divorces
81 occurrences across the corpus
Church Orders
If a layman divorces his own wife, and takes another, or one divorced by another, let him be suspended.
The Mishnah
If he performed halitzah for his yevamah, and his brother married her sister and died, she must perform halitzah but may not be taken in yibbum. Similarly if a man divorces his wife and his brother marries her sister and dies behold she is exempt from halitzah and from yibbum.
If a deaf man married a woman of sound senses or a man of sound senses married a deaf woman he may, if he wishes, divorce her, and he may, if he wishes retain her; just as he marries by gestures so he divorces her by gestures. If a man of sound senses married a woman of sound senses and she became deaf, he may, if he wishes, divorce her; and he may, if he wishes, retain her. If she became insane he may not divorce her. If he became deaf or insane, he may never divorce her. Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri says: Why may a woman who became deaf be divorced while a man who became deaf may not divorce [his wife]? They answered him: a man who divorces is not like a woman who is divorced, for while a woman may be divorced with her consent and without her consent, a man can divorce only with his consent.
If a deaf man married a woman of sound senses or a man of sound senses married a deaf woman he may, if he wishes, divorce her, and he may, if he wishes retain her; just as he marries by gestures so he divorces her by gestures. If a man of sound senses married a woman of sound senses and she became deaf, he may, if he wishes, divorce her; and he may, if he wishes, retain her. If she became insane he may not divorce her. If he became deaf or insane, he may never divorce her. Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri says: Why may a woman who became deaf be divorced while a man who became deaf may not divorce [his wife]? They answered him: a man who divorces is not like a woman who is divorced, for while a woman may be divorced with her consent and without her consent, a man can divorce only with his consent.
Rabbi Shimon says: In respect to that in which the husband is at an advantage when he marries his wife he is at a disadvantage when he divorces her and in respect to that in which he is at a disadvantage when he marries her he is at an advantage when he divorces her. Produce which is attached to the ground is the husband’s when he marries his wife and hers when he divorces her, Produce that is detached from the ground is hers when she marries but the husband’s when she is divorced.
Rabbi Shimon says: In respect to that in which the husband is at an advantage when he marries his wife he is at a disadvantage when he divorces her and in respect to that in which he is at a disadvantage when he marries her he is at an advantage when he divorces her. Produce which is attached to the ground is the husband’s when he marries his wife and hers when he divorces her, Produce that is detached from the ground is hers when she marries but the husband’s when she is divorced.
Rabbi Shimon says: In respect to that in which the husband is at an advantage when he marries his wife he is at a disadvantage when he divorces her and in respect to that in which he is at a disadvantage when he marries her he is at an advantage when he divorces her. Produce which is attached to the ground is the husband’s when he marries his wife and hers when he divorces her, Produce that is detached from the ground is hers when she marries but the husband’s when she is divorced.
If she produced a get without a ketubah, she collects her kethubah. [If she produced her] ketubah without a get, and she says, “My get was lost”, and he says, “My receipt was lost”, and also a creditor who produced a debt document that was unaccompanied by a prosbul, these are not paid back. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: from the time of danger a woman collects her ketubah with out a get and a creditor collects [his debt] without a prosbul. [A woman who produced] two letters of divorce and two ketuboth collects two kethuboth. Two kethuboth and one get or one kethubah and two gittin, or a kethubah, a get and [evidence of her husband’s] death, she collects one kethubah only, for a man who divorces his wife and then remarries her contracts his second marriage on the condition of the first kethubah. A minor whose his father had given him in marriage, the ketubah of his wife is valid, since it is on this condition that he kept her as his wife. A convert who converted with his wife, the kethubah remains valid, since it is on this condition that he kept her as his wife.
Any get which is not written [expressly] for the woman [for whom it is intended] is invalid. How is this so? If a man was passing through the street and heard the voice of a scribe dictating “So-and-so divorces so-and-so from such and such a place” and he says “that is my name and that is the name of my wife”, it is not a valid [document] with which to divorce his wife. Moreover: if he wrote [a get] with which to divorce his wife and changed his mind and a person found him and said to him, “My name is the same as yours and my wife’s name the same as your wife’s”, it is not a valid [document with which the second] may divorce his wife. Moreover: if he had two wives with the same name and wrote a get with which to divorce the elder, he may not use it to divorce the younger. Moreover: if he said to the scribe, “Write [a get] and I will divorce whichever I choose,” it is not a valid [document] with which to divorce his wife.
