would
8268 occurrences across the corpus
The Jerusalem Talmud
HALAKHAH: So is the Mishnah: Rebbi Neḥemia declares him not prosecutable but the Sages declare him guilty since it is not unsubstantiated. The Sages say, two estimations have precedence over one estimation; Rebbi Neḥemiah says, the intermediate estimation has precedence over the two. What is Rebbi Neḥemiah’s reason? “ ‘If he gets up and walks outside on his cane, the attacker is exonerated.’ Could you think that this one walks in the market and the other is executed because of him? But even if he died according to the first estimation he cannot be prosecuted.” What is the rabbi’s reason? “If he does not die but is bedridden.” Would we not know that even if he does not die that he will be bedridden? But if they estimated that he would die. If they estimated that he would die, that is what is written: “If he gets up and walks outside on his cane.” Therefore, if he does not get up, [the attacker] is guilty. But if they did not estimate that he would die? If they did not estimate that he would die, that is what is written: “But he has to pay for his disability.” Rebbi Ila in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: It is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he has to pay. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: It was an erroneous estimation. What is the difference between them? If his state improved. For him who says, it is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he has to pay; if he paid, he paid. If he did not pay, the verse makes him pay. A baraita supports one and a baraita supports the other. A baraita supports Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: If they estimated that he would die, when does he have to pay him? From the moment he improves. For him who says, it was an erroneous estimation; if he did not pay one does not order him to pay. If he paid, can he take it back? This supports Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: If they estimated that he would live but he died. From when does one have to pay him? From the moment he turns worse. Rebbi Yose said, it does not say here, “from the moment he turns worse” but “from the moment he turns better.”
HALAKHAH: So is the Mishnah: Rebbi Neḥemia declares him not prosecutable but the Sages declare him guilty since it is not unsubstantiated. The Sages say, two estimations have precedence over one estimation; Rebbi Neḥemiah says, the intermediate estimation has precedence over the two. What is Rebbi Neḥemiah’s reason? “ ‘If he gets up and walks outside on his cane, the attacker is exonerated.’ Could you think that this one walks in the market and the other is executed because of him? But even if he died according to the first estimation he cannot be prosecuted.” What is the rabbi’s reason? “If he does not die but is bedridden.” Would we not know that even if he does not die that he will be bedridden? But if they estimated that he would die. If they estimated that he would die, that is what is written: “If he gets up and walks outside on his cane.” Therefore, if he does not get up, [the attacker] is guilty. But if they did not estimate that he would die? If they did not estimate that he would die, that is what is written: “But he has to pay for his disability.” Rebbi Ila in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: It is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he has to pay. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: It was an erroneous estimation. What is the difference between them? If his state improved. For him who says, it is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he has to pay; if he paid, he paid. If he did not pay, the verse makes him pay. A baraita supports one and a baraita supports the other. A baraita supports Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: If they estimated that he would die, when does he have to pay him? From the moment he improves. For him who says, it was an erroneous estimation; if he did not pay one does not order him to pay. If he paid, can he take it back? This supports Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: If they estimated that he would live but he died. From when does one have to pay him? From the moment he turns worse. Rebbi Yose said, it does not say here, “from the moment he turns worse” but “from the moment he turns better.”
HALAKHAH: So is the Mishnah: Rebbi Neḥemia declares him not prosecutable but the Sages declare him guilty since it is not unsubstantiated. The Sages say, two estimations have precedence over one estimation; Rebbi Neḥemiah says, the intermediate estimation has precedence over the two. What is Rebbi Neḥemiah’s reason? “ ‘If he gets up and walks outside on his cane, the attacker is exonerated.’ Could you think that this one walks in the market and the other is executed because of him? But even if he died according to the first estimation he cannot be prosecuted.” What is the rabbi’s reason? “If he does not die but is bedridden.” Would we not know that even if he does not die that he will be bedridden? But if they estimated that he would die. If they estimated that he would die, that is what is written: “If he gets up and walks outside on his cane.” Therefore, if he does not get up, [the attacker] is guilty. But if they did not estimate that he would die? If they did not estimate that he would die, that is what is written: “But he has to pay for his disability.” Rebbi Ila in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: It is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he has to pay. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: It was an erroneous estimation. What is the difference between them? If his state improved. For him who says, it is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he has to pay; if he paid, he paid. If he did not pay, the verse makes him pay. A baraita supports one and a baraita supports the other. A baraita supports Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: If they estimated that he would die, when does he have to pay him? From the moment he improves. For him who says, it was an erroneous estimation; if he did not pay one does not order him to pay. If he paid, can he take it back? This supports Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: If they estimated that he would live but he died. From when does one have to pay him? From the moment he turns worse. Rebbi Yose said, it does not say here, “from the moment he turns worse” but “from the moment he turns better.”
HALAKHAH: So is the Mishnah: Rebbi Neḥemia declares him not prosecutable but the Sages declare him guilty since it is not unsubstantiated. The Sages say, two estimations have precedence over one estimation; Rebbi Neḥemiah says, the intermediate estimation has precedence over the two. What is Rebbi Neḥemiah’s reason? “ ‘If he gets up and walks outside on his cane, the attacker is exonerated.’ Could you think that this one walks in the market and the other is executed because of him? But even if he died according to the first estimation he cannot be prosecuted.” What is the rabbi’s reason? “If he does not die but is bedridden.” Would we not know that even if he does not die that he will be bedridden? But if they estimated that he would die. If they estimated that he would die, that is what is written: “If he gets up and walks outside on his cane.” Therefore, if he does not get up, [the attacker] is guilty. But if they did not estimate that he would die? If they did not estimate that he would die, that is what is written: “But he has to pay for his disability.” Rebbi Ila in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: It is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he has to pay. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: It was an erroneous estimation. What is the difference between them? If his state improved. For him who says, it is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he has to pay; if he paid, he paid. If he did not pay, the verse makes him pay. A baraita supports one and a baraita supports the other. A baraita supports Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: If they estimated that he would die, when does he have to pay him? From the moment he improves. For him who says, it was an erroneous estimation; if he did not pay one does not order him to pay. If he paid, can he take it back? This supports Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: If they estimated that he would live but he died. From when does one have to pay him? From the moment he turns worse. Rebbi Yose said, it does not say here, “from the moment he turns worse” but “from the moment he turns better.”
HALAKHAH: So is the Mishnah: Rebbi Neḥemia declares him not prosecutable but the Sages declare him guilty since it is not unsubstantiated. The Sages say, two estimations have precedence over one estimation; Rebbi Neḥemiah says, the intermediate estimation has precedence over the two. What is Rebbi Neḥemiah’s reason? “ ‘If he gets up and walks outside on his cane, the attacker is exonerated.’ Could you think that this one walks in the market and the other is executed because of him? But even if he died according to the first estimation he cannot be prosecuted.” What is the rabbi’s reason? “If he does not die but is bedridden.” Would we not know that even if he does not die that he will be bedridden? But if they estimated that he would die. If they estimated that he would die, that is what is written: “If he gets up and walks outside on his cane.” Therefore, if he does not get up, [the attacker] is guilty. But if they did not estimate that he would die? If they did not estimate that he would die, that is what is written: “But he has to pay for his disability.” Rebbi Ila in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: It is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he has to pay. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: It was an erroneous estimation. What is the difference between them? If his state improved. For him who says, it is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he has to pay; if he paid, he paid. If he did not pay, the verse makes him pay. A baraita supports one and a baraita supports the other. A baraita supports Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: If they estimated that he would die, when does he have to pay him? From the moment he improves. For him who says, it was an erroneous estimation; if he did not pay one does not order him to pay. If he paid, can he take it back? This supports Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: If they estimated that he would live but he died. From when does one have to pay him? From the moment he turns worse. Rebbi Yose said, it does not say here, “from the moment he turns worse” but “from the moment he turns better.”
HALAKHAH: So is the Mishnah: Rebbi Neḥemia declares him not prosecutable but the Sages declare him guilty since it is not unsubstantiated. The Sages say, two estimations have precedence over one estimation; Rebbi Neḥemiah says, the intermediate estimation has precedence over the two. What is Rebbi Neḥemiah’s reason? “ ‘If he gets up and walks outside on his cane, the attacker is exonerated.’ Could you think that this one walks in the market and the other is executed because of him? But even if he died according to the first estimation he cannot be prosecuted.” What is the rabbi’s reason? “If he does not die but is bedridden.” Would we not know that even if he does not die that he will be bedridden? But if they estimated that he would die. If they estimated that he would die, that is what is written: “If he gets up and walks outside on his cane.” Therefore, if he does not get up, [the attacker] is guilty. But if they did not estimate that he would die? If they did not estimate that he would die, that is what is written: “But he has to pay for his disability.” Rebbi Ila in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: It is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he has to pay. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: It was an erroneous estimation. What is the difference between them? If his state improved. For him who says, it is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he has to pay; if he paid, he paid. If he did not pay, the verse makes him pay. A baraita supports one and a baraita supports the other. A baraita supports Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: If they estimated that he would die, when does he have to pay him? From the moment he improves. For him who says, it was an erroneous estimation; if he did not pay one does not order him to pay. If he paid, can he take it back? This supports Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: If they estimated that he would live but he died. From when does one have to pay him? From the moment he turns worse. Rebbi Yose said, it does not say here, “from the moment he turns worse” but “from the moment he turns better.”
HALAKHAH: “Somebody who brings a bill of divorce from overseas,” etc. This is difficult. If somebody brings a gift document from overseas,would you require him to say, it was written and signed before me? Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said, there is a difference because they are not conversant with the fine points of bills of divorce. Rebbi Joḥanan said, that is a leniency lest she sit abandoned. Is that a leniency? It is only a restriction, for if he does not say to her, it was written and signed before me, you do not permit her to remarry. Rebbi Yose said, the difficulty which you impose upon her at the beginning, that he is required to say, it was written and signed before me, makes it easy for her at the end. For if [the husband] would come and protest, his protest would be void. Rebbi Mana wanted to say, a protest other than the text of the bill. But is a protest about the text of the bill a protest which has no validity? Even for a protest which has validity, said Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun, since you say that the reason for the difficulty which you impose upon her at the beginning, that he is required to say, it was signed before me, is to make it easy for her at the end, that if [the husband] would come and protest, his protest would be void; this means that there is no difference whether it is a protest not about the text of the bill or about the body of the bill, a protest which has no validity, or a protest which does have validity! But should you worry that maybe be gave the bill to disqualified witnesses to sign? Rebbi Abun said, he is not suspect to damage her before Heaven. Before the court he is suspect to damage her. But since he knows that if he comes and protests his protest is void, he will choose qualified witnesses to sign.
