536 occurrences across the corpus

The Jerusalem Talmud

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:51

“If he allots her to his son.” He allots her to his son but may not allot her to his brother. He should be able to allot her to his brother by an argument de minore ad majus! If he may allot her to his son who may not take his place for ḥalîṣah and levirate, should it not be logical that he may allot her to his brother who may take his place for ḥalîṣah and levirate? No. If you would accept the son since he will take [the father’s] place in a field of inheritance, what can you say about his brother who will not take his place in a field of inheritance? Would it be reasonable that he may allot her to him? The verse says, “if he allots her to his son.” He allots her to his son but may not allot her to his brother.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:60

Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish asked before Rebbi Joḥanan: Should not the Hebrew slave girl leave by definitive marriage, by an argument de minore ad majus? Since indications [of puberty] which do not emancipate her from her father’s power, free her from her master’s power, is it not logical that definitive marriage, which emancipates her from her father’s power, shall free her from her master’s power? He said to him, I have only the Mishnah: “The Hebrew slave girl in addition regains her autonomy by indicators of puberty.” Bar Pedaiah said, the Hebrew slave girl leaves at the death of her master. What is the reason? “Also your slave girl you shall treat in the same way;” and it is written: “He shall be for you a permanent slave.” He bracketed the Hebrew slave girl with the “pierced slave”. Since the “pierced slave” leaves at his master’s death, the Hebrew slave girl also leaves at her master’s death. It turns out that Bar Pedaiah parallels the following Tanna, as it was stated: The Hebrew slave serves the son but not the daughter; the Hebrew slave girl serves the daughter but not the son. Some Tannaїm state: The Hebrew slave girl as well as the Hebrew slave serve neither the son nor the daughter. How does the Tanna confirm “your slave girl you also shall treat in the same way”? He explains it about the allowance, as it was stated: The following are given allowances: The one who leaves after six years or in the Jubilee, and the Hebrew slave girl who becomes autonomous by indicators of puberty. But one does not give allowances to one who leaves by the reduction of the amount or following the master’s death.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:90

Rav Jehudah sent to Rebbi Eleazar: If a keeper give to another keeper. He answered, the first is responsible. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the second is responsible. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, the second is responsible. There, we have stated: “If somebody leases a cow from another person and lends it to a third party; if it died naturally, the lessee has to swear that it died naturally and the borrower has to pay to the lessee. Rebbi Yose said, how can this person make a deal with another’s cow? But the cow’s [price] has to be restituted to the owner.” Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lend to others. Also Rebbi Ḥiyya stated thus: “The borrower cannot lend, nor the lessee lease, nor the borrower lease, nor the lessee lend, nor the trustee give to another unless they received permission from the owners. And all who changed the titles without the owners’ knowledge are liable. But the borrower is liable even if he did not change.” But it is because we stated: “An unpaid watchman can stipulate to be exempt from an oath and the borrower may stipulate that he not have to pay.” This means that even if he stipulated to be exempt he is obligated. What if he wanted to let the borrower swear? Let us hear from the following: “If he wrote to her: ‘I have no vow or oath against you,’ he cannot make her swear, but he can ask an oath from the heirs or her business associates.” This implies that if he wanted to make the borrower swear, he can force him to swear. The second case teaches about the first, that if he wants to force the wife to swear, he can make her swear. Rebbi Ḥanina said, it is not necessary to derive the first case from the second, and what does one learn for the second case from the first? Following what Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lend to others. And here, only if he gave permission to let her sons be stewards. Rebbi Yose said, he has to pay the lease the entire time it is leased to him. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked Rebbi Abinna: If the owners borrowed it and it died? He said to him, we hold that they ate it. Rebbi Yose bar Abun said, if they ate it, they ate their own property. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Yasa: How does one act? He said to him, there are two against four; one does not act following the argument. He said to him, they are two against two! Rebbi Eleazar is the Elder Rebbi Ḥiyya’s student; Rebbi Joḥanan is Rebbi Yannai’s student.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 2:47

HALAKHAH: “If a man performs preliminary marriage using ‘orlah, or kilaim of a vineyard,” etc. The first-born of a she-ass, Rebbi Eleazar said, may be used to preliminarily marry a woman; Rebbi Joḥanan said, it may not be used to preliminarily marry a woman. Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: The first-born of a she-ass may be used to preliminarily marry a woman by an argument de minore ad majus. Since you say that a firstling, whose prohibition cannot be lifted during its lifetime, can be used to preliminarily marry a woman, this one, whose prohibition can be lifted during its lifetime, not so much more? What is the difference between them? If somebody transgressed and redeemed it without the knowledge of its owner. Rebbi Eleazar said, it is not redeemed. Rebbi Joḥanan said, it is redeemed. A baraita supports Rebbi Eleazar and disagrees with him. A baraita supports Rebbi Eleazar: If somebody steals the first-born of another person’s she-ass, he has to pay double restitution. The end disagrees with him: For even though he has no interest in it now he will later. The Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Eleazar: One may not use the first-born of a she-ass to preliminarily marry a woman. Rebbi Eleazar explained that, after breaking of [the foal’s] neck. For Rebbi Eleazar said, everybody agrees that after its neck was broken it cannot be redeemed.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 2:48

“One may not use the first-born of a she-ass to preliminarily marry a woman, but Rebbi Simeon permits it.” That disagrees with Rebbi Eleazar in two respects. If during its lifetime, it disagrees following the rabbis; if after breaking the neck, it disagrees following Rebbi Simeon. Rebbi Ḥanina in the name of Rebbi Yudan: Explain it that it died. If he broke its neck, it is forbidden for usufruct, but Rebbi Simeon permits it. “Breaking the neck, breaking the neck.” Since “breaking the neck” mentioned there implies that one has to break its neck, bury it, and it is forbidden for usufruct, so “breaking of the neck” mentioned here implies that one has to break its neck, [bury it,] and it is forbidden for usufruct. Following Rebbi Eleazar it is understandable. He permits during its lifetime; he needs an argument to forbid it after the breaking of the neck. Following Rebbi Joḥanan it is difficult. If it is forbidden during its lifetime, not so much more after breaking of its neck? There came Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of the rabbis: It is needed following the rabbis, lest you say that since the Torah combined the breaking of its neck with its redemption, and its redemption makes it profane, so also the breaking of its neck should make it profane. Do we find anything whose lifting makes profane and which is forbidden for usufruct? They objected: There is ṭevel containing the tithe of the poor which becomes totally profane by its lifting; but Rebbi Abba, Rav Huna said in the name of Rebbi: A person eating produce which is ṭevel for the tithe of the poor is guilty of a deadly sin. The rabbis of Caesarea in the name of Rebbi Jeremiah: So the rabbis answer Rebbi Simeon: Do we find anything that needs redemption and is permitted for usufruct? He replied to them: There is the first-born human who needs redemption and is permitted for usufruct.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 3:10

“From today and after 30 days.” Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Even preliminary marriages of a hundred men apply to her. Rebbi Eleazar said, it was necessary [to state], even if the second preliminarily married her absolutely. Rebbi Isaac bar Tebele asked before Rebbi Eleazar: As you take it; what the first acquired, he acquired; the remainder the second finished. He answered, is this kind of argument applicable to incest prohibitions? How is that? To any woman who is not acquired by one man only, even preliminary marriages of a hundred men apply.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 3:36

Ḥizqiah said, if he redeemed them they revert to their sanctity. Rebbi Joḥanan said, if he redeemed them they are redeemed. The Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “These have no redemption.” He explains thus: After they were cut they do not need redemption. Rebbi Yose said, what Ḥizqiah said refers to the case that he himself redeemed them. But if another person redeemed them, the sanctity is removed from them. The argument of Rebbi Yose is switched: There, he says that if [another] redeemed them, the sanctity is removed from them, but here, he says that if she was married to another man the qiddušin [of the first] were not removed! All that is questionable for him is if he gave her two peruṭot, one for the moment and one for after he divorced her; what is the situation?

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 3:64

Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba went to Tyre. When he came before Rebbi Joḥanan, he asked him, what case did you handle? He said to him, a proselyte who had been circumcised but had not immersed himself. He asked him, why did you not injure him? Rebbi Joshua ben Levi told him, leave him alone, he acted correctly not to injure him. The argument of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi seems inverted. There, Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa, Rebbi Simeon bar Abba, Rebbi Joshua ben Levi, in the name of Rebbi Gamliel ben Rebbi: The child is neither qualified nor disqualified but dirtied. And here, he says so? Did we not state: If a proselyte was circumcised but not immersed, immersed but not circumcised, everything depends on circumcision, the words of Rebbi Eliezer. Rebbi Joshua says, immersion also is necessary. But Rebbi Joshua ben Levi follows what Bar Qappara stated, as Bar Qappara stated: A proselyte who was circumcised but not immersed is qualified since there is no proselyte who did not immerse himself for his emission of semen. Is that not difficult? The cleansing from a minor impurity is counted for him for a major impurity? Rebbi Yose ben Abun said, since either one is for the holiness of Israel, it is counted for him.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 4:12

Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Josia: The eleventh generation of bastards is qualified following Rebbi Simeon; he does not use [the principle of gezerah šawah for] “the tenth, the tenth.” It was stated: Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon says, in the eleventh generation of bastards, the males are forbidden but the females permitted. Rebbi Samuel ben Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, it turns out that Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon follows the argument of Rebbi Meïr. As Rebbi Meïr said, a gezerah šawah is as if written in a verse, so Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon says, a gezerah šawah is as if written in a verse. Here also, the males are forbidden but the females permitted. In that case, even immediately? Only from the tenth onward.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 4:56

New paragraph. “Rebbi Meïr says that a man should try to teach his son a clean trade,” etc. What should a man do? A person should try and teach his son an unassuming trade and pray for mercy to Him to Whom riches belong since there is no trade in which poor and rich people are not found, for everything depends on a person’s merit. Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Meïr: Did you ever see a lion porter, a (lion) [deer] maker of fig cakes, a fox grocer, a wolf selling pots? And they sustain themselves without pain. Why were they created? Only to serve me, and I was created to serve my Maker. Is it not an argument de minore ad maius? Since they were created to serve me and sustain themselves so without pain, should it not be logical that I, who was created to serve my Maker, should be able to sustain myself without pain? What caused me to have to sustain myself with pain? One has to say, my sins. Because I worsened my deeds and destroyed my sustenance.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 2:10