If a man divorces his wife because of ill-repute, he cannot remarry her. If because of a vow, he cannot remarry her. Rabbi Judah says: [if he divorces her] for vows which she made in front of many people, he may not remarry her, but if for vows which she did not make in front of many people, he may remarry her. Rabbi Meir says: [if he divorces her] for a vow which requires the investigation of a sage, he may not remarry her, but if for one which does not require the investigation of a sage, he may remarry her. Rabbi Eliezer says: they only forbid that one because of that one. Rabbi Yose son of Rabbi Judah said: a case happened in Sidon of a man who said to his wife, “Konam, if I do not divorce you”, and he did divorce her, and the Sages permitted him to remarry her because of tikkun olam.
If a man divorces his wife because of ill-repute, he cannot remarry her. If because of a vow, he cannot remarry her. Rabbi Judah says: [if he divorces her] for vows which she made in front of many people, he may not remarry her, but if for vows which she did not make in front of many people, he may remarry her. Rabbi Meir says: [if he divorces her] for a vow which requires the investigation of a sage, he may not remarry her, but if for one which does not require the investigation of a sage, he may remarry her. Rabbi Eliezer says: they only forbid that one because of that one. Rabbi Yose son of Rabbi Judah said: a case happened in Sidon of a man who said to his wife, “Konam, if I do not divorce you”, and he did divorce her, and the Sages permitted him to remarry her because of tikkun olam.
If a man divorces his wife because of ill-repute, he cannot remarry her. If because of a vow, he cannot remarry her. Rabbi Judah says: [if he divorces her] for vows which she made in front of many people, he may not remarry her, but if for vows which she did not make in front of many people, he may remarry her. Rabbi Meir says: [if he divorces her] for a vow which requires the investigation of a sage, he may not remarry her, but if for one which does not require the investigation of a sage, he may remarry her. Rabbi Eliezer says: they only forbid that one because of that one. Rabbi Yose son of Rabbi Judah said: a case happened in Sidon of a man who said to his wife, “Konam, if I do not divorce you”, and he did divorce her, and the Sages permitted him to remarry her because of tikkun olam.
A man divorces his wife because she is an aylonit: Rabbi Judah says he may not remarry her, But the sages say that he may remarry her. She marries someone else and has children from him and then demands her ketubah settlement [from her first husband]: Rabbi Judah said, they say to her, “Your silence is better than your speaking.”
A man divorces his wife and then stays with her over night in an inn: Bet Shammai says: she does not require from him a second get, But Beth Hillel say she does require a second get from him. When is this so? When she was divorced after marriage. And [Beth Hillel] agrees that if she is divorced after betrothal, she does not require a second get from him, because he would not [yet] take liberties with her. If a man marries a [divorced] woman through a “bald” get, she must leave both husbands and all the above-mentioned consequences apply to her.
If a man divorces his wife and said to her, “You are free to marry any man but so-and-so”, Rabbi Eliezer permits her [to marry on the strength of this get], but the rabbis forbid her. What should he do? He should take it back from her and give it to her again saying, “You are free to marry any man.” If he wrote [the restriction] in the get, even though he went back and erased it, it is invalid.
Two men sent two identical gittin [to their wives] and they became mixed up they give both of them to this wife and both of them to this wife. Therefore, if one of them was lost the other is void. If five men wrote jointly in the same get, “So-and-so divorces so-and-so and so-and-so [divorces] so-and-so and the witnesses [signed] below, all are valid and the get is to be given to each [of the women]. If the scribe wrote out the formula for each one and the witnesses signed below, only the one with which the signatures are read is valid.
Two men sent two identical gittin [to their wives] and they became mixed up they give both of them to this wife and both of them to this wife. Therefore, if one of them was lost the other is void. If five men wrote jointly in the same get, “So-and-so divorces so-and-so and so-and-so [divorces] so-and-so and the witnesses [signed] below, all are valid and the get is to be given to each [of the women]. If the scribe wrote out the formula for each one and the witnesses signed below, only the one with which the signatures are read is valid.
A woman is betrothed by a denar or the value of a denar, according to the opinion of Beth Shammai. But Beth Hillel says: by a perutah or the value of a perutah. And how much is a perutah? One-eighth of an Italian issar. Beth Shammai says: one may dismiss his wife with an old bill of divorcement, But Beth Hillel forbids it. What is an old bill of divorcement? Whenever he was secluded with her after he has written it for her. One who divorces his wife and she [afterwards] spends a night with him at the [same] inn: Beth Shammai says: she does not require a second bill of divorcement from him. But Beth Hillel says: she requires a second bill of divorcement from him. When [does she require a second bill of divorcement]? When she was divorced after marriage. But if she was divorced after betrothal she does not require from him a second bill of divorcement, since he is not [yet] familiar with her.
