did he not say, “an oath if I would eat of X” without detail? Because of Rebbi Simeon. But if following Rebbi Simeon, how could we state the Day of Atonement, since Rebbi Simeon stated, you shall deprive yourselves, of what is (forbidden) to you, not of what is (permitted) to you. Only one has a fixed rate sacrifice, the other a variable one.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:24

HALAKHAH: He wants to teach himself a pretext. “Whether matters of himself,” etc. Rebbi Abba in the name of Samuel: “An oath that X gave a mina to Y,” and it turns out that he did not give, since it was not in his power for the future, it is not in his power for the past. Rebbi Yose objected, about phylacteries there is nothing about the future but there is about the past! He told him, phylacteries came from another source. To cause evil or cause good; just as doing good is optional so doing bad is optional; this excludes anything involving a prohibition or anything involving a permission. Anything which one will blurt out, excluding a minor. A person in an oath, excluding a person not acting at his own will. And it will be forgotten by him, he will be oblivious of the oath. Or could I think that the object was forgotten by him? The verse says, in an oath and it was forgotten by him; he is liable for forgetting the oath; he is not liable for forgetting the object. Could one not add forgetting the object to forgetting the oath so that he should be liable? What is the difference between this and forgetting impurity and forgetting the Sanctuary so that he should be liable twice following Rebbi Ismael, who said forgetting impurity and forgetting the Sanctuary? There it is written it was forgotten by him, it was forgotten by him twice. Here it is written it was forgotten by him once. I could think that one who swears to the detriment of others should be liable: the verse says, to cause evil or cause good; just as doing good is optional so doing bad is optional. I shall exclude one who swears to the detriment of another that he should not be liable. For example, if one swears that he will not provide food for another. He saw him in convulsions and gave to him.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:25

How does Rebbi Ismael explain the verse? Or a person, if he would swear blurting out with his lips, a general statement. To cause evil or cause good, a detail. A general statement followed by a detail; the general statement contains only what is in the detail. But the detail only contains matters of causing evil or good! But it is so: To cause evil or cause good, a detail. Anything which a person will blurt out, a general statement. A detail followed by a general statement, everything is included; this adds matters directed towards the past. But it is so: Or a person, if he would swear blurting out with his lips, a general statement. To cause evil or cause good, a detail. Anything which a person will blurt out, a general statement. A general statement followed by a detail followed by a general statement, you only argue in the pattern of the detail. Since the detail is explicit, matters of causing evil or good, from where matters not causing evil or good? “He answered him, from the additional text of the verse. He answered, just as the verse added for this, the verse added for the other.” You cannot, as Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: So did Rebbi Ismael answer Rebbi Aqiba. Do we find cases where one is liable for intentional action because of a false oath but if in oblivion because of a blurted oath? Could he not have objected, do we find cases where one is liable for intentional action because of a false oath and he has to bring a sacrifice? He said to him, do you agree that there are cases which are not matters of causing evil or good, even if they are not written? He told him, even though I accept cases which are not matters of causing evil or good, are they only written if they be matters of causing evil or good? Therefore never for the past.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:26

MISHNAH: If he swore not to observe a commandment but failed not to observe it, he is not liable; to observe a commandment and did not observe it, he is not liable, though it would have been logical that he should be liable, the words of Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra. Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra said, since he is liable for a permitted purpose, for which he is not sworn to from Mount Sinai, is it not logical that he should be liable about a commandment to which he is sworn from Mount Sinai? They said to him, no. What you say about an oath for permitted purpose where He made “no” equal to “yes”, can you say that about an oath concerning a commandment, where He did not make “no” equal to “yes”? Since one who swears not to observe a commandment but failed not to observe it, is not liable.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:27

HALAKHAH: “If he swore not to observe a commandment,” etc. Rebbi Mani said, so is the Mishnah: “He is liable, the words of Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra.” What Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra said refers to prohibitions in general. “An oath that I shall eat carcass meat,” but he did not eat it. He is not liable. “An oath that I shall eat,” and he ate. If you would say that he is liable, they should have objected to him: No. You declare about an oath for permitted purpose where He made “no” equal to “yes” and “yes” equal to “no”, can you declare this about an oath concerning a commandment, where He did not make “no” equal to “yes”?

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:30

HALAKHAH: “An oath that I shall not eat this loaf,” etc. “An oath that I shall eat this loaf today,” the day passed and then he ate it. Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both say, he is not liable; not for the same reason. The reason of Rebbi Joḥanan, because he cannot be duly warned. The reason of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, because it is a prohibition without action. What is the difference between them? He burned it or threw it into the sea. If you say, because he cannot be duly warned, he is not liable. If you say, because it is a prohibition without action, there is an action.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:32

Rebbi Yose asked, “an oath, an oath, an oath, that I shall not eat,” and he ate. What is the rule? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Bun said, let us hear from the following: “'An oath that I shall not eat this loaf, an oath that I shall not eat it, an oath that I shall not eat it;' he is liable once.” Because he mentioned this. Therefore, if he did not mention this, he would be liable for each single one.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:36

MISHNAH: For an intentional vain oath one is liable to be flogged; if in error one is not liable. What is a vain oath? One swears to change what is known to man, about a stone pillar that it is of gold, a man that he is a woman, or a woman that she is a man. One swears about an impossibility, if I did not see a flying camel, if I did not see a snake like the beam of the olive press. If one said to witnesses come and testify for me, an oath that we shall not testify for you. One swears not to keep commandments: not to make a booth, not to take the lulav, not to put on phylacteries; these are vain oaths for which one is liable to be flogged if intentional, and free from prosecution of unintentional.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:36

MISHNAH: For an intentional vain oath one is liable to be flogged; if in error one is not liable. What is a vain oath? One swears to change what is known to man, about a stone pillar that it is of gold, a man that he is a woman, or a woman that she is a man. One swears about an impossibility, if I did not see a flying camel, if I did not see a snake like the beam of the olive press. If one said to witnesses come and testify for me, an oath that we shall not testify for you. One swears not to keep commandments: not to make a booth, not to take the lulav, not to put on phylacteries; these are vain oaths for which one is liable to be flogged if intentional, and free from prosecution of unintentional.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:42

A vain oath, if one swears to change what is known to men; a false oath if he swears to substitute. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: anything known to two persons is a (vain) oath, to three it is (false). Rebbi La in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: If it is known to two persons and another one at the end of the world, it is a vain oath. What is the difference between them? If he was untrue before two [persons], threw it into the sea, and they had warned him because of a vain oath; in the opinion of R. Joḥanan he is not flogged, in the opinion of Rebbi Eleazar he is flogged. If they had warned him because of a false oath, in the opinion of Rebbi Eleazar he is flogged, in the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan he is not flogged. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Jehudah, even an egg and a pearl. What means “even”? But, for example, an egg and a pearl.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:42

A vain oath, if one swears to change what is known to men; a false oath if he swears to substitute. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: anything known to two persons is a (vain) oath, to three it is (false). Rebbi La in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: If it is known to two persons and another one at the end of the world, it is a vain oath. What is the difference between them? If he was untrue before two [persons], threw it into the sea, and they had warned him because of a vain oath; in the opinion of R. Joḥanan he is not flogged, in the opinion of Rebbi Eleazar he is flogged. If they had warned him because of a false oath, in the opinion of Rebbi Eleazar he is flogged, in the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan he is not flogged. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Jehudah, even an egg and a pearl. What means “even”? But, for example, an egg and a pearl.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:42

A vain oath, if one swears to change what is known to men; a false oath if he swears to substitute. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: anything known to two persons is a (vain) oath, to three it is (false). Rebbi La in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: If it is known to two persons and another one at the end of the world, it is a vain oath. What is the difference between them? If he was untrue before two [persons], threw it into the sea, and they had warned him because of a vain oath; in the opinion of R. Joḥanan he is not flogged, in the opinion of Rebbi Eleazar he is flogged. If they had warned him because of a false oath, in the opinion of Rebbi Eleazar he is flogged, in the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan he is not flogged. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Jehudah, even an egg and a pearl. What means “even”? But, for example, an egg and a pearl.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:55

