case
3217 occurrences across the corpus
The Babylonian Talmud
Whenever he came to 'Arabot he said the benediction "Blessed... Who hast wrought for me a miracle in 'Arabot and with the camel" ; and whenever he came to the market-place of Mahoza he said, "Blessed... Who hast wrought for me a miracle with the camel and in 'Arabot." They answer : In the case of a miracle wrought on behalf of the many, everybody is obliged to utter the benediction; but in the case of a miracle wrought on behalf of an individual, only he is obliged to say it. Our Rabbis have taught : He who beholds the fords of the [Red] Sea, or the fords of the Jordan, or the fords of the valleys of Arnon, or the hail-stones in the descent of Bet Horon, or the stone which Og, king of Bashan, sought to cast upon Israel, or the stone upon which Moses sat when Joshua fought against Amalek, or [the pillar of salt of] Lot's wife, or the wall of Jericho which was swallowed up in its place — over all these one must give thanks and praise before the All-present. It is quite right with the fords of the [Red] Sea ; for it is written,
Whoever prolongs his prayer and calculates on it will eventually come to pain of heart; as it is said, "Hope deferred maketh the heart sick" (Prov. 13:12). And R. Isaac said: Three things cause the sins of a man to be remembered ; viz. [passing under] a wall threatening to fall, calculating on prayer and surrendering one's case against a man to Heaven !
Rab Hisda said : [There is no reality in] any dream without a fast. Rab Hisda also said : An uninterpreted dream is like an unread letter. Rab Hisda also said : Neither a good nor a bad dream is fulfilled in every detail. Rab Hisda also said : A bad dream is preferable to a good dream. Rab Hisda also said : When a dream is bad, the pain it causes is sufficient [to prevent its fulfilment], and when the dream is good, the joy it brings is sufficient. Rab Joseph said : As for a good dream, even in my own case, its cheerfulness frustrates it [so that it is not realised]. Rab Hisda also said : A bad dream is worse than scourging ; as it is said, "God hath so made it that men should fear before Him" (Eccles. 3:14), and Rabbah b. Bar Hannah said in the name of R. Johanan : This refers to a bad dream.
He said to him : I dreamt that I was told, "Thy father has left thee property in Cappadocia." He asked, "Hast thou property in Cappadocia?" He replied, "No." "Hast thy father been to Cappadocia?" He answered, "No." "In that case Kappa means 'a beam' and Deka 'ten.' Go, examine the beam which heads number ten, for it is full of coins." He went and found it full of coins.
A Tanna taught in the presence of R. Johanan : To dream of any kind of liquids is a good omen, with the exception of wine. Some [dream they] drink it and it is a good omen for them, and some do so and it is a bad omen for them. There are some who [dream they] drink it and it is a good omen for them, as it is said, "Wine that maketh glad the heart of man" (Ps. civ. 15); and there are some who [dream they] drink it and it is a bad omen for them, as it is said, "Give strong drink unto him that is ready to perish, and wine unto the bitter in soul" (Prov. xxxi. 6). R. Johanan said to the Tanna : Teach that in the case of a
R. Shela flogged a certain man who had had intercourse with a gentile woman ; so he went and laid a charge against him before the king, saying, "There is a certain Jew who judges without the king's consent." The king sent an official for him [to appear]. When R. Shela came he was asked, "For what reason didst thou flog this person?" He replied, "Because he had intercourse with a she-ass." They said to him, "Hast thou witnesses?" He answered, "Yes." Elijah came in human guise and gave evidence. They said to him, "In that case, his punishment is death." He said to them, "From the day we were exiled from our land, we have no power to inflict the death-sentence ; but you do with him as you please."
While they were considering the case, R. Shela commenced saying, "Thine, O Lord, is the greatness and the power" etc. (I Chron. xxix. 11). They asked him, "What is it thou art saying?" He replied, "I am saying, 'Blessed be the All-merciful Who has made earthly kingship like the Kingship of Heaven and has given you power and love of justice'." They said, "The honour of the kingship is very dear to him." They thereupon handed to him the staff and said to him, "Do thou act as judge."
Rab Kattina said, "The necromancer lies and his words are false; for in that case, there should be one rumbling noise followed by another!" But it is not so ; there is really one rumbling noise followed by another, and the reason that Kattina did not acknowledge the necromancer's statement was that people should not be led astray after him.
