would
8268 occurrences across the corpus
The Jerusalem Talmud
HALAKHAH: “That you would have usufruct from me,” etc. He is forbidden to have usufruct from her immediately, for maybe she would go after Passover and it would turn out that his having usufruct would be retroactively [forbidden].
HALAKHAH: “That you would have usufruct from me,” etc. He is forbidden to have usufruct from her immediately, for maybe she would go after Passover and it would turn out that his having usufruct would be retroactively [forbidden].
HALAKHAH: “That you would have usufruct from me,” etc. He is forbidden to have usufruct from her immediately, for maybe she would go after Passover and it would turn out that his having usufruct would be retroactively [forbidden].
MISHNAH: ‘That you provide me with usufruct from you until Tabernacles if you would go to your father’s house until Passover.’ If she went before Passover, she is forbidden to deliver usufruct to him until Tabernacles; but she is permitted to go after Passover.
HALAKHAH: “That you would have usufruct from me until Tabernacles,” etc. He is forbidden to have usufruct from her immediately, for maybe she would go after Passover and it would turn out that his having usufruct would be retroactively [forbidden].
HALAKHAH: “That you would have usufruct from me until Tabernacles,” etc. He is forbidden to have usufruct from her immediately, for maybe she would go after Passover and it would turn out that his having usufruct would be retroactively [forbidden].
HALAKHAH: “That you would have usufruct from me until Tabernacles,” etc. He is forbidden to have usufruct from her immediately, for maybe she would go after Passover and it would turn out that his having usufruct would be retroactively [forbidden].
HALAKHAH: “That you would have usufruct from me until Tabernacles,” etc. He is forbidden to have usufruct from her immediately, for maybe she would go after Passover and it would turn out that his having usufruct would be retroactively [forbidden].
HALAKHAH: “ ‘A qônām that I shall not taste wine today,’ ” etc. This implies that he is permitted at nightfall. Does this not disagree with Rebbi Joḥanan, since Rebbi Joḥanan said, in matters of vows one follows common usage? It is not usual that a man should say to another in the evening, I did not eat until evening. Would he say, yesterday? Refer to the following and it does disagree: It is not usual that a man should say to another in the morning, I did not eat in the evening. Would he say, the same day? Does the following not disagree? This day from this week, or this week from this day? What is the difference between “this day” and “today”? That is, following the opinion that in matters of vows one follows common usage. But here, one follows the opinion that in matters of vows one follows biblical usage. Rebbi Jonah from Bostra said, it is the way of people to say to another, bear with me this day.
HALAKHAH: “ ‘A qônām that I shall not taste wine today,’ ” etc. This implies that he is permitted at nightfall. Does this not disagree with Rebbi Joḥanan, since Rebbi Joḥanan said, in matters of vows one follows common usage? It is not usual that a man should say to another in the evening, I did not eat until evening. Would he say, yesterday? Refer to the following and it does disagree: It is not usual that a man should say to another in the morning, I did not eat in the evening. Would he say, the same day? Does the following not disagree? This day from this week, or this week from this day? What is the difference between “this day” and “today”? That is, following the opinion that in matters of vows one follows common usage. But here, one follows the opinion that in matters of vows one follows biblical usage. Rebbi Jonah from Bostra said, it is the way of people to say to another, bear with me this day.
There, we have stated: “Until the beginning of Adar, until the beginning of the First Adar. Until the end of Adar, until the end of the First Adar.” Does this imply that Nisan is the beginning of the year as far as vows are concerned? Tishre is the beginning of the year as far as vows are concerned. That you should not say, the beginning of Adar should compensate for Ellul and he would be permitted in Ellul; therefore, it was necessary to say that “he is forbidden it and its intercalary [month]”.
HALAKHAH: Does this imply that Nisan is the beginning of the year as far as vows are concerned? Tishre is is the beginning of the year as far as vows are concerned. That you should not say, the beginning of Adar should compensate for Ellul and he would be permitted in Ellul; therefore, it was necessary to say that “he is forbidden it and its intercalary [month]”.
Rebbi Jeremiah asked: Since you say, one opens for him by the honor of his father and mother; in things between him and the Omnipresent, one does not open for him by the honor of the Omnipresent. But since in matters between him and his father and mother one opens for him by the honor of his father and mother; similarly, in things between him and the Omnipresent should one not open for him by the honor of the Omnipresent? What is the honor of the Omnipresent? For example, that I shall not make a tabernacle, that I shall not take a lulab, that I shall not put on phylacteries. One understands that he does it for his own benefit. As in the following: “If you are just, what are you giving Him?” “If you sinned, what would you do to Him?” Rebbi Yannai said, one who listens to his urges is as if he worshipped idols. What is the reason? “In yourself there shall be no alien force; do not bow down to a foreign god.”
Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish provided an opening: If you had known that one who makes a vow is as if he put a neck-iron on his neck, would you have made the vow? It is as if a gang of prisoners was passing by, he saw that there was one unused neck-iron and put his head into it! “To bind a prohibition onto himself”, as you say, “he was bound with chains.” Rebbi Jonathan provided an opening: If you had known that one who makes a vow is like one who builds an idolatrous altar and one who continues in it is like one who sacrifices there, would you have made the vow? That is difficult to understand. Idolatry is a capital crime but vows are a simple prohibition; how can you say that? You have only what Rebbi Yannai said, one who listens to his urges is as if he worshipped idols. Rebbi Isaac provided an opening: If you had known that one who makes a vow is like one who takes a sword and sticks it in his heart, would you have made the vow? “Some talk bluntly like sword piercings.” Rebbi Ḥanina from Sepphoris in the name of Rebbi Phineas: It does not say “piercing” but “sword piercings”. For example, one who made a vow not to eat a loaf. Woe if he eats, woe if he does not eat. If he eats he transgresses his vow. If he does not eat he sins against himself. What can he do? He goes to a Sage who will dissolve his vow, “but the speech of Sages is healing. Rebbi Eudaimon in the name of Rebbi Isaac: Is it not enough what the Torah forbade you that you want to forbid other things for yourself? “To forbid a prohibition”.
Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish provided an opening: If you had known that one who makes a vow is as if he put a neck-iron on his neck, would you have made the vow? It is as if a gang of prisoners was passing by, he saw that there was one unused neck-iron and put his head into it! “To bind a prohibition onto himself”, as you say, “he was bound with chains.” Rebbi Jonathan provided an opening: If you had known that one who makes a vow is like one who builds an idolatrous altar and one who continues in it is like one who sacrifices there, would you have made the vow? That is difficult to understand. Idolatry is a capital crime but vows are a simple prohibition; how can you say that? You have only what Rebbi Yannai said, one who listens to his urges is as if he worshipped idols. Rebbi Isaac provided an opening: If you had known that one who makes a vow is like one who takes a sword and sticks it in his heart, would you have made the vow? “Some talk bluntly like sword piercings.” Rebbi Ḥanina from Sepphoris in the name of Rebbi Phineas: It does not say “piercing” but “sword piercings”. For example, one who made a vow not to eat a loaf. Woe if he eats, woe if he does not eat. If he eats he transgresses his vow. If he does not eat he sins against himself. What can he do? He goes to a Sage who will dissolve his vow, “but the speech of Sages is healing. Rebbi Eudaimon in the name of Rebbi Isaac: Is it not enough what the Torah forbade you that you want to forbid other things for yourself? “To forbid a prohibition”.
Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish provided an opening: If you had known that one who makes a vow is as if he put a neck-iron on his neck, would you have made the vow? It is as if a gang of prisoners was passing by, he saw that there was one unused neck-iron and put his head into it! “To bind a prohibition onto himself”, as you say, “he was bound with chains.” Rebbi Jonathan provided an opening: If you had known that one who makes a vow is like one who builds an idolatrous altar and one who continues in it is like one who sacrifices there, would you have made the vow? That is difficult to understand. Idolatry is a capital crime but vows are a simple prohibition; how can you say that? You have only what Rebbi Yannai said, one who listens to his urges is as if he worshipped idols. Rebbi Isaac provided an opening: If you had known that one who makes a vow is like one who takes a sword and sticks it in his heart, would you have made the vow? “Some talk bluntly like sword piercings.” Rebbi Ḥanina from Sepphoris in the name of Rebbi Phineas: It does not say “piercing” but “sword piercings”. For example, one who made a vow not to eat a loaf. Woe if he eats, woe if he does not eat. If he eats he transgresses his vow. If he does not eat he sins against himself. What can he do? He goes to a Sage who will dissolve his vow, “but the speech of Sages is healing. Rebbi Eudaimon in the name of Rebbi Isaac: Is it not enough what the Torah forbade you that you want to forbid other things for yourself? “To forbid a prohibition”.
Rebbi Joḥanan provided an opening by having second thoughts: “If it were not for that, would he have come?” Are second thoughts not something new? Rebbi Hila said, second thoughts are a common occurrence. In this kind, Rebbi Simeon did not find an opening for his own vow until one of the Galilean Elders came; some say, that one was Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar. He took him from here and put him there; he took him from here and put him there, until finally he put him into the sun and told him to check his garments for fleas. They said to him, if you had known that this old man would treat you in such a way, would you have made the vow? He said, No. He permitted him. They asked, from where do you have this? He said to them, I was Meïr’s servant both times when he fled, but some say, Rebbi Meïr’s walking stick was in my hand and it teaches me knowledge.
Rebbi Joḥanan provided an opening by having second thoughts: “If it were not for that, would he have come?” Are second thoughts not something new? Rebbi Hila said, second thoughts are a common occurrence. In this kind, Rebbi Simeon did not find an opening for his own vow until one of the Galilean Elders came; some say, that one was Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar. He took him from here and put him there; he took him from here and put him there, until finally he put him into the sun and told him to check his garments for fleas. They said to him, if you had known that this old man would treat you in such a way, would you have made the vow? He said, No. He permitted him. They asked, from where do you have this? He said to them, I was Meïr’s servant both times when he fled, but some say, Rebbi Meïr’s walking stick was in my hand and it teaches me knowledge.
Rebbi Joḥanan provided an opening by having second thoughts: “If it were not for that, would he have come?” Are second thoughts not something new? Rebbi Hila said, second thoughts are a common occurrence. In this kind, Rebbi Simeon did not find an opening for his own vow until one of the Galilean Elders came; some say, that one was Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar. He took him from here and put him there; he took him from here and put him there, until finally he put him into the sun and told him to check his garments for fleas. They said to him, if you had known that this old man would treat you in such a way, would you have made the vow? He said, No. He permitted him. They asked, from where do you have this? He said to them, I was Meïr’s servant both times when he fled, but some say, Rebbi Meïr’s walking stick was in my hand and it teaches me knowledge.
Rebbi Mana made a vow away from his father’s wine. His father came to him and said to him, would you have made that vow if you had known that I am hurt by it? He said, no. He dissolved for him. Where do we hold? If he said, my benefit [is forbidden] to my father; is that not what Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa, Rebbi Samuel bar Naḥman said in the name of Rebbi Jonathan: One forces the son to support his father. But we must hold that he said, my father’s benefit [is forbidden] to me. Rebbi Mana made a vow and came to Rebbi Shammai, who said to him, would you have made that vow if you had known that people do not want to deal with you since you are a vower? He said, no, and he dissolved for him.
