argument
536 occurrences across the corpus
The Jerusalem Talmud
HALAKHAH: “A widow to the High Priest,” etc. What is the reason of the rabbis? “Being” is mentioned here and “being” is mentioned there, “if a girl will be betrothed to a man.” Just as “being” there means betrothal, so “being” here means betrothal. What is the reason of Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon? “Being” is mentioned here and “being” is mentioned there, “if the daughter of a Cohen will be an outside man’s”. Just as “being” there means marriage, so “being” here means marriage. Rebbi Yosa said, from where do Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon know that the daughter of a Cohen betrothed to an Israel may not eat heave? Not from that verse, “if the daughter of a Cohen will be an outside man’s”? Here they make it betrothal, there they make it marriage! What is the reason of the rabbis? “A man’s”, the man who enables to eat. Is it not an argument de minore ad majus? Since an Israel, whose intercourse does not disable her from the priesthood, by intercourse will disable her from eating heave, the High Priest, whose intercourse does disable her from the priesthood, it should be logical that his intercourse will disable her from eating heave. No. If you argue about an Israel who cannot enable others to eat, what can you say about the High Priest who can enable others to eat? Since he can enable others to eat, his intercourse should not disable her from eating heave. The argument de minore ad majus is broken, and one has to return to the verse. Therefore, it must say “a man’s”; viz., the man who enables her to eat. What is the reason of Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon, because he may eat or because he may enable to eat? Let us hear from the following: “If he did not know her after his testicles became injured or his penis cut off, these they enable to eat.” Rebbi Eleazar said, this follows Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon. You have to say, here it is because he enables to eat, there because he cannot enable to eat. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, not really from betrothal or marriage. If they had copulated whether betrothed or married, they are disabled; if they had not copulated whether betrothed or married, they are enabled.
HALAKHAH: “A widow to the High Priest,” etc. What is the reason of the rabbis? “Being” is mentioned here and “being” is mentioned there, “if a girl will be betrothed to a man.” Just as “being” there means betrothal, so “being” here means betrothal. What is the reason of Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon? “Being” is mentioned here and “being” is mentioned there, “if the daughter of a Cohen will be an outside man’s”. Just as “being” there means marriage, so “being” here means marriage. Rebbi Yosa said, from where do Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon know that the daughter of a Cohen betrothed to an Israel may not eat heave? Not from that verse, “if the daughter of a Cohen will be an outside man’s”? Here they make it betrothal, there they make it marriage! What is the reason of the rabbis? “A man’s”, the man who enables to eat. Is it not an argument de minore ad majus? Since an Israel, whose intercourse does not disable her from the priesthood, by intercourse will disable her from eating heave, the High Priest, whose intercourse does disable her from the priesthood, it should be logical that his intercourse will disable her from eating heave. No. If you argue about an Israel who cannot enable others to eat, what can you say about the High Priest who can enable others to eat? Since he can enable others to eat, his intercourse should not disable her from eating heave. The argument de minore ad majus is broken, and one has to return to the verse. Therefore, it must say “a man’s”; viz., the man who enables her to eat. What is the reason of Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon, because he may eat or because he may enable to eat? Let us hear from the following: “If he did not know her after his testicles became injured or his penis cut off, these they enable to eat.” Rebbi Eleazar said, this follows Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon. You have to say, here it is because he enables to eat, there because he cannot enable to eat. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, not really from betrothal or marriage. If they had copulated whether betrothed or married, they are disabled; if they had not copulated whether betrothed or married, they are enabled.
A sister injured by a piece of wood, Rebbi Meїr and Rebbi Simeon say, he shall not defile himself for her, but the Sages say, he must defile himself for her. Rebbi Meїr and Rebbi Simeon follow well what they have stated, but the argument of Sages seems inverted. There, they say “a girl”, not an adult, “a virgin”, not one injured by a piece of wood; and here, they say so? Rebbi Hila said, every interpretation follows its context. There, “and for his virgin sister”, that excludes the raped and the seduced one. Or maybe I should exclude the one injured by a piece of wood? The verse says, “who had not been a man’s.” Who became [deflowered] through the action of a man, not one who became it through something else. “The close one”, to include the betrothed one. “To him”, to include the adult. The argument of Sages seems inverted. There, they say “the close one”, to exclude the betrothed one, “to him”, to exclude the divorcee. And here, they say so? Rebbi Hila said, every interpretation follows its context. “His sister” is always inside [the family] until she leaves; his betrothed is always outside until she enters.
A sister injured by a piece of wood, Rebbi Meїr and Rebbi Simeon say, he shall not defile himself for her, but the Sages say, he must defile himself for her. Rebbi Meїr and Rebbi Simeon follow well what they have stated, but the argument of Sages seems inverted. There, they say “a girl”, not an adult, “a virgin”, not one injured by a piece of wood; and here, they say so? Rebbi Hila said, every interpretation follows its context. There, “and for his virgin sister”, that excludes the raped and the seduced one. Or maybe I should exclude the one injured by a piece of wood? The verse says, “who had not been a man’s.” Who became [deflowered] through the action of a man, not one who became it through something else. “The close one”, to include the betrothed one. “To him”, to include the adult. The argument of Sages seems inverted. There, they say “the close one”, to exclude the betrothed one, “to him”, to exclude the divorcee. And here, they say so? Rebbi Hila said, every interpretation follows its context. “His sister” is always inside [the family] until she leaves; his betrothed is always outside until she enters.
HALAKHAH: “A slave disables because of intercourse,” etc. From where that the intercourse with a slave disables? Rebbi Joḥanan said in the name of Rebbi Ismael: “If a Cohen’s daughter becomes a widow or a divorcee without issue,” from [a man] with whom she has widowhood or divorce she returns, from [a man] with whom she has no relation of widowhood or divorce she does not return. Rebbi Jeremiah objected: But if a widow whored she has no widowhood or divorce and she returns! Rebbi Yose did not say so, but [he held] that the argument of Rebbi Joḥanan is reversed. In Giṭṭin he says, why are Samaritans disqualified? Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Ismael: Because if a Gentile or a slave has intercourse with a Jewish woman, the child is a bastard. In Qiddushin one says, Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both say, the child is a bastard. Here he says it in his own name but there he says it in the name of Rebbi Ismael! For also according to the words of the Sages the child is a bastard. Rebbi Ḥizqiah did not say so, but: the argument of Rebbi Joḥanan is reversed. In Giṭṭin he says, why are Samaritans disqualified? Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Ismael: Because if a Gentile or slave has intercourse with a Jewish woman, the child is a bastard. In Qiddushin one says, Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both say, the child is a bastard. Here he says, from [a man] with whom she has widowhood or divorce she returns, from [a man] with whom she has no relation of widowhood or divorce she does not return. Rebbi Mattaniah said, I went to Seḥora and heard: Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Ismael the sons of Jesua: “If a Cohen’s daughter becomes a widow or a divorcee without issue,” from [a man] with whom she has widowhood or divorce she returns, from [a man] with whom she has no relation of widowhood or divorce she does not return. And I said, that is correct, there is no bastard, following Rebbi Joshua, for a bastard is only from a woman which is for him under an incest prohibition and for whom one is punished by divine extirpation.
HALAKHAH: “A slave disables because of intercourse,” etc. From where that the intercourse with a slave disables? Rebbi Joḥanan said in the name of Rebbi Ismael: “If a Cohen’s daughter becomes a widow or a divorcee without issue,” from [a man] with whom she has widowhood or divorce she returns, from [a man] with whom she has no relation of widowhood or divorce she does not return. Rebbi Jeremiah objected: But if a widow whored she has no widowhood or divorce and she returns! Rebbi Yose did not say so, but [he held] that the argument of Rebbi Joḥanan is reversed. In Giṭṭin he says, why are Samaritans disqualified? Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Ismael: Because if a Gentile or a slave has intercourse with a Jewish woman, the child is a bastard. In Qiddushin one says, Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both say, the child is a bastard. Here he says it in his own name but there he says it in the name of Rebbi Ismael! For also according to the words of the Sages the child is a bastard. Rebbi Ḥizqiah did not say so, but: the argument of Rebbi Joḥanan is reversed. In Giṭṭin he says, why are Samaritans disqualified? Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Ismael: Because if a Gentile or slave has intercourse with a Jewish woman, the child is a bastard. In Qiddushin one says, Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both say, the child is a bastard. Here he says, from [a man] with whom she has widowhood or divorce she returns, from [a man] with whom she has no relation of widowhood or divorce she does not return. Rebbi Mattaniah said, I went to Seḥora and heard: Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Ismael the sons of Jesua: “If a Cohen’s daughter becomes a widow or a divorcee without issue,” from [a man] with whom she has widowhood or divorce she returns, from [a man] with whom she has no relation of widowhood or divorce she does not return. And I said, that is correct, there is no bastard, following Rebbi Joshua, for a bastard is only from a woman which is for him under an incest prohibition and for whom one is punished by divine extirpation.
There, we have stated: “Everybody is required to be seen except the deaf-and-dumb, the insane, the minor, the sexless, and the hermaphrodite.” What says Rebbi Jehudah in this respect? Let us hear from the following: Rebbi Joḥanan ben Dahavai said in the name of Rebbi Jehudah, “also the blind one.” Nobody says “also” unless he agrees with the preceding statement. The argument of Rebbi Jehudah seems to be inverted. There he says to exclude, but here he says to include. Rebbi Jehudah and the rabbis explain the same verse. The rabbis explain “uncircumcised”, why does the verse add “male”? Only if he is totally male. Rebbi Jehudah explains “male”, why does the verse add “uncircumcised”? Even if he is partially male. But here, “all your maleness”, that excludes the hermaphrodite.
MISHNAH: Ammonites and Moabites are eternally forbidden but their females are immediately permitted. Egyptians and Edomites are forbidden only for three generations, both males and females. Rebbi Simeon said, is it not an argument de minore ad majus? If He permitted the females immediately in a case where the males are eternally forbidden, should we not permit the females in a case where He forbade the males only for three generations? They said to him: If it is practice, we shall accept this; if it is a logical argument, there is a counter-argument. He said to them, in fact, I am declaring practice. Bastards and Gibeonites are eternally forbidden, both males and females.
MISHNAH: Ammonites and Moabites are eternally forbidden but their females are immediately permitted. Egyptians and Edomites are forbidden only for three generations, both males and females. Rebbi Simeon said, is it not an argument de minore ad majus? If He permitted the females immediately in a case where the males are eternally forbidden, should we not permit the females in a case where He forbade the males only for three generations? They said to him: If it is practice, we shall accept this; if it is a logical argument, there is a counter-argument. He said to them, in fact, I am declaring practice. Bastards and Gibeonites are eternally forbidden, both males and females.
MISHNAH: Ammonites and Moabites are eternally forbidden but their females are immediately permitted. Egyptians and Edomites are forbidden only for three generations, both males and females. Rebbi Simeon said, is it not an argument de minore ad majus? If He permitted the females immediately in a case where the males are eternally forbidden, should we not permit the females in a case where He forbade the males only for three generations? They said to him: If it is practice, we shall accept this; if it is a logical argument, there is a counter-argument. He said to them, in fact, I am declaring practice. Bastards and Gibeonites are eternally forbidden, both males and females.
“They said to him: If it is practice, we shall accept this; if it is a logical argument, there is a counter-argument.” What could they have argued? Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Ḥanina: Are not his grandchildren forbidden for three generations, both male and female? Rebbi Abbahu said that Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish questioned, does one argue a matter concerning bastardy in a matter not concerning bastardy? Rebbi Ḥaggai said that Rebbi Abbahu questioned, does one argue a matter concerning extirpation in a matter not concerning extirpation? He said to them, in fact, I am declaring practice and a verse supports me. “Sons,” not daughters.