HALAKHAH: “How is the tooth notorious,” etc. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, it refers to the first part. Rebbi Joḥanan said, it refers to all. The argument of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish seems inverted. There, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia: If it stood still and ate from heaped produce, it is responsible. And here, he says so? They said, there in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia; but here, in his own name. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish’s word implies that if a walking [animal] kicks one which is lying down, is it free [from payment]. Rebbi Joḥanan’s word implies that if a walking [animal] kicks one which is lying down, it is obligated. Not only if the walking [animal] kicks one which is lying down or one which is lying down kicks the walking one. If a walking [animal] kicks a walking one? Rebbi Immi said, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, only if a walking [animal] kicks one which is lying down, it is free [from payment]. But in the case of one lying down against one walking or one who was walking against one walking, it is obligated. Rebbi Hoshaia stated: It always is free. What is Rebbi Hoshaia’s reason; is there no “horn” in the public domain? Rav said, if it stood still and ate from heaped produce, [it is obligated]. Since the leniency for “tooth” is in case it ate walking from the standing; the restriction for “horn” is in case the walking animal kicked the one standing still. Ilfai said: If it stood still and ate from heaped produce, it is obligated. Since the leniency for “tooth” is that it ate walking {from the standing} [from the walking]; the restriction for “horn” is in case the walking animal kicked the walking one.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 2:19

MISHNAH: How does one treat the bull of the person causing the damage in the domain of the person sustaining the damage? If it gored, hit, bit, wallowed, or kicked, in the public domain he pays half of the damages. In the domain of the person sustaining the damage, Rebbi Ṭarphon said, full damages; but the Sages say, half damages. Rebbi Tarphon said to them: Since in a case where He was lenient with [damage by] tooth or foot in the public domain, where one is free, He was restrictive for them in the domain of the person sustaining the damage, when full damages must be paid, and He was restrictive regarding damage by the horn in the public domain, where one has to pay half damages; is it not logical that we should be restrictive in this case in the domain of the person sustaining the damage, that full damages must be paid? They said to him, it is sufficient for the result of an argument de minore ad majus that it should be like the premiss. Since in the public domain [one pays] half damages, also in the domain of the person sustaining the damage half damages. He said to them, I do not argue horn from horn, I argue horn from foot! Since in a case where He was lenient with [damage by] tooth or foot in the public domain, He was restrictive for damage by the horn, when He was restrictive with [damage by] tooth or foot in the domain of the person sustaining the damage; is it not logical that we should be restrictive [in case of damage] by the horn? They said to him, it is sufficient for the result of an argument de minore ad majus that it should be like the premiss. Since in the public domain [one pays] half damages, also in the domain of the person sustaining the damage half damages.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 2:19

MISHNAH: How does one treat the bull of the person causing the damage in the domain of the person sustaining the damage? If it gored, hit, bit, wallowed, or kicked, in the public domain he pays half of the damages. In the domain of the person sustaining the damage, Rebbi Ṭarphon said, full damages; but the Sages say, half damages. Rebbi Tarphon said to them: Since in a case where He was lenient with [damage by] tooth or foot in the public domain, where one is free, He was restrictive for them in the domain of the person sustaining the damage, when full damages must be paid, and He was restrictive regarding damage by the horn in the public domain, where one has to pay half damages; is it not logical that we should be restrictive in this case in the domain of the person sustaining the damage, that full damages must be paid? They said to him, it is sufficient for the result of an argument de minore ad majus that it should be like the premiss. Since in the public domain [one pays] half damages, also in the domain of the person sustaining the damage half damages. He said to them, I do not argue horn from horn, I argue horn from foot! Since in a case where He was lenient with [damage by] tooth or foot in the public domain, He was restrictive for damage by the horn, when He was restrictive with [damage by] tooth or foot in the domain of the person sustaining the damage; is it not logical that we should be restrictive [in case of damage] by the horn? They said to him, it is sufficient for the result of an argument de minore ad majus that it should be like the premiss. Since in the public domain [one pays] half damages, also in the domain of the person sustaining the damage half damages.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 5:2

HALAKHAH: “A bull gored a cow”, etc. Do all cows have miscarriages? Should we follow the majority of cases? This implies that in criminal cases and in money matters one does not apply a majority argument. Rebbi Yose said, in another case they applied a majority argument in criminal cases and in money matters, as Rebbi Aḥa stated: “If a camel was in heat among camels and one finds one of them dead, I am saying that certainly the one in heat killed it.”

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 5:2

HALAKHAH: “A bull gored a cow”, etc. Do all cows have miscarriages? Should we follow the majority of cases? This implies that in criminal cases and in money matters one does not apply a majority argument. Rebbi Yose said, in another case they applied a majority argument in criminal cases and in money matters, as Rebbi Aḥa stated: “If a camel was in heat among camels and one finds one of them dead, I am saying that certainly the one in heat killed it.”

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 6:24

HALAKHAH: “He who sets fire to a stack of sheaves,” etc. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The Sages agree with Rebbi Jehudah about threshing tools which usually are hidden there. The argument of Rebbi Jehudah seems inverted. There he says except what is hidden, but here he says including what is hidden? But does not Rebbi Jehudah simply explain “stack”? Why was “stack” written? That he has to pay for all that is in it. The argument of the rabbis seems inverted. There they say, including what is hidden; but here they say, except what is hidden? But did not Rebbi Abbahu say in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The Sages agree with Rebbi Joḥanan about threshing tools which usually are hidden there? Rebbi Hoshaia said, if there are no witnesses. But if there are witnesses, everybody agrees with Rebbi (Yose) as it was stated: “If it was a stack of wheat sheaves covered with barley or a stack of barley sheaves covered with wheat, he pays for a stack of barley.” As the following: A person deposited a tied sack with another person, when something happened. This one said, it was full of dross, but the other said, it was full of raw silk. [ ] He swears and collects.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 6:24

HALAKHAH: “He who sets fire to a stack of sheaves,” etc. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The Sages agree with Rebbi Jehudah about threshing tools which usually are hidden there. The argument of Rebbi Jehudah seems inverted. There he says except what is hidden, but here he says including what is hidden? But does not Rebbi Jehudah simply explain “stack”? Why was “stack” written? That he has to pay for all that is in it. The argument of the rabbis seems inverted. There they say, including what is hidden; but here they say, except what is hidden? But did not Rebbi Abbahu say in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The Sages agree with Rebbi Joḥanan about threshing tools which usually are hidden there? Rebbi Hoshaia said, if there are no witnesses. But if there are witnesses, everybody agrees with Rebbi (Yose) as it was stated: “If it was a stack of wheat sheaves covered with barley or a stack of barley sheaves covered with wheat, he pays for a stack of barley.” As the following: A person deposited a tied sack with another person, when something happened. This one said, it was full of dross, but the other said, it was full of raw silk. [ ] He swears and collects.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 6:25

Rebbi Joḥanan asked: Can one argue for him an argument which does not apply to him? Let us hear from the following: Bar Ziza’s sharecropper deposited a pound of gold with somebody. Bar Ziza and Bar Ziza’s sharecropper died; the case came before Rebbi Ismael ben Rebbi Yose. He said, does not everybody know that all Bar Ziza’s sharecrooper had was Bar Ziza’s property? It should be given to Bar Ziza’s sons. Bar Ziza had adult and underage sons. He said, the adult one should take half and when the underage ones grow up, they should receive half. Rebbi Ismael ben Rebbi Yose died; the case came before Rebbi Ḥiyya who said, that argument means nothing [since there are people who do not flout their wealth]; it should be given to the sharecropper’s sons. The trustee told him, I already disbursed half of it. He told him, what you gave, you gave by court order and what you will give, you will give by court order. May the sharecropper’s sons say to Bar Ziza’s sons, give us what you took? They can tell them, what was done was done by court order. May the underage ones say to the adult, let us share with you? May they tell them, we found a find? Rebbi Isaac said, the case between the adult and underaged ones is compared to one who gave a gift.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 6:25

Rebbi Joḥanan asked: Can one argue for him an argument which does not apply to him? Let us hear from the following: Bar Ziza’s sharecropper deposited a pound of gold with somebody. Bar Ziza and Bar Ziza’s sharecropper died; the case came before Rebbi Ismael ben Rebbi Yose. He said, does not everybody know that all Bar Ziza’s sharecrooper had was Bar Ziza’s property? It should be given to Bar Ziza’s sons. Bar Ziza had adult and underage sons. He said, the adult one should take half and when the underage ones grow up, they should receive half. Rebbi Ismael ben Rebbi Yose died; the case came before Rebbi Ḥiyya who said, that argument means nothing [since there are people who do not flout their wealth]; it should be given to the sharecropper’s sons. The trustee told him, I already disbursed half of it. He told him, what you gave, you gave by court order and what you will give, you will give by court order. May the sharecropper’s sons say to Bar Ziza’s sons, give us what you took? They can tell them, what was done was done by court order. May the underage ones say to the adult, let us share with you? May they tell them, we found a find? Rebbi Isaac said, the case between the adult and underaged ones is compared to one who gave a gift.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Batra 8:4

So far a daughter. A son? Since the daughter, whose power is diminished regarding the father’s property, has her power increased regarding the mother’s property, should the son’s power not be increased regarding the mother’s property, since his power is increased regarding the father’s property? It turns out that for the daughter one infers from the verse and for the son from an argument de minore ad majus. Does the son precede the daughter? Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar said in the name of Rebbi Zachariah the butcher’s son: So did Rebbi Simeon ben Jehudah say in the name of Rebbi Simeon: Both son and daughter are equal for the mother’s tribe Rebbi Mallukh in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: Practice follows Rebbi Zachariah. Rebbi Yannai the Kappadokian had a case; the judges were Rav Huna, Rebbi Jehudah ben Pazi, and Rebbi Aḥa. Rebbi Aḥa told them: Our brothers outside the Land are unqualified and err in practice; in particular they rely on Rebbi Mallukh in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi, but it is not so. Rebbi Simon in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: Practice does not follow Rebbi Zachariah. Rebbi Abba the son of Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Practice does not follow Rebbi Zachariah. Rebbi Eleazar the father of Rebbi Isaac bar Naḥman in the name of Rebbi Hoshaiah: Practice does not follow Rebbi Zachariah. Rebbi Yannai and Rebbi Joḥanan were sitting when Rebbi Yudan the Prince came and asked concerning: “Any daughter who is an heiress of the tribes,” what is the rule? He said to him, it binds the father’s tribe together with the mother’s tribe. Since from the father’s tribe there is nothing for the daughter when there is a son, so also from the mother’s tribe there is nothing for the daughter when there is a son. Or is it the other way around? Since from the mother’s tribe there is something for the daughter when there is a son, so also from the father’s tribe is there something for the daughter when there is a son? Rebbi Joḥanan said to him, let us leave; that man does not want to listen to words of instruction.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Batra 10:34

“Ben Nannas said to him,” etc. Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Even though Rebbi Ismael praised Ben Nannas, he praised him only for his argument. But [practice] does not follow Ben Nannas. Simeon bar Abba in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Also in the case of the strangled person practice follows Rebbi Ismael. Rebbi Yose said, one infers from here that a person who caught another in the market place, when a third person came and said, let him go and I shall give, collects from the one but does not collect from the other.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 3:45

When Rav Huna saw that witnesses said exactly the same, he was investigating. When he saw them essentially identical, he determined the common element. Rav Huna made light of a judge who said, “accept a single witness,” but they should say it themselves. When Rav Huna realized an argument in favor of a person who himself did not know it, he guided him, following open your mouth for the dumb.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 4:31

“Therefore man was created,” etc. “Man was created single in the world because of the families, lest they should attack one another. Is that not argument de minore ad majus? Since now that they are all descendants of one father they attack one another, if they had been descendants of two not so much more? Another explanation: The just ones should not say, we are the descendants of a just man, but you are the sons of evildoers.”

