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The Jerusalem Talmud

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 9:24

MISHNAH: If one intended to kill an animal but he killed a human, a Non-Jew but he killed a Jew, a stillborn but he killed a viable baby, he is not criminally liable. If one intended to hit someone on his hips where it would not have been enough to kill but it went on his heart where it was enough to kill and he died, he cannot be prosecuted. If one intended to hit someone on his heart where it would have been enough to kill but it went on his hips where it was not enough to kill but he died, he cannot be prosecuted. If one intended to hit someone big whom it would not have been enough to kill but it went on somebody small whom it was enough to kill and he died, he cannot be prosecuted. If one intended to hit someone small whom it would have been enough to kill but it went on somebody big whom it was not enough to kill but he died, he cannot be prosecuted. If one intended to hit someone on his hips where it was enough to kill but it went on his heart and he died; [or] if one intended to hit someone big and it was enough to kill but it went on somebody small and he died; he is [criminally] liable. Rebbi Simeon says, even if he intended to kill one person but killed another, he is not criminally liable.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 9:30

MISHNAH: Somebody who was found guilty of two death penalties shall be convicted to the more painful one. One who committed one crime punishable by two death penalties shall be convicted to the more painful one. Rebbi Yose says, he shall be convicted for the first connection. If somebody was repeatedly whipped, the court sends him to jail where he is fed barley until his belly bursts. One sends the murderer without witnesses to jail and feeds him scanty bread and sparing water.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 10:10

It is written: For he showed contempt for the Eternal’s Word. Not only if he was contemptuous of the teachings of the Torah, from where if he denied one verse, one Aramaic expression, one argument de minore ad majus? The verse says, His command he violated. One verse, Lotan’s sister was Timna`. One Aramaic expression, Laban called it Yegar Sahadu̅ta̅. One argument de minore ad majus: For Cain would be avenged sevenfold, etc..

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 10:13

Another explanation: Hand to hand will not cleanse evil. Rebbi Phineas said, that is one who gives alms and expects an immediate reward. Rebbi Simon said, like a man who says, here is a sack, here is a tetradrachma, and here is a se`ah, go and fill it. You should know that this is so, for if the patriarchs had demanded to receive the reward in this world for the good deeds which they did, from where would their merit remain for their descendants after them? That is what Moses told Israel: I shall remember My covenant with Jacob, etc.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 10:24

They were given from one shepherd. The Holy One said, if you heard something from the most insignificant one of Israel and it gave you satisfaction, it should not be in your eyes as if you heard it from an insignificant one but from an important one; and not as if you heard it from an important one but from a Sage; and not as if you heard it from a Sage but from a prophet; and not as if you heard it from a prophet but from a shepherd (and shepherd only means Moses, as it is said: He remembered the days of old, Moses with his people; where is He Who brought them up from the Sea with his people’s shepherd; where is He Who gave His Holy Spirit in its midst); not as if you heard it from a shepherd but from Divinity. They were given from one shepherd, but “One” is only the Holy One, praise to Him, as it is said: Hear, o Israel, the Eternal is our God, the Eternal is One.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 10:24

They were given from one shepherd. The Holy One said, if you heard something from the most insignificant one of Israel and it gave you satisfaction, it should not be in your eyes as if you heard it from an insignificant one but from an important one; and not as if you heard it from an important one but from a Sage; and not as if you heard it from a Sage but from a prophet; and not as if you heard it from a prophet but from a shepherd (and shepherd only means Moses, as it is said: He remembered the days of old, Moses with his people; where is He Who brought them up from the Sea with his people’s shepherd; where is He Who gave His Holy Spirit in its midst); not as if you heard it from a shepherd but from Divinity. They were given from one shepherd, but “One” is only the Holy One, praise to Him, as it is said: Hear, o Israel, the Eternal is our God, the Eternal is One.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 10:43

It is written The rage of the Eternal was kindled against Israel. The Eternal said to Moses: Take all the heads of the people and hang them for the Eternal before the sun. What he told him was, install their heads as judges over them and let them execute the sinners at daytime. That is what is written: Moses told the judges of Israel: each one should kill his men who cling to the Baˋal Peˋor. How many were the judges of Israel? 78’600. Heads of thousands, 600. Heads of hundreds, 6'000. Heads of fifties, 12’000. heads of tens, 60’000. It turns out that the judges of Israel were 78’600. He told them, each of you should execute two. It turns out that the number of the killed was 157’200. Behold, a man from the Children of Israel came and introduced to his brothers the Midianite woman, to the eyes of Moses. What means to the eyes of Moses? Like a man who says, that is in your eyes, Moses. He told him, is not Ẓippora a Midianite, and are not her hooves split? This one is pure, that one is impure? There, Phineas was present. He said, is there nobody who would kill him or be killed? Where are the lions? A lion whelp is Jehudah; Dan is a lion whelp; Benjamin a rapacious wolf. When Phineas saw that nobody of Israel did anything, he immediately rose from his court, took the spear in his hand, and put its iron under his belt. He was leaning on its wood until he arrived at his door. When he arrived at his door, they asked him, where to, Phineas? He said to them, do you not agree that everywhere the tribe of Levi is with the tribe of Simeon? They said, let him, maybe the Pharisees permitted the matter. When he entered, the Holy One, praise to Him, performed six wonders for him. The first miracle: usually they would separate, but the angel glued the one to the other. The second miracle: He directed the spear into her belly to that his penis should be seen inside her belly because of the fault-finders, lest they say that he muscled himself in with them and satisfied himself. The third miracle: the angel closed their mouths, so they could not cry. The fourth miracle: they did not slip from the weapon but stayed in place. The fifth miracle: The angel lifted the lintel so that both of them were carried out between his shoulders. The sixth miracle: When the plague started to destroy the people, what did he do? He threw them on the ground and prayed. That is what is written: Phineas stood and prayed; the plague was arrested.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 10:43

It is written The rage of the Eternal was kindled against Israel. The Eternal said to Moses: Take all the heads of the people and hang them for the Eternal before the sun. What he told him was, install their heads as judges over them and let them execute the sinners at daytime. That is what is written: Moses told the judges of Israel: each one should kill his men who cling to the Baˋal Peˋor. How many were the judges of Israel? 78’600. Heads of thousands, 600. Heads of hundreds, 6'000. Heads of fifties, 12’000. heads of tens, 60’000. It turns out that the judges of Israel were 78’600. He told them, each of you should execute two. It turns out that the number of the killed was 157’200. Behold, a man from the Children of Israel came and introduced to his brothers the Midianite woman, to the eyes of Moses. What means to the eyes of Moses? Like a man who says, that is in your eyes, Moses. He told him, is not Ẓippora a Midianite, and are not her hooves split? This one is pure, that one is impure? There, Phineas was present. He said, is there nobody who would kill him or be killed? Where are the lions? A lion whelp is Jehudah; Dan is a lion whelp; Benjamin a rapacious wolf. When Phineas saw that nobody of Israel did anything, he immediately rose from his court, took the spear in his hand, and put its iron under his belt. He was leaning on its wood until he arrived at his door. When he arrived at his door, they asked him, where to, Phineas? He said to them, do you not agree that everywhere the tribe of Levi is with the tribe of Simeon? They said, let him, maybe the Pharisees permitted the matter. When he entered, the Holy One, praise to Him, performed six wonders for him. The first miracle: usually they would separate, but the angel glued the one to the other. The second miracle: He directed the spear into her belly to that his penis should be seen inside her belly because of the fault-finders, lest they say that he muscled himself in with them and satisfied himself. The third miracle: the angel closed their mouths, so they could not cry. The fourth miracle: they did not slip from the weapon but stayed in place. The fifth miracle: The angel lifted the lintel so that both of them were carried out between his shoulders. The sixth miracle: When the plague started to destroy the people, what did he do? He threw them on the ground and prayed. That is what is written: Phineas stood and prayed; the plague was arrested.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 10:48

Geḥazi was great in Torah, but three things were the matter with him: He was grudging, dissolute in sexual matters, and denied the Resurrection of the Dead. Grudging. When Elisha sat and formulated his teachings, Geḥazi sat outside the door. The students saw him and said, Geḥazi did not find room inside, could we find room inside? His statements were said without anybody profiting from them. Once he was removed, what is written there? The prophecy students said to Elisha (etc.,) the place where we are sitting is too narrow for us. It does not contain the general population and the students who were there.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 10:50

And denied the Resurrection of the Dead. You find that at the time when Elisha came to resurrect the Shunamite’s son, he told him: Take my support staff in your hand and go, and if you meet a man do not greet him, or if a person greets you do not answer him. But he did not do that, but when a person met him and asked, from where and to where, Geḥazi? He told him, I am going to resurrect the dead. This one would tell him, only the Holy One, praise to Him, can resurrect the dead, as it is written: The Eternal kills and gives life, brings down to the pit and lifts up. He went there and did not do anything. He returned to him and said to him, I know that if he really were dead, he would not wake up through you.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 10:50

And denied the Resurrection of the Dead. You find that at the time when Elisha came to resurrect the Shunamite’s son, he told him: Take my support staff in your hand and go, and if you meet a man do not greet him, or if a person greets you do not answer him. But he did not do that, but when a person met him and asked, from where and to where, Geḥazi? He told him, I am going to resurrect the dead. This one would tell him, only the Holy One, praise to Him, can resurrect the dead, as it is written: The Eternal kills and gives life, brings down to the pit and lifts up. He went there and did not do anything. He returned to him and said to him, I know that if he really were dead, he would not wake up through you.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 10:51

You find [written] when Naˋaman, the army commander of the king of Aram, came to him with his horses and his chariot. Rebbi Joḥanan said, it is written with his horse. He wanted to give him gold and silver, stolas and garments, precious stones and pearls, but he did not accept. That is what is written: He insisted that he take, but he refused. Geḥazi came and said, by the living Eternal, if I would run after him and take anything from him. “A defect” is written. He went, met him, took what he took, and hid it in his upper storey. He came to Elisha, who asked him, from where to where, Geḥazi? You refused the reward of the just! He answered, your servant did not go here or there. But he said, did not my thoughts go when a man turned from his carriage towards you; is it time to take silver and gold; is it time to take precious stones and pearls? Therefore, Naˋaman’s skin disease shall cling to you. It is written: Four men afflicted with skin disease were at the door of the gate. Who were they? Rebbi Jehudah in the name of Rav: They were Geḥazi and his three sons.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 10:51