“They said to him: If it is practice, we shall accept this; if it is a logical argument, there is a counter-argument.” What could they have argued? Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Ḥanina: Are not his grandchildren forbidden for three generations, both male and female? Rebbi Abbahu said that Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish questioned, does one argue a matter concerning bastardy in a matter not concerning bastardy? Rebbi Ḥaggai said that Rebbi Abbahu questioned, does one argue a matter concerning extirpation in a matter not concerning extirpation? He said to them, in fact, I am declaring practice and a verse supports me. “Sons,” not daughters.
Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Josia: The eleventh generation of bastards is qualified following Rebbi Simeon; he does not use the principle of gezerah šawah. It was stated: Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon says, in the eleventh generation of bastards, the males are forbidden and the females permitted. Here also the males are forbidden and the females permitted. Rebbi Samuel ben Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, it turns out that Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon follows the argument of Rebbi Meїr. As Rebbi Meїr said, a gezerah šawah is as if written in a verse, so Rebbi [Eleazar] ben Rebbi Simeon says, a gezerah šawah is as if written in a verse. Here also, the males are forbidden and the females permitted. In that case, even immediately? Only from the tenth and further.
The argument of Rebbi Eliezer is inverted. There, he says “it is not so, but a congenital castrate performs ḥalîṣah and one performs ḥalîṣah for his wife,” and you say so? Rebbi Iniah said, Rebbi Eliezer referred only to criminal responsibility.
Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said the argument is about the daughter of an Israel married to a Cohen: Rebbi Joḥanan said, he enables her for heave but not for breast and thigh. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, there are several arguments de minore ad majus in this matter. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Ḥanina asked, what means “there are several arguments de minore ad majus in this matter”? He said to him, open your mouth and receive. Rebbi Mana said, he made fun of him. Rebbi Abun said, he gave him an example. “Since she eats heave that never was within the reach of an Israel, is it not logical that she should eat breast and thigh that were within the reach of Israel? Breast and thigh were within the reach of Israel but when they became guilty these were taken from them and given to the priests. I could think, since these were taken from them when they incurred guilt, so they would be given back to them when they acquire merit. The verse says, ‘I gave them to Aaron the priest and his sons for an eternal law;’ since a gift is not returned, so these are not returned.”
HALAKHAH: “If a woman’s husband and son went overseas,” etc. How do you consider this situation, comparing to witnesses of death or witnesses of divorce? If you compare it to witnesses of death, it disagrees with the (rabbis there). If you compare it to witnesses of divorce, it disagrees (both with the rabbis here and those there). Rebbi Joḥanan said, it was stated thus: Two [witnesses] say he died, [later] two witnesses said, he did not die. She shall not remarry, but if she has remarried she should not leave. Two [witnesses] say she was divorced, [later] two witnesses said, she was not divorced. She shall not remarry; if she has remarried she must leave. There, they say, it makes no difference; whether about death or divorce she should not leave. In the opinion of the rabbis there it is understandable, there is no difference between death and divorce. In the opinion of the rabbis here, what is the difference between death and divorce? Rebbi Ze‘ira said it without attribution, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It is reasonable to decide in the case of witnesses of death that if he comes he contradicts them. Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, the rabbis there stick to their opinion since the rabbis there say, when the [first] testimony was accepted, it was accepted as certain. So the rabbis here say, at the moment of her remarriage, she remarried based on certain testimony. Rebbi Yose said, it is reasonable that the rabbis there did not change their argument. Do the rabbis there not agree if two [witnesses] say, his father died while in possession, and two say his father died while not in possession, that the field is in Reuben’s possession? Therefore, if two say, she was married, divorced, and remarried, and two say she was not divorced, rightly she should not leave.
The elder Rebbi Hoshaia said, the baraita is about someone who takes back his divorcee after she had been married to another. Why after she had been married, not also after she had been betrothed? Because of Rebbi Yose ben Kipper, since Rebbi Yose ben Kipper said, she is permitted after betrothal. Rebbi Eleazar said, the baraita is about a sister-in-law who became eligible before two levirs, when one of them “bespoke” her and then the other copulated with her. Why when one of them “bespoke” her, even if he had not “bespoken” her! Why if he copulated with her, even if he did not copulate with her! Because of the House of Shammai, because of Rebbi Simeon. As it was stated, Rebbi Simeon said, the House of Shammai and the House of Hillel did not disagree that one who copulates with his wife’s sister disables his wife. Where did they disagree? If he copulates with his mother-in-law; where the House of Shammai say, he disabled her, but the House of Hillel say, he did not disable her. The House of Hillel were arguing: A man is permitted all women, a woman is permitted all men. When he becomes betrothed to her, he forbids her and she forbids him. The prohibition through which he forbids her is greater than the prohibition through which she forbids him, since he forbids her to go to marry any other man but she forbids him only her relatives. And is that not an argument de minore ad majus? If she, whose prohibition is greater, transgressed the prohibition in error, is not forbidden even to the one permitted to her, he, whose prohibition is less, if he transgressed the prohibition in error, is it not logical that he should not be forbidden even to the one permitted to him? That works for an error. From where if intentional: The verse says “with her;” her sleeping prohibits her, the sleeping of another woman does not prohibit her.
“How is that? [A male] nine years and one day old.” “If he allots her to his son.” He allots her to his son but may not allot her to the brothers. He should be able to allot her to the brothers by an argument de minore ad majus! If he may allot her to his son who may not take his place for ḥalîṣah and levirate, should it not be logical that he may allot her to his brother who may take his place for ḥalîṣah and levirate? The verse says, “if he allots her to his son.” He allots her [to his son] but may not allot her to the brothers. No. If you would accept the son since he will take [the father’s] place in a field of inheritance, what can you say about his brother who will not take his place in a field of inheritance? Would it be reasonable that he may allot her to him? The verse says, “if he allots her to his son.” He allots her to his son but may not allot her to the brothers.
Rebbi Abbahu, Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Hoshaiah. If there are two prohibitions and one liability to extirpation, the prohibitions split the extirpation. What is the reason? “On human flesh it may not be rubbed and in its proportions you should not make [a compound] like it.” And it is written: “A man who would compound like it”. Here are two prohibitions and one liability to extirpation. The prohibitions divide the extirpation. This follows Rebbi Ismael, since Rebbi Ismael said one infers from an argument de minore ad majus but one does not punish from an argument de minore ad majus. Where does he have that from? It comes following what Ḥizqiah stated: “If the daughter of a Cohen is desecrated by whoring.” Why does the verse say, “a man”? To include him who cohabits with his daughter’s daughter from a rape that she should be [under sentence of] burning. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, one may even understand this from the warning: “Do not desecrate your daughter.”
Rebbi Abbahu, Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Hoshaiah. If there are two prohibitions and one liability to extirpation, the prohibitions split the extirpation. What is the reason? “On human flesh it may not be rubbed and in its proportions you should not make [a compound] like it.” And it is written: “A man who would compound like it”. Here are two prohibitions and one liability to extirpation. The prohibitions divide the extirpation. This follows Rebbi Ismael, since Rebbi Ismael said one infers from an argument de minore ad majus but one does not punish from an argument de minore ad majus. Where does he have that from? It comes following what Ḥizqiah stated: “If the daughter of a Cohen is desecrated by whoring.” Why does the verse say, “a man”? To include him who cohabits with his daughter’s daughter from a rape that she should be [under sentence of] burning. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, one may even understand this from the warning: “Do not desecrate your daughter.”
Rebbi Ḥaggai asked before Rebbi Yose: Is the child a bastard following Rebbi Jehudah? He said to him, “No one with a damaged testicle or with cut-off penis may marry” interrupts the argument. It interrupted the argument in the matter of the father’s wife. He retorted, the father’s wife was part of the set of all incest prohibitions; it was selected from this set to teach about bastardy for all incest prohibitions. (Let the father’s wife be selected to teach about bastardy for all incests prohibitions.) Similarly, let the rape victim be selected to teach a prohibition concerning all rape victims. He said to him, the father’s wife was part of the set of all incest prohibitions; it was selected from this set to teach about bastardy for all incest prohibitions. Can you say that the rape victim was in a set of all rape victims, that it could teach a prohibition concerning all rape victims? Why cannot the father’s wife be selected to teach about the rape victims in her case? He said to him, is she is the father’s wife, she is not his rape victim; is she is the father’s rape victim, she is not his wife.
Rebbi Ḥaggai asked before Rebbi Yose: Is the child a bastard following Rebbi Jehudah? He said to him, “No one with a damaged testicle or with cut-off penis may marry” interrupts the argument. It interrupted the argument in the matter of the father’s wife. He retorted, the father’s wife was part of the set of all incest prohibitions; it was selected from this set to teach about bastardy for all incest prohibitions. (Let the father’s wife be selected to teach about bastardy for all incests prohibitions.) Similarly, let the rape victim be selected to teach a prohibition concerning all rape victims. He said to him, the father’s wife was part of the set of all incest prohibitions; it was selected from this set to teach about bastardy for all incest prohibitions. Can you say that the rape victim was in a set of all rape victims, that it could teach a prohibition concerning all rape victims? Why cannot the father’s wife be selected to teach about the rape victims in her case? He said to him, is she is the father’s wife, she is not his rape victim; is she is the father’s rape victim, she is not his wife.
“If he injured both of them at the same time or cursed them at the same time, he is guilty. Rebbi Jehudah frees him.” Rebbi Joḥanan asked: Is not the argument of Rebbi Jehudah inverted? As we have stated there: “If he ate the volume of an olive of one of them and the volume of an olive of the other, he absorbs eighty [lashes]; Rebbi Jehudah says, he absorbs only forty [lashes].” Rebbi Crispus said, it is not inverted. There, it was in doubt what is forbidden. Here, it was certain but it became doubtful for him. Rebbi Judan asked: If it is so, in case carcass meat was mixed up with slaughtered meat, since it was certain but became doubtful for him, should he be free if he ate it? Rebbi Yose said, Rebbi Jehudah agrees for all other prohibitions that he is (free). But here, Rebbi Jehudah is interpreting verses: “His father,” certain but not uncertain, “his mother”, certain but not uncertain.
What is the reason of Rebbi Eliezer? “Before the Elders’ eyes.” How do the rabbis uphold “before the Elders’ eyes”? That excludes a court of blind people. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the argument of Rebbi Eliezer seems to be inverted. There, he says that the right hand is obligatory, but here, he says that the right hand is not obligatory. Rebbi Yose said, there it is written “the right hand”, the right hand is obl;igatory, but here, where “the right hand” is not written, the right hand is notobligatory. Rebbi Yose from Sidon stated before Rebbi Jeremiah: “His ear”, “his ear”. Since “his ear” mentioned there refers to the right ear, so “his ear” mentioned here means the right ear. It also says “his foot”, “his foot”. He who infers from “his ear”, “his ear” infers from “his foot”, “his foot”; he who does not infer from “his ear”, “his ear” does not infer from “his foot”, “his foot”. But it was stated in the name of Rebbi Eliezer: “his foot”, “his foot”. That means, there are two statements about the words of Rebbi Eliezer. He who argues from “his ear”, “his ear” argues from “his foot”, “his foot”; he who does not argue from “his ear”, “his ear” does not argue from “his foot”. And this Mishnah accepts neither “his ear”, “his ear” nor “his foot”, “his foot”.
What is the status of her co-wife? Rav said, her co-wife is forbidden. Rebbi Joḥanan said, her co-wife is forbidden. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, her co-wife is permitted. Rebbi Eleazar said, I looked around at the rabbis here and at the rabbis there and did not find anybody agreeing with me except Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish who says, her co-wife is permitted.Rav Hamnuna was sitting before Rav Ada bar Ahava and said, what is the status of her co-wife? He said to him, she is permitted. He asked, divorce? He answered, forbidden. He said, go around. Rebbi Abba bar Mamal said, it is reasonable following him who said that her co-wife is permitted. But following him who said, her co-wife is forbidden, as you take it: The aspect he acquired in her makes the corresponding aspect forbidden in her co-wife, the aspect he did not acquire in her makes the corresponding aspect permitted in her co-wife! Rebbi Shammai said, does one admit that kind of argument in matters of incest prohibitions? What about it? For any sister-in-law who is not totally outside [the family], the acquired aspect of her belongs to an incest prohibition and an incest prohibition forbids the co-wife.