HALAKHAH: “Somebody who brings a bill of divorce from overseas,” etc. This is difficult. If somebody brings a gift document from overseas,would you require him to say, it was written and signed before me? Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said, there is a difference because they are not conversant with the fine points of bills of divorce. Rebbi Joḥanan said, that is a leniency lest she sit abandoned. Is that a leniency? It is only a restriction, for if he does not say to her, it was written and signed before me, you do not permit her to remarry. Rebbi Yose said, the difficulty which you impose upon her at the beginning, that he is required to say, it was written and signed before me, makes it easy for her at the end. For if [the husband] would come and protest, his protest would be void. Rebbi Mana wanted to say, a protest other than the text of the bill. But is a protest about the text of the bill a protest which has no validity? Even for a protest which has validity, said Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun, since you say that the reason for the difficulty which you impose upon her at the beginning, that he is required to say, it was signed before me, is to make it easy for her at the end, that if [the husband] would come and protest, his protest would be void; this means that there is no difference whether it is a protest not about the text of the bill or about the body of the bill, a protest which has no validity, or a protest which does have validity! But should you worry that maybe be gave the bill to disqualified witnesses to sign? Rebbi Abun said, he is not suspect to damage her before Heaven. Before the court he is suspect to damage her. But since he knows that if he comes and protests his protest is void, he will choose qualified witnesses to sign.
HALAKHAH: “Somebody who brings a bill of divorce from overseas,” etc. This is difficult. If somebody brings a gift document from overseas,would you require him to say, it was written and signed before me? Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said, there is a difference because they are not conversant with the fine points of bills of divorce. Rebbi Joḥanan said, that is a leniency lest she sit abandoned. Is that a leniency? It is only a restriction, for if he does not say to her, it was written and signed before me, you do not permit her to remarry. Rebbi Yose said, the difficulty which you impose upon her at the beginning, that he is required to say, it was written and signed before me, makes it easy for her at the end. For if [the husband] would come and protest, his protest would be void. Rebbi Mana wanted to say, a protest other than the text of the bill. But is a protest about the text of the bill a protest which has no validity? Even for a protest which has validity, said Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun, since you say that the reason for the difficulty which you impose upon her at the beginning, that he is required to say, it was signed before me, is to make it easy for her at the end, that if [the husband] would come and protest, his protest would be void; this means that there is no difference whether it is a protest not about the text of the bill or about the body of the bill, a protest which has no validity, or a protest which does have validity! But should you worry that maybe be gave the bill to disqualified witnesses to sign? Rebbi Abun said, he is not suspect to damage her before Heaven. Before the court he is suspect to damage her. But since he knows that if he comes and protests his protest is void, he will choose qualified witnesses to sign.
HALAKHAH: “Somebody who brings a bill of divorce from overseas,” etc. This is difficult. If somebody brings a gift document from overseas,would you require him to say, it was written and signed before me? Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said, there is a difference because they are not conversant with the fine points of bills of divorce. Rebbi Joḥanan said, that is a leniency lest she sit abandoned. Is that a leniency? It is only a restriction, for if he does not say to her, it was written and signed before me, you do not permit her to remarry. Rebbi Yose said, the difficulty which you impose upon her at the beginning, that he is required to say, it was written and signed before me, makes it easy for her at the end. For if [the husband] would come and protest, his protest would be void. Rebbi Mana wanted to say, a protest other than the text of the bill. But is a protest about the text of the bill a protest which has no validity? Even for a protest which has validity, said Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun, since you say that the reason for the difficulty which you impose upon her at the beginning, that he is required to say, it was signed before me, is to make it easy for her at the end, that if [the husband] would come and protest, his protest would be void; this means that there is no difference whether it is a protest not about the text of the bill or about the body of the bill, a protest which has no validity, or a protest which does have validity! But should you worry that maybe be gave the bill to disqualified witnesses to sign? Rebbi Abun said, he is not suspect to damage her before Heaven. Before the court he is suspect to damage her. But since he knows that if he comes and protests his protest is void, he will choose qualified witnesses to sign.
HALAKHAH: “Somebody who brings a bill of divorce from overseas,” etc. This is difficult. If somebody brings a gift document from overseas,would you require him to say, it was written and signed before me? Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said, there is a difference because they are not conversant with the fine points of bills of divorce. Rebbi Joḥanan said, that is a leniency lest she sit abandoned. Is that a leniency? It is only a restriction, for if he does not say to her, it was written and signed before me, you do not permit her to remarry. Rebbi Yose said, the difficulty which you impose upon her at the beginning, that he is required to say, it was written and signed before me, makes it easy for her at the end. For if [the husband] would come and protest, his protest would be void. Rebbi Mana wanted to say, a protest other than the text of the bill. But is a protest about the text of the bill a protest which has no validity? Even for a protest which has validity, said Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun, since you say that the reason for the difficulty which you impose upon her at the beginning, that he is required to say, it was signed before me, is to make it easy for her at the end, that if [the husband] would come and protest, his protest would be void; this means that there is no difference whether it is a protest not about the text of the bill or about the body of the bill, a protest which has no validity, or a protest which does have validity! But should you worry that maybe be gave the bill to disqualified witnesses to sign? Rebbi Abun said, he is not suspect to damage her before Heaven. Before the court he is suspect to damage her. But since he knows that if he comes and protests his protest is void, he will choose qualified witnesses to sign.
Only if he says, it was written before me during the day and signed during the day; only if he says, it was written before me especially for her and signed expressly for her. It was asked before Rebbi Joḥanan: Does he have to know the names of the witnesses at the moment of their signing? He said to them, did the Gentiles Luciani sign it? And you say so? A baraita supports Rebbi Joḥanan: “All bills of divorce coming from overseas are valid even if their names sound Gentile since Jews outside the Land of Israel bear Gentile names.” He said only, outside the Land; therefore not in the Land of Israel. What about this? Rebbi Bevai in the name of Rebbi Issi: unless he writes, at a Jewish place. If there is no Jewish place, in the synagogue. If there is no synagogue, he assembles there ten people. Rebbi Abun said, it would be better to certify the signatures than to assemble there ten people. What about this? Even in a Jewish store.
If he did not say: “it was written and signed before me”? Should not an Amora have asked this question? He said to him, that is what Rabin ben Rav said: If he brought a bill of divorce, gave it to her, but did not tell her: “It was written and signed before me”? There came a case before Rebbi Joḥanan, who said to him, take it from her and say in front of two [witnesses]: “It was written and signed before me.” Does Rebbi Joḥanan follow Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar, since Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar said, it is no bill of divorce unless he tells her at the moment of delivery that it is her bill of divorce? Can the position of Rebbi Joḥanan be derived from Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar? Would Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar agree that if he told her at the moment of delivery that it was her bill of divorce it would not be a bill of divorce? But here, even if he tells her at the moment of delivery that it is her bill of divorce, it is no bill of divorce unless he tells her in front of two [witnesses]: “It was written and signed before me.” But Rebbi Joḥanan might hold that a woman cannot be believed if she says, I received a bill of divorce from my husband’s agents. But we did state: “The wife herself can bring her bill of divorce.” Would you not have to be afraid that she might have received the bill from a representative of the husband? How is it? The reason of Rebbi Joḥanan is to make her known as divorcee in front of two [witnesses].
If he did not say: “it was written and signed before me”? Should not an Amora have asked this question? He said to him, that is what Rabin ben Rav said: If he brought a bill of divorce, gave it to her, but did not tell her: “It was written and signed before me”? There came a case before Rebbi Joḥanan, who said to him, take it from her and say in front of two [witnesses]: “It was written and signed before me.” Does Rebbi Joḥanan follow Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar, since Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar said, it is no bill of divorce unless he tells her at the moment of delivery that it is her bill of divorce? Can the position of Rebbi Joḥanan be derived from Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar? Would Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar agree that if he told her at the moment of delivery that it was her bill of divorce it would not be a bill of divorce? But here, even if he tells her at the moment of delivery that it is her bill of divorce, it is no bill of divorce unless he tells her in front of two [witnesses]: “It was written and signed before me.” But Rebbi Joḥanan might hold that a woman cannot be believed if she says, I received a bill of divorce from my husband’s agents. But we did state: “The wife herself can bring her bill of divorce.” Would you not have to be afraid that she might have received the bill from a representative of the husband? How is it? The reason of Rebbi Joḥanan is to make her known as divorcee in front of two [witnesses].
If he did not say: “it was written and signed before me”? Should not an Amora have asked this question? He said to him, that is what Rabin ben Rav said: If he brought a bill of divorce, gave it to her, but did not tell her: “It was written and signed before me”? There came a case before Rebbi Joḥanan, who said to him, take it from her and say in front of two [witnesses]: “It was written and signed before me.” Does Rebbi Joḥanan follow Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar, since Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar said, it is no bill of divorce unless he tells her at the moment of delivery that it is her bill of divorce? Can the position of Rebbi Joḥanan be derived from Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar? Would Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar agree that if he told her at the moment of delivery that it was her bill of divorce it would not be a bill of divorce? But here, even if he tells her at the moment of delivery that it is her bill of divorce, it is no bill of divorce unless he tells her in front of two [witnesses]: “It was written and signed before me.” But Rebbi Joḥanan might hold that a woman cannot be believed if she says, I received a bill of divorce from my husband’s agents. But we did state: “The wife herself can bring her bill of divorce.” Would you not have to be afraid that she might have received the bill from a representative of the husband? How is it? The reason of Rebbi Joḥanan is to make her known as divorcee in front of two [witnesses].
Rebbi Jeremiah asked: If he wrote it in the Land of Israel, signed it outside the Land, went to deliver it to her outside the Land but did not find her outside the Land, returned and found her in the Land of Israel. He must say, “it was written and signed before me,” because he wrote it in the Land of Israel and signed it outside the Land But if it was written and signed in the Land of Israel, he went to deliver it to her outside the Land but did not find her outside the Land, he need not say, “it was written and signed before me.” If he gave her bill of divorce to her when she said, my courtyard at Acco shall acquire it for me, Rebbi Ḥinena said, it is as if she had a long arm. If she had a long arm, she stretched it out and took it from there, does he not have to say “it was written and signed before me”? Rebbi Abba said, who would deny it?
