consistent

This, then, is the account of the blessed Polycarp, who, being the twelfth that was martyred in Smyrna (reckoning those also of Philadelphia), yet occupies a place of his own in the memory of all men, insomuch that he is everywhere spoken of by the heathen themselves. He was not merely an illustrious teacher, but also a pre-eminent martyr, whose martyrdom all desire to imitate, as having been altogether consistent with the gospel of Christ. For, having through patience overcome the unjust governor, and thus acquired the crown of immortality, he now, with the apostles and all the righteous [in heaven], rejoicingly glorifies God, even the Father, and blesses our Lord Jesus Christ, the Saviour of our souls, the Governor of our bodies, and the Shepherd of the catholic church throughout the world.

AS for Seth, when he was seven years old, he knew good and evil, and was consistent in fasting and praying, and spent all his nights in entreating God for mercy and forgiveness.

And he replied, 'Look always to your own fame and your own supreme position, that you may speak and think only such things as are consistent therewith, knowing that all your subjects think and talk about you. For you must not appear to be worse than the actors, who study carefully the role, which it is necessary for them to play, and shape all their actions in accordance with it. You are not acting a part, but are really a king, since God has bestowed upon you a royal authority in keeping with your character.'

It was not many days before Booz, after the barley was winnowed, slept in his thrashing-floor. When Naomi was informed of this circumstance she contrived it so that Ruth should lie down by him, for she thought it might be for their advantage that he should discourse with the girl. Accordingly she sent the damsel to sleep at his feet; who went as she bade her, for she did not think it consistent with her duty to contradict any command of her mother-in-law. And at first she lay concealed from Booz, as he was fast asleep; but when he awaked about midnight, and perceived a woman lying by him, he asked who she was;—and when she told him her name, and desired that he whom she owned for her lord would excuse her, he then said no more; but in the morning, before the servants began to set about their work, he awaked her, and bid her take as much barley as she was able to carry, and go to her mother-in-law before any body there should see that she had lain down by him, because it was but prudent to avoid any reproach that might arise on that account, especially when there had been nothing done that was ill. But as to the main point she aimed at, the matter should rest here,—"He that is nearer of kin than I am, shall be asked whether he wants to take thee to wife: if he says he does, thou shalt follow him; but if he refuse it, I will marry thee, according to the law."

After this fight was over, Vespasian sat upon his tribunal at Taricheae, in order to distinguish the foreigners from the old inhabitants; for those foreigners appear to have begun the war. So he deliberated with the other commanders, whether he ought to save those old inhabitants or not. And when those commanders alleged that the dismission of them would be to his own disadvantage, because, when they were once set at liberty, they would not be at rest, since they would be people destitute of proper habitations, and would be able to compel such as they fled to fight against us, Vespasian acknowledged that they did not deserve to be saved, and that if they had leave given them to fly away, they would make use of it against those that gave them that leave. But still he considered with himself after what manner they should be slain for if he had them slain there, he suspected the people of the country would thereby become his enemies; for that to be sure they would never bear it, that so many that had been supplicants to him should be killed; and to offer violence to them, after he had given them assurances of their lives, he could not himself bear to do it. However, his friends were too hard for him, and pretended that nothing against Jews could be any impiety, and that he ought to prefer what was profitable before what was fit to be done, where both could not be made consistent. So he gave them an ambiguous liberty to do as they advised, and permitted the prisoners to go along no other road than that which led to Tiberias only. So they readily believed what they desired to be true, and went along securely, with their effects, the way which was allowed them, while the Romans seized upon all the road that led to Tiberias, that none of them might go out of it, and shut them up in the city. Then came Vespasian, and ordered them all to stand in the stadium, and commanded them to kill the old men, together with the others that were useless, which were in number a thousand and two hundred. Out of the young men he chose six thousand of the strongest, and sent them to Nero, to dig through the Isthmus, and sold the remainder for slaves, being thirty thousand and four hundred, besides such as he made a present of to Agrippa; for as to those that belonged to his kingdom, he gave him leave to do what he pleased with them; however, the king sold these also for slaves; but for the rest of the multitude, who were Trachonites, and Gaulanites, and of Hippos, and some of Gadara, the greatest part of them were seditious persons and fugitives, who were of such shameful characters, that they preferred war before peace. These prisoners were taken on the eighth day of the month Gorpieus [Elul].

But besides this, Apion objects to us thus: "If the Jews [says he] be citizens of Alexandria, why do they not worship the same gods with the Alexandrians?" To which I give this answer: Since you are yourselves Egyptians, why do you fight it out one against another, and have implacable wars about your religion? At this rate we must not call you all Egyptians, nor indeed in general men, because you breed up with great care beasts of a nature quite contrary to that of men, although the nature of all men seems to be one and the same. Now if there be such differences in opinion among you Egyptians, why are you surprised that those who came to Alexandria from another country, and had original laws of their own before, should persevere in the observance of those laws? But still he charges us with being the authors of sedition; which accusation, if it be a just one, why is it not laid against us all, since we are known to be all of one mind. Moreover, those that search into such matters will soon discover that the authors of sedition have been such citizens of Alexandria as Apion is; for while they were the Grecians and Macedonians who were ill possession of this city, there was no sedition raised against us, and we were permitted to observe our ancient solemnities; but when the number of the Egyptians therein came to be considerable, the times grew confused, and then these seditions brake out still more and more, while our people continued uncorrupted. These Egyptians, therefore, were the authors of these troubles, who having not the constancy of Macedonians, nor the prudence of Grecians, indulged all of them the evil manners of the Egyptians, and continued their ancient hatred against us; for what is here so presumptuously charged upon us, is owing to the differences that are amongst themselves; while many of them have not obtained the privileges of citizens in proper times, but style those who are well known to have had that privilege extended to them all no other than foreigners: for it does not appear that any of the kings have ever formerly bestowed those privileges of citizens upon Egyptians, no more than have the emperors done it more lately; while it was Alexander who introduced us into this city at first, the kings augmented our privileges therein, and the Romans have been pleased to preserve them always inviolable. Moreover, Apion would lay a blot upon us, because we do not erect images for our emperors; as if those emperors did not know this before, or stood in need of Apion as their defender; whereas he ought rather to have admired the magnanimity and modesty of the Romans, whereby they do not compel those that are subject to them to transgress the laws of their countries, but are willing to receive the honors due to them after such a manner as those who are to pay them esteem consistent with piety and with their own laws; for they do not thank people for conferring honors upon them, When they are compelled by violence so to do. Accordingly, since the Grecians and some other nations think it a right thing to make images, nay, when they have painted the pictures of their parents, and wives, and children, they exult for joy; and some there are who take pictures for themselves of such persons as were no way related to them; nay, some take the pictures of such servants as they were fond of; what wonder is it then if such as these appear willing to pay the same respect to their princes and lords? But then our legislator hath forbidden us to make images, not by way of denunciation beforehand, that the Roman authority was not to be honored, but as despising a thing that was neither necessary nor useful for either God or man; and he forbade them, as we shall prove hereafter, to make these images for any part of the animal creation, and much less for God himself, who is no part of such animal creation. Yet hath our legislator no where forbidden us to pay honors to worthy men, provided they be of another kind, and inferior to those we pay to God; with which honors we willingly testify our respect to our emperors, and to the people of Rome; we also offer perpetual sacrifices for them; nor do we only offer them every day at the common expenses of all the Jews, but although we offer no other such sacrifices out of our common expenses, no, not for our own children, yet do we this as a peculiar honor to the emperors, and to them alone, while we do the same to no other person whomsoever. And let this suffice for an answer in general to Apion, as to what he says with relation to the Alexandrian Jews.

To explain the matter more fully, it will not appear absurd to make use of an illustration, although on a subject of so much difficulty it is not easy to obtain suitable illustrations. However, if we may speak without offence, the metal iron is capable of cold and heat. If, then, a mass of iron be kept constantly in the fire, receiving the heat through all its pores and veins, and the fire being continuous and the iron never removed from it, it become wholly converted into the latter; could we at all say of this, which is by nature a mass of iron, that when placed in the fire, and incessantly burning, it was at any time capable of admitting cold? On the contrary, because it is more consistent with truth, do we not rather say, what we often see happening in furnaces, that it has become wholly fire, seeing nothing but fire is visible in it? And if any one were to attempt to touch or handle it, he would experience the action not of iron, but of fire. In this way, then, that soul which, like an iron in the fire, has been perpetually placed in the Word, and perpetually in the Wisdom, and perpetually in God, is God in all that it does, feels, and understands, and therefore can be called neither convertible nor mutable, inasmuch as, being incessantly heated, it possessed immutability from its union with the Word of God. To all the saints, finally, some warmth from the Word of God must be supposed to have passed; and in this soul the divine fire itself must be believed to have rested, from which some warmth may have passed to others. Lastly, the expression, “God, thy God, anointed thee with the oil of gladness above thy fellows,” shows that that soul is anointed in one way with the oil of gladness, i.e. with the word of God and wisdom; and his fellows, i.e. the holy prophets and apostles, in another. For they are said to have “run in the odour of his ointments;” and that soul was the vessel which contained that very ointment of whose fragrance all the worthy prophets and apostles were made partakers. As, then, the substance of an ointment is one thing and its odour another, so also Christ is one thing and His fellows another. And as the vessel itself, which contains the substance of the ointment, can by no means admit any foul smell; whereas it is possible that those who enjoy its odour may, if they remove a little way from its fragrance, receive any foul odour which comes upon them: so, in the same way, was it impossible that Christ, being as it were the vessel itself, in which was the substance of the ointment, should receive an odour of an opposite kind, while they who are His “fellows” will be partakers and receivers of His odour, in proportion to their nearness to the vessel.