But in a case where there is not another [sharing] with him, does he not use the benediction "Who art good and dispensest good"? Lo, there is a teaching : Should they announce to him "Thy wife has given birth to a son," he says "Blessed... Who art good and dispensest good" ! Even here, his wife [shares the joy] with him, because she has a preference for a son.
Against this is quoted : If he built a new house and he has not a similar one, or bought new vessels without possessing the like, he must say a benediction ; but if he has the like, he need not say the benediction. These are the words of R. Meir ; R. Judah says : In either case, a benediction is necessary !
But let the conflict of opinion [in the Baraita between R. Meir and R. Judah] be in the case where the man bought an article and then purchased another and no benediction is necessary, to show the extreme view taken by R. Judah! It is preferable to take the extreme view on the side of leniency.
Come and hear: [It has been taught:] To what distance may they go and remain clean? So long as one can see them! It is different with food-stuffs whose purity [must be supervised], because the Rabbis take a more lenient view in such a case.
He replied : The Tanna derives it from the shoe, and thou sayest [it should be derived] from the short cut — how can that be? For there is a teaching : A man must not enter the Temple Mount with his staff in his hand, his shoe upon his foot, and his money tied up in his cloth or in his money-bag thrown over his shoulder, nor may he make it a short cut ; and [the prohibition of] expectoration is derived a fortiori from the shoe — as in the case of a shoe which is not in itself contemptible the Torah declares, "Put off thy shoes from off thy feet" (Exod. iii. 5), must not expectoration, which is in itself contemptible, be all the more forbidden !
This is evident ! No, it is necessary for the case where the two of them are of equal standing.
R. Abin the Levite also said : One who takes leave of his friend should not say to him, "Go in peace" but "Go to peace"; because in the case of Jethro who said to Moses "Go to peace" (Exod. iv. 18), the latter advanced and prospered ; but in the case of David who said to Absalom "Go in peace" (II Sam. xv. 9), the latter went and was hanged.
R. Abin the Levite also said : One who takes leave of his friend should not say to him, "Go in peace" but "Go to peace"; because in the case of Jethro who said to Moses "Go to peace" (Exod. iv. 18), the latter advanced and prospered ; but in the case of David who said to Absalom "Go in peace" (II Sam. xv. 9), the latter went and was hanged.
And, if you wish, you may say that even with a toraitic mitzvah a remedy may be given, but with regard to the sukkah, since there are many rules about it, it was briefly stated, invalid. [While in the case of a cross-beam over] an alley, since it has only one rule, it taught a remedy.
He answered him: In that case, remove the Ashteroth Karnayim and there will remain the shade of the sukkah, but here, remove the walls, and you have no shade of a sukkah.
Now this [Baraisa] is well according to the authority who says that their difference of opinion was in the case where the walls did not reach the covering; Since it is the custom of a queen to sit in a sukkah whose walls do not reach the roof,
because of ventilation; but according to the ruling who states that they differed only in the case of a small’ Sukkah, is it then customary for a queen to sit in a small Sukkah? Rabbah bar Ada answered: The ruling was necessary only in the case of a Sukkah constructed with many recesses.
because of ventilation; but according to the ruling who states that they differed only in the case of a small’ Sukkah, is it then customary for a queen to sit in a small Sukkah? Rabbah bar Ada answered: The ruling was necessary only in the case of a Sukkah constructed with many recesses.
Is it then customary for a queen to sit in a sukkah with many recesses? ... Rav Ashi answered: [The ruling] was necessary only in the case of the recesses in it.
Say rather, The law of division does not apply to it, as [it does in the case of] a courtyard. For R' Huna ruled, ‘A courtyard is divided according to the number of its doors.’ (and) R' Chisda said, ‘Four amos are given for each door and the remainder is divided equally’.
If [a sukkah] was more than twenty cubits high and one built in it a pillar ten handbreadths high, and [the pillar] was large enough for a valid sukkah,[in this case] Abaye intended to draw the partitions upward,
But in any case is it not written, "He seizes hold of the face of His throne"? The throne was well lowered for his sake until [it reached a level] lower than ten handbreadths [from Heaven] and then he seized hold of it.
One can understand that the ark was nine [handbreadths high] since it is written, "And they shall make an ark of acacia wood: two cubits and a half shall be its length, and a cubit and a half its breadth, and a cubit and a half its height"(Exodus 25:10). But how do we know that the ark-cover was a handbreadth [high]? From that which R. Hanina taught: For all the vessels which Moses made, the Torah gave the measurements of their length and breadth and height, [except in the case of] the ark-cover, its length and its breadth are given, but not its height.