HALAKHAH: “Rebbi Jehudah says, from Reqam to the East,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan told the people of Sepphoris: You say in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, even a person who brings a bill of divorce from Babylonia does not have to say “it was written and signed before me.” But I am saying that it is necessary, for there is a Mishnah: “Rebbi Jehudah says, from Reqam to the East and Reqam belongs to the East.” And even if you say that they disagree with Rebbi Jehudah and say that Reqam does not belong to the East, what about from Babylonia to here? Rav said, we consider ourselves as in the Land of Israel in the matter of bills of divorce. But Samuel said, even from one city quarter to another. He asked before him to change his opinion, when Cahana told him, what would we do with the earlier cases of women who remarried? He said to him, what do you have in your hand? For he was of Rebbi’s opinion as it was stated: If somebody brings a bill of divorce from overseas which was neither written nor signed in his presence, she has to leave under the thirteen penalties, the words of Rebbi. But the Sages did not agree in this matter.
Everybody agrees that if [the husband] comes and protests, his protest is invalid. That is, if he protested after she remarried. If he protested before she remarried and then she remarried? Let us hear from the following: It happened that somebody brought a bill of divorce before Rebbi Ismael. He asked him, from where are you? He answered, from Kefar Simai in the region of Acco. He said to him, then you have to say, “it was written and signed in my presence;” you do not need witnesses. After [that person] left, Rebbi Ilai said to him, my teacher, is not Kefar Simai in the Land of Israel, closer to Sepphoris than to Acco? He answered, since the matter was resolved in a permissive way; it stands. What means “since the matter was resolved in a permissive way; it stands”? Rebbi Ze‘ira said, that if [the husband] came and protested, his protest would be invalid. But does a person who brings a bill of divorce from the Land of Israel for delivery in the Land of Israel have to say, “it was written and signed in my presence”? Therefore, there cannot be any difference whether he protested after she remarried or before she remarried and then she remarried.
If a bond was signed by four witnesses and it turned out that the first two were relatives or disqualified, it is valid and is confirmed by the remaining testimony. Rebbi Ila in the name of Rebbi Yasa: This follows him who says that witnesses sign only in the presence of each other. But following him who says that witnesses may sign without being in the presence of each other, even if the Jew signed last it is invalid. And would it not be remote testimony? That one cannot say since Rebbi Yasa said in the name of Rebbi Jeremiah that disqualified witnesses do not constitute remote testimony since they came only to support the document’s validity.
Rebbi Aḥa said, the acts of a Gentile court are public knowledge. Then even if both [witnesses] are Samaritan? Did one not say that they are not conversant with the fine points in writing bills of divorce? But Rebbi Simeon validates their bills of divorce! Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira: It turns out that Rebbi Simeon agrees with Rebbi Eleazar. Just as Rebbi Eleazar said, even if no witnesses signed on it, it is valid, so Rebbi Simeon said, even if no witnesses signed on it, it is valid. But then even if it was made by private persons? This shows that it was necessary that Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, the acts of a Gentile court are public knowledge. A bond was executed in Bet Shean, whose witnesses were Gentiles. Rebbi Yose says, Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagree, one said it is invalid, the other said it is valid. Rebbi Abbahu explained: Rebbi Joḥanan said it is invalid, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said it is valid. What is Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish’s reason? That a Jew should not lose money. But if that one would not lose money, the other would lose money! Rebbi Yudan said, it must be in order not to close the door before people, for tomorrow one would look to borrow but does not succeed.
Rebbi Aḥa said, the acts of a Gentile court are public knowledge. Then even if both [witnesses] are Samaritan? Did one not say that they are not conversant with the fine points in writing bills of divorce? But Rebbi Simeon validates their bills of divorce! Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira: It turns out that Rebbi Simeon agrees with Rebbi Eleazar. Just as Rebbi Eleazar said, even if no witnesses signed on it, it is valid, so Rebbi Simeon said, even if no witnesses signed on it, it is valid. But then even if it was made by private persons? This shows that it was necessary that Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, the acts of a Gentile court are public knowledge. A bond was executed in Bet Shean, whose witnesses were Gentiles. Rebbi Yose says, Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagree, one said it is invalid, the other said it is valid. Rebbi Abbahu explained: Rebbi Joḥanan said it is invalid, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said it is valid. What is Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish’s reason? That a Jew should not lose money. But if that one would not lose money, the other would lose money! Rebbi Yudan said, it must be in order not to close the door before people, for tomorrow one would look to borrow but does not succeed.
Rebbi Aḥa said, the acts of a Gentile court are public knowledge. Then even if both [witnesses] are Samaritan? Did one not say that they are not conversant with the fine points in writing bills of divorce? But Rebbi Simeon validates their bills of divorce! Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira: It turns out that Rebbi Simeon agrees with Rebbi Eleazar. Just as Rebbi Eleazar said, even if no witnesses signed on it, it is valid, so Rebbi Simeon said, even if no witnesses signed on it, it is valid. But then even if it was made by private persons? This shows that it was necessary that Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, the acts of a Gentile court are public knowledge. A bond was executed in Bet Shean, whose witnesses were Gentiles. Rebbi Yose says, Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagree, one said it is invalid, the other said it is valid. Rebbi Abbahu explained: Rebbi Joḥanan said it is invalid, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said it is valid. What is Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish’s reason? That a Jew should not lose money. But if that one would not lose money, the other would lose money! Rebbi Yudan said, it must be in order not to close the door before people, for tomorrow one would look to borrow but does not succeed.
HALAKHAH: If one says, “give this bill of divorce to my wife,” etc. Elsewhere you say that “give” means “bring”, but here you say that “give” means “acquire”! So is the Mishnah: “Acquire this bill of divorce for my wife; acquire this document of manumission for my slave.” The formulation of the Mishnah says so: “Because one may bestow benefit on a person in his absence but put a detriment on a person only in his presence.” Rebbi Meïr says, it is a detriment for either of them, but the Sages say it is a benefit for the slave but a detriment for the wife. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said, Rebbi Joḥanan asked: Think of it, if he was the slave of a rich person, would it not be a detriment for the slave? The colleagues said, Rebbi Joḥanan asked: Think of it, if she was the wife of a man suffering from boils, would it not be a benefit for the woman? You have only the following: If one sells his slave without the latter’s knowledge, is the sale of the slave not valid? If one divorces his wife without her knowledge, is the divorce valid because she was acquired by him? Rebbi Abin said, he is his property but he disqualifies him for heave.
HALAKHAH: If one says, “give this bill of divorce to my wife,” etc. Elsewhere you say that “give” means “bring”, but here you say that “give” means “acquire”! So is the Mishnah: “Acquire this bill of divorce for my wife; acquire this document of manumission for my slave.” The formulation of the Mishnah says so: “Because one may bestow benefit on a person in his absence but put a detriment on a person only in his presence.” Rebbi Meïr says, it is a detriment for either of them, but the Sages say it is a benefit for the slave but a detriment for the wife. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said, Rebbi Joḥanan asked: Think of it, if he was the slave of a rich person, would it not be a detriment for the slave? The colleagues said, Rebbi Joḥanan asked: Think of it, if she was the wife of a man suffering from boils, would it not be a benefit for the woman? You have only the following: If one sells his slave without the latter’s knowledge, is the sale of the slave not valid? If one divorces his wife without her knowledge, is the divorce valid because she was acquired by him? Rebbi Abin said, he is his property but he disqualifies him for heave.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody brings a bill of divorce from overseas,” etc. One understands “it was written before me” but not “it was signed before me”, but “it was signed before me” but not “it was written before me”? Is not a bill of divorce validated by its signatures? That must follow Rebbi Jehudah, for Rebbi Jehudah invalidates forms. Following Rebbi Jehudah outside the Land as for one who divorces in the Land of Israel. Are there forms of bills of divorce outside the Land for divorces outside the Land? It is necessary for him to know that it is a bill of divorce and that he be appointed as an agent; he would not know that it was a bill of divorce unless it was written completely before him. Rebbi Ḥanin stated: It is permitted that he enter and leave.
If the witnesses do not know how to sign. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, one sketches for them in ink and they sign with vermilion, or with vermilion and they sign in ink. Rebbi Joḥanan told him, because we are occupied with the rules of the Sabbath, should we permit a married woman? But he brings an blank sheet of paper and cuts it before them. Would it not have been the first person’s handwriting? One has to widen the cuts. Rebbi Mana said, why do we not say that one sketches for them with water? If he would come and protest, his protest would be accepted. If somebody tears into skin in the form of writing it is valid. If somebody sketches on skin in the form of writing it is invalid.
If the witnesses do not know how to sign. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, one sketches for them in ink and they sign with vermilion, or with vermilion and they sign in ink. Rebbi Joḥanan told him, because we are occupied with the rules of the Sabbath, should we permit a married woman? But he brings an blank sheet of paper and cuts it before them. Would it not have been the first person’s handwriting? One has to widen the cuts. Rebbi Mana said, why do we not say that one sketches for them with water? If he would come and protest, his protest would be accepted. If somebody tears into skin in the form of writing it is valid. If somebody sketches on skin in the form of writing it is invalid.
If the witnesses do not know how to sign. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, one sketches for them in ink and they sign with vermilion, or with vermilion and they sign in ink. Rebbi Joḥanan told him, because we are occupied with the rules of the Sabbath, should we permit a married woman? But he brings an blank sheet of paper and cuts it before them. Would it not have been the first person’s handwriting? One has to widen the cuts. Rebbi Mana said, why do we not say that one sketches for them with water? If he would come and protest, his protest would be accepted. If somebody tears into skin in the form of writing it is valid. If somebody sketches on skin in the form of writing it is invalid.
HALAKHAH: “If the minor received it and became an adult,” etc. There came a case before Rebbi Immi that a slave brought a bill of divorce; [he declared it] valid. Rebbi Abba said to him, did not Rebbi Ḥiyya state that if a slave brought a bill of divorce, it would be invalid? Rebbi Assi said, if not for Rebbi Abba, we would have permitted a married woman! Even if you say that Rebbi Assi did not accept what Rebbi Ḥiyya stated, did he not accept what the rabbis said? Let us hear from the following which Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rebbi Ḥiyya said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It is reasonable that a slave could accept a bill of manumission [for delivery] but he should not accept [a bill of divorce] as we do. They thought, he formulated “he should not accept,” therefore, if he transgressed and accepted, it would be valid. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rav Hoshaiah: It happened that she was a Cohen’s wife and they were not afraid of a hint of invalidity.