HALAKHAH: “The House of Hillel say, we heard only,” etc. The House of Shammai said to them: Is there not harvest the entire year? How is that? At the end of barley harvest starts wheat harvest. At the end of wheat harvest starts grape harvest. At the end of grape harvest starts olive harvest. That means, there is some harvest the year round. They accepted this argument. And why the grain harvest? Rebbi Mana said, because there accidents are frequent, for the sun only hits a person’s head at grain harvest time. That is what is written: “The child grew and some day it went to his father, to the harvesters. He said to his father, ‘my head, my head’; who said to the servant, ‘carry him to his mother’. He carried him and brought him to his mother where he sat on her knees until noontime, when he died.” But the rabbis say, because snakes are abundant. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, “You shielded my head at the day of kissing,” at the day summer and winter are kissing. Another explanation: “At the day of weaponry,” that is Gog’s weaponry. Another explanation, on a day when two worlds kiss one another, when this world leaves and the future world enters.
It was stated: “Rebbi Jehudah says, her husband is believed about her by an argument de minore ad majus. Since he is believed about her when she is menstruating, when he would be subject to extirpation because of her, but for this one he is not subject to extirpation because of her, is it not logical that he should be believed about her? They said to him, no. If you mention the menstruating, she will be permitted after being forbidden, what can you say about this one who may not be permitted after being forbidden? And it says, “stolen waters are sweet”. Rebbi Jehudah said to them, it is a decree of the verse: “The man shall bring his wife to the priest”, etc. They said to him, only with witnesses.
The argument of Rebbi Jehudah seems inverted. There, he says: “One covers a man in front and a woman front and back.” And here, he says so? There, she goes to her death anyhow, but here, maybe she will be found to be pure and the young priests would attack her. The argument of the rabbis seems inverted. There, they say: “A man is stoned naked but no woman is stoned naked.” And here, they say so? There, “you shall love your neighbor as yourself,” choose for him the easiest death. But here, “all women should be taught and not do as your whoring.”
The argument of Rebbi Jehudah seems inverted. There, he says: “One covers a man in front and a woman front and back.” And here, he says so? There, she goes to her death anyhow, but here, maybe she will be found to be pure and the young priests would attack her. The argument of the rabbis seems inverted. There, they say: “A man is stoned naked but no woman is stoned naked.” And here, they say so? There, “you shall love your neighbor as yourself,” choose for him the easiest death. But here, “all women should be taught and not do as your whoring.”
There, we have stated: “A hyssop which was used to sprinkle is acceptable [to be used] to purify the sufferer from skin disease.” Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: That [was stated] to exclude the opinion of Rebbi Eliezer, as it was stated: If he sprinkled with it for purifying, it is disqualified for the sufferer from skin disease. If he sprinkled with it for the sufferer from skin disease, it is disqualified for purifying. Rebbi Yose said, would that not be an argument de minore ad majus? Since for the sufferer from skin disease, for whose ceremony use does not disable, if he sprinkled with it for purifying, it is disqualified for the sufferer from skin disease; purifying, for whose ceremony use does disable, if he sprinkled with it for purifying, is it not logical that it should be disqualified for purifying?
“An offering of remembrance,” a general statement; “referring to sin”, a detailed statement. If a general statement is followed by a specific one, the general does not mean more than the specific. If you say so, do you not find the argument disadvantaged? If punishment, which is given out sparingly, can refer, then reward, which is given out in abundance, should do so much more! But, “an offering of remembrance,” if she has merit, “referring to sin”, if she has no merit. It was stated: Rebbi Tarphon said, all statements of “remembrance” in the Torah have a good meaning except this one which is for punishment. Rebbi Aqiba said to him: If it only said, “referring to sin”, and then was silent, I would agree with your statement. But since it says “an offering of remembrance,” this must be for a good [purpose].
“‘A Cohen’s daughter is desecrated, a Cohen is not desecrated.’ For it is written: ‘He shall not desecrate his seed in his clan.’ Not only that he desecrates his seed; from where [that he desecrates] herself? It is a conclusion of an argument. Since the seed who did not commit any sin is desecrated, she, who committed a sin, is it not logical that she should be desecrated? He himself gives a counter-argument since he sinned and is not desecrated. No. If you talk about the man who is not otherwise desecrated, what can you say about a woman who can be otherwise desecrated? Since she can be otherwise desecrated, it is an argument that she should be desecrated! If you wish, you can say, he shall not desecrate - “he shall not repeatedly desecrate,’” even to desecrate one who is enabled.
“‘A Cohen’s daughter is desecrated, a Cohen is not desecrated.’ For it is written: ‘He shall not desecrate his seed in his clan.’ Not only that he desecrates his seed; from where [that he desecrates] herself? It is a conclusion of an argument. Since the seed who did not commit any sin is desecrated, she, who committed a sin, is it not logical that she should be desecrated? He himself gives a counter-argument since he sinned and is not desecrated. No. If you talk about the man who is not otherwise desecrated, what can you say about a woman who can be otherwise desecrated? Since she can be otherwise desecrated, it is an argument that she should be desecrated! If you wish, you can say, he shall not desecrate - “he shall not repeatedly desecrate,’” even to desecrate one who is enabled.
“‘A Cohen’s daughter is desecrated, a Cohen is not desecrated.’ For it is written: ‘He shall not desecrate his seed in his clan.’ Not only that he desecrates his seed; from where [that he desecrates] herself? It is a conclusion of an argument. Since the seed who did not commit any sin is desecrated, she, who committed a sin, is it not logical that she should be desecrated? He himself gives a counter-argument since he sinned and is not desecrated. No. If you talk about the man who is not otherwise desecrated, what can you say about a woman who can be otherwise desecrated? Since she can be otherwise desecrated, it is an argument that she should be desecrated! If you wish, you can say, he shall not desecrate - “he shall not repeatedly desecrate,’” even to desecrate one who is enabled.
There, they say, because Rebbi Joshua praised Rebbi Aqiba, it implies that practice follows his argument. The rabbis of Caesarea say, he praised him for his ingenuity, but in fact practice does not follow his argument, since Rebbi Aḥa, Rebbi Maisha, in the name of Rebbi Eleazar said, one whips for tertiary [impurity] for tithes, even according to Rebbi Aqiba. Rebbi Yudan in the name of Rebbi Hilai: Even according to Rebbi Aqiba one does not whip. Why? The ṭevul yom makes invalid, secondary impurity makes invalid. Since the ṭevul yom has no touch for profane food, also secondary impurity has no touch for profane food. Rebbi Eleazar said, as the count for profane food so is the count of tithes. This corresponds to what Rebbi Jonah, Rebbi Immi, said in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: We deal with somebody who ate profane food, and that Chapter deals with tithe. Rebbi Yose said, even its primary [impurity] is not clear. Not “I will not eat” is written, but “I did not eat.” Rebbi Abba Mari said, since it is written “following all Your commandments which You commanded me,” is it as if it were not clear?
There, they say, because Rebbi Joshua praised Rebbi Aqiba, it implies that practice follows his argument. The rabbis of Caesarea say, he praised him for his ingenuity, but in fact practice does not follow his argument, since Rebbi Aḥa, Rebbi Maisha, in the name of Rebbi Eleazar said, one whips for tertiary [impurity] for tithes, even according to Rebbi Aqiba. Rebbi Yudan in the name of Rebbi Hilai: Even according to Rebbi Aqiba one does not whip. Why? The ṭevul yom makes invalid, secondary impurity makes invalid. Since the ṭevul yom has no touch for profane food, also secondary impurity has no touch for profane food. Rebbi Eleazar said, as the count for profane food so is the count of tithes. This corresponds to what Rebbi Jonah, Rebbi Immi, said in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: We deal with somebody who ate profane food, and that Chapter deals with tithe. Rebbi Yose said, even its primary [impurity] is not clear. Not “I will not eat” is written, but “I did not eat.” Rebbi Abba Mari said, since it is written “following all Your commandments which You commanded me,” is it as if it were not clear?
It was stated: “Rebbi Yose said, from where that the fourth degree is disabled in sanctified food? It is an argument. Since one who lacks expiation is not disabled for heave but disabled for sanctified food, it is only logical that third degree [impurity] which is disabled for heave should disable for sanctified food. That means, we learned third degree from a verse and fourth degree from an argument de minore ad majus.” Rebbi Joḥanan objected: Food that was touched by a ṭevul yom is a counterexample, because it is disabled in the case of heave but not disabled in the case of sanctified food. Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Rebbi Yose argues the method of his teacher Rebbi Aqiba. Just as Rebbi Aqiba says “it will be impure”, it makes impure by the words of the Torah, so Rebbi Yose says “it will be impure”, it makes impure by the words of the Torah. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Yose bar Ḥanina: Rebbi Yose does not need that argument de minore ad majus. Rebbi Yose explains the verse: “Any meat which would touch”, that is second degree food because it touched primary impurity; “anything impure”, that is third degree food because it touched second degree impurity; “shall not be eaten”, the endstage of impurity cannot be eaten.
It was stated: “Rebbi Yose said, from where that the fourth degree is disabled in sanctified food? It is an argument. Since one who lacks expiation is not disabled for heave but disabled for sanctified food, it is only logical that third degree [impurity] which is disabled for heave should disable for sanctified food. That means, we learned third degree from a verse and fourth degree from an argument de minore ad majus.” Rebbi Joḥanan objected: Food that was touched by a ṭevul yom is a counterexample, because it is disabled in the case of heave but not disabled in the case of sanctified food. Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Rebbi Yose argues the method of his teacher Rebbi Aqiba. Just as Rebbi Aqiba says “it will be impure”, it makes impure by the words of the Torah, so Rebbi Yose says “it will be impure”, it makes impure by the words of the Torah. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Yose bar Ḥanina: Rebbi Yose does not need that argument de minore ad majus. Rebbi Yose explains the verse: “Any meat which would touch”, that is second degree food because it touched primary impurity; “anything impure”, that is third degree food because it touched second degree impurity; “shall not be eaten”, the endstage of impurity cannot be eaten.
It was stated: “Rebbi Yose said, from where that the fourth degree is disabled in sanctified food? It is an argument. Since one who lacks expiation is not disabled for heave but disabled for sanctified food, it is only logical that third degree [impurity] which is disabled for heave should disable for sanctified food. That means, we learned third degree from a verse and fourth degree from an argument de minore ad majus.” Rebbi Joḥanan objected: Food that was touched by a ṭevul yom is a counterexample, because it is disabled in the case of heave but not disabled in the case of sanctified food. Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Rebbi Yose argues the method of his teacher Rebbi Aqiba. Just as Rebbi Aqiba says “it will be impure”, it makes impure by the words of the Torah, so Rebbi Yose says “it will be impure”, it makes impure by the words of the Torah. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Yose bar Ḥanina: Rebbi Yose does not need that argument de minore ad majus. Rebbi Yose explains the verse: “Any meat which would touch”, that is second degree food because it touched primary impurity; “anything impure”, that is third degree food because it touched second degree impurity; “shall not be eaten”, the endstage of impurity cannot be eaten.
So far about solid food that became impure in the air space of a clay vessel which had become impure by a reptile. What about solid food that became impure directly from a reptile? Is that not an argument? Since vessels, which cannot become impure in the air space of a clay vessel that became impure by a reptile, become impure by contact with a reptile to defile solid food, [is it not logical that solid food, which becomes impure in the air space of a clay vessel that became impure by a reptile, should become impure by contact with a reptile to defile solid food.] So far, following Rebbi Aqiba. Following Rebbi Ismael? Rebbi Ismael stated: “Any meat which would touch anything impure”, that is first degree food which touched any impurity, “shall not be eaten”, to add a second degree of impurity. The third degree from where? It is an argument. Since a ṭevul yom who is not disabled for profane food disables heave, it is only logical that a person secondarily impure, who disables profane food should disable heave. The fourth degree for sacrifices from where? It is an argument. Since one who lacks expiation who does not disable heave disables sanctified food, it is only logical that third degree [impurity] which disables heave should disable sanctified food. That means, we learned first and second degrees from a verse, the third from an argument and the fourth from an argument de minore ad majus. Can one pile argument on argument? Everything is subject to practice, i. e., that third degree disables heave and fourth degree disables sacrifices.