Seeing, then, that all things which have been created are said to have been made through Christ, and in Christ, as the Apostle Paul most clearly indicates, when he says, “For in Him and by Him were all things created, whether things in heaven or things on earth, visible and invisible, whether they be thrones, or powers, or principalities, or dominions; all things were created by Him, and in Him;” and as in his Gospel John indicates the same thing, saying, “In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God: the same was in the beginning with God: all things were made by Him; and without Him was not anything made;” and as in the Psalm also it is written, “In wisdom hast Thou made them all;”—seeing, then, Christ is, as it were, the Word and Wisdom, and so also the Righteousness, it will undoubtedly follow that those things which were created in the Word and Wisdom are said to be created also in that righteousness which is Christ; that in created things there may appear to be nothing unrighteous or accidental, but that all things may be shown to be in conformity with the law of equity and righteousness. How, then, so great a variety of things, and so great a diversity, can be understood to be altogether just and righteous, I am sure no human power or language can explain, unless as prostrate suppliants we pray to the Word, and Wisdom, and Righteousness Himself, who is the only-begotten Son of God, and who, pouring Himself by His graces into our senses, may deign to illuminate what is dark, to lay open what is concealed, and to reveal what is secret; if, indeed, we should be found either to seek, or ask, or knock so worthily as to deserve to receive when we ask, or to find when we seek, or to have it opened to us when we knock. Not relying, then, on our own powers, but on the help of that Wisdom which made all things, and of that Righteousness which we believe to be in all His creatures, although we are in the meantime unable to declare it, yet, trusting in His mercy, we shall endeavour to examine and inquire how that great variety and diversity in the world may appear to be consistent with all righteousness and reason. I mean, of course, merely reason in general; for it would be a mark of ignorance either to seek, or of folly to give, a special reason for each individual case.

But with respect to the declaration of the apostle, “Therefore hath He mercy on whom He will have mercy, and whom He will He hardeneth. Thou wilt say then unto me, Why doth He yet find fault? For who hath resisted His will? Nay but, O man, who art thou that repliest against God? Shall the thing formed say to him that formed it, Why hast thou made me thus? Hath not the potter power over the clay, of the same lump to make one vessel unto honour, and another unto dishonour?” Some one will perhaps say, that as the potter out of the same lump makes some vessels to honour, and others to dishonour, so God creates some men for perdition, and others for salvation; and that it is not therefore in our own power either to be saved or to perish; by which reasoning we appear not to be possessed of free-will. We must answer those who are of this opinion with the question, Whether it is possible for the apostle to contradict himself? And if this cannot be imagined of an apostle, how shall he appear, according to them, to be just in blaming those who committed fornication in Corinth, or those who sinned, and did not repent of their unchastity, and fornication, and uncleanness, which they had committed? How, also, does he greatly praise those who acted rightly, like the house of Onesiphorus, saying, “The Lord give mercy to the house of Onesiphorus; for he oft refreshed me, and was not ashamed of my chain: but, when he had come to Rome, he sought me out very diligently, and found me. The Lord grant unto him that he may find mercy of the Lord in that day.” Now it is not consistent with apostolic gravity to blame him who is worthy of blame, i.e. who has sinned, and greatly to praise him who is deserving of praise for his good works; and again, as if it were in no one’s power to do any good or evil, to say that it was the Creator’s doing that every one should act virtuously or wickedly, seeing He makes one vessel to honour, and another to dishonour. And how can he add that statement, “We must all stand before the judgment-seat of Christ, that every one of us may receive in his body, according to what he hath done, whether it be good or bad?” For what reward of good will be conferred on him who could not commit evil, being formed by the Creator to that very end? or what punishment will deservedly be inflicted on him who was unable to do good in consequence of the creative act of his Maker? Then, again, how is not this opposed to that other declaration elsewhere, that “in a great house there are not only vessels of gold and silver, but also of wood and of earth, and some to honour, and some to dishonour. If a man therefore purge himself from these, he shall be a vessel unto honour, sanctified, and meet for the Master’s use, prepared unto every good work.” He, accordingly, who purges himself, is made a vessel unto honour, while he who has disdained to cleanse himself from his impurity is made a vessel unto dishonour. From such declarations, in my opinion, the cause of our actions can in no degree be referred to the Creator. For God the Creator makes a certain vessel unto honour, and other vessels to dishonour; but that vessel which has cleansed itself from all impurity He makes a vessel unto honour, while that which has stained itself with the filth of vice He makes a vessel unto dishonour. The conclusion from which, accordingly, is this, that the cause of each one’s actions is a pre-existing one; and then every one, according to his deserts, is made by God either a vessel unto honour or dishonour. Therefore every individual vessel has furnished to its Creator out of itself the causes and occasions of its being formed by Him to be either a vessel unto honour or one unto dishonour. And if the assertion appear correct, as it certainly is, and in harmony with all piety, that it is due to previous causes that every vessel be prepared by God either to honour or to dishonour, it does not appear absurd that, in discussing remoter causes in the same order, and in the same method, we should come to the same conclusion respecting the nature of souls, and [believe] that this was the reason why Jacob was beloved before he was born into this world, and Esau hated, while he still was contained in the womb of his mother.

Still the declaration of the apostle will appear to drag us to the conclusion that we are not possessed of freedom of will, in which, objecting against himself, he says, “Therefore hath He mercy on whom He will have mercy, and whom He will He hardeneth. Thou wilt say then unto me, Why doth He yet find fault? For who hath resisted His will? Nay but, O man, who art thou that repliest against God? Shall the thing formed say to him that formed it, Why hast thou made me thus? Hath not the potter power over the clay, of the same lump to make one vessel unto honour, and another unto dishonour?” For it will be said: If the potter of the same lump make some vessels to honour and others to dishonour, and God thus form some men for salvation and others for ruin, then salvation or ruin does not depend upon ourselves, nor are we possessed of free-will. Now we must ask him who deals so with these passages, whether it is possible to conceive of the apostle as contradicting himself. I presume, however, that no one will venture to say so. If, then, the apostle does not utter contradictions, how can he, according to him who so understands him, reasonably find fault, censuring the individual at Corinth who had committed fornication, or those who had fallen away, and had not repented of the licentiousness and impurity of which they had been guilty? And how can he bless those whom he praises as having done well, as he does the house of Onesiphorus in these words: “The Lord give mercy to the house of Onesiphorus; for he oft refreshed me, and was not ashamed of my chain: but, when he was in Rome, he sought me out very diligently, and found me. The Lord grant to him that he may find mercy of the Lord in that day.” It is not consistent for the same apostle to blame the sinner as worthy of censure, and to praise him who had done well as deserving of approval; and again, on the other hand, to say, as if nothing depended on ourselves, that the cause was in the Creator why the one vessel was formed to honour, and the other to dishonour. And how is this statement correct: “For we must all appear before the judgment-seat of Christ; that every one may receive the things done in his body, according to that he hath done, whether it be good or bad,” since they who have done evil have advanced to this pitch of wickedness because they were created vessels unto dishonour, while they that have lived virtuously have done good because they were created from the beginning for this purpose, and became vessels unto honour? And again, how does not the statement made elsewhere conflict with the view which these persons draw from the words which we have quoted (that it is the fault of the Creator that one vessel is in honour and another in dishonour), viz. “that in a great house there are not only vessels of gold and silver, but also of wood and of earth; and some to honour, and some to dishonour. If a man therefore purge himself, he shall be a vessel unto honour, sanctified, and meet for the Master’s use, and prepared unto every good work;” for if he who purges himself becomes a vessel unto honour, and he who allows himself to remain unpurged becomes a vessel unto dishonour, then, so far as these words are concerned, the Creator is not at all to blame. For the Creator makes vessels of honour and vessels of dishonour, not from the beginning according to His foreknowledge, since He does not condemn or justify beforehand according to it; but [He makes] those into vessels of honour who purged themselves, and those into vessels of dishonour who allowed themselves to remain unpurged: so that it results from older causes [which operated] in the formation of the vessels unto honour and dishonour, that one was created for the former condition, and another for the latter. But if we once admit that there were certain older causes [at work] in the forming of a vessel unto honour, and of one unto dishonour, what absurdity is there in going back to the subject of the soul, and [in supposing] that a more ancient cause for Jacob being loved and for Esau being hated existed with respect to Jacob before his assumption of a body, and with regard to Esau before he was conceived in the womb of Rebecca?

It will not, I consider, be opposed to the nature of our undertaking, if we restate with all possible brevity our opinions on the immortality of rational natures. Every one who participates in anything, is unquestionably of one essence and nature with him who is partaker of the same thing. For example, as all eyes participate in the light, so accordingly all eyes which partake of the light are of one nature; but although every eye partakes of the light, yet, inasmuch as one sees more clearly, and another more obscurely, every eye does not equally share in the light. And again, all hearing receives voice or sound, and therefore all hearing is of one nature; but each one hears more rapidly or more slowly, according as the quality of his hearing is clear and sound. Let us pass now from these sensuous illustrations to the consideration of intellectual things. Every mind which partakes of intellectual light ought undoubtedly to be of one nature with every mind which partakes in a similar manner of intellectual light. If the heavenly virtues, then, partake of intellectual light, i.e. of divine nature, because they participate in wisdom and holiness, and if human souls have partaken of the same light and wisdom, and thus are mutually of one nature and of one essence,—then, since the heavenly virtues are incorruptible and immortal, the essence of the human soul will also be immortal and incorruptible. And not only so, but because the nature of Father, and Son, and Holy Spirit, of whose intellectual light alone all created things have a share, is incorruptible and eternal, it is altogether consistent and necessary that every substance which partakes of that eternal nature should last for ever, and be incorruptible and eternal, so that the eternity of divine goodness may be understood also in this respect, that they who obtain its benefits are also eternal. But as, in the instances referred to, a diversity in the participation of the light was observed, when the glance of the beholder was described as being duller or more acute, so also a diversity is to be noted in the participation of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, varying with the degree of zeal or capacity of mind. If such were not the case, we have to consider whether it would not seem to be an act of impiety to say that the mind which is capable of [receiving] God should admit of a destruction of its essence; as if the very fact that it is able to feel and understand God could not suffice for its perpetual existence, especially since, if even through neglect the mind fall away from a pure and complete reception of God, it nevertheless contains within it certain seeds of restoration and renewal to a better understanding, seeing the “inner,” which is also called the “rational” man, is renewed after “the image and likeness of God, who created him.” And therefore the prophet says, “All the ends of the earth shall remember, and turn unto the Lord; and all the kindreds of the nations shall worship before Thee.”