The traditional law comes [to teach] concerning one's hair, in agreement with a statement of Rabbah b. Bar Hana, or Rabbah b. Bar Hana stated: One knotted hair constitutes an interposition, three hairs do not, but I do not know [the law in the case of] two.
From the Torah if it is majority of one's hair and he does mind it, it interposes but if he doesn't mind it does not interpose. But they decreed concerning a case where it is a majority and he doesn't mind on account of a case where it is a majority and he does mind, and [they also decreed] concerning a case where it is a minority and he does mind it on account of a case where it is a majority and he does mind.
From the Torah if it is majority of one's hair and he does mind it, it interposes but if he doesn't mind it does not interpose. But they decreed concerning a case where it is a majority and he doesn't mind on account of a case where it is a majority and he does mind, and [they also decreed] concerning a case where it is a minority and he does mind it on account of a case where it is a majority and he does mind.
From the Torah if it is majority of one's hair and he does mind it, it interposes but if he doesn't mind it does not interpose. But they decreed concerning a case where it is a majority and he doesn't mind on account of a case where it is a majority and he does mind, and [they also decreed] concerning a case where it is a minority and he does mind it on account of a case where it is a majority and he does mind.
From the Torah if it is majority of one's hair and he does mind it, it interposes but if he doesn't mind it does not interpose. But they decreed concerning a case where it is a majority and he doesn't mind on account of a case where it is a majority and he does mind, and [they also decreed] concerning a case where it is a minority and he does mind it on account of a case where it is a majority and he does mind.
Let us also decree concerning a case where it is not a majority and he doesn't mind on account of a case where it is not a majority and he does mind, or on account of a case where it is a majority and he doesn't mind.
Let us also decree concerning a case where it is not a majority and he doesn't mind on account of a case where it is not a majority and he does mind, or on account of a case where it is a majority and he doesn't mind.
Let us also decree concerning a case where it is not a majority and he doesn't mind on account of a case where it is not a majority and he does mind, or on account of a case where it is a majority and he doesn't mind.
But why did you say in the previous case that one loose handbreadth suffices while here you say that there must be a strip of four handbreadths? There where there are two valid walls, a loose handbreadth suffices, but here where there are not two valid walls, if there is a strip of four handbreadths it is valid, otherwise, it is not [valid].
And the [law relating to] Shabbat is more [stringent] than that of Sukkah, in that a [wall for purposes of] the Sabbath is valid only if its standing portion is greater than its gaps, which is not the case with the Sukkah’
And the [law relating to] Shabbat is more [stringent] than that of Sukkah, in that a [wall for purposes of] the Sabbath is valid only if its standing portion is greater than its gaps, which is not the case with the Sukkah’
And [all the three laws were] necessary. For if he had mentioned only [the law relating to] the alleyway one would have assumed [that there the sukkah is valid] because it had two proper walls, but that in the case of partitions of wells, which do not have not two proper walls, the sukkah is not valid.
That applies only to a circle, but in the case of a square, a greater perimeter is required.
That is so in the case of a circle inscribed within a square, but if a square is to be inscribed within a circle a greater circumference is required on account of the projection of the corners....
How many [cubits] does this[amount to]? Eighteen; while sixteen and four-fifths would be enough. That is [then] what was meant [when it was stated] that he only gave an approximate figure; and in this case it is in the direction of stringency.
That [phrase] is needed to exclude a stolen [Sukkah]. But in the other case too it is needed to exclude stolen [tzitzit]?
In that case there is another verse, "And they shall make for themselves" (Numbers 15:38) of their own.
But even where the sun is more than the shade, so what? Behold he joins invalid skhakh with valid skhakh? R. Papa answered: [This is a case] where he interwove [the branches of the tree].
If the branches were interwoven, why mention the case at all? One might have thought that it should be prohibited where it is interwoven lest he regard it as valid even where it was not interwoven, [therefore the mishnah] informs us that we don't decree against it.