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 5:18

Rebbi Meïr says, from noontime on it is from their words; Rebbi Jehudah says, from noontime on it is biblical. What is Rebbi Meïr’s reason? Only on the first day, that is the fifteenth. I could think at nightfall; the verse says only, to separate. How is this? Give it one hour before sundown. What is Rebbi Jehudah’s reason? Only on the first day, that is the fourteenth. I could think the entire day; the verse says only, to separate. Half for leavened matter, half for mazzah. Rebbi Meïr’s argument seems inverted. There, he said only to add; here he said only to diminish. Rebbi Samuel bar Eudaimon said, he diminished, lest it be for leavened matter. Rebbi Meïr said, do not eat leavened matter with it, while it is eaten. Rebbi Jehudah said, do not eat leavened matter with it, while it is prepared.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 5:20

Now Rebbi Meïr says, after noontime it is forbidden because of their words. The (sixth) [seventh] hour it is forbidden because of a fence. Why the (fifth) [sixth]? Because of a fence. Is there a fence around a fence? But the (fifth) [sixth] may be confounded with the seventh. Rebbi Jehudah’s argument seems inverted. There, he says that the fifth cannot be confounded with the seventh. But here, he says that the fifth can be confounded with the seventh. Rebbi Yose said, there the matter is given over to women who are lazy, here the matter is given over to the court who is careful. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, there it is a matter between the beginning of the fifth and the end of the seventh hour. Here it is between the end of the fifth and the start of the seventh. It also was stated thus: At the start of the fifth hour, the sun is in the East, and the end of the seventh the sun is in the West. The sun never starts setting before the end of the seventh hour.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 5:21

MISHNAH: They brought in the second [witness] and examined him. If their testimonies were coherent, one starts with arguing for acquittal. If one of the witnesses said, I have an argument for his acquittal, or one of the students said, I have an argument for his conviction, one forces them to be silent. If one of the students said, I have an argument for his acquittal, one brings him up and lets him sit among them. He was not demoted from there the entire day; if his argument has substance, one listens to him. Even if he said, I have to argue for my acquittal, one listens to him if there is substance to his words.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 5:21

MISHNAH: They brought in the second [witness] and examined him. If their testimonies were coherent, one starts with arguing for acquittal. If one of the witnesses said, I have an argument for his acquittal, or one of the students said, I have an argument for his conviction, one forces them to be silent. If one of the students said, I have an argument for his acquittal, one brings him up and lets him sit among them. He was not demoted from there the entire day; if his argument has substance, one listens to him. Even if he said, I have to argue for my acquittal, one listens to him if there is substance to his words.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 5:21

MISHNAH: They brought in the second [witness] and examined him. If their testimonies were coherent, one starts with arguing for acquittal. If one of the witnesses said, I have an argument for his acquittal, or one of the students said, I have an argument for his conviction, one forces them to be silent. If one of the students said, I have an argument for his acquittal, one brings him up and lets him sit among them. He was not demoted from there the entire day; if his argument has substance, one listens to him. Even if he said, I have to argue for my acquittal, one listens to him if there is substance to his words.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 5:21

MISHNAH: They brought in the second [witness] and examined him. If their testimonies were coherent, one starts with arguing for acquittal. If one of the witnesses said, I have an argument for his acquittal, or one of the students said, I have an argument for his conviction, one forces them to be silent. If one of the students said, I have an argument for his acquittal, one brings him up and lets him sit among them. He was not demoted from there the entire day; if his argument has substance, one listens to him. Even if he said, I have to argue for my acquittal, one listens to him if there is substance to his words.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 5:23

Rabbi La said, why does one record the argument of him who argues for acquittal? Because of him who argues for conviction, maybe his memory will fail him. If he switches his argument, they could say to him, this you said, this you did not say. [Does this mean] that it needs two [groups of] witnesses? It would mean that the trial would be extended. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, because of him who argues for acquittal.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 5:23

Rabbi La said, why does one record the argument of him who argues for acquittal? Because of him who argues for conviction, maybe his memory will fail him. If he switches his argument, they could say to him, this you said, this you did not say. [Does this mean] that it needs two [groups of] witnesses? It would mean that the trial would be extended. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, because of him who argues for acquittal.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 5:25

HALAKHAH: “If they found him innocent, they free him,” etc. It was stated: If one of the witnesses said, I have an argument for his acquittal, and another came to support him, (and another came to support him,) whom do you co-opt? Let us hear from the following of Rebbi Joḥanan: If somebody was acquitted following his own pleading, one does not place him with the judges. Therefore, if he was acquitted following (his own) pleading, then one person would be simultaneously witness and judge. We do not find that anybody can be both witness and judge.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 6:1

MISHNAH: If sentence was passed, one brings him out to be stoned. The place for stoning was outside the court as it is said: Bring the blasphemer outside the camp. One person was standing outside the court building with towels in his hand; a horse was standing ready at a distance but so he could see him. If one said, I have an argument in his favor, that one waves his towels, the horse gallops and stops him. Even if he himself says, I have an exculpatory argument for myself, one returns him even four or five times, on condition that his argument be substantial.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 6:1

MISHNAH: If sentence was passed, one brings him out to be stoned. The place for stoning was outside the court as it is said: Bring the blasphemer outside the camp. One person was standing outside the court building with towels in his hand; a horse was standing ready at a distance but so he could see him. If one said, I have an argument in his favor, that one waves his towels, the horse gallops and stops him. Even if he himself says, I have an exculpatory argument for myself, one returns him even four or five times, on condition that his argument be substantial.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 6:1

MISHNAH: If sentence was passed, one brings him out to be stoned. The place for stoning was outside the court as it is said: Bring the blasphemer outside the camp. One person was standing outside the court building with towels in his hand; a horse was standing ready at a distance but so he could see him. If one said, I have an argument in his favor, that one waves his towels, the horse gallops and stops him. Even if he himself says, I have an exculpatory argument for myself, one returns him even four or five times, on condition that his argument be substantial.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 6:14

HALAKHAH: “Rebbi Eliezer said,” etc. The argument of Rebbi Jehudah seems inverted. There, he says: “If her hair was beautiful, he did not uncover it.” And here, he says so? Here, anyhow she goes to her death, but there, maybe she will be found to be pure and the young priests would attack her. The argument of the rabbis seems inverted. There, they say: “A man is stoned naked, but no woman is stoned naked.” And here, they say so? Here, you shall love your neighbor as yourself, choose for him a decorous death. But here, all women should be taught.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 6:14

HALAKHAH: “Rebbi Eliezer said,” etc. The argument of Rebbi Jehudah seems inverted. There, he says: “If her hair was beautiful, he did not uncover it.” And here, he says so? Here, anyhow she goes to her death, but there, maybe she will be found to be pure and the young priests would attack her. The argument of the rabbis seems inverted. There, they say: “A man is stoned naked, but no woman is stoned naked.” And here, they say so? Here, you shall love your neighbor as yourself, choose for him a decorous death. But here, all women should be taught.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 6:25

The king said, I shall give. The king took the two sons of Riṣpah bat Ayah. Michal, Saul’s daughter, did not have a child, and you say so? Say now that they were sons of Merab but Michal raised them, so they were named after her. The king gave them into the hand of the Gibeonites who hanged them on the mountain before the Eternal. All seven is written defective of one letter. That refers to Mephiboshet, for whom David prayed and whom the altar received. He told them, I let them pass by the altar and anyone whom the altar receives will be his, because of Mephiboshet who was great in Torah. He let him pass by the altar, which received him. Rebbi Avin said, I shall call to the Most High God, to the Power Who has the ultimate decision over me. For the Holy One, praise to Him, agreed with David. They were killed on the day of harvest …at the start of the barley harvest. Riṣpah bat Ayah took a garment and laid it out on the rock. What means on the rock? Rebbi Hoshaia said, she was reciting: The rock, perfect is His action. Rebbi Abba bar Zamina in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia: Sanctification of the Name is greater than desecration of the Name. Referring to sanctification of the Name it is written: Do not leave his corpse overnight. But referring to desecration of the Name it is written that they were left hanging until water was poured on them. This teaches that they were hanging from the sixteenth of Nisan to the seventeenth of Marḥeshwan. The passers-by were saying: How did these people sin that the rules of justice were changed for them? They were answered: Because these had attacked cursed proselytes. Is that not an argument de minore ad majus? Since even for those who did not convert for the sake of Heaven, the Eternal avenged their blood; if one would convert for the sake of Heaven not so much more? Many converts were converted at that time; that is what is written: Solomon counted all proselytes … and appointed from them 70’000 carriers, etc.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 7:32

Rebbi Jeremiah asked: Is a person having sexual relations with his mother guilty [of adultery] with her as a married woman? Come and see: if a third person had sexual relations with her, would he not be guilty [of adultery] with her as a married woman? Her son not so much more? Rebbi Yose objected: is not her stepson guilty [of adultery] with her as a married woman, but her son is not guilty [of adultery] with her as a married woman? As we have stated: Also with all other cases of incest and adultery the situation is the same. His mother-in-law as a married woman, you catch him because of his mother-in-law. His daughter-in-law as a married woman, you catch him because of his daughter-in-law. His sister as a married woman, do you catch him because of his sister? You smuggle him away from the serious crime and strike him for the easier one; this you cannot do as we have stated: A person having sexual relations with his sister is liable because of her as his sister and as a daughter of his father’s wife. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah says, a person having sexual relations with his sister is only liable because of her as his sister; the same is true for his daughter-in-law. Rebbi Jeremiah, Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah follows the argument of his father Rebbi Jehudah. Just as Rebbi Jehudah accepts the description mentioned first, so Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah accepts the description mentioned first. Rebbi Jeremiah, Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan turned around: Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah does not follow the argument of his father Rebbi Jehudah. There he is liable because of his mother, who is not his father’s wife; he is liable because of his father’s wife who is not his mother. But here we find that he is permitted his father’s wife’s daughter, who is not his sister.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 7:32