After this he continues: “These herdsmen and shepherds concluded that there was but one God, named either the Highest, or Adonai, or the Heavenly, or Sabaoth, or called by some other of those names which they delight to give this world; and they knew nothing beyond that.” And in a subsequent part of his work he says, that “It makes no difference whether the God who is over all things be called by the name of Zeus, which is current among the Greeks, or by that, e.g., which is in use among the Indians or Egyptians.” Now, in answer to this, we have to remark that this involves a deep and mysterious subject—that, viz., respecting the nature of names: it being a question whether, as Aristotle thinks, names were bestowed by arrangement, or, as the Stoics hold, by nature; the first words being imitations of things, agreeably to which the names were formed, and in conformity with which they introduce certain principles of etymology; or whether, as Epicurus teaches (differing in this from the Stoics), names were given by nature,—the first men having uttered certain words varying with the circumstances in which they found themselves. If, then, we shall be able to establish, in reference to the preceding statement, the nature of powerful names, some of which are used by the learned amongst the Egyptians, or by the Magi among the Persians, and by the Indian philosophers called Brahmans, or by the Samanæans, and others in different countries; and shall be able to make out that the so-called magic is not, as the followers of Epicurus and Aristotle suppose, an altogether uncertain thing, but is, as those skilled in it prove, a consistent system, having words which are known to exceedingly few; then we say that the name Sabaoth, and Adonai, and the other names treated with so much reverence among the Hebrews, are not applicable to any ordinary created things, but belong to a secret theology which refers to the Framer of all things. These names, accordingly, when pronounced with that attendant train of circumstances which is appropriate to their nature, are possessed of great power; and other names, again, current in the Egyptian tongue, are efficacious against certain demons who can only do certain things; and other names in the Persian language have corresponding power over other spirits; and so on in every individual nation, for different purposes. And thus it will be found that, of the various demons upon the earth, to whom different localities have been assigned, each one bears a name appropriate to the several dialects of place and country. He, therefore, who has a nobler idea, however small, of these matters, will be careful not to apply differing names to different things; lest he should resemble those who mistakenly apply the name of God to lifeless matter, or who drag down the title of “the Good” from the First Cause, or from virtue and excellence, and apply it to blind Plutus, and to a healthy and well-proportioned mixture of flesh and blood and bones, or to what is considered to be noble birth.

But let us see the manner in which this Celsus, who professes to know everything, brings a false accusation against the Jews, when he alleges that “they worship angels, and are addicted to sorcery, in which Moses was their instructor.” Now, in what part of the writings of Moses he found the lawgiver laying down the worship of angels, let him tell, who professes to know all about Christianity and Judaism; and let him show also how sorcery can exist among those who have accepted the Mosaic law, and read the injunction, “Neither seek after wizards, to be defiled by them.” Moreover, he promises to show afterwards “how it was through ignorance that the Jews were deceived and led into error.” Now, if he had discovered that the ignorance of the Jews regarding Christ was the effect of their not having heard the prophecies about Him, he would show with truth how the Jews fell into error. But without any wish whatever that this should appear, he views as Jewish errors what are no errors at all. And Celsus having promised to make us acquainted, in a subsequent part of his work, with the doctrines of Judaism, proceeds in the first place to speak of our Saviour as having been the leader of our generation, in so far as we are Christians, and says that “a few years ago he began to teach this doctrine, being regarded by Christians as the Son of God.” Now, with respect to this point—His prior existence a few years ago—we have to remark as follows. Could it have come to pass without divine assistance, that Jesus, desiring during these years to spread abroad His words and teaching, should have been so successful, that everywhere throughout the world, not a few persons, Greeks as well as Barbarians, learned as well as ignorant, adopted His doctrine, so that they struggled even to death in its defence, rather than deny it, which no one is ever related to have done for any other system? I indeed, from no wish to flatter Christianity, but from a desire thoroughly to examine the facts, would say that even those who are engaged in the healing of numbers of sick persons, do not attain their object—the cure of the body—without divine help; and if one were to succeed in delivering souls from a flood of wickedness, and excesses, and acts of injustice, and from a contempt of God, and were to show, as evidence of such a result, one hundred persons improved in their natures (let us suppose the number to be so large), no one would reasonably say that it was without divine assistance that he had implanted in those hundred individuals a doctrine capable of removing so many evils. And if any one, on a candid consideration of these things, shall admit that no improvement ever takes place among men without divine help, how much more confidently shall he make the same assertion regarding Jesus, when he compares the former lives of many converts to His doctrine with their after conduct, and reflects in what acts of licentiousness and injustice and covetousness they formerly indulged, until, as Celsus, and they who think with him, allege, “they were deceived,” and accepted a doctrine which, as these individuals assert, is destructive of the life of men; but who, from the time that they adopted it, have become in some way meeker, and more religious, and more consistent, so that certain among them, from a desire of exceeding chastity, and a wish to worship God with greater purity, abstain even from the permitted indulgences of [lawful] love.

And since Jesus, in teaching His disciples not to be guilty of rashness, gave them the precept, “If they persecute you in this city, flee ye into another; and if they persecute you in the other, flee again into a third,” to which teaching He added the example of a consistent life, acting so as not to expose Himself to danger rashly, or unseasonably, or without good grounds; from this Celsus takes occasion to bring a malicious and slanderous accusation,—the Jew whom he brings forward saying to Jesus, “In company with your disciples you go and hide yourself in different places.” Now similar to what has thus been made the ground of a slanderous charge against Jesus and His disciples, do we say was the conduct recorded of Aristotle. This philosopher, seeing that a court was about to be summoned to try him, on the ground of his being guilty of impiety on account of certain of his philosophical tenets which the Athenians regarded as impious, withdrew from Athens, and fixed his school in Chalcis, defending his course of procedure to his friends by saying, “Let us depart from Athens, that we may not give the Athenians a handle for incurring guilt a second time, as formerly in the case of Socrates, and so prevent them from committing a second act of impiety against philosophy.” He further says, “that Jesus went about with his disciples, and obtained his livelihood in a disgraceful and importunate manner.” Let him show wherein lay the disgraceful and importunate element in their manner of subsistence. For it is related in the Gospels, that there were certain women who had been healed of their diseases, among whom also was Susanna, who from their own possessions afforded the disciples the means of support. And who is there among philosophers, that, when devoting himself to the service of his acquaintances, is not in the habit of receiving from them what is needful for his wants? Or is it only in them that such acts are proper and becoming; but when the disciples of Jesus do the same, they are accused by Celsus of obtaining their livelihood by disgraceful importunity?

The first book of our answer to the treatise of Celsus, entitled A True Discourse, which concluded with the representation of the Jew addressing Jesus, having now extended to a sufficient length, we intend the present part as a reply to the charges brought by him against those who have been converted from Judaism to Christianity. And we call attention, in the first place, to this special question, viz. why Celsus, when he had once resolved upon the introduction of individuals upon the stage of his book, did not represent the Jew as addressing the converts from heathenism rather than those from Judaism, seeing that his discourse, if directed to us, would have appeared more likely to produce an impression. But probably this claimant to universal knowledge does not know what is appropriate in the matter of such representations; and therefore let us proceed to consider what he has to say to the converts from Judaism. He asserts that “they have forsaken the law of their fathers, in consequence of their minds being led captive by Jesus; that they have been most ridiculously deceived, and that they have become deserters to another name and to another mode of life.” Here he has not observed that the Jewish converts have not deserted the law of their fathers, inasmuch as they live according to its prescriptions, receiving their very name from the poverty of the law, according to the literal acceptation of the word; for Ebion signifies “poor” among the Jews, and those Jews who have received Jesus as Christ are called by the name of Ebionites. Nay, Peter himself seems to have observed for a considerable time the Jewish observances enjoined by the law of Moses, not having yet learned from Jesus to ascend from the law that is regulated according to the letter, to that which is interpreted according to the spirit,—a fact which we learn from the Acts of the Apostles. For on the day after the angel of God appeared to Cornelius, suggesting to him “to send to Joppa, to Simon surnamed Peter,” Peter “went up into the upper room to pray about the sixth hour. And he became very hungry, and would have eaten: but while they made ready he fell into a trance, and saw heaven opened, and a certain vessel descending unto him, as it had been a great sheet knit at the four corners, and let down to the earth; wherein were all manner of four-footed beasts, and creeping things of the earth, and fowls of the air. And there came a voice to him, Rise, Peter; kill, and eat. But Peter said, Not so, Lord; for I have never eaten anything that is common or unclean. And the voice spake unto him again the second time, What God hath cleansed, that call thou not common.” Now observe how, by this instance, Peter is represented as still observing the Jewish customs respecting clean and unclean animals. And from the narrative that follows, it is manifest that he, as being yet a Jew, and living according to their traditions, and despising those who were beyond the pale of Judaism, stood in need of a vision to lead him to communicate to Cornelius (who was not an Israelite according to the flesh), and to those who were with him, the word of faith. Moreover, in the Epistle to the Galatians, Paul states that Peter, still from fear of the Jews, ceased upon the arrival of James to eat with the Gentiles, and “separated himself from them, fearing them that were of the circumcision;” and the rest of the Jews, and Barnabas also, followed the same course. And certainly it was quite consistent that those should not abstain from the observance of Jewish usages who were sent to minister to the circumcision, when they who “seemed to be pillars” gave the right hand of fellowship to Paul and Barnabas, in order that, while devoting themselves to the circumcision, the latter might preach to the Gentiles. And why do I mention that they who preached to the circumcision withdrew and separated themselves from the heathen, when even Paul himself “became as a Jew to the Jews, that he might gain the Jews?” Wherefore also in the Acts of the Apostles it is related that he even brought an offering to the altar, that he might satisfy the Jews that he was no apostate from their law. Now, if Celsus had been acquainted with all these circumstances, he would not have represented the Jew holding such language as this to the converts from Judaism: “What induced you, my fellow-citizens, to abandon the law of your fathers, and to allow your minds to be led captive by him with whom we have just conversed, and thus be most ridiculously deluded, so as to become deserters from us to another name, and to the practices of another life?”