HALAKHAH: “If the minor received it and became an adult,” etc. There came a case before Rebbi Immi that a slave brought a bill of divorce; [he declared it] valid. Rebbi Abba said to him, did not Rebbi Ḥiyya state that if a slave brought a bill of divorce, it would be invalid? Rebbi Assi said, if not for Rebbi Abba, we would have permitted a married woman! Even if you say that Rebbi Assi did not accept what Rebbi Ḥiyya stated, did he not accept what the rabbis said? Let us hear from the following which Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rebbi Ḥiyya said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It is reasonable that a slave could accept a bill of manumission [for delivery] but he should not accept [a bill of divorce] as we do. They thought, he formulated “he should not accept,” therefore, if he transgressed and accepted, it would be valid. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rav Hoshaiah: It happened that she was a Cohen’s wife and they were not afraid of a hint of invalidity.
HALAKHAH: “If the minor received it and became an adult,” etc. There came a case before Rebbi Immi that a slave brought a bill of divorce; [he declared it] valid. Rebbi Abba said to him, did not Rebbi Ḥiyya state that if a slave brought a bill of divorce, it would be invalid? Rebbi Assi said, if not for Rebbi Abba, we would have permitted a married woman! Even if you say that Rebbi Assi did not accept what Rebbi Ḥiyya stated, did he not accept what the rabbis said? Let us hear from the following which Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rebbi Ḥiyya said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It is reasonable that a slave could accept a bill of manumission [for delivery] but he should not accept [a bill of divorce] as we do. They thought, he formulated “he should not accept,” therefore, if he transgressed and accepted, it would be valid. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rav Hoshaiah: It happened that she was a Cohen’s wife and they were not afraid of a hint of invalidity.
HALAKHAH: “Also those women who cannot be believed if they say that [a woman’s] husband died,” etc. Would you believe her if it was written but not signed [in her presence]? If she did not say ‘it was written in my presence, it was signed in my presence’, would you permit her to remarry? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, that parallels what Rebbi Abun said, he is not suspect to damage her before Heaven. Before the court he is suspect to damage her. But since he knows that if he comes and protests, his protest is void, he will choose qualified witnesses to sign.
HALAKHAH: “Also those women who cannot be believed if they say that [a woman’s] husband died,” etc. Would you believe her if it was written but not signed [in her presence]? If she did not say ‘it was written in my presence, it was signed in my presence’, would you permit her to remarry? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, that parallels what Rebbi Abun said, he is not suspect to damage her before Heaven. Before the court he is suspect to damage her. But since he knows that if he comes and protests, his protest is void, he will choose qualified witnesses to sign.
Rav said, none of these are invalid except for the last which is invalid. Issi said, all are invalid except for the first which is not invalid. Rebbi Abba bar Ḥinena said, all are invalid. The word of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish implied that all are invalid since Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, if he wrote the essential text with the formula, it is invalid. The word of Rebbi Joḥanan implied that none are invalid since Rebbi Joḥanan said, if he wrote the essential text with the formula, it is valid. Does the word of Rebbi Eleazar imply that none are invalid? Since Rebbi Eleazar asked: if one wrote a bill of preliminary marriage not for a specific name, does preliminary marriage take hold? If he had a problem with divorce, would he ask about preliminary marriage? Since in the case of divorce, where the document is required to be for a specific name and he did not write for a specific name, divorce will not touch her, is it not logical that in the case of preliminary marriage, where a specific name is not required and he did not write for a specific name, preliminary marriage take hold with her? That should be obvious to him. Really, the following is obvious to him: Since one inferred the bill of preliminary marriage only from divorce, and in the case of divorce she is not divorced, in the case of preliminary marriage she is not preliminarily married.
Rebbi Ḥanania in the name of Rebbi Abin bar Ḥiyya, [this is Rebbi’s opinion.] Rebbi Joḥanan said, and it was stated so: “All conditions invalidate a bill of divorce, the words of Rebbi. But the Sages say, what invalidates orally invalidates in writing, and what does not invalidate orally does not invalidate in writing.” “You are permitted to marry anybody except Mr. X,” because this invalidates orally it invalidates in writing. “This is your bill of divorce on condition that you give me 200 zuz”; because this does not invalidate orally it does not invalidate in writing. Rebbi Yudan said, when do they disagree? If he rescinded his condition. But if he did nor rescind his condition, even Rebbi agrees. Otherwise, we would have to say that all conditions which were stated for bills of divorce do not follow Rebbi. Rebbi Ḥinena said, there when he writes “on condition,” here if he gives “on condition.” Rebbi Ezra asked before Rebbi Mana: Does this imply that Rebbi does not recognize formulaic texts? He answered him, about whom do you ask? About Rebbi! He follows Rebbi Jehudah, for Rebbi Jehudah invalidates formulaic texts. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, everybody agrees that all conditions invalidate a bill of divorce. There came a case before Rebbi Jeremiah and he acted following Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. Rebbi Yose said to him, does one neglect Rebbi Joḥanan and act following Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? He answered him, is Rebbi Joḥanan’s instruction an instruction but Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish’s instruction not an instruction? Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, it is not that Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan, but he understood a baraita and acted accordingly. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, not that Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish fights against Rebbi Joḥanan when he disagrees with him only to extract a ruling from him. If he finds a baraita, he depends on it; if he does not find a baraita, he retracts his opinion before Rebbi Joḥanan’s opinion.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody writes formulaic texts of bills of divorce,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said, writing the essential text with the formula is valid. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, writing the essential text with the formula is invalid. The Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If somebody writes formulaic texts of bills of divorce he has to leave space for the man, the woman, and the time.” He explains it, with the essential text. It is difficult for Rebbi Joḥanan: Do the Sages declare valid in case he wrote the essential text with the formulaic text? Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira: From its invalidity you learn its validity. If he wrote everything in her name but the husband’s and the wife’s names not in her name, would that be valid? Similarly, if he wrote everything not in her name but the husband’s and the wife’s names in her name, it is valid. Rebbi Yose asked Rebbi Jeremiah: Think of it, if it was paired? He said, so said his teacher Rebbi Ze‘ira to him: Since pairing is infrequent, even if there was pairing it is as if there was no pairing. Then it is difficult for Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Even if he did not write the essential text in the formula, Rebbi Jehudah declares invalid! Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Ze‘ira: Rebbi Jehudah refers to something else; it follows what Simeon bar Abba said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: An empty space of two lines about one subject is invalid in any case.
What is “the good order”? Rebbi Sabbatai in the name of Ḥizqiah: Because of the good order of Jewish women, lest they frequently be divorced. Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac asked Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba: It is valid, and you say so? If it were invalid, then [the explanation] would be acceptable. Rebbi Abun said, for the good order of the scribe, that his livelihood be guaranteed.
But did we not state: From where that “if somebody says to his wife, this is your bill of divorce one hour before my death, or he says to his slave girl, this is the document of your manumission one hour before my death, each would be immediately forbidden to eat heave?” There, she is disabled immediately, but here she will only be disabled when he has died.
Rebbi Crispus asked: Does he check every year or only once every three years? Let us hear from the following: If somebody sells unspecified wine to another person, he has to warrant it until after Tabernacles. Rebbi Yudan said, explain it for those Galileans who harvest only after the beginning of Tabernacles and you cannot deduce anything. That which was said, “old from the preceding year, very old aged three years”, should we say because of the tasting? This means that any time it is declared old he has to warrant it for two years. This means that very old [wine] has to be warranted until Tabernacles. This means that he has to check every year. How does he check? May one check one amphora on which all others depend that they would not become vinegar? Rebbi Shammai said, there are people who knock on the barrel from the outside and know what is inside.
There, we have stated: “One writes a bill of divorce for a man even if his wife is not with him, and a receipt for a woman even if her husband is not with her, and the husband pays the fee.” Rebbi Abba said, he has to know both of them. Rebbi La said, he has to know the husband for the bill of divorce and the wife for her receipt. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya asked before Rebbi [ ]: Think of it, if he brought another woman and divorced by means of her. He said to him, let the witnesses come and testify. But did not Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish say that they considered witnesses who signed a document as if their testimony had been cross-examined in court? There, if they said, we did not sign at all. But here if they say, we signed this but not that. The Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Abba: “In earlier times, his name and her name and the names of his and her towns could change.” If he knows them, why would he change their names? There are people who know others by sight but do not know their names. The Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Ilai: “Rabban Gamliel the Elder instituted that one should write Mr. X and all his names, Mrs. Y and all her names, because of the public good.” The Mishnah about one who is forced to divorce, Rebbi Ila speaks about one who divorces on his initiative; some want to say if he divorces at another place.
MISHNAH: A widow can be paid from the orphans’ property only by an oath. When they avoided letting her swear, Rabban Gamliel the Elder instituted that she should make a vow on the instruction of the orphans for anything they would decide on and collect her ketubah, and that witnesses sign the bill of divorce because of the public good. Hillel instituted prozbol for the public good.
HALAKHAH: “A widow can be paid from the orphans’ property only,” etc. Earlier they swore falsely and buried their children, since it is written: “For vain [vows] I smote your children.” In addition, they fear vows more than oaths. If she transgressed and swore? Rav Huna said, if she swore, she swore. Rav said to his daughter-in-law: If I were not a person readily making concessions, even the cover on your head would be my property. Samuel said, she acquires the garments which she is wearing. A Mishnah supports Samuel: “Neither his wife’s garments nor his children’s are his property.”
HALAKHAH: “If a slave was kidnapped and ransomed,” etc. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Ḥizqiah: It would be logical that even as a slave he should not have to serve. And why did they say, he has to serve? That a slave should not run away to the kidnappers. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, a baraita implies this: “His master pays his ransom and frees him.” They said that only about his master, not anybody else. Rebbi Ila in the name of Rebbi Yasa: It would be logical that even as a free person he should have to serve. Why did they say that he does not have to serve? Not to damage the reputations of free persons. Rebbi Yose said, but it is so: “Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, in any case he shall serve; just as Israel are obligated to ransom free persons so they are obligated to ransom slaves.” The first Tanna is of the opinion that they are obligated to ransom free persons but they are not obligated to ransom slaves. Rebbi Jacob bar Idi in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Practice follows Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel.