Rebbi Jeremiah asked: Is a person having sexual relations with his mother guilty [of adultery] with her as a married woman? Come and see: if a third person had sexual relations with her, would he not be guilty [of adultery] with her as a married woman? Her son not so much more? Rebbi Yose objected: is not her stepson guilty [of adultery] with her as a married woman, but her son is not guilty [of adultery] with her as a married woman? As we have stated: Also with all other cases of incest and adultery the situation is the same. His mother-in-law as a married woman, you catch him because of his mother-in-law. His daughter-in-law as a married woman, you catch him because of his daughter-in-law. His sister as a married woman, do you catch him because of his sister? You smuggle him away from the serious crime and strike him for the easier one; this you cannot do as we have stated: A person having sexual relations with his sister is liable because of her as his sister and as a daughter of his father’s wife. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah says, a person having sexual relations with his sister is only liable because of her as his sister; the same is true for his daughter-in-law. Rebbi Jeremiah, Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah follows the argument of his father Rebbi Jehudah. Just as Rebbi Jehudah accepts the description mentioned first, so Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah accepts the description mentioned first. Rebbi Jeremiah, Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan turned around: Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah does not follow the argument of his father Rebbi Jehudah. There he is liable because of his mother, who is not his father’s wife; he is liable because of his father’s wife who is not his mother. But here we find that he is permitted his father’s wife’s daughter, who is not his sister.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 7:58

Rebbi Abba bar Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Look at the expression which the Torah taught you, Moloch; anything that you make king over yourself, even a chip of wood, even a pebble. I shall extirpate him from amidst his people, to include all other foreign worship in extirpation. Rebbi Nasa in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: to include all other foreign worship relating to sons and daughters, as it was stated: He is guilty whether for the Moloch or any other foreign worship, whether he worshipped them with sons and daughters, or worshipped them with fathers and mothers. Rebbi Zeˋira said: if its worship did not prescribe this; but if its worship did prescribe it, he is free from prosecution. Rebbi Hila said, even if its worship did prescribe it, he is twice guilty. A baraita supports Rebbi Hila: The Moloch was included in all other foreign worships; it is mentioned separately to be lenient in this regard that he be guilty only for his descendants. Rebbi Tanḥum bar Jeremiah said, it follows that Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon follows the argument of his father Rebbi Simeon. Just as Rebbi Simeon said, the Moloch was included in all other foreign worships; it is mentioned separately to be lenient in this regard that he be guilty only for his descendants, so Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon said, the Moloch was included in all other foreign worships; it is mentioned separately to be lenient in this regard that he be guilty only for his descendants.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 7:69

“One who has sexual relations with a preliminarily married maiden.” Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: This is Rebbi Meïr’s. But for the rabbis even if she is a minor. What is Rebbi Meïr’s reason? “Lad” is written defectively in the paragraph. How do the rabbis explain “a lad”? Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Once in the paragraph it is written a young woman; this teaches that in the entire paragraph she is an adult. Rebbi Meïr objected to the rabbis: In the matter of the calumniator, a lad is written and she is an adult since a minor is not stoned? What do the rabbis do with this? Rebbi Abin said, explain it that he came to her as a male. Rebbi Jacob bar Abba asked before Rav: What is the law of him who comes to a minor? He said to him, by stoning. What is the law of him who comes to an adult? He said to him, I am reading an adolescent, not an adult. Read an adolescent, not a minor! Do you not agree with me that she has the right to a fine? He answered, because he mistreated her, that includes a minor for a fine. Read because he mistreated her, that includes an adult for a fine! Rav said, even though Rebbi Jacob bar Abba won the logical argument, practice is that he who comes to a minor is [punished] by stoning but she is free. Rebbi Abun in the name of (Rebbi) Samuel. Why? He understood it from the following: The man who had lain with her alone shall die. Do we not know that the girl has not committed a capital crime? Why does the verse say, do not do anything to the girl; the girl has not committed a capital crime? That includes him who has sexual relations with a [preliminarily married] underage girl; he is stoned and she is free.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 7:74

HALAKHAH: “The sorcerer is one who does a deed,” etc. A sorceress you shall not let live, whether man or woman, but the Torah taught you the way of the world that most women have a tendency to sorcery. Rebbi Eliezer said, a sorcerer is [executed] by stoning. What is Rebbi Eliezer’s reason? It says here, a sorceress you shall not let live, and it says there, whether human or animal they shall not live. Since shall not live there means by stoning, also here by stoning. What is the rabbis’ reason? It says here, a sorceress you shall not let live, and it says there, you shall not let live anybody. Since you shall not let live there means death by the sword, also you shall not let live here means death by the sword. Rebbi Aqiba said, from this argument I am deciding. It is preferable to learn you shall not let live from you shall not let live rather than from shall not live. What is Rebbi Jehudah’s reason? It says here, a sorceress you shall not let live, and it says there, anybody lying with an animal shall die the death. Since the execution of the animal is by stoning, so here also by stoning.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 9:16

Rebbi Ḥaggai asked before Rebbi Yose: Is the child a bastard following Rebbi Jehudah? He said to him, No one with a damaged testicle or with cut-off penis may marry into the Eternal’s congregation interrupts the argument. It interrupted the argument in the matter of the father’s wife. The father’s wife was part of the set of all incest prohibitions; it was selected from this set to teach about bastardy for all incest prohibitions. Similarly, let the rape victim be selected to teach a prohibition concerning all rape victims. The father’s wife was part of the set of all incest prohibitions; it was selected from this set to teach about bastardy for all incest prohibitions. Can you say here that the rape victim was in the set, that it could teach a prohibition concerning all rape victims? Why cannot the father’s wife be selected to teach about the rape victim in her case? He said to him, if she is his father’s wife, she is not his rape victim; if she is the father’s rape victim, she is not his wife.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 9:16

Rebbi Ḥaggai asked before Rebbi Yose: Is the child a bastard following Rebbi Jehudah? He said to him, No one with a damaged testicle or with cut-off penis may marry into the Eternal’s congregation interrupts the argument. It interrupted the argument in the matter of the father’s wife. The father’s wife was part of the set of all incest prohibitions; it was selected from this set to teach about bastardy for all incest prohibitions. Similarly, let the rape victim be selected to teach a prohibition concerning all rape victims. The father’s wife was part of the set of all incest prohibitions; it was selected from this set to teach about bastardy for all incest prohibitions. Can you say here that the rape victim was in the set, that it could teach a prohibition concerning all rape victims? Why cannot the father’s wife be selected to teach about the rape victim in her case? He said to him, if she is his father’s wife, she is not his rape victim; if she is the father’s rape victim, she is not his wife.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 10:10

It is written: For he showed contempt for the Eternal’s Word. Not only if he was contemptuous of the teachings of the Torah, from where if he denied one verse, one Aramaic expression, one argument de minore ad majus? The verse says, His command he violated. One verse, Lotan’s sister was Timna`. One Aramaic expression, Laban called it Yegar Sahadu̅ta̅. One argument de minore ad majus: For Cain would be avenged sevenfold, etc..

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 10:10

It is written: For he showed contempt for the Eternal’s Word. Not only if he was contemptuous of the teachings of the Torah, from where if he denied one verse, one Aramaic expression, one argument de minore ad majus? The verse says, His command he violated. One verse, Lotan’s sister was Timna`. One Aramaic expression, Laban called it Yegar Sahadu̅ta̅. One argument de minore ad majus: For Cain would be avenged sevenfold, etc..

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 10:73

HALAKHAH: All its spoils you shall collect, etc. Rebbi Simeon said, is there not an argument de minore ad majus about this? Since properties, which have no knowledge of good or bad, but because they caused the just to dwell with the evildoers the Torah said, should be burned, if somebody has the intention of influencing his neighbor and influences him from good ways to bad ones, not so much more? Rebbi Eleazar said, the matter is demonstrated by Lot who dwelt in Sodom only because of his money but left there with his hands on his head. This is what is written: Quickly escape to there; it is enough for you that you escape with your life.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 11:25

“And a prophet who transgressed his own word,” like the companion of Micha. That is what is written: An old prophet was dwelling at Bethel; his son came and told him all the actions which the man of God had wrought, etc. Their father asked them, which way did he go, etc. He told his sons, saddle the donkey for me, etc. He followed the man of God and found him sitting under the terebinth, etc. He said to him, come with me to my house and eat. He told him, I cannot return, etc., up to he said to him, I also am a prophet like you and an angel spoke to me the words of the Eternal as follows, etc., up to he should eat food and drink water; he tricked him. What means “tricked him”? He lied to him. While they were sitting at table, the word of the Eternal came to the prophet who had turned him back. It is not written “who had returned,” but “who had turned him back.” Is that not an argument de minore ad majus? Since one who fed his neighbor food in falsehood was worthy of the Word to be addressed to him, one who feeds his neighbor food in truth, so much more.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 1:16

HALAKHAH: “But about where there is no knowledge,” etc. Halakhah 5: “Rebbi Simeon used to say,” etc. Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia: The reason of Rebbi Jehudah is and one goat’s he-goat sin offering for the Eternal. This he-goat atones for a sin known only to the Eternal. I have not only the he-goat of the Day of the New Moon; from where the he-goats of the holidays? Rebbi Ze`ira said, and a he-goat, the copula adds to the prior subject. Rebbi Ze`ira and Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia, Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: He gave it to you to lift the sins of the congregation. Where do we hold? If about Naḥshon’s he-goat, it atoned for his tribe. If about the he-goat of the Day of (Atonement), there is nothing similar in later generations. But we must deal with the he-goat of the Day of the New Moon. What about it? It is said here “lifting sin” and it is said there “lifting sin”, Aaron shall lift the sin of the sancta”. Since there it is the sinfulness of the offerings not the sins of the offerers, also here it is the sinfulness of the offerings not the sins of the offerers. What did you see to say, “for the pure person who ate impure”, maybe we should say for the impure person who ate pure? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Bun said, Rebbi Jehudah splits the argument of Rebbi Meїr; Rebbi Simeon splits the argument of Rebbi Jehudah. Rebbi Joḥanan agrees that the he-goat brought inside does not atone; rather it suspends. This parallels Rebbi Jonah in the name of Rebbi Ze`ira, he shall make it a purification offering. He fixed it for suspension, that it could not be changed.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 1:16