You find [written] when Naˋaman, the army commander of the king of Aram, came to him with his horses and his chariot. Rebbi Joḥanan said, it is written with his horse. He wanted to give him gold and silver, stolas and garments, precious stones and pearls, but he did not accept. That is what is written: He insisted that he take, but he refused. Geḥazi came and said, by the living Eternal, if I would run after him and take anything from him. “A defect” is written. He went, met him, took what he took, and hid it in his upper storey. He came to Elisha, who asked him, from where to where, Geḥazi? You refused the reward of the just! He answered, your servant did not go here or there. But he said, did not my thoughts go when a man turned from his carriage towards you; is it time to take silver and gold; is it time to take precious stones and pearls? Therefore, Naˋaman’s skin disease shall cling to you. It is written: Four men afflicted with skin disease were at the door of the gate. Who were they? Rebbi Jehudah in the name of Rav: They were Geḥazi and his three sons.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 10:56

It was stated: Rebbi Neḥemiah says, one understands it from what was said My Spirit shall not judge man forever. Rebbi Jehudah says, My Spirit shall not judge him, for I shall not give My Spirit into them when I shall give My Spirit into people. Rebbi Simeon says, My Spirit shall not judge him, for I shall not give My Spirit into them when I shall distribute the rewards of the just. Others say, My Spirit shall not judge him, I shall not bring it back into its sheath. Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said, mainly their scalding was parboiling. What is the reason? At the time when they were scalded they shrank; in its heat they disappear from their place. What is in its heat? In their boiling. Rebbi Joḥanan said, every single drop which the Holy One, praise to Him, rained on them, He brought to a boil in Hell and rained it on them. That is what is written, in its heat they disappear from their place. Jehudah ben Rebbi Ḥizqiah and Rebbi said, the Holy One, praise to Him, judges the evildoers in Hell for twelve months. First He brings the itch on them; then He brings them into fire and they say woe, woe; after that He brings them into snow and they say wai, wai. What is the reason? He brought me up from the noisy pit, from miry mud. What is from יָוֶן mud? From a place where one says woe. Why could they not receive their punishment and then take part in the World to Come? Because the scoffer will not hear rebuke.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 11:2

HALAKHAH: But the following are strangled,” etc. From where warning for one who hits his father or his mother? Forty times he shall hit him, he may not add. Since one who is commanded to hit is commanded not to hit, one who is commanded not to hit a fortiori is commanded not to hit.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 11:5

HALAKHAH: From where a first warning about stealing: you shall not steal. From where a second warning about stealing: you shall not steal. You shall not steal, in order to aggravate; you shall not steal, in order to pay double restitution, in order to pay quadruple or quintuple restitution. Ben Bagbag says, do not steal your own property back from the thief, lest you be seen stealing.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 11:5

HALAKHAH: From where a first warning about stealing: you shall not steal. From where a second warning about stealing: you shall not steal. You shall not steal, in order to aggravate; you shall not steal, in order to pay double restitution, in order to pay quadruple or quintuple restitution. Ben Bagbag says, do not steal your own property back from the thief, lest you be seen stealing.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 11:6

Rebbi Abba, Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia: he is punishable only if he steals money. Rebbi Zeˋira in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia: he is punishable only if he shows contempt for money. What means showing contempt for money? Where do we hold? If about him who says, here you have five and give me for three, he is an idiot. Here you have three and give me for five, he is a regular person. But we deal with one who says, here you have five and give me for five.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 11:30

Rebbi Jehudah ben Pazi said. not only to the bridal chamber but also to a house containing the bridal chamber. The following is problematic: Dining room and bedroom, bridal chamber and bedroom; if she entered the dining room, for which consequence? Rebbi Joḥanan said, to inherit from her. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, to dissolve her vows. Rebbi Zeˋira said, even though Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, to dissolve her vows, he agrees that he cannot actually dissolve them before she enters the bridal chamber. Rebbi Huna said, a verse supports Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: to whore in her father’s house. This excludes the case where the father’s agents handed her over to the husband’s agents, that she could not be stoned, but is strangled.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 1:2

HALAKHAH: “There are two kinds of oaths which are four kinds,” etc. Two which are four for liability and two which are four for no liability, or four for liability and four for no liability? Let us hear from the following: “There are two kinds of oaths which are four kinds,” etc. Rebbi Yose said, the Mishnah says so, “there are two kinds of oaths which are four kinds,” not because of liability? And similarly, “there are two kinds of export on the Sabbath which are four kinds,” because there is liability. Rebbi Abba said, there all are about liability, but here we come to state both liability and no liability. This implies four of liability and four of no liability. But did we not state, the doors of the Temple hall were two which are four? Can you say, liability and no liability? Should we state twelve cases of no liability? We come to state cases of no liability which correspond to cases of no liability. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Ada said, what is this “no liability” which we stated here? Permitted! Rebbi Yose said, the poor man and the rich man are one but the Sages counted them as two. Exporting or importing are two but the Sages counted them as one. Exporting on the Sabbath does not include importing; if one exports from a domain this does not include importing. If one who exports from one domain to the other, does this not include the one who imports? In addition, from what Rebbi Yasa said in the name if Rebbi Joḥanan: Somebody who imports half the size of a dried fig and exports half the size of a dried fig is liable. And from where that exporting is called work? Rebbi Samuel in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: “Moses ordered, they made a public proclamation in the camp,” etc. The people refrained from taking objects out from their houses to give them to the collectors, who also did not take out anything from them to import into the office. Rebbi Ḥizqiah in the name of Rebbi Aḥa understood it from the following: “do not bring out any load from your houses on the Sabbath day, and perform no work.”

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 1:5

From where that they can be joined one to the other? Rebbi Mana said, the Sages counted them as two and counted them as four. Just as two can be joined one to the other so also four can be joined one to the other. Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Abin: If it can be joined to what is not of its kind, so much more of its own kind. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Bun said, it is not written “they will be” but “it will be”. This teaches that they cannot be joined one to the other. Ḥizqiah stated: It is not written “skin diseases” but “skin disease”. This teaches that they cannot be joined one to the other.” “He said to him, they could have said ‘starting with eggshell and stronger it is impure’ but should not have said, ‘there are two kinds of appearances of skin disease which are four kinds.’ He answered him, it teaches that they are not one superior to the other.” Could they not be one superior to the other? If you say so, you would have said the darkened one is impure, the very darkened is impure. But the Torah said, behold, the diseased spot darkened. The darkened one is impure but the very much darkened is pure. It follows what Rebbi Ḥanina said, it is comparable to two kings and their two lieutenants. One king is greater then the other king, one lieutenant is greater than the other lieutenant. But the first one’s lieutenant is not greater than the other king. Samuel said, it is comparable to two kings and two of their ambassadors. One king is greater then the other king, one ambassador is greater than the other ambassador. But the first one’s ambassador is not greater than the other king. Rebbi Ḥanina in the name of Rav (Aḥa) [Ada] bar Aḥawa: A king, and his army commander, and the Arghabeṭa and the Head of the Captivity. Rebbi Eleasar ben Rebbi Yose said before Rebbi Yose: The Mishnah implies that one is no greater than the other. If s´et whose very darkened spot is pure has a second color, the shiny spot, whose very darkened spot is impure, certainly will have a second color. He answered him, look at what you are saying. It has a second degree; should it not also have a third? What causes you to say that the very white spot, whose very darkened spot is impure, is the s´et? The kind of s´et is like eggshell. “שְׂאֵ֤ת, this is s´et. בַהֶ֔רֶת, this is the shiny spot. סַפַּ֨חַת֙ is secondary to the shiny spot. [The diseased spot’s] look is deepened, secondary to s´et. What is the etymology of s´et? Elevated. As the shadow looks elevated compared to the sunny spot. What is the etymology of deepened? It is deep, as the sunny spot looks depressed compared to the shadow. What is the etymology of סַפַּ֨חַת֙? Adjunct. As it is said, adjoin me please to one of the priesthoods, etc.” Rebbi Eleazar said, these are the words of Rebbi Ismael and Rebbi Aqiba. But the words of the Sages are that s´et and the shiny spot are one. Sappaḥat is secondary to either one. The Mishnah says so: “Mispaḥat is turned into s´et or strong mispaḥat.”

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 1:6

MISHNAH: In any case where there is knowledge at the start and knowledge at the end but forgetting in between there is an increasing or decreasing [sacrifice]. If there was knowledge at the start but no knowledge at the end, the he-goat whose blood in brought inside and the Day of Atonement suspend until it becomes a certainty for him and he brings an increasing or decreasing one.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 1:7

HALAKHAH: “In any case where there is knowledge at the start,” etc. From where that we require knowledge at the start and at the end but forgetting in between? The verse says, it was forgotten, it was forgotten two times; this implies that he had knowledge at the start and at the end but forgetting in between. So far for Rebbi Aqiba; following Rebbi Ismael? For Rebbi Ismael [argues] like Rebbi. As Rebbi said, it was forgotten by him, this implies that he knows. “But he knew,” there is knowledge two times. Hence Rebbi Ismael [argues] like Rebbi, and Rebbi like Rebbi Ismael. This comes even according to Rebbi Aqiba; it is the same for knowledge and forgetting about the impurity of the Sanctuary as for knowledge and forgetting about the impurity of sancta. But some want to understand it from the following: He knew and felt guilty. Was it not already said, he became impure and felt guilty? But if it does not refer to knowledge at the beginning, let it refer to knowledge at the end.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 1:7

HALAKHAH: “In any case where there is knowledge at the start,” etc. From where that we require knowledge at the start and at the end but forgetting in between? The verse says, it was forgotten, it was forgotten two times; this implies that he had knowledge at the start and at the end but forgetting in between. So far for Rebbi Aqiba; following Rebbi Ismael? For Rebbi Ismael [argues] like Rebbi. As Rebbi said, it was forgotten by him, this implies that he knows. “But he knew,” there is knowledge two times. Hence Rebbi Ismael [argues] like Rebbi, and Rebbi like Rebbi Ismael. This comes even according to Rebbi Aqiba; it is the same for knowledge and forgetting about the impurity of the Sanctuary as for knowledge and forgetting about the impurity of sancta. But some want to understand it from the following: He knew and felt guilty. Was it not already said, he became impure and felt guilty? But if it does not refer to knowledge at the beginning, let it refer to knowledge at the end.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 1:9