HALAKHAH: “If a slave was kidnapped and ransomed,” etc. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Ḥizqiah: It would be logical that even as a slave he should not have to serve. And why did they say, he has to serve? That a slave should not run away to the kidnappers. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, a baraita implies this: “His master pays his ransom and frees him.” They said that only about his master, not anybody else. Rebbi Ila in the name of Rebbi Yasa: It would be logical that even as a free person he should have to serve. Why did they say that he does not have to serve? Not to damage the reputations of free persons. Rebbi Yose said, but it is so: “Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, in any case he shall serve; just as Israel are obligated to ransom free persons so they are obligated to ransom slaves.” The first Tanna is of the opinion that they are obligated to ransom free persons but they are not obligated to ransom slaves. Rebbi Jacob bar Idi in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Practice follows Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel.
Simeon bar Abba in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If a slave fled from the kidnappers to his master, the master may not enslave him but has to write him a bill of manumission. Rebbi Abbahu said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If somebody declares his slave as ownerless he can neither enslave him nor write him a bill of manumission. Rebbi Ze‘ira said to him, everybody says that he needs one; do you say that he does not need? Would he hinder him from eating the Passah [sacrifice]? As it was stated: “The slave of any man, acquisition of his money, if you circumcise him.” Anytime he serves his master, he prevents his master from eating the Passah; if he does not serve his master, he does not prevent his master from eating the Passah.
If a convert died and Jews plundered his property, if there were slaves, either adult or underage, they gain their freedom. Abba Shaul said, the adults gain their freedom, the minors do not become free. Why? They are no longer property after their owner’s death. Then even adults? Rebbi Abba said, since adults are competent to acquire themselves, they gain their freedom. Minors, who are not competent to acquire for themselves, do not gain their freedom. Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said, practice follows Abba Shaul. The opinions of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi are contradictory. There, Rebbi Simon in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi and Rebbi Yossi ben Shaul in the name of Rebbi said: A person who has given up hope to recover his slave is not entitled to enslave him. They said, what Rebbi Joshua said about enslaving, if he did not give, he did not give; perhaps practice would be to enslave him, therefore he has to write him a bill of manumission. And here, he says so! We heard that Rebbi Joḥanan said, Rebbi Joshua ben Levi taught us that correctly, perhaps practice follows Abba Shaul. The slave girl of Rabba bar Zuṭra ran away and he gave up hope to recover her. He went to ask Rebbi Ḥanina and Rebbi Joshua ben Levi. They said, he is not entitled to enslave her. How is it to write her a bill of manumission? They said to him, if you wrote, you did the right thing. Rebbi Ḥanina in the name of Rebbi Ismael ben Rebbi Yose: A slave who married as a free person in the presence of his master gained his freedom. Rebbi Joḥanan said, yesterday I was sitting and formulating: If somebody writes a document of preliminary marriage for his slave or a document of definitive marriage for his girl slave, Rebbi says, they acquired, but the Sages say, they did not acquire. The first Tanna follows Rebbi: he acquired.
Who frees? Rav says, either his first or his second master. Rebbi Joḥanan says, only his first master alone is able to free. Rebbi Ḥaggai objected before Rebbi Yose: Does not a baraita disagree with Rav? If a Jew gave a loan to a Gentile on the latter’s leavened matter, it is permitted after Passover. If you say that the Jew has property rights in it, it would be forbidden. What does Rav do with this? Rebbi Yudan said, manumission is made easy, as it was stated: If somebody gives his slave as mortgage, if he sold him, he is not sold; if he freed him, he is freed. The strength of Rebbi Joḥanan is from the following: Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, only the manumittor writes. If somebody mortgaged his field to another, then went and sold it, can the creditor not come and foreclose? Rebbi Abbahu said, in this matter Rebbi Joḥanan opened for us a door to illuminate. We do not find that a slave can again be enslaved after having been freed. If that is so, he should not have to write a bond for his value! Rebbi Ila said, it is better that a person say to him, give me the 200 zuz which you owe me than say to him, you are my slave! The rabbis of Caesarea say in Rebbi Nasa’s name: Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel follows Rebbi Meïr. Just as Rebbi Meїr imposes a fine for words, so Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel imposes a fine for words. As it was stated: With a bond documenting both principal and interest one can collect neither principal nor interest, the words of Rebbi Meїr. But the Sages say, one collects the principal but not the interest.
HALAKHAH: “A person who is half slave and half free,” etc. How is it possible that anyone be half slave and half free? Explain it either following Rebbi, since Rebbi said that a person can free half of his slave, or following everybody in the case of a slave belonging to two partners, when one of them manumitted his part. If he found anything of value, on his master’s day it belongs to his master, on his own day it belongs to him. But would he not on the next day turn it over to his master? If he entered a preliminary marriage. On his master’s day, one would not consider his marriage, on his own day one would consider his marriage. But did not Rebbi Ḥiyya say in Rebbi Joḥanan’s name: If a person who is half slave and half free entered a preliminary marriage, one does not consider his marriage. In parallel, if he divorced one does not consider his divorce.
HALAKHAH: “A person who is half slave and half free,” etc. How is it possible that anyone be half slave and half free? Explain it either following Rebbi, since Rebbi said that a person can free half of his slave, or following everybody in the case of a slave belonging to two partners, when one of them manumitted his part. If he found anything of value, on his master’s day it belongs to his master, on his own day it belongs to him. But would he not on the next day turn it over to his master? If he entered a preliminary marriage. On his master’s day, one would not consider his marriage, on his own day one would consider his marriage. But did not Rebbi Ḥiyya say in Rebbi Joḥanan’s name: If a person who is half slave and half free entered a preliminary marriage, one does not consider his marriage. In parallel, if he divorced one does not consider his divorce.
HALAKHAH: “A person who is half slave and half free,” etc. How is it possible that anyone be half slave and half free? Explain it either following Rebbi, since Rebbi said that a person can free half of his slave, or following everybody in the case of a slave belonging to two partners, when one of them manumitted his part. If he found anything of value, on his master’s day it belongs to his master, on his own day it belongs to him. But would he not on the next day turn it over to his master? If he entered a preliminary marriage. On his master’s day, one would not consider his marriage, on his own day one would consider his marriage. But did not Rebbi Ḥiyya say in Rebbi Joḥanan’s name: If a person who is half slave and half free entered a preliminary marriage, one does not consider his marriage. In parallel, if he divorced one does not consider his divorce.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody divorces his wife because of bad reputation,” etc. And it was stated: “Why did the Sages say that he who divorces his wife because of bad reputation cannot take her back? For if he divorced his wife because of bad reputation, when she went, married another, and bore him children, after some time it turned out that the accusations were baseless and he said, if I had known that the accusations were baseless, even if somebody had offered me a hundred minas for my wife I would not have divorced her, then the bill of divorce would be invalidated and her children bastards. But since he knows that if he divorces her, she will be forbidden to return to him, from the start he gives her a perfect bill of divorce.”
HALAKHAH: “If somebody divorces his wife because of bad reputation,” etc. And it was stated: “Why did the Sages say that he who divorces his wife because of bad reputation cannot take her back? For if he divorced his wife because of bad reputation, when she went, married another, and bore him children, after some time it turned out that the accusations were baseless and he said, if I had known that the accusations were baseless, even if somebody had offered me a hundred minas for my wife I would not have divorced her, then the bill of divorce would be invalidated and her children bastards. But since he knows that if he divorces her, she will be forbidden to return to him, from the start he gives her a perfect bill of divorce.”
It was stated: “Why did they say that he who divorces his wife because of a vow cannot take her back? For if he divorced his wife because of a vow, when she went, married another, and bore him children, after some time it turned out that the vow was void and he said, if I had known that the vow was void, even if somebody had offered me a hundred minas for my wife I would not have divorced her, then the bill of divorce would be invalidated and her child a bastard. But since he knows that if he divorces her, she will be forbidden to return to him, from the start he gives her a perfect bill of divorce.” Rebbi Ze‘ira said, you can see that he was looking for a pretext to divorce her since it must have been a vow which does not need investigation by a Sage! Rebbi Ze‘ira said, you can see that he was looking for a pretext to divorce her since it must have been a vow which was not public knowledge! “Rebbi Eleazar said, they forbade one because of the other.” The law should be that he can take her back even if it was a vow which needs investigation by a Sage, for the Elder uproots the vow. Why did they forbid a vow which needs investigation by a Sage? Because of a vow which does not need investigation by a Sage.
It was stated: “Why did they say that he who divorces his wife because of a vow cannot take her back? For if he divorced his wife because of a vow, when she went, married another, and bore him children, after some time it turned out that the vow was void and he said, if I had known that the vow was void, even if somebody had offered me a hundred minas for my wife I would not have divorced her, then the bill of divorce would be invalidated and her child a bastard. But since he knows that if he divorces her, she will be forbidden to return to him, from the start he gives her a perfect bill of divorce.” Rebbi Ze‘ira said, you can see that he was looking for a pretext to divorce her since it must have been a vow which does not need investigation by a Sage! Rebbi Ze‘ira said, you can see that he was looking for a pretext to divorce her since it must have been a vow which was not public knowledge! “Rebbi Eleazar said, they forbade one because of the other.” The law should be that he can take her back even if it was a vow which needs investigation by a Sage, for the Elder uproots the vow. Why did they forbid a vow which needs investigation by a Sage? Because of a vow which does not need investigation by a Sage.
MISHNAH: If somebody divorces his wife because she is a she-ram, Rebbi Jehudah says, he cannot take her back, but the Sages say, he may take her back. If she was married to another man, had children by him, and requests her ketubah, Rebbi Jehudah says, he tells her: Your silence would be better than your talking.
HALAKHAH: It was stated: “Why did they say that he who divorces his wife as a she-ram cannot take her back? For if he divorced his wife as a she-ram, when she went, married another man, and bore him children, and he said, if I had known that she can have children, even if somebody had offered me a hundred minas for my wife I would not have divorced her, then the bill of divorce would be invalidated and her child a bastard. But since he knows that if he divorces her, she will be forbidden to return to him, from the start he gives her a perfect bill of divorce.” Rebbi Ze‘ira said, you can see that he was looking for a pretext to divorce her since there are women she-rams who are married and since [their husbands] are satisfied with them they keep them.