[The property] of orphans which has been evaluated [must be proclaimed for] thirty days. And [the property of] the Sanctuary which has been evaluated, [for] sixty days. They must make the proclamation in the morning and in the evening. If a man dedicates his property to the Sanctuary and he is still liable for his wife’s ketubah: Rabbi Eliezer says: when he divorces her he must vow that he will not derive any further benefit from her. Rabbi Joshua says: he need not do so. Similarly, Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel said: Also if one guarantees a woman's ketubah and her husband divorces her, the husband must vow to derive no benefit from her, lest he make a conspiracy against the property of that man [the guarantor] and take his wife back again.
[The property] of orphans which has been evaluated [must be proclaimed for] thirty days. And [the property of] the Sanctuary which has been evaluated, [for] sixty days. They must make the proclamation in the morning and in the evening. If a man dedicates his property to the Sanctuary and he is still liable for his wife’s ketubah: Rabbi Eliezer says: when he divorces her he must vow that he will not derive any further benefit from her. Rabbi Joshua says: he need not do so. Similarly, Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel said: Also if one guarantees a woman's ketubah and her husband divorces her, the husband must vow to derive no benefit from her, lest he make a conspiracy against the property of that man [the guarantor] and take his wife back again.
The Jerusalem Talmud
“ That all tithes should be mine as long as you own it, he gets its tithes as long as the buyer owns it.” When he sold it to a third party, he has no tithes. If the buyer then bought it back from the third party, Rebbi Ḥiyya states that he has no tithes, Rebbi Hoshaia states that the tithes are his. This disagreement turns out like the other disagreement, as we have stated there “that he who divorces his wife and then remarries her, remarries her on the basis of the first ketubah.” Rebbi Ḥanin stated before Rebbi La: Two Amoraïm, one says for ketubah but not for individual stipulations, and the other says, both for ketubah and individual stipulations. For him who says, for ketubah but not for individual stipulations, he has the tithes. For him who says, both for ketubah and for individual stipulations, he has no tithes. But did we not state: “If somebody received (as sharecropper) from the daughter of a Cohen, she has the tithes. If she married an Israel, they split the tithes. If she was widowed or divorced, she returns to her prior status.” There when he sold, here when he received. But did not Rebbi Ḥiyya state: “When she sold?” Rebbi Samuel bar Eudaimon said, there it left the power of both parties; here, it left the power of the seller but not that of the buyer.
Rebbi Yose said, I questioned before Samuel: But with bills of divorce, thought is not written and his action cannot prove his intention! As we have stated: “Everybody is permitted to write a bill of divorce, even an insane person, a deaf-mute, and a minor.” Rebbi Huna said, if a sane person directs him. Rebbi Joḥanan asked, is that (Deut. 24:1,3): “he writes for her”, for her personally? Rebbi Yose came back and said, there one person writes and another person divorces. But here, the same person thinks and takes heave. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, there, if he would write himself and divorce, would that not be a divorce? But here, he thinks and takes heave.
Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa, Rebbi Ḥiyya, in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: One disagrees with this Mishnah teacher. How is that? It turns out that Rebbi Joḥanan concerning heaves parallels Rebbi Ismael, the son of Rebbi Joḥanan ben Beroqa concerning sanctification, and Rebbi Joḥanan concerning divorces parallels the rabbis concerning sanctification, as we have stated: “The sanctifications of a deaf-mute person, an insane, and a minor who sanctified are no sanctifications. Rebbi Ismael, the son of Rebbi Joḥanan ben Beroqa says, if they are alone, their sanctifications are no sanctifications. Together with others, their sanctifications are sanctifications.”