Extremely foolish also is his remark, “What God, or spirit, or prudent man would not, on foreseeing that such events were to befall him, avoid them if he could; whereas he threw himself headlong into those things which he knew beforehand were to happen?” And yet Socrates knew that he would die after drinking the hemlock, and it was in his power, if he had allowed himself to be persuaded by Crito, by escaping from prison, to avoid these calamities; but nevertheless he decided, as it appeared to him consistent with right reason, that it was better for him to die as became a philosopher, than to retain his life in a manner unbecoming one. Leonidas also, the Lacedemonian general, knowing that he was on the point of dying with his followers at Thermopylæ, did not make any effort to preserve his life by disgraceful means, but said to his companions, “Let us go to breakfast, as we shall sup in Hades.” And those who are interested in collecting stories of this kind, will find numbers of them. Now, where is the wonder if Jesus, knowing all things that were to happen, did not avoid them, but encountered what He foreknew; when Paul, His own disciple, having heard what would befall him when he went up to Jerusalem, proceeded to face the danger, reproaching those who were weeping around him, and endeavouring to prevent him from going up to Jerusalem? Many also of our contemporaries, knowing well that if they made a confession of Christianity they would be put to death, but that if they denied it they would be liberated, and their property restored, despised life, and voluntarily selected death for the sake of their religion.

Celsus, indeed, evinced a slight knowledge of Scripture when he made Jesus say, that it is “a certain Satan who contrives such devices;” although he begs the question when he asserts that “Jesus did not deny that these works have in them nothing of divinity, but proceed from wicked men,” for he makes things which differ in kind to be the same. Now, as a wolf is not of the same species as a dog, although it may appear to have some resemblance in the figure of its body and in its voice, nor a common wood-pigeon the same as a dove, so there is no resemblance between what is done by the power of God and what is the effect of sorcery. And we might further say, in answer to the calumnies of Celsus, Are those to be regarded as miracles which are wrought through sorcery by wicked demons, but those not which are performed by a nature that is holy and divine? and does human life endure the worse, but never receive the better? Now it appears to me that we must lay it down as a general principle, that as, wherever anything that is evil would make itself to be of the same nature with the good, there must by all means be something that is good opposed to the evil; so also, in opposition to those things which are brought about by sorcery, there must also of necessity be some things in human life which are the result of divine power. And it follows from the same, that we must either annihilate both, and assert that neither exists, or, assuming the one, and particularly the evil, admit also the reality of the good. Now, if one were to lay it down that works are wrought by means of sorcery, but would not grant that there are also works which are the product of divine power, he would seem to me to resemble him who should admit the existence of sophisms and plausible arguments, which have the appearance of establishing the truth, although really undermining it, while denying that truth had anywhere a home among men, or a dialectic which differed from sophistry. But if we once admit that it is consistent with the existence of magic and sorcery (which derive their power from evil demons, who are spell-bound by elaborate incantations, and become subject to sorcerers) that some works must be found among men which proceed from a power that is divine, why shall we not test those who profess to perform them by their lives and morals, and the consequences of their miracles, viz. whether they tend to the injury of men or to the reformation of conduct? What minister of evil demons, e.g., can do such things? and by means of what incantations and magic arts? And who, on the other hand, is it that, having his soul and his spirit, and I imagine also his body, in a pure and holy state, receives a divine spirit, and performs such works in order to benefit men, and to lead them to believe on the true God? But if we must once investigate (without being carried away by the miracles themselves) who it is that performs them by help of a good, and who by help of an evil power, so that we may neither slander all without discrimination, nor yet admire and accept all as divine, will it not be manifest, from what occurred in the times of Moses and Jesus, when entire nations were established in consequence of their miracles, that these men wrought by means of divine power what they are recorded to have performed? For wickedness and sorcery would not have led a whole nation to rise not only above idols and images erected by men, but also above all created things, and to ascend to the uncreated origin of the God of the universe.

Now if these things be so, why should it not be consistent with reason to hold with regard to Jesus, who was able to effect results so great, that there dwelt in Him no ordinary divinity? while this was not the case either with the Proconnesian Aristeas (although Apollo would have him regarded as a god), or with the other individuals enumerated by Celsus when he says, “No one regards Abaris the Hyperborean as a god, who was possessed of such power as to be borne along like an arrow from a bow.” For with what object did the deity who bestowed upon this Hyperborean Abaris the power of being carried along like an arrow, confer upon him such a gift? Was it that the human race might be benefited thereby, or did he himself obtain any advantage from the possession of such a power?—always supposing it to be conceded that these statements are not wholly inventions, but that the thing actually happened through the co-operation of some demon. But if it be recorded that my Jesus was received up into glory, I perceive the divine arrangement in such an act, viz. because God, who brought this to pass, commends in this way the Teacher to those who witnessed it, in order that as men who are contending not for human doctrine, but for divine teaching, they may devote themselves as far as possible to the God who is over all, and may do all things in order to please Him, as those who are to receive in the divine judgment the reward of the good or evil which they have wrought in this life.

But will not those narratives, especially when they are understood in their proper sense, appear far more worthy of respect than the story that Dionysus was deceived by the Titans, and expelled from the throne of Jupiter, and torn in pieces by them, and his remains being afterwards put together again, he returned as it were once more to life, and ascended to heaven? Or are the Greeks at liberty to refer such stories to the doctrine of the soul, and to interpret them figuratively, while the door of a consistent explanation, and one everywhere in accord and harmony with the writings of the Divine Spirit, who had His abode in pure souls, is closed against us? Celsus, then, is altogether ignorant of the purpose of our writings, and it is therefore upon his own acceptation of them that he casts discredit, and not upon their real meaning; whereas, if he had reflected on what is appropriate to a soul which is to enjoy an everlasting life, and on the opinion which we are to form of its essence and principles, he would not so have ridiculed the entrance of the immortal into a mortal body, which took place not according to the metempsychosis of Plato, but agreeably to another and higher view of things. And he would have observed one “descent,” distinguished by its great benevolence, undertaken to convert (as the Scripture mystically terms them) the “lost sheep of the house of Israel,” which had strayed down from the mountains, and to which the Shepherd is said in certain parables to have gone down, leaving on the mountains those “which had not strayed.”

Celsus, however, says that it is only “the course of mortal things which, according to the appointed cycles, must always be the same in the past, present, and future;” whereas the majority of the Stoics maintain that this is the case not only with the course of mortal, but also with that of immortal things, and of those whom they regard as gods. For after the conflagration of the world, which has taken place countless times in the past, and will happen countless times in the future, there has been, and will be, the same arrangement of all things from the beginning to the end. The Stoics, indeed, in endeavouring to parry, I don’t know how, the objections raised to their views, allege that as cycle after cycle returns, all men will be altogether unchanged from those who lived in former cycles; so that Socrates will not live again, but one altogether like to Socrates, who will marry a wife exactly like Xanthippe, and will be accused by men exactly like Anytus and Melitus. I do not understand, however, how the world is to be always the same, and one individual not different from another, and yet the things in it not the same, though exactly alike. But the main argument in answer to the statements of Celsus and of the Stoics will be more appropriately investigated elsewhere, since on the present occasion it is not consistent with the purpose we have in view to expatiate on these points.

God, then, gives to each thing its own body as He pleases: as in the case of plants that are sown, so also in the case of those beings who are, as it were, sown in dying, and who in due time receive, out of what has been “sown,” the body assigned by God to each one according to his deserts. And we may hear, moreover, the Scripture teaching us at great length the difference between that which is, as it were, “sown,” and that which is, as it were, “raised” from it, in these words: “It is sown in corruption, it is raised in incorruption; it is sown in dishonour, it is raised in glory; it is sown in weakness, it is raised in power; it is sown a natural body, it is raised a spiritual body.” And let him who has the capacity understand the meaning of the words: “As is the earthy, such are they also that are earthy; and as is the heavenly, such are they also that are heavenly. And as we have borne the image of the earthy, we shall also bear the image of the heavenly.” And although the apostle wished to conceal the secret meaning of the passage, which was not adapted to the simpler class of believers, and to the understanding of the common people, who are led by their faith to enter on a better course of life, he was nevertheless obliged afterwards to say (in order that we might not misapprehend his meaning), after “Let us bear the image of the heavenly,” these words also: “Now this I say, brethren, that flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of God; neither doth corruption inherit incorruption.” Then, knowing that there was a secret and mystical meaning in the passage, as was becoming in one who was leaving, in his epistles, to those who were to come after him words full of significance, he subjoins the following, “Behold, I show you a mystery;” which is his usual style in introducing matters of a profounder and more mystical nature, and such as are fittingly concealed from the multitude, as is written in the book of Tobit: “It is good to keep close the secret of a king, but honourable to reveal the works of God,”—in a way consistent with truth and God’s glory, and so as to be to the advantage of the multitude. Our hope, then, is not “the hope of worms, nor does our soul long for a body that has seen corruption;” for although it may require a body, for the sake of moving from place to place, yet it understands (as having meditated on the wisdom [that is from above], agreeably to the declaration, “The mouth of the righteous will speak wisdom”) the difference between the “earthly house,” in which is the tabernacle of the building that is to be dissolved, and that in which the righteous do groan, being burdened,—not wishing to “put off” the tabernacle, but to be “clothed therewith,” that by being clothed upon, mortality might be swallowed up of life. For, in virtue of the whole nature of the body being corruptible, the corruptible tabernacle must put on incorruption; and its other part, being mortal, and becoming liable to the death which follows sin, must put on immortality, in order that, when the corruptible shall have put on incorruption, and the mortal immortality, then shall come to pass what was predicted of old by the prophets,—the annihilation of the “victory” of death (because it had conquered and subjected us to his sway), and of its “sting,” with which it stings the imperfectly defended soul, and inflicts upon it the wounds which result from sin.