This is the principle: One flogs for any prohibition involving an action, but one does not flog if there is no action except for one who substitutes, or swears, or curses a fellow man by the Name. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: This does not include one who substitutes; substituting implies speech and action. From where one who swears falsely? Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai: For the Eternal will not cleanse; but the judges will cleanse him. From where one who cursed his fellow man by the Name? Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia: To fear the Name, etc. The one who swears falsely in the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish from where? Since he swore falsely, he does not fear. The one who cursed his fellow man by the Name in the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish from where? Since he cursed, he does not fear. What is the difference between them? If one swore falsely and cursed a fellow man by the Name. In Rebbi Joḥanan’s opinion he is liable for two [punishments]. In Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish’s opinion he is only liable for one.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 4:1

MISHNAH: An oath about testimony applies to men but not to women, to unrelated persons but not to relatives, to qualified but not to disqualified ones; it applies only to those admitted to testify, in court and out of court, and by the person’s own words. By the words of others they only become liable if they renege before a court, the words of Rebbi Meїr. But the Sages say, whether by the person’s own words or by the words of others they only become liable if they renege before a court. They are liable both for intentional [violation of the] oath and for erroneous one, and for intentional [refusal of] testimony, but one is not liable unintentionally. What is one liable for if intentional? A variable value sacrifice.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 4:8

Rebbi Jehudah said, I heard that if the judge wants to let both of them sit, he may tell them to sit down. What is forbidden is that not one be standing and the other sitting; one says everything he has to say, but to the other one says, make your statement short. Rebbi Ismael says, one says to him, either you dress as he is dressed or pay him to be dressed as you are.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 4:9

Rebbi Abba said in the name of Rav Huna: The witnesses have to stand while testifying. What is the reason? The two men shall stand. Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of Rebbi Abbahu: Also the parties have to stand at the moment the verdict is given. What is the reason?: Who have the quarrel before the Eternal.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 4:9

Rebbi Abba said in the name of Rav Huna: The witnesses have to stand while testifying. What is the reason? The two men shall stand. Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of Rebbi Abbahu: Also the parties have to stand at the moment the verdict is given. What is the reason?: Who have the quarrel before the Eternal.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 4:21

Should a relative be found guilty of a blurted oath? Does it follow what Rebbi Abba said in the name of Samuel: “An oath that X gave to Y,” and it turns out that X had not given; since there is nothing in the future there is nothing in the past. Or the following: “Where is my ox?” He responded, “I do not know what you are referring to.” Rebbi declares him not liable for a keeper’s oath but liable because of a blurted oath. Rebbi Joḥanan said, since it is a religious duty to appease him, he is not liable because of a blurted oath. In the rabbis’ opinion, is there no religious duty to appease him? One appeases with truthful statements, not with lies.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 4:21

Should a relative be found guilty of a blurted oath? Does it follow what Rebbi Abba said in the name of Samuel: “An oath that X gave to Y,” and it turns out that X had not given; since there is nothing in the future there is nothing in the past. Or the following: “Where is my ox?” He responded, “I do not know what you are referring to.” Rebbi declares him not liable for a keeper’s oath but liable because of a blurted oath. Rebbi Joḥanan said, since it is a religious duty to appease him, he is not liable because of a blurted oath. In the rabbis’ opinion, is there no religious duty to appease him? One appeases with truthful statements, not with lies.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 4:24

MISHNAH: What is an oath about testimony? One said to witnesses, come and testify for me. “An oath that we do not know testimony for you;” or they said to him, we do not know any testimony for you, “I am asking you to take an oath upon this;” if they said “Amen”, they are liable. If he asked them five times outside of court to take an oath; when they came to court and admitted it they are not liable. If they deny, they are liable for each single one. If he asked them five times in court to take an oath and the refused, they are liable only once. Rebbi Simeon said, what is the reason? Because they cannot come back and admit.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 4:24

MISHNAH: What is an oath about testimony? One said to witnesses, come and testify for me. “An oath that we do not know testimony for you;” or they said to him, we do not know any testimony for you, “I am asking you to take an oath upon this;” if they said “Amen”, they are liable. If he asked them five times outside of court to take an oath; when they came to court and admitted it they are not liable. If they deny, they are liable for each single one. If he asked them five times in court to take an oath and the refused, they are liable only once. Rebbi Simeon said, what is the reason? Because they cannot come back and admit.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 4:25

HALAKHAH: “What is an oath about testimony,” etc. A person, a person. Since there it is from his own words, also here from his own words. Since here it is from others’ words, also there it is from others’ words. Rebbi Meїr explains the equal cut which was said here: Since there it is said about his own words, so also here about his own words. Also the rabbis explain the equal cut which was said here. Since others’ words said there are in court, also others’ words said here are in court.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 4:27

Rebbi Yudan the Cappadocian asked: He made him swear five times by his own formulation before the court: would he not be liable for each instance separately? Rebbi Yose said, is this not the Mishnah: “Rebbi Simeon said, what is the reason? Because they cannot come back and admit?” But here, since they can come back and admit, they are liable for each single instance.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 4:28

Rebbi Jeremiah asked: If he made him swear five times in his own words and let him swear five times by the mouth of others, what? Since Rebbi Meїr considered “in his own words” as if in court, would they determine the sacrifice on the first occasion, even without request? It should come like the following: “Why do you go after us? An oath that we do not know any testimony relevant for you. Should they be liable? The verse says, and he heard the voice of an imprecation. Only one who hears an imprecation. This excludes those who did not hear a voice.” Would he be liable from his own mouth for real estate? From his own mouth would he be liable for fines? From his own mouth would he be liable for a variable value sacrifice?

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 4:31

HALAKHAH: “If both of them disavowed simultaneously,” etc. If they dedicated a sacrifice and said, we are going to disavowe in court. This is what Rebbi Ḥiyya stated, his sacrifice for the Eternal for his vow of nazir; that his vow of nazir precede his sacrifice, not that his sacrifice precede his vow of nazir. If they were sworn to out of court, dedicated a sacrifice and said, we are going to renege in court, how do you treat this? As if his sin did precede his sacrifice or since the are liable only in court as if their sacrifice did precede their sin?

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 4:37

HALAKHAH: “I am putting an oath on you,” etc. It was stated: Rebbi Yose the Galilean says, why does the verse say, and he is a witness, or saw, or knew, etc.? I said this only for testimony which may be accepted about knowing without seeing, or seeing without knowing. How is knowing without seeing in monetary claims? “Give me my 200 zuz which you are holding.” “I do not have anything of yours.” “But did you not confess before X and Y”? “They should testify and I shall pay.” This refers to knowing without seeing. They came and said, whether he confessed to him or whether he robbed him, we do not know. Whether he gave him a loan we do not know. How is seeing without knowing in monetary claims? “Give me my 200 zuz which you are holding.” “I do not have anything of yours.” “But did I not count them for you in a meeting with X and Y”? “They should testify and I shall pay.” This refers to seeing without knowing. They came and said, whether he counted for him or whether he robbed him, we do not know. Whether he took a loan from him, we do not know. “Give me the fine for my daughter which you owe me.” But he says, “I never in my life was found liable for a fine.” Witnesses testify that he was found liable for a fine, but we do not know whether the fine was for his daughter or the fine for another woman. “You raped or you seduced my daughter.” But he says, “I never in my life did rape or seduce a woman.” Witnesses testify that he raped a woman, but we do not know whether it was his daughter or another woman. “You killed my ox and cut down my orchard.” But he says, “I do not know.” He is liable. “You told me to kill and cut down,” one follows the majority of orchards. What means, one follows the majority of orchards? Rebbi Ḥaggai said, if his ox was goring, he would have told him; if the orchard was barren, he would have told him. Rebbi Yudan said, in matters of monetary claims, since he may tell him, you told me to kill and cut down, even if he told him “I did not kill, I did not cut down,” he is not liable.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 4:43

Why? Because he does not know them, or because he does not intend to ask them? What is the difference between them? If he obligated them in pairs of two. If you would say because he does not know them, he knows them. Therefore the reason only can be that he does not intend to ask them.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 4:47