And from where that it speaks only about the impurity of the Sanctuary and its sancta? He warned and punished about impurity and required a sacrifice about impurity. Since punishment and warning spelled out later on refer to impurity of the Sanctuary and its sancta, also when He made liable for a sacrifice it is about impurity of the Sanctuary and its sancta. Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob says, since it says, I did not eat from it in my deep mourning, I could think that an Israel who ate tithe in deep mourning should bring a sacrifice. The verse says, from thes e. For some of these he is liable, for some of these he is not liable. I will exclude tithe which is not a deadly sin but will not exclude heave which is a deadly sin as it is said, they would die from it for they desecrated it. The verse says from thes e; for some of these he is liable, for some of these he is not liable. Or since there [one speaks about] heave, also here heave. But did you not learn it from foreign worship? Since foreign worship teaches about all transgressions in the Torah, to say that as foreign worship is special that one is liable for extirpation if done intentionally and for a sacrifice if done unintentionally. This excludes heave which only is a deadly sin.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 1:10

Rebbi Ḥanina said before Rebbi Mana: Did you learn this from foreign worship? Then one should learn from foreign worship that for everything one needs one knowledge! He told him, foreign worship requires a fixed value [sacrifice] but the impurity of the Sanctuary and its sancta an increasing or decreasing one. One cannot infer about a fixed value [sacrifice] from an increasing and decreasing one, nor for an increasing or decreasing from a fixed value one. How did you understand to say that the verse speaks about impurity of Sanctuary sancta? It is said here an impure animal and it is said further on an impure animal. Since an impure animal mentioned there is about impurity of Sanctuary sancta, so an impure animal mentioned here is about impurity of Sanctuary sancta. Not only Sanctuary sancta; from where the impurity of the Sanctuary? “The verse says: his impurity is on him. How did you understand to explain it? About an impure person who ate pure [meat], or a pure person who ate impure [meat]? The verse says: his impurity is on him. Impurity of the body, not impurity of the meat. Rebbi says, he ate, his impurity is on him. Impurity of the body, not impurity of the meat. Rebbi Ḥiyya says, sancta are mentioned in the plural but impurity is mentioned in the singular. How can I uphold his impurity is on him? Impurity of the body, not impurity of the meat. Rebbi Meїr says, the verse only speaks of one from whom impurity separates. This excludes meat from which impurity does not separate.”

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 1:15

MISHNAH: But about where there is no knowledge either at the start or at the end, the he-goats of the holidays and the he-goats of the Days of the New Moon atone, the words of Rebbi Jehudah. Rebbi Simeon says, the he-goats of the holidays atone but not the he-goats of the Days of the New Moon. What do the he-goats of the Days of the New Moon atone for? For the pure person who ate impure. Rebbi Meїr says, the atoning of all he-goats is the same, about the impurity of the Sanctuary and its sancta. Rebbi Simeon used to say, the he-goats of the holidays atone for the pure person who ate impure; those of the holidays atone for where there is no knowledge either at the start or at the end, and those of the Day of Atonement where there is no knowledge at the start but there is knowledge at the end. They asked him, could they be brought one for the other? He told them, they may be brought. They asked him, since their atoning is not the same, how can they be brought one for the other? He told them, all of them serve to atone for the impurity of the Sanctuary and its sancta.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 1:15

MISHNAH: But about where there is no knowledge either at the start or at the end, the he-goats of the holidays and the he-goats of the Days of the New Moon atone, the words of Rebbi Jehudah. Rebbi Simeon says, the he-goats of the holidays atone but not the he-goats of the Days of the New Moon. What do the he-goats of the Days of the New Moon atone for? For the pure person who ate impure. Rebbi Meїr says, the atoning of all he-goats is the same, about the impurity of the Sanctuary and its sancta. Rebbi Simeon used to say, the he-goats of the holidays atone for the pure person who ate impure; those of the holidays atone for where there is no knowledge either at the start or at the end, and those of the Day of Atonement where there is no knowledge at the start but there is knowledge at the end. They asked him, could they be brought one for the other? He told them, they may be brought. They asked him, since their atoning is not the same, how can they be brought one for the other? He told them, all of them serve to atone for the impurity of the Sanctuary and its sancta.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 1:15

MISHNAH: But about where there is no knowledge either at the start or at the end, the he-goats of the holidays and the he-goats of the Days of the New Moon atone, the words of Rebbi Jehudah. Rebbi Simeon says, the he-goats of the holidays atone but not the he-goats of the Days of the New Moon. What do the he-goats of the Days of the New Moon atone for? For the pure person who ate impure. Rebbi Meїr says, the atoning of all he-goats is the same, about the impurity of the Sanctuary and its sancta. Rebbi Simeon used to say, the he-goats of the holidays atone for the pure person who ate impure; those of the holidays atone for where there is no knowledge either at the start or at the end, and those of the Day of Atonement where there is no knowledge at the start but there is knowledge at the end. They asked him, could they be brought one for the other? He told them, they may be brought. They asked him, since their atoning is not the same, how can they be brought one for the other? He told them, all of them serve to atone for the impurity of the Sanctuary and its sancta.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 1:16

HALAKHAH: “But about where there is no knowledge,” etc. Halakhah 5: “Rebbi Simeon used to say,” etc. Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia: The reason of Rebbi Jehudah is and one goat’s he-goat sin offering for the Eternal. This he-goat atones for a sin known only to the Eternal. I have not only the he-goat of the Day of the New Moon; from where the he-goats of the holidays? Rebbi Ze`ira said, and a he-goat, the copula adds to the prior subject. Rebbi Ze`ira and Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia, Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: He gave it to you to lift the sins of the congregation. Where do we hold? If about Naḥshon’s he-goat, it atoned for his tribe. If about the he-goat of the Day of (Atonement), there is nothing similar in later generations. But we must deal with the he-goat of the Day of the New Moon. What about it? It is said here “lifting sin” and it is said there “lifting sin”, Aaron shall lift the sin of the sancta”. Since there it is the sinfulness of the offerings not the sins of the offerers, also here it is the sinfulness of the offerings not the sins of the offerers. What did you see to say, “for the pure person who ate impure”, maybe we should say for the impure person who ate pure? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Bun said, Rebbi Jehudah splits the argument of Rebbi Meїr; Rebbi Simeon splits the argument of Rebbi Jehudah. Rebbi Joḥanan agrees that the he-goat brought inside does not atone; rather it suspends. This parallels Rebbi Jonah in the name of Rebbi Ze`ira, he shall make it a purification offering. He fixed it for suspension, that it could not be changed.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 1:16

HALAKHAH: “But about where there is no knowledge,” etc. Halakhah 5: “Rebbi Simeon used to say,” etc. Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia: The reason of Rebbi Jehudah is and one goat’s he-goat sin offering for the Eternal. This he-goat atones for a sin known only to the Eternal. I have not only the he-goat of the Day of the New Moon; from where the he-goats of the holidays? Rebbi Ze`ira said, and a he-goat, the copula adds to the prior subject. Rebbi Ze`ira and Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia, Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: He gave it to you to lift the sins of the congregation. Where do we hold? If about Naḥshon’s he-goat, it atoned for his tribe. If about the he-goat of the Day of (Atonement), there is nothing similar in later generations. But we must deal with the he-goat of the Day of the New Moon. What about it? It is said here “lifting sin” and it is said there “lifting sin”, Aaron shall lift the sin of the sancta”. Since there it is the sinfulness of the offerings not the sins of the offerers, also here it is the sinfulness of the offerings not the sins of the offerers. What did you see to say, “for the pure person who ate impure”, maybe we should say for the impure person who ate pure? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Bun said, Rebbi Jehudah splits the argument of Rebbi Meїr; Rebbi Simeon splits the argument of Rebbi Jehudah. Rebbi Joḥanan agrees that the he-goat brought inside does not atone; rather it suspends. This parallels Rebbi Jonah in the name of Rebbi Ze`ira, he shall make it a purification offering. He fixed it for suspension, that it could not be changed.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 1:16

HALAKHAH: “But about where there is no knowledge,” etc. Halakhah 5: “Rebbi Simeon used to say,” etc. Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia: The reason of Rebbi Jehudah is and one goat’s he-goat sin offering for the Eternal. This he-goat atones for a sin known only to the Eternal. I have not only the he-goat of the Day of the New Moon; from where the he-goats of the holidays? Rebbi Ze`ira said, and a he-goat, the copula adds to the prior subject. Rebbi Ze`ira and Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia, Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: He gave it to you to lift the sins of the congregation. Where do we hold? If about Naḥshon’s he-goat, it atoned for his tribe. If about the he-goat of the Day of (Atonement), there is nothing similar in later generations. But we must deal with the he-goat of the Day of the New Moon. What about it? It is said here “lifting sin” and it is said there “lifting sin”, Aaron shall lift the sin of the sancta”. Since there it is the sinfulness of the offerings not the sins of the offerers, also here it is the sinfulness of the offerings not the sins of the offerers. What did you see to say, “for the pure person who ate impure”, maybe we should say for the impure person who ate pure? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Bun said, Rebbi Jehudah splits the argument of Rebbi Meїr; Rebbi Simeon splits the argument of Rebbi Jehudah. Rebbi Joḥanan agrees that the he-goat brought inside does not atone; rather it suspends. This parallels Rebbi Jonah in the name of Rebbi Ze`ira, he shall make it a purification offering. He fixed it for suspension, that it could not be changed.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 1:19

Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Yasa: The one who stands before the Ark on New Year’s holiday does not have to mention the New Moon. Rebbi Aḥa bar Pappus said, it was stated thus: “The one who stands before the Ark on New Year’s holiday in the morning, the House of Shammai say, he prays eight [benedictions], but the House of Hillel say seven. For musaf, the House of Shammai say ten, but the House of Hillel say nine.” Should he not say eleven? Rebbi Yose said, where do they disagree? In a matter which needs a separate benediction. But here even on a weekday he simply includes it. So he should mention it in “Service”. Rebbi Yose asked, since the two he-goats of New Year’s day come because of the New Moon, why do you say that he does not have to mention the New Moon? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Bun said, does Rebbi Abba bar Mamal not ask correctly? As it was stated: “The two lambs of Pentecost and the two he-goats of New Year’s Day.” If the first atoned, what does the second atone for? For impurity that happened between them. Is that not Rebbi Simeon’s? And Rebbi Simeon splits atoning. But if both of them were for the New Moon? Rebbi Abba Mari said, you cannot do that, since it is written, in addition to the elevation offering of the month. In addition, from what we have stated, “twelve for the twelve months of the year.” A patrician stood before the Ark and did not mention the New Moon; they praised him. Rav Hoshaia asked: think of it, if they slaughtered both of them simultaneously? What impurity happened between them? Rebbi Bun said, if all of Israel are proper, would they not bring what the Torah prescribed for them?