Passages, indeed, might be found where corporeal and external [benefits] are improperly called “good,”—those things, viz., which contribute to the natural life, while those which do the reverse are termed “evil.” It is in this sense that Job says to his wife: “If we have received good at the hand of the Lord, shall we not also receive evil?” Since, then, there is found in the sacred Scriptures, in a certain passage, this statement put into the mouth of God, “I make peace, and create evil;” and again another, where it is said of Him that “evil came down from the Lord to the gate of Jerusalem, the noise of chariots and horsemen,”—passages which have disturbed many readers of Scripture, who are unable to see what Scripture means by “good” and “evil,”—it is probable that Celsus, being perplexed thereby, gave utterance to the question, “How is it that God created evil?” or, perhaps, having heard some one discussing the matters relating to it in an ignorant manner, he made this statement which we have noticed. We, on the other hand, maintain that “evil,” or “wickedness,” and the actions which proceed from it, were not created by God. For if God created that which is really evil, how was it possible that the proclamation regarding [the last] judgment should be confidently announced, which informs us that the wicked are to be punished for their evil deeds in proportion to the amount of their wickedness, while those who have lived a virtuous life, or performed virtuous actions, will be in the enjoyment of blessedness, and will receive rewards from God? I am well aware that those who would daringly assert that these evils were created by God will quote certain expressions of Scripture [in their support], because we are not able to show one consistent series of passages; for although Scripture [generally] blames the wicked and approves of the righteous, it nevertheless contains some statements which, although comparatively few in number, seem to disturb the minds of ignorant readers of Holy Scripture. I have not, however, deemed it appropriate to my present treatise to quote on the present occasion those discordant statements, which are many in number, and their explanations, which would require a long array of proofs. Evils, then, if those be meant which are properly so called, were not created by God; but some, although few in comparison with the order of the whole world, have resulted from His principal works, as there follow from the chief works of the carpenter such things as spiral shavings and sawdust, or as architects might appear to be the cause of the rubbish which lies around their buildings in the form of the filth which drops from the stones and the plaster.

Again, not understanding the meaning of the words, “And God ended on the sixth day His works which He had made, and ceased on the seventh day from all His works which He had made: and God blessed the seventh day, and hallowed it, because on it He had ceased from all His works which He had begun to make;” and imagining the expression, “He ceased on the seventh day,” to be the same as this, “He rested on the seventh day,” he makes the remark: “After this, indeed, he is weary, like a very bad workman, who stands in need of rest to refresh himself!” For he knows nothing of the day of the Sabbath and rest of God, which follows the completion of the world’s creation, and which lasts during the duration of the world, and in which all those will keep festival with God who have done all their works in their six days, and who, because they have omitted none of their duties, will ascend to the contemplation [of celestial things], and to the assembly of righteous and blessed beings. In the next place, as if either the Scriptures made such a statement, or as if we ourselves so spoke of God as having rested from fatigue, he continues: “It is not in keeping with the fitness of things that the first God should feel fatigue, or work with His hands, or give forth commands.” Celsus says, that “it is not in keeping with the fitness of things that the first God should feel fatigue.” Now we would say that neither does God the Word feel fatigue, nor any of those beings who belong to a better and diviner order of things, because the sensation of fatigue is peculiar to those who are in the body. You can examine whether this is true of those who possess a body of any kind, or of those who have an earthly body, or one a little better than this. But “neither is it consistent with the fitness of things that the first God should work with His own hands.” If you understand the words “work with His own hands” literally, then neither are they applicable to the second God, nor to any other being partaking of divinity. But suppose that they are spoken in an improper and figurative sense, so that we may translate the following expressions, “And the firmament showeth forth His handywork,” and “the heavens are the work of Thy hands,” and any other similar phrases, in a figurative manner, so far as respects the “hands” and “limbs” of Deity, where is the absurdity in the words, “God thus working with His own hands?” And as there is no absurdity in God thus working, so neither is there in His issuing “commands;” so that what is done at His bidding should be beautiful and praiseworthy, because it was God who commanded it to be performed.

But since he sends us to Hercules, let him repeat to us any of his sayings, and let him justify his shameful subjection to Omphale. Let him show that divine honours should be paid to one who, like a highway robber, carries off a farmer’s ox by force, and afterwards devours it, amusing himself meanwhile with the curses of the owner; in memory of which even to this day sacrifices offered to the demon of Hercules are accompanied with curses. Again he proposes Æsculapius to us, as if to oblige us to repeat what we have said already; but we forbear. In regard to Orpheus, what does he admire in him to make him assert that, by common consent, he was regarded as a divinely inspired man, and lived a noble life? I am greatly deceived if it is not the desire which Celsus has to oppose us and put down Jesus that leads him to sound forth the praises of Orpheus; and whether, when he made himself acquainted with his impious fables about the gods, he did not cast them aside as deserving, even more than the poems of Homer, to be excluded from a well-ordered state. For, indeed, Orpheus says much worse things than Homer of those whom they call gods. Noble, indeed, it was in Anaxarchus to say to Aristocreon, tyrant of Cyprus, “Beat on, beat the shell of Anaxarchus,” but it is the one admirable incident in the life of Anaxarchus known to the Greeks; and although, on the strength of that, some like Celsus might deservedly honour the man for his courage, yet to look up to Anaxarchus as a god is not consistent with reason. He also directs us to Epictetus, whose firmness is justly admired, although his saying when his leg was broken by his master is not to be compared with the marvellous acts and words of Jesus which Celsus refuses to believe; and these words were accompanied by such a divine power, that even to this day they convert not only some of the more ignorant and simple, but many also of the most enlightened of men.

Rebbi Vivan in the name of Rebbi Yoḥanan: It turns out that the House of Shammai is consistent with Rebbi Yose and the House of Hillel with Rebbi Meïr, since we have stated there (Mishnah Kelim 25:7): “Rebbi Meïr said, for impure and pure hands. Rebbi Yose said, they spoke only about pure hands.”

“One does not have to mention, etc.” Rebbi Ismael is consistent since Rebbi Ismael said the ‘omer may not come from Syria; the harvesting of the ‘omer is different, it is a commandment.

“One may sprinkle with water on white dust, the words of Rebbi Simeon; Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob forbids it.” Rebbi Simeon follows the rabbis and Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob is consistent, as we have stated there: “One may continue [to draw] water from tree to tree on condition not to water the entire field.” Rebbi Mana said it anonymously, Rebbi Abin in the name of Samuel: They disagree anonymously. Where are we holding? If they are widely spaced, it is forbidden according to everybody, if they are tightly planted, it is permitted according to everybody. But we deal with the case that they are planted ten to a bet seah. Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob makes them widely spaced, the rabbis make them tightly planted. So the rabbis said, if they are widely spaced, it is forbidden to irrigate. May one continue? Let us learn the opinion of the rabbis from that of Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob. Just as Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob says, it is forbidden to irrigate but permitted to continue, so the rabbis say it is permitted to continue but forbidden to irrigate. Did we not think that according to everybody if they are widely spaced, it is forbidden; but is white dust not when they are widely spaced? But here it is the Sabbatical, there the holiday.

It was stated in the name of Rebbi Meïr: “All trees can be exempted by intention except olive and fig trees.” Rebbi Meïr is consistent since he says all trees are futile except olive and fig trees.

HALAKHAH: There is written abomination about the menstruating woman, and there is written abomination about idolatry, and there is written abomination about vermin. There is written abomination about the menstruating woman, for anybody who would commit any of these abomination s, etc. Abomination about idolatry, and do not bring any abomination into your house, etc. Abomination about vermin, do not eat any abomination. But I do not know to which of them it was compared. Rebbi Aqiba says, it was compared to abomination regarding the menstruating woman. As the menstruating woman imparts impurity by load, also idolatry imparts impurity by load. Or since the menstruating woman imparts impurity through a cover stone, does idolatry impart impurity through a cover stone? Rebbi Zeriqan in the name of Rav Jehudah, but some say in the name of Rav Ḥisda: Rebbi Aqiba agrees with the Sages that idolatry does not impart impurity through a cover stone. But the rabbis say it was compared to abomination s of vermin. As vermin imparts impurity by motion, so also idolatry imparts impurity by motion. Or as vermin in the size of a lentil imparts impurity does idolatry in the size of a lentil also impart impurity? Rebbi Zeˋira, Rebbi Isaac bar Naḥman in the name of Rebbi Eleazar, Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: They were yoked to Baal Peor and ate sacrifices to the dead. As the dead in the volume of an olive impart impurity so idolatry in the volume of an olive imparts impurity. Or since a corpse imparts impurity once a person puts his finger tips in, could I think that idolatry imparts once a person puts his finger tips in? Tearing down, tearing down from the leprous house. Since in a leprous house when he entered with his head and most of his body, so idolatry when he entered with his head and most of his body. Rebbi Ḥanania said, this means that the impurity of idolatry is not consistent. For otherwise, why does one compare if for the facile [impurity] and does not compare for the strict? Rebbi Mana said, it is consistent. Why was it compared to a corpse and to vermin? To inform in both cases about the facile [impurity] attached to it. This is for a broken idol. But a whole one even in the most minute size, as Rebbi Ḥuna, Rebbi Ḥama bar Gorion said in the name of Rav: Baal was the penis gland in the form of a bean: They selected the Baal of circumcision as god.