“Even though the House of Shammai and the House of Hillel disagreed about co-wives, and sisters, and an old bill of divorce, and a woman doubtfully married, and one who gives qiddushin in the value of a peruṭa, i. e., he who divorces his wife and spends the night with her in a hostelry, and that a woman receives qiddushin for at least a denar or the value of a denar, the House of Shammai did not refrain from marrying women from the House of Hillel or the House of Hillel from the House of Shammai but they behave truthfully and in peace, as it is said: ‘Love truth and peace.’ ” Bastardy is between them and you say so? How is that? If a first man gives her qiddushin for a peruṭa and a second for a denar, in the opinion of the House of Shammai she is betrothed to the second and the child of the first is a bastard. In the opinion of the House of Hillel she is betrothed to the first and the child of the second is a bastard. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The House of Shammai concede to the House of Hillel as a restriction. In that case, the House of Shammai should marry women from the House of Hillel since they concede to them. But the House of Hillel should not marry women from the House of Shammai since they do not concede to them. Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: They all followed the same practice. If they followed the same practice, in this case we stated: “The House of Shammai sent and diminished it, since the House of Shammai says unless most of it is missing?” Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, the House of Shammai acted before the question came before the House of Hillel. After a question came before the House of Hillel, the House of Shammai were not touching it. Rebbi Abba Mari said, that is correct. Did we not state: “They declared impure all purities from before”, but not in the future. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, Rav and Samuel, one said both acted according to valid practice; the other said, each party followed its own practice. Bastardy is between them and you say so? The Omnipresent watched and no case ever happened.
A Mishnah disagrees with Samuel: “If somebody performs ḥalîṣah with his sister-in-law, her relatives are forbidden to him and his relatives are forbidden to her.” There is a difference here, since he already is available to free himself from her. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “If somebody performs ḥalîṣah with his sister-in-law, then his brother marries her sister and dies, she performs ḥalîṣah but cannot have levirate.” This supports him who says that ḥalîṣah is freeing. But according to him who says, ḥalîṣah is acquisiton, is there anybody who wants to acquire two sisters together? Explain it, after her death. Is there no levirate after death? Explain it following Rebbi Eleazar, since Rebbi Eleazar said, if the cause is removed the prohibition remains. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “Three brothers, two of them are married to two sisters and the third is free. One of the sisters’ husbands died, the free [brother] “bespoke” her, then the second brother died. The House of Shammai say, his wife is with him and the other one should leave as the wife’s sister. The House of Hillel say, he divorces his wife with a bill of divorce (and ḥalîṣah), and his wife’s sister with ḥalîṣah. This supports him who says that ḥalîṣah is (acquisiton) [freeing]. But according to him who says, ḥalîṣah is acquisiton, is there anybody who wants to acquire two sisters together? Explain it, after her death. Is there no levirate after death? Explain it following Rebbi Eleazar, since Rebbi Eleazar said, if the cause is removed the prohibition remains. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “If a brother gives qiddushin to the sister of a woman waiting for the levir, they said in the name of Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra: One says to him, wait until your brother has acted. If one of the brothers performed ḥalîṣah or married her, he may marry his wife. If the sister-in-law died, he may marry his wife. If the levir died, he has to remove his wife by a bill of divorce and his brother’s widow by ḥalîṣah.”. This supports him who says that ḥalîṣah is freeing. But according to him who says, ḥalîṣah is acquisiton, is there anybody who wants to acquire two sisters together? Explain it following Rebbi Eleazar, since Rebbi Eleazar said, if the cause is removed the prohibition remains. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “If a brother of the High Priest dies, he performs ḥalîṣah but not levirate.” This supports him who says that ḥalîṣah is freeing. But according to him who says, ḥalîṣah is acquisiton, does one say to him, transgress the words of the Torah? Rebbi Ḥama, the colleague of the rabbis, objected: Does not a Mishnah disagree with Rav? “Three brothers, two of them married to two sisters or a woman and her daughter or a woman and her daughter’s or her son’s daughter. These perform ḥalîṣah but not levirate.” There is a difference since the prohibition of a woman and her daughter applies both when she is alive as also after her death. These last two disagree with Rav and one cannot explain them away.
MISHNAH: Three brothers, two of whom are married to two sisters and the third is a bachelor. One of the sisters’ husbands died; the bachelor “bespoke” her; then the second brother died. The House of Shammai say, his wife is with him and the other one should leave as the wife’s sister. The House of Hillel say, he divorces his wife with a bill of divorce, and his wife’s sister with ḥalîṣah. That is what people say, he is unlucky with his wife and with his brother’s wife.
MISHNAH: In all cases in which there were questionable qiddushin or divorces, the [co-wives] must perform ḥalîṣah but cannot have levirate. What are questionable qiddushin? If he threw the betrothal gift to her and there is a doubt whether it fell closer to him or to her, that are questionable qiddushin. What is a questionable divorce? If [the divorce document] was written in his handwriting but without witnesses, or there are witnesses but no date, or there is a date but only one witness, these are questionable divorces.