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 1:26

It is understandable if it did not come to his knowledge. If it did come to his knowledge? Was it not stated: “From where that those obligated for purification sacrifices and certain reparation sacrifices for whom the Day of Atonement had passed, are obligated to bring them after the Day of Atonement, but those obligated for suspended reparation offerings are no longer liable?” Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya said, whether it was known to him on it, or not known to him on it, did not the Day of Atonement already atone? Rebbi Simeon in the name of Levi [Sokhia], the Mishnah speaks of one who rebels against the day of Atonement. Why did he not say, if it was not known to him on the Day of Atonement? His words imply that even if it was not known to him on the Day of Atonement, the Day of Atonement atones.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 1:29

Rebbi says, the Day of Atonement atones for all sins against the Torah except for him who tears away the yoke, or who breaks the Covenant, or who finds aspects in the Torah, where it atones if he repented but does not atone otherwise. Rebbi Zebida said: Rebbi Yasa asked: Does Rebbi think that the Day of Atonement atones without repentance? There came Rebbi Ashian, Rebbi Jonah, Rebbi Abba, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The Day of Atonement atones without repentance, and death cleanses without repentance. We have stated thus: The day of death equals repentance. Who stated this? Rebbi! Then what we stated, “death and the Day of Atonement atone with repentance,” does not follow Rebbi.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 2:7

Rebbi Joḥanan said: In any case of doubt in the public domain, the doubt has to be resolved as pure, but one does not allow to act. But did we not state: “Any case of doubt which was declared pure for heave is pure for sprinkling water, and in any case where it remains unresolved for heave the sprinkling water is poured out.” There is nothing unresolved for the sprinkling water; either it is genuinely pure or genuinely impure. Rebbi Ze`ira said, the Mishnah deals with a situation not caused by a sacrifice; what Rebbi Joḥanan said refers to a situation caused by a sacrifice. Everybody agrees that if the person transgresses and acted, it is pure. The arguments of Rebbi Joḥanan are inverted. There, he says, if he transgresses and acted, it is impure. But here he said, if he transgresses and acted, it is pure. There in a private domain, here in the public domain. But you could even say, there and here in the public domain. The arguments of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish are inverted, the arguments of Rebbi Joḥanan are inverted, since they disagreed: A nazir became impure by a grave in the abyss, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, the nazir does not shave, but Rebbi Joḥanan said, the nazir has to shave. That is since Rebbi Joḥanan said, a doubt of awareness is awareness, even if the first was because of a crawling animal and the second by a corpse. The first before he converted and the second after he converted. The first before he grew two pubic hairs, the second after he grew them.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 2:10

An androgynus who saw whitish [effluent] and entered the Sanctuary is not liable. If he saw red [effluent] and entered the Sanctuary, he is not liable. If he saw simultaneously whitish and red and entered the Sanctuary, he is liable. There is a Tanna who states: he is not liable. Rebbi Joḥanan said, this is Rebbi Simeon, as it was stated: “Two paths, one pure and one impure. He walked on one of them, entered the Sanctuary on the first one, sprinkled repeatedly, immersed himself, on the second one and entered; he is liable. Rebbi Simeon declares him not liable in this case. Rebbi Simeon ben Jehudah in the name of Rebbi Simeon declares him not liable in all cases.” One understands the androgynus, for whitish [effluent] you declare him to be a woman, for red [effluent] you declare him to be a man. But here there is no known impurity. Rebbi Samuel bar Sosartai said, explain it if he forgot the first. Rebbi Yose asked, where do we hold? If he forgot it forever, it is one path. If he forgot repeatedly, there are two paths. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, Rebbi Simeon parallels Rebbi Eliezer in the interpretation of Ḥizqiah. Just as Rebbi Eliezer said there, until he knows whether he did become impure by a crawling animal or a corpse, so Rebbi Simeon says here, until he knows whether he did become impure by red [effluent] or by whitish. One understands there since he said, a doubt of awareness is awareness. But here, since he saw whitish and red together, it is certain knowledge.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 2:11

Rav Ḥisda asked: What is the situation if he entered the Sanctuary thinking it was a synagogue? Rebbi Yose said, the following is what we are saying: One knew that there exists impurity in the world but he did not know whether one is liable for a sacrifice because of it, that certainly is awareness. But the following is where we hold, if it was clear to him that he was impure but he was oblivious of the Sanctuary, and he entered the Sanctuary. And so if it was clear to him that this was the Sanctuary, he was oblivious of the impurity and entered the Sanctuary.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:1

MISHNAH: There are two kinds of oaths which are four kinds: An oath that I shall eat, or that I shall not eat; that I ate, or that I did not eat. An oath that I shall not eat, when he ate the most minute amount, he is liable, the words of Rebbi Aqiba. They said to Rebbi Aqiba, where do we find that one who eats the most minute amount should be liable, that this one be liable? He told them, where do we find that a person talks and has to bring a sacrifice; but this one talks and has to bring a sacrifice!

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:1

MISHNAH: There are two kinds of oaths which are four kinds: An oath that I shall eat, or that I shall not eat; that I ate, or that I did not eat. An oath that I shall not eat, when he ate the most minute amount, he is liable, the words of Rebbi Aqiba. They said to Rebbi Aqiba, where do we find that one who eats the most minute amount should be liable, that this one be liable? He told them, where do we find that a person talks and has to bring a sacrifice; but this one talks and has to bring a sacrifice!

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:2

HALAKHAH: “There are two kinds of oaths which are four kinds,” etc. One understands “that I shall eat, or that I shall not eat.” “That I ate, or that I did not eat”? Where do we stand? If it is known that he ate and he swore that he did not eat, it is a false oath. But if he was of the opinion that he ate and swore that he did not eat? Rebbi Abba, Rav Jehudah in the name of Rav: If he is inadvertent for its sacrifice or intentional for its sacrifice. But “I was of the opinion that this is not an oath” is permitted. But it must be that he was intentional in the deed but in error about the sacrifice. Did not Rebbi Abbahu say in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Intentional about fat and in error about the sacrifice, one warns him, he is flogged and has to bring a sacrifice. This is impossible, as Rebbi La said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: So did Rebbi Ismael answer Rebbi Aqiba: Do we find a situation where one is liable if intentional because of a false oath and in oblivion because of blurting? Should not Rebbi Aqiba retort, we find a situation where one is liable if intentional because of a false oath and he brings a sacrifice? But we deal here with the case that he was sure that he ate, and he swore, and it turned out that he had not eaten. Not about him who said that this is not an oath? There, if he says this is not an oath; but here if he knows that this is an oath but he errs because of something else.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:2

HALAKHAH: “There are two kinds of oaths which are four kinds,” etc. One understands “that I shall eat, or that I shall not eat.” “That I ate, or that I did not eat”? Where do we stand? If it is known that he ate and he swore that he did not eat, it is a false oath. But if he was of the opinion that he ate and swore that he did not eat? Rebbi Abba, Rav Jehudah in the name of Rav: If he is inadvertent for its sacrifice or intentional for its sacrifice. But “I was of the opinion that this is not an oath” is permitted. But it must be that he was intentional in the deed but in error about the sacrifice. Did not Rebbi Abbahu say in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Intentional about fat and in error about the sacrifice, one warns him, he is flogged and has to bring a sacrifice. This is impossible, as Rebbi La said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: So did Rebbi Ismael answer Rebbi Aqiba: Do we find a situation where one is liable if intentional because of a false oath and in oblivion because of blurting? Should not Rebbi Aqiba retort, we find a situation where one is liable if intentional because of a false oath and he brings a sacrifice? But we deal here with the case that he was sure that he ate, and he swore, and it turned out that he had not eaten. Not about him who said that this is not an oath? There, if he says this is not an oath; but here if he knows that this is an oath but he errs because of something else.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:2

HALAKHAH: “There are two kinds of oaths which are four kinds,” etc. One understands “that I shall eat, or that I shall not eat.” “That I ate, or that I did not eat”? Where do we stand? If it is known that he ate and he swore that he did not eat, it is a false oath. But if he was of the opinion that he ate and swore that he did not eat? Rebbi Abba, Rav Jehudah in the name of Rav: If he is inadvertent for its sacrifice or intentional for its sacrifice. But “I was of the opinion that this is not an oath” is permitted. But it must be that he was intentional in the deed but in error about the sacrifice. Did not Rebbi Abbahu say in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Intentional about fat and in error about the sacrifice, one warns him, he is flogged and has to bring a sacrifice. This is impossible, as Rebbi La said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: So did Rebbi Ismael answer Rebbi Aqiba: Do we find a situation where one is liable if intentional because of a false oath and in oblivion because of blurting? Should not Rebbi Aqiba retort, we find a situation where one is liable if intentional because of a false oath and he brings a sacrifice? But we deal here with the case that he was sure that he ate, and he swore, and it turned out that he had not eaten. Not about him who said that this is not an oath? There, if he says this is not an oath; but here if he knows that this is an oath but he errs because of something else.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:3