HALAKHAH: There is written abomination about the menstruating woman, and there is written abomination about idolatry, and there is written abomination about vermin. There is written abomination about the menstruating woman, for anybody who would commit any of these abomination s, etc. Abomination about idolatry, and do not bring any abomination into your house, etc. Abomination about vermin, do not eat any abomination. But I do not know to which of them it was compared. Rebbi Aqiba says, it was compared to abomination regarding the menstruating woman. As the menstruating woman imparts impurity by load, also idolatry imparts impurity by load. Or since the menstruating woman imparts impurity through a cover stone, does idolatry impart impurity through a cover stone? Rebbi Zeriqan in the name of Rav Jehudah, but some say in the name of Rav Ḥisda: Rebbi Aqiba agrees with the Sages that idolatry does not impart impurity through a cover stone. But the rabbis say it was compared to abomination s of vermin. As vermin imparts impurity by motion, so also idolatry imparts impurity by motion. Or as vermin in the size of a lentil imparts impurity does idolatry in the size of a lentil also impart impurity? Rebbi Zeˋira, Rebbi Isaac bar Naḥman in the name of Rebbi Eleazar, Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: They were yoked to Baal Peor and ate sacrifices to the dead. As the dead in the volume of an olive impart impurity so idolatry in the volume of an olive imparts impurity. Or since a corpse imparts impurity once a person puts his finger tips in, could I think that idolatry imparts once a person puts his finger tips in? Tearing down, tearing down from the leprous house. Since in a leprous house when he entered with his head and most of his body, so idolatry when he entered with his head and most of his body. Rebbi Ḥanania said, this means that the impurity of idolatry is not consistent. For otherwise, why does one compare if for the facile [impurity] and does not compare for the strict? Rebbi Mana said, it is consistent. Why was it compared to a corpse and to vermin? To inform in both cases about the facile [impurity] attached to it. This is for a broken idol. But a whole one even in the most minute size, as Rebbi Ḥuna, Rebbi Ḥama bar Gorion said in the name of Rav: Baal was the penis gland in the form of a bean: They selected the Baal of circumcision as god.

They asked before Rebbi Yose: Since you say about implements which were resting anywhere in the courtyard one may move them in the entire courtyard, similarly concerning implements which were resting anywhere in a dead-end street, may one move them in the entire dead-end street? They asked him in Šabbat and he did not answer since Rebbi Yose said each matter only at its place. When they came to Eruvin he told them in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: one may move implements which were resting anywhere in a dead-end street in the entire dead-end street; similarly implements which were resting in a courtyard one may move in the entire courtyard; Rav said, one may move them only four cubits. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, Rav is consistent and Rebbi Johanan is consistent. Since Rebbi Joḥanan says that a beam permits without participation, it is he who says that one may move in the entire dead-end street. Since Rav said that a beam does not permit without participation, it is he who says that one may move them only within four cubits. In Rebbi Joḥanan’s opinion, why does one participate in the entire dead-end street? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, to make all domains one.

They asked before Rebbi Yose: Since you say about implements which were resting anywhere in the courtyard one may move them in the entire courtyard, similarly concerning implements which were resting anywhere in a dead-end street, may one move them in the entire dead-end street? They asked him in Šabbat and he did not answer since Rebbi Yose said each matter only at its place. When they came to Eruvin he told them in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: one may move implements which were resting anywhere in a dead-end street in the entire dead-end street; similarly implements which were resting in a courtyard one may move in the entire courtyard; Rav said, one may move them only four cubits. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, Rav is consistent and Rebbi Johanan is consistent. Since Rebbi Joḥanan says that a beam permits without participation, it is he who says that one may move in the entire dead-end street. Since Rav said that a beam does not permit without participation, it is he who says that one may move them only within four cubits. In Rebbi Joḥanan’s opinion, why does one participate in the entire dead-end street? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, to make all domains one.

They asked before Rebbi Yasa: Since you say about implements which were resting anywhere in the courtyard, one may move them in the entire courtyard, similarly concerning implements which were resting anywhere in a dead-end street, may one move them in the entire dead-end street? They asked him in Šabbat and he did not answer since Rebbi Yasa said, each matter only at its place. When they came to Eruvin he told them in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: one may move implements which were resting anywhere in a dead-end street in the entire dead-end street. Rav said, one may move them only four cubits. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, Rav is consistent and Rebbi Johanan is consistent. Since Rebbi Joḥanan says that a beam permits without participation, it is he who says that one may move in the entire dead-end street. Since Rav said that a beam does not permit without participation, it is he who says that one may move it only within four cubits. In Rebbi Joḥanan’s opinion, why does one participate in the entire dead-end street? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, to make all domains as one.

They asked before Rebbi Yasa: Since you say about implements which were resting anywhere in the courtyard, one may move them in the entire courtyard, similarly concerning implements which were resting anywhere in a dead-end street, may one move them in the entire dead-end street? They asked him in Šabbat and he did not answer since Rebbi Yasa said, each matter only at its place. When they came to Eruvin he told them in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: one may move implements which were resting anywhere in a dead-end street in the entire dead-end street. Rav said, one may move them only four cubits. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, Rav is consistent and Rebbi Johanan is consistent. Since Rebbi Joḥanan says that a beam permits without participation, it is he who says that one may move in the entire dead-end street. Since Rav said that a beam does not permit without participation, it is he who says that one may move it only within four cubits. In Rebbi Joḥanan’s opinion, why does one participate in the entire dead-end street? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, to make all domains as one.

Rebbi Jeremiah said that Rebbi Samuel bar Rav Isaac asked: May one check by the light of torches? What is his problem? Because their light is unsteady. Rebbi Samuel bar Rav Isaac is consistent since Rebbi Samuel bar Rav Isaac said, because a candle permits checking everywhere. [ Even though it is not proof of the matter, it is an allusion to the matter: It shall be on that daythat I shall search Jerusalem by candles. But some want to say,] one can understand it from the following: A candle of the Eternal is a person’s soul, it searches all rooms of the body.

Rebbi Yasa asked: Why does Rebbi Yose say, this is not the implication? Rebbi Yasa had heard that Rebbi Joḥanan said, “from the words of Rebbi Aqiba and Rebbi Ḥananiah the executive officer of the Cohanim,” and he had heard that Bar Qappara said, “original impurity is a word from the Torah, derivative impurity is of their words.” But he had not heard that Rebbi Joḥanan had said, “both these and those are words of the Torah.” Therefore, he was asking: Just as it is permitted to burn what is (rabbinically) [biblically] forbidden with what is biblically impure, since one burns what is (rabbinically) [biblically] impure with what is biblically impure, so it should be permitted to burn what is (biblically) [rabbinically] forbidden with what is biblically impure since one burns what is (biblically) [rabbinically] impure with what is biblically impure. But there must be a difference between prohibition and impurity. And Rebbi Yasa said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Everybody agrees that on the Sixteenth one burns pure and impure heave [together]. Just as you did not make a difference for us between biblical prohibition and biblical impurity since one burns what is biblically impure with what is biblically impure, so you should not make a difference for us between what is rabbinically forbidden with what is biblically impure since one burns what is rabbinically impure with what is biblically impure. But it must be that both these and those are words of the Torah. There came Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba from Tyre and said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: both these and those are words of the Torah, and I said, it is correct. There (rabbinic) [biblical] impurity with biblical impurity but here biblical disqualification with biblical impurity. Therefore Rebbi Yose said, this is not the implication. The position of Rebbi Joḥanan is difficult for Rebbi Meïr; therefore Rebbi Yose said, this is not the implication. Bar Qappara must argue like Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, as Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, from the words of Rebbi Eliezer and the words of Rebbi Joshua. Then the opinion of Bar Qappara is difficult for Rebbi Yose based on what Rebbi Meïr said, “from their words we learned.” Rebbi Abbin said, Rebbi Meïr is consistent since Rebbi Meïr is restrictive in their words as in words of the Torah. Where do we find that Rebbi Meïr is restrictive in their words as in words of the Torah? Rebbi Ḥinena said, as we have stated there: “A woman who sees a stain is out of order and worries because of flux[, the words of Rebbi Meïr. But the Sages say, nothing in stains implies flux].”

What is the reason of the House of Shammai? You and your captives. Since you could not be impure before you entered the covenant, also your captives cannot be impure before they enter the covenant. What is the reason of the House of Hillel? You and your captives. Since you need sprinkling on the third and seventh {days}, so your captives need sprinkling on the third and seventh {days}. But it is not logically consistent, since Rav Ḥiyya bar Joseph, Giddul bar Benjamin said in the name of Rav: The House of Hillel agree that if he transgressed and poured the blood, that it is accepted.