Rebbi Mana made a vow away from his father’s wine. His father came to him and said to him, would you have made that vow if you had known that I am hurt by it? He said, no. He dissolved for him. Where do we hold? If he said, my benefit [is forbidden] to my father; is that not what Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa, Rebbi Samuel bar Naḥman said in the name of Rebbi Jonathan: One forces the son to support his father. But we must hold that he said, my father’s benefit [is forbidden] to me. Rebbi Mana made a vow and came to Rebbi Shammai, who said to him, would you have made that vow if you had known that people do not want to deal with you since you are a vower? He said, no, and he dissolved for him.
MISHNAH: In addition, Rebbi Eliezer said, one finds an opening in changed circumstances, but the Sages forbid it. How is this? If he said, a qônām that I shall not benefit from Mr. X, who then becomes a public scribe or who marries off his son to one of [the vower’s] relatives, and he said, if I had known that he will become a public scribe or marry off his son to a relative, I would not have vowed; or if he said, a qônām that I shall not enter this house and it was turned into a synagogue and he said, if I had known that it would become a synagogue, I would not have vowed; Rebbi Eliezer permits but the Sages prohibit.
MISHNAH: In addition, Rebbi Eliezer said, one finds an opening in changed circumstances, but the Sages forbid it. How is this? If he said, a qônām that I shall not benefit from Mr. X, who then becomes a public scribe or who marries off his son to one of [the vower’s] relatives, and he said, if I had known that he will become a public scribe or marry off his son to a relative, I would not have vowed; or if he said, a qônām that I shall not enter this house and it was turned into a synagogue and he said, if I had known that it would become a synagogue, I would not have vowed; Rebbi Eliezer permits but the Sages prohibit.
MISHNAH: In addition, Rebbi Eliezer said, one finds an opening in changed circumstances, but the Sages forbid it. How is this? If he said, a qônām that I shall not benefit from Mr. X, who then becomes a public scribe or who marries off his son to one of [the vower’s] relatives, and he said, if I had known that he will become a public scribe or marry off his son to a relative, I would not have vowed; or if he said, a qônām that I shall not enter this house and it was turned into a synagogue and he said, if I had known that it would become a synagogue, I would not have vowed; Rebbi Eliezer permits but the Sages prohibit.
HALAKHAH: “In addition, Rebbi Eliezer said, one finds an opening in changed circumstances,” etc. Rebbi Simon in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: Rebbi Eliezer learned from Moses, to whom the Holy One, praise to Him, provided an opening by changed circumstances. The Holy One, praise to Him, said to him: If you had known that “all the men who want to kill you have died,” would you have vowed? But did they really die? Were they not Dathan and Abiram? Only, they became poor.
Rebbi Jeremiah said, what you say is only that there are changed circumstances before the matter is discussed. The force of Rebbi Yose is from the following: “That was the error of Naḥum the Mede.” What was his error? That he found them an opening by changed circumstances. “Naḥum the Mede said to them: ‘Would you have made a vow to become nezirim if you had known that the Temple would be destroyed at some future time?’ ” Rebbi Ze‘ira said, the following he should have said to them: Did you not know that the earlier prophets had prophesied while the Temple was standing that eventually it would be destroyed? Then there are no changed circumstances. Rebbi Hila said, still it is changed circumstances. They could have said to him, we knew it, but it seemed to us that this referred to the far future: “The vision he sees is for many years; for faraway times he prophesies.” It turns out that Rebbi Jeremiah parallels Rebbi Ze‘ira and Rebbi Yose parallels Rebbi Hila.
Rebbi Jeremiah said, what you say is only that there are changed circumstances before the matter is discussed. The force of Rebbi Yose is from the following: “That was the error of Naḥum the Mede.” What was his error? That he found them an opening by changed circumstances. “Naḥum the Mede said to them: ‘Would you have made a vow to become nezirim if you had known that the Temple would be destroyed at some future time?’ ” Rebbi Ze‘ira said, the following he should have said to them: Did you not know that the earlier prophets had prophesied while the Temple was standing that eventually it would be destroyed? Then there are no changed circumstances. Rebbi Hila said, still it is changed circumstances. They could have said to him, we knew it, but it seemed to us that this referred to the far future: “The vision he sees is for many years; for faraway times he prophesies.” It turns out that Rebbi Jeremiah parallels Rebbi Ze‘ira and Rebbi Yose parallels Rebbi Hila.
Rebbi Jeremiah said, what you say is only that there are changed circumstances before the matter is discussed. The force of Rebbi Yose is from the following: “That was the error of Naḥum the Mede.” What was his error? That he found them an opening by changed circumstances. “Naḥum the Mede said to them: ‘Would you have made a vow to become nezirim if you had known that the Temple would be destroyed at some future time?’ ” Rebbi Ze‘ira said, the following he should have said to them: Did you not know that the earlier prophets had prophesied while the Temple was standing that eventually it would be destroyed? Then there are no changed circumstances. Rebbi Hila said, still it is changed circumstances. They could have said to him, we knew it, but it seemed to us that this referred to the far future: “The vision he sees is for many years; for faraway times he prophesies.” It turns out that Rebbi Jeremiah parallels Rebbi Ze‘ira and Rebbi Yose parallels Rebbi Hila.
HALAKHAH: “Rebbi Meïr says, there are things like changed circumstances”. Samuel says, because of an erroneous vow; the dog was already dead, the snake had already been killed. Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Eleazar, because he is like someone who makes his vow dependent on something: A qônām that I shall have no benefit from this man as long as he wears black garments. If he wore white, he would be permitted to him. Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: That one does not need the permission of a Sage.
MISHNAH: In addition, Rebbi Meïr said, one opens for him with what is written in the Torah. One says to him, if you had realized that you sin against “you shall not take revenge”, “you shall not nurse hatred”, “you shall not hate your brother in your heart, “you shall love your neighbor as yourself”, “let your brother live with you”, maybe he would become poor and you cannot provide for him! If he said, if I had realized this, I would not have vowed, he is permitted.
MISHNAH: In addition, Rebbi Meïr said, one opens for him with what is written in the Torah. One says to him, if you had realized that you sin against “you shall not take revenge”, “you shall not nurse hatred”, “you shall not hate your brother in your heart, “you shall love your neighbor as yourself”, “let your brother live with you”, maybe he would become poor and you cannot provide for him! If he said, if I had realized this, I would not have vowed, he is permitted.
“Maybe he would become poor”. Are these not changed circumstances? Rebbi Ze‘ira said, poverty is frequent. As the following: A man had a lawsuit against a rich man. He wanted to be judged before Rav; Rav sent for [the rich man], who said: For this one I should come to court? If all the camels of Arabia came they could not carry all the leather sacks containing my mortgages! [Rav] heard this and said, what does this one pride himself with what is not his! There should be depreciation of it! Immediately there came a royal decree that he and his property should belong to the treasury. He [the rich man] came before Rav and said to him, pray for me that my personality could be restored. He prayed, and it was restored to him.
MISHNAH: One creates an opening for a man with his wife’s ketubah. It happened that one vowed usufruct from his wife whose ketubah was 400 denar. She came before Rebbi Aqiba who obliged him to give her her ketubah. He said, Rebbi, my father left 800 denar. My brother took 400 and I 400, would it not be enough if she take 200 and I 200? Rebbi Aqiba told him, even if you have to sell the hair on your head, you will pay her ketubah. He said to him, if I had known that, I would not have vowed. Rebbi Aqiba freed him.
MISHNAH: One creates an opening for a man with his wife’s ketubah. It happened that one vowed usufruct from his wife whose ketubah was 400 denar. She came before Rebbi Aqiba who obliged him to give her her ketubah. He said, Rebbi, my father left 800 denar. My brother took 400 and I 400, would it not be enough if she take 200 and I 200? Rebbi Aqiba told him, even if you have to sell the hair on your head, you will pay her ketubah. He said to him, if I had known that, I would not have vowed. Rebbi Aqiba freed him.
HALAKHAH: “One opens about festive days and Sabbaths,” etc. It was stated: “If one was permitted, all subsequent ones are permitted, all preceding ones are forbidden.” It was stated in the name of Rebbi Nathan: “There exists a type of vow which may be partly voided and the rest confirmed. How is this? One made a vow [not to eat] from a fig basket which contained benot s̄eba’ figs. If he said, if I had known that it contained benot s̄eba’ figs, I would not have made the vow, he is permitted the benot s̄eba’ figs and not only these but all figs. But if he said, if I had known that it contained benot s̄eba’ figs, I would not have extended my vow to benot s̄eba’ figs, only benot s̄eba’ figs are permitted to him.”
HALAKHAH: “One opens about festive days and Sabbaths,” etc. It was stated: “If one was permitted, all subsequent ones are permitted, all preceding ones are forbidden.” It was stated in the name of Rebbi Nathan: “There exists a type of vow which may be partly voided and the rest confirmed. How is this? One made a vow [not to eat] from a fig basket which contained benot s̄eba’ figs. If he said, if I had known that it contained benot s̄eba’ figs, I would not have made the vow, he is permitted the benot s̄eba’ figs and not only these but all figs. But if he said, if I had known that it contained benot s̄eba’ figs, I would not have extended my vow to benot s̄eba’ figs, only benot s̄eba’ figs are permitted to him.”
MISHNAH: One finds an opening for a man with his own honor and that of his children. One tells him, if you had known that tomorrow one will say of you, it is the habit of this man to divorce his wife, and about your daughters one will say, they are daughters of a divorcee, what did the mother of these do to get herself divorced? If he said, if I had known that it is so I would not have made the vow, then it is dissolved.
HALAKHAH: “One finds an opening for a man about his own honor,” etc. It was stated: Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra said, one finds an opening for a man exclusively about his own honor. As the following? A woman vowed [not to have benefit] from her daughter. She came to Rebbi Joḥanan who said to her, if you had known that your daughter gets a bad reputation, would you have made the vow? She said, no, and he permitted her. Is that not the Mishnah: “One finds an opening for a man about his own honor and that of his children”? That you should not think one follows Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra.
You say that the father dissolves the husband’s part. If he wanted to confirm, he says, it is confirmed for you, without details, (it is confirmed for you, without details); the husband’s part is dissolved for you. The following is obvious: If the father did not dissolve his part and she violated her vow, she is whipped. If the father dissolved but the husband did not, would she be whipped? Or since if the husband died and his part became void in favor of the father, would she not be whipped? This follows him who said, death does not force [dissolution]. But following him who said, death does force dissolution, and here since he did not dissolve for her and she violated her vow, she is whipped. It was stated: If the father dissolved his part but the husband died before he could dissolve, the last husband dissolves the part of the first one. Rebbi Yose said, a Mishnah says so: “Her father and her last husband dissolve her vows”.