Now to what case does this refer? Now to what case does this refer? If I say where he did not interweave them, then behold he joins the invalid covering to the valid one? Rather it refers to a case where one did interweave them; and we learn from here that we don't decree against this?What might you have thought? That [this is permissible] only ex post facto but not ab initio, hence we were informed
Now to what case does this refer? Now to what case does this refer? If I say where he did not interweave them, then behold he joins the invalid covering to the valid one? Rather it refers to a case where one did interweave them; and we learn from here that we don't decree against this?What might you have thought? That [this is permissible] only ex post facto but not ab initio, hence we were informed
Now to what case does this refer? Now to what case does this refer? If I say where he did not interweave them, then behold he joins the invalid covering to the valid one? Rather it refers to a case where one did interweave them; and we learn from here that we don't decree against this?What might you have thought? That [this is permissible] only ex post facto but not ab initio, hence we were informed
Come and hear: He who sleeps in a canopied bed in a Sukkah has not fulfilled his obligation? Here we are dealing with a case of one that was ten [handbreadths] high.
Come and hear: or if he spread [a sheet] over the frame of a four-post bed, [the sukkah] is invalid? There also it is a case where they are ten [handbreadths] high
Kinofoth are different, since they are permanent. But, behold the case of one Sukkah above another, which is also permanent; and Shmuel nevertheless said, ‘As its validity so is its invalidity’? They said: In the latter case, [when it is a question] of invalidating a Sukkah, [the upper one must be ten [handbreadths] high, but here, [where it is a question] of making a tent, even less than ten [handbreadths suffices] also to constitute a tent.
Kinofoth are different, since they are permanent. But, behold the case of one Sukkah above another, which is also permanent; and Shmuel nevertheless said, ‘As its validity so is its invalidity’? They said: In the latter case, [when it is a question] of invalidating a Sukkah, [the upper one must be ten [handbreadths] high, but here, [where it is a question] of making a tent, even less than ten [handbreadths suffices] also to constitute a tent.
It was objected: He who sleeps in a canopied bed naked may not put his head out of it and read the Shema? The latter refers to a case where [the canopy] was ten [handbreadths] high.
This stands to reason also, since it was stated in the final clause To what can it be compared? To a man standing naked in a house, in which case he may not put his head out of the window and read the Shema’. Learn from this.
It was objected: He who sleeps in a canopied bed in a Sukkah has not fulfilled his obligations? Here we are dealing with the case of one which has a roof.
R. Huna said to him: That has been said by Shmuel! R. Joseph turned away his face [in annoyance] and retorted, Did I say to you that Shmuel did not say it? Rav said it and Shmuel also said it. R. Huna said back to him: This is what I meant to say to you: that, Shmuel said it, and not Rav, for Rav declares it valid [without shaking], As in the case of R. Amram the Pious who attached fringes to the aprons of the women of his house. He hung them but he did not cut off the ends of the threads.
When he came before R. Hiyya b. Ashi the latter said to him: Thus said Rav, [In such a case the threads] may be cut and they are valid. Thus it is obvious that their cutting is considered their making, so too here, their cutting is considered their making.
How so? If you say that it is a case where one did not cut them, why did he give the reason ‘"You shall make" but not from that which is already made’? Let him rather give the reason that they are joined to the ground? Consequently it must be a case where he cut them, and yet it is taught that they are invalid. Learn from this that we do not say that their cutting is their making. And this is a refutation of Rav?
How so? If you say that it is a case where one did not cut them, why did he give the reason ‘"You shall make" but not from that which is already made’? Let him rather give the reason that they are joined to the ground? Consequently it must be a case where he cut them, and yet it is taught that they are invalid. Learn from this that we do not say that their cutting is their making. And this is a refutation of Rav?
Rav could answer that here we are dealing with a case where he pulled them [from the trunk] so that their ‘making’ is not apparent. In any case, [the baraita] "he inserted them and then cut their ends" is a difficulty against Rav? It is a difficulty.
Rav could answer that here we are dealing with a case where he pulled them [from the trunk] so that their ‘making’ is not apparent. In any case, [the baraita] "he inserted them and then cut their ends" is a difficulty against Rav? It is a difficulty.
it is invalid, because of the possible use of a storehouse, but according to Toraitic law it is valid; While in the other case where it is stated "it is not a sukkah," it implies that even when he has made it, it is not a sukkah, even from the Torah.
R. Abba said: These cone-shaped bundles of willows, as soon as the top-knots are untied they are valid [as skhakh]. But are they not still tied at the bottom? R. Papa answered, [This is a case] where he loosens them.