“Rebbi Jehudah says, she may not use lime because it disfigures her.” Two Amoraim, Rebbi Ḥanina and Rebbi Mana. One said, they disagreed about lime which she removed on the holiday, but lime which she removes after the holiday everybody agrees that it is forbidden. But the other says, they disagreed about lime which she removes after the holiday. But lime which she removes during the holiday everybody agrees that it is permitted. We did not know who said what. From what R. Ḥanina, Rebbi Yasa said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, Rebbi Jehudah is consistent: just as Rebbi Jehudah said there, temporary pain is pain, so he says here, temporary disfiguration is disfiguration. This implies that they disagreed about lime which she removed on the holiday, but lime which she removes after the holiday is forbidden.

Rebbi Eliezer says, the actions of an underage girl have no legal standing. He has no right to what she finds or earns, nor may he dissolve her vows; she is as if not his wife in any respect except that she needs repudiation from him. Rebbi Joshua said, he owns what she finds or earns, he may he dissolve her vows; she is his wife in all respects except that she needs a bill of divorce from him. Rebbi Ismael said, I looked around at all logical systems of Sages and did not find anybody who was consistent in the matter of an underage girl except Rebbi Eliezer, only that he requires repudiation from him.

Rav said, if testimony was contradicted in its essence, the testimony is not void. Rebbi Joḥanan said, if testimony was contradicted in itself, the testimony is void in the opinion of everybody. If testimony was contradicted in some aspects that belong after the fact, the testimony is not void. Rebbi Joḥanan is consistent since Rebbi Abba, Rebbi Ḥiyya, said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, if it was agreed that he counted but one [witness] said, he counted from a wallet and the other said, he counted from a bundle, that contradicts the essence of the testimony, and Rav will agree that the testimony is void. Where do they disagree? If there were two groups of witnesses, these say he counted from a wallet and the others say he counted from a bundle. That contradicts the essence of the testimony, the testimony is void but according to Rav, the testimony is not void. These say, he counted into his bosom, the others say he counted into his money-belt; everybody agrees that is contradicting testimony after the main testimony, and the testimony is not void. If one [witness] said, he killed him with a mace, the other [witness] said, he killed him with a sword, that contradicts the essence of the testimony, the testimony is void and Rav will agree that the testimony is void. Where do they disagree? If there were two groups of witnesses, these say he killed him with a mace and the others say, he killed him with a sword. That contradicts the essence of the testimony, the testimony is void but according to Rav, the testimony is not void. If these say, he ran away to the South and those say, he ran away to the North, everybody agrees that the testimony was contradictory in some aspects that belong after the fact, the testimony is not void. The strength of Rav comes from the following: “Rebbi Jehudah and Rebbi Simeon say, since both agree that he is not alive they can remarry.” He did nor hear that Rebbi Eleazar said, Rebbi Judah and Rebbi Simeon concede in the case of witnesses. What is the difference between witnesses and the co-wife? Did they not consider the co-wife’s words as nonexistent for her companion? (Rebbi Joḥanan said, if Rebbi Eleazar said this, he heard it from me and formulated it.) A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “Both in investigations and in cross examinations, if they contradict one another their testimony is void.” Rebbi Mana said, Rav will explain that as referring to single witness against single witness. Rebbi Abun said, even if you say groups and groups. There is a difference in criminal cases: “Justice, justice you shall pursue”.

HALAKHAH: “Also he can separate his heave” etc. If somebody fixes the harvest of another person without the latter’s knowledge, who receives the goodwill from the tithes? Rebbi Abbahu says, the one who does the fixing. Rebbi Ze‘ira says, the owner of the produce. Rebbi Ze‘ira is consistent since Rebbi Ze‘ira said in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, if somebody gave the sacrifice of a nazir or of a [healed] person afflicted with skin disease, the person purged makes (heave). The Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: “Also he can separate his heave and tithes with his knowledge.” Explain it, that [it was stipulated] that the other should not get the goodwill.

HALAKHAH: “If two groups of witnesses,” etc. Rav said, they differ in the overall testimony. But in detail, everybody agrees that five contains two, and that he has to be a nazir for two periods. Rebbi Joḥanan said, they differ in counting. But in an overall testimony, everybody agrees that the testimonies contradict one another and there is no nezirut. What is overall and what is counting? Overall, this one says two, the other one says five. Counting, this one says one, two, the other one says three, four, five. Rav said, if testimony was contradictory in its essence, the testimony is not void. Rebbi Joḥanan said, if testimony was contradictory in itself, the testimony is void. In the opinion of everybody, if testimony was contradictory in some aspects that belong after the fact, the testimony is not void. Rebbi Joḥanan is consistent in what he said, since Rebbi Abba, Rebbi Ḥiyya, said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, if it was agreed that he counted but one [witness] said, he counted from a wallet and the other said, he counted from a bundle, that contradicts the essence of the testimony, and Rav will agree that the testimony is void. Where do they disagree? If there were two groups of witnesses, these say he counted from a wallet and the others say he counted from a bundle. That contradicts the essence of the testimony, the testimony is void, but according to Rav, the testimony is not void. If one [witness] said, he killed him with a mace, the other [witness] said, he killed him with a sword, that contradicts the essence of the testimony; the testimony is void and Rav will agree that the testimony is void. Where do they disagree? If there were two groups of witnesses, these say he killed him with a mace and the others say, he killed him with a sword. That contradicts the essence of the testimony; the testimony is void, but according to Rav, the testimony is not void. If these say, he ran away to the South and those say, he ran away to the North, everybody agrees that the testimony was contradictory in some aspects that refer [to] the facts, the testimony is not void. The strength of Rav comes from the following: “Rebbi Jehudah and Rebbi Simeon say, since both agree that he is not alive they can remarry.” He did nor hear that Rebbi Eleazar said, Rebbi Eliezer concedes in the case of witnesses. What is the difference between witnesses and the co-wife? They do not consider the co-wife’s words compared to that of her companion. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “Both in investigations and in cross examinations, if they contradict one another their testimony is void.” Rebbi Mana said, Rav will explain that as referring to single witness against single witness. Rebbi Abun said, even if you say groups and groups. There is a difference in criminal cases, as it is written: “Justice, justice you shall pursue”.

There, we have stated: “Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah says, He made error equal to intent for substitution, but not for sacrifices.” Ḥizqiah said, in error: a prohibition, the one who substitutes: a prohibition. If he wants to say “profane” but said “an elevation sacrifice”, it is sanctified. If he wants to say “an elevation sacrifice” but said “profane”, it is not sanctified. It follows that Rebbi Joḥanan, interpreting Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah, parallels Rebbi Jeremiah’s explanation regarding the House of Shammai on sacrifices. In Rebbi Joḥanan’s opinion, may one understand that “He made error equal to intent for substitution, but not for sacrifices,” if somebody dedicates a firstling? Can it be dedicated? Did not Rebbi Ḥiyya, Rebbi Aḥa, and Rebbi Yasa say in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If somebody dedicated a firstling and it was brought to the altar, it is not sanctified even for its money’s worth. If somebody dedicated a blemished animal for the altar, even as a substitute it is not sanctified. But if somebody dedicated an animal with a temporary blemish. Is that consistent with whipping? Rebbi Yudan, Rebbi Mattaniah’s father, said, explain it if he gave unblemished animals for the upkeep of the Temple.

HALAKHAH: “If somebody divorced his wife but she stayed with him,” etc. Rebbi Mana said, the House of Shammai are consistent and the House of Hillel are consistent. Since the House of Shammai say that “a man may send away his wife with an old bill of divorce,” they say that she does not need a second bill of divorce from him. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, the House of Shammai are consistent and the House of Hillel are consistent. Since the House of Shammai say that “a man shall not divorce his wife unless he found in her a matter of immorality,” thy say that she is dirty in his eyes and he is not suspected of having relations with her, therefore she does not need a second bill of divorce from him.. Since the House of Hillel say, “even if she spoiled his food”, they say that she is not dirty in his eyes, he is suspected of having relations with her, and she needs a second bill of divorce from him’.

HALAKHAH: “If somebody divorced his wife but she stayed with him,” etc. Rebbi Mana said, the House of Shammai are consistent and the House of Hillel are consistent. Since the House of Shammai say that “a man may send away his wife with an old bill of divorce,” they say that she does not need a second bill of divorce from him. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, the House of Shammai are consistent and the House of Hillel are consistent. Since the House of Shammai say that “a man shall not divorce his wife unless he found in her a matter of immorality,” thy say that she is dirty in his eyes and he is not suspected of having relations with her, therefore she does not need a second bill of divorce from him.. Since the House of Hillel say, “even if she spoiled his food”, they say that she is not dirty in his eyes, he is suspected of having relations with her, and she needs a second bill of divorce from him’.

HALAKHAH: “If somebody divorced his wife but she stayed with him,” etc. Rebbi Mana said, the House of Shammai are consistent and the House of Hillel are consistent. Since the House of Shammai say that “a man may send away his wife with an old bill of divorce,” they say that she does not need a second bill of divorce from him. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, the House of Shammai are consistent and the House of Hillel are consistent. Since the House of Shammai say that “a man shall not divorce his wife unless he found in her a matter of immorality,” thy say that she is dirty in his eyes and he is not suspected of having relations with her, therefore she does not need a second bill of divorce from him.. Since the House of Hillel say, “even if she spoiled his food”, they say that she is not dirty in his eyes, he is suspected of having relations with her, and she needs a second bill of divorce from him’.

HALAKHAH: “If somebody divorced his wife but she stayed with him,” etc. Rebbi Mana said, the House of Shammai are consistent and the House of Hillel are consistent. Since the House of Shammai say that “a man may send away his wife with an old bill of divorce,” they say that she does not need a second bill of divorce from him. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, the House of Shammai are consistent and the House of Hillel are consistent. Since the House of Shammai say that “a man shall not divorce his wife unless he found in her a matter of immorality,” thy say that she is dirty in his eyes and he is not suspected of having relations with her, therefore she does not need a second bill of divorce from him.. Since the House of Hillel say, “even if she spoiled his food”, they say that she is not dirty in his eyes, he is suspected of having relations with her, and she needs a second bill of divorce from him’.