HALAKHAH: “If he sent through his slave,” etc. Rebbi Eleazar said, why does the verse say, if he does not tell, he has to carry his iniquity? Not, from the mouth of the claimant. Our Mishnah needs what Rebbi Eleazar said, and what Rebbi Eleazar said needs our Mishnah. If we had stated but Rebbi Eleazar had not stated, we would have said that they are liable if they had heard from the claimant but had sworn to the defendant. Therefore what Rebbi Eleazar said is necessary. If Rebbi Eleazar had stated but we had not stated, we would have instructed that they are liable if they heard it from the defendant but had sworn to the claimant. Therefore one needs our Mishnah and needs what Rebbi Eleazar said, only if they heard from the claimant and swore to the claimant.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 4:47

HALAKHAH: “If he sent through his slave,” etc. Rebbi Eleazar said, why does the verse say, if he does not tell, he has to carry his iniquity? Not, from the mouth of the claimant. Our Mishnah needs what Rebbi Eleazar said, and what Rebbi Eleazar said needs our Mishnah. If we had stated but Rebbi Eleazar had not stated, we would have said that they are liable if they had heard from the claimant but had sworn to the defendant. Therefore what Rebbi Eleazar said is necessary. If Rebbi Eleazar had stated but we had not stated, we would have instructed that they are liable if they heard it from the defendant but had sworn to the claimant. Therefore one needs our Mishnah and needs what Rebbi Eleazar said, only if they heard from the claimant and swore to the claimant.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 4:47

HALAKHAH: “If he sent through his slave,” etc. Rebbi Eleazar said, why does the verse say, if he does not tell, he has to carry his iniquity? Not, from the mouth of the claimant. Our Mishnah needs what Rebbi Eleazar said, and what Rebbi Eleazar said needs our Mishnah. If we had stated but Rebbi Eleazar had not stated, we would have said that they are liable if they had heard from the claimant but had sworn to the defendant. Therefore what Rebbi Eleazar said is necessary. If Rebbi Eleazar had stated but we had not stated, we would have instructed that they are liable if they heard it from the defendant but had sworn to the claimant. Therefore one needs our Mishnah and needs what Rebbi Eleazar said, only if they heard from the claimant and swore to the claimant.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 4:47

HALAKHAH: “If he sent through his slave,” etc. Rebbi Eleazar said, why does the verse say, if he does not tell, he has to carry his iniquity? Not, from the mouth of the claimant. Our Mishnah needs what Rebbi Eleazar said, and what Rebbi Eleazar said needs our Mishnah. If we had stated but Rebbi Eleazar had not stated, we would have said that they are liable if they had heard from the claimant but had sworn to the defendant. Therefore what Rebbi Eleazar said is necessary. If Rebbi Eleazar had stated but we had not stated, we would have instructed that they are liable if they heard it from the defendant but had sworn to the claimant. Therefore one needs our Mishnah and needs what Rebbi Eleazar said, only if they heard from the claimant and swore to the claimant.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 4:51

“One who curses himself or another person by any of these violates a prohibition.” What about flogging? The colleagues say, he cannot be flogged. Rebbi Yose said to them, why? Because it is a prohibition not involving an action. But is not one who substitutes and one who swears falsely also a prohibition which involves no action?

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 5:1

MISHNAH: An oath about a deposit applies to men and women, unrelated persons and relatives, qualified and disqualified persons, before a court or out of court, from his own mouth. From the mouth of another he is liable only if he denies in court, the words of Rebbi Meїr. But the Sages say, whether by his own mouth or the mouth of others, from the moment that he denies, he is liable. He is liable for intent about the oath, or error about it with intent about the deposit, but he is not liable for error about the latter. What is he liable for in case of intentional violation? A reparation offering in the value of two Šeqalim.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 5:2

HALAKHAH: “An oath about a deposit,” etc. It was stated: Is an oath in his own formulation of an oath of testimony like an imprecation; in his own words is an oath about a deposit like an imprecation? Rebbi Yose said, since it is written “a person, a person”, everything is here and everything is there. Rebbi Mana said, an imprecation made in court is the topic of disagreement between Rebbi Meїr and the Sages. He lied to his fellow man, if his confession was eliminated by the oath. It excludes one who lied to one of partners; it excludes one who lied where there are witnesses and a document. Rebbi Yose said, this implies that if two people took a loan from one person, even if they did not write “we are responsible and warrantors for one another”, they are responsible and warrantors for one another; but one does not act on this. If two made a joint deposit and one came to retrieve his property, one does not listen to him. Should he not be treated as denying his part and be liable? If one made a deposit with two people. If one denied it, he is liable. If the other denied it, he is liable. If the deposit was worth one peruṭa, does this not result in each of them bringing a sacrifice for half a peruṭa? What here? If one would swear, and swear, and swear, would he not bring a sacrifice for half a peruṭa? There, each oath refers to a peruṭa’s worth. Here no oath refers to a peruṭa’s worth.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 5:5

MISHNAH: What is an oath about a deposit? He said to him, “give me the deposit which you hold for me.” “An oath that I am holding nothing of yours;” or that he said to him, “I am holding nothing of yours;” “I am putting an oath upon you” and he said “Amen”; this one is liable. If he made him swear five times whether in court or out of court and he denied, he is liable for each single one. Rebbi Simeon said, what is the reason? Because he may return and admit.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 5:5

MISHNAH: What is an oath about a deposit? He said to him, “give me the deposit which you hold for me.” “An oath that I am holding nothing of yours;” or that he said to him, “I am holding nothing of yours;” “I am putting an oath upon you” and he said “Amen”; this one is liable. If he made him swear five times whether in court or out of court and he denied, he is liable for each single one. Rebbi Simeon said, what is the reason? Because he may return and admit.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 5:6

HALAKHAH: “What is an oath about a deposit,” etc. A person, a person. Since here it is from his own words, also there from his own words. Since there it is from others’ words, also here it is from others’ words. Rebbi Meїr explains the equal cut at the place it comes from: Since here it is said about his own words, so also here about his own words. Also the rabbis explain the equal cut which was said about it. Since others’ words said there are in court, also others’ words said here are in court.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 5:8

Rebbi Yudan the Cappadocian asked: He made him swear five times by the formulation of others out of the court: would he not be liable only once? Rebbi Yose said, is this not the Mishnah: “Rebbi Simeon said, what is the reason? Because they can come back and admit?” But here, since they cannot come back and admit, they are liable only once.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 5:14

Rebbi Yudan from Cappadocia asked: What about “an oath that neither wheat, nor barley, nor spelt I am holding for you”? Is it as if he had mentioned “oath” at beginning and end? Since the oath would be confirmed by any one of them, he is liable only once. “I am not holding for you wheat, or barley, or spelt, an oath,” is this as if he had mentioned “oath” at beginning and end? Since the oath would be confirmed by any one of them, he is liable only once. Is it so if this were a blurted oath? “An oath that I shall not eat; I shall not eat, an oath”? In the rabbis’ opinion he brings a sacrifice for each one. In Rebbi Eleazar’s opinion does he bring one for the entirety? Even Rebbi Eleazar will agree that he is only emphasizing the prohibitions. It only would be problematic if it were about the past. “An oath that I did not eat; I did not eat, an oath.” In the rabbis’ opinion he brings two sacrifices (for each one). In Rebbi Eleazar’s opinion he brings one (for each).

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 5:15

Rebbi Abbahu, Rebbi Jeremiah asked: If one said, “an oath wheat and wheat I am not holding;” what? Let us hear from the following: “Not from place X, not from place Y,” he is liable. Rebbi Yose said, they considered a multiplicity of places like a multiplicity of kinds. If he had said, not from this place, not from this place; it would have been useful.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 5:16

Rebbi Ḥaggai asked: “10 oaths that I am not holding;” what?