HALAKHAH: “But about where there is no knowledge,” etc. Halakhah 5: “Rebbi Simeon used to say,” etc. Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia: The reason of Rebbi Jehudah is and one goat’s he-goat sin offering for the Eternal. This he-goat atones for a sin known only to the Eternal. I have not only the he-goat of the Day of the New Moon; from where the he-goats of the holidays? Rebbi Ze`ira said, and a he-goat, the copula adds to the prior subject. Rebbi Ze`ira and Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia, Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: He gave it to you to lift the sins of the congregation. Where do we hold? If about Naḥshon’s he-goat, it atoned for his tribe. If about the he-goat of the Day of (Atonement), there is nothing similar in later generations. But we must deal with the he-goat of the Day of the New Moon. What about it? It is said here “lifting sin” and it is said there “lifting sin”, Aaron shall lift the sin of the sancta”. Since there it is the sinfulness of the offerings not the sins of the offerers, also here it is the sinfulness of the offerings not the sins of the offerers. What did you see to say, “for the pure person who ate impure”, maybe we should say for the impure person who ate pure? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Bun said, Rebbi Jehudah splits the argument of Rebbi Meїr; Rebbi Simeon splits the argument of Rebbi Jehudah. Rebbi Joḥanan agrees that the he-goat brought inside does not atone; rather it suspends. This parallels Rebbi Jonah in the name of Rebbi Ze`ira, he shall make it a purification offering. He fixed it for suspension, that it could not be changed.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 1:20

“They asked him, could they be brought one for the other,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the words of the Sages [imply] that one may change; the words of Rebbi Simeon [imply] that one may not change. The words of the Sages [imply] that one may change, and you say “could they be brought one for the other”? They objected to him according to his argument. According to your argument, since you say that one may not change, could they be brought one for the other? Rebbi Yose said, since public sacrifices are designated only by use. Rebbi Yudan said, it was stated thus: “For the purpose of the sacrifice for which it is brought it was sanctified from the beginning.”

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 1:20

“They asked him, could they be brought one for the other,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the words of the Sages [imply] that one may change; the words of Rebbi Simeon [imply] that one may not change. The words of the Sages [imply] that one may change, and you say “could they be brought one for the other”? They objected to him according to his argument. According to your argument, since you say that one may not change, could they be brought one for the other? Rebbi Yose said, since public sacrifices are designated only by use. Rebbi Yudan said, it was stated thus: “For the purpose of the sacrifice for which it is brought it was sanctified from the beginning.”

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 2:5

The argument of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish seems to be inverted. There he says, the knowledge about his doubt determines his kind of transgression. But here he says, the knowledge about his doubt does not determine his kind of transgression. There, his reparation offering determines it. Here what do you have?

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 2:6

The argument of Rebbi Joḥanan seems to be inverted. There, he said, if part of the sin was atoned, all of the sin was atoned. And here he says so? Rebbi Joḥanan said this only for the last realization which does not require any sacrifice.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 2:23

HALAKHAH: “Rebbi Eliezer says,” etc. Ḥizqiah says, there is disagreement between them. Rebbi Joḥanan said, interpreting the verse is between them; there are Tannaim who state, he is liable for forgetting impurity but is not liable for forgetting the Sanctuary, and there are Tannain who state, he is liable for forgetting the crawling animal but is not liable for forgetting the Sanctuary. The argument of Rebbi Eliezer seems inverted. There he says, even if he did not know. But here he says, not unless he knew. There, by which he sinned, not unless he knew by what he became liable. Here, while he was impure, in all cases. Rebbi Ḥinena said, here “by what” is not written. The argument of Rebbi Joshua seems inverted. There he says, while he was impure, not unless he knew by what he became liable. Here, by which he sinned, in any case. How does Rebbi Eliezer uphold by what? This excludes the one who is occupied.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 2:23

HALAKHAH: “Rebbi Eliezer says,” etc. Ḥizqiah says, there is disagreement between them. Rebbi Joḥanan said, interpreting the verse is between them; there are Tannaim who state, he is liable for forgetting impurity but is not liable for forgetting the Sanctuary, and there are Tannain who state, he is liable for forgetting the crawling animal but is not liable for forgetting the Sanctuary. The argument of Rebbi Eliezer seems inverted. There he says, even if he did not know. But here he says, not unless he knew. There, by which he sinned, not unless he knew by what he became liable. Here, while he was impure, in all cases. Rebbi Ḥinena said, here “by what” is not written. The argument of Rebbi Joshua seems inverted. There he says, while he was impure, not unless he knew by what he became liable. Here, by which he sinned, in any case. How does Rebbi Eliezer uphold by what? This excludes the one who is occupied.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:4

Does not the blasphemer have to bring a sacrifice? The colleagues in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: They answered him according to his argument. Following your argument, since you say that the blasphemer does not act, where do we find that somebody talks and brings a sacrifice that this one talks and brings a sacrifice? Rebbi Abba from Carthage asked, is not Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish’s argument inverted? There he said, for Rebbi Aqiba the blasphemer does not act. But here he says, the blasphemer is acting in the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba. Rebbi La in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Two Tannaïm following the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba. One said, the blasphemer does not act, and the other said, the blasphemer does act.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:4

Does not the blasphemer have to bring a sacrifice? The colleagues in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: They answered him according to his argument. Following your argument, since you say that the blasphemer does not act, where do we find that somebody talks and brings a sacrifice that this one talks and brings a sacrifice? Rebbi Abba from Carthage asked, is not Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish’s argument inverted? There he said, for Rebbi Aqiba the blasphemer does not act. But here he says, the blasphemer is acting in the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba. Rebbi La in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Two Tannaïm following the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba. One said, the blasphemer does not act, and the other said, the blasphemer does act.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:4

Does not the blasphemer have to bring a sacrifice? The colleagues in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: They answered him according to his argument. Following your argument, since you say that the blasphemer does not act, where do we find that somebody talks and brings a sacrifice that this one talks and brings a sacrifice? Rebbi Abba from Carthage asked, is not Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish’s argument inverted? There he said, for Rebbi Aqiba the blasphemer does not act. But here he says, the blasphemer is acting in the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba. Rebbi La in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Two Tannaïm following the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba. One said, the blasphemer does not act, and the other said, the blasphemer does act.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 6:2

HALAKHAH: “A judicial oath,” etc. The claim, the House of Shammai say, an obolos, but the House of Hillel say, two oboloi. The argument of the House of Shammai seems inverted. There, they say, “silver” is a denar, but here, they say that “silver” is an obolos. The argument of the House of Hillel seems inverted. There, they say that “money” is a peruṭah but here, they say that “money” is two oboloi. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina: The House of Shammai learn from the initial sale of a Hebrew girl. Since her initial sale was by [at least] a denar, so her preliminary marriage is by [at least] a denar. The House of Hillel learn from the end of her diminution. Since the end of her diminution is a peruṭah, so her preliminary marriage is by a peruṭah. What is the reason of the House of Shammai? As it is said, she leaves gratis, without silver. Would we not know that it is without money? Why does the verse say, without silver? From there, that she is sold for more than silver. And what is more than silver? A denar. But maybe “silver” is a peruṭah, more than silver two peruṭot. The smallest silver coin is an obolos. So why is it not an obolos? Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Judah bar Pazi: For if she wants to diminish, she diminishes every year by an obolos and leaves. Could she not diminish by a peruṭah? Rebbi Abun said, think of it. If she wanted to compute the diminution at the start of the sixth year, there would be a peruṭah left. But the start of the diminution must be an obolos, the end of the diminution a peruṭah. If there is only one peruṭah left, can she not pay the diminished amount and leave? Just as the last diminished amount is a peruṭah, so her preliminary marriage should be a peruṭah! What is the reason of the House of Hillel? Since her last diminished amount is a peruṭah, you know that her preliminary marriage is by a peruṭah. Think of it, if there is only one peruṭah’s worth left, can she not pay the diminished amount and leave? Just as the last diminished amount is a peruṭah, so her preliminary marriage is by a peruṭah.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 6:2

HALAKHAH: “A judicial oath,” etc. The claim, the House of Shammai say, an obolos, but the House of Hillel say, two oboloi. The argument of the House of Shammai seems inverted. There, they say, “silver” is a denar, but here, they say that “silver” is an obolos. The argument of the House of Hillel seems inverted. There, they say that “money” is a peruṭah but here, they say that “money” is two oboloi. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina: The House of Shammai learn from the initial sale of a Hebrew girl. Since her initial sale was by [at least] a denar, so her preliminary marriage is by [at least] a denar. The House of Hillel learn from the end of her diminution. Since the end of her diminution is a peruṭah, so her preliminary marriage is by a peruṭah. What is the reason of the House of Shammai? As it is said, she leaves gratis, without silver. Would we not know that it is without money? Why does the verse say, without silver? From there, that she is sold for more than silver. And what is more than silver? A denar. But maybe “silver” is a peruṭah, more than silver two peruṭot. The smallest silver coin is an obolos. So why is it not an obolos? Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Judah bar Pazi: For if she wants to diminish, she diminishes every year by an obolos and leaves. Could she not diminish by a peruṭah? Rebbi Abun said, think of it. If she wanted to compute the diminution at the start of the sixth year, there would be a peruṭah left. But the start of the diminution must be an obolos, the end of the diminution a peruṭah. If there is only one peruṭah left, can she not pay the diminished amount and leave? Just as the last diminished amount is a peruṭah, so her preliminary marriage should be a peruṭah! What is the reason of the House of Hillel? Since her last diminished amount is a peruṭah, you know that her preliminary marriage is by a peruṭah. Think of it, if there is only one peruṭah’s worth left, can she not pay the diminished amount and leave? Just as the last diminished amount is a peruṭah, so her preliminary marriage is by a peruṭah.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 6:3

