argues

30 occurrences across the corpus

The Jerusalem Talmud

It is written (Lev. 19:25): “In the fifth year, you shall eat its yield.” Rebbi Yose the Galilean says, here one adds the fruits of the fifth to the fruits of the fourth year. Just as the fruits of the fifth year are for the proprietors, so the fruits of the fourth year are for the proprietors. Rebbi Zeïra, Rebbi Yasa, in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It turns out that Rebbi Yose the Galilean argues like Rebbi Jehudah. Just as Rebbi Jehudah makes it his property, so Rebbi Yose the Galilean makes it his property.

Jerusalem Talmud Maaser Sheni 5:29

It is written (Lev. 19:25): “In the fifth year, you shall eat its yield to add for you, etc.” Rebbi Yose the Galilean says, here one adds the fruits of the fifth to the fruits of the fourth year. Just as the fruits of the fifth year are for the proprietors, so the fruits of the fourth year are for the proprietors. Rebbi Zeïra, Rebbi Yasa, in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It turns out that Rebbi Yose the Galilean argues like Rebbi Jehudah. Just as Rebbi Jehudah makes it his property, so Rebbi Yose the Galilean makes it his property.

Jerusalem Talmud Yoma 5:24

“He shall sprinkle it, [in front of the cover], this teaches that he gives a single one upwards. In front of the cover, I do not know how many. So I am arguing: It mentions giving the bull’s blood downwards, and it mentions giving the he-goat’s blood downwards. Since giving the bull’s blood downwards as mentioned is seven times, so giving the he-goat’s blood downwards as mentioned must be seven times. Or go in the following way: Blood is mentioned upwards and blood is mentioned downwards. Since the blood mentioned upwards is once, so the blood mentioned downwards must be once. Let us see to what it is comparable. One argues downwards from downwards; one does not argue downwards from upwards. Or go in the following way: One argues he-goat’s blood from he-goat’s blood; but one does not argue he-goat’s blood from bull’s blood. The verse says, he shall treat its blood as he treated the bull’s blood. Since the bull’s blood is downwards seven times, also the he-goat’s blood is downwards seven times. But I do not know how many times to give the bull’s blood upwards. Giving the blood upwards is mentioned for the he-goat and giving the blood upwards is mentioned for the bull. Since giving the blood upwards as mentioned for the he-goat is once, so giving the blood upwards as mentioned for the bull is once. Or go in the following way: Blood is mentioned downwards; blood is mentioned upwards. Since the blood mentioned downwards is seven, so the blood mentioned upwards must be seven. Let us see to what it is similar. One argues upwards from upwards; one does not argue upwards from downwards. Or go in the following way: One argues bull’s blood from bull’s blood; but one does not argue bull’s blood from he-goat’s blood. The verse says, he shall treat its blood as he treated the bull’s blood, that all its works be the same. Since the bull’s blood is seven times downwards, also the he-goat’s blood is seven times downwards. Since the he-goat’s blood is once upwards, also the bull’s blood is once upwards.”