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 5:17

Rebbi Yose asked: “An oath, an oath that I am not holding for you,” what? Rebbi Yose said, let us hear from the following: “ ‘An oath that I shall not eat this loaf; an oath that I shall not eat it’. Then he ate it. He is liable only once.” Because he mentioned “this”. Therefore, had he not mentioned “this” we would be liable for each one. Is it the same for a blurted oath? “An oath that I shall eat carcass meat, and wheat bread, and barley bread, and spelt bread.” Since he is not liable for carcass meat he is not liable for the remainder.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 5:19

HALAKHAH: “Give me the deposit, the loan,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said, Rebbi Simeon implies that if it turns out that he had no wheat, he is not liable for the rest. Rebbi Abba said, even Rebbi (Yasa) will agree with this. If it turns out that he had no wheat, does [the oath] refer to the other kinds? The colleagues said, it does not. Rebbi Ze`ira said, it does. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, a baraita supports what the colleagues said. “A woman made a vow as a nazir and her friend heard it and said, ‘so am I’; the first woman’s husband heard it and dissolved [the vow] for her; the first one is permitted and the second forbidden. If she said, ‘my intention was only to be like her,’ both are permitted.” Because she said, “to be like her, in her state”. Therefore, if she did not say “to be like her, in her state”, the first is permitted and the second forbidden. Since there, where the essence is not an oath, you say it applies, here, where there was an original oath, not so much more? What Rebbi Joḥanan said, Rebbi Simeon implies if it turns out that he had no wheat, he is not liable for the rest, if he connects: If he says, [my obligation for] barley shall be like that for wheat; [my obligation for] spelt shall be like that for wheat.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 5:19

HALAKHAH: “Give me the deposit, the loan,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said, Rebbi Simeon implies that if it turns out that he had no wheat, he is not liable for the rest. Rebbi Abba said, even Rebbi (Yasa) will agree with this. If it turns out that he had no wheat, does [the oath] refer to the other kinds? The colleagues said, it does not. Rebbi Ze`ira said, it does. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, a baraita supports what the colleagues said. “A woman made a vow as a nazir and her friend heard it and said, ‘so am I’; the first woman’s husband heard it and dissolved [the vow] for her; the first one is permitted and the second forbidden. If she said, ‘my intention was only to be like her,’ both are permitted.” Because she said, “to be like her, in her state”. Therefore, if she did not say “to be like her, in her state”, the first is permitted and the second forbidden. Since there, where the essence is not an oath, you say it applies, here, where there was an original oath, not so much more? What Rebbi Joḥanan said, Rebbi Simeon implies if it turns out that he had no wheat, he is not liable for the rest, if he connects: If he says, [my obligation for] barley shall be like that for wheat; [my obligation for] spelt shall be like that for wheat.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 5:21

“Give me the wheat, and the barley,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the words of Rebbi Jehudah imply collectively one sacrifice, in detail three sacrifices. How is this? A detail wheat, a detail barley, a detail spelt. Collectively one sacrifice, in detail three sacrifices. Detail a third wheat, detail a third barley, detail a third spelt, are these taken together? Come and see; although he holds many details, even so they can be formulated collectively or in detail. In which respect? To make him liable for sacrifices. If he held four kinds, two kinds in one detail, two kinds on two details. even so they can be formulated collectively or in detail. As Rebbi Joḥanan said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: “And I am greeting X,” one can assume that he signed concerning everything; “I am greeting X,” he signed only for the greeting. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, “I am greeting X,” one can assume that he signed concerning everything. What means “collectively”? Rebbi Joḥanan said, “X divorces Y and Z U.” What means “collectively”? Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, “We, X and Z, divorce our wives at place A.” Rebbi Ze`ira said, Rebbi Joḥanan agrees that if he mentions divorce for each one separately that he needs the typical text and witnesses for each one separately. The strength of Rebbi Joḥanan is from the following: “ ‘That I shall not benefit from this one; a qorban for this one and a qorban for that one.’ Each single one needs a separate opening.” Rebbi Yose said, the Mishnah supports Rebbi Joḥanan: “If he wrote a separate text for each of them and the witnesses signed at the end, [only] the one with which the witnesses are read is valid.”

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 5:21

“Give me the wheat, and the barley,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the words of Rebbi Jehudah imply collectively one sacrifice, in detail three sacrifices. How is this? A detail wheat, a detail barley, a detail spelt. Collectively one sacrifice, in detail three sacrifices. Detail a third wheat, detail a third barley, detail a third spelt, are these taken together? Come and see; although he holds many details, even so they can be formulated collectively or in detail. In which respect? To make him liable for sacrifices. If he held four kinds, two kinds in one detail, two kinds on two details. even so they can be formulated collectively or in detail. As Rebbi Joḥanan said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: “And I am greeting X,” one can assume that he signed concerning everything; “I am greeting X,” he signed only for the greeting. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, “I am greeting X,” one can assume that he signed concerning everything. What means “collectively”? Rebbi Joḥanan said, “X divorces Y and Z U.” What means “collectively”? Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, “We, X and Z, divorce our wives at place A.” Rebbi Ze`ira said, Rebbi Joḥanan agrees that if he mentions divorce for each one separately that he needs the typical text and witnesses for each one separately. The strength of Rebbi Joḥanan is from the following: “ ‘That I shall not benefit from this one; a qorban for this one and a qorban for that one.’ Each single one needs a separate opening.” Rebbi Yose said, the Mishnah supports Rebbi Joḥanan: “If he wrote a separate text for each of them and the witnesses signed at the end, [only] the one with which the witnesses are read is valid.”

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 5:26

HALAKHAH: “ “You stole my ox,” etc. to the end of the Chapter. Rebbi Isaac asked, should one have to pay the value of the slave by his admission? But what is his problem? Are the entire thirty a fine or is only the excess over his value a fine? If you say, all the thirty are a fine, he does not pay. If you say, the excess over his value is a fine, he pays. There, we have stated: “ ‘Your ox killed my slave’, but he says ‘he did not kill;’ ‘I am asking you to swear’ and he says ‘Amen’, he is not liable.” Rebbi Ḥaggai said before Rebbi Yose: Explain it if he killed a slave covered with boils. He said to him, but it says afterwards, “ ‘Your ox killed my son’, but he says ‘he did not kill;’ ‘I am asking you to swear’ and he says ‘Amen’, he is liable.” You could explain it if he was covered with boils, then he would not be liable! You cannot do this, as we have stated: “If he killed a human, he has to pay his worth.” Rebbi Ezra said before Rebbi Mana Explain it following him who said, he shall pay redemption of his person; of the injured. He said to him, if following him who said, he shall pay redemption of his person; of the injured, all is a fine

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 6:2

HALAKHAH: “A judicial oath,” etc. The claim, the House of Shammai say, an obolos, but the House of Hillel say, two oboloi. The argument of the House of Shammai seems inverted. There, they say, “silver” is a denar, but here, they say that “silver” is an obolos. The argument of the House of Hillel seems inverted. There, they say that “money” is a peruṭah but here, they say that “money” is two oboloi. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina: The House of Shammai learn from the initial sale of a Hebrew girl. Since her initial sale was by [at least] a denar, so her preliminary marriage is by [at least] a denar. The House of Hillel learn from the end of her diminution. Since the end of her diminution is a peruṭah, so her preliminary marriage is by a peruṭah. What is the reason of the House of Shammai? As it is said, she leaves gratis, without silver. Would we not know that it is without money? Why does the verse say, without silver? From there, that she is sold for more than silver. And what is more than silver? A denar. But maybe “silver” is a peruṭah, more than silver two peruṭot. The smallest silver coin is an obolos. So why is it not an obolos? Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Judah bar Pazi: For if she wants to diminish, she diminishes every year by an obolos and leaves. Could she not diminish by a peruṭah? Rebbi Abun said, think of it. If she wanted to compute the diminution at the start of the sixth year, there would be a peruṭah left. But the start of the diminution must be an obolos, the end of the diminution a peruṭah. If there is only one peruṭah left, can she not pay the diminished amount and leave? Just as the last diminished amount is a peruṭah, so her preliminary marriage should be a peruṭah! What is the reason of the House of Hillel? Since her last diminished amount is a peruṭah, you know that her preliminary marriage is by a peruṭah. Think of it, if there is only one peruṭah’s worth left, can she not pay the diminished amount and leave? Just as the last diminished amount is a peruṭah, so her preliminary marriage is by a peruṭah.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 6:2