Where do we hold? If about one who said, an oath that I shall eat according to Torah standards, even Rebbi Aqiba will agree. And if about one who says, an oath that I shall not taste, even the rabbis will agree. But we hold, about minute amounts. Are minute amounts eating? Explain it following Rebbi Aqiba who said that a minute amount is eating. What is the difference between them? “An oath that I shall eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba he is liable, in the opinion of the rabbis he is not liable. “That I shall not eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba he is not liable, in the opinion of the rabbis he is liable. Also for blurted oaths it is so: “An oath that my wife may not have any usufruct from me if I shall eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba his wife is forbidden [to have usufruct], in the opinion of the rabbis his wife is permitted. “That I shall not eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba his wife is permitted [to have usufruct], in the opinion of the rabbis his wife is forbidden. Also with property it is the same. “An oath that my properties be forbidden to me if I shall eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba they are forbidden, in the opinion of the rabbis his properties are permitted. “That I shall not eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba his properties are permitted, in the opinion of the rabbis they are forbidden.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:4

Does not the blasphemer have to bring a sacrifice? The colleagues in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: They answered him according to his argument. Following your argument, since you say that the blasphemer does not act, where do we find that somebody talks and brings a sacrifice that this one talks and brings a sacrifice? Rebbi Abba from Carthage asked, is not Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish’s argument inverted? There he said, for Rebbi Aqiba the blasphemer does not act. But here he says, the blasphemer is acting in the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba. Rebbi La in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Two Tannaïm following the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba. One said, the blasphemer does not act, and the other said, the blasphemer does act.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:6

HALAKHAH: “An oath that I shall not eat; when he ate,” etc. Drinking is subsumed under eating but eating is not subsumed under drinking. Rebbi Jonah understood all this from: Therefore, I told the Children of Israel, none of you shall eat blood. Where do we hold? If about congealed blood, was it not stated that congealed blood is neither food nor drink? (But we hold, about minute amounts. Are minute amounts eating? Explain it following Rebbi Aqiba who said that a minute amount is eating.) And was it not stated: If one liquefied the blood and swallowed it, or froze fat and ate it, if there is the volume of an olive he is liable. What does Rebbi Jonah do with this? It is not food to become impure in the impurity of food, or fluid to become impure in the impurity of fluids. Rebbi Jonah changed and explained the Mishnah: You shall spend the money for anything you desire. Where do we hold? If about one who gives the taste of wine into a cooked dish, is that not spoiling the taste? But we hold with everything and the Merciful called it “eating.” The rabbis of Caesarea said, explain if about gomraya and orzaraya, since anything that is auxiliary to food is like food.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:6

HALAKHAH: “An oath that I shall not eat; when he ate,” etc. Drinking is subsumed under eating but eating is not subsumed under drinking. Rebbi Jonah understood all this from: Therefore, I told the Children of Israel, none of you shall eat blood. Where do we hold? If about congealed blood, was it not stated that congealed blood is neither food nor drink? (But we hold, about minute amounts. Are minute amounts eating? Explain it following Rebbi Aqiba who said that a minute amount is eating.) And was it not stated: If one liquefied the blood and swallowed it, or froze fat and ate it, if there is the volume of an olive he is liable. What does Rebbi Jonah do with this? It is not food to become impure in the impurity of food, or fluid to become impure in the impurity of fluids. Rebbi Jonah changed and explained the Mishnah: You shall spend the money for anything you desire. Where do we hold? If about one who gives the taste of wine into a cooked dish, is that not spoiling the taste? But we hold with everything and the Merciful called it “eating.” The rabbis of Caesarea said, explain if about gomraya and orzaraya, since anything that is auxiliary to food is like food.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:16

Rebbi Abba bar Mamal asked: According to Rebbi Joḥanan, who said that comprehensive oaths fall on prohibitions, should we not state “an oath that I shall not eat; when he ate”? Rebbi Ze`ira said, in the whole lifetime of Rebbi Abba bar Mamal we did not find an answer; after he had died, we found an answer. Where do we stand? If one said, an oath that I shall not eat meat, including Passover; that I shall not eat during these ten days, including the Day of Atonement, then the oath falls on prohibitions. Rebbi Yose said, one may infer from here if in front of him were olive-sized pieces of slaughtered [meat] and one of carcass meat and he said, [an oath] that I shall eat these ten olive-sized pieces, since he is not liable for the carcass meat, he neither is liable for the remainder.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:23

MISHNAH: Whether matters of himself, or matters of others, or material matters, or immaterial matters. How is this? An oath that I shall give to X, or that I shall not give, that I gave, or that I did not give, that I shall sleep, or that I shall not sleep, that I slept, or that I did not sleep, that I shall throw a pebble into the sea, or that I shall not throw, that I threw, or that I did not throw. Rebbi Ismael said, he is liable only for the future, for it is said to cause evil or cause good. Rebbi Aqiba said to him, if it is so then this refers only to matters of causing evil or good; from where matters which do not refer to causing evil or good? He answered him, from the additional text of the verse. He answered, just as the additional text of the verse is for this, the additional text of the verse is for the other.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:25

How does Rebbi Ismael explain the verse? Or a person, if he would swear blurting out with his lips, a general statement. To cause evil or cause good, a detail. A general statement followed by a detail; the general statement contains only what is in the detail. But the detail only contains matters of causing evil or good! But it is so: To cause evil or cause good, a detail. Anything which a person will blurt out, a general statement. A detail followed by a general statement, everything is included; this adds matters directed towards the past. But it is so: Or a person, if he would swear blurting out with his lips, a general statement. To cause evil or cause good, a detail. Anything which a person will blurt out, a general statement. A general statement followed by a detail followed by a general statement, you only argue in the pattern of the detail. Since the detail is explicit, matters of causing evil or good, from where matters not causing evil or good? “He answered him, from the additional text of the verse. He answered, just as the verse added for this, the verse added for the other.” You cannot, as Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: So did Rebbi Ismael answer Rebbi Aqiba. Do we find cases where one is liable for intentional action because of a false oath but if in oblivion because of a blurted oath? Could he not have objected, do we find cases where one is liable for intentional action because of a false oath and he has to bring a sacrifice? He said to him, do you agree that there are cases which are not matters of causing evil or good, even if they are not written? He told him, even though I accept cases which are not matters of causing evil or good, are they only written if they be matters of causing evil or good? Therefore never for the past.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:25

How does Rebbi Ismael explain the verse? Or a person, if he would swear blurting out with his lips, a general statement. To cause evil or cause good, a detail. A general statement followed by a detail; the general statement contains only what is in the detail. But the detail only contains matters of causing evil or good! But it is so: To cause evil or cause good, a detail. Anything which a person will blurt out, a general statement. A detail followed by a general statement, everything is included; this adds matters directed towards the past. But it is so: Or a person, if he would swear blurting out with his lips, a general statement. To cause evil or cause good, a detail. Anything which a person will blurt out, a general statement. A general statement followed by a detail followed by a general statement, you only argue in the pattern of the detail. Since the detail is explicit, matters of causing evil or good, from where matters not causing evil or good? “He answered him, from the additional text of the verse. He answered, just as the verse added for this, the verse added for the other.” You cannot, as Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: So did Rebbi Ismael answer Rebbi Aqiba. Do we find cases where one is liable for intentional action because of a false oath but if in oblivion because of a blurted oath? Could he not have objected, do we find cases where one is liable for intentional action because of a false oath and he has to bring a sacrifice? He said to him, do you agree that there are cases which are not matters of causing evil or good, even if they are not written? He told him, even though I accept cases which are not matters of causing evil or good, are they only written if they be matters of causing evil or good? Therefore never for the past.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:25

How does Rebbi Ismael explain the verse? Or a person, if he would swear blurting out with his lips, a general statement. To cause evil or cause good, a detail. A general statement followed by a detail; the general statement contains only what is in the detail. But the detail only contains matters of causing evil or good! But it is so: To cause evil or cause good, a detail. Anything which a person will blurt out, a general statement. A detail followed by a general statement, everything is included; this adds matters directed towards the past. But it is so: Or a person, if he would swear blurting out with his lips, a general statement. To cause evil or cause good, a detail. Anything which a person will blurt out, a general statement. A general statement followed by a detail followed by a general statement, you only argue in the pattern of the detail. Since the detail is explicit, matters of causing evil or good, from where matters not causing evil or good? “He answered him, from the additional text of the verse. He answered, just as the verse added for this, the verse added for the other.” You cannot, as Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: So did Rebbi Ismael answer Rebbi Aqiba. Do we find cases where one is liable for intentional action because of a false oath but if in oblivion because of a blurted oath? Could he not have objected, do we find cases where one is liable for intentional action because of a false oath and he has to bring a sacrifice? He said to him, do you agree that there are cases which are not matters of causing evil or good, even if they are not written? He told him, even though I accept cases which are not matters of causing evil or good, are they only written if they be matters of causing evil or good? Therefore never for the past.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:26

MISHNAH: If he swore not to observe a commandment but failed not to observe it, he is not liable; to observe a commandment and did not observe it, he is not liable, though it would have been logical that he should be liable, the words of Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra. Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra said, since he is liable for a permitted purpose, for which he is not sworn to from Mount Sinai, is it not logical that he should be liable about a commandment to which he is sworn from Mount Sinai? They said to him, no. What you say about an oath for permitted purpose where He made “no” equal to “yes”, can you say that about an oath concerning a commandment, where He did not make “no” equal to “yes”? Since one who swears not to observe a commandment but failed not to observe it, is not liable.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:26

MISHNAH: If he swore not to observe a commandment but failed not to observe it, he is not liable; to observe a commandment and did not observe it, he is not liable, though it would have been logical that he should be liable, the words of Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra. Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra said, since he is liable for a permitted purpose, for which he is not sworn to from Mount Sinai, is it not logical that he should be liable about a commandment to which he is sworn from Mount Sinai? They said to him, no. What you say about an oath for permitted purpose where He made “no” equal to “yes”, can you say that about an oath concerning a commandment, where He did not make “no” equal to “yes”? Since one who swears not to observe a commandment but failed not to observe it, is not liable.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:27

HALAKHAH: “If he swore not to observe a commandment,” etc. Rebbi Mani said, so is the Mishnah: “He is liable, the words of Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra.” What Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra said refers to prohibitions in general. “An oath that I shall eat carcass meat,” but he did not eat it. He is not liable. “An oath that I shall eat,” and he ate. If you would say that he is liable, they should have objected to him: No. You declare about an oath for permitted purpose where He made “no” equal to “yes” and “yes” equal to “no”, can you declare this about an oath concerning a commandment, where He did not make “no” equal to “yes”?