Jerusalem Talmud Yoma 5:24

Jerusalem Talmud Chagigah 3:16

“Rebbi Yose stated, from where that the fourth degree is disqualified in sanctified food? It is an argument. Since one who lacks expiation is not disqualified for heave but disqualified for sanctified food, it is only logical that third degree [impurity] which is disabled for heave should disqualify for sanctified food. That means, we learned third degree from a verse and fourth degree from an argument de minore ad majus.” Rebbi Joḥanan objected: Food that was touched by a Tevul Yom is a counter-example, because he disqualifies in the case of heave but does not disqualify in the case of sanctified food. Rebbi Ḥananiah in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Rebbi Yose argues the method of his teacher Rebbi Aqiba. Just as Rebbi Aqiba says impure, impure by the words of the Torah, so Rebbi Yose says it will be impure, it makes impure by the words of the Torah. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: Rebbi Yose does not need that argument de minore ad majus. Rebbi Yose explains the verse: Any meat which would touch, that is second degree food because it touched primary impurity; anything impure, that is third degree food because it touched second degree impurity; shall not be eaten, the endstage of impurity may not be eaten. So far about solid food that became impure in the air space of a clay vessel which had become impure by a reptile. What about solid food that became impure directly from a reptile? Is that not an argument? Since vessels, which cannot become impure in the air space of a clay vessel that became impure by a reptile, become impure by contact with a reptile to defile solid food, is it not logical that solid food itself which became impure by a reptile should become impure by contact with a reptile to defile solid food. So far, following Rebbi Aqiba. Following Rebbi Ismael? Rebbi Ismael stated: Any meat which would touch anything impure, that is first degree food which touched any impurity, shall not be eaten, to add a second degree of impurity. The third degree from where? It is an argument. Since a tevul yom who is not disqualified for profane food disqualifies heave, it is only logical that a person secondarily impure, who disables profane food should disable heave. The fourth degree for sacrifices from where? It is an argument. Since one who lacks expiation who does not disable heave disables sanctified food, it is only logical that third degree [impurity] which disqualifies heave should disable sanctified food. That means, we learned first and second degrees from a verse, the third from an argument and the fourth from an argument de minore ad majus. Can one pile argument on argument? Everything is subject to practice, i. e., that third degree disables heave and fourth degree disables sacrifices.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 2:10

What does Rebbi Simeon say about the “bespoken” woman? Let us hear from the following: “Rebbi Simeon says, the cohabitation or the ḥalîṣah of one of them frees her co-wife but if he performed ḥalîṣah with the “bespoken” woman, her colleague also needs ḥalîṣah. You say, the cohabitation or the ḥalîṣah of one of them frees her co-wife. However one argues, if “bespeaking” acquires, both are his wives and any one of them becomes free by her colleague’s ḥalîṣah. If “bespeaking” does not acquire, the first one does not need ḥalîṣah, but if he performed ḥalîṣah with the “bespoken” one, the second one also needs ḥalîṣah. Maybe “bespeaking” does not acquire, then ḥalîṣah or levirate do not apply to her. Maybe “bespeaking” does acquire; then she is freed by her colleague’s ḥalîṣah. What is the difference between them? If he performed ḥalîṣah with the first and cohabited with the second. In the opinion of the rabbis it was an incestuous cohabitation. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon it was not an incestuous cohabitation. If he cohabited both with the first and the second widow, in the opinion of the rabbis with the first it was incest and the second needs a bill of divorce and ḥalîṣah. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon, both need a bill of divorce. The first one needs a bill of divorce; perhaps the “bespeaking” did acquire. The second one needs a bill of divorce; perhaps levirate did acquire; if “bespeaking” did acquire, she was freed by her colleague’s ḥalîṣah.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 12:23

What is the reason of Rebbi Eliezer? “Before the Elders’ eyes.” How do the rabbis uphold “before the Elders’ eyes”? That excludes a court of blind people. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the argument of Rebbi Eliezer seems to be inverted. There, he says that the right hand is obligatory, but here, he says that the right hand is not obligatory. Rebbi Yose said, there it is written “the right hand”, the right hand is obl;igatory, but here, where “the right hand” is not written, the right hand is notobligatory. Rebbi Yose from Sidon stated before Rebbi Jeremiah: “His ear”, “his ear”. Since “his ear” mentioned there refers to the right ear, so “his ear” mentioned here means the right ear. It also says “his foot”, “his foot”. He who infers from “his ear”, “his ear” infers from “his foot”, “his foot”; he who does not infer from “his ear”, “his ear” does not infer from “his foot”, “his foot”. But it was stated in the name of Rebbi Eliezer: “his foot”, “his foot”. That means, there are two statements about the words of Rebbi Eliezer. He who argues from “his ear”, “his ear” argues from “his foot”, “his foot”; he who does not argue from “his ear”, “his ear” does not argue from “his foot”. And this Mishnah accepts neither “his ear”, “his ear” nor “his foot”, “his foot”.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 12:23