MISHNAH: In all cases in which there were questionable qiddushin or divorces, the [co-wives] must perform ḥalîṣah but cannot have levirate. What are questionable qiddushin? If he threw the betrothal gift to her and there is a doubt whether it fell closer to him or to her, that are questionable qiddushin. What is a questionable divorce? If [the divorce document] was written in his handwriting but without witnesses, or there are witnesses but no date, or there is a date but only one witness, these are questionable divorces.
HALAKHAH: “In all cases in which there were questionable qiddushin or divorces, the [co-wives] must perform ḥalîṣah but cannot have levirate,” etc. There really is no questionable divorce here. What are questionable qiddushin? If he threw the betrothal gift to her and there is a doubt whether it fell closer to him or to her, that are questionable qiddushin. And here, if he threw the divorce document to her and there is a doubt whether it fell closer to him or to her, that is a questionable divorce.
MISHNAH: If somebody performs ḥalîṣah with his sister-in-law while his brother had married her sister and then died, she must perform ḥalîṣah but not levirate. Similarly, if somebody divorces his wife while his brother had married her sister and then died, she is free.
HALAKHAH: “Similarly, if somebody divorces his wife,” etc. Simeon bar Abba asked before Rebbi Joḥanan: What is the difference between having ḥalîṣah and divorcing? He said to him: You think that ḥalîṣah is acquisiton, but it is only freeing. The brothers are not guilty for her under the category of “wife of the one acting in ḥalîṣah” but they are guilty under the category of “wife of the deceased”.
MISHNAH: If [a girl] repudiates a man and marries another who divorces her, another and she repudiates him, another who divorces her, another and she repudiates him, she is forbidden to return to anyone who had divorce her but permitted to return to those she had repudiated.
MISHNAH: If [a girl] repudiates a man and marries another who divorces her, another and she repudiates him, another who divorces her, another and she repudiates him, she is forbidden to return to anyone who had divorce her but permitted to return to those she had repudiated.
HALAKHAH: Is the degree of acquisition of one equal to that of the other? Did we not state “underage and deaf-mute”? Rebbi Hiyya stated ““underage and deaf-mute”: “If the husband of the underage girl died, the husband of the deaf-mute has to divorce her and the underage girl has to wait until she comes of age and perform ḥalîṣah” Why can she not perform ḥalîṣah immediately? She cannot because of Rebbi Meїr, since Rebbi Meїr said that one does not perform levirate or ḥalîṣah with an underage girl, since she might be found to be a she-ram. “If the husband of the deaf-mute died, the husband of the underage girl has to divorce her and the deaf-mute is permanently forbidden. If he transgressed and had intercourse with the deaf-mute, he divorces her and she becomes permitted.” This follows what Rebbi Hila said, in order to fix her status.
HALAKHAH: Is the degree of acquisition of one equal to that of the other? What does he do? Rav Ḥiyya bar Ashi in the name of Rav: He marries the deaf-mute and divorces her; the underage girl has to wait until she can perform ḥalîṣah.” Why can she not perform ḥalîṣah immediately? She cannot because of Rebbi Meїr, since Rebbi Meїr said that one does not perform levirate or ḥalîṣah with an underage girl, since she might be found to be a she-ram. If he sleeps with the underage girl, he has to divorce her, and the deaf-mute is permanently forbidden. If he transgressed and had intercourse with the deaf-mute, he divorces her and she became permitted.” This follows what Rebbi Hila said, in order to fix her status. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya asked before Rebbi Hila: What means, “in order to fix her status”? As you say there, he should perform ḥalîṣah for the aspect that was acquired in her and marry her co-wife; could he not perform ḥalîṣah for the aspect that was acquired in the underage girl and marry the deaf-mute? He said to him, so says Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: We never find two sisters-in-law of whom one performs ḥalîṣah and one is married in levirate. Do we find two sisters-in-law of whom one performs ḥalîṣah and one is divorced? He said to him, that happens. That is what we have stated there: “If he ‘bespoke’ one and performed ḥalîṣah with the other, the first one needs a bill of divorce”.