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:27

HALAKHAH: “If he swore not to observe a commandment,” etc. Rebbi Mani said, so is the Mishnah: “He is liable, the words of Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra.” What Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra said refers to prohibitions in general. “An oath that I shall eat carcass meat,” but he did not eat it. He is not liable. “An oath that I shall eat,” and he ate. If you would say that he is liable, they should have objected to him: No. You declare about an oath for permitted purpose where He made “no” equal to “yes” and “yes” equal to “no”, can you declare this about an oath concerning a commandment, where He did not make “no” equal to “yes”?

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:28

From where a warning about an oath for a permitted purpose? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, he shall not profane his word, he shall not make his words profane.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:29

MISHNAH: “An oath that I shall not eat this loaf, an oath that I shall not eat it, an oath that I shall not eat it;” he is liable only once. This is the blurted oath where in case it be intentional one is liable for flogging, and if unintentional for a variable sacrifice.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:55

This is the principle: One flogs for any prohibition involving an action, but one does not flog if there is no action except for one who substitutes, or swears, or curses a fellow man by the Name. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: This does not include one who substitutes; substituting implies speech and action. From where one who swears falsely? Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai: For the Eternal will not cleanse; but the judges will cleanse him. From where one who cursed his fellow man by the Name? Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia: To fear the Name, etc. The one who swears falsely in the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish from where? Since he swore falsely, he does not fear. The one who cursed his fellow man by the Name in the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish from where? Since he cursed, he does not fear. What is the difference between them? If one swore falsely and cursed a fellow man by the Name. In Rebbi Joḥanan’s opinion he is liable for two [punishments]. In Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish’s opinion he is only liable for one.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:55

This is the principle: One flogs for any prohibition involving an action, but one does not flog if there is no action except for one who substitutes, or swears, or curses a fellow man by the Name. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: This does not include one who substitutes; substituting implies speech and action. From where one who swears falsely? Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai: For the Eternal will not cleanse; but the judges will cleanse him. From where one who cursed his fellow man by the Name? Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia: To fear the Name, etc. The one who swears falsely in the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish from where? Since he swore falsely, he does not fear. The one who cursed his fellow man by the Name in the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish from where? Since he cursed, he does not fear. What is the difference between them? If one swore falsely and cursed a fellow man by the Name. In Rebbi Joḥanan’s opinion he is liable for two [punishments]. In Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish’s opinion he is only liable for one.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:55

This is the principle: One flogs for any prohibition involving an action, but one does not flog if there is no action except for one who substitutes, or swears, or curses a fellow man by the Name. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: This does not include one who substitutes; substituting implies speech and action. From where one who swears falsely? Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai: For the Eternal will not cleanse; but the judges will cleanse him. From where one who cursed his fellow man by the Name? Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia: To fear the Name, etc. The one who swears falsely in the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish from where? Since he swore falsely, he does not fear. The one who cursed his fellow man by the Name in the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish from where? Since he cursed, he does not fear. What is the difference between them? If one swore falsely and cursed a fellow man by the Name. In Rebbi Joḥanan’s opinion he is liable for two [punishments]. In Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish’s opinion he is only liable for one.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:55

This is the principle: One flogs for any prohibition involving an action, but one does not flog if there is no action except for one who substitutes, or swears, or curses a fellow man by the Name. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: This does not include one who substitutes; substituting implies speech and action. From where one who swears falsely? Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai: For the Eternal will not cleanse; but the judges will cleanse him. From where one who cursed his fellow man by the Name? Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia: To fear the Name, etc. The one who swears falsely in the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish from where? Since he swore falsely, he does not fear. The one who cursed his fellow man by the Name in the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish from where? Since he cursed, he does not fear. What is the difference between them? If one swore falsely and cursed a fellow man by the Name. In Rebbi Joḥanan’s opinion he is liable for two [punishments]. In Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish’s opinion he is only liable for one.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 4:11

From where that witnesses may not be relatives of one another? Think of it, if they be found perjured, would each of them not be killed by the other’s testimony? From where that witnesses may not be relatives of the judges? Think of it, if one of them be found perjured, he could not be killed unless the other also was found perjured. If you say so, would he not be killed by the other’s sentencing?

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 4:11

From where that witnesses may not be relatives of one another? Think of it, if they be found perjured, would each of them not be killed by the other’s testimony? From where that witnesses may not be relatives of the judges? Think of it, if one of them be found perjured, he could not be killed unless the other also was found perjured. If you say so, would he not be killed by the other’s sentencing?

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 4:12

From where that judges may not be relatives of one another? The Torah said, kill on the testimony of witnesses, kill on the sentence of judges. Since witnesses may not be relatives of one another, neither may judges be relatives of one another.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 4:13

So far only fathers and sons; from where the other relatives? Rebbi Ze`ira says, and sons includes the remaining relatives.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 4:15

From where following Rebbi Ismael? Rebbi Ismael stated: The congregation shall judge between the beater, etc. The congregation be neither relatives of the murderer nor relatives of the murdered. Rebbi Yose said, otherwise you would say that the court is engaged in vendetta. This implies that the judges may not be related to the accused. And from where that the witnesses may not be related to the accused? The Torah said, kill on the testimony of witnesses, kill on the sentence of those who vote. Since judges may not be related to the accused, neither may witnesses be related to the accused. From where that witnesses may not be relatives of one another? Think of it, if they be found perjured, would they not be killed by each other’s testimony?

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 4:15

From where following Rebbi Ismael? Rebbi Ismael stated: The congregation shall judge between the beater, etc. The congregation be neither relatives of the murderer nor relatives of the murdered. Rebbi Yose said, otherwise you would say that the court is engaged in vendetta. This implies that the judges may not be related to the accused. And from where that the witnesses may not be related to the accused? The Torah said, kill on the testimony of witnesses, kill on the sentence of those who vote. Since judges may not be related to the accused, neither may witnesses be related to the accused. From where that witnesses may not be relatives of one another? Think of it, if they be found perjured, would they not be killed by each other’s testimony?

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 4:15

From where following Rebbi Ismael? Rebbi Ismael stated: The congregation shall judge between the beater, etc. The congregation be neither relatives of the murderer nor relatives of the murdered. Rebbi Yose said, otherwise you would say that the court is engaged in vendetta. This implies that the judges may not be related to the accused. And from where that the witnesses may not be related to the accused? The Torah said, kill on the testimony of witnesses, kill on the sentence of those who vote. Since judges may not be related to the accused, neither may witnesses be related to the accused. From where that witnesses may not be relatives of one another? Think of it, if they be found perjured, would they not be killed by each other’s testimony?

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 4:16

From where that witnesses may not be relatives of the judges? Think of it, if one of them be found perjured, he could not be killed unless the other also was found perjured. If you say so, would he not be killed by his sentence?

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 4:17

“To qualified but not to disqualified ones.” For it is said, if he does not tell, he has to bear his punishment. If he told, the other would have to pay money. This excludes one where the other would not have to pay money even if he told.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 4:18

“Before the court.” To exclude a single witness. If they told him that they would accept his word as if there were two witnesses, from where? The verse says, if he was a witness, had seen or known; if he does not tell he shall bear his punishment. One who is qualified to testify according to biblical standards; this excludes a single witness who is not qualified to testify.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 4:19

“Outside of court.” If he does not tell, he has to bear his punishment. If he told, one would have to pay money. This excludes outside of court where the other would not have to pay money even if he told.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 4:20

From where two witnesses? And he is a witness, this makes two. Following Rebbi Ismael, who said, any place where the Torah mentions a witness without further determination it implies two witnesses; unless the verse informs you that a single witness is meant. It was found stated in the name of Rebbi Ismael: “Two witnesses.” Can a single witness be found guilty of a blurted oath? Since it is possible to say that one person could team up with him, then he would be subject to the oath of testimony, you could find him liable for an oath of testimony. How could you find him guilty of a blurted oath?

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 4:20

From where two witnesses? And he is a witness, this makes two. Following Rebbi Ismael, who said, any place where the Torah mentions a witness without further determination it implies two witnesses; unless the verse informs you that a single witness is meant. It was found stated in the name of Rebbi Ismael: “Two witnesses.” Can a single witness be found guilty of a blurted oath? Since it is possible to say that one person could team up with him, then he would be subject to the oath of testimony, you could find him liable for an oath of testimony. How could you find him guilty of a blurted oath?

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 4:21

Should a relative be found guilty of a blurted oath? Does it follow what Rebbi Abba said in the name of Samuel: “An oath that X gave to Y,” and it turns out that X had not given; since there is nothing in the future there is nothing in the past. Or the following: “Where is my ox?” He responded, “I do not know what you are referring to.” Rebbi declares him not liable for a keeper’s oath but liable because of a blurted oath. Rebbi Joḥanan said, since it is a religious duty to appease him, he is not liable because of a blurted oath. In the rabbis’ opinion, is there no religious duty to appease him? One appeases with truthful statements, not with lies.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 4:22

Rebbi Ismael stated: He has to bear his punishment, a sacrifice. From where that one needs a court? “Telling, telling”. Since telling mentioned there is before a court, also telling here is before a court.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 4:29

Rebbi Abba, Rav Jehudah in the name of Rav: in error, a sacrifice; intentional, a sacrifice. But if he said, I was of the opinion that this oath does not exist, he is free. Ḥizqiah stated: At any place where the Torah mentions sin without attribute you include intentional equally with unintentional unless Scripture inform you that it is unintentional.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 4:35