HALAKHAH: “A judicial oath,” etc. The claim, the House of Shammai say, an obolos, but the House of Hillel say, two oboloi. The argument of the House of Shammai seems inverted. There, they say, “silver” is a denar, but here, they say that “silver” is an obolos. The argument of the House of Hillel seems inverted. There, they say that “money” is a peruṭah but here, they say that “money” is two oboloi. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina: The House of Shammai learn from the initial sale of a Hebrew girl. Since her initial sale was by [at least] a denar, so her preliminary marriage is by [at least] a denar. The House of Hillel learn from the end of her diminution. Since the end of her diminution is a peruṭah, so her preliminary marriage is by a peruṭah. What is the reason of the House of Shammai? As it is said, she leaves gratis, without silver. Would we not know that it is without money? Why does the verse say, without silver? From there, that she is sold for more than silver. And what is more than silver? A denar. But maybe “silver” is a peruṭah, more than silver two peruṭot. The smallest silver coin is an obolos. So why is it not an obolos? Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Judah bar Pazi: For if she wants to diminish, she diminishes every year by an obolos and leaves. Could she not diminish by a peruṭah? Rebbi Abun said, think of it. If she wanted to compute the diminution at the start of the sixth year, there would be a peruṭah left. But the start of the diminution must be an obolos, the end of the diminution a peruṭah. If there is only one peruṭah left, can she not pay the diminished amount and leave? Just as the last diminished amount is a peruṭah, so her preliminary marriage should be a peruṭah! What is the reason of the House of Hillel? Since her last diminished amount is a peruṭah, you know that her preliminary marriage is by a peruṭah. Think of it, if there is only one peruṭah’s worth left, can she not pay the diminished amount and leave? Just as the last diminished amount is a peruṭah, so her preliminary marriage is by a peruṭah.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 6:2

HALAKHAH: “A judicial oath,” etc. The claim, the House of Shammai say, an obolos, but the House of Hillel say, two oboloi. The argument of the House of Shammai seems inverted. There, they say, “silver” is a denar, but here, they say that “silver” is an obolos. The argument of the House of Hillel seems inverted. There, they say that “money” is a peruṭah but here, they say that “money” is two oboloi. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina: The House of Shammai learn from the initial sale of a Hebrew girl. Since her initial sale was by [at least] a denar, so her preliminary marriage is by [at least] a denar. The House of Hillel learn from the end of her diminution. Since the end of her diminution is a peruṭah, so her preliminary marriage is by a peruṭah. What is the reason of the House of Shammai? As it is said, she leaves gratis, without silver. Would we not know that it is without money? Why does the verse say, without silver? From there, that she is sold for more than silver. And what is more than silver? A denar. But maybe “silver” is a peruṭah, more than silver two peruṭot. The smallest silver coin is an obolos. So why is it not an obolos? Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Judah bar Pazi: For if she wants to diminish, she diminishes every year by an obolos and leaves. Could she not diminish by a peruṭah? Rebbi Abun said, think of it. If she wanted to compute the diminution at the start of the sixth year, there would be a peruṭah left. But the start of the diminution must be an obolos, the end of the diminution a peruṭah. If there is only one peruṭah left, can she not pay the diminished amount and leave? Just as the last diminished amount is a peruṭah, so her preliminary marriage should be a peruṭah! What is the reason of the House of Hillel? Since her last diminished amount is a peruṭah, you know that her preliminary marriage is by a peruṭah. Think of it, if there is only one peruṭah’s worth left, can she not pay the diminished amount and leave? Just as the last diminished amount is a peruṭah, so her preliminary marriage is by a peruṭah.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 6:3

The argument of the House of Hillel seems inverted. If a person give to his neighbor, etc. If to teach that the court will not act on less than a peruṭah’s worth, is it not already written, to incur liability for it? To exclude anything not worth a peruṭah. From here, that it should be more than silver. And what is more than silver? Two oboloi. But maybe “silver” is a peruṭah, more than silver two peruṭot. The smallest silver coin is an obolos. So why is it not an obolos? Or vessels; since vessels are two, also “money” is two. How do the House of Shammai interpret or vessels? Following what Rebbi Nathan stated, or vessels, including clay vessels. Samuel said, if he claimed from him two needles and he admitted to one, he is liable. Rebbi Ḥinena said, only if they are worth two peruṭot, that the claim should be about a peruṭah’s worth and the confession about a peruṭah’s worth. This follows the House of Shammai who do not learn money’s worth from “vessels”. But following the House of Hillel who learn money’s worth from “vessels”, since vessels are two, also “money” is two. Similarly, since “money” means two oboloi, also “vessels” means two oboloi’s worth.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 6:3

The argument of the House of Hillel seems inverted. If a person give to his neighbor, etc. If to teach that the court will not act on less than a peruṭah’s worth, is it not already written, to incur liability for it? To exclude anything not worth a peruṭah. From here, that it should be more than silver. And what is more than silver? Two oboloi. But maybe “silver” is a peruṭah, more than silver two peruṭot. The smallest silver coin is an obolos. So why is it not an obolos? Or vessels; since vessels are two, also “money” is two. How do the House of Shammai interpret or vessels? Following what Rebbi Nathan stated, or vessels, including clay vessels. Samuel said, if he claimed from him two needles and he admitted to one, he is liable. Rebbi Ḥinena said, only if they are worth two peruṭot, that the claim should be about a peruṭah’s worth and the confession about a peruṭah’s worth. This follows the House of Shammai who do not learn money’s worth from “vessels”. But following the House of Hillel who learn money’s worth from “vessels”, since vessels are two, also “money” is two. Similarly, since “money” means two oboloi, also “vessels” means two oboloi’s worth.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 6:4

Rebbi Abba, Rav Jehudah in the name of Samuel: In any case where two [witnesses] make him liable to pay money, a single witness sets him up for an oath. But do not two [witnesses] make him liable for real estate? It is a difference since one does not swear about real estate. But do not two [witnesses] make him liable for a fine? There is a difference since one does not swear about a fine. But do not two [witnesses] make him liable for a peruṭah? Is it so? Have we not stated: “A judicial oath is about a claim of two silver coins and the acknowledgment of one peruṭah.” Our Mishnah, when he swears by his own formulation. What (Rebbi) Samuel said, when he swears by the formulation of others. Rav Ḥisda and his group disagree. “A judicial oath”, any judicial oath. There is no difference whether he swears by his own formulation or he swears by the formulation of others, he cannot be liable except for a claim.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 6:13

Rebbi Marinus was guarantor for his daughter-in-law. They went to court before Rebbi Ḥama the father of Bat Qappara and Rebbi Hoshaia. After he had admitted he said to him, I gave. They asked the Elder Rebbi Ḥiyya; Rebbi Ḥiyya asked Rebbi: One who became liable in court cannot be trusted. What is the meaning of “he cannot be trusted”? Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If he pays on his own initiative, he is trusted when he says, I gave. But from the orders of others, he cannot be trusted. Rebbi Abun bar Cahana said, also for oaths it is the same. What is the meaning of “also for oaths it is the same”? Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If he swears on his own initiative, he is trusted when he says, I swore. But from the orders of others, he cannot be trusted.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 6:13

Rebbi Marinus was guarantor for his daughter-in-law. They went to court before Rebbi Ḥama the father of Bat Qappara and Rebbi Hoshaia. After he had admitted he said to him, I gave. They asked the Elder Rebbi Ḥiyya; Rebbi Ḥiyya asked Rebbi: One who became liable in court cannot be trusted. What is the meaning of “he cannot be trusted”? Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If he pays on his own initiative, he is trusted when he says, I gave. But from the orders of others, he cannot be trusted. Rebbi Abun bar Cahana said, also for oaths it is the same. What is the meaning of “also for oaths it is the same”? Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If he swears on his own initiative, he is trusted when he says, I swore. But from the orders of others, he cannot be trusted.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 6:17

HALAKHAH: “You are holding for me a kor of grain;” etc. Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Our Mishnah if he sued him for wheat and he admitted barley; but if he sued him for two kinds and he admitted one of them, everybody agrees that he is not liable. Rebbi Abbahu said about that of Rebbi Immi: Why did we state, “Rabban Gamliel declares him liable”? It comes to inform you of the power of Rabban Gamliel, how far he declares liable. Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Not only if he claimed wheat and he admitted barley to him, but if he claimed two kinds and he admitted one of them, the words of the Sages are that he is not liable. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, it is only if he claimed two kinds and he admitted one of them, but if he sued for wheat and he admitted barley according to everybody he is liable. Following Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: A person went to court before Rav: When he claimed from another wheat, barley, and spelt. Rav told him, wait until he charged you with anything he has to charge, and in the end you will swear one oath about everything. Rebbi Abbahu said, so argued Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish against Rebbi Joḥanan: In your opinion, since you say that if he claimed two kinds and he admitted one of them, according to the Sages he is not liable, did we not state “if he claimed vessels and real estate; if he admitted the vessels and denied the real estate, the real estate and denied the vessels”? For vessels about vessels he is liable, not so much more for vessels and real estate? He answered him, to transfer an oath to him by the following Mishnah, “since guaranteed property obligates non-guaranteed property to be sworn about.” This does not even disagree with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. But did we not state: “Somebody who sued for amphoras of oil and he admitted to vessels”? How do we hold? If he sued him for vessels and oil, and he admitted one of them, everybody agrees that this refers to the claim. But if he sued him for vessels and he did (not) admit oil, everybody agrees that what he admitted did not refer to the claim. Rebbi Ze`ira and Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Samuel: If he sued for vessels full of oil, one said vessels but not oil, the other said oil but not vessels. (Thrown) vessels but not oil. Oil but not vessels? Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Abin formulates it as oil buckets. Can one not ask him? If he was paralyzed.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 6:20