So far about solid food that became impure in the air space of a clay vessel which had become impure by a reptile. What about solid food that became impure directly from a reptile? Is that not an argument? Since vessels, which cannot become impure in the air space of a clay vessel that became impure by a reptile, become impure by contact with a reptile to defile solid food, [is it not logical that solid food, which becomes impure in the air space of a clay vessel that became impure by a reptile, should become impure by contact with a reptile to defile solid food.] So far, following Rebbi Aqiba. Following Rebbi Ismael? Rebbi Ismael stated: “Any meat which would touch anything impure”, that is first degree food which touched any impurity, “shall not be eaten”, to add a second degree of impurity. The third degree from where? It is an argument. Since a ṭevul yom who is not disabled for profane food disables heave, it is only logical that a person secondarily impure, who disables profane food should disable heave. The fourth degree for sacrifices from where? It is an argument. Since one who lacks expiation who does not disable heave disables sanctified food, it is only logical that third degree [impurity] which disables heave should disable sanctified food. That means, we learned first and second degrees from a verse, the third from an argument and the fourth from an argument de minore ad majus. Can one pile argument on argument? Everything is subject to practice, i. e., that third degree disables heave and fourth degree disables sacrifices.
So far about solid food that became impure in the air space of a clay vessel which had become impure by a reptile. What about solid food that became impure directly from a reptile? Is that not an argument? Since vessels, which cannot become impure in the air space of a clay vessel that became impure by a reptile, become impure by contact with a reptile to defile solid food, [is it not logical that solid food, which becomes impure in the air space of a clay vessel that became impure by a reptile, should become impure by contact with a reptile to defile solid food.] So far, following Rebbi Aqiba. Following Rebbi Ismael? Rebbi Ismael stated: “Any meat which would touch anything impure”, that is first degree food which touched any impurity, “shall not be eaten”, to add a second degree of impurity. The third degree from where? It is an argument. Since a ṭevul yom who is not disabled for profane food disables heave, it is only logical that a person secondarily impure, who disables profane food should disable heave. The fourth degree for sacrifices from where? It is an argument. Since one who lacks expiation who does not disable heave disables sanctified food, it is only logical that third degree [impurity] which disables heave should disable sanctified food. That means, we learned first and second degrees from a verse, the third from an argument and the fourth from an argument de minore ad majus. Can one pile argument on argument? Everything is subject to practice, i. e., that third degree disables heave and fourth degree disables sacrifices.
So far about solid food that became impure in the air space of a clay vessel which had become impure by a reptile. What about solid food that became impure directly from a reptile? Is that not an argument? Since vessels, which cannot become impure in the air space of a clay vessel that became impure by a reptile, become impure by contact with a reptile to defile solid food, [is it not logical that solid food, which becomes impure in the air space of a clay vessel that became impure by a reptile, should become impure by contact with a reptile to defile solid food.] So far, following Rebbi Aqiba. Following Rebbi Ismael? Rebbi Ismael stated: “Any meat which would touch anything impure”, that is first degree food which touched any impurity, “shall not be eaten”, to add a second degree of impurity. The third degree from where? It is an argument. Since a ṭevul yom who is not disabled for profane food disables heave, it is only logical that a person secondarily impure, who disables profane food should disable heave. The fourth degree for sacrifices from where? It is an argument. Since one who lacks expiation who does not disable heave disables sanctified food, it is only logical that third degree [impurity] which disables heave should disable sanctified food. That means, we learned first and second degrees from a verse, the third from an argument and the fourth from an argument de minore ad majus. Can one pile argument on argument? Everything is subject to practice, i. e., that third degree disables heave and fourth degree disables sacrifices.
So far about solid food that became impure in the air space of a clay vessel which had become impure by a reptile. What about solid food that became impure directly from a reptile? Is that not an argument? Since vessels, which cannot become impure in the air space of a clay vessel that became impure by a reptile, become impure by contact with a reptile to defile solid food, [is it not logical that solid food, which becomes impure in the air space of a clay vessel that became impure by a reptile, should become impure by contact with a reptile to defile solid food.] So far, following Rebbi Aqiba. Following Rebbi Ismael? Rebbi Ismael stated: “Any meat which would touch anything impure”, that is first degree food which touched any impurity, “shall not be eaten”, to add a second degree of impurity. The third degree from where? It is an argument. Since a ṭevul yom who is not disabled for profane food disables heave, it is only logical that a person secondarily impure, who disables profane food should disable heave. The fourth degree for sacrifices from where? It is an argument. Since one who lacks expiation who does not disable heave disables sanctified food, it is only logical that third degree [impurity] which disables heave should disable sanctified food. That means, we learned first and second degrees from a verse, the third from an argument and the fourth from an argument de minore ad majus. Can one pile argument on argument? Everything is subject to practice, i. e., that third degree disables heave and fourth degree disables sacrifices.
So far about solid food that became impure in the air space of a clay vessel which had become impure by a reptile. What about solid food that became impure directly from a reptile? Is that not an argument? Since vessels, which cannot become impure in the air space of a clay vessel that became impure by a reptile, become impure by contact with a reptile to defile solid food, [is it not logical that solid food, which becomes impure in the air space of a clay vessel that became impure by a reptile, should become impure by contact with a reptile to defile solid food.] So far, following Rebbi Aqiba. Following Rebbi Ismael? Rebbi Ismael stated: “Any meat which would touch anything impure”, that is first degree food which touched any impurity, “shall not be eaten”, to add a second degree of impurity. The third degree from where? It is an argument. Since a ṭevul yom who is not disabled for profane food disables heave, it is only logical that a person secondarily impure, who disables profane food should disable heave. The fourth degree for sacrifices from where? It is an argument. Since one who lacks expiation who does not disable heave disables sanctified food, it is only logical that third degree [impurity] which disables heave should disable sanctified food. That means, we learned first and second degrees from a verse, the third from an argument and the fourth from an argument de minore ad majus. Can one pile argument on argument? Everything is subject to practice, i. e., that third degree disables heave and fourth degree disables sacrifices.
So far about solid food that became impure in the air space of a clay vessel which had become impure by a reptile. What about solid food that became impure directly from a reptile? Is that not an argument? Since vessels, which cannot become impure in the air space of a clay vessel that became impure by a reptile, become impure by contact with a reptile to defile solid food, [is it not logical that solid food, which becomes impure in the air space of a clay vessel that became impure by a reptile, should become impure by contact with a reptile to defile solid food.] So far, following Rebbi Aqiba. Following Rebbi Ismael? Rebbi Ismael stated: “Any meat which would touch anything impure”, that is first degree food which touched any impurity, “shall not be eaten”, to add a second degree of impurity. The third degree from where? It is an argument. Since a ṭevul yom who is not disabled for profane food disables heave, it is only logical that a person secondarily impure, who disables profane food should disable heave. The fourth degree for sacrifices from where? It is an argument. Since one who lacks expiation who does not disable heave disables sanctified food, it is only logical that third degree [impurity] which disables heave should disable sanctified food. That means, we learned first and second degrees from a verse, the third from an argument and the fourth from an argument de minore ad majus. Can one pile argument on argument? Everything is subject to practice, i. e., that third degree disables heave and fourth degree disables sacrifices.
MISHNAH: It would have been logical: Since the first testimony, which does not forbid her permanently, is not confirmed if not from two [witnesses], the last testimony, which forbids her permanently, should reasonably only be confirmed by [witnesses]. The verse says: “There is no witness about her”, any kind of testimony about her. There would now be an argument de minore ad majus for the first testimony! Since the last testimony, which forbids her permanently, is confirmed from a single witness, the first testimony, which does not forbid her permanently, should logically be confirmed from a single witness. The verse says, “for he found out about her a matter of sexual misbehavior,” and further, it says, “by the mouth of two witnesses a matter should be confirmed.”
HALAKHAH: “There would now be an argument de minore ad majus for the first testimony,” etc. Gidul bar Miniamin in the name of Rav: Anywhere they accepted the testimony of a woman parallel to that of a man, a man can contradict a woman and a woman can contradict a man. Then one should state: “A witness says that she became impure, and a woman says that she did not become impure; a woman said that she became impure and a witness said that she did not become impure.” In the House of Rebbi they stated it this way. It was stated in the name of Rebbi Neḥemiah: One follows the majority of the testimonies. How is that? Two women against one woman they considered as if there were two witnesses against one witness. What you say refers to a woman and women. But if there were a hundred women against one [male] witness, they are like one witness.
The argument of the rabbis seems inverted; there they say to exclude the hidden things, but here they say to include the hidden things. There, “your field,” in the open, to exclude that which is hidden; “your harvest,” in the open, to exclude that which is hidden. It is a restriction after a restriction to add the hidden things. But here, “on the land,” not floating on the water.
Rebbi Abba bar Cohen said before Rebbi Yose: Rebbi Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Jacob bar Idi: A man may not [preliminarily] marry on a Friday. That means, to make an engagement feast. This implies that the preliminary marriage itself is permitted. Samuel says, even on the Ninth of Ab a preliminary marriage is permitted, lest another forestall him. The argument of Samuel seems inverted. There, he says, “God puts singles in a house, etc.,” “To rise on scales; they all are of vapor!” And there, he says so? That means, that he should not forestall him in prayer. Even so, it would not be permanent.
There came a case before Rebbi Ḥanina of a woman whose ketubah was less than 200 zuz, and he said, she should take what he had written for her. He said to Rebbi Mana, sit down and sign. He answered, follow your argument and sign yourself, did not Rebbi Ḥiyya say in the name of Samuel, by the Temple šeqel? Rebbi Eudaimon of Sepphoris in the name of Rebbi Ḥuna: Because of a renunciation. Now, should a woman whose ketubah was for less than 200 [zuz] not hide her ketubah in order to collect by the Temple šeqel? They said in the name of Rebbi Ḥuna, at a place where one does not write a ketubah. But at a place where one writes a ketubah, what she presents she collects. Rebbi Joḥanan said, it was stated thus: If a deaf-mute man married a hearing wife, she has no claim for support nor ketubah, but if she died, he inherits from her, for she wanted to connect him with her property, but he could not want to connect her with his property. If a hearing male married a deaf-mute woman, she has a claim to support and ketubah, but if she died, he does not inherit, for he wanted to connect her with his property, but she could not want to connect him with her property. But can a deaf-mute woman acquire and have ketubah? Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of Rebbi Eleazar, explain it that at the moment he married her, she was hearing. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Eleazar, he married her when she was hearing but she turned deaf-mute. In any case, did he not marry her when she was hearing? Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Eleazar, explain it that she was deaf-mute and turned hearing; he married her when she was hearing and she turned deaf. That you should not say, because at the start she was deaf-mute she has [no] ketubah, therefore it is necessary to say that she (does not have) [has]. Rebbi Yose does not say so, but since if one has sexual relations with a deaf-mute, is he not liable for a fine? Only if there were no fine would there be no ketubah. Rebbi Yudan said, does that depend on a fine? Look, the adult woman collects no fine but her ketubah is 200, the virgin after marriage collects a fine but her ketubah is a mina!
The blind woman and the she-ram are subject to claims of missing virginity. Symmachos said in the name of Rebbi Meïr that the blind woman is not subject to claims of missing virginity. What is Rebbi Meïr’s reason? I say, he found [her to be a virgin] and destroyed [the evidence]. What is the rabbi’s reason? She can catch him. What does Rebbi Meïr with this argument? He can cleanse it with spittle.