HALAKHAH: “I am putting an oath on you that you should come and testify for me,” etc. From where that this only refers to monetary claims? Rebbi Eliezer said, it uses here “or” and it uses “or” with a deposit. Since the “or” used with a deposit only refers to monetary claims, also the “or” used here only refers to monetary claims. The “or” of the homicide will disprove since they do not refer to monetary claims. One argues about “or” accompanied by an oath from “or” accompanied by an oath; the “or” of the homicide cannot disprove since they are not accompanied by an oath. The “or” of the deviant woman will disprove since they are accompanied by an oath and do not refer to monetary claims. One argues about “or” accompanied by an oath not accompanied by a Cohen from similar “or”; the “or” of the deviant woman cannot disprove since they are accompanied by a Cohen. The “or” of blurting lips will disprove since they do not refer to monetary claims. One argues about “or” where He made intent equal to error from similar “or”; the “or” of blurting lips cannot disprove since there He did not make intent equal to error. Rebbi Aqiba says, for some of these one is liable, for some one is not liable. For monetary claims one is liable; for non-monetary claims one is not liable. Rebbi Simeon says, He made liable here and he made liable for a deposit. Since deposits only refer to monetary claims, so here also it only refers to monetary claims.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 4:35

HALAKHAH: “I am putting an oath on you that you should come and testify for me,” etc. From where that this only refers to monetary claims? Rebbi Eliezer said, it uses here “or” and it uses “or” with a deposit. Since the “or” used with a deposit only refers to monetary claims, also the “or” used here only refers to monetary claims. The “or” of the homicide will disprove since they do not refer to monetary claims. One argues about “or” accompanied by an oath from “or” accompanied by an oath; the “or” of the homicide cannot disprove since they are not accompanied by an oath. The “or” of the deviant woman will disprove since they are accompanied by an oath and do not refer to monetary claims. One argues about “or” accompanied by an oath not accompanied by a Cohen from similar “or”; the “or” of the deviant woman cannot disprove since they are accompanied by a Cohen. The “or” of blurting lips will disprove since they do not refer to monetary claims. One argues about “or” where He made intent equal to error from similar “or”; the “or” of blurting lips cannot disprove since there He did not make intent equal to error. Rebbi Aqiba says, for some of these one is liable, for some one is not liable. For monetary claims one is liable; for non-monetary claims one is not liable. Rebbi Simeon says, He made liable here and he made liable for a deposit. Since deposits only refer to monetary claims, so here also it only refers to monetary claims.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 4:52

Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Rebbi Meïr is the one who says that out of a negative one understands a positive. “May He not punish you if you come and testify for me.” Therefore, if you do not come and testify for me He shall punish you. There is not only an imprecation accompanied by an oath. From where one not accompanied by an oath be like one which is accompanied by an oath? The verse says, and heard an imprecation, and heard a voice, to make one without imprecation like one with an imprecation. Therefore not an imprecation without an oath. Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: There is no difference; an imprecation without oath is the same as an oath without an imprecation.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 5:2

HALAKHAH: “An oath about a deposit,” etc. It was stated: Is an oath in his own formulation of an oath of testimony like an imprecation; in his own words is an oath about a deposit like an imprecation? Rebbi Yose said, since it is written “a person, a person”, everything is here and everything is there. Rebbi Mana said, an imprecation made in court is the topic of disagreement between Rebbi Meїr and the Sages. He lied to his fellow man, if his confession was eliminated by the oath. It excludes one who lied to one of partners; it excludes one who lied where there are witnesses and a document. Rebbi Yose said, this implies that if two people took a loan from one person, even if they did not write “we are responsible and warrantors for one another”, they are responsible and warrantors for one another; but one does not act on this. If two made a joint deposit and one came to retrieve his property, one does not listen to him. Should he not be treated as denying his part and be liable? If one made a deposit with two people. If one denied it, he is liable. If the other denied it, he is liable. If the deposit was worth one peruṭa, does this not result in each of them bringing a sacrifice for half a peruṭa? What here? If one would swear, and swear, and swear, would he not bring a sacrifice for half a peruṭa? There, each oath refers to a peruṭa’s worth. Here no oath refers to a peruṭa’s worth.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 5:3

Rebbi La: Both Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both are saying, there is no ”witnesses “here. Why? Because they might die. But might not a document be lost? Therefore, the reason can only be that they might forget their testimony. There, we have stated: “Where is my ox? He told him, it is lost. I want you to swear, he said, Amen. But witnesses testify that he ate it. He has to pay the value. If he confessed himself, he has to pay the value, and the fifth, and the reparation sacrifice.” The Mishnah [applies] if he does not know that there are witnesses. He comes to tell you, even if he knows that there are witnesses. Rebbi Yose said, the Mishnah says so: “If there were two groups of witnesses, if the first group reneged and after this the second, both are liable.” One understands that the first group becomes liable. Why the second? Not because they might forget their testimony? [Here also, because they (are commanded) to forget their testimony.]

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 5:4

He denied it, not him. “Ben Azzai says, there are three kinds of lost properties. One who knows about it and its finder; about it but not about its finder; neither about it nor about its finder.” Rebbi Onias in the name of Rebbi Jeremiah: All of them to relieve from liability. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Yose: This is not so. Rebbi Yose asked, why should it be to relieve from liability? Rebbi Mana said, the three kinds of lost property cannot be “one who knows about it and its finder; about it but not about its finder; neither about it nor about its finder.” About it and its finder, that is where we hold. But it must be about one who denies [knowledge] about it and its finder; about its finder but not about it; about it but not about its finder. So is the baraita: “About it and its finder.”

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 5:19

HALAKHAH: “Give me the deposit, the loan,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said, Rebbi Simeon implies that if it turns out that he had no wheat, he is not liable for the rest. Rebbi Abba said, even Rebbi (Yasa) will agree with this. If it turns out that he had no wheat, does [the oath] refer to the other kinds? The colleagues said, it does not. Rebbi Ze`ira said, it does. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, a baraita supports what the colleagues said. “A woman made a vow as a nazir and her friend heard it and said, ‘so am I’; the first woman’s husband heard it and dissolved [the vow] for her; the first one is permitted and the second forbidden. If she said, ‘my intention was only to be like her,’ both are permitted.” Because she said, “to be like her, in her state”. Therefore, if she did not say “to be like her, in her state”, the first is permitted and the second forbidden. Since there, where the essence is not an oath, you say it applies, here, where there was an original oath, not so much more? What Rebbi Joḥanan said, Rebbi Simeon implies if it turns out that he had no wheat, he is not liable for the rest, if he connects: If he says, [my obligation for] barley shall be like that for wheat; [my obligation for] spelt shall be like that for wheat.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 5:19

HALAKHAH: “Give me the deposit, the loan,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said, Rebbi Simeon implies that if it turns out that he had no wheat, he is not liable for the rest. Rebbi Abba said, even Rebbi (Yasa) will agree with this. If it turns out that he had no wheat, does [the oath] refer to the other kinds? The colleagues said, it does not. Rebbi Ze`ira said, it does. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, a baraita supports what the colleagues said. “A woman made a vow as a nazir and her friend heard it and said, ‘so am I’; the first woman’s husband heard it and dissolved [the vow] for her; the first one is permitted and the second forbidden. If she said, ‘my intention was only to be like her,’ both are permitted.” Because she said, “to be like her, in her state”. Therefore, if she did not say “to be like her, in her state”, the first is permitted and the second forbidden. Since there, where the essence is not an oath, you say it applies, here, where there was an original oath, not so much more? What Rebbi Joḥanan said, Rebbi Simeon implies if it turns out that he had no wheat, he is not liable for the rest, if he connects: If he says, [my obligation for] barley shall be like that for wheat; [my obligation for] spelt shall be like that for wheat.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 5:24

HALAKHAH: “You raped or seduced my daughter,” etc. Rebbi Ze`ira, Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The words of Rebbi Simeon [imply that] the main claim is for the fine, which is not so for the words of the Sages. Rebbi Illa said, the words of Rebbi Simeon if he claims the fine, shame and diminution; the words of the Sages if he claims shame, diminution, and fine. The rabbis say, the words of Rebbi Simeon if he advances three claims; the words of the Sages if he advances one claim. Rebbi Ze`ira asked before Rebbi Yasa, did you hear explicitly from Rebbi Joḥanan, or from his word? Rebbi Yasa said, for he is of the rabbis’ opinion. Rebbi Mana said, even if he is of Rebbi Illa’s opinion, the words of Rebbi Simeon if he advances one claim; the words of the Sages if he advances three claims. “Not only matters for which he has to pay the capital, from where double payment, quadruple and quintuple payment, the rapist, and the seducer, and the calumniator? The verse says, everything about which one would swear falsely.” Is the calumniator’s not a fine? Rebbi Jeremiah says, this is Rebbi Simeon’s who said, all depends on the collection.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 6:4

Rebbi Abba, Rav Jehudah in the name of Samuel: In any case where two [witnesses] make him liable to pay money, a single witness sets him up for an oath. But do not two [witnesses] make him liable for real estate? It is a difference since one does not swear about real estate. But do not two [witnesses] make him liable for a fine? There is a difference since one does not swear about a fine. But do not two [witnesses] make him liable for a peruṭah? Is it so? Have we not stated: “A judicial oath is about a claim of two silver coins and the acknowledgment of one peruṭah.” Our Mishnah, when he swears by his own formulation. What (Rebbi) Samuel said, when he swears by the formulation of others. Rav Ḥisda and his group disagree. “A judicial oath”, any judicial oath. There is no difference whether he swears by his own formulation or he swears by the formulation of others, he cannot be liable except for a claim.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 6:20

HALAKHAH: “One does not swear on the claim of a deaf-and-dumb person, an insane person, or a minor,” etc. It is written: If a man give to his neighbor, to exclude the minor. So far if a minor gave to him and the minor requested from him. If he gave it as a minor and requested it as an adult? The verse says, his neighbor; only if giving and requesting are equal. Rebbi Abba bar Mamal said, is that not obvious by what Rebbi Joḥanan said, one who claims a claim of theft in respect of his neighbor’s lost object is liable? “Where is my lost object?” He told him, it was stolen. Rebbi Abba said, explain it if he told him, you already asked me when you were underage and I was freed from swearing for you. An oath of the Eternal shall be between both of them, to exclude the heir. Rebbi Illa in the name of Rebbi Yasa: The baraita is about the heir.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 7:2

HALAKHAH: “All who must swear by Torah standards,” etc. One understands from what is said, an oath before the Eternal shall be between them, would we not know that if he does not swear, he has to pay? Why does the verse say, its owner shall take it, and he does not have to pay? But from the moment the owner accepted his oath, he does not have to pay. Rebbi Ḥaggai asked before Rebbi Yose: Is this only following Rebbi Meїr or even following the rabbis? Did not Rebbi Assi say in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Rebbi Meїr is the one who says that out of a negative one understands a positive? Its owner shall take it, and he does not have to pay, therefore if he does not swear, he has to pay. Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: The unpaid and the paid trustees may stipulate to be like a borrower. Rebbi Ḥanina said, everybody agrees that in the language of the Torah out of a negative one understands a positive; where do they disagree? In everyday speech.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 7:7

Rav Huna said, if after he swore he brought witnesses that it was standing at the feeding trough, the oath already had robbed it. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav Huna: “ ‘Where is my ox?’ He told him, it was lost. ‘I am putting an oath on you,’ and he said Amen. But witnesses testify that he ate it. He has to pay the value. If he confessed on his own, he pays the value, an additional fifth, and a reparation offering”. The Mishnah if he ate it and only later swore to him. What Rav Huna said, it he swore to him and only later ate it.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 7:15

HALAKHAH: “The injured one, how,” etc. “Rebbi Jehudah was calling them beaters. Any time they are rubbing one another, he swears and collects. If he was bitten at a place where he could not bite himself, he collects without oath. At a later time if one says, you injured me, but the other says, I did not injure, this is like any other claim.”