The argument of the House of Hillel seems inverted. If a person give to his neighbor, etc. If to teach that the court will not act on less than a peruṭah’s worth, is it not already written, to incur liability for it? To exclude anything not worth a peruṭah. From here, that it should be more than silver. And what is more than silver? Two oboloi. But maybe “silver” is a peruṭah, more than silver two peruṭot. The smallest silver coin is an obolos. So why is it not an obolos? Or vessels; since vessels are two, also “money” is two. How do the House of Shammai interpret or vessels? Following what Rebbi Nathan stated, or vessels, including clay vessels. Samuel said, if he claimed from him two needles and he admitted to one, he is liable. Rebbi Ḥinena said, only if they are worth two peruṭot, that the claim should be about a peruṭah’s worth and the confession about a peruṭah’s worth. This follows the House of Shammai who do not learn money’s worth from “vessels”. But following the House of Hillel who learn money’s worth from “vessels”, since vessels are two, also “money” is two. Similarly, since “money” means two oboloi, also “vessels” means two oboloi’s worth.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 7:8

Rebbi Jehudah’s argument seems inverted. There he says, even if he does not know. But here he says, not unless he knows. There since it is not in the form of a biblical oath even (about a biblical oath) he does not know. But here it is in the form of a biblical oath.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 7:13

May one claim extraordinary things? One may, following what Rebbi Joḥanan said, a person may be rich on the market place and poor in his house; rich in his house and poor in the market place. There is one who poses as richand has nothing, poses as poor and has great wealth. Rebbi Abba told: Bar Ziza’s sharecropper deposited a pound of gold with somebody. Bar Ziza and Bar Ziza’s sharecropper died; the case came before Rebbi Ismael ben Rebbi Yose. Would one not say that all that Bar Ziza’s sharecropper had was Bar Ziza’s property? It should be given to Bar Ziza’s sons. Bar Ziza’s sons came. He said, the adult ones should take half and when the underage grow up they should take half. Rebbi Ismael ben Rebbi Yose died; the case came before the Elder Rebbi Ḥiyya who said, that argument means nothing since there are people who do not advertise themselves. It should be given to the sharecropper’s sons. The trustee told him, I already disbursed half of it. He told him, what you gave, you gave by court order and what you will give, you will give by court order. May the sharecropper’s sons say to Bar Ziza’s sons, give us what you took? They can tell them, what was done was done by court order. May the underage ones say to the adult, let us share with you? May they tell them, we found a find? Rebbi Isaac said, the case between the adult and underage ones is only comparable to a gift given to them.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 8:7

For the borrower only the broken is written. From where loss and theft? It is logical. Since the paid keeper and the renter who do not pay for the broken or the dead have to pay for theft and loss, the borrower who pays for the broken or the dead certainly has to pay for theft and loss. It was stated about this: This is an argument de minore ad majus which cannot be challenged. From where the abducted? It is said here, it was broken or died; and it is said there, it dies or was broken. Since there the abducted was included, here also the abducted was included. So far following Rebbi Aqiba. Following Rebbi Ismael? Rebbi Ismael follows Rebbi Nathan. Rebbi Nathan says, or, to include the abducted. Or following Rebbi Meïr who said, an equal cut at the place it comes from. Since there one swears for duress, also here one swears for duress. Still following Rebbi Nathan, for Rebbi Nathan said, or it died, to include the abducted one.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 8:8

Rebbi Yudan asked: If he claimed the claim of a thief and duress? He told him, an armed robber came and took it; does he have to pay double restitution of duress? Rebbi Yose said, if it were so one should state “the paid keeper and the renter;” but we have stated: We do not find that the paid keeper and the renter pay double restitution of duress. On this we have stated, “this is an argument de minore ad majus which is questionable”. Rebbi Ḥanina said, if you say so, should you say, this is an argument de minore ad majus which is questionable, for he can tell him, let us say that the borrower pays double restitution. On this it was stated, this is an argument de minore ad majus which cannot be challenged.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 8:8

Rebbi Yudan asked: If he claimed the claim of a thief and duress? He told him, an armed robber came and took it; does he have to pay double restitution of duress? Rebbi Yose said, if it were so one should state “the paid keeper and the renter;” but we have stated: We do not find that the paid keeper and the renter pay double restitution of duress. On this we have stated, “this is an argument de minore ad majus which is questionable”. Rebbi Ḥanina said, if you say so, should you say, this is an argument de minore ad majus which is questionable, for he can tell him, let us say that the borrower pays double restitution. On this it was stated, this is an argument de minore ad majus which cannot be challenged.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 8:8

Rebbi Yudan asked: If he claimed the claim of a thief and duress? He told him, an armed robber came and took it; does he have to pay double restitution of duress? Rebbi Yose said, if it were so one should state “the paid keeper and the renter;” but we have stated: We do not find that the paid keeper and the renter pay double restitution of duress. On this we have stated, “this is an argument de minore ad majus which is questionable”. Rebbi Ḥanina said, if you say so, should you say, this is an argument de minore ad majus which is questionable, for he can tell him, let us say that the borrower pays double restitution. On this it was stated, this is an argument de minore ad majus which cannot be challenged.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 8:21

“He said to the recipient of a fee,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said, one who claims before his neighbor a claim of thief in a case of loss is liable. “Where is my lost object?” He told him, “it was stolen.” Rebbi Joḥanan said, one who claims before his neighbor a claim of thief is liable only after an oath. What is the reason? It is said here “grabbing” and it says there “grabbing.” Since “grabbing” mentioned there only applies after an oath, so also “grabbing” mentioned here only applies after an oath. Rebbi Joḥanan said, one who claims a claim of loss, swore to him, and afterwards claimed a claim of thief is not liable. Rebbi Joḥanan asked: May one be liable for a blurted oath in case of an oath regarding a claim of thief? The argument of Rebbi Joḥanan seems to be inverted. There he said, if he claimed a claim of loss, swore to him, and afterwards claimed a claim of thief is not liable. And here he says so? There it is obvious to him, here it is problematic for him. What is problematic for him? He saw and found it simple. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Joseph said, one who claims before his neighbor a claim of thief is liable only after he denied in court. Where do we hold? If about him who already owes an oath to his neighbor, even if he was swearing out of court he is liable. But we must hold about him who saw them coming. They wanted to make him swear but he jumped in and swore. Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: When it was standing at his feeding trough. Rebbi Ze`ira asked: how was it said? “If it was standing” or “even if it was standing”? If you say “even if it was standing,” it makes no difference. If you say “if it was standing,” then the argument of Rebbi Joḥanan is inverted. There, he said, if he claimed before him a claim of loss, had been swearing to him, selected a sacrifice, and then claimed a claim of duress, he is not liable. But here you are saying so? Rebbi La said, there is a difference since he absolved himself of confession by the oath. They objected to the opinion of Rebbi Ze`ira: “‘Where is my ox?’ He told him, ‘it was stolen.’ ‘I want you to swear;’ he answered ‘Amen’. Witnesses testify that he stole it: he has to pay double restitution. If he confessed himself he pays the value, and a fifth, and a reparation sacrifice.” But here when he moved it by claiming that it was lost. Afterwards he claimed a claim of thief and is not liable. Explain it that he swore to him but slaughtered it afterwards. The students of Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Julianus say, explain it that he slaughtered it when it was lying down. Is there slaughter without sale? Following Symmachos who said, there can be slaughter and sale without theft. Samuel said, if there came no witnesses of the theft, but there came witnesses of the slaughter; he is liable.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 8:21

“He said to the recipient of a fee,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said, one who claims before his neighbor a claim of thief in a case of loss is liable. “Where is my lost object?” He told him, “it was stolen.” Rebbi Joḥanan said, one who claims before his neighbor a claim of thief is liable only after an oath. What is the reason? It is said here “grabbing” and it says there “grabbing.” Since “grabbing” mentioned there only applies after an oath, so also “grabbing” mentioned here only applies after an oath. Rebbi Joḥanan said, one who claims a claim of loss, swore to him, and afterwards claimed a claim of thief is not liable. Rebbi Joḥanan asked: May one be liable for a blurted oath in case of an oath regarding a claim of thief? The argument of Rebbi Joḥanan seems to be inverted. There he said, if he claimed a claim of loss, swore to him, and afterwards claimed a claim of thief is not liable. And here he says so? There it is obvious to him, here it is problematic for him. What is problematic for him? He saw and found it simple. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Joseph said, one who claims before his neighbor a claim of thief is liable only after he denied in court. Where do we hold? If about him who already owes an oath to his neighbor, even if he was swearing out of court he is liable. But we must hold about him who saw them coming. They wanted to make him swear but he jumped in and swore. Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: When it was standing at his feeding trough. Rebbi Ze`ira asked: how was it said? “If it was standing” or “even if it was standing”? If you say “even if it was standing,” it makes no difference. If you say “if it was standing,” then the argument of Rebbi Joḥanan is inverted. There, he said, if he claimed before him a claim of loss, had been swearing to him, selected a sacrifice, and then claimed a claim of duress, he is not liable. But here you are saying so? Rebbi La said, there is a difference since he absolved himself of confession by the oath. They objected to the opinion of Rebbi Ze`ira: “‘Where is my ox?’ He told him, ‘it was stolen.’ ‘I want you to swear;’ he answered ‘Amen’. Witnesses testify that he stole it: he has to pay double restitution. If he confessed himself he pays the value, and a fifth, and a reparation sacrifice.” But here when he moved it by claiming that it was lost. Afterwards he claimed a claim of thief and is not liable. Explain it that he swore to him but slaughtered it afterwards. The students of Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Julianus say, explain it that he slaughtered it when it was lying down. Is there slaughter without sale? Following Symmachos who said, there can be slaughter and sale without theft. Samuel said, if there came no witnesses of the theft, but there came witnesses of the slaughter; he is liable.

Jerusalem Talmud Avodah Zarah 1:44

“Ben Bathyra permits horses.” Ben Bathyra said this only about a male horse because it kills its owner in war. Some say, because it runs after females, and some say, because it stands still to urinate. What is between them? A gelding. He who says because it runs after females, it does not run. He who says because it stands still to urinate, this one also stands still to urinate. [Rebbi Aḥa in the name of] Rebbi Tanḥum bar Ḥiyya: If it gets old he binds it to the grindstone. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Huna: Ben Bathyra and Rebbi Nathan both said the same, as it was stated: “If he carried out domestic animals, wild animals, or birds, whether alive or dead, he is liable. Rebbi Nathan says, dead he is liable, alive he is not liable.” The rabbis hold that he is liable for a purification sacrifice and they answer him so? They answer following his own argument. Following your argument, since you are saying because of rabbinic Sabbath prohibition, also we hold that if it gets old he binds it to the grindstone. Rebbi says, I am saying that it is forbidden for two reasons, as a weapon and as a large animal. It was stated so: A large wild animal is like a (small) [large] domestic animal. Who stated this? Rebbi. The words of the Sages: Rebbi Bisna, Rebbi Ḥanan bar Abba in the name of Rav: A wild animal is like a (large) [small] domestic animal.