Should one follow the majority, and most women are married as virgins. Say then that she was married as a virgin! This implies that in criminal cases and in money matters one does not apply a majority argument. There, we have stated: “If an ox gored a cow and one finds her fetus beside her.” Do most cows have miscarriages? Say therefore that the goring induced the miscarriage. Rebbi Abbahu said, this implies that in criminal cases and in money matters one does not apply a majority argument. Rebbi Abun said, in one case they applied a majority argument, as Rebbi Aḥa stated: If a camel was in heat among camels and one finds one of them dead, I am saying that the one in heat bit it.
Should one follow the majority, and most women are married as virgins. Say then that she was married as a virgin! This implies that in criminal cases and in money matters one does not apply a majority argument. There, we have stated: “If an ox gored a cow and one finds her fetus beside her.” Do most cows have miscarriages? Say therefore that the goring induced the miscarriage. Rebbi Abbahu said, this implies that in criminal cases and in money matters one does not apply a majority argument. Rebbi Abun said, in one case they applied a majority argument, as Rebbi Aḥa stated: If a camel was in heat among camels and one finds one of them dead, I am saying that the one in heat bit it.
Should one follow the majority, and most women are married as virgins. Say then that she was married as a virgin! This implies that in criminal cases and in money matters one does not apply a majority argument. There, we have stated: “If an ox gored a cow and one finds her fetus beside her.” Do most cows have miscarriages? Say therefore that the goring induced the miscarriage. Rebbi Abbahu said, this implies that in criminal cases and in money matters one does not apply a majority argument. Rebbi Abun said, in one case they applied a majority argument, as Rebbi Aḥa stated: If a camel was in heat among camels and one finds one of them dead, I am saying that the one in heat bit it.
Rebbi Joḥanan said, it was stated thus: “Two [witnesses] say he died, [later] two witnesses say, he did not die. She shall not remarry, but if she has remarried she should not leave. Two [witnesses] say she was divorced, [later] two witnesses say, she was not divorced. She shall not remarry; if she has remarried she must leave.” There, they say, it makes no difference; whether about death or divorce she should not leave. In the opinion of the rabbis there it is understandable, there is no difference between death and divorce. In the opinion of the rabbis here, what is the difference between death and divorce? Rebbi Ze‘ira said it without attribution, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It is reasonable to decide in the case of witnesses of death that if he returns he contradicts them. Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, the rabbis there stick to their opinion since the rabbis there say, when the [first] testimony was accepted, it was accepted as certain. So the rabbis here say, at the moment of her remarriage, she remarried based on certified testimony. Rebbi Yose said, it is reasonable that the rabbis there did not change their argument. Do the rabbis there not agree if two [witnesses] say, his father died while in possession, [and two say his father died while not in possession,] that the field is in Reuben’s possession? Therefore, if two say, she was divorced and remarried, and two say she was not divorced, rightly she should not leave. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If two are saying, she was preliminarily married, and two are saying, she was not preliminarily married, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” Rebbi Hoshaia said, Rebbi Joḥanan may explain it as follows: “If two are saying, she was divorced, and two are saying, she was not divorced, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” What is the difference between this and the first case? There, she was considered a married woman in everybody’s opinion. Here, she is considered a married woman only for two people. If two others came and identified the man who was betrothed to her. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If two are saying, she was kidnapped but is pure, and two are saying, she was kidnapped and is impure, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” Rebbi Yose said, since these say, she is pure, and those say, she is impure, it is as if two said, she was kidnapped, and two said, she was not kidnapped, and we depend on what she says. If two are saying, she had been betrothed and two are saying she had not been betrothed. Rebbi Jonah compares that to fat. If two said, X ate fat, and two said, X did not eat fat, did he not have to bring a “hung” reparation sacrifice because of the doubt? Here, he should give a bill of divorce because of the doubt. Rebbi Yose said to him, do not compare this to fat, because even if he says my conscience bothers me, he brings a “hung” reparation sacrifice. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Yose: If two are saying she had been betrothed and two are saying she had not been betrothed, she should not get married. The end disagrees with Rebbi Jonah: If she married she must leave. Rebbi Mana said, Rebbi Yose did not say that she may marry, nor did Rebbi Jonah say if she married she must leave, he said only, do not compare this to fat, because even if he says my conscience bothers me, he brings a “hung” reparation sacrifice.
Jacob bar Abba asked before Rav: What is the law for him who comes to a minor? He said to him, by stoning. What is the law for him who comes to an adult? He said to him, I am reading “an adolescent”, not an adult. Read “an adolescent”, not a minor! “‘Because he mistreated her’, that includes a minor for a fine”, read ‘because he mistreaded her’, that includes an adult for a fine! Rav said, even though Jacob won the logical argument, practice is that he who comes to a minor is [punished] by stoning but she is free. Rebbi Abin in the name of Samuel: Why? He understood it from the following: “The man who had lain with her alone should die.” Did we not know that “the girl has not committed a capital crime”? Then why does the verse say: “Do not do anything to the girl, the girl has not committed a capital crime”? That includes him who comes to a preliminarily married underage girl that he is stoned and she is free.
“If she spent six months for her husband and six months for the levir, she cannot eat heave. Not only six months for the levir but even all the time for the levir except for one day, she cannot eat heave.” The Mishna follows neither the earliest not the last Mishnah, but the intermediate development. As it was stated: First, they were saying that a preliminarily married woman, daughter of an Israel, could eat heave, for they were explaining: “If a Cohen acquires a person, acquistion by money;” for what would be the difference between one who acquires a wife and one who acquires a slave girl? They changed, to say: after twelve months, when he becomes responsible for her upkeep. The court of the later ones said: A woman never eats heave before she enters the bridal chamber. ”Already Rebbi Joḥanan ben Bagbag sent to Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra at Nisibis: They say in your name that the preliminarily married daughter of an Israel eats heave. He sent back the following: I had been convinced that you are knowledgeable in the secrets of the Torah, but you do not even know the rules de minore ad majus! Since money can acquire a Gentile slave girl to permit her to eat heave, but she cannot be acquired by sexual relations to permit her to eat heave, whereas a wife can be acquired by sexual relations to permit her to eat heave, it is only logical that money can acquire a wife to permit her to eat heave! But what can I do? They said that no woman eats heave before she enters the bridal chamber,” and they supported it by the verse: “Every pure person in your household shall eat it.” Rebbi Yudan said, that is an argument de minore ad majus that can be reversed! Because he could say to him, since a Gentile slave girl can be acquired by active possession to permit her to eat heave, what can you say about a wife who cannot be acquired by active possession? If an argument de minore ad majus can be reversed, the argument is invalid.
“If she spent six months for her husband and six months for the levir, she cannot eat heave. Not only six months for the levir but even all the time for the levir except for one day, she cannot eat heave.” The Mishna follows neither the earliest not the last Mishnah, but the intermediate development. As it was stated: First, they were saying that a preliminarily married woman, daughter of an Israel, could eat heave, for they were explaining: “If a Cohen acquires a person, acquistion by money;” for what would be the difference between one who acquires a wife and one who acquires a slave girl? They changed, to say: after twelve months, when he becomes responsible for her upkeep. The court of the later ones said: A woman never eats heave before she enters the bridal chamber. ”Already Rebbi Joḥanan ben Bagbag sent to Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra at Nisibis: They say in your name that the preliminarily married daughter of an Israel eats heave. He sent back the following: I had been convinced that you are knowledgeable in the secrets of the Torah, but you do not even know the rules de minore ad majus! Since money can acquire a Gentile slave girl to permit her to eat heave, but she cannot be acquired by sexual relations to permit her to eat heave, whereas a wife can be acquired by sexual relations to permit her to eat heave, it is only logical that money can acquire a wife to permit her to eat heave! But what can I do? They said that no woman eats heave before she enters the bridal chamber,” and they supported it by the verse: “Every pure person in your household shall eat it.” Rebbi Yudan said, that is an argument de minore ad majus that can be reversed! Because he could say to him, since a Gentile slave girl can be acquired by active possession to permit her to eat heave, what can you say about a wife who cannot be acquired by active possession? If an argument de minore ad majus can be reversed, the argument is invalid.
“If she spent six months for her husband and six months for the levir, she cannot eat heave. Not only six months for the levir but even all the time for the levir except for one day, she cannot eat heave.” The Mishna follows neither the earliest not the last Mishnah, but the intermediate development. As it was stated: First, they were saying that a preliminarily married woman, daughter of an Israel, could eat heave, for they were explaining: “If a Cohen acquires a person, acquistion by money;” for what would be the difference between one who acquires a wife and one who acquires a slave girl? They changed, to say: after twelve months, when he becomes responsible for her upkeep. The court of the later ones said: A woman never eats heave before she enters the bridal chamber. ”Already Rebbi Joḥanan ben Bagbag sent to Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra at Nisibis: They say in your name that the preliminarily married daughter of an Israel eats heave. He sent back the following: I had been convinced that you are knowledgeable in the secrets of the Torah, but you do not even know the rules de minore ad majus! Since money can acquire a Gentile slave girl to permit her to eat heave, but she cannot be acquired by sexual relations to permit her to eat heave, whereas a wife can be acquired by sexual relations to permit her to eat heave, it is only logical that money can acquire a wife to permit her to eat heave! But what can I do? They said that no woman eats heave before she enters the bridal chamber,” and they supported it by the verse: “Every pure person in your household shall eat it.” Rebbi Yudan said, that is an argument de minore ad majus that can be reversed! Because he could say to him, since a Gentile slave girl can be acquired by active possession to permit her to eat heave, what can you say about a wife who cannot be acquired by active possession? If an argument de minore ad majus can be reversed, the argument is invalid.
HALAKHAH: “If she inherited after she was definitively married,” etc. We did state: She may sell or give away and it is valid. Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: She should not sell or give away, but if she sold or gave away it is valid. ”Rebbi Ḥanina ben Aqiba said, that is not what Rabban Gamliel gave as answer, but the following was his argument: No, if you have an argument about a preliminarily married one, where he has rights neither to what she finds, nor to her handiwork, nor to dissolve her vows, what can you say about a definitively married one where he has rights to what she finds, to her handiwork, and to dissolve her vows? Let the proof be the case of one who [inherited] before the definitive marriage and then was definitively married, in which case he has rights to what she finds, to her handiwork, and to dissolve her vows, and you admit to us that she should not sell or give away. He said to them, I agree that she should not sell or give away, but if she sold or gave away it is valid..” There came a case before Rebbi Immi. He said, is not Rabban Gamliel’s an isolated opinion? One cannot rely on it. A baraita supports him and disagrees with him: ”Our teachers took up the case again, voted, and instructed about property which she inherited before the definitive marriage and then was definitively married, that she should not sell or give away, and if she sold or gave away it is invalid.” It disagrees that the sale is invalid. It agrees that our teachers took up the case again, instructed, and voted. Before they voted, they did not disagree with him.
HALAKHAH: “If she inherited after she was definitively married,” etc. We did state: She may sell or give away and it is valid. Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: She should not sell or give away, but if she sold or gave away it is valid. ”Rebbi Ḥanina ben Aqiba said, that is not what Rabban Gamliel gave as answer, but the following was his argument: No, if you have an argument about a preliminarily married one, where he has rights neither to what she finds, nor to her handiwork, nor to dissolve her vows, what can you say about a definitively married one where he has rights to what she finds, to her handiwork, and to dissolve her vows? Let the proof be the case of one who [inherited] before the definitive marriage and then was definitively married, in which case he has rights to what she finds, to her handiwork, and to dissolve her vows, and you admit to us that she should not sell or give away. He said to them, I agree that she should not sell or give away, but if she sold or gave away it is valid..” There came a case before Rebbi Immi. He said, is not Rabban Gamliel’s an isolated opinion? One cannot rely on it. A baraita supports him and disagrees with him: ”Our teachers took up the case again, voted, and instructed about property which she inherited before the definitive marriage and then was definitively married, that she should not sell or give away, and if she sold or gave away it is invalid.” It disagrees that the sale is invalid. It agrees that our teachers took up the case again, instructed, and voted. Before they voted, they did not disagree with him.