You say that the father dissolves the husband’s part. If he wanted to confirm, he says, it is confirmed for you, without details, (it is confirmed for you, without details); the husband’s part is dissolved for you. The following is obvious: If the father did not dissolve his part and she violated her vow, she is whipped. If the father dissolved but the husband did not, would she be whipped? Or since if the husband died and his part became void in favor of the father, would she not be whipped? This follows him who said, death does not force [dissolution]. But following him who said, death does force dissolution, and here since he did not dissolve for her and she violated her vow, she is whipped. It was stated: If the father dissolved his part but the husband died before he could dissolve, the last husband dissolves the part of the first one. Rebbi Yose said, a Mishnah says so: “Her father and her last husband dissolve her vows”.
HALAKHAH: “Rebbi Eliezer said,” etc. “Rebbi Eliezer said, since a woman on whom I had no claim before she entered into my domain, becomes absolutely mine after she entered my domain, is it not logical that a woman on whom I had some claim before she entered my domain, shall become absolutely mine when she enters my domain? Rebbi Aqiba told him, no. If you speak about a woman on whom you had no claim before she entered into your domain, but after she entered your domain she became absolutely yours, then just as you had no part in her so no other man had any part in her. What can you conclude about a woman on whom you had some claim before she entered your domain, and after she entered your domain she became absolutely yours, but just as you had some rights to her so others had the same rights to her! Rebbi Joshua told him, Aqiba, your argument holds for two levirs. What do you respond in the case of a single levir? He said to him, just as you make no difference in the rules of one waiting for one levir or for two levirs, whether he ‘bespoke’ her or did not ‘bespeak’ her, can it not be the same for vows and oaths? He said to him, that is true. He said to him, if you had lived in the times of Rebbi Eleazar ben Arakh, he would have said that ‘bespeaking’ does not acquire completely since he would agree that he cannot dissolve until she enters his domain.
HALAKHAH: “Rebbi Eliezer said,” etc. “Rebbi Eliezer said, since a woman on whom I had no claim before she entered into my domain, becomes absolutely mine after she entered my domain, is it not logical that a woman on whom I had some claim before she entered my domain, shall become absolutely mine when she enters my domain? Rebbi Aqiba told him, no. If you speak about a woman on whom you had no claim before she entered into your domain, but after she entered your domain she became absolutely yours, then just as you had no part in her so no other man had any part in her. What can you conclude about a woman on whom you had some claim before she entered your domain, and after she entered your domain she became absolutely yours, but just as you had some rights to her so others had the same rights to her! Rebbi Joshua told him, Aqiba, your argument holds for two levirs. What do you respond in the case of a single levir? He said to him, just as you make no difference in the rules of one waiting for one levir or for two levirs, whether he ‘bespoke’ her or did not ‘bespeak’ her, can it not be the same for vows and oaths? He said to him, that is true. He said to him, if you had lived in the times of Rebbi Eleazar ben Arakh, he would have said that ‘bespeaking’ does not acquire completely since he would agree that he cannot dissolve until she enters his domain.
HALAKHAH: “He answered to the words of Rebbi Eliezer: Let the miqweh prove it! It frees the impure from their impurities but it cannot save pure ones. Rebbi Eliezer argued another track: Since in a situation where he cannot dissolve his own vows before he made them, he dissolves his wife’s vows before she made them, in a situation where he can dissolve his own vows after he made them, would it not be logical that he could dissolve his wife’s vows before she made them? No! Why can he not dissolve his own vows before he made them? For if he wants to confirm them, he confirms them. Could he dissolve his wife’s vows after she made them, when if he wanted to confirm them, he could not confirm them?” “But it says, ‘her husband may confirm them and her husband may dissolve them’. What can be confirmed can be dissolved,; what cannot be confirmed cannot be dissolved.”
Rebbi Ze‘ira explained the Mishnah: “These are the vows which he can dissolve: Matters connected with mortification. [E. g.], ‘if I wash, if I do not wash; if I shall wear jewels, if I do not wear jewels.’ Rebbi Yose said, these are not vows of mortification” but vows between him and her. “The following are vows of mortification” following Rebbi Yose. For example, “she said, all produce of the world is qônām for me, he may dissolve.” The rabbis say, if he dissolves vows of mortification, they are permanently dissolved. Vows between him and her are only dissolved as long as she is married to him. Rebbi Yose says, both vows of mortification and vows between him and her, if he dissolved them they are permanently dissolved. That means, the rabbis say, if he dissolves vows of mortification, they are permanently dissolved. Rebi Yose says, if he dissolves vows between him and her, they are permanently dissolved. What is the difference between them? If she said, any benefit from me shall be qônām for you when I leave your domain. Why can he not dissolve that? Because she did not say, any benefit from my body shall be qônām for you when I leave your domain. Rebbi Ze‘ira and Rebbi Hila, both of them say: That is the essence of vows between him and her. In the opinion of Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rebbi Yose and Rebbi Joḥanan ben Nuri said the same thing since we stated there: “Rebbi Joḥanan said, he shall dissolve it since maybe he would divorce her, then she would be forbidden to return to him.”
Rebbi Ze‘ira explained the Mishnah: “These are the vows which he can dissolve: Matters connected with mortification. [E. g.], ‘if I wash, if I do not wash; if I shall wear jewels, if I do not wear jewels.’ Rebbi Yose said, these are not vows of mortification” but vows between him and her. “The following are vows of mortification” following Rebbi Yose. For example, “she said, all produce of the world is qônām for me, he may dissolve.” The rabbis say, if he dissolves vows of mortification, they are permanently dissolved. Vows between him and her are only dissolved as long as she is married to him. Rebbi Yose says, both vows of mortification and vows between him and her, if he dissolved them they are permanently dissolved. That means, the rabbis say, if he dissolves vows of mortification, they are permanently dissolved. Rebi Yose says, if he dissolves vows between him and her, they are permanently dissolved. What is the difference between them? If she said, any benefit from me shall be qônām for you when I leave your domain. Why can he not dissolve that? Because she did not say, any benefit from my body shall be qônām for you when I leave your domain. Rebbi Ze‘ira and Rebbi Hila, both of them say: That is the essence of vows between him and her. In the opinion of Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rebbi Yose and Rebbi Joḥanan ben Nuri said the same thing since we stated there: “Rebbi Joḥanan said, he shall dissolve it since maybe he would divorce her, then she would be forbidden to return to him.”
It is written: “Every vow and every oath of prohibition to mortify a person.” For example, [a qônām] if I would taste peppers, if I would taste rolls. Not only if that kind is available now; even if that kind is not available now, perhaps he might bring her some later on. Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai: If there were two pieces before them, one nice and one not nice. If she desired the nice one and made a vow to forbid herself the less nice one, he may dissolve that. Why can he dissolve? The colleagues say, because of her mortification. Rebbi Ze‘ira and Rebbi Hila both say, because of his mortification. Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Samuel: A man can dissolve all vows except if she says, any benefit from me shall [be qônām] for X. That means he can dissolve: Any benefit from X shall [be qônām] for me. But did we not state: “The produce of this grocery store [is qônām] for me, he cannot dissolve.” Explain that following Rebbi Yose and they disagree with him, for we did state there: “If he can get the necessities of life only from that grocer, he may dissolve.” Rebbi Yose said, because he gives him credit, he delivers to him. Rebbi Mana said, because he gives him good quality produce.
It is written: “Every vow and every oath of prohibition to mortify a person.” For example, [a qônām] if I would taste peppers, if I would taste rolls. Not only if that kind is available now; even if that kind is not available now, perhaps he might bring her some later on. Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai: If there were two pieces before them, one nice and one not nice. If she desired the nice one and made a vow to forbid herself the less nice one, he may dissolve that. Why can he dissolve? The colleagues say, because of her mortification. Rebbi Ze‘ira and Rebbi Hila both say, because of his mortification. Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Samuel: A man can dissolve all vows except if she says, any benefit from me shall [be qônām] for X. That means he can dissolve: Any benefit from X shall [be qônām] for me. But did we not state: “The produce of this grocery store [is qônām] for me, he cannot dissolve.” Explain that following Rebbi Yose and they disagree with him, for we did state there: “If he can get the necessities of life only from that grocer, he may dissolve.” Rebbi Yose said, because he gives him credit, he delivers to him. Rebbi Mana said, because he gives him good quality produce.
MISHNAH: 4: ‘A qônām that I shall not work according to the wishes of my father, or your father, or my brother, or your brother,’ he cannot dissolve. ‘According to your wish,’ he does not have to dissolve. Rebbi Aqiba says, he has to dissolve, maybe she works more than the required minimum. Rebbi Joḥanan ben Nuri said, he shall dissolve since maybe he would divorce her, then she would be forbidden to return to him.
MISHNAH: 4: ‘A qônām that I shall not work according to the wishes of my father, or your father, or my brother, or your brother,’ he cannot dissolve. ‘According to your wish,’ he does not have to dissolve. Rebbi Aqiba says, he has to dissolve, maybe she works more than the required minimum. Rebbi Joḥanan ben Nuri said, he shall dissolve since maybe he would divorce her, then she would be forbidden to return to him.
“Rebbi Aqiba said, he has to dissolve.” Rebbi Abba said, if she forbids the yields of her work, [vowing] not to work, he can force her up to the weight of five tetradrachmas. More than that he cannot force, for he has to be afraid that she may work more and it turns out that she profits from what is forbidden. Therefore, Rebbi Aqiba says, he has to dissolve his part. Rebbi Hila said, it is impossible for her to make exactly the weight of five tetradrachmas. He could force her up to the weight of five tetradrachmas; more that that he cannot force. He has to be afraid that she might be over the limit by a minute amount; then he would profit from what is forbidden. Therefore ….
“Rebbi Joḥanan ben Nuri said, he should dissolve.” Rebbi Hila said, the reason of Rebbi Joḥanan ben Nuri is that even if he knows that if he divorces her she would be forbidden to return to him, she needles him until he divorces her.
HALAKHAH: “If a person is by a vow prevented to benefit his son-in-law,” etc. It was stated: “Neither do you”. Rebbi said, who stated “neither do you”? Rebbi Meĩr, for Rebbi Meïr makes the hand of the slave the hand of his master. Because he said “neither do you.” If he had not said “neither do you”, if the wife acquired, the husband would have acquired.
HALAKHAH: “Earlier they said,” etc. That is, if she cannot bring proof for her assertion, it is obvious that she is permitted to her house. Rebbi Hila said, would it not be reasonable that a fellow should be apprehensive, and if he was a Cohen that she should be forbidden to eat heave? There came a case before Rebbi Ḥanina, the colleague of the rabbis, and he permitted her to eat heave. Rebbi Ḥaggai said, my father knew the first and the last case. Soldiers entered the town. A woman came and said, a soldier embraced me and ejaculated semen between my knees. He permitted her to eat heave. There came a case before Rebbi Isaac bar Tevele of a woman who said, my cowhand seduced me. He said to her, is the cowhand not forbidden? And he forbade her. Here, you say that he forbade her. There, you say that he permitted her. There, she came to forbid herself and he permitted her. But here, she came to permit herself and he forbade her.