HALAKHAH: It was stated: “Why did they say that he who divorces his wife as a she-ram cannot take her back? For if he divorced his wife as a she-ram, when she went, married another man, and bore him children, and he said, if I had known that she can have children, even if somebody had offered me a hundred minas for my wife I would not have divorced her, then the bill of divorce would be invalidated and her child a bastard. But since he knows that if he divorces her, she will be forbidden to return to him, from the start he gives her a perfect bill of divorce.” Rebbi Ze‘ira said, you can see that he was looking for a pretext to divorce her since there are women she-rams who are married and since [their husbands] are satisfied with them they keep them.
“Rebbi Jehudah says, he cannot take her back,” and you say so? Rebbi Joḥanan said, there is no Rebbi Jehudah but Rebbi Meїr. It was stated thus in Rebbi Meїr’s name: Your silence would be better than your talking.
The Mishnah is Rebbi Meїr’s, since Rebbi Meїr says that a Gentile may not acquire real estate in the Land of Israel to remove it from tithes; Rebbi Jehudah and Rebbi Simeon say, a Gentile may acquire real estate in the Land of Israel to free it from tithes. Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: The reason of Rebbi Meïr (Lev. 25:46): “You shall transmit them by inheritance to your sons after you, to inherit by the rules of real estate.” This brackets slaves with real estate. Just as you may buy slaves from them but they cannot buy from you, so real estate you may buy from them but they cannot buy from you. Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Yose said before Rebbi Yasa, the following supports Rebbi Meїr (Lev. 25:23): “The land shall not be sold permanently,” absolutely. He said to him, that in itself supports Rebbi Simeon. “It shall not be sold”, because if it was sold, it would be sold absolutely. Rebbi Huna from Sepphoris said, Rebbi Ḥanina instituted in Sepphoris following Rebbi Simeon.
Reuben robbed a field from Simeon and sold it to Levi; Levi went and gave it to Jehudah as a gift. Then Simeon foreclosed it from Jehudah. Jehudah has no regress on Levi since it was a gift. Levi has regress on Reuben since it was a sale. Did he not give it away as a gift? He can say to him, it was my intention to give it to him so he would return me favors. Reuben robbed a field from Simeon and gave it to Levi as a gift; Levi sold it to Jehudah. Jehudah has regress on Levi since he sold it; Levi has no regress on Reuben since it was a gift; as Rebbi Yose said in the name of the rabbis: No easement is created by a gift.
Can one collect dowry from encumbered property? Rebbi Ze‘ira said that Rebbi Joḥanan does not collect. Who collects? Rebbi Ḥanina and Rebbi Ila collect. Rebbi Yasa was appointed custodian of orphans’ property. There were orphan [girls] who asked for dowry. He brought the case before Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon bar Yaqim. Rebbi Simeon bar Yaqim said, is it not better to provide for them from their father’s estate rather than from charity? Rebbi Eleazar said to him: If such a case came before our teachers, our teachers would not touch it; would we act? Rebbi Yose said, I shall give to them, and if some orphans would get up and complained, I would give it to them. They stood up and complained.
Can one collect dowry from encumbered property? Rebbi Ze‘ira said that Rebbi Joḥanan does not collect. Who collects? Rebbi Ḥanina and Rebbi Ila collect. Rebbi Yasa was appointed custodian of orphans’ property. There were orphan [girls] who asked for dowry. He brought the case before Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon bar Yaqim. Rebbi Simeon bar Yaqim said, is it not better to provide for them from their father’s estate rather than from charity? Rebbi Eleazar said to him: If such a case came before our teachers, our teachers would not touch it; would we act? Rebbi Yose said, I shall give to them, and if some orphans would get up and complained, I would give it to them. They stood up and complained.
Can one collect dowry from encumbered property? Rebbi Ze‘ira said that Rebbi Joḥanan does not collect. Who collects? Rebbi Ḥanina and Rebbi Ila collect. Rebbi Yasa was appointed custodian of orphans’ property. There were orphan [girls] who asked for dowry. He brought the case before Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon bar Yaqim. Rebbi Simeon bar Yaqim said, is it not better to provide for them from their father’s estate rather than from charity? Rebbi Eleazar said to him: If such a case came before our teachers, our teachers would not touch it; would we act? Rebbi Yose said, I shall give to them, and if some orphans would get up and complained, I would give it to them. They stood up and complained.
Can one collect dowry from encumbered property? Rebbi Ze‘ira said that Rebbi Joḥanan does not collect. Who collects? Rebbi Ḥanina and Rebbi Ila collect. Rebbi Yasa was appointed custodian of orphans’ property. There were orphan [girls] who asked for dowry. He brought the case before Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon bar Yaqim. Rebbi Simeon bar Yaqim said, is it not better to provide for them from their father’s estate rather than from charity? Rebbi Eleazar said to him: If such a case came before our teachers, our teachers would not touch it; would we act? Rebbi Yose said, I shall give to them, and if some orphans would get up and complained, I would give it to them. They stood up and complained.
“If somebody stole a log and used it in building. The House of Shammai say, he has to tear down the entire building and return it. But the House of Hillel say, for the benefit of repenting sinners, that he has to pay its full value.” Rebbi Eleazar said, where do they disagree? If he stole it planed, but if he stole and planed it himself, he owes him money. If he stole and planed it on the spot, what is the rule? Let us hear from the following: “If somebody appropriates another person’s ruin and rebuilds it without prermission, one appraises it and his hand is weak. If he wants to take his logs and stones, one does not listen to him.” Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: It was asked in the name of Rav Naḥman bar Jacob: If somebody stores his bundle in somebody else’s ruin and wants to take it from there, does one not listen to him? He had not heard that Rebbi Jacob bar Idi said in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: Because of civilisation. Rebbi Yose said, this is correct. We would have thought that they disagree only in the Land, but not outside the Land. Since Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, because of civilisation, this implies that there is no difference between the Land and outside the Land. If he wants to take [the value of] his logs and stones, what is the rule? One tells him, wait until he dwells in it. Samuel said, one pays him immediately.
A weaver asked Rebbi Immi, what about a Gentile wedding feast? He wanted to permit it to them from this: “Because of peaceful coexistence.” Rebbi Abba told them, did not Rebbi Ḥiyya state that the holiday of a Gentile wedding feast is forbidden? Rebbi Immi said, if it had not been for Rebbi Abba, we would have come to permit their strange worship; praised be He Who separated us from them.
MISHNAH: If one said to two persons, give a bill of divorce to my wife, or to three persons, write a bill of divorce and deliver to my wife, they should write and deliver. If he said to three persons, deliver a bill of divorce to my wife, they shall ask others to write since he appointed them as a court, the words of Rebbi Meïr. This instructions for practice did Ḥananiah from Ono send from jail: I know from tradition that if someone said to three persons, deliver a bill of divorce to my wife, they shall ask others to write since he appointed them as a court. Rebbi Yose said, we told the messenger that we also know from tradition that even if he said to the Supreme Court in Jerusalem, deliver a bill of divorce to my wife, they shall learn, write, and deliver. If he said to ten persons, write a bill of divorce for my wife, one writes and two sign. All of you shall write, one writes and all sign. Therefore, if one of them died, the bill of divorce would be void.
Rebbi Yudan said, there, if he said I did such and such, here, if he says do such and such. Rebbi Benjamin ben Levi inquired: He should have understanding for the future if he has understanding for the past; (if he has no understanding for the past,) he would not have understanding for the future! Rebbi Abba Mari said, here we deal with a mute; there is no agency for a mute. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, we deal with a sane person. Why is there no divorce? Because I say, he was occupied with his documents. We also stated thus: “When was this said? When he was paralyzed while being healthy. But if he was paralyzed by a prior sickness, once is enough.”
There, we have stated: “If somebody writes his property over to his sons, he has to write: From today and after death. Rebbi Yose says, this is unnecessary.” What is Rebbi Yose’s reason? The date of the document is its proof. The colleagues in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: This is no condition. Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It applies neither to bills of divorce nor to gifts. Rebbi Ila said, for a gift; since he said “from today”, the gift is irrevocable. Why did he write “after death”? To reserve the yield to himself. But in bills of divorce, since he wrote “from today” in the bill, it would be a separation. Why did he write “after death”? To reserve her body to himself. Rebbi Bibon bar Cahana said before Rebbi Ilai, not to reserve her earnings for himself? He answered, we do not find a woman married to one man and her earnings belonging to another. Rebbi Ze‘ira praised him for this and called him “son of the Torah.”
The opinion of Rebbi Jehudah seems to be inverted. There, he says that death is frequent but here, he says that death is not frequent. There in public, here in private, as it was stated: Rebbi Jehudah says there was no chest for nests in Jerusalem because of the mixing, maybe one of them would die and money for purification offerings destined to die would be mixed in with them.
The opinion of Rebbi Jehudah seems to be inverted. There, he says that death is frequent but here, he says that death is not frequent. There in public, here in private, as it was stated: Rebbi Jehudah says there was no chest for nests in Jerusalem because of the mixing, maybe one of them would die and money for purification offerings destined to die would be mixed in with them.
Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The following is the contract text: “I, X son of Y, contract a preliminary marriage with you, Z, daughter of U, on condition that I shall give you property A anddefinitively marry you by day B. If that day should pass without me having taken you in, I shall have no claim on you.” If anything intervened beyond his control? Rebbi Joḥanan said, matters beyond his control are as if he were inactive. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, matters outside his control are as if he had acted. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, what would be necessary? “If that day should pass without you having taken me in, I shall have no claim on you.” When Rebbi Joḥanan was dying, he told his daughters to act following Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. He said, maybe in the future there might be a court which follows him; then his descendants might be in danger of bastardy.
He is forbidden to be alone with her immediately, for maybe he shall not visit her for thirty days and then her bill of divorce would be older than her child.
Rebbi Zeïra objected before Rebbi Yasa: But did we not state: The same applies to marriage? He answered him, divorce documents and marriage contracts have the same rules. But did we not state: The same applies to debt? He said to him, because if he said to him: Throw it into the sea and your debt will be forgiven, it would be forgiven. But if that is true, even if it fell down close to the debtor, the debtor should have the benefit! But we have stated, if it falls down close to the debtor, the debtor is still obligated. For he said to him, throw it so that it will enter my domain, but it did not yet enter his domain. Rebbi Abbahu said, all those objections that Rebbi Zeïra raised before Rebbi Yasa, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish raised before Rebbi Joḥanan. Did he accept them from him? He solved them with those same solutions.