There, we have stated: “If somebody leases a cow from another person and lends it to a third party; if it died naturally, the lessee has to swear that it died naturally and the borrower has to pay to the lessee.” Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lend to others. Also Rebbi Ḥiyya stated thus: “The borrower cannot lend, nor the lessee lease, nor the borrower lease, nor the lessee lend, nor the trustee give to another unless they received permission from the owners. And all who changed the titles without the owners’ knowledge are liable. But the borrower is liable even if he did not change.” But it is because we stated: “An unpaid watchman can stipulate to be exempt from an oath and the borrower may stipulate that he not have to pay.” This means that even if he stipulated to be exempt that he is obligated. What if he wanted to let the borrower swear? Let us hear from the following: “If he wrote to her: ‘I have no vow or oath against you,’ he cannot make her swear, but he can ask an oath from the heirs or her business associates.” This implies that if he wanted to make the borrower swear, he can force him to swear. The first case teaches about the second and the second about the first. The first case teaches about the second, that if he wanted to make the borrower swear, he can force him to swear. The second case teaches about the first, that if he wants to force the wife to swear, that he can make her swear. Rebbi Ḥanina said, it is not necessary to derive the first case from the second, and what does one learn for the second case from the first? Following what Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lend to others. And here, only if he gave permission to let her sons be stewards. Rebbi Yose said, he has to pay the lease all the time it is leased to him. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked Rebbi Abuna: If the owners borrowed it and it died? He said to him, in that case we say, they ate it. Rebbi Yose bar Abun said, if they ate it, they ate their own property. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Yasa: How does one act? He said to him, there are two against four; one does not act following the argument. He said to him, they are two against two! Rebbi Eleazar is the elder Rebbi Ḥiyya’s student; Rebbi Joḥanan is Rebbi Yannai’s student.
HALAKHAH: “Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, her sale is valid,” etc. That is, if she sold them in four contracts. If she sold them in one contract, there is disagreement between Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, as they disagreed: If somebody wrote all his property over to two persons in one document and the testimony of the witnesses was valid for one but invalid for the other. Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Yasa: Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagreed; one said, since it is invalid for one it is invalid for the other, but the other said, it is valid for one and invalid for the other. Rebbi Mana did not specify; Rebbi Abin specified: Rebbi Joḥanan said, since it is invalid for one it is invalid for the other; but Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, it is valid for one and invalid for the other. Rebbi Elazar said, a Mishnah supports Rebbi Joḥanan: “Since testimony of two [witnesses] is invalid if one of them turns out to be related or disqualified, so also of three [witnesses] it is invalid if one of them turns out to be related or disqualified. From where even 100? The verse says, ‘witnesses’”. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, Rebbi Ḥananiah the colleague of the rabbis and the rabbis disagree. One says, the argument of Rebbi Eleazar is correct, but the other says, the argument of Rebbi Eleazar is not correct. For him who says, the argument of Rebbi Eleazar is correct, it is as if there was one testimony about one person. For him who says, the argument of Rebbi Eleazar is not correct, it is as if two groups of witnesses came, valid for one and disqualified for the other.
HALAKHAH: “Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, her sale is valid,” etc. That is, if she sold them in four contracts. If she sold them in one contract, there is disagreement between Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, as they disagreed: If somebody wrote all his property over to two persons in one document and the testimony of the witnesses was valid for one but invalid for the other. Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Yasa: Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagreed; one said, since it is invalid for one it is invalid for the other, but the other said, it is valid for one and invalid for the other. Rebbi Mana did not specify; Rebbi Abin specified: Rebbi Joḥanan said, since it is invalid for one it is invalid for the other; but Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, it is valid for one and invalid for the other. Rebbi Elazar said, a Mishnah supports Rebbi Joḥanan: “Since testimony of two [witnesses] is invalid if one of them turns out to be related or disqualified, so also of three [witnesses] it is invalid if one of them turns out to be related or disqualified. From where even 100? The verse says, ‘witnesses’”. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, Rebbi Ḥananiah the colleague of the rabbis and the rabbis disagree. One says, the argument of Rebbi Eleazar is correct, but the other says, the argument of Rebbi Eleazar is not correct. For him who says, the argument of Rebbi Eleazar is correct, it is as if there was one testimony about one person. For him who says, the argument of Rebbi Eleazar is not correct, it is as if two groups of witnesses came, valid for one and disqualified for the other.
HALAKHAH: “Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, her sale is valid,” etc. That is, if she sold them in four contracts. If she sold them in one contract, there is disagreement between Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, as they disagreed: If somebody wrote all his property over to two persons in one document and the testimony of the witnesses was valid for one but invalid for the other. Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Yasa: Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagreed; one said, since it is invalid for one it is invalid for the other, but the other said, it is valid for one and invalid for the other. Rebbi Mana did not specify; Rebbi Abin specified: Rebbi Joḥanan said, since it is invalid for one it is invalid for the other; but Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, it is valid for one and invalid for the other. Rebbi Elazar said, a Mishnah supports Rebbi Joḥanan: “Since testimony of two [witnesses] is invalid if one of them turns out to be related or disqualified, so also of three [witnesses] it is invalid if one of them turns out to be related or disqualified. From where even 100? The verse says, ‘witnesses’”. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, Rebbi Ḥananiah the colleague of the rabbis and the rabbis disagree. One says, the argument of Rebbi Eleazar is correct, but the other says, the argument of Rebbi Eleazar is not correct. For him who says, the argument of Rebbi Eleazar is correct, it is as if there was one testimony about one person. For him who says, the argument of Rebbi Eleazar is not correct, it is as if two groups of witnesses came, valid for one and disqualified for the other.
HALAKHAH: “Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, her sale is valid,” etc. That is, if she sold them in four contracts. If she sold them in one contract, there is disagreement between Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, as they disagreed: If somebody wrote all his property over to two persons in one document and the testimony of the witnesses was valid for one but invalid for the other. Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Yasa: Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagreed; one said, since it is invalid for one it is invalid for the other, but the other said, it is valid for one and invalid for the other. Rebbi Mana did not specify; Rebbi Abin specified: Rebbi Joḥanan said, since it is invalid for one it is invalid for the other; but Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, it is valid for one and invalid for the other. Rebbi Elazar said, a Mishnah supports Rebbi Joḥanan: “Since testimony of two [witnesses] is invalid if one of them turns out to be related or disqualified, so also of three [witnesses] it is invalid if one of them turns out to be related or disqualified. From where even 100? The verse says, ‘witnesses’”. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, Rebbi Ḥananiah the colleague of the rabbis and the rabbis disagree. One says, the argument of Rebbi Eleazar is correct, but the other says, the argument of Rebbi Eleazar is not correct. For him who says, the argument of Rebbi Eleazar is correct, it is as if there was one testimony about one person. For him who says, the argument of Rebbi Eleazar is not correct, it is as if two groups of witnesses came, valid for one and disqualified for the other.
Ḥizqiah said, if he redeemed them they revert to their sanctity. Rebbi Joḥanan said, if he redeemed them they are redeemed. The Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “These have no redemption.” He explains thus: After they have been cut they do not need redemption. Rebbi Yose said, what Ḥizqiah said refers to the case that he himself redeemed them. But if another person redeemed them, the sanctity is removed from them. The argument of Rebbi Yose is switched: There, he says that if [another] redeemed them, the sanctity is removed from them, but here, he says that if she was married to another man the qiddušin [of the first] were not removed! All that is questionable for him is if he gave her two peruṭot, one for the moment and one for after he has divorced her, what is the situation?
HALAKHAH: “Rebbi Eliezer said,” etc. “Rebbi Eliezer said, since a woman on whom I had no claim before she entered into my domain, becomes absolutely mine after she entered my domain, is it not logical that a woman on whom I had some claim before she entered my domain, shall become absolutely mine when she enters my domain? Rebbi Aqiba told him, no. If you speak about a woman on whom you had no claim before she entered into your domain, but after she entered your domain she became absolutely yours, then just as you had no part in her so no other man had any part in her. What can you conclude about a woman on whom you had some claim before she entered your domain, and after she entered your domain she became absolutely yours, but just as you had some rights to her so others had the same rights to her! Rebbi Joshua told him, Aqiba, your argument holds for two levirs. What do you respond in the case of a single levir? He said to him, just as you make no difference in the rules of one waiting for one levir or for two levirs, whether he ‘bespoke’ her or did not ‘bespeak’ her, can it not be the same for vows and oaths? He said to him, that is true. He said to him, if you had lived in the times of Rebbi Eleazar ben Arakh, he would have said that ‘bespeaking’ does not acquire completely since he would agree that he cannot dissolve until she enters his domain.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody made a vow of nazir while he was in a cemetery,” etc. If he made the vow while he was among grave sites, Rebbi Joḥanan said, one warns him about wine and shaving. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, since one cannot warn him because of impurity, one does not warn him about wine and shaving. The argument of Rebbi Joḥanan seems inverted. There, he says, one warns him about wine, impurity, and shaving. And here, he says so? The rabbis from Caesarea: They disagree about the whole, for Rebbi Joḥanan said, one warns him about wine and shaving. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, since one cannot warn him because of impurity, one does not warn him either about wine or about shaving.
Rebbi Yose said, what is his problem? Of a pure nazir. But for an impure nazir, it is obvious to him that they cannot be combined. Rebbi Mana said before Rebbi Yose: Is that not an argument of “so much more”? Since for days which are counted neither for his nor for his son’s nezirut, you say that they are combined, days which are counted for his and for his son’s nezirut, it would only be logical that they should be combined! Rebbi Mana said, there he is not in a state to receive a warning, but here he is in a state to receive a warning. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya asked: Since you say there about Rebbi Eliezer, at the start only if he has something to omit; at the end even if he has nothing to omit? Rebbi Ze‘ira said before Rebbi Mana, is that not a Mishnah? “If he became impure on day 101, he invalidated 30; Rebbi Eliezer said, he invalidated only seven.” He said, we hear that he invalidates; did we hear that he brings a sacrifice?
Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: One does not whip for anything imparting taste until he tasted the forbidden thing itself. Rebbi Ḥiya bar Yosef objected before Rebbi Joḥanan: Take, for example, meat in milk, where he did not taste the forbidden thing itself and you say that he is whipped! He accepted that. What is meant by: he accepted that? Rebbi Ḥiya bar Abun said before Rebbi Ze‘ira: Like a person who listens to the argument of the opposing party he accepted it.
HALAKHAH: The argument of Rebbi Eliezer seems inverted. There, he says: “he has to repeat only for 30,” and here, he says so? Rebbi Joḥanan says, he has to repeat all his sacrifices. It is obvious, if it would have been valid without him becoming impure, then why is it not valid if later he becomes impure? Rebbi Ḥinena said, is that not Rebbi Eliezer’s? And Rebbi Eliezer follows the Shammaites, as it was stated: Concerning a nazir who lost all his hair, the House of Shammai say, he has to move a shaving knife over his head; the House of Hillel say, he does not need to move a shaving knife over his head.
MISHNAH: Rebbi Eleazar said in the name of Rebbi Joshua: For any impurity caused by a corpse for which the nazir shaves, one is guilty if entering the Sanctuary, but for any impurity caused by a corpse for which the nazir does not shave, one is not guilty if entering the Sanctuary. Rebbi Meïr said, this should not be less than the impurity of a dead reptile! Rebbi Aqiba said, I argued before Rebbi Eliezer: If for a barley-grain sized bone, which does not cause impurity to a human in a tent, a nazir shaves if he touches or carries it, should it not be logical that for a quartarius of blood, which causes impurity to a human in a tent, a nazir should have to shave if he touches or carries it? He said to me, what is that, Aqiba? This is not a place for an argument de minore ad majus! When I came and expounded that before Rebbi Joshua, he said to me, you have a good argument, but that is what they said was practice.