HALAKHAH: “One does not swear on the claim of a deaf-and-dumb person, an insane person, or a minor,” etc. It is written: If a man give to his neighbor, to exclude the minor. So far if a minor gave to him and the minor requested from him. If he gave it as a minor and requested it as an adult? The verse says, his neighbor; only if giving and requesting are equal. Rebbi Abba bar Mamal said, is that not obvious by what Rebbi Joḥanan said, one who claims a claim of theft in respect of his neighbor’s lost object is liable? “Where is my lost object?” He told him, it was stolen. Rebbi Abba said, explain it if he told him, you already asked me when you were underage and I was freed from swearing for you. An oath of the Eternal shall be between both of them, to exclude the heir. Rebbi Illa in the name of Rebbi Yasa: The baraita is about the heir.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 6:21

Between both of them it will never move from between them. If the one forcing the oath forces the oath lying, at the end it will come over him. If the one swearing swears lying, at the end it will come over him. What is the reason? I shall take it out, oracle of the Eternal Sabaot, and it will come into the house of the thief and the house of him who swears falsely in My Name, etc. Rebbi Samuel bar Naḥman said, destructive angels have no joints. What is the reason? From roving about the Earth and walking there. But here, it will destroy its wood and its stones. Come and see, things which the fire will not burn, a vain oath will destroy. Rebbi Jonah said, about falsehood. Rebbi Yose said, even on truth. Ḥaggai was preaching following Rebbi Yose. There was a case about a woman who went to knead dough with another and had two denarii bound into the seam of her head cover. These fell out and were rolled into a loaf. She went back to he house, wanted them and did not find them. She returned to her and said to her, give me the two denarii which fell from me in your house. She told her, I do not know. If she would know of it, she should bury her son. She buried him. When they returned from his grave, she heard a voice saying, if she had not known about them she would not have buried him. She said, if this woman knows about them, she should bury her other son. She buried him. They came to console her and cut one loaf and found two denarii rolled into the loaf. This says, whether innocent or guilty, never swear an oath.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 6:21

Between both of them it will never move from between them. If the one forcing the oath forces the oath lying, at the end it will come over him. If the one swearing swears lying, at the end it will come over him. What is the reason? I shall take it out, oracle of the Eternal Sabaot, and it will come into the house of the thief and the house of him who swears falsely in My Name, etc. Rebbi Samuel bar Naḥman said, destructive angels have no joints. What is the reason? From roving about the Earth and walking there. But here, it will destroy its wood and its stones. Come and see, things which the fire will not burn, a vain oath will destroy. Rebbi Jonah said, about falsehood. Rebbi Yose said, even on truth. Ḥaggai was preaching following Rebbi Yose. There was a case about a woman who went to knead dough with another and had two denarii bound into the seam of her head cover. These fell out and were rolled into a loaf. She went back to he house, wanted them and did not find them. She returned to her and said to her, give me the two denarii which fell from me in your house. She told her, I do not know. If she would know of it, she should bury her son. She buried him. When they returned from his grave, she heard a voice saying, if she had not known about them she would not have buried him. She said, if this woman knows about them, she should bury her other son. She buried him. They came to console her and cut one loaf and found two denarii rolled into the loaf. This says, whether innocent or guilty, never swear an oath.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 6:23

HALAKHAH: “About the following one does not swear,” etc. If he transgressed and swore, Rebbi Joḥanan said he brings a sacrifice for the oath; Rebbi Eleazar says, he does not bring. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya said, so does Rebbi Johanan answer Rebbi Eleazar. No. If you pronounced about an oath about testimony which may apply to slaves, documents, and real estate, what can you say about oaths concerning deposits which do not apply to slaves, documents, and real estate? But an oath for testimony is not in court. Would the court admit an oath of a suspect person? Only when he transgressed and swore, you say that he brings a sacrifice for his oath; here also if he transgressed and swore, you say that he brings a sacrifice for his oath.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 6:28

MISHNAH: One swears only on matters of measure, or weight, or count. How is that? “I handed over to you a full house; or I handed over to you a full wallet,” But the other says, “I do not know; take what you left with me;” he is not liable. One says, up to the gutter; the other says, up to the window; he is liable.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 6:29

HALAKHAH: Rebbi Ḥanina said, One says, a large candelabra, but the other says, a small candelabra; he is liable since we have stated: “One swears only on matters of measure, or weight, or count.” Rebbi Abba bar Mamal said, explain it if it was a candelabra composed of sections. One says, a large belt; the other says, a small belt. Rebbi Ḥiyya stated something but we do not know what he stated. If you say “liable”, a Mishnah disagrees, as we have stated: “One swears only on matters of measure, or weight, or count.” If you say “not liable”, a Mishnah disagrees, as we have stated: “If one says the adult one and the other says the underage one, let the seller swear that he sold the underage one. If both say that they do not know, they shall split.”

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 6:32

A person encountered another in the market and took away his linen cloth saying, “this sheet will not leave my hand until you give me what you are holding for me.” It came before Samuel. He told him, return his linen cloth to him and sue him. Does Samuel follow the judges of Nahardea? There, the pledge was held by him, here the pledge was not held by him.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 7:2

HALAKHAH: “All who must swear by Torah standards,” etc. One understands from what is said, an oath before the Eternal shall be between them, would we not know that if he does not swear, he has to pay? Why does the verse say, its owner shall take it, and he does not have to pay? But from the moment the owner accepted his oath, he does not have to pay. Rebbi Ḥaggai asked before Rebbi Yose: Is this only following Rebbi Meїr or even following the rabbis? Did not Rebbi Assi say in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Rebbi Meїr is the one who says that out of a negative one understands a positive? Its owner shall take it, and he does not have to pay, therefore if he does not swear, he has to pay. Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: The unpaid and the paid trustees may stipulate to be like a borrower. Rebbi Ḥanina said, everybody agrees that in the language of the Torah out of a negative one understands a positive; where do they disagree? In everyday speech.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 7:3

Rebbi Abin said, since the householder has many occupations they instituted that the journeyman should swear and collect. [Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, there they instituted that the journeyman should swear and collect;] similarly they instituted for the householder that if its deadline had elapsed, he cannot swear and collect. Rebbi Ḥiyya stated, if there are witnesses that he claimed it in time, he swears and collects even after a year. Rebbi Yose said, he has only that single day. Rebbi Jonah said, Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Ḥanina and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagreed. One said, if he claimed from him during daytime, he has only that day; if in the night he has only that night. But the other said, if he claimed from him and he said, I gave. But if he said, I shall give, the presumption is that he gave. We do not know who said what. Since Rebbi Ḥama bar Uqba said in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: if he claimed from him during daytime, he has only that day; if in the night he has only that night, therefore Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Ḥanina is the one who said, if he claimed from him and he said, I gave. But if he said, I shall give, the presumption is that he gave. Rebbi Mana said, sometimes he claims after its time and it is considered as in time. How is this? He claimed from him and he said to him, did I not say to you that I gave at that date? That date becomes as if it were yesterday; one gives him one measure.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 7:7

Rav Huna said, if after he swore he brought witnesses that it was standing at the feeding trough, the oath already had robbed it. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav Huna: “ ‘Where is my ox?’ He told him, it was lost. ‘I am putting an oath on you,’ and he said Amen. But witnesses testify that he ate it. He has to pay the value. If he confessed on his own, he pays the value, an additional fifth, and a reparation offering”. The Mishnah if he ate it and only later swore to him. What Rav Huna said, it he swore to him and only later ate it.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 7:11