“Naziq,naziaḥ,paziq”. Rebbi Joḥanan said, these are expressions chosen by earlier generations and nobody has the right to add to them. But did not Rebbi Ḥiyya state: raziaḥ,haziaḥ? Rebbi Shila said, also to expressions chosen by earlier secondary ones nobody has the right to add. But did not Bar Qappara state ḥeres? Rebbi Ze‘ira said, that is a name relating to the High One: “If He commands the sun: would it not shine?”. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, these are Gentile words, like those Nabateans who say khaspa for ḥaspa. Rebbi Yose said, it is reasonable in other places, but in a place where the nazir is called naziq, do I say that a nazir of people with speech defects should not be a nazir?
From here, “if his hair became heavy”: Rebbi. For Rebbi Jeremiah said in the name of Rebbi Immi: The words of Rebbi: A nazir in perpetuity shaves once in twelve months. The words of the Sages: A nazir in perpetuity sometimes shaves every thirty days, sometimes once in twelve months. Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Assi: It says so: “I am a nazir like the hair on my head, like the dust of the earth, or like the sand of the sea. He is a nazir in perpetuity and shaves every thirty days. Rebbi says, this one does not shave every thirty days,” but once in twelve months. “Who is one who shaves every thirty days? If he says, I am obligated for nezirut like the hair on my head, like the dust of the earth, or like the sand of the sea.” Rebbi Ze‘ira said, they differ if it was not made explicit. Where do we hold? If he says, “the fullness of my hair”, everybody agrees that he shaves once every thirty days. If he says, “the number of the hairs on my head,” everybody agrees that he shaves after twelve months. But we must hold that he says “like hair”. Rebbi says, “the fullness of my hair”. But the rabbis say, he means “the number of the hairs on my head.” And here, why? Why did the man not make the vow? He only encourages himself to avoid prohibitions. In addition, from the following: “Rebbi Jehudah added: If he said, like that which is collected in the fig harvest, or like sheaves in a Sabbatical year, or like stars in the sky, he is a nazir in perpetuity and shaves every thirty days.” Could you say that Rebbi Jehudah follows the rabbis? He holds with Rebbi, as Rebbi Jehudah added: “Absalom was a nazir in perpetuity and shaved every twelve months.” What is the reason? Because of nezirut. But that would mean for the rabbis that he shaved every thirty days; that is what we have stated: “I am a nazir the house full, or a chest full. One checks him out.” It was stated on that: He shaves every thirty days. But here he said, he shaved every twelve months.
MISHNAH: “I am a nazir on condition that I may drink wine or become impure for the dead,” he is a nazir and forbidden everything. “I knew that there are nezirim but I did not know that wine is forbidden to the nazir”; wine is forbidden to him, but Rebbi Simeon permits. “I knew that wine was forbidden to the nazir but I thought that the Sages would permit me because I cannot live without wine, or because I am an undertaker;” he is permitted but Rebbi Simeon forbids.
Rebbi Mana asked before Rebbi Yudan: If he said “I am obligated for the sacrifices of a nazir,” might he make the vow of nazir in the future?If he made the vow without explaining, he may shave any nazir, whether he already made the vow or whether he would make it in the future. If he explained? It can be compared to the following, as Rebbi Levi ben Ḥayyata asked: If he wrote to her, “I shall have nothing to do with the properties which you might inherit in the future.” May a person make a condition on things not yet in existence?
HALAKHAH: “ “I am a nazir and a nazir when a son is born to me,” etc. Rebbi Yose asked: If he said, “I am a nazir for these 30 days and those 30 days.” Rebbi Ze‘ira said before Rebbi Mana: Is that not the Mishnah? “He interrupts his own, counts for his son, and then finishes for himself.” Not even if his wife is in the process of giving birth? He said to him, his nezirut is not comparable to his son’s nezirut, but to the case that he said, “I am already a nazir and a nazir after twenty days.” Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina both say: If he finished his nezirut, his son’s nezirut cannot start for him before he was shaving with a sacrifice. About a nazir who became impure, the opinions of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina seem contradictory. There, he says, if a person impure by the impurity of the dead made a vow of nazir, his seventh day is counted. If a nazir becomes impure, his seventh day is not counted. In our case, is he not like a person impure by the impurity of the dead, who made a vow of nazir? And is not the seventh day counted for a person impure by the impurity of the dead, who made a vow of nazir? Would this obligate him to bring a sacrifice for his impurity? But if a nazir who becomes impure, his seventh day is not counted; does it not obligate him to bring a sacrifice for his impurity? And here, because he is obligated to bring a sacrifice (of impurity), the seventh day is [not] counted for him.
If he was born on the eightieth day, he eliminates ten. If he was born on the ninetieth day, he eliminates twenty. If he finished his nezirut and came to complete his son’s nezirut and became impure within the first ten days, he eliminates everything. Within the last twenty days? Rebbi Abba in the name of Rab and Rebbi Joḥanan both say, he eliminates thirty. Rebbi Samuel said, he eliminates seven only. Samuel bar Abba asked before Rebbi Yose: Does Rebbi Joḥanan think that eliminating by a shaving knife is identical with substantial eliminating? Rebbi Ze‘ira said, if Rebbi Joḥanan thought that eliminating by a shaving knife is identical to substantial eliminating, why would he say that he eliminates thirty? Should he not invalidate everything? Rebbi Abin bar Ḥiyya said before Rebbi Ze‘ira: Explain it if he was born on a day unsuitable to bring a sacrifice. Think of it, if he was born in the night, is that not unsuitable to bring a sacrifice? It is suitable; the night caused it. Think of it, if he was born on the Sabbath, is that not unsuitable to bring a sacrifice? It is suitable; the Sabbath caused it. If he had finished his nezirut but did not manage to shave when [the son] was born on the Sabbath, is that not unsuitable to bring a sacrifice? It is suitable; the Sabbath caused it. If he had finished his nezirut but did not manage to shave before his son was born, he celebrates one shaving for both. If he had dedicated his sacrifices but did not manage to shave before his son was born. There, they say that he celebrates one shaving for both. Rebbi Joḥanan said, he shaves and then shaves a second time. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “They asked Rebbi Simeon ben Ioḥai: Assume that he was both a nazir and a sufferer from scale disease, may he shave once and have it counted for his nezirut and his scale disease? He said to them: If he shaved to remove hair, you would be correct. But the nazir shaves to remove hair whereas the sufferer from scale disease shaves to have hair grow. They said to him, if it cannot be counted for the days of his completeness, should it not be counted for the days of his count? Both of them shave to remove hair. (They said to him. If both of them shaved before the sprinkling of the blood, you would be correct. But the nazir shaves before the sprinkling of the blood and the sufferer from scale disease shaves after the sprinkling of the blood! They said to him, if it cannot be counted for the days of his completeness, should it not be counted for the days of his count? Both of them shave before the sprinkling of the blood!) He said to them, if both shaved before they immerse themselves in water, you would be correct. But the nazir shaves before he immerses himself in water and the sufferer from scale disease shaves after he immerses himself in water. They said to him, the matter is settled. It cannot be counted for the days of his completeness, it cannot be counted for the days of his count. It cannot be counted for purification; it cannot be counted for impurity. That is, if he was a nazir and sufferer from scale disease. But if he was a nazir and nazir, he may shave once for both.” What does Rebbi Joḥanan do with this? He explains that they disagree with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish.
If he was born on the eightieth day, he eliminates ten. If he was born on the ninetieth day, he eliminates twenty. If he finished his nezirut and came to complete his son’s nezirut and became impure within the first ten days, he eliminates everything. Within the last twenty days? Rebbi Abba in the name of Rab and Rebbi Joḥanan both say, he eliminates thirty. Rebbi Samuel said, he eliminates seven only. Samuel bar Abba asked before Rebbi Yose: Does Rebbi Joḥanan think that eliminating by a shaving knife is identical with substantial eliminating? Rebbi Ze‘ira said, if Rebbi Joḥanan thought that eliminating by a shaving knife is identical to substantial eliminating, why would he say that he eliminates thirty? Should he not invalidate everything? Rebbi Abin bar Ḥiyya said before Rebbi Ze‘ira: Explain it if he was born on a day unsuitable to bring a sacrifice. Think of it, if he was born in the night, is that not unsuitable to bring a sacrifice? It is suitable; the night caused it. Think of it, if he was born on the Sabbath, is that not unsuitable to bring a sacrifice? It is suitable; the Sabbath caused it. If he had finished his nezirut but did not manage to shave when [the son] was born on the Sabbath, is that not unsuitable to bring a sacrifice? It is suitable; the Sabbath caused it. If he had finished his nezirut but did not manage to shave before his son was born, he celebrates one shaving for both. If he had dedicated his sacrifices but did not manage to shave before his son was born. There, they say that he celebrates one shaving for both. Rebbi Joḥanan said, he shaves and then shaves a second time. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “They asked Rebbi Simeon ben Ioḥai: Assume that he was both a nazir and a sufferer from scale disease, may he shave once and have it counted for his nezirut and his scale disease? He said to them: If he shaved to remove hair, you would be correct. But the nazir shaves to remove hair whereas the sufferer from scale disease shaves to have hair grow. They said to him, if it cannot be counted for the days of his completeness, should it not be counted for the days of his count? Both of them shave to remove hair. (They said to him. If both of them shaved before the sprinkling of the blood, you would be correct. But the nazir shaves before the sprinkling of the blood and the sufferer from scale disease shaves after the sprinkling of the blood! They said to him, if it cannot be counted for the days of his completeness, should it not be counted for the days of his count? Both of them shave before the sprinkling of the blood!) He said to them, if both shaved before they immerse themselves in water, you would be correct. But the nazir shaves before he immerses himself in water and the sufferer from scale disease shaves after he immerses himself in water. They said to him, the matter is settled. It cannot be counted for the days of his completeness, it cannot be counted for the days of his count. It cannot be counted for purification; it cannot be counted for impurity. That is, if he was a nazir and sufferer from scale disease. But if he was a nazir and nazir, he may shave once for both.” What does Rebbi Joḥanan do with this? He explains that they disagree with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish.