MISHNAH: Rebbi Eleazar said in the name of Rebbi Joshua: For any impurity caused by a corpse for which the nazir shaves, one is guilty if entering the Sanctuary, but for any impurity caused by a corpse for which the nazir does not shave, one is not guilty if entering the Sanctuary. Rebbi Meïr said, this should not be less than the impurity of a dead reptile! Rebbi Aqiba said, I argued before Rebbi Eliezer: If for a barley-grain sized bone, which does not cause impurity to a human in a tent, a nazir shaves if he touches or carries it, should it not be logical that for a quartarius of blood, which causes impurity to a human in a tent, a nazir should have to shave if he touches or carries it? He said to me, what is that, Aqiba? This is not a place for an argument de minore ad majus! When I came and expounded that before Rebbi Joshua, he said to me, you have a good argument, but that is what they said was practice.
If [the bill of divorce] contained documentation of a gift and [the messenger] said, it was written and signed before me, is [the husband’s] protest about the gift void since it is void about the divorce? Or, since his protest is void [only] about the divorce, is it valid about the gift? We have stated later: “Bills of divorce for wives and documents of manumission are equal in the rules of carrying and bringing.” If [the document of manumission] contained documentation of a gift and [the messenger] said, it was written and signed before me, is [the master’s] protest about the gift void since it is void about the manumission? Or since his protest is void [only] about the manumission, is it valid about the gift? If somebody signed all his property over to his slave, you say that the gift is the document of manumission. How do you treat this? Is it a document of manumission and his protest is void or is it a gift and his protest is valid? This can be compared to the following: If somebody signed all his property over to two persons in one document and the testimony of the witnesses was valid for one but invalid for the other. Rebbi Ila in the name of Rebbi Immi: Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagreed; one said, since it is invalid for one it is invalid for the other, but the other said, it is valid for one and invalid for the other. Rebbi Mana did not specify; Rebbi Abin specified: Rebbi Joḥanan said, since it is invalid for one it is invalid for the other; but Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, it is valid for one and invalid for the other. Rebbi Eleazar said, a Mishnah supports Rebbi Joḥanan: “Since testimony of two [witnesses] is invalid if one of them turns out to be related or disqualified, so also of three [witnesses] it is invalid if one of them turns out to be related or disqualified”. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, Rebbi Ḥanina the colleague of the rabbis and the rabbis disagree. One says, the argument of Rebbi Eleazar is correct, but the other says, Rebbi Eleazar is not correct. For him who says, the argument of Rebbi Eleazar is correct, it is a testimony about one person; as testimony it is totally invalid if it is partially invalid. For him who says, the argument of Rebbi Eleazar is not correct, it is as if two groups of witnesses came, valid for one and disqualified for the other.
If [the bill of divorce] contained documentation of a gift and [the messenger] said, it was written and signed before me, is [the husband’s] protest about the gift void since it is void about the divorce? Or, since his protest is void [only] about the divorce, is it valid about the gift? We have stated later: “Bills of divorce for wives and documents of manumission are equal in the rules of carrying and bringing.” If [the document of manumission] contained documentation of a gift and [the messenger] said, it was written and signed before me, is [the master’s] protest about the gift void since it is void about the manumission? Or since his protest is void [only] about the manumission, is it valid about the gift? If somebody signed all his property over to his slave, you say that the gift is the document of manumission. How do you treat this? Is it a document of manumission and his protest is void or is it a gift and his protest is valid? This can be compared to the following: If somebody signed all his property over to two persons in one document and the testimony of the witnesses was valid for one but invalid for the other. Rebbi Ila in the name of Rebbi Immi: Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagreed; one said, since it is invalid for one it is invalid for the other, but the other said, it is valid for one and invalid for the other. Rebbi Mana did not specify; Rebbi Abin specified: Rebbi Joḥanan said, since it is invalid for one it is invalid for the other; but Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, it is valid for one and invalid for the other. Rebbi Eleazar said, a Mishnah supports Rebbi Joḥanan: “Since testimony of two [witnesses] is invalid if one of them turns out to be related or disqualified, so also of three [witnesses] it is invalid if one of them turns out to be related or disqualified”. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, Rebbi Ḥanina the colleague of the rabbis and the rabbis disagree. One says, the argument of Rebbi Eleazar is correct, but the other says, Rebbi Eleazar is not correct. For him who says, the argument of Rebbi Eleazar is correct, it is a testimony about one person; as testimony it is totally invalid if it is partially invalid. For him who says, the argument of Rebbi Eleazar is not correct, it is as if two groups of witnesses came, valid for one and disqualified for the other.
If [the bill of divorce] contained documentation of a gift and [the messenger] said, it was written and signed before me, is [the husband’s] protest about the gift void since it is void about the divorce? Or, since his protest is void [only] about the divorce, is it valid about the gift? We have stated later: “Bills of divorce for wives and documents of manumission are equal in the rules of carrying and bringing.” If [the document of manumission] contained documentation of a gift and [the messenger] said, it was written and signed before me, is [the master’s] protest about the gift void since it is void about the manumission? Or since his protest is void [only] about the manumission, is it valid about the gift? If somebody signed all his property over to his slave, you say that the gift is the document of manumission. How do you treat this? Is it a document of manumission and his protest is void or is it a gift and his protest is valid? This can be compared to the following: If somebody signed all his property over to two persons in one document and the testimony of the witnesses was valid for one but invalid for the other. Rebbi Ila in the name of Rebbi Immi: Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagreed; one said, since it is invalid for one it is invalid for the other, but the other said, it is valid for one and invalid for the other. Rebbi Mana did not specify; Rebbi Abin specified: Rebbi Joḥanan said, since it is invalid for one it is invalid for the other; but Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, it is valid for one and invalid for the other. Rebbi Eleazar said, a Mishnah supports Rebbi Joḥanan: “Since testimony of two [witnesses] is invalid if one of them turns out to be related or disqualified, so also of three [witnesses] it is invalid if one of them turns out to be related or disqualified”. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, Rebbi Ḥanina the colleague of the rabbis and the rabbis disagree. One says, the argument of Rebbi Eleazar is correct, but the other says, Rebbi Eleazar is not correct. For him who says, the argument of Rebbi Eleazar is correct, it is a testimony about one person; as testimony it is totally invalid if it is partially invalid. For him who says, the argument of Rebbi Eleazar is not correct, it is as if two groups of witnesses came, valid for one and disqualified for the other.
Rebbi Eleazar said, where do they disagree? About bills of divorce. But for contracts even Rebbi Jehudah will agree. He explains it if the document is on a smooth surface and the witnesses on the erasure. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, it makes no difference; they disagree both about bills of divorce and contracts. He explains it if the document is on a smooth surface and the witnesses on the erasure. It is difficult for Rebbi Eleazar: If the witnesses [sign] on the erasure, do the Sages declare it valid? Rebbi Ze‘ira said before Rebbi Mana: The Sages follow the argument of Rebbi Eleazar, for he explains that the document is on the erasure and the witnesses on a smooth surface. Samuel said, everything is on the erasure. Does not Rebbi Jehudah say it correctly? Rebbi Abba said, it is recognizable whether there was an erasure once or twice.
Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagree. Rebbi Joḥanan said, even while he is suffering an attack of seizures, one writes the bill of divorce and delivers it to his wife. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, when he regains his sanity. The argument of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish seems to be inverted, since they disagreed: If he became deaf-mute, or insane, or became an apostate, or the Court ruled that fat may be eaten, Rebbi Joḥanan said, his sacrifice of purification is pushed aside, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, his sacrifice of purification is not pushed aside. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, Rebbi (Joḥanan) [Aḥa] switches traditions, to avoid that a word of Rebbi Joḥanan contradict his own word. For Rebbi Samuel bar Abba said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: One sprinkles the blood of a purification sacrifice or a reparation sacrifice for a person terminally ill. The rabbis of Caesarea said, Rebbi Ḥiyya and Rebbi Yasa, one follows the one, the other follows the other.
How close is “near”? Rav said, four cubits. Rebbi Ilai the heir said, four cubits. Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Stretching out hands, and we have stated: “stretching out hands.” Rebbi Abba, Rebbi Jeremiah, in the name of Rav: Stretching out hands. The argument of Rav is inverted; there, he says four cubits and here he says so? There in theory, here in practice. “Rebbi Eleazar stated: Even if it was closer to her than to him but a dog came and took it away, she is not divorced.” Samuel agrees with Rebbi Eleazar and disagrees. The clearest way is that he puts it into her hand. If there was room for stretching out hands between him and her, Simeon bar Abba in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan [states]: If it was closer to her than to him she is divorced, closer to him than to her she is not divorced, half and half she is divorced and not divorced. Abba bar Rav Jeremiah said: In all cases in which we have stated “divorced and not divorced”, support is on him.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody in divorcing his wife,” etc. Rebbi Ilai said, the reason of Rebbi Eliezer: “She left his house, went, and became another man’s”, even if he did permit her only to one other man. This argument proves more than the Mishnah! The Mishnah said if she was permitted to all but forbidden to one other man; the argument is that he forbade her to all but permitted her only to one other man. What is the reason of Rebbi Eliezer? Death permits and divorce permits. Since death permits only partially, so the bill of divorce permits only partially. What is the reason of the rabbis? “She left his house, went, and became another man’s”; it brackets marriage and divorce. Since her divorce is without participation of a third party, so her marriage must be without participation of a third party.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody in divorcing his wife,” etc. Rebbi Ilai said, the reason of Rebbi Eliezer: “She left his house, went, and became another man’s”, even if he did permit her only to one other man. This argument proves more than the Mishnah! The Mishnah said if she was permitted to all but forbidden to one other man; the argument is that he forbade her to all but permitted her only to one other man. What is the reason of Rebbi Eliezer? Death permits and divorce permits. Since death permits only partially, so the bill of divorce permits only partially. What is the reason of the rabbis? “She left his house, went, and became another man’s”; it brackets marriage and divorce. Since her divorce is without participation of a third party, so her marriage must be without participation of a third party.
Another argument: “Assume that he said to her, ‘you are permitted to every man except Mr. X;’ she went and married another and had children by him. Then her [second] husband died; she went and married Mr. X. Will not her children by her second husband become bastards?” His argument implies that divorce does not permit what the first husband had forbidden. Rebbi Shammai said, do we find that a woman was not originally forbidden to a man because of adultery and then retroactively became forbidden as adulterous? Rebbi Mana said to him, to what can you compare this? To one who told his wife, “this is your bill of divorce on condition that you sleep with Mr. X.” At the start, he is forbidden to have sexual relations with her. If he transgressed and slept with her, the divorce was retroactively validated.
Another argument: “Assume that he said to her, ‘you are permitted to every man except Mr. X;’ she went and married another and had children by him. Then her [second] husband died; she went and married Mr. X. Will not her children by her second husband become bastards?” His argument implies that divorce does not permit what the first husband had forbidden. Rebbi Shammai said, do we find that a woman was not originally forbidden to a man because of adultery and then retroactively became forbidden as adulterous? Rebbi Mana said to him, to what can you compare this? To one who told his wife, “this is your bill of divorce on condition that you sleep with Mr. X.” At the start, he is forbidden to have sexual relations with her. If he transgressed and slept with her, the divorce was retroactively validated.
A document which has an erasure or insertion in its main part is invalid; in the routine matter it is valid; but if it was mentioned later it is valid even in the main part. Rebbi Jonah and Rebbi Yose both say, one has to mention it at least in the second line before the end of the text. Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rav: One has to mention the essence of the document with it. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav: If one did not mention the essence of the document with it. The argument of Rebbi Abba seems inverted. There, Rebbi Ba said in the name of Rav Jeremiah: Disqualified witnesses do not constitute remote testimony since they came only to support the document’s validity. And here, he says so? There, in the name of Rebbi Jeremiah, here in the name of Rav.