Jerusalem Talmud Avodah Zarah 1:44

“Ben Bathyra permits horses.” Ben Bathyra said this only about a male horse because it kills its owner in war. Some say, because it runs after females, and some say, because it stands still to urinate. What is between them? A gelding. He who says because it runs after females, it does not run. He who says because it stands still to urinate, this one also stands still to urinate. [Rebbi Aḥa in the name of] Rebbi Tanḥum bar Ḥiyya: If it gets old he binds it to the grindstone. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Huna: Ben Bathyra and Rebbi Nathan both said the same, as it was stated: “If he carried out domestic animals, wild animals, or birds, whether alive or dead, he is liable. Rebbi Nathan says, dead he is liable, alive he is not liable.” The rabbis hold that he is liable for a purification sacrifice and they answer him so? They answer following his own argument. Following your argument, since you are saying because of rabbinic Sabbath prohibition, also we hold that if it gets old he binds it to the grindstone. Rebbi says, I am saying that it is forbidden for two reasons, as a weapon and as a large animal. It was stated so: A large wild animal is like a (small) [large] domestic animal. Who stated this? Rebbi. The words of the Sages: Rebbi Bisna, Rebbi Ḥanan bar Abba in the name of Rav: A wild animal is like a (large) [small] domestic animal.

Jerusalem Talmud Avodah Zarah 2:2

HALAKHAH: “One does not put up animals in hostelries of Gentiles,” etc. Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Ḥanina; Rebbi Abba, Rebbi Jonah: explain it following Rebbi Eliezer, since Rebbi Eliezer said “it may not be bought from Gentiles.” Rebbi Jonah asked, why do we not explain it according to everybody, following what Rebbi Eleazar said in the name of Rav: Even one who says it is permitted to sell [says] it is forbidden to leave alone. If he transgressed and left it alone by everybody’s opinion. Rebbi Jeremiah said, let us hear from the following: “A woman who was jailed by Gentiles.” Rebbi Yose said, it is different for a woman because she usually cries. Think of it if she was mute! She uses sign language. What about it? Explain it following Rebbi Eliezer, since Rebbi Eliezer said “it may not be bought from Gentiles.” They wanted to say, where do Rebbi Eliezer and the rabbis disagree? About the cow, because of “eminence was given to the cow, an adornment was made for the cow.” But since the rabbis answer to Rebbi Eliezer all sheep of Qedar will be assembled for you, this says that Rebbi Eliezer disagrees about everything. Rebbi Hoshaia asked, does one reply with an argument about the future against one about the past? Rebbi Abin asked, does one reply with an argument when evil inclinations will have disappeared against one when evil inclinations exist?

Jerusalem Talmud Avodah Zarah 2:2

HALAKHAH: “One does not put up animals in hostelries of Gentiles,” etc. Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Ḥanina; Rebbi Abba, Rebbi Jonah: explain it following Rebbi Eliezer, since Rebbi Eliezer said “it may not be bought from Gentiles.” Rebbi Jonah asked, why do we not explain it according to everybody, following what Rebbi Eleazar said in the name of Rav: Even one who says it is permitted to sell [says] it is forbidden to leave alone. If he transgressed and left it alone by everybody’s opinion. Rebbi Jeremiah said, let us hear from the following: “A woman who was jailed by Gentiles.” Rebbi Yose said, it is different for a woman because she usually cries. Think of it if she was mute! She uses sign language. What about it? Explain it following Rebbi Eliezer, since Rebbi Eliezer said “it may not be bought from Gentiles.” They wanted to say, where do Rebbi Eliezer and the rabbis disagree? About the cow, because of “eminence was given to the cow, an adornment was made for the cow.” But since the rabbis answer to Rebbi Eliezer all sheep of Qedar will be assembled for you, this says that Rebbi Eliezer disagrees about everything. Rebbi Hoshaia asked, does one reply with an argument about the future against one about the past? Rebbi Abin asked, does one reply with an argument when evil inclinations will have disappeared against one when evil inclinations exist?

Jerusalem Talmud Avodah Zarah 2:27

HALAKHAH: “The following Gentile properties are forbidden,” etc. Rebbi Isaac bar Naḥman in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: Bitter, sweet, and hot are not under the rules of being uncovered. Rebbi Simon in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: The hot, the bitter, and the sweet are not under the rules of being uncovered or under those of libation wine. Rebbi Simon explains: The hot, spice wine. The bitter, vermouth wine. And the sweet, cooked wine. Rebbi Joshua ben Zeidal had cooked wine which was left unsupervised in the custudy of a Gentile. He asked Rebbi Yannai ben Rebbi Ismael who said to him, so says Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: The sweet is not under the rules of being uncovered or under those of libation wine. Rebbi Yannai ben Rebbi Ismael fell ill. Rebbi Ze`ira, Rebbi (Joshua) [Hoshaia], Rebbi Abun bar Cahana, and Rebbi Ḥanianiah the colleague of the rabbis, went to visit him. They saw Rebbi Joshua ben Zeidal sitting there. They said, there is the master of the decision and the person of the happening, let us ask him. He said to them, so says Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, the sweet is not under the rules of being uncovered or under those of libation wine. One said to him, maybe that of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish is for argument’s sake? He told them, it is for action and you can rely on it. When (they got up) [returned], Rebbi Ila was standing with Rebbi Abun bar Cahana and told him, if you did not prefer decisions, is this not a baraita? As Rebbi Ḥiyya stated, “why is cooked wine of Gentiles forbidden? Because it started out as wine.” Rebbi Yose said, the Mishnah says so, “wine and vinegar which originally was wine.”

Jerusalem Talmud Avodah Zarah 2:68

MISHNAH: Rebbi Jehudah said, Rebbi Ismael asked Rebbi Joshua when they were walking on a road, why did they forbid Gentiles’ cheeses? He told him, because they make them with stomach of cadaver. He answered him, is not the stomach of an elevation offering more serious than the stomach of a cadaver and they said, a Cohen who is not repulsed may burn it raw; they did not agree to this but said one has no usufruct but does not commit larceny. He gave a second argument and said, because they curd it with stomach content of calves for pagan worship. He retorted, then why did they not forbid it for usufruct? He deflected him to an other subject and said to him, my brother Ismael, how do you read, for your (m.) friends are better than wine, or for your (f.) friends are better than wine? He told him, for your (f.) friendship is better. He answered, it is not so since the next verse implies it, by the scent of your (m.) good oils.

Jerusalem Talmud Avodah Zarah 5:54

And profane animals slaughtered in the Temple precinct. Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Ismael: The Torah said, slaughter what is Mine in My place and what is yours in yours. Since Mine in yours is forbidden, also yours in Mine. Is it punished by extirpation? Does not Rebbi Ismael say, one infers by an argument de minore ad majus but one does not punish by an argument de minore ad majus?

Jerusalem Talmud Avodah Zarah 5:54

And profane animals slaughtered in the Temple precinct. Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Ismael: The Torah said, slaughter what is Mine in My place and what is yours in yours. Since Mine in yours is forbidden, also yours in Mine. Is it punished by extirpation? Does not Rebbi Ismael say, one infers by an argument de minore ad majus but one does not punish by an argument de minore ad majus?

Jerusalem Talmud Makkot 1:23

“Whose sentence was passed,” etc. If somebody wrote all his property over to two persons in one document and the testimony of the witnesses was valid for one but invalid for the other. Rebbi Hila said, Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagreed; one said, since it is invalid for one it is invalid for the other, but the other said, it is valid for one and invalid for the other. Rebbi Mana did not specify; Rebbi Abun specified: Rebbi Joḥanan said, since it is invalid for one it is invalid for the other; but Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, it is valid for one and invalid for the other. Rebbi Eleazar said, the Mishnah supports Rebbi Joḥanan: “Since the testimony of two [witnesses] is invalid if one of them is found to be a relative or a disqualified person, the same holds for three if one of them is found to be a relative or a disqualified person. From where even for a hundred? The verse says, witnesses.” Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, Rebbi Ḥanina the colleague of the rabbis and the rabbis disagree. One says, the argument of Rebbi Eleazar is correct, but the other says, the argument of Rebbi Eleazar is not correct. For him who says, the argument of Rebbi Eleazar is correct, it is a single testimony and a single warning, and any testimony which is partially disqualified is totally disqualified. For him who says, the argument of Rebbi Eleazar is not correct, it is as if two groups of witnesses came, valid for one and invalid for the other.

Jerusalem Talmud Makkot 1:23

“Whose sentence was passed,” etc. If somebody wrote all his property over to two persons in one document and the testimony of the witnesses was valid for one but invalid for the other. Rebbi Hila said, Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagreed; one said, since it is invalid for one it is invalid for the other, but the other said, it is valid for one and invalid for the other. Rebbi Mana did not specify; Rebbi Abun specified: Rebbi Joḥanan said, since it is invalid for one it is invalid for the other; but Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, it is valid for one and invalid for the other. Rebbi Eleazar said, the Mishnah supports Rebbi Joḥanan: “Since the testimony of two [witnesses] is invalid if one of them is found to be a relative or a disqualified person, the same holds for three if one of them is found to be a relative or a disqualified person. From where even for a hundred? The verse says, witnesses.” Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, Rebbi Ḥanina the colleague of the rabbis and the rabbis disagree. One says, the argument of Rebbi Eleazar is correct, but the other says, the argument of Rebbi Eleazar is not correct. For him who says, the argument of Rebbi Eleazar is correct, it is a single testimony and a single warning, and any testimony which is partially disqualified is totally disqualified. For him who says, the argument of Rebbi Eleazar is not correct, it is as if two groups of witnesses came, valid for one and invalid for the other.

Jerusalem Talmud Makkot 1:23

“Whose sentence was passed,” etc. If somebody wrote all his property over to two persons in one document and the testimony of the witnesses was valid for one but invalid for the other. Rebbi Hila said, Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagreed; one said, since it is invalid for one it is invalid for the other, but the other said, it is valid for one and invalid for the other. Rebbi Mana did not specify; Rebbi Abun specified: Rebbi Joḥanan said, since it is invalid for one it is invalid for the other; but Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, it is valid for one and invalid for the other. Rebbi Eleazar said, the Mishnah supports Rebbi Joḥanan: “Since the testimony of two [witnesses] is invalid if one of them is found to be a relative or a disqualified person, the same holds for three if one of them is found to be a relative or a disqualified person. From where even for a hundred? The verse says, witnesses.” Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, Rebbi Ḥanina the colleague of the rabbis and the rabbis disagree. One says, the argument of Rebbi Eleazar is correct, but the other says, the argument of Rebbi Eleazar is not correct. For him who says, the argument of Rebbi Eleazar is correct, it is a single testimony and a single warning, and any testimony which is partially disqualified is totally disqualified. For him who says, the argument of Rebbi Eleazar is not correct, it is as if two groups of witnesses came, valid for one and invalid for the other.