MISHNAH: Anybody can supplement a bald document following the words of Ben Nanas. Rebbi Aqiba says, one supplements the signatures only by relatives who would be able to testify under other circumstances. What is a bald document? One whose knots are more than its signatures.
The condition of validity is stated here and was stated there. It was necessary to state it there. If it had been stated here but not there, we would have said that here it is invalid because of the restrictions connected with adultery but there, since no restrictions connected with adultery are involved, it would be valid. Or if it had been stated there but not here, we would have said that there it is invalid since one comes to collect money based on that document but here, where one does not collect money, it would be valid. Therefore, it was necessary both to state it here and to state it there.
The condition of validity is stated here and was stated there. It was necessary to state it there. If it had been stated here but not there, we would have said that here it is invalid because of the restrictions connected with adultery but there, since no restrictions connected with adultery are involved, it would be valid. Or if it had been stated there but not here, we would have said that there it is invalid since one comes to collect money based on that document but here, where one does not collect money, it would be valid. Therefore, it was necessary both to state it here and to state it there.
The condition of validity is stated here and was stated there. It was necessary to state it there. If it had been stated here but not there, we would have said that here it is invalid because of the restrictions connected with adultery but there, since no restrictions connected with adultery are involved, it would be valid. Or if it had been stated there but not here, we would have said that there it is invalid since one comes to collect money based on that document but here, where one does not collect money, it would be valid. Therefore, it was necessary both to state it here and to state it there.
The condition of validity is stated here and was stated there. It was necessary to state it there. If it had been stated here but not there, we would have said that here it is invalid because of the restrictions connected with adultery but there, since no restrictions connected with adultery are involved, it would be valid. Or if it had been stated there but not here, we would have said that there it is invalid since one comes to collect money based on that document but here, where one does not collect money, it would be valid. Therefore, it was necessary both to state it here and to state it there.
MISHNAH: If somebody in divorcing his wife says to her: Herewith you are permitted to any man except Mr. X, Rebbi Eliezer permits but the Sages prohibit. What should he do? He should take the document back from her and deliver it again while saying, herewith you are permitted to any man. If he had written the condition in the document it would be invalid even if he had later erased it.
Rebbi Yose the Galilean said: Do we find in the Torah that what is forbidden to one is permitted to the other and what is permitted to one is forbidden for the other? Forbidden to one she is forbidden to everybody;permitted to one is permitted to everybody. Rebbi Aqiba objected: If the one to whom she was prohibited was a Cohen and the divorcer died, would she not be considered a widow for him but a divorcee for all his clan of Cohanim? Where was the Torah more restrictive, for a divorcee or for a widow? The Torah was more restrictive for a divorcee than for a widow. But since a divorcee, where one is more restrictive in all aspects, does not become forbidden with respect to what was permitted by her divorce, would it be logical that the widow should be forbidden from what was permitted her from her aspect of married woman? Even him did the divorce touch. Since both a widow and a divorcee were forbidden even if her aspect of married woman was permitted, with restrictive divorce certainly she should be forbidden even in the aspect that was permitted by her divorce.
Rebbi Yose the Galilean said: Do we find in the Torah that what is forbidden to one is permitted to the other and what is permitted to one is forbidden for the other? Forbidden to one she is forbidden to everybody;permitted to one is permitted to everybody. Rebbi Aqiba objected: If the one to whom she was prohibited was a Cohen and the divorcer died, would she not be considered a widow for him but a divorcee for all his clan of Cohanim? Where was the Torah more restrictive, for a divorcee or for a widow? The Torah was more restrictive for a divorcee than for a widow. But since a divorcee, where one is more restrictive in all aspects, does not become forbidden with respect to what was permitted by her divorce, would it be logical that the widow should be forbidden from what was permitted her from her aspect of married woman? Even him did the divorce touch. Since both a widow and a divorcee were forbidden even if her aspect of married woman was permitted, with restrictive divorce certainly she should be forbidden even in the aspect that was permitted by her divorce.
HALAKHAH: “Five who wrote collectively a bill of divorce,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: “And I am greeting X,” one can assume that he signed regarding everything; “I am greeting X,” he signed only for the greeting. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, even if he said “I am greeting X,” one can assume that he signed regarding everything. What means “collectively” for Rebbi Joḥanan? X divorces Y and Z U. What means “collectively” for Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? We, X and Z, divorce our wives at place A. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, Rebbi Joḥanan agrees that if he mentions divorce for each one separately he needs a text and witnesses for each one separately. The strength of Rebbi Joḥanan is from the following: “ ‘That I shall not benefit, a qorbān for this one or that one’; each single one needs a separate opening.” Rebbi Yose said, the Mishnah supports Rebbi Joḥanan: “If he wrote a separate text for each of them and the witnesses signed at the end, [only] the one with which the witnesses are read is valid.” Samuel said, the detailed statement for Rebbi Meїr is the general statement for Rebbi Jehudah and the detailed statement for Rebbi Jehudah is the general statement for Rebbi Meїr. [Rebbi] Samuel said in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira, the words of the rabbis show that the detailed statement for Rebbi Meїr is not the general statement for Rebbi Jehudah and the detailed statement for Rebbi Jehudah is not the general statement for Rebbi Meїr, since Rebbi Joḥanan said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: “and I am greeting X,” one can assume that he signed regarding everything; “I am greeting X,” he signed only for the greeting. If you would say that the detailed statement for Rebbi Meїr is the general statement for Rebbi Jehudah, even if he said “and I am greeting X,” can one assume that he signed regarding everything? How is this? Rebbi Yose said, a Mishnah implies that the detailed statement for Rebbi Jehudah is not the general statement for Rebbi Meїr, as we have stated there: “Rebbi Meїr says, even ‘wheat, and barley, and spelt’ makes him guilty for each one separately”, but nobody says “even” unless he refers to an earlier statement. How is this? Rebbi Ḥanina said, in Rebbi Meїr’s opinion, [whether] he said “wheat, and barley, and spelt”, [or “wheat, barley, spelt] is a general statement and particulars. [In Rebbi Jehudah’s opinion,] if he said, “wheat grains, barley grains, and spelt grains”, it is a general statement without particulars.
MISHNAH: If it became public knowledge in town that she was preliminarily married, she is preliminarily married; divorced, she is divorced, except if there was an excuse. What would be an excuse? Mr. X divorced his wife conditionally, or he threw valuables for preliminary marriage to her and it was doubtful whether it was closer to her than to him; that is an excuse.
HALAKHAH: Was it not stated in the name of the House of Shammai: Not only that the woman must leave because of incest; from where that she must leave if her head’s [hair] is loose, if the side seams of her dress are open, or her arms stripped bare? The verse says, “for he found in her a matter of nakedness.” How can the House of Shammai confirm this? Lest you say that one divorced because of immorality is forbidden, for anothercause she would be permitted. Rebbi Shila from Kefar-Tamarta said: The verse is difficult for the House of Shammai: “Her first husband, who had sent her away, cannot afterwards retake her.” Where do we hold? If to forbid her to him, is she not already forbidden to him? But we must hold, to burden him with a prohibition.
By money, from where? “After he acquires,” this tells you that she is acquired by money. By marital relations, from where? “And has marital relations with her,” this tells you that she is acquired by intercourse. I would say, by both together. Money without intercourse and intercourse without money, from where? Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, it is written: “If a man is found lying with a woman having had intercourse with her husband.” Think of it, even if he did only acquire her by intercourse, the one coming after him is [executed] by strangulation. Not only regular intercourse but even perverse. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, it is necessary to mention perverse intercourse for if it were regular, why mention her husband? As we have stated there: “If she was raped by two men, the first is stoned, the second strangled.”
Rebbi Abin said that Ḥisqiah stated: “After he acquires,” which means that she is acquired by money. Would it not be an argument de minore ad majus? Since the Hebrew slave girl, who cannot be acquired by intercourse, can be acquired by money, would it not be logical that this one, who may be acquired by intercourse, should be acquired by money? This is proved by the sister-in-law, who cannot be acquired by money but is acquired by intercourse. Therefore you would not be astonished if this one, who may be acquired by intercourse, might not be acquired by money. The verse says, “after he acquires,” this tells you that she is acquired by money.
Rebbi Abin said that Ḥisqiah stated: “After he acquires,” which means that she is acquired by money. Would it not be an argument de minore ad majus? Since the Hebrew slave girl, who cannot be acquired by intercourse, can be acquired by money, would it not be logical that this one, who may be acquired by intercourse, should be acquired by money? This is proved by the sister-in-law, who cannot be acquired by money but is acquired by intercourse. Therefore you would not be astonished if this one, who may be acquired by intercourse, might not be acquired by money. The verse says, “after he acquires,” this tells you that she is acquired by money.
Rebbi Abin said that Ḥisqiah stated: “After he acquires,” which means that she is acquired by money. Would it not be an argument de minore ad majus? Since the Hebrew slave girl, who cannot be acquired by intercourse, can be acquired by money, would it not be logical that this one, who may be acquired by intercourse, should be acquired by money? This is proved by the sister-in-law, who cannot be acquired by money but is acquired by intercourse. Therefore you would not be astonished if this one, who may be acquired by intercourse, might not be acquired by money. The verse says, “after he acquires,” this tells you that she is acquired by money.
“And has marital relations with her,” this tells you that she is acquired by intercourse. Would it not be an argument de minore ad majus? Since the sister-in-law, who cannot be acquired by money, can be acquired by intercourse, would it not be logical that this one, who may be acquired by money, should be acquired by intercourse? The Hebrew slave girl proves, who cannot be acquired by intercourse but is acquired by money. You likewise do not wonder that this one, who may be acquired by money, might not be acquired by intercourse. The verse says, “after he acquires,” this tells you that she is acquired by money; “and has marital relations with her,” this tells you that she is acquired by intercourse.
“And has marital relations with her,” this tells you that she is acquired by intercourse. Would it not be an argument de minore ad majus? Since the sister-in-law, who cannot be acquired by money, can be acquired by intercourse, would it not be logical that this one, who may be acquired by money, should be acquired by intercourse? The Hebrew slave girl proves, who cannot be acquired by intercourse but is acquired by money. You likewise do not wonder that this one, who may be acquired by money, might not be acquired by intercourse. The verse says, “after he acquires,” this tells you that she is acquired by money; “and has marital relations with her,” this tells you that she is acquired by intercourse.