If he was born on the eightieth day, he eliminates ten. If he was born on the ninetieth day, he eliminates twenty. If he finished his nezirut and came to complete his son’s nezirut and became impure within the first ten days, he eliminates everything. Within the last twenty days? Rebbi Abba in the name of Rab and Rebbi Joḥanan both say, he eliminates thirty. Rebbi Samuel said, he eliminates seven only. Samuel bar Abba asked before Rebbi Yose: Does Rebbi Joḥanan think that eliminating by a shaving knife is identical with substantial eliminating? Rebbi Ze‘ira said, if Rebbi Joḥanan thought that eliminating by a shaving knife is identical to substantial eliminating, why would he say that he eliminates thirty? Should he not invalidate everything? Rebbi Abin bar Ḥiyya said before Rebbi Ze‘ira: Explain it if he was born on a day unsuitable to bring a sacrifice. Think of it, if he was born in the night, is that not unsuitable to bring a sacrifice? It is suitable; the night caused it. Think of it, if he was born on the Sabbath, is that not unsuitable to bring a sacrifice? It is suitable; the Sabbath caused it. If he had finished his nezirut but did not manage to shave when [the son] was born on the Sabbath, is that not unsuitable to bring a sacrifice? It is suitable; the Sabbath caused it. If he had finished his nezirut but did not manage to shave before his son was born, he celebrates one shaving for both. If he had dedicated his sacrifices but did not manage to shave before his son was born. There, they say that he celebrates one shaving for both. Rebbi Joḥanan said, he shaves and then shaves a second time. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “They asked Rebbi Simeon ben Ioḥai: Assume that he was both a nazir and a sufferer from scale disease, may he shave once and have it counted for his nezirut and his scale disease? He said to them: If he shaved to remove hair, you would be correct. But the nazir shaves to remove hair whereas the sufferer from scale disease shaves to have hair grow. They said to him, if it cannot be counted for the days of his completeness, should it not be counted for the days of his count? Both of them shave to remove hair. (They said to him. If both of them shaved before the sprinkling of the blood, you would be correct. But the nazir shaves before the sprinkling of the blood and the sufferer from scale disease shaves after the sprinkling of the blood! They said to him, if it cannot be counted for the days of his completeness, should it not be counted for the days of his count? Both of them shave before the sprinkling of the blood!) He said to them, if both shaved before they immerse themselves in water, you would be correct. But the nazir shaves before he immerses himself in water and the sufferer from scale disease shaves after he immerses himself in water. They said to him, the matter is settled. It cannot be counted for the days of his completeness, it cannot be counted for the days of his count. It cannot be counted for purification; it cannot be counted for impurity. That is, if he was a nazir and sufferer from scale disease. But if he was a nazir and nazir, he may shave once for both.” What does Rebbi Joḥanan do with this? He explains that they disagree with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish.
If he was born on the eightieth day, he eliminates ten. If he was born on the ninetieth day, he eliminates twenty. If he finished his nezirut and came to complete his son’s nezirut and became impure within the first ten days, he eliminates everything. Within the last twenty days? Rebbi Abba in the name of Rab and Rebbi Joḥanan both say, he eliminates thirty. Rebbi Samuel said, he eliminates seven only. Samuel bar Abba asked before Rebbi Yose: Does Rebbi Joḥanan think that eliminating by a shaving knife is identical with substantial eliminating? Rebbi Ze‘ira said, if Rebbi Joḥanan thought that eliminating by a shaving knife is identical to substantial eliminating, why would he say that he eliminates thirty? Should he not invalidate everything? Rebbi Abin bar Ḥiyya said before Rebbi Ze‘ira: Explain it if he was born on a day unsuitable to bring a sacrifice. Think of it, if he was born in the night, is that not unsuitable to bring a sacrifice? It is suitable; the night caused it. Think of it, if he was born on the Sabbath, is that not unsuitable to bring a sacrifice? It is suitable; the Sabbath caused it. If he had finished his nezirut but did not manage to shave when [the son] was born on the Sabbath, is that not unsuitable to bring a sacrifice? It is suitable; the Sabbath caused it. If he had finished his nezirut but did not manage to shave before his son was born, he celebrates one shaving for both. If he had dedicated his sacrifices but did not manage to shave before his son was born. There, they say that he celebrates one shaving for both. Rebbi Joḥanan said, he shaves and then shaves a second time. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “They asked Rebbi Simeon ben Ioḥai: Assume that he was both a nazir and a sufferer from scale disease, may he shave once and have it counted for his nezirut and his scale disease? He said to them: If he shaved to remove hair, you would be correct. But the nazir shaves to remove hair whereas the sufferer from scale disease shaves to have hair grow. They said to him, if it cannot be counted for the days of his completeness, should it not be counted for the days of his count? Both of them shave to remove hair. (They said to him. If both of them shaved before the sprinkling of the blood, you would be correct. But the nazir shaves before the sprinkling of the blood and the sufferer from scale disease shaves after the sprinkling of the blood! They said to him, if it cannot be counted for the days of his completeness, should it not be counted for the days of his count? Both of them shave before the sprinkling of the blood!) He said to them, if both shaved before they immerse themselves in water, you would be correct. But the nazir shaves before he immerses himself in water and the sufferer from scale disease shaves after he immerses himself in water. They said to him, the matter is settled. It cannot be counted for the days of his completeness, it cannot be counted for the days of his count. It cannot be counted for purification; it cannot be counted for impurity. That is, if he was a nazir and sufferer from scale disease. But if he was a nazir and nazir, he may shave once for both.” What does Rebbi Joḥanan do with this? He explains that they disagree with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish.
Rebbi Yose said, what is his problem? Of a pure nazir. But for an impure nazir, it is obvious to him that they cannot be combined. Rebbi Mana said before Rebbi Yose: Is that not an argument of “so much more”? Since for days which are counted neither for his nor for his son’s nezirut, you say that they are combined, days which are counted for his and for his son’s nezirut, it would only be logical that they should be combined! Rebbi Mana said, there he is not in a state to receive a warning, but here he is in a state to receive a warning. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya asked: Since you say there about Rebbi Eliezer, at the start only if he has something to omit; at the end even if he has nothing to omit? Rebbi Ze‘ira said before Rebbi Mana, is that not a Mishnah? “If he became impure on day 101, he invalidated 30; Rebbi Eliezer said, he invalidated only seven.” He said, we hear that he invalidates; did we hear that he brings a sacrifice?
What about, “and so am I,” how do you treat this? As “amen, it is confirmed for you,” or “you did well”? The elder [Rebbi] Ḥiyya and the elder Rebbi Hoshaia. It is stated: If a woman made a vow to be anazir; her husband heard and said to her, “why did you make a vow of nazir? What did you do to make a vow of nazir? I would not like that you made a vow of nazir! There is neither vow nor oath here;” he did not say anything. But if he said, “you did well that you did make a vow of nazir; I liked that you did make a vow of nazir; if you had not made a vow of nazir I would have told you to make one”, Rebbi Ḥiyya stated on this, in all of these cases he cannot dissolve. But Rebbi Hoshaia stated: In all these cases, he can dissolve unless he said “amen” or “it is confirmed for you”, then he can no longer dissolve.
What about, “and so am I,” how do you treat this? As “amen, it is confirmed for you,” or “you did well”? The elder [Rebbi] Ḥiyya and the elder Rebbi Hoshaia. It is stated: If a woman made a vow to be anazir; her husband heard and said to her, “why did you make a vow of nazir? What did you do to make a vow of nazir? I would not like that you made a vow of nazir! There is neither vow nor oath here;” he did not say anything. But if he said, “you did well that you did make a vow of nazir; I liked that you did make a vow of nazir; if you had not made a vow of nazir I would have told you to make one”, Rebbi Ḥiyya stated on this, in all of these cases he cannot dissolve. But Rebbi Hoshaia stated: In all these cases, he can dissolve unless he said “amen” or “it is confirmed for you”, then he can no longer dissolve.
HALAKHAH: “If one of the bloods was sprinkled for her,” etc. He dissolves for her because of her hair. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: It is a decision of Scripture: “He dissolved her vows,” he dissolves what is on her. Whenever he dissolves her vow, he dissolves what is on her. Rebbi Eleazar said, it follows Rebbi Simeon. Rebbi Joḥanan said, it is everybody’s opinion, after she was transferred from the prohibition to the positive commandment. The rabbis say, “afterwards, the nazir shall drink wine,” after all these actions. Rebbi Simeon says, even after a single action. Ḥizqiah said, the Mishnah supports Rebbi (Bevai). “When has this been said? If she shaves in purity. But if she shaves in impurity, he may dissolve since he can say, I cannot stand an unseemly wife.” Therefore, shaving in purity does not make her unseemly. Who holds that shaving does not make unseemly? Rebbi Simeon. Rebbi Yose bar Abun said, even Rebbi thinks so: “Rebbi says, he may dissolve even if she shaves [in purity], since he can say, I cannot stand a shorn wife.” Should he not say, I cannot stand an unseemly and shorn wife? Rebbi Joḥanan said, Rebbi (Jehudah) said that only for the purification sacrifice, since a purification sacrifice would be invalid if not in her name. That means, as long as it is alive it is surrendered to Heaven only by slaughter.
What is Rebbi Yose’s reason? “His offering to the Eternal for his vow”, that (his sacrifice precede his vow) but not (that his vow precede his sacrifice). They wanted to say that Rebbi Jehudah would agree with Rebbi Yose. It was found said that neither of them agrees with the other.
HALAKHAH: “A person who made a vow of nazir,” etc. It was stated: The House of Shammai say, from the moment he asked; but the House of Hillel say, from the moment he vowed. Where do we hold? If he scoffed at his vow, everybody agrees from the moment he asked. If he did not scoff at his vow, everybody agrees from the moment he vowed. But we have to deal with one who is going to ask. The House of Shammai say, since he decided to ask, he is now scoffing. But the House of Hillel say, if he were scoffing, he would not ask. If he made a vow of nazir and scoffed at his vow, one does not let him ask about it unless he kept its prohibitions for the number of days he did not keep the prohibitions, the words of Rebbi Jehudah. Rebbi Yasa said, when has this been said? If he vowed a lengthy period. But if he vowed a short period, thirty days are sufficient for him. What is the difference between a lengthy and a short period? But it must be: When has this been said? If he scoffed at his vow for a lengthy period. But if he scoffed at his vow for a short period, thirty days are sufficient for him. Where are we holding? If he scoffed in impurity, everybody agrees that he invalidated everything. If he scoffed in shaving, everybody agrees that he invalidated only 30 days. But we must deal with the case that he scoffed with wine. That is, if he is still within his period of nazir. But after his period of nazir, he invalidated everything.
MISHNAH: A person vowed to be a nazir and went to bring his animal when he found that it was stolen; if he vowed before the animal was stolen he is a nazir, after the animal was stolen he is not a nazir. This error was made by Naḥum from Media: When nezirim came from the Diaspora and found that the Temple had been destroyed, Naḥum from Media asked them: If you had known that the Temple would be destroyed, would you have made a vow of nazir? They said to him, no, and Naḥum from Media permitted them. When the case came before the Sages they said, anyone who made his vow before the Temple was destroyed is a nazir, after the Temple was destroyed he is not a nazir.
MISHNAH: A person vowed to be a nazir and went to bring his animal when he found that it was stolen; if he vowed before the animal was stolen he is a nazir, after the animal was stolen he is not a nazir. This error was made by Naḥum from Media: When nezirim came from the Diaspora and found that the Temple had been destroyed, Naḥum from Media asked them: If you had known that the Temple would be destroyed, would you have made a vow of nazir? They said to him, no, and Naḥum from Media permitted them. When the case came before the Sages they said, anyone who made his vow before the Temple was destroyed is a nazir, after the Temple was destroyed he is not a nazir.