Jerusalem Talmud Sotah 5:11

Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Mana: Why did they say that secondarily impure profane food defiles profane fluids? Because of the hands. Since hands, [whose impurity] is rabbinical, defile profane fluids, secondarily impure food, [whose impurity] is biblical, not so much more? Also, since hands, in a case of doubt whether they defiled, impart impurity, so also secondarily impure fluids, in a case of doubt whether they defiled, impart impurity. Rebbi Ḥanina objected before Rebbi Mana: Look, if somebody eats secondarily impure food and drinks secondarily impure fluids, in a case of doubt whether they defiled, they impart impurity. But secondarily impure foods by biblical standards, in a case of doubt whether they defiled, leave it pure! Rebbi Ḥanina said before Rebbi Mana: Do we not deal with heave? He said to him, even if you say that we deal with heave; is the one who argues “is impure”, “shall become impure” as word of the Torah not Rebbi Aqiba?

Jerusalem Talmud Sotah 5:15

It was stated: “Rebbi Yose said, from where that the fourth degree is disabled in sanctified food? It is an argument. Since one who lacks expiation is not disabled for heave but disabled for sanctified food, it is only logical that third degree [impurity] which is disabled for heave should disable for sanctified food. That means, we learned third degree from a verse and fourth degree from an argument de minore ad majus.” Rebbi Joḥanan objected: Food that was touched by a ṭevul yom is a counterexample, because it is disabled in the case of heave but not disabled in the case of sanctified food. Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Rebbi Yose argues the method of his teacher Rebbi Aqiba. Just as Rebbi Aqiba says “it will be impure”, it makes impure by the words of the Torah, so Rebbi Yose says “it will be impure”, it makes impure by the words of the Torah. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Yose bar Ḥanina: Rebbi Yose does not need that argument de minore ad majus. Rebbi Yose explains the verse: “Any meat which would touch”, that is second degree food because it touched primary impurity; “anything impure”, that is third degree food because it touched second degree impurity; “shall not be eaten”, the endstage of impurity cannot be eaten.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 7:13

MISHNAH: If somebody causes a vow of his wife that she should not pay condolence visits or go to weddings has to divorce her and pay the ketubah. But if he argues because of another reason, he is in his rights. If he said to her you should tell X what I said to you or that she should fill [vessels] and pour them out on garbage heaps, he has to divorce her and pay the ketubah.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 7:15

“If he argues because of another reason, he is in his rights,” because of bad reputation.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 12:25

MISHNAH: If she said, I cannot possibly move from my father’s house, the heirs can tell her: If you are with us, you are provided with sustenance, but if you are not with us, you are not provided with sustenance. If she argues because she is young and they are young, one provides her with sustenance while she is in her father’s house.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 12:26

HALAKHAH: “If she said, I cannot possibly move from my father’s house,” etc. “If she argues because she is young and they are young,” to avoid a bad reputation.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 3:47

MISHNAH: One calls in the second [witness] and examines him. If their testimonies are found consistent, one argues the case. Two say not guilty and one says guilty, he is not guilty. Two say guilty and one says not guilty, he is guilty. One says not guilty, one says guilty, and one says “I do not know”, they shall add judges. Even if two say not guilty or guilty but one says “I do not know”, they shall add judges

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 5:23

Rabbi La said, why does one record the argument of him who argues for acquittal? Because of him who argues for conviction, maybe his memory will fail him. If he switches his argument, they could say to him, this you said, this you did not say. [Does this mean] that it needs two [groups of] witnesses? It would mean that the trial would be extended. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, because of him who argues for acquittal.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 5:23