Rebbi Eleazar said, it is everybody’s opinion. Rebbi Joḥanan said, it is Rebbi Jehudah’s. Rebbi Yose said, you should not infer that the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan is that he differs, but he answered him following his argument. Lengthwise. That is what he said in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira: Since pairing is infrequent, there was no pairing. So is the Mishnah: “If the scribe wrote with one witness, is it valid. “X” is valid. “The son of Y” is valid. “X the son of Y” but he did not write “witness”, is valid. If he wrote his or her surname, it is invalid. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, even if he wrote “he is it”, it is valid. Rebbi Abbahu wrote א. Rav Ḥisda wrote ס. Samuel wrote a palm branch.
Rebbi Abin said that Ḥisqiah stated: “After he acquires,” which means that she is acquired by money. Would it not be an argument de minore ad majus? Since the Hebrew slave girl, who cannot be acquired by intercourse, can be acquired by money, would it not be logical that this one, who may be acquired by intercourse, should be acquired by money? This is proved by the sister-in-law, who cannot be acquired by money but is acquired by intercourse. Therefore you would not be astonished if this one, who may be acquired by intercourse, might not be acquired by money. The verse says, “after he acquires,” this tells you that she is acquired by money.
“And has marital relations with her,” this tells you that she is acquired by intercourse. Would it not be an argument de minore ad majus? Since the sister-in-law, who cannot be acquired by money, can be acquired by intercourse, would it not be logical that this one, who may be acquired by money, should be acquired by intercourse? The Hebrew slave girl proves, who cannot be acquired by intercourse but is acquired by money. You likewise do not wonder that this one, who may be acquired by money, might not be acquired by intercourse. The verse says, “after he acquires,” this tells you that she is acquired by money; “and has marital relations with her,” this tells you that she is acquired by intercourse.
By a document. Since money which does not send out permits to enter, would it not be logical that a document which sends out should permit to enter? No. If you speak about money which eliminates dedication through redemption, what can you say about a document which does not eliminate dedication through redemption? The argument de minore ad majus is broken and you have to return to Scripture. Therefore, it was necessary to say: “He shall write her a bill of divorce, hand it to her, and send her out of his house. If she left his house and went to be another man’s.” It brackets her being with her leaving. Since her leaving was by a document, so her being is by a document.
Rebbi Yudan said, an argument de minore ad majus that a free woman should be acquired by actual possession. Is it not logical that since a Gentile slave woman, who cannot be acquired by intercourse, can be acquired by actual possession, by an argument de minore ad majus a free woman, who can be acquired by intercourse, could be acquired by actual possession? The verse says, “and has marital relations with her.” She can be acquired by intercourse but cannot be acquired by actual possession. An argument de minore ad majus that a Gentile slave woman should be acquired by intercourse: Is it not logical that since a free woman, who cannot be acquired by actual possession, can be acquired by intercourse, by an argument de minore ad majus a Gentile slave woman, who can be acquired by actual possession, could be acquired by intercourse? The verse says, “you may leave them as inheritance to your sons after you, to inherit them as property.” She is acquired by actual possession; she is not acquired by intercourse. So we inferred that a woman can be acquired in three ways: by money, or by document, or by intercourse.
Rebbi Yudan said, an argument de minore ad majus that a free woman should be acquired by actual possession. Is it not logical that since a Gentile slave woman, who cannot be acquired by intercourse, can be acquired by actual possession, by an argument de minore ad majus a free woman, who can be acquired by intercourse, could be acquired by actual possession? The verse says, “and has marital relations with her.” She can be acquired by intercourse but cannot be acquired by actual possession. An argument de minore ad majus that a Gentile slave woman should be acquired by intercourse: Is it not logical that since a free woman, who cannot be acquired by actual possession, can be acquired by intercourse, by an argument de minore ad majus a Gentile slave woman, who can be acquired by actual possession, could be acquired by intercourse? The verse says, “you may leave them as inheritance to your sons after you, to inherit them as property.” She is acquired by actual possession; she is not acquired by intercourse. So we inferred that a woman can be acquired in three ways: by money, or by document, or by intercourse.
Rebbi Yudan said, an argument de minore ad majus that a free woman should be acquired by actual possession. Is it not logical that since a Gentile slave woman, who cannot be acquired by intercourse, can be acquired by actual possession, by an argument de minore ad majus a free woman, who can be acquired by intercourse, could be acquired by actual possession? The verse says, “and has marital relations with her.” She can be acquired by intercourse but cannot be acquired by actual possession. An argument de minore ad majus that a Gentile slave woman should be acquired by intercourse: Is it not logical that since a free woman, who cannot be acquired by actual possession, can be acquired by intercourse, by an argument de minore ad majus a Gentile slave woman, who can be acquired by actual possession, could be acquired by intercourse? The verse says, “you may leave them as inheritance to your sons after you, to inherit them as property.” She is acquired by actual possession; she is not acquired by intercourse. So we inferred that a woman can be acquired in three ways: by money, or by document, or by intercourse.
Rebbi Yudan said, an argument de minore ad majus that a free woman should be acquired by actual possession. Is it not logical that since a Gentile slave woman, who cannot be acquired by intercourse, can be acquired by actual possession, by an argument de minore ad majus a free woman, who can be acquired by intercourse, could be acquired by actual possession? The verse says, “and has marital relations with her.” She can be acquired by intercourse but cannot be acquired by actual possession. An argument de minore ad majus that a Gentile slave woman should be acquired by intercourse: Is it not logical that since a free woman, who cannot be acquired by actual possession, can be acquired by intercourse, by an argument de minore ad majus a Gentile slave woman, who can be acquired by actual possession, could be acquired by intercourse? The verse says, “you may leave them as inheritance to your sons after you, to inherit them as property.” She is acquired by actual possession; she is not acquired by intercourse. So we inferred that a woman can be acquired in three ways: by money, or by document, or by intercourse.
There, we have stated: “A judicial oath, for a claim of two silver pieces and a judicial acknowlegdment of a peruṭah. The claim, the House of Shammai say, an obolus, but the House of Hillel say, two obols.” The argument of the House of Shammai seems inverted. There, they say, “silver” is a denar, but here, they say that “silver” is an obolus. The argument of the House of Hillel seems inverted. There, they say, “money” is a peruṭah, but here, they say that “money” is two obols. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina: The house of Shammai learn from the initial sale of a Hebrew girl. Since her initial sale was by [at least] a denar, so her preliminary marriage is by [at least] a denar. The House of Hillel learn from the end of her diminution. Since the end of her diminution is a peruṭah, so her preliminary marriage is by a peruṭah. What is the reason of the House of Shammai? As it is said: “She leaves gratis, without silver.” Would we not know that it is without money? Why does the verse say, “without silver”? From there, that she is sold for more than silver. And what is more than silver? A denar. But maybe “silver” is a peruṭah, more than silver two peruṭot? The smallest silver coin is an obolus. So why is it not an obolus? Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Judah bar Pazi: For if she wants to diminish, she diminishes every year by an obolus and leaves. Could she not diminish by a peruṭah? Rebbi Abun said, think of it. If she wanted to compute the diminution at the start of the sixth year, there would be a peruṭah left, and at the end of the sixth year, there would be a peruṭah left. But the start of the diminution must be an obolus, the end of the diminution a peruṭah. If there is only one peruṭah left, can she not pay the diminished amount and leave? Just as the last diminished amount is a peruṭah, so her preliminary marriage should be a peruṭah! What is the reason of the House of Hillel? Since her last diminished amount is a peruṭah, you know that her preliminary marriage is by a peruṭah.
There, we have stated: “A judicial oath, for a claim of two silver pieces and a judicial acknowlegdment of a peruṭah. The claim, the House of Shammai say, an obolus, but the House of Hillel say, two obols.” The argument of the House of Shammai seems inverted. There, they say, “silver” is a denar, but here, they say that “silver” is an obolus. The argument of the House of Hillel seems inverted. There, they say, “money” is a peruṭah, but here, they say that “money” is two obols. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina: The house of Shammai learn from the initial sale of a Hebrew girl. Since her initial sale was by [at least] a denar, so her preliminary marriage is by [at least] a denar. The House of Hillel learn from the end of her diminution. Since the end of her diminution is a peruṭah, so her preliminary marriage is by a peruṭah. What is the reason of the House of Shammai? As it is said: “She leaves gratis, without silver.” Would we not know that it is without money? Why does the verse say, “without silver”? From there, that she is sold for more than silver. And what is more than silver? A denar. But maybe “silver” is a peruṭah, more than silver two peruṭot? The smallest silver coin is an obolus. So why is it not an obolus? Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Judah bar Pazi: For if she wants to diminish, she diminishes every year by an obolus and leaves. Could she not diminish by a peruṭah? Rebbi Abun said, think of it. If she wanted to compute the diminution at the start of the sixth year, there would be a peruṭah left, and at the end of the sixth year, there would be a peruṭah left. But the start of the diminution must be an obolus, the end of the diminution a peruṭah. If there is only one peruṭah left, can she not pay the diminished amount and leave? Just as the last diminished amount is a peruṭah, so her preliminary marriage should be a peruṭah! What is the reason of the House of Hillel? Since her last diminished amount is a peruṭah, you know that her preliminary marriage is by a peruṭah.
The argument of the House of Hillel seems inverted. It is written: “If a person give to his neighbor money or vessels to watch over.” If to teach that the court will not act on less that a peruṭah’s worth, is it not already written: “To incur liability for it”? To exclude anything not worth a peruṭah. (Why does the verse say, “without silver”?) From there, that it should be more than silver. And what is more than silver? Two obols. But maybe “silver” is a peruṭah, more than silver two peruṭot? The smallest silver coin is an obolus. So why is it not an obolus? “Or vessels”; since “vessels” are two, also “money” is two. How do the House of Shammai interpret “or vessels”? As we have stated: Rebbi Nathan says, “or vessels”, to include all kinds of vessels. Samuel said, if he claimed from him two needles and he admitted to one, he is guilty. Rebbi Ḥinena said, only if they are worth two perutot, that the claim should be about a perutah’s worth and the confession about a perutah’s worth. This follows the House of Shammai who do not learn money’s worth from “vessels”. But following the House of Hillel who learn money’s worth from “vessels”, since “vessels” are two, also “money” is two. Similarly, since “money” means two obols, also “vessels” means two oboli’s worth.
Rebbi Simeon says, “bespeaking” either acquires or does not acquire. What is the argument of Rebbi Simeon? “Her levir shall come upon her”, that is cohabitation. “And take her for himself”, that is “bespeaking”. Just as cohabitation is final so “bespeaking” is final. Or “her levir shall come upon her”, then she has been acquired by him and “bespeaking” was of no use to her.
Rebbi Eleazar ben Arakh says, “bespeaking” acquires a sister-in-law completely. What is the argument of Rebbi Eleazar ben Arakh? “And take her as a wife for himself”, the same expression is used as for the preliminary marriage of a woman. Just as preliminary marriage acquires completely, so “bespeaking” acquires a sister-in-law completely. What is the formula for “bespeaking” a sister-in-law? “You are betrothed to me by money or money’s worth.”
From where even if he fell ill? The verse says, “in the seventh year he shall leave into freedom gratis.” I could think, even if he fled; the verse says, “six years he shall work.” What did you see to include this and to exclude that? After the verse included, it excluded. I am including the one who remains in his power and am exluding the one who is not in his power. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya said that Rav Hoshaia asked: I understand that if he fell ill and fled afterwards, he has to make up [the time lost]. If he fled and then fell ill? Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Ada said, let us hear from the following: “If a woman rebels against her husband, one writes him a bill of rebellion on her ketubah.” And Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: One writes a bill of rebellion on the ketubah of a menstruating woman or a sick one, a preliminarily married one and one waiting for her levir. Where do we hold? If she rebelled against him while she was menstruating, the Torah instructed her to rebel. But we must hold that she rebelled when she was not menstruating and then started menstruating. Here she is unable to rebel, nevertheless you say, one writes. Here also, if he rebelled and then fell ill he has to make up. For he can say to him, if you had stayed with me, you would not have become sick. Rebbi Ḥinena said, that argument even works in the first case. If he fell ill and fled afterwards, he has to make up, since he can say to him, if you had stayed with me, you would have recuperated sooner.