HALAKHAH: “If a person vowed to be a nazir and went to bring his animal,” etc. Where do we hold? If he saw an animal passing on the market and said, I am a nazir on that animal which passed by, he is a nazir even if the animal was stolen. If he thought that he had one and it turned out that he did not, would we say if he was rich and became poor, the nezirut would be invalidated? But we must hold that he said, I am a nazir on the animal I have at home, then went and found it stolen. If he vowed before the animal was stolen he is a nazir, after the animal was stolen he is not a nazir. The students of Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Julianus say: Rebbi Jehudah asked: If the thieves returned it in the night, did his nezirut return to him retroactively or for the future?
HALAKHAH: “If a person vowed to be a nazir and went to bring his animal,” etc. Where do we hold? If he saw an animal passing on the market and said, I am a nazir on that animal which passed by, he is a nazir even if the animal was stolen. If he thought that he had one and it turned out that he did not, would we say if he was rich and became poor, the nezirut would be invalidated? But we must hold that he said, I am a nazir on the animal I have at home, then went and found it stolen. If he vowed before the animal was stolen he is a nazir, after the animal was stolen he is not a nazir. The students of Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Julianus say: Rebbi Jehudah asked: If the thieves returned it in the night, did his nezirut return to him retroactively or for the future?
“That was the error of Naḥum from Media.” What was his error? That he found for them an opening due to changed circumstances. “Naḥum from Media said to them: ‘Would you have made a vow to become nezirim if you had known that the Temple would be destroyed at some future time?’ ” Rebbi Ze‘ira said, the following he should have said to them: Did you not know that the prophets already had prophesied that eventually the Temple would be destroyed? Then there are no changed circumstances. Rebbi Hila said, still it is changed circumstances. They could have said to him, we knew it, but it seemed to us that this referred to the distant future: “The vision he sees is for many years.”
“That was the error of Naḥum from Media.” What was his error? That he found for them an opening due to changed circumstances. “Naḥum from Media said to them: ‘Would you have made a vow to become nezirim if you had known that the Temple would be destroyed at some future time?’ ” Rebbi Ze‘ira said, the following he should have said to them: Did you not know that the prophets already had prophesied that eventually the Temple would be destroyed? Then there are no changed circumstances. Rebbi Hila said, still it is changed circumstances. They could have said to him, we knew it, but it seemed to us that this referred to the distant future: “The vision he sees is for many years.”
“That was the error of Naḥum from Media.” What was his error? That he found for them an opening due to changed circumstances. “Naḥum from Media said to them: ‘Would you have made a vow to become nezirim if you had known that the Temple would be destroyed at some future time?’ ” Rebbi Ze‘ira said, the following he should have said to them: Did you not know that the prophets already had prophesied that eventually the Temple would be destroyed? Then there are no changed circumstances. Rebbi Hila said, still it is changed circumstances. They could have said to him, we knew it, but it seemed to us that this referred to the distant future: “The vision he sees is for many years.”
Rav Zakkai stated before Rebbi Joḥanan: If somebody sacrificed, burned incense, and poured a libation in one forgetting, he is guilty for each action separately. Rebbi Joḥanan told him, Babylonian! You crossed three rivers with your hands and were broken. He is guilty only once! {Before he broke in his hand there is “one” but not “those”; after he broke in his hand there are “those” but not “one”.} Rebbi Abba bar Mamal asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: Should he not be guilty for each action separately? As you say for the Sabbath: “Do not perform any work,” principle. “Do not light fire in any of your dwelling places,” a detail. Was not lighting fire subsumed under the principle, but it is mentioned separately from this principle! Since lighting fire is special in that it is the work of a single individual and one would be guilty for it alone, so everything for which alone one is guilty. Also here: “Do not worship them,” a principle. “Do not prostrate yourself,” a detail. Was not prostrating itself included in the principle and why was it mentioned separately? To infer, to tell you that prostrating oneself is special in that it is the work of a single individual and one would be guilty for it alone, so everything for which alone one is guilty. He answered: For the Sabbath, he mentioned the principle at one place and the details at another place. For idol worship, the principle is found close to the detail. He retorted: Is it not witten: “Do not prostrate yourself before another power”? He did not state the principle and the detail at the same spot! He said, since you do not infer anything from it close up, you cannot infer anything from afar. The colleagues say, it makes no difference; whether He gave the principle at one place and the detail at another, or gave principle and detail at the same place, it is a matter of principle and detail. For the Sabbath, He first gave the principle and then the detail. For idolatry, He gave the detail and only later the principle. Rebbi Yose said, it makes no difference whether [He first gave the principle and then the detail or He gave the detail and only later the principle, or He gave principle, detail, and principle]; it is a matter of principle and detail. For the Sabbath, He gave a general prohibition of work, followed by details; for idolatry, He was indeterminate regarding its worship but detailed the worship of Heaven.
Rav Zakkai stated before Rebbi Joḥanan: If somebody sacrificed, burned incense, and poured a libation in one forgetting, he is guilty for each action separately. Rebbi Joḥanan told him, Babylonian! You crossed three rivers with your hands and were broken. He is guilty only once! {Before he broke in his hand there is “one” but not “those”; after he broke in his hand there are “those” but not “one”.} Rebbi Abba bar Mamal asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: Should he not be guilty for each action separately? As you say for the Sabbath: “Do not perform any work,” principle. “Do not light fire in any of your dwelling places,” a detail. Was not lighting fire subsumed under the principle, but it is mentioned separately from this principle! Since lighting fire is special in that it is the work of a single individual and one would be guilty for it alone, so everything for which alone one is guilty. Also here: “Do not worship them,” a principle. “Do not prostrate yourself,” a detail. Was not prostrating itself included in the principle and why was it mentioned separately? To infer, to tell you that prostrating oneself is special in that it is the work of a single individual and one would be guilty for it alone, so everything for which alone one is guilty. He answered: For the Sabbath, he mentioned the principle at one place and the details at another place. For idol worship, the principle is found close to the detail. He retorted: Is it not witten: “Do not prostrate yourself before another power”? He did not state the principle and the detail at the same spot! He said, since you do not infer anything from it close up, you cannot infer anything from afar. The colleagues say, it makes no difference; whether He gave the principle at one place and the detail at another, or gave principle and detail at the same place, it is a matter of principle and detail. For the Sabbath, He first gave the principle and then the detail. For idolatry, He gave the detail and only later the principle. Rebbi Yose said, it makes no difference whether [He first gave the principle and then the detail or He gave the detail and only later the principle, or He gave principle, detail, and principle]; it is a matter of principle and detail. For the Sabbath, He gave a general prohibition of work, followed by details; for idolatry, He was indeterminate regarding its worship but detailed the worship of Heaven.
Warning for one who eats carcass meat, from where? “You shall not eat any carcass meat.” That covers carcass meat; from a “torn” animal from where? Rebbi Joḥanan said, “carcass meat” and “any carcass meat”, to include the “torn” animal. If somebody eats flesh from a living animal which is “torn”, Rebbi Yasa said, Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagree. Rebbi Joḥanan said, he is guilty twice, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, he is guilty only once. What is the reason of Rebbi Joḥanan? “You shall not eat any carcass meat;” “you shall not eat of life with the flesh.” What is the reason of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? The colleagues said before Rebbi Yose: The assertion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish parallels what Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob stated: “ ‘Flesh torn on the field you shall not eat’, you shall not tear from an animal and eat in the way you tear from the ground and eat.” What is the reason of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? The colleagues before Rebbi Yose: Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish does not hold with Rebbi Joḥanan about the “torn” animal; if he did hold with him, one should be twice guilty. He said to them, even if he held with him, one should be guilty only once. There is a difference, because He repeated it and combined it. They objected: “Suet you shall not eat,” “and blood you shall not eat,” and it is written: “Any suet and any blood you shall not eat.” Then because He repeated it and combined it, one should be guilty only once! He said to them, if it were written “suet and blood”, you would be correct. But it is written “any suet and any blood,” to declare him guilty for each case separately. But it is not written: “Anything soaked with grapes he shall not drink,” and it is written, “from skins to seeds he shall not eat.” Then because He repeated it and combined it, one should be guilty only once! He said to them, if it were written “skins and seeds”, you would be correct. But it is written “skins unto seeds,” to declare him guilty for each case separately.
Warning for one who eats carcass meat, from where? “You shall not eat any carcass meat.” That covers carcass meat; from a “torn” animal from where? Rebbi Joḥanan said, “carcass meat” and “any carcass meat”, to include the “torn” animal. If somebody eats flesh from a living animal which is “torn”, Rebbi Yasa said, Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagree. Rebbi Joḥanan said, he is guilty twice, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, he is guilty only once. What is the reason of Rebbi Joḥanan? “You shall not eat any carcass meat;” “you shall not eat of life with the flesh.” What is the reason of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? The colleagues said before Rebbi Yose: The assertion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish parallels what Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob stated: “ ‘Flesh torn on the field you shall not eat’, you shall not tear from an animal and eat in the way you tear from the ground and eat.” What is the reason of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? The colleagues before Rebbi Yose: Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish does not hold with Rebbi Joḥanan about the “torn” animal; if he did hold with him, one should be twice guilty. He said to them, even if he held with him, one should be guilty only once. There is a difference, because He repeated it and combined it. They objected: “Suet you shall not eat,” “and blood you shall not eat,” and it is written: “Any suet and any blood you shall not eat.” Then because He repeated it and combined it, one should be guilty only once! He said to them, if it were written “suet and blood”, you would be correct. But it is written “any suet and any blood,” to declare him guilty for each case separately. But it is not written: “Anything soaked with grapes he shall not drink,” and it is written, “from skins to seeds he shall not eat.” Then because He repeated it and combined it, one should be guilty only once! He said to them, if it were written “skins and seeds”, you would be correct. But it is written “skins unto seeds,” to declare him guilty for each case separately.
A “torn” [creature] that was turned into a carcass. Rebbi Yasa, the son of Rebbi Yasa’s daughter, in the name of Rebbi Jeremiah: Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagree. Rebbi Joḥanan says, he is guilty twice; Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, he is guilty only once. Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Yose said before Rebbi Yose, the following supports Rebbi Joḥanan: “ ‘Any person who would eat any carcass meat,’ why does the verse say ‘and torn’? If a ‘torn’ animal can survive, was ‘carcass meat’ mentioned before? If a ‘torn’ animal must die, is it not included in ‘carcass meat’ ”? Should he not say, it is carcass meat? Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: The reason of Rebbi Yose: “Do not defile yourself by animals and birds,” but only the Eight Reptiles impart impurity! But the measure of their impurities is the measure of their uses as food. Rebbi Eleazar objected: May not the limbs of pure animals impart impurity in the most minute amount but as food only in the volume of an olive? He accepted it. What is meant by “he accepted it”? Like a person who said, the opponent accepted it. Ḥiyya bar Abba said: “You shall not [eat] any carcass meat.” The Torah identified all eating together. Rebbi Ḥanina objected: Is not the impurity of the Eight Reptiles in the size of a lentil, but as food in the volume of an olive, whether for blood or for meat?