HALAKHAH: “How about a person robbed,” etc. “In another’s house,” not in his courtyard. “To take a pledge,” not for another purpose. Rebbi Issac said, and only by witnesses. If two entered to take pledges from him? It should come like the following: “If he was injured between the two …” But if both were entitled to take pledges? What should be seen there? If they saw two [men] hitting him with sticks.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 7:13

May one claim extraordinary things? One may, following what Rebbi Joḥanan said, a person may be rich on the market place and poor in his house; rich in his house and poor in the market place. There is one who poses as richand has nothing, poses as poor and has great wealth. Rebbi Abba told: Bar Ziza’s sharecropper deposited a pound of gold with somebody. Bar Ziza and Bar Ziza’s sharecropper died; the case came before Rebbi Ismael ben Rebbi Yose. Would one not say that all that Bar Ziza’s sharecropper had was Bar Ziza’s property? It should be given to Bar Ziza’s sons. Bar Ziza’s sons came. He said, the adult ones should take half and when the underage grow up they should take half. Rebbi Ismael ben Rebbi Yose died; the case came before the Elder Rebbi Ḥiyya who said, that argument means nothing since there are people who do not advertise themselves. It should be given to the sharecropper’s sons. The trustee told him, I already disbursed half of it. He told him, what you gave, you gave by court order and what you will give, you will give by court order. May the sharecropper’s sons say to Bar Ziza’s sons, give us what you took? They can tell them, what was done was done by court order. May the underage ones say to the adult, let us share with you? May they tell them, we found a find? Rebbi Isaac said, the case between the adult and underage ones is only comparable to a gift given to them.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 7:13

May one claim extraordinary things? One may, following what Rebbi Joḥanan said, a person may be rich on the market place and poor in his house; rich in his house and poor in the market place. There is one who poses as richand has nothing, poses as poor and has great wealth. Rebbi Abba told: Bar Ziza’s sharecropper deposited a pound of gold with somebody. Bar Ziza and Bar Ziza’s sharecropper died; the case came before Rebbi Ismael ben Rebbi Yose. Would one not say that all that Bar Ziza’s sharecropper had was Bar Ziza’s property? It should be given to Bar Ziza’s sons. Bar Ziza’s sons came. He said, the adult ones should take half and when the underage grow up they should take half. Rebbi Ismael ben Rebbi Yose died; the case came before the Elder Rebbi Ḥiyya who said, that argument means nothing since there are people who do not advertise themselves. It should be given to the sharecropper’s sons. The trustee told him, I already disbursed half of it. He told him, what you gave, you gave by court order and what you will give, you will give by court order. May the sharecropper’s sons say to Bar Ziza’s sons, give us what you took? They can tell them, what was done was done by court order. May the underage ones say to the adult, let us share with you? May they tell them, we found a find? Rebbi Isaac said, the case between the adult and underage ones is only comparable to a gift given to them.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 7:13

May one claim extraordinary things? One may, following what Rebbi Joḥanan said, a person may be rich on the market place and poor in his house; rich in his house and poor in the market place. There is one who poses as richand has nothing, poses as poor and has great wealth. Rebbi Abba told: Bar Ziza’s sharecropper deposited a pound of gold with somebody. Bar Ziza and Bar Ziza’s sharecropper died; the case came before Rebbi Ismael ben Rebbi Yose. Would one not say that all that Bar Ziza’s sharecropper had was Bar Ziza’s property? It should be given to Bar Ziza’s sons. Bar Ziza’s sons came. He said, the adult ones should take half and when the underage grow up they should take half. Rebbi Ismael ben Rebbi Yose died; the case came before the Elder Rebbi Ḥiyya who said, that argument means nothing since there are people who do not advertise themselves. It should be given to the sharecropper’s sons. The trustee told him, I already disbursed half of it. He told him, what you gave, you gave by court order and what you will give, you will give by court order. May the sharecropper’s sons say to Bar Ziza’s sons, give us what you took? They can tell them, what was done was done by court order. May the underage ones say to the adult, let us share with you? May they tell them, we found a find? Rebbi Isaac said, the case between the adult and underage ones is only comparable to a gift given to them.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 7:13

May one claim extraordinary things? One may, following what Rebbi Joḥanan said, a person may be rich on the market place and poor in his house; rich in his house and poor in the market place. There is one who poses as richand has nothing, poses as poor and has great wealth. Rebbi Abba told: Bar Ziza’s sharecropper deposited a pound of gold with somebody. Bar Ziza and Bar Ziza’s sharecropper died; the case came before Rebbi Ismael ben Rebbi Yose. Would one not say that all that Bar Ziza’s sharecropper had was Bar Ziza’s property? It should be given to Bar Ziza’s sons. Bar Ziza’s sons came. He said, the adult ones should take half and when the underage grow up they should take half. Rebbi Ismael ben Rebbi Yose died; the case came before the Elder Rebbi Ḥiyya who said, that argument means nothing since there are people who do not advertise themselves. It should be given to the sharecropper’s sons. The trustee told him, I already disbursed half of it. He told him, what you gave, you gave by court order and what you will give, you will give by court order. May the sharecropper’s sons say to Bar Ziza’s sons, give us what you took? They can tell them, what was done was done by court order. May the underage ones say to the adult, let us share with you? May they tell them, we found a find? Rebbi Isaac said, the case between the adult and underage ones is only comparable to a gift given to them.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 7:13

May one claim extraordinary things? One may, following what Rebbi Joḥanan said, a person may be rich on the market place and poor in his house; rich in his house and poor in the market place. There is one who poses as richand has nothing, poses as poor and has great wealth. Rebbi Abba told: Bar Ziza’s sharecropper deposited a pound of gold with somebody. Bar Ziza and Bar Ziza’s sharecropper died; the case came before Rebbi Ismael ben Rebbi Yose. Would one not say that all that Bar Ziza’s sharecropper had was Bar Ziza’s property? It should be given to Bar Ziza’s sons. Bar Ziza’s sons came. He said, the adult ones should take half and when the underage grow up they should take half. Rebbi Ismael ben Rebbi Yose died; the case came before the Elder Rebbi Ḥiyya who said, that argument means nothing since there are people who do not advertise themselves. It should be given to the sharecropper’s sons. The trustee told him, I already disbursed half of it. He told him, what you gave, you gave by court order and what you will give, you will give by court order. May the sharecropper’s sons say to Bar Ziza’s sons, give us what you took? They can tell them, what was done was done by court order. May the underage ones say to the adult, let us share with you? May they tell them, we found a find? Rebbi Isaac said, the case between the adult and underage ones is only comparable to a gift given to them.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 7:20

Rav Huna said: Who is the Tanna of “participants in pigeon contests”? Rebbi Eliezer, as we have stated there: “Participants in pigeon contests are disqualified from testimony.” Rebbi Mana said before Rebbi Yose: Is that statement in Sanhedrin Rebbi Eliezer’s? He told him, it is everybody’s opinion. So said Rebbi Yose: We knew that he was disqualified for testimony in money matters. What does he come to testify about? For as he is disqualified in money matters, so he is disqualified to testify in criminal trials. The witnesses for the New Moon are held to the standards of criminal trials, as we have stated: “Any testimony for which a woman is not qualified, they are not qualified for.” Who stated this? The rabbis! Do the rabbis follow Rebbi Eliezer? They agree with him and disagree with him. Rebbi Huna in the name of Rebbi Jonah said: It follows Rebbi Eliezer in everything. It turns out that this disagreement parallels another disagreement, as it was stated: A perjured witness is disqualified for any and all testimony required by the Torah, the words of Rebbi Meїr. Rebbi Yose said, when has this been said? When he was found perjured in criminal matters. But if he was found perjured in money matters, he is disqualified only from that particular testimony. It turns out that Rebbi Yose parallels the rabbis and Rebbi Meїr Rebbi Eliezer.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 7:26

That is to say, only if he did not introduce them. But if he introduced them, the householder has no liability, following what Rebbi Jehudah bar Shalom said: One did introduce the porters to the food merchants. They came, but they sent them away without giving them anything. The case came before Rebbi Shammai. Since if the food merchants had said that they took, would at the end not these and those collect? Therefore, they shall collect immediately.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 7:33