By a document. Since money which does not send out permits to enter, would it not be logical that a document which sends out should permit to enter? No. If you speak about money which eliminates dedication through redemption, what can you say about a document which does not eliminate dedication through redemption? The argument de minore ad majus is broken and you have to return to Scripture. Therefore, it was necessary to say: “He shall write her a bill of divorce, hand it to her, and send her out of his house. If she left his house and went to be another man’s.” It brackets her being with her leaving. Since her leaving was by a document, so her being is by a document.
There, we have stated: “A judicial oath, for a claim of two silver pieces and a judicial acknowlegdment of a peruṭah. The claim, the House of Shammai say, an obolus, but the House of Hillel say, two obols.” The argument of the House of Shammai seems inverted. There, they say, “silver” is a denar, but here, they say that “silver” is an obolus. The argument of the House of Hillel seems inverted. There, they say, “money” is a peruṭah, but here, they say that “money” is two obols. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina: The house of Shammai learn from the initial sale of a Hebrew girl. Since her initial sale was by [at least] a denar, so her preliminary marriage is by [at least] a denar. The House of Hillel learn from the end of her diminution. Since the end of her diminution is a peruṭah, so her preliminary marriage is by a peruṭah. What is the reason of the House of Shammai? As it is said: “She leaves gratis, without silver.” Would we not know that it is without money? Why does the verse say, “without silver”? From there, that she is sold for more than silver. And what is more than silver? A denar. But maybe “silver” is a peruṭah, more than silver two peruṭot? The smallest silver coin is an obolus. So why is it not an obolus? Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Judah bar Pazi: For if she wants to diminish, she diminishes every year by an obolus and leaves. Could she not diminish by a peruṭah? Rebbi Abun said, think of it. If she wanted to compute the diminution at the start of the sixth year, there would be a peruṭah left, and at the end of the sixth year, there would be a peruṭah left. But the start of the diminution must be an obolus, the end of the diminution a peruṭah. If there is only one peruṭah left, can she not pay the diminished amount and leave? Just as the last diminished amount is a peruṭah, so her preliminary marriage should be a peruṭah! What is the reason of the House of Hillel? Since her last diminished amount is a peruṭah, you know that her preliminary marriage is by a peruṭah.
There, we have stated: “A judicial oath, for a claim of two silver pieces and a judicial acknowlegdment of a peruṭah. The claim, the House of Shammai say, an obolus, but the House of Hillel say, two obols.” The argument of the House of Shammai seems inverted. There, they say, “silver” is a denar, but here, they say that “silver” is an obolus. The argument of the House of Hillel seems inverted. There, they say, “money” is a peruṭah, but here, they say that “money” is two obols. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina: The house of Shammai learn from the initial sale of a Hebrew girl. Since her initial sale was by [at least] a denar, so her preliminary marriage is by [at least] a denar. The House of Hillel learn from the end of her diminution. Since the end of her diminution is a peruṭah, so her preliminary marriage is by a peruṭah. What is the reason of the House of Shammai? As it is said: “She leaves gratis, without silver.” Would we not know that it is without money? Why does the verse say, “without silver”? From there, that she is sold for more than silver. And what is more than silver? A denar. But maybe “silver” is a peruṭah, more than silver two peruṭot? The smallest silver coin is an obolus. So why is it not an obolus? Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Judah bar Pazi: For if she wants to diminish, she diminishes every year by an obolus and leaves. Could she not diminish by a peruṭah? Rebbi Abun said, think of it. If she wanted to compute the diminution at the start of the sixth year, there would be a peruṭah left, and at the end of the sixth year, there would be a peruṭah left. But the start of the diminution must be an obolus, the end of the diminution a peruṭah. If there is only one peruṭah left, can she not pay the diminished amount and leave? Just as the last diminished amount is a peruṭah, so her preliminary marriage should be a peruṭah! What is the reason of the House of Hillel? Since her last diminished amount is a peruṭah, you know that her preliminary marriage is by a peruṭah.
There, we have stated: “A judicial oath, for a claim of two silver pieces and a judicial acknowlegdment of a peruṭah. The claim, the House of Shammai say, an obolus, but the House of Hillel say, two obols.” The argument of the House of Shammai seems inverted. There, they say, “silver” is a denar, but here, they say that “silver” is an obolus. The argument of the House of Hillel seems inverted. There, they say, “money” is a peruṭah, but here, they say that “money” is two obols. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina: The house of Shammai learn from the initial sale of a Hebrew girl. Since her initial sale was by [at least] a denar, so her preliminary marriage is by [at least] a denar. The House of Hillel learn from the end of her diminution. Since the end of her diminution is a peruṭah, so her preliminary marriage is by a peruṭah. What is the reason of the House of Shammai? As it is said: “She leaves gratis, without silver.” Would we not know that it is without money? Why does the verse say, “without silver”? From there, that she is sold for more than silver. And what is more than silver? A denar. But maybe “silver” is a peruṭah, more than silver two peruṭot? The smallest silver coin is an obolus. So why is it not an obolus? Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Judah bar Pazi: For if she wants to diminish, she diminishes every year by an obolus and leaves. Could she not diminish by a peruṭah? Rebbi Abun said, think of it. If she wanted to compute the diminution at the start of the sixth year, there would be a peruṭah left, and at the end of the sixth year, there would be a peruṭah left. But the start of the diminution must be an obolus, the end of the diminution a peruṭah. If there is only one peruṭah left, can she not pay the diminished amount and leave? Just as the last diminished amount is a peruṭah, so her preliminary marriage should be a peruṭah! What is the reason of the House of Hillel? Since her last diminished amount is a peruṭah, you know that her preliminary marriage is by a peruṭah.
“She regains her autonomy by a bill of divorce,” as it is written: “He shall write her a bill of divorce.” “Or the husband’s death,” as it is written: “Or if the latter husband dies.” So far, if the latter one dies, [what about] the death of the former? Since the latter’s death releases her, even though his death does not cause a complete release, it is only logical that the former’s death should release her since his death will cause a complete release. Rebbi Ḥuna said, the verse implies that death releases, as it is written: “If brothers live together and one of them dies childless, etc.” Therefore, if he had a child, death releases. Rebbi Yose bar Abun said, if you would say that death does not release, how could we find a widow for a High priest, a divorcee or one who has received ḥalîṣah for a common priest? Rebbi Joḥanan bar Marius said, explain it for a sister-in-law.
Rebbi Samuel bar Rav Isaac asked: How can a ḥăruphah slave girl acquire her autonomy in such a way that she would be freed from flogging, and [free] the one who had intercourse with her from a reparation sacrifice? It is obvious that she cannot leave by a bill of divorce since Rebbi Ḥiyya said in Rebbi Joḥanan’s name: If a person who is half slave and half free entered a preliminary marriage, one does not consider his marriage. In parallel, if he divorced one does not consider his divorce. It is obvious that she can leave by a bill of divorce at least since (Rebbi Ḥiyya said in Rebbi Joḥanan’s name: If a person who is half slave and half free entered a preliminary marriage, one does not consider his marriage. In parallel, if he divorced one does not consider his divorce. It is obvious that she can leave by a bill of divorce at least). Rebbi Yose said in Rebbi Joḥanan’s name: Aquila the proselyte translated before Rebbi Aqiba “and she is a slave girl נֶחֱרֶפֶת to a man”, by “one who was pounded before a man”, as you say, “she spread morsels on it.” Rebbi Ḥiyya said in Rebbi Joḥanan’s name: So Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon explained it before the Sages. “And she is a slave girl נֶחֱרֶפֶת to a man”, by “one who was pounded before a man”, as you say, “in morsels by a pestle.”
“By a document.” Rebbi Abbahu said, by a money document; therefore not by a gift document, since maybe he would renege. But then, could he not renege even with a money document? He said to him, maybe there comes a year of famine and his master reneges.
It is written: “Six years he shall work.” How much does he work? I could think that he leaves at the end of six [years]. The verse says, “and in the seventh he shall leave.” I could think that he leave at the end of seven [years]. The verse says, “six years he shall work.” How is that? He works the entire six and leaves at the start of the seventh. “And in the seventh he shall leave.” The seventh from the sale and not the Seventh of the world. Do you say, the seventh from the sale and not the Seventh of the world? Since it says, “six years he shall work,” this spells out six years. How can I confirm “and in the seventh he shall leave?” The seventh from the sale and not the Seventh of the world. Say it is the opposite. Rebbi Ze‘ira said in the name of Rav Huna: It is written: “and in the seventh,” “and in the seventh”. Rebbi Ḥuna said, if you say, in the Seventh of the world, what would the Jubilee free? Rebbi Joḥanan bar Marius said, this follows him who said that the Jubilee does not become part of a Sabbatical period. But following him who said that the Jubilee becomes part of a Sabbatical period, sometimes it falls in the middle of a Sabbatical period. The rabbis of Caesarea say, even following him who said that the Jubilee becomes part of a Sabbatical period, we could deduce from here that the Sabbatical year frees the slaves and the Jubilee the pierced ones.
From where even if he fell ill? The verse says, “in the seventh year he shall leave into freedom gratis.” I could think, even if he fled; the verse says, “six years he shall work.” What did you see to include this and to exclude that? After the verse included, it excluded. I am including the one who remains in his power and am exluding the one who is not in his power. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya said that Rav Hoshaia asked: I understand that if he fell ill and fled afterwards, he has to make up [the time lost]. If he fled and then fell ill? Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Ada said, let us hear from the following: “If a woman rebels against her husband, one writes him a bill of rebellion on her ketubah.” And Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: One writes a bill of rebellion on the ketubah of a menstruating woman or a sick one, a preliminarily married one and one waiting for her levir. Where do we hold? If she rebelled against him while she was menstruating, the Torah instructed her to rebel. But we must hold that she rebelled when she was not menstruating and then started menstruating. Here she is unable to rebel, nevertheless you say, one writes. Here also, if he rebelled and then fell ill he has to make up. For he can say to him, if you had stayed with me, you would not have become sick. Rebbi Ḥinena said, that argument even works in the first case. If he fell ill and fled afterwards, he has to make up, since he can say to him, if you had stayed with me, you would have recuperated sooner.