HALAKHAH: “One is guilty for wine separately, for grapes separately,” etc. It is written: “Also grapes, fresh or dried, he shall not eat.” One understands, since it said “grapes”, do we not know that they are fresh? Why does the verse say, “grapes, fresh or dried”? To declare guilty for either one separately. This parallels what Ḥizqiah stated: Since at a place where He did not treat the waste of fruits like fruits, He treated fresh and dried equally, here, where He treated the waste of fruits like fruits, would it not be logical that we treat fresh and dried equally? The verse said, “fresh or dried”, to declare guilty for either one separately. This parallels what Rebbi Hila said: “One may not impound the movable and the fixed part of a flour-mill. “One understands, since it said “the fixed part”, do we not know that the entire mill is understood? Why does the verse say, “the movable and the fixed part”? To declare guilty for either part separately.
HALAKHAH: Is it counted for him and his shaving? If you would say that it is not counted for him and his shaving, then his sacrifices count for nothing. Rebbi Joḥanan asked: Following Rebbi Simeon, may he shave for his holiday well-being offerings? Is that not the Mishnah? “Rebbi Simeon says, that sacrifice is not counted for him but the others are counted for him.” When he slaughtered them are they not like voluntary well-being offerings? This means that he may shave for voluntary well-being offerings following Rebbi Simeon. Rebbi Yose bar Abun said, Rav Ada bar Aḥawa and Rebbi Joḥanan. For Rav Ada bar Aḥawa it is problematic, but for Rebbi Joḥanan it is obvious.
HALAKHAH: The argument of Rebbi Eliezer seems inverted. There, he says: “he has to repeat only for 30,” and here, he says so? Rebbi Joḥanan says, he has to repeat all his sacrifices. It is obvious, if it would have been valid without him becoming impure, then why is it not valid if later he becomes impure? Rebbi Ḥinena said, is that not Rebbi Eliezer’s? And Rebbi Eliezer follows the Shammaites, as it was stated: Concerning a nazir who lost all his hair, the House of Shammai say, he has to move a shaving knife over his head; the House of Hillel say, he does not need to move a shaving knife over his head.
It is stated: The carriers may not wear sandals lest a shoelace of one of them break so he would be prevented from performing a good deed.
We have stated: “Rebbi Yose said, dried flesh from a corpse which even if soaked will not return to its former status is pure. What is Rebbi Yose’s reason? Did he not infer this from a carcass? From a carcass, since a dried carcass is pure, so also a dried corpse should be pure. Rebbi Immi asked: Since a foul-smelling carcass is pure, would a foul-smelling corpse also be pure? Then there can be no decayed matter for Rebbi Yose! It was found stated in Rebbi Yose’s name that there was decayed matter. The colleagues asked before Rebbi Yose: Since a carcass has no decay, so a corpse should have no decay! He told them that he inferred from an animal only for the flesh, not for the bones. There is no decay from flesh, there is decay from bones, as Bar Qappara stated, “decay of bones is jealousy.” Rebbi Yannai said, “or a grave”, even if one touched the first Adam’s grave. The colleagues say, he transposes the verse: “or a grave qbr” means “or decay rqb”. Bar Qappara stated, “or a grave qbr”, “or decay rqb”.
Do stillbirths generate “decay”? For him who says that their blood induces impurity by a quartarius they generate “decay”; for him who says that their blood does not induce impurity by a quartarius, do they generate “decay”? Let us hear from the following: “Why is the dust from small heaps impure? Because women bury there their stillbirths.” Rebbi Yudan, the father of Rebbi Mattaniah, said: Would it not be reasonable otherwise, that lepers bury their limbs there? You must say that it is because of “decay”, not because a bone the size of a lentil, since it was stated: “If he took some dust from it and replaced it, [the small heap] is pure.” Explain it following Tannaïm, as it was stated: If one removed it, it remains impure; Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel declares it pure.
HALAKHAH: “Rebbi Eleazar said in the name of Rebbi Joshua,” etc. There, we have stated: “Two are impure from the dead, one is impure for seven days and one is impure by the impurity of evening. Three are impure from the dead, two are impure for seven days and one is impure until nightfall. Four are impure from the dead, three are impure for seven days and one is impure until nightfall. How is it for two? Any person who touches a corpse is impure for seven days; a person who touches him is impure until nightfall,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai: All are biblically [impure] for heave, but for entering the Sanctuary only the second impure who touched the first impure. What is the reason? “A person who would be impure and did not purify himself;” anybody needing purification is guilty for entering the Sanctuary; anybody not needing purification is not guilty for entering the Sanctuary. They objected: But a person who touches objects which touched a corpse needs purification, but is he the second? Rebbi Abin bar Ḥiyya said, for impurity of a person from a person, not for impurity of a person from objects. The statement of Rebbi Abin bar Ḥiyya [implies that] only the first is guilty. Since [for impurity of] a person from a person only the first is guilty, so here the first is guilty. Rebbi Yose said, only if he immersed himself. That is a statement of Rebbi, since Rebbi said, all impure persons remain impure until the are immersed in water.
Rebbi Illa said: He himself, who touched the corpse, is guilty. He said it and gave its reason: “who became impure,” that refers to the impurity of a human. But is there not a third? As Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya said, for impurity of a person from a person a man is guilty for impurity in the Sanctuary. They objected: If objects touch the corpse, a human the objects, and objects the human. For impurity of a person from a person, not for impurity of a person from objects. Rebbi Zeriqa in the name of Rav Hamnuna: The Tanna there disagrees with Rebbi Illa: “For an object made half of cement־earth and half of dung one is not guilty for coming to the Sanctuary” Because it is half of earth and half of dung; but if it were totally of earth, one would be guilty. Who is guilty? Not the one who touches it? Is he not the second who touches the first? Rebbi Phineas said before Rebbi Yose: Explain it if he threw it. He answered him, about him who threw it we stated: For washing his body he is subject to extirpation, for washing his garments to the forty. Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Yose said before Rebbi Yose, do we not have the Mishnah in support of that first Tanna, as is stated: “Rebbi Eleazar said in the name of Rebbi Joshua: For any impurity caused by a corpse for which the nazir shaves, one is guilty if entering the Sanctuary, but for any impurity caused by a corpse for which the nazir does not shave, one is not guilty if entering the Sanctuary.” For the first, for which the nazir shaves, one is guilty if entering the Sanctuary; for the second, for which the nazir does not shave, one is not guilty if entering the Sanctuary. Rebbi Joḥanan said, it is needed from what comes from the corpse: For a quartarius of blood or a quarter qab of bones, for which the nazir does not shave, one is not guilty if entering the Sanctuary; for half a log of blood and half a qab of bones, for which the nazir shaves, one is guilty if entering the Sanctuary. Rebbi Jeremiah said, we were of the opinion that they disagree about a sacrifice, but one whips even the third, even the fourth. Rebbi Yose from Sidon stated before Rebbi Jeremiah in opposition to Rebbi Jeremiah: “For any impurity caused by a corpse for which the nazir shaves, one is guilty if entering the Sanctuary, but for any impurity caused by a corpse for which the nazir does not shave, one is not guilty if entering the Sanctuary.” Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, Rebbi Yannai, Rebbi Joḥanan: It is needed from what comes from the corpse: For a quartarius of blood or a quarter qab of bones, for which the nazir does not shave, one is not guilty; for half a log of blood and half a qab of bones, for which the nazir shaves, one is guilty.
MISHNAH: If a person said to two nezirim: I saw one of you becoming impure but I do not know which one of you it was, they bring one sacrifice of impurity and one of purity. One of them says, if I am impure, the sacrifice of impurity is mine and that of purity is yours; otherwise the sacrifice of purity is mine and that of impurity is yours. Then they count another thirty days and bring one sacrifice of purity; (Mishnah 2) one of them says, if I was impure, the sacrifice of impurity was mine and that of purity was yours, hence this is my sacrifice of purity; otherwise the sacrifice of purity was mine and that of impurity was yours, hence this is your sacrifice of purity. If one of them died, Rebbi Joshua said, he should seek out a person from the general public who would make a vow of nazir corresponding to his needs and say: If I was impure, you are a nazir immediately, but if I was pure, you are a nazir after 30 days. They count 30 days and bring one sacrifice of impurity and one of purity (Mishnah 3) and he says: If I am impure, the sacrifice of impurity is mine and that of purity is yours; otherwise the sacrifice of purity is mine and that of impurity is questionable. Then they count another thirty days, bring one sacrifice of purity (Mishnah 4) and he says: If I was impure, the sacrifice of impurity was mine and that of purity was yours, hence this is my sacrifice of purity; otherwise the sacrifice of purity was mine and that of impurity was questionable; hence this is your sacrifice of purity. Ben Zoma said to him, who would accommodate him to make a vow of nazir corresponding to his needs? But he brings a bird as purification offering and an animal as elevation offering and says: If I was impure, the purification offering is for my obligation and the elevation offering is voluntary. But if I was pure, the elevation offering is for my obligation and the purification offering is questionable. Then he counts 30 days and brings one sacrifice (of impurity and one) of purity (Mishnah 5) and says: If I was impure, the first elevation offering was voluntary and the one now is for my obligation. But if I was pure, the first elevation offering was for my obligation and now I am bringing the remainder of my sacrifices. Rebbi Joshua said, then it turns out that he brings his sacrifices piecemeal! But the Sages accepted the words of Ben Zoma.
MISHNAH: If a person said to two nezirim: I saw one of you becoming impure but I do not know which one of you it was, they bring one sacrifice of impurity and one of purity. One of them says, if I am impure, the sacrifice of impurity is mine and that of purity is yours; otherwise the sacrifice of purity is mine and that of impurity is yours. Then they count another thirty days and bring one sacrifice of purity; (Mishnah 2) one of them says, if I was impure, the sacrifice of impurity was mine and that of purity was yours, hence this is my sacrifice of purity; otherwise the sacrifice of purity was mine and that of impurity was yours, hence this is your sacrifice of purity. If one of them died, Rebbi Joshua said, he should seek out a person from the general public who would make a vow of nazir corresponding to his needs and say: If I was impure, you are a nazir immediately, but if I was pure, you are a nazir after 30 days. They count 30 days and bring one sacrifice of impurity and one of purity (Mishnah 3) and he says: If I am impure, the sacrifice of impurity is mine and that of purity is yours; otherwise the sacrifice of purity is mine and that of impurity is questionable. Then they count another thirty days, bring one sacrifice of purity (Mishnah 4) and he says: If I was impure, the sacrifice of impurity was mine and that of purity was yours, hence this is my sacrifice of purity; otherwise the sacrifice of purity was mine and that of impurity was questionable; hence this is your sacrifice of purity. Ben Zoma said to him, who would accommodate him to make a vow of nazir corresponding to his needs? But he brings a bird as purification offering and an animal as elevation offering and says: If I was impure, the purification offering is for my obligation and the elevation offering is voluntary. But if I was pure, the elevation offering is for my obligation and the purification offering is questionable. Then he counts 30 days and brings one sacrifice (of impurity and one) of purity (Mishnah 5) and says: If I was impure, the first elevation offering was voluntary and the one now is for my obligation. But if I was pure, the first elevation offering was for my obligation and now I am bringing the remainder of my sacrifices. Rebbi Joshua said, then it turns out that he brings his sacrifices piecemeal! But the Sages accepted the words of Ben Zoma.