“Similarly, the orphans can collect only by an oath;” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai: One pays from an orphan’s property only if interest is due; Rebbi Nathan says, also a woman’s ketubah. Rebbi Mana said, because of her sustenance. Rebbi Mattania said, who is worried about sustenance? Rebbi Simeon! Since Rebbi Simeon said, all depends on the female. What about it? For attraction, that everybody should jump to marry her. Rebbi Nathan said, also for robbery and torts. Rebbi Yose said, we stated both of these. Robbery from the following: “If it was mortgageable, he has to pay.” For torts from the following: “One pays from minor orphans’ property only from the least valuable.” So is the Mishnah: One pays for torts from minor orphans’ property only from the least valuable. But was it not stated, the son shall stand in the father’s place; one estimates torts from the most valuable land, creditors from average quality, and a woman’s ketubah from the least valuable? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, explain it as everybody’s opinion about testamentary dispositions.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 7:38

Rav Ḥiyya bar Ashi in the name of Rav: A document produced by the creditor in the creditor’s handwriting is invalid, for I am saying that he has practiced writing documents. This implies that in the hand of another it would be valid. Rebbi Abinna in the name of Samuel: It is always invalid unless it be in the creditors’s possession but in the debtor’s handwriting. What about this? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Bun said, explain it according to everybody about a testamentary gift.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 7:39

MISHNAH: The following have to swear without a claim: Partners, and sharecroppers, and trustees, and a wife trading in the house, and a family member. If he says, what do you claim from me? “I want you to swear to me,” he is liable. After partners or sharecroppers distributed, he cannot force them to swear. If an oath was rolled over to him for another cause, one may roll everything over to him. The Sabbatical year remits an oath.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 7:41

Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac said, watch it for it is otherwise. What do we say? Watch it, for it is not negligible. “Owner,” “owner.” Since the owner mentioned there is subject to annulment, so also here he is subject to annulment. The Sabbatical annuls things which are his hand’s loans and annuls the corresponding oaths; the Sabbatical does not annul things which are not his hand’s loans, nor does it annul the corresponding oaths. “For anything which the Sabbatical annuls it annuls the corresponding oath; anything which the Sabbatical does not annul it does not annul the corresponding oath.”

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 8:5

It was stated, if it was stolen from the man’s house; not from the borrower’s house. If it was stolen from the man’s house; not from the house of the paid keeper or the renter? Since he is obligated to watch it, it is as if it referred to him; for you may say that there are three paragraphs. The last one about the borrower, the middle one about the paid keeper and the renter, the first one about the unpaid keeper. The borrower who profits from all pays everything. The paid keeper or the renter, because he profits partially and gives partial profit, swears about part and pays part. The unpaid keeper who does not profit at all swears and leaves. What does he swear? I did not commit anything. What is the situation if others know that he did not commit anything? Let us hear from the following: If the thief was found but has nothing with which to pay, may he say to him, swear to me that you were not thinking to take it? Let us hear from the following: If the thief was not found. Therefore, it he was found he is not liable.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 8:5

It was stated, if it was stolen from the man’s house; not from the borrower’s house. If it was stolen from the man’s house; not from the house of the paid keeper or the renter? Since he is obligated to watch it, it is as if it referred to him; for you may say that there are three paragraphs. The last one about the borrower, the middle one about the paid keeper and the renter, the first one about the unpaid keeper. The borrower who profits from all pays everything. The paid keeper or the renter, because he profits partially and gives partial profit, swears about part and pays part. The unpaid keeper who does not profit at all swears and leaves. What does he swear? I did not commit anything. What is the situation if others know that he did not commit anything? Let us hear from the following: If the thief was found but has nothing with which to pay, may he say to him, swear to me that you were not thinking to take it? Let us hear from the following: If the thief was not found. Therefore, it he was found he is not liable.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 8:9

It was said, if its owners were with him, he does not have to pay. Does he have to swear? Rebbi Ze`ira said, he swears. Rebbi Ḥanina and Rebbi La both are saying, he does not swear. A baraita supports Rebbi Ḥanina and Rebbi La: “Breakage, abduction, and death for which he is not liable in the cases of the paid keeper and the renter, and the borrower with the owner is not liable, without the owner is liable; loss and theft where the paid keeper and the renter are liable, is it not that a fortiori the borrower be not liable with the owner but liable without the owner?” For him who says it is obvious that he swears, should he not have to pay? Rebbi Ḥanina in the name of Rebbi Yudan: A baraita supports Rebbi Ze`ira. “The borrower, for whom the Torah was restrictive, with the owner is not liable, without the owner is liable; the paid keeper, for whom the Torah was lenient, a fortiori with the owner should not be liable, without the owner should be liable.” If you are saying, his problem was swearing, he should have stated “the paid keeper and the renter.” That means he only needs it for payment. It is difficult for Rebbi Ze`ira: the borrower swears if the owner was with him; if the owner was not with him he must pay. The unpaid keeper swears, whether the owner was with him or was not with him. You are saying that where the borrower pays the paid keeper swears. Where the paid keeper swears, the unpaid keeper should not be liable. Where the paid keeper pays, the unpaid keeper swears. What do you state about an unpaid keeper when the owner be with him? But some are asking, what do you state about an unpaid and a paid keeper, whether or not the owner be with him? Rebbi Abin said, any word of criminality. Rebbi Mana said, do we not find that the Torah treated loss and theft equally for the borrower? Therefore, we shall treat breakage, abduction, and death equally both for the unpaid and the paid keepers.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 8:9

It was said, if its owners were with him, he does not have to pay. Does he have to swear? Rebbi Ze`ira said, he swears. Rebbi Ḥanina and Rebbi La both are saying, he does not swear. A baraita supports Rebbi Ḥanina and Rebbi La: “Breakage, abduction, and death for which he is not liable in the cases of the paid keeper and the renter, and the borrower with the owner is not liable, without the owner is liable; loss and theft where the paid keeper and the renter are liable, is it not that a fortiori the borrower be not liable with the owner but liable without the owner?” For him who says it is obvious that he swears, should he not have to pay? Rebbi Ḥanina in the name of Rebbi Yudan: A baraita supports Rebbi Ze`ira. “The borrower, for whom the Torah was restrictive, with the owner is not liable, without the owner is liable; the paid keeper, for whom the Torah was lenient, a fortiori with the owner should not be liable, without the owner should be liable.” If you are saying, his problem was swearing, he should have stated “the paid keeper and the renter.” That means he only needs it for payment. It is difficult for Rebbi Ze`ira: the borrower swears if the owner was with him; if the owner was not with him he must pay. The unpaid keeper swears, whether the owner was with him or was not with him. You are saying that where the borrower pays the paid keeper swears. Where the paid keeper swears, the unpaid keeper should not be liable. Where the paid keeper pays, the unpaid keeper swears. What do you state about an unpaid keeper when the owner be with him? But some are asking, what do you state about an unpaid and a paid keeper, whether or not the owner be with him? Rebbi Abin said, any word of criminality. Rebbi Mana said, do we not find that the Torah treated loss and theft equally for the borrower? Therefore, we shall treat breakage, abduction, and death equally both for the unpaid and the paid keepers.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 8:10

What is the reason of the House of Shammai? Any word of criminality. How do the House of Hillel explain the reason of the House of Shammai? “Criminality,” any word of criminality. Explain it if he appropriated it through an agent.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 8:11

Rebbi Yose bar Ḥanina asked, what was said, to take? Took? Did not Rebbi Hoshaia state, “it broke”; if it turned into vinegar he pays for everything? It turned into vinegar only because of its spoilage. Rebbi Samuel, Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Eleazar. “Grabbing” which was mentioned for the unpaid keeper makes him liable only if he diminished. Rebbi Samuel asked before Rebbi Abbahu: What has been said about taking? That he diminished or even if he did not diminish? He said to him, is that not Rebbi Yose bar Ḥanina’s question, to take, took? If you say “to take”, even if he did not diminish. If you say “took,” only when he diminished. If you say “to take”, if he returned it either to its former place or to another place he is not liable. If you say “took,” if he returned it to its former place he is not liable, to another place he is liable.