MISHNAH: One calls in the second [witness] and examines him. If their testimonies are found consistent, one argues the case. Two say not guilty and one says guilty, he is not guilty. Two say guilty and one says not guilty, he is guilty. One says not guilty, one says guilty, and one says “I do not know”, they shall add judges. Even if two say not guilty or guilty but one says “I do not know”, they shall add judges

Rav said, if testimony was contradictory in its essence, the testimony is not void. Rebbi Joḥanan said, if testimony is contradictory in itself, the testimony is void. In the opinion of everybody, if testimony was contradictory in aspects that belong after the fact, the testimony is not void. The strength of Rebbi Joḥanan is consistent with what Rebbi Abba bar Ḥiyya said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, if it was agreed that he counted but one [witness] said, he counted from a wallet, and the other said, he counted from a bundle, that contradicts the essence of the testimony, and Rav will agree that the testimony be void. Where do they disagree? If there were two groups of witnesses, one says he counted from a wallet and the other says he counted from a bundle. That contradicts the essence of the testimony: the testimony is void, but according to Rav, the testimony is not void. One said, he counted into his bosom, but the other said, he counted into his money-belt: everybody agrees that this contradicts the essence of the testimony but the testimony is not void. If one [witness] said, he killed him with a sword, the other [witness] said, he killed him with a mace, that contradicts the essence of the testimony; Rav will agree that the testimony be void. Where do they disagree? If there were two groups of witnesses, one says he killed him with a sword and the other says, he killed him with a mace. That contradicts the essence of the testimony, the testimony is void, but according to Rav, the testimony is not void. One says, he turned to the North and one says, he ran away to the South, everybody agrees that the testimony was contradictory in aspects that belong after the fact, and the testimony is not void. The strength of Rav comes from what we have stated there: “Rebbi Jehudah and Rebbi Simeon say, since both agree that he is not alive they can be remarried.” He did not hear that Rebbi Eleazar said, Rebbi Jehudah and Rebbi Simeon concede in the case of witnesses. What is the difference between witnesses and the co-wife? They do not consider the co-wife’s words compared to those of her companion. Rebbi Joḥanan said, if Rebbi Eleazar said this, he said it because he had heard it from me. The Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “Both in investigations and cross-examinations, if they contradict one another their testimony is worthless.” What does Rav do with this? Rebbi Mana said, Rav will explain it as referring to single witness against single witness. Rebbi Abun said, even if you say groups and groups. There is a difference in criminal cases, as it is written: Justice, justice you shall pursue.

There, we have stated: “Rebbi Jehudah says, a woman should not apply lime because it disfigures her.” Rebbi Ḥanina and Rebbi Mana. One said, they disagreed about lime which she removed on the holiday, but lime which she removes after the holiday is forbidden. But the other says, they disagreed about lime which she removes after the holiday. But lime which she removes during the holiday is permitted. We did not know who said what. From what R. Ḥanina, Rebbi Yose said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, Rebbi Jehudah is consistent. Just as Rebbi Jehudah said there, temporary disfiguration is disfiguration, so he says here, temporary pain is pain. This implies that they disagreed about lime which she removed on the holiday, but lime which she removes after the holiday is forbidden.

HALAKHAH: “If one’s house was connected to a house of pagan worship,” etc. There is written abomination about the menstruating women, abomination about vermin, abomination about idolatry. About the menstruating woman, for anybody who would commit any of these abominations. About vermin, do not eat any abomination. About idolatry, and do not bring any abomination into your house. But I do not know for which purpose it was compared. Rebbi Aqiba says, it was compared to abomination regarding the menstruating woman. As the menstruating woman imparts impurity by load, also idolatry imparts impurity by load. Or since the menstruating woman imparts impurity through a cover stone, does idolatry impart impurity through a cover stone? Rebbi Zeriqa in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina, but some say in the name of Rav Ḥisda: Rebbi Aqiba agrees with the Sages that idolatry does not impart impurity through a cover stone. But the rabbis say it was compared to abominations of vermin. As vermin imparts impurity by motion, so also idolatry imparts impurity by motion. Or as vermin in the size of a lentil imparts impurity does also idolatry in the size of a lentil impart impurity? Rebbi Zeˋira, Rebbi Isaac bar Naḥman, Rebbi Eleazar, Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: They were yoked to Baal Peor and ate sacrifices to the dead. As the dead in the size of an olive impart impurity so idolatry in the size of an olive imparts impurity. Or since a corpse imparts impurity once a person puts his finger tips in, could I think that idolatry imparts once a person puts his finger tips in? Tearing down, tearing down one infers from the leprous house. Since in a leprous house when he entered with his head and most of his body, so idolatry when he entered with his head and most of his body. Rebbi Ḥanina said, this means that the impurity of idolatry is not consistent. For otherwise, why does one compare if for the facile [impurity] and does not compare for the strict? Rebbi Mana said, it is consistent. Why was it compared to a corpse and to vermin? To inform in both cases about the facile [impurity] attached to it. This is for a broken idol. But an entire one even in the most minute size, as Rebbi Yose hen Rebbi Abun said, Rav Ḥama bar Gorion in the name of Rav: Baal was the penis gland in the form of a bean. What is the reason? They selected the Baal of circumcision as god.

HALAKHAH: “If one’s house was connected to a house of pagan worship,” etc. There is written abomination about the menstruating women, abomination about vermin, abomination about idolatry. About the menstruating woman, for anybody who would commit any of these abominations. About vermin, do not eat any abomination. About idolatry, and do not bring any abomination into your house. But I do not know for which purpose it was compared. Rebbi Aqiba says, it was compared to abomination regarding the menstruating woman. As the menstruating woman imparts impurity by load, also idolatry imparts impurity by load. Or since the menstruating woman imparts impurity through a cover stone, does idolatry impart impurity through a cover stone? Rebbi Zeriqa in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina, but some say in the name of Rav Ḥisda: Rebbi Aqiba agrees with the Sages that idolatry does not impart impurity through a cover stone. But the rabbis say it was compared to abominations of vermin. As vermin imparts impurity by motion, so also idolatry imparts impurity by motion. Or as vermin in the size of a lentil imparts impurity does also idolatry in the size of a lentil impart impurity? Rebbi Zeˋira, Rebbi Isaac bar Naḥman, Rebbi Eleazar, Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: They were yoked to Baal Peor and ate sacrifices to the dead. As the dead in the size of an olive impart impurity so idolatry in the size of an olive imparts impurity. Or since a corpse imparts impurity once a person puts his finger tips in, could I think that idolatry imparts once a person puts his finger tips in? Tearing down, tearing down one infers from the leprous house. Since in a leprous house when he entered with his head and most of his body, so idolatry when he entered with his head and most of his body. Rebbi Ḥanina said, this means that the impurity of idolatry is not consistent. For otherwise, why does one compare if for the facile [impurity] and does not compare for the strict? Rebbi Mana said, it is consistent. Why was it compared to a corpse and to vermin? To inform in both cases about the facile [impurity] attached to it. This is for a broken idol. But an entire one even in the most minute size, as Rebbi Yose hen Rebbi Abun said, Rav Ḥama bar Gorion in the name of Rav: Baal was the penis gland in the form of a bean. What is the reason? They selected the Baal of circumcision as god.

Why is its shadow forbidden? Because it is an enjoyment. But a grave is forbidden for usufruct and its shadow is permitted! But the Temple Hall is forbidden for usufruct and Rabban Joḥanan ben Zakkai was sitting and teaching in the shadow of the Temple Hall! Therefore the reason cannot be that it is forbidden for usufruct. Rav Abin in the name of the rabbis there: This implies that this impurity of the dead is not logically consistent. For otherwise if a grave were robbing the public and one passed under it one would be pure.

Over pepper, Rab Sheshet said: [The benediction is] "...By Whose word all things exist" ; Raba said : None at all [is required]. Raba is consistent with his opinion [expressed elsewhere] ; for he has said : If one chews pepper-corns on the Day of Atonement he is free [from guilt]; if he chews ginger on the Day of Atonement he is likewise free.

And Resh Lakish is consistent with his own view, since Resh Lakish said, May I be atonement for R. Hiyya and his sons. For in ancient times when the Torah was forgotten from Israel, Ezra came up from Babylon and established it. [Some of] it was again forgotten and Hillel the Babylonian came up and established it. Yet again was [some of] it forgotten, and R. Hiyya and his sons came up and established it And thus said R. Hiyya and his sons: R. Dosa and the Sages did not dispute about reed-mats of Usha,

R. Judah said in the name of Shmuel: The halakhah is according to R. Tarfon. And Shmuel is consistent with his own opinion, or Shmuel said to those who sold hadasim, "Sell at the normal price, for if not, I will expound to you as R. Tarfon."

a knot in water is drawn tighter, while in the former case the water makes the vessel to swim, and so there is no interposition. Thus it was necessary that they should be separately mentioned. Rabbi Ela is consistent with himself. For R. Ela said that R. Chănina bar Papa said, Ten degrees of superior excellence are taught here. The first five refer alike to hallowed things, and to ordinary things which are treated with observance of the laws of purification belonging to hallowed things; the later refer to hallowed things, but not to ordinary things, which are treated with observance of the laws of purification belonging to hallowed things. What is the reason? Because the former five involve an essential impurity arising out of the Law, our Rabbis have decided that they apply as well to hallowed things, as to ordinary things which are treated with observance of the laws of purification belonging to hallowed things. Because the later ones involve no essential impurity arising out of the Law, our Rabbis have decided that they apply to hallowed things; but to ordinary things which are treated with observance of the laws of purification belonging to hallowed things our Rabbis have decided that they do not apply.