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 7:31

There, we have stated: Rebbi Jehudah says, if his mother was not fit for his father, he is liable only for one [sacrifice]. Therefore, if his mother was fit for his father, he is liable for two. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: There is no difference. Whether his mother was fit for his father or unfit for his father, he is liable only once. The reason of Rebbi Joḥanan: Your mother is she, you find him guilty because of his mother; this directs the entire chapter towards his mother. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya asked before Rebbi Zeˋira: What caused Rebbi Joḥanan to concentrate on the mother and to leave the father’s wife aside? He told him, for he argues with Rebbi Ismael, as Rebbi Ismael explained: Your father’s wife’s nakedness; the verse refers to the male. Is not his father included in the category of the male? Only to make him liable twice, as we have stated: A person having sexual relations with his father is doubly liable about him. Then should we not state “thirty-seven extirpations in the Torah”? Rebbi Mana said, all denotations of males are one. Your father’s wife’s nakedness; the verse refers to the father’s wife. Your mother’s nakedness, that is his mother who is his father’s wife. From where his mother who is not his father’s wife? Your mother is she; do not uncover her nakedness. How does Rebbi Ismael treat this? He explains it to apply after [the father’s] death. Does Rebbi Aqiba not explain she is your father’s nakedness? There is no difference whether during lifetime or after death. Rebbi Aqiba explains: Your father’s wife’s nakedness, the verse refers to the father’s wife. Your mother’s nakedness, that is his mother who is his father’s wife. From where his mother who is not his father’s wife? Your mother is she; do not uncover her nakedness. How does Rebbi Ismael treat this? He explains it to apply after [the father’s] death. Does not Rebbi Aqiba treat your father’s nakedness, your mother’s nakedness? Since your father refers to your father in any capacity both for punishment and warning, so also your mother refers to one’s mother in any capacity both for punishment and warning. Is it not reasonable to explain that verse except following Rebbi Jehudah who because he does not accept “his mother who is his father’s wife” must explain that your father’s nakedness, your mother’s nakedness refers to your father in any capacity both for punishment and warning, so also your mother refers to your mother in any capacity both for punishment and warning. Rebbi Zeˋira said, this implies that one infers from parallel language even if it is free only from one side. Rebbi Yudan said to him, this is obvious for Rebbi Aqiba since Rebbi Aqiba infers from parallel language even if it is not free.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 1:7

HALAKHAH: “In any case where there is knowledge at the start,” etc. From where that we require knowledge at the start and at the end but forgetting in between? The verse says, it was forgotten, it was forgotten two times; this implies that he had knowledge at the start and at the end but forgetting in between. So far for Rebbi Aqiba; following Rebbi Ismael? For Rebbi Ismael [argues] like Rebbi. As Rebbi said, it was forgotten by him, this implies that he knows. “But he knew,” there is knowledge two times. Hence Rebbi Ismael [argues] like Rebbi, and Rebbi like Rebbi Ismael. This comes even according to Rebbi Aqiba; it is the same for knowledge and forgetting about the impurity of the Sanctuary as for knowledge and forgetting about the impurity of sancta. But some want to understand it from the following: He knew and felt guilty. Was it not already said, he became impure and felt guilty? But if it does not refer to knowledge at the beginning, let it refer to knowledge at the end.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 1:7

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 4:35

HALAKHAH: “I am putting an oath on you that you should come and testify for me,” etc. From where that this only refers to monetary claims? Rebbi Eliezer said, it uses here “or” and it uses “or” with a deposit. Since the “or” used with a deposit only refers to monetary claims, also the “or” used here only refers to monetary claims. The “or” of the homicide will disprove since they do not refer to monetary claims. One argues about “or” accompanied by an oath from “or” accompanied by an oath; the “or” of the homicide cannot disprove since they are not accompanied by an oath. The “or” of the deviant woman will disprove since they are accompanied by an oath and do not refer to monetary claims. One argues about “or” accompanied by an oath not accompanied by a Cohen from similar “or”; the “or” of the deviant woman cannot disprove since they are accompanied by a Cohen. The “or” of blurting lips will disprove since they do not refer to monetary claims. One argues about “or” where He made intent equal to error from similar “or”; the “or” of blurting lips cannot disprove since there He did not make intent equal to error. Rebbi Aqiba says, for some of these one is liable, for some one is not liable. For monetary claims one is liable; for non-monetary claims one is not liable. Rebbi Simeon says, He made liable here and he made liable for a deposit. Since deposits only refer to monetary claims, so here also it only refers to monetary claims.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 4:35