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 7:21

When does one accept one who is suspect in matters of oaths? From when he comes to the court and says, I am suspect. Where do we hold? If one who stands here and is obligated to swear for another, does the court deliver an oath to a suspect person? But we must hold about one who has a suit at a court where he is unknown and tells them, this man is suspect. Also about one who stands and another owes him an oath and he forgives it.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 7:21

When does one accept one who is suspect in matters of oaths? From when he comes to the court and says, I am suspect. Where do we hold? If one who stands here and is obligated to swear for another, does the court deliver an oath to a suspect person? But we must hold about one who has a suit at a court where he is unknown and tells them, this man is suspect. Also about one who stands and another owes him an oath and he forgives it.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 8:7

For the borrower only the broken is written. From where loss and theft? It is logical. Since the paid keeper and the renter who do not pay for the broken or the dead have to pay for theft and loss, the borrower who pays for the broken or the dead certainly has to pay for theft and loss. It was stated about this: This is an argument de minore ad majus which cannot be challenged. From where the abducted? It is said here, it was broken or died; and it is said there, it dies or was broken. Since there the abducted was included, here also the abducted was included. So far following Rebbi Aqiba. Following Rebbi Ismael? Rebbi Ismael follows Rebbi Nathan. Rebbi Nathan says, or, to include the abducted. Or following Rebbi Meïr who said, an equal cut at the place it comes from. Since there one swears for duress, also here one swears for duress. Still following Rebbi Nathan, for Rebbi Nathan said, or it died, to include the abducted one.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 8:7

For the borrower only the broken is written. From where loss and theft? It is logical. Since the paid keeper and the renter who do not pay for the broken or the dead have to pay for theft and loss, the borrower who pays for the broken or the dead certainly has to pay for theft and loss. It was stated about this: This is an argument de minore ad majus which cannot be challenged. From where the abducted? It is said here, it was broken or died; and it is said there, it dies or was broken. Since there the abducted was included, here also the abducted was included. So far following Rebbi Aqiba. Following Rebbi Ismael? Rebbi Ismael follows Rebbi Nathan. Rebbi Nathan says, or, to include the abducted. Or following Rebbi Meïr who said, an equal cut at the place it comes from. Since there one swears for duress, also here one swears for duress. Still following Rebbi Nathan, for Rebbi Nathan said, or it died, to include the abducted one.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 8:9

It was said, if its owners were with him, he does not have to pay. Does he have to swear? Rebbi Ze`ira said, he swears. Rebbi Ḥanina and Rebbi La both are saying, he does not swear. A baraita supports Rebbi Ḥanina and Rebbi La: “Breakage, abduction, and death for which he is not liable in the cases of the paid keeper and the renter, and the borrower with the owner is not liable, without the owner is liable; loss and theft where the paid keeper and the renter are liable, is it not that a fortiori the borrower be not liable with the owner but liable without the owner?” For him who says it is obvious that he swears, should he not have to pay? Rebbi Ḥanina in the name of Rebbi Yudan: A baraita supports Rebbi Ze`ira. “The borrower, for whom the Torah was restrictive, with the owner is not liable, without the owner is liable; the paid keeper, for whom the Torah was lenient, a fortiori with the owner should not be liable, without the owner should be liable.” If you are saying, his problem was swearing, he should have stated “the paid keeper and the renter.” That means he only needs it for payment. It is difficult for Rebbi Ze`ira: the borrower swears if the owner was with him; if the owner was not with him he must pay. The unpaid keeper swears, whether the owner was with him or was not with him. You are saying that where the borrower pays the paid keeper swears. Where the paid keeper swears, the unpaid keeper should not be liable. Where the paid keeper pays, the unpaid keeper swears. What do you state about an unpaid keeper when the owner be with him? But some are asking, what do you state about an unpaid and a paid keeper, whether or not the owner be with him? Rebbi Abin said, any word of criminality. Rebbi Mana said, do we not find that the Torah treated loss and theft equally for the borrower? Therefore, we shall treat breakage, abduction, and death equally both for the unpaid and the paid keepers.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 8:9

It was said, if its owners were with him, he does not have to pay. Does he have to swear? Rebbi Ze`ira said, he swears. Rebbi Ḥanina and Rebbi La both are saying, he does not swear. A baraita supports Rebbi Ḥanina and Rebbi La: “Breakage, abduction, and death for which he is not liable in the cases of the paid keeper and the renter, and the borrower with the owner is not liable, without the owner is liable; loss and theft where the paid keeper and the renter are liable, is it not that a fortiori the borrower be not liable with the owner but liable without the owner?” For him who says it is obvious that he swears, should he not have to pay? Rebbi Ḥanina in the name of Rebbi Yudan: A baraita supports Rebbi Ze`ira. “The borrower, for whom the Torah was restrictive, with the owner is not liable, without the owner is liable; the paid keeper, for whom the Torah was lenient, a fortiori with the owner should not be liable, without the owner should be liable.” If you are saying, his problem was swearing, he should have stated “the paid keeper and the renter.” That means he only needs it for payment. It is difficult for Rebbi Ze`ira: the borrower swears if the owner was with him; if the owner was not with him he must pay. The unpaid keeper swears, whether the owner was with him or was not with him. You are saying that where the borrower pays the paid keeper swears. Where the paid keeper swears, the unpaid keeper should not be liable. Where the paid keeper pays, the unpaid keeper swears. What do you state about an unpaid keeper when the owner be with him? But some are asking, what do you state about an unpaid and a paid keeper, whether or not the owner be with him? Rebbi Abin said, any word of criminality. Rebbi Mana said, do we not find that the Torah treated loss and theft equally for the borrower? Therefore, we shall treat breakage, abduction, and death equally both for the unpaid and the paid keepers.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 8:9

It was said, if its owners were with him, he does not have to pay. Does he have to swear? Rebbi Ze`ira said, he swears. Rebbi Ḥanina and Rebbi La both are saying, he does not swear. A baraita supports Rebbi Ḥanina and Rebbi La: “Breakage, abduction, and death for which he is not liable in the cases of the paid keeper and the renter, and the borrower with the owner is not liable, without the owner is liable; loss and theft where the paid keeper and the renter are liable, is it not that a fortiori the borrower be not liable with the owner but liable without the owner?” For him who says it is obvious that he swears, should he not have to pay? Rebbi Ḥanina in the name of Rebbi Yudan: A baraita supports Rebbi Ze`ira. “The borrower, for whom the Torah was restrictive, with the owner is not liable, without the owner is liable; the paid keeper, for whom the Torah was lenient, a fortiori with the owner should not be liable, without the owner should be liable.” If you are saying, his problem was swearing, he should have stated “the paid keeper and the renter.” That means he only needs it for payment. It is difficult for Rebbi Ze`ira: the borrower swears if the owner was with him; if the owner was not with him he must pay. The unpaid keeper swears, whether the owner was with him or was not with him. You are saying that where the borrower pays the paid keeper swears. Where the paid keeper swears, the unpaid keeper should not be liable. Where the paid keeper pays, the unpaid keeper swears. What do you state about an unpaid keeper when the owner be with him? But some are asking, what do you state about an unpaid and a paid keeper, whether or not the owner be with him? Rebbi Abin said, any word of criminality. Rebbi Mana said, do we not find that the Torah treated loss and theft equally for the borrower? Therefore, we shall treat breakage, abduction, and death equally both for the unpaid and the paid keepers.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 8:9

It was said, if its owners were with him, he does not have to pay. Does he have to swear? Rebbi Ze`ira said, he swears. Rebbi Ḥanina and Rebbi La both are saying, he does not swear. A baraita supports Rebbi Ḥanina and Rebbi La: “Breakage, abduction, and death for which he is not liable in the cases of the paid keeper and the renter, and the borrower with the owner is not liable, without the owner is liable; loss and theft where the paid keeper and the renter are liable, is it not that a fortiori the borrower be not liable with the owner but liable without the owner?” For him who says it is obvious that he swears, should he not have to pay? Rebbi Ḥanina in the name of Rebbi Yudan: A baraita supports Rebbi Ze`ira. “The borrower, for whom the Torah was restrictive, with the owner is not liable, without the owner is liable; the paid keeper, for whom the Torah was lenient, a fortiori with the owner should not be liable, without the owner should be liable.” If you are saying, his problem was swearing, he should have stated “the paid keeper and the renter.” That means he only needs it for payment. It is difficult for Rebbi Ze`ira: the borrower swears if the owner was with him; if the owner was not with him he must pay. The unpaid keeper swears, whether the owner was with him or was not with him. You are saying that where the borrower pays the paid keeper swears. Where the paid keeper swears, the unpaid keeper should not be liable. Where the paid keeper pays, the unpaid keeper swears. What do you state about an unpaid keeper when the owner be with him? But some are asking, what do you state about an unpaid and a paid keeper, whether or not the owner be with him? Rebbi Abin said, any word of criminality. Rebbi Mana said, do we not find that the Torah treated loss and theft equally for the borrower? Therefore, we shall treat breakage, abduction, and death equally both for the unpaid and the paid keepers.