Jerusalem Talmud Makkot 1:23

“Whose sentence was passed,” etc. If somebody wrote all his property over to two persons in one document and the testimony of the witnesses was valid for one but invalid for the other. Rebbi Hila said, Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagreed; one said, since it is invalid for one it is invalid for the other, but the other said, it is valid for one and invalid for the other. Rebbi Mana did not specify; Rebbi Abun specified: Rebbi Joḥanan said, since it is invalid for one it is invalid for the other; but Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, it is valid for one and invalid for the other. Rebbi Eleazar said, the Mishnah supports Rebbi Joḥanan: “Since the testimony of two [witnesses] is invalid if one of them is found to be a relative or a disqualified person, the same holds for three if one of them is found to be a relative or a disqualified person. From where even for a hundred? The verse says, witnesses.” Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, Rebbi Ḥanina the colleague of the rabbis and the rabbis disagree. One says, the argument of Rebbi Eleazar is correct, but the other says, the argument of Rebbi Eleazar is not correct. For him who says, the argument of Rebbi Eleazar is correct, it is a single testimony and a single warning, and any testimony which is partially disqualified is totally disqualified. For him who says, the argument of Rebbi Eleazar is not correct, it is as if two groups of witnesses came, valid for one and invalid for the other.

Jerusalem Talmud Makkot 2:13

“And the blind person.” Rebbi Abba said, who stated “the blind person”? Rebbi Jehudah, for Rebbi Jehudah frees him from all obligations of the Torah, as we have stated there: “Rebbi Jehudah said, anyone who never saw light in his life may not cover the Shemaˋ.” Therefore, if he saw once he may cover. And both of them explained the same verse, without seeing. Rebbi Meïr says, to include the blind person. Rebbi Jehudah says, excluding the blind person. The argument of Rebbi Meïr seems inverted. There he says, excluding, but here he says, to include. Rebbi Ḥanina the son of Rebbi Hillel said, the Mishnah is about one sitting in a dark house. So we are saying, “one sitting in a dark house may not cover the Shemaˋ.” But here, without seeing, to include the blind person. How do the rabbis read without seeing? To include one who smites in the night.

Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 3:9

The argument of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish seems to be inverted. There he says, the knowledge about his doubt determines his kind of transgression. But here he says, the knowledge about his doubt does not determine his kind of transgression. There, his reparation offering determines it. Here what do you have?

Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 3:10

The argument of Rebbi Joḥanan seems to be inverted. There, he said, if part of the sin was atoned, all of the sin was atoned. And here he says so? Rebbi Joḥanan said this only for the last realization which does not require any sacrifice.

Jerusalem Talmud Niddah 1:24

Rebbi Hoshaia stated: If [a woman] gave birth and then converted, she has no period of purity. Rebbi Yose said, this is correct. If Rebbi Hoshaia had not stated this, would it have been a problem for us? Since she has no period of impurity, she cannot have a period of purity. It was stated: The proselyte, the captive, and the slave woman who were redeemed, or converted, or freed, have to wait three months, the words of Rebbi Judah. Rebbi Yose says, they do not have to wait. Their blood, Rebbi Jehudah says, is timed exactly; Rebbi Yose says, it makes impure 24 hours retroactively. Rebbi said, the words of Rebbi Yose are reasonable for the blood, and the words of Rebbi Judah for the child. But Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Yoḥanan, practice follows Rebbi Yose. Rebbi Abba bar Cohen asked before Rebbi Yose: For if it were not so, what could we say? Between Rebbi Jehudah and Rebbi Yose, practice does not follow Rebbi Yose? But because Rebbi said, “they are reasonable”. Did not Rebbi Abba say in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira, every time Rebbi taught “they are reasonable”, the disagreement is unresolved except in the case of the fig cake where each party to the controversy accepts the opposition’s argument. Rebbi Yose said, I stated a difficulty before Rebbi Ḥanina ben Rebbi Abbahu: Even if it is certain that they had sex? He said to him, is a normal Gentile not like one who had sex?

Jerusalem Talmud Niddah 3:24

Rebbi Yose ben Shaul asked before Rebbi: Can one refer a placenta to something which is not a child? He said to him, one does not refer a placenta to anything which is not a child. If it came out attached to it, what then? He said to him, one does not discuss anything impossible. Rebbi Ḥanin stated from Samuel: One does not refer a placenta to something which is not a child, if [nevertheless] it came out attached to something else, one refers to it. Samuel asked the students of Rav: Can one refer a placenta to stillbirths? They said to him, one refers a placenta to a child and one [does not] refer(s) a placenta to stillbirths. Samuel praised them because they follow the argument [of their teacher]. Rebbi Ḥanin stated from Samuel: One refers a placenta to a child but one does not refer a placenta to stillbirths since it does not separate until it [was completed]. Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of the rabbis: What you say, that one refers a placenta to a child, is because a pregnant woman does not become pregnant. Why does one not refer it to stillbirth, can a woman not have a stillbirth followed by a stillbirth? I say that she was pregnant with twins when the placenta of one amnion was crushed by the amnion of the other placenta. Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rav Jehudah in the name of Rav: One refers a placenta to a child for up to three days, and no child remains after another child for three days. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, he who said this also said the other, but they disagree with one another! Rebbi Abba said, Rav Jehudah explained it following Rav: You say that one refers a placenta to a child for up to three days if the child was born first, and you say that no child remains after another child for three days if the sole appeared first. Rebbi Mana said, is that correct? The active ones come out first. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, if [the womb] opened for the large, it opened for the small; if it opened for the small it did not open for the large.

The Babylonian Talmud

Babylonian Talmud Berakhot 1:63

How does R. Nathan answer this argument? He agrees with the opinion of R. Joshua ; for there is a Mishnaic teaching : R. Joshua says : Until the third hour [in the day may the morning Shema' be read], for so is the custom of kings to rise at the third hour. Six hours of the night and two of the day make two watches.

Babylonian Talmud Berakhot 1:374

According to R. Eleazar b. 'Azariah who uses the argument of Gezerah Shawah, it is quite right that it was necessary to state "in that night"; but how does R. 'Akiba explain the word "that"?

Babylonian Talmud Berakhot 2:145

And may we not use the a fortiori argument ? As the womb receives [the seed] in silence and yields up [the child] with loud cries, how much more so will the grave, which receives [the body] with loud cries [of lament], yield up with loud cries ! Hence a refutation of those who assert that the resurrection of the dead is not taught in the Torah.

Babylonian Talmud Berakhot 3:114

R. Johanan said : We derive the injunction to utter a benediction after reading the Torah from the Grace after meals by a fortiori argument, and the injunction to say Grace before meals from the benediction over the reading of the Torah by a similar method of reasoning. We derive the injunction to utter a benediction after reading the Torah from the Grace after meals by a fortiori argument : If a meal which requires no benediction before it requires one after it, is it not right that the reading of the Torah, which does require a benediction before it, should require one after it ! And we derive the injunction to say Grace after meals from the benediction over the reading of the Torah by a similar method of reasoning : If the reading of the Torah, which requires no benediction after it, requires one before it, is it not right that a meal, which does require a benediction after it, should require one before it !

Babylonian Talmud Berakhot 3:114

R. Johanan said : We derive the injunction to utter a benediction after reading the Torah from the Grace after meals by a fortiori argument, and the injunction to say Grace before meals from the benediction over the reading of the Torah by a similar method of reasoning. We derive the injunction to utter a benediction after reading the Torah from the Grace after meals by a fortiori argument : If a meal which requires no benediction before it requires one after it, is it not right that the reading of the Torah, which does require a benediction before it, should require one after it ! And we derive the injunction to say Grace after meals from the benediction over the reading of the Torah by a similar method of reasoning : If the reading of the Torah, which requires no benediction after it, requires one before it, is it not right that a meal, which does require a benediction after it, should require one before it !

Babylonian Talmud Berakhot 3:214

It is quoted in objection: "What I have permitted thee in one place I have forbidden thee in another, [and this is an argument a fortiori which cannot be refuted"] — does this not refer to the Tefillin? It is quite right if thou sayest that the above Baraita emanates from Bet Hillel; for then I have permitted thee elsewhere [to enter] a regular privy [with Tefillin], but here I forbid thee [to enter] a chance privy ! On the other hand, if thou sayest that it emanates from Bet Shammai, they do not permit it in either case !

Babylonian Talmud Berakhot 3:218

If this be so, that which is mentioned in the sequel, viz. "This is an argument a fortiori which cannot be refuted" — what means it cannot be refuted? It is a natural proceeding!

Babylonian Talmud Berakhot 3:222

If so, why does it mention "[This is an argument a fortiori] which cannot be refuted "? [What has just been said] is an excellent refutation !

Babylonian Talmud Berakhot 3:223

But this is what he means to say : This question [of carrying Tefillin in a regular privy but not a chance one] thou mayest argue with a reason; but thou must not argue it by means of a fortiori deduction, for if thou usest this method of argument, it is an argument which cannot be refuted.

Babylonian Talmud Berakhot 3:223

But this is what he means to say : This question [of carrying Tefillin in a regular privy but not a chance one] thou mayest argue with a reason; but thou must not argue it by means of a fortiori deduction, for if thou usest this method of argument, it is an argument which cannot be refuted.

Babylonian Talmud Berakhot 3:302

But against thine own argument, I quote the first clause [of the Baraita brought in objection, viz. :] "With urine, so long as the ground is wet enough to moisten it is prohibited" ; hence if the trace of it be recognisable, it is permitted! No such deduction can be drawn. It is possible to say that [the question under consideration]

Babylonian Talmud Berakhot 5:132

responded to him?" he replied "No," "And if thou hadst responded to him, what would they have done to thee?" He answered, "They would have cut off my head with the sword." He said to him, "May we not use the a fortiori argument : If thou standing before a human king, who is here to-day and to-morrow in the grave, actest thus, how much more so I who was standing before the supreme King of kings, the Holy One, blessed be He, Who lives and endures for all eternity?"