The Babylonian Talmud

Babylonian Talmud Berakhot 6:5

According to him who teaches "the vineyard of the fourth year" it is quite right if he argues by analogy of expression ; for there is a teaching : Rabbi says : It is stated here, "That it may yield unto you more richly the increase thereof" (Lev. xix. 25), and it is stated elsewhere, "the increase of the vineyard" (Deut. xxii. 9) — as in the latter passage "increase" refers to the vineyard, so also in the former passage it refers to the vineyard ; and there thus remains over one hillul to be interpreted as meaning that a benediction is required [when partaking of fruits].

Babylonian Talmud Ta'anit 4:12

Gemara: At three periods of the year the priests must raise their hands, etc. Is there a Musaf prayer on days of public fasts or on the days of the Ma'amadot? Answer. There is an omission in this text, it should read as follows: At three periods of the year the priests must raise their hands each time they pray, occasionally even four times daily, namely during the Shaḥarit, Musaf, Minḥah and Ne'ilah prayers, and these are the three periods: On public fast days, on the days of the Ma'amadot, and on the Day of Atonement. Said R. Naḥman in the name of Rabbah b. 'Abuha, this is the opinion of R. Meir, but the Sages say, there is raising of hands only during the Shaḥarit and Musaf prayers, but not during the Minḥah and Ne'ilah prayers. Who is meant by "the Sages"? R. Judah; for a Baraita teaches: There is raising of hands in the Shaḥarit, Musaf, Minḥah, and Ne'ilah. This is the opinion of R. Meir; R. Judah said there is raising of hands in the Shaḥarit and Musaf prayers, but none in the Minḥah and Ne'ilah prayers; R. Jose said there is raising of hands in the Ne'ilah prayer, but not in the Minḥah prayer. What is the underlying principle of their diverging opinions? It is this: R. Meir argues that since the priests are allowed to raise their hands daily, during the Shaḥarit and Musaf prayers, because drunkenness is not common at that time of the day, they ought to be allowed to do so on fast days even during the Minḥah and Ne'ilah prayers, since on fast days drunkenness is out of the question; R. Judah, however, is of the opinion that inasmuch as drunkenness during the time of the Shaḥarit and Musaf prayers is not a common occurrence even on ordinary days, it is not necessary to prohibit the raising of hands during these prayers on fast days either, but in the Minḥah and Ne'ilah prayers, during the time of which drunkenness on ordinary days is a common occurrence, it is necessary to prohibit the raising of hands during these prayers even on fast days; R. Jose holds that in the service of Minḥah, which is a prayer of every day, the raising of hands is to be forbidden even on fast days, but in the service of Ne'ilah, which is not a matter of every day, the raising of hands need not be forbidden.

Babylonian Talmud Makkot 1:7

Bar Pada said It stands to reason, a fortiori, since a priest who successfully takes away priesthood from his fellow keeps his priesthood, a priest who is unsuccessful remains a priest. Ravina argues, if so, false witnesses can never be punished

Babylonian Talmud Makkot 3:160

And who is the Tanna that argues with Rebbi Yehuda? It is Rebbi Eliezer ben Yaakov. As it was taught in a baraisa (Deuteronomy 26,4) "And the Kohen will take the basket from his hand" this teaches ud that Bikorim require waving. These are the words of Rebbi Elezier ben Yaakov. What is the reason of Rebbi Eliezer ben Yaakov?