Rebbi Mana understood it from the following: “They told him, if he wishes, he says that he did it intentionally.” What can he say for an assigned slave girl? In error, he is obligated; intentionally, he is obligated! He can tell him, I touched her but did not finish, or as Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, I was forced to it by the spell she put on me. For a nazir what can you say? In error, he is obligated; intentionally, he is obligated; forced, he is obligated! “Suddenly”, to include in error, “suddenly”, to include intentionally. “There was a condition in my mind that if I should become impure, my nezirut should burst away from me and a new nezirut would fall on me”; in any case he was not obligated to be a nazir until now. (“There was a condition in my mind that if I should become impure, my nezirut should burst away from me and a new nezirut would fall on me”; in any case he was not obligated to be a nazir until now.) What do you have in case of an oath? In error, he is obligated; intentionally, he is obligated! A condition may apply to words; there is no condition for oaths! It follows what Rebbi Abba said, Rav Jehudah: For error, its sacrifice, for intention, its sacrifice. But if he said, I thought that this was no oath, he is free. Therefore, all these subjects cannot be stated, but the following can be stated.
Rebbi Mana understood it from the following: “They told him, if he wishes, he says that he did it intentionally.” What can he say for an assigned slave girl? In error, he is obligated; intentionally, he is obligated! He can tell him, I touched her but did not finish, or as Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, I was forced to it by the spell she put on me. For a nazir what can you say? In error, he is obligated; intentionally, he is obligated; forced, he is obligated! “Suddenly”, to include in error, “suddenly”, to include intentionally. “There was a condition in my mind that if I should become impure, my nezirut should burst away from me and a new nezirut would fall on me”; in any case he was not obligated to be a nazir until now. (“There was a condition in my mind that if I should become impure, my nezirut should burst away from me and a new nezirut would fall on me”; in any case he was not obligated to be a nazir until now.) What do you have in case of an oath? In error, he is obligated; intentionally, he is obligated! A condition may apply to words; there is no condition for oaths! It follows what Rebbi Abba said, Rav Jehudah: For error, its sacrifice, for intention, its sacrifice. But if he said, I thought that this was no oath, he is free. Therefore, all these subjects cannot be stated, but the following can be stated.
There, we have stated: “The Non-Jew, Rebbi Meїr says, is evaluated but does not evaluate; Rebbi Jehudah says, he evaluates but is not evaluated. Both agree that they make vows and are objects of vows.” Rebbi Jeremiah asked: For him who says there that he evaluates, here can he declare a nazir? For him who says there that he is evaluated, here can he be declared a nazir? How would it be possible for him to [be declared a nazir]? A Israelite can declare a Gentile to be a nazir. Would he listen to him? But the Israelite said, “I am a nazir,” the Gentile heard it and said, “I am responsible for what this one said.” It is only as if he paid a debt. How would it be possible for him to [declare a nazir]? A Gentile can declare an Israelite to be nazir. Since an Israelite cannot declare [another] Israelite to be a nazir, a Gentile cannot declare an Israelite to be a nazir. But it must be that the Gentile said, “I am a nazir”, the Israelite heard it and said, “I am taking upon me what this one said.” What did you exclude from him? An Israelite is subject to “not to desecrate”, a Gentile is not subject to “not to desecrate”. Rebbi Jonah said, Israelites can be relieved by a Sage, Gentiles cannot be relieved by a Sage. Rebbi Yose said, Israelites need a Sage to be relieved, Gentiles do not need a Sage to be relieved. It follows that Rebbi (Jonah) [Yose] follows Rebbi Abbahu. A Gentile woman came before Rebbi Abbahu, who said to Abime bar Tobi: Go and find her an opening by unforeseen circumstances. And Rebbi Jonah follows Rebbi Aḥa, who said that Laban was Kushan-Riš‘ataim. Why was he called “Kushan the doubly bad”? Because he committed two evils. One that he desecrated his oath, the other that he subjugated Israel for eight years.
There, we have stated: “The Non-Jew, Rebbi Meїr says, is evaluated but does not evaluate; Rebbi Jehudah says, he evaluates but is not evaluated. Both agree that they make vows and are objects of vows.” Rebbi Jeremiah asked: For him who says there that he evaluates, here can he declare a nazir? For him who says there that he is evaluated, here can he be declared a nazir? How would it be possible for him to [be declared a nazir]? A Israelite can declare a Gentile to be a nazir. Would he listen to him? But the Israelite said, “I am a nazir,” the Gentile heard it and said, “I am responsible for what this one said.” It is only as if he paid a debt. How would it be possible for him to [declare a nazir]? A Gentile can declare an Israelite to be nazir. Since an Israelite cannot declare [another] Israelite to be a nazir, a Gentile cannot declare an Israelite to be a nazir. But it must be that the Gentile said, “I am a nazir”, the Israelite heard it and said, “I am taking upon me what this one said.” What did you exclude from him? An Israelite is subject to “not to desecrate”, a Gentile is not subject to “not to desecrate”. Rebbi Jonah said, Israelites can be relieved by a Sage, Gentiles cannot be relieved by a Sage. Rebbi Yose said, Israelites need a Sage to be relieved, Gentiles do not need a Sage to be relieved. It follows that Rebbi (Jonah) [Yose] follows Rebbi Abbahu. A Gentile woman came before Rebbi Abbahu, who said to Abime bar Tobi: Go and find her an opening by unforeseen circumstances. And Rebbi Jonah follows Rebbi Aḥa, who said that Laban was Kushan-Riš‘ataim. Why was he called “Kushan the doubly bad”? Because he committed two evils. One that he desecrated his oath, the other that he subjugated Israel for eight years.
There, we have stated: “The Non-Jew, Rebbi Meїr says, is evaluated but does not evaluate; Rebbi Jehudah says, he evaluates but is not evaluated. Both agree that they make vows and are objects of vows.” Rebbi Jeremiah asked: For him who says there that he evaluates, here can he declare a nazir? For him who says there that he is evaluated, here can he be declared a nazir? How would it be possible for him to [be declared a nazir]? A Israelite can declare a Gentile to be a nazir. Would he listen to him? But the Israelite said, “I am a nazir,” the Gentile heard it and said, “I am responsible for what this one said.” It is only as if he paid a debt. How would it be possible for him to [declare a nazir]? A Gentile can declare an Israelite to be nazir. Since an Israelite cannot declare [another] Israelite to be a nazir, a Gentile cannot declare an Israelite to be a nazir. But it must be that the Gentile said, “I am a nazir”, the Israelite heard it and said, “I am taking upon me what this one said.” What did you exclude from him? An Israelite is subject to “not to desecrate”, a Gentile is not subject to “not to desecrate”. Rebbi Jonah said, Israelites can be relieved by a Sage, Gentiles cannot be relieved by a Sage. Rebbi Yose said, Israelites need a Sage to be relieved, Gentiles do not need a Sage to be relieved. It follows that Rebbi (Jonah) [Yose] follows Rebbi Abbahu. A Gentile woman came before Rebbi Abbahu, who said to Abime bar Tobi: Go and find her an opening by unforeseen circumstances. And Rebbi Jonah follows Rebbi Aḥa, who said that Laban was Kushan-Riš‘ataim. Why was he called “Kushan the doubly bad”? Because he committed two evils. One that he desecrated his oath, the other that he subjugated Israel for eight years.
HALAKHAH: Rebbi Joḥanan said, who is the Tanna of “when he had shaved, before he shaved”? Rebbi Eliezer! But for the rabbis it would be before the blood was sprinkled for him. Ulla bar Ismael in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: What is Rebbi Eliezer’s reason? “The nazir shall shave the hair of his crowned head.” The Torah made his nezirut dependent on his hair.
It was stated: “Only a corpse creates a grave of the abyss.” Therefore, not a carcass. Would it not be a conclusion de minore ad majus? Since a corpse, which does not cause impurity of couch and seat, creates a grave of the abyss, should a carcasss which causes impurity of couch and seat not create a grave of the abyss? Why was it said that only a corpse creates a grave of the abyss? To exclude couch and seat.
MISHNAH: If somebody finds a corpse in original position, lying as usual, he takes him and his surroundings. If he finds two, he takes them and their surroundings. If he finds three and between one and the next is a distance of between four and eight cubits, enough for the bier and the people who bury, that is a cemetery. He has to check on both sides for another 20 cubits. If he finds a grave at the end of 20 cubits, he has to check another 20 cubits since it is obvious that if this were a new burial ground, one would have taken him and his surroundings there.
There, we have stated: “If a vineyard is planted with less that four cubits of space, Rebbi Simeon says that it is no vineyard. But the Sages say that it is a vineyard and one disregards the plants in the middle as if nonexistent.” Simeon bar Abba in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Just as they disagree here, they disagree about a graveyard. Rebbi Jonah said, one cannot compare these. There, they form a graveyard; here, they do not form a graveyard. Rebbi Yose said, one cannot compare these. There, if they were spaced apart and one moved them closer together, that is the disagreement. If they were close and one moved them apart, everybody would agree. But here, what is their disagreement? When one found them close together. Rebbi Simeon said, a landslide fell on them and compressed them. But the Sages say, were they spaced apart and somebody brought them close together?”
HALAKHAH: So is the Mishnah: Rebbi Neḥemia declares him not prosecutable but the Sages declare him guilty since it is not unsubstantiated. The Sages say, two estimations have precedence over one estimation; Rebbi Neḥemiah says, the intermediate estimation has precedence over the two. What is Rebbi Neḥemiah’s reason? “ ‘If he gets up and walks outside on his cane, the attacker is exonerated.’ Could you think that this one walks in the market and the other is executed because of him? But even if he died according to the first estimation he cannot be prosecuted.” What is the rabbi’s reason? “If he does not die but is bedridden.” Would we not know that even if he does not die that he will be bedridden? But if they estimated that he would die. If they estimated that he would die, that is what is written: “If he gets up and walks outside on his cane.” Therefore, if he does not get up, [the attacker] is guilty. But if they did not estimate that he would die? If they did not estimate that he would die, that is what is written: “But he has to pay for his disability.” Rebbi Ila in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: It is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he has to pay. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: It was an erroneous estimation. What is the difference between them? If his state improved. For him who says, it is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he has to pay; if he paid, he paid. If he did not pay, the verse makes him pay. A baraita supports one and a baraita supports the other. A baraita supports Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: If they estimated that he would die, when does he have to pay him? From the moment he improves. For him who says, it was an erroneous estimation; if he did not pay one does not order him to pay. If he paid, can he take it back? This supports Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: If they estimated that he would live but he died. From when does one have to pay him? From the moment he turns worse. Rebbi Yose said, it does not say here, “from the moment he turns worse” but “from the moment he turns better.”