To R. Abba this is certainly a tannaitic dispute. But shall we say that it is also a tannaitic dispute according to R. Menashye bar Gada? All agree that he who harvests grain for skhakh does not render the ‘handles’ susceptible to uncleanliness, but here we are dealing with a particular case where he harvests them for food, and then changed his mind [and used them] for skhakh.
But if he cut them for food, what is the reason [for the view] of the rabbis? And if you will answer that the rabbis are of the opinion that since he changed his mind about them [to use them] for skhakh, his original intention becomes annulled, [it may be objected], does then one's intention become annulled in such a case? Have we not learned: All vessels
That in the previous case also, he actually threshed them. If so, what is the reason of the ‘others’? They hold the same opinion as R. Yose, as we have learned, R. Yose declares them susceptible to uncleanness.
What is this [comparison]? One can understand there the reason of R. Yose, that [the stalks] have a use according to R. Shimon ben Lakish, as R. Shimon b. Lakish said, Since one can [the more easily] turn them with the pitchfork. But in this case, what use do they have?
Rav said: The dispute is in a case of planks which are four [handbreadths wide], for R. Meir holds that this is forbidden as a decree against [the possible use of] an ordinary roof, while R. Judah holds that there is not a decree against [the possible use of] an ordinary roof. But in the case of planks which are less than four handbreadths wide all agree that the Sukkah is valid. Shmuel however says that the dispute concerns planks which are less than four [handbreadths wide], but if they are four [handbreadths wide], they are invalid according to all.
Rav said: The dispute is in a case of planks which are four [handbreadths wide], for R. Meir holds that this is forbidden as a decree against [the possible use of] an ordinary roof, while R. Judah holds that there is not a decree against [the possible use of] an ordinary roof. But in the case of planks which are less than four handbreadths wide all agree that the Sukkah is valid. Shmuel however says that the dispute concerns planks which are less than four [handbreadths wide], but if they are four [handbreadths wide], they are invalid according to all.
If they are ‘less than four’ and even less than three? But [in this case] are they not mere sticks?
Indeed [it is a case] where there are four handbreadths, and what [is meant by] "combine" they combine to form four cubits at the side
How so? Surely that he placed them on their sides? No! Here we are dealing with a case where he placed it above the entrance of the sukkah, with three [of the four handbreadths] within and one protruding outside, in which case it is considered as a waste (skhakh) protruding from the Sukkah, and every waste (skhakh) protruding from a Sukkah is regarded as [part of the] Sukkah.
How so? Surely that he placed them on their sides? No! Here we are dealing with a case where he placed it above the entrance of the sukkah, with three [of the four handbreadths] within and one protruding outside, in which case it is considered as a waste (skhakh) protruding from the Sukkah, and every waste (skhakh) protruding from a Sukkah is regarded as [part of the] Sukkah.
This is correct according to Rav who says that the dispute is where the planks are four [handbreadths wide], since in such a case R. Meir holds that we decree lest one come to use ordinary roofing while R. Judah says we don't decree lest one use ordinary roofing But according to Shmuel, who says that the dispute is where the planks are not four [handbreadths wide], but that where they are four handbreadths wide all agree that it is invalid, on what principle do they dispute in the latter [Mishnah]?
But is it not possible to measure them exactly’? R. Ammi answered: This is a case where he makes it larger.
Similarly in the case of a courtyard which is surrounded by columns. A large sukkah which was surrounded with material which is invalid for skhakh, if there is a space of four cubits beneath it, it is invalid.
Gemara. Why are all these [rulings] needed? It is necessary [to state them all]. For if he had only informed us of [the roof of] a house which had been opened, [one would have said that the validity applied to this case only] because the partitions are made for the house, but in the case of a courtyard which is surrounded by columns, where the partitions are not made for the walls are not made for the columns it does not apply.
Gemara. Why are all these [rulings] needed? It is necessary [to state them all]. For if he had only informed us of [the roof of] a house which had been opened, [one would have said that the validity applied to this case only] because the partitions are made for the house, but in the case of a courtyard which is surrounded by columns, where the partitions are not made for the walls are not made for the columns it does not apply.
And if he had informed us of those two, [one would have said that the validity applied to these cases only] because their skhakh is valid, but in the case of a large sukkah which is surrounded with a material which is invalid for a sukkah covering, since the skhakh itself is invalid, it does not apply [therefore it is] necessary [to mention all].
because [in this case the validity of the sukkah depends on] whether there is the standard size or not, and there is not the standard size, for since their standard sizes are unequal, they do not combine;
because [in this case the validity of the sukkah depends on] whether there is the standard size or not, and there is not the standard size, for since their standard sizes are unequal, they do not combine;
And in any case where the minimum measures are not equal they don't join together? Have we not in fact learned: a garment that is three [handbreadths] square, sacking four handbreadths square, leather five handbreadths square and matting six handbreadths square[are susceptible to uncleanness].
In that case the reason has been given, as Rabbi Shimon said: "What is the reason? Since they are susceptible to uncleanliness if [a zav] sits on them, as we have learned: if he cuts from any one of them a piece one handbreadth square, it is susceptible to uncleanliness’.
This is indeed a case where they are each four handbreadths wide; and what does ‘combine’ mean? That they combine to make up four cubits at the side.
What is the reason of him who says that the rule of lavud applies in the middle? — Because it has been taught: If a beam protrudes from one wall but does not touch the opposite wall, and similarly in the case of two beams, one protruding from one wall and one from the other and not touching each other, if [the space between them is] less than three [handbreadths] it is unnecessary to provide another beam; if it is three [handbreadths] it is necessary to provide another beam. And [what does] the other [answer to this]?
Rava said to Abaye: according to you who say that the edge of the roof [is regarded as though it] descends and fills in [the space, is a sukkah valid] even if the middle wall is missing? .He answered him, In that case I agree with you [that the Sukkah is invalid] since it would be like an alley-way that is open on two opposite sides.
They only differ with regard to the opinion of Rav. Abaye agrees with Rav, while Rava can say that Rav ruled then only in that case, since the partitions are made for the exedra, but in the case here, since they are not made for this purpose [he would] not [rule thus].
They only differ with regard to the opinion of Rav. Abaye agrees with Rav, while Rava can say that Rav ruled then only in that case, since the partitions are made for the exedra, but in the case here, since they are not made for this purpose [he would] not [rule thus].
We have learned: similarly in the case of a courtyard which is surrounded with an exedra. But why? Should it not rather be assumed that the edge of the roof descends and fills in [the space]?
Rava explained according to Abaye that this is a case where one made the beams level.
But do we not need three walls? [This refers to a case] where there were [three walls]. But do we not need the size prescribed as a minimum for the validity of a Sukkah? But do we not need the size prescribed as a minimum for the validity of a Sukkah? But do we not need that the shade should exceed the sun? [This refers to] where there was [more shade than sun].
Rabbah b. Bar Hana said in the name of R. Yohanan: it was necessary only in the case of a Sukkah, most of which has more shade than sun, while a minor part of it has more sun than shade. What might one have said? That this small portion invalidates it, therefore he informs us [that it does not]. What then is meant by ‘going out’? [It means] going out from the validity of a Sukkah.
R. Oshaia said: This is necessary only in the case of a small sukkah which has invalid skhakh to an extent of less than three [handbreadths]. And what is meant by ‘going out’? Going out from the laws governing a Sukkah.
R. Abba answered him, [The difference is that] in the former case it combines [with the rest of the Sukkah] and it is permitted to sleep under it; in the latter case it does not combine and it is forbidden to sleep under it.
R. Abba answered him, [The difference is that] in the former case it combines [with the rest of the Sukkah] and it is permitted to sleep under it; in the latter case it does not combine and it is forbidden to sleep under it.
This is no difficulty. The former case refers to a large [mat], the latter to a small one.
Rather Rava said: In the case of a large [mat] all agree that if made without specific purpose [it is assumed to be intended] for a covering. They only differ in the case of a small [mat]. The first Tanna holds that ordinarily a small one is for reclining upon, and R. Eliezer holds that ordinarily a small one is for a covering as well.
Rather Rava said: In the case of a large [mat] all agree that if made without specific purpose [it is assumed to be intended] for a covering. They only differ in the case of a small [mat]. The first Tanna holds that ordinarily a small one is for reclining upon, and R. Eliezer holds that ordinarily a small one is for a covering as well.
When R. Dimi came he said in the name of R. Elazar, R. Judah agrees in, the case [of a ‘tent’ that is as large as] a fistful. So it has also been taught: R. Judah admits in the case of overhanging crags and clefts of rocks.
When R. Dimi came he said in the name of R. Elazar, R. Judah agrees in, the case [of a ‘tent’ that is as large as] a fistful. So it has also been taught: R. Judah admits in the case of overhanging crags and clefts of rocks.