HALAKHAH: Is the degree of acquisition of one equal to that of the other? What does he do? Rav Ḥiyya bar Ashi in the name of Rav: He marries the deaf-mute and divorces her; the underage girl has to wait until she can perform ḥalîṣah.” Why can she not perform ḥalîṣah immediately? She cannot because of Rebbi Meїr, since Rebbi Meїr said that one does not perform levirate or ḥalîṣah with an underage girl, since she might be found to be a she-ram. If he sleeps with the underage girl, he has to divorce her, and the deaf-mute is permanently forbidden. If he transgressed and had intercourse with the deaf-mute, he divorces her and she became permitted.” This follows what Rebbi Hila said, in order to fix her status. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya asked before Rebbi Hila: What means, “in order to fix her status”? As you say there, he should perform ḥalîṣah for the aspect that was acquired in her and marry her co-wife; could he not perform ḥalîṣah for the aspect that was acquired in the underage girl and marry the deaf-mute? He said to him, so says Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: We never find two sisters-in-law of whom one performs ḥalîṣah and one is married in levirate. Do we find two sisters-in-law of whom one performs ḥalîṣah and one is divorced? He said to him, that happens. That is what we have stated there: “If he ‘bespoke’ one and performed ḥalîṣah with the other, the first one needs a bill of divorce”.
MISHNAH: A deaf-mute man who married a hearing woman or a hearing man who married a deaf-mute woman may divorce or stay married at will; just as he marries with sign language so he divorces with sign language. A hearing man who married a hearing woman who then became deaf-mute may divorce or stay married at will. If she became insane he shall not divorce. If he became deaf-mute or insane, he can never divorce.
MISHNAH: Rebbi Joḥanan ben Nuri said, why can a deaf-mute woman be divorced but a deaf-mute man cannot divorce? They told him, a divorcing man is not comparable to a divorced woman since a woman can be divorced with or against her will but a man divorces only by his own will. Rebbi Joḥanan ben Gudgada testified about a deaf-mute girl who was married off by her father that she could be divorced by a bill of divorce. They said to him, that is an example.
MISHNAH: Two deaf-mute brothers married to two deaf-mute sisters, or two hearing sisters, or two sisters of whom one is deaf-mute, the other hearing; or two deaf-mute sisters married to two deaf-mute brothers, or two hearing brothers, or two brothers of whom one is deaf-mute, these are free from ḥalîṣah and levirate. If the women are unrelated, they must marry them, and, if they want to, they may send them away. Two brothers, one deaf-mute and one hearing, married to two hearing sisters. If the deaf-mute married to the hearing wife died, what shall the hearing [brother] married to the hearing wife do? [The widow] has to leave as the wife’s sister. If the hearing [brother] married to the hearing wife died, what shall the deaf-mute married to the hearing wife do? He divorces his wife by a bill of divorce; his brother’s widow is permanently forbidden.
MISHNAH: Two hearing brothers, married to two unrelated women, one deaf-mute and one hearing. If the hearing [brother] married to the deaf-mute wife died, what shall the hearing [brother] married to a hearing wife do? He marries [the widow], and if he wants to divorce, he divorces. If the hearing [brother] married to the hearing wife died, what shall the hearing [brother] married to the deaf-mute wife do? He performs either ḥalîṣah or levirate. Two brothers, one deaf-mute and one hearing, married to two unrelated women, one deaf-mute and one hearing. If the deaf-mute [brother] married to the deaf-mute wife died, what shall the hearing [brother] married to the hearing wife do? He marries, and if he wants to divorce, he divorces. If the hearing [brother] married to the hearing wife died, what shall the deaf-mute [brother] married to the deaf-mute wife do? He marries and can never divorce.
MISHNAH: Two hearing brothers, married to two unrelated women, one deaf-mute and one hearing. If the hearing [brother] married to the deaf-mute wife died, what shall the hearing [brother] married to a hearing wife do? He marries [the widow], and if he wants to divorce, he divorces. If the hearing [brother] married to the hearing wife died, what shall the hearing [brother] married to the deaf-mute wife do? He performs either ḥalîṣah or levirate. Two brothers, one deaf-mute and one hearing, married to two unrelated women, one deaf-mute and one hearing. If the deaf-mute [brother] married to the deaf-mute wife died, what shall the hearing [brother] married to the hearing wife do? He marries, and if he wants to divorce, he divorces. If the hearing [brother] married to the hearing wife died, what shall the deaf-mute [brother] married to the deaf-mute wife do? He marries and can never divorce.
Rebbi Jehudah insists on interpreting the contract text. It was stated in the name of Rebbi Jehudah: A person brings for his wife any sacrifice she is obligated for, even if she ate suet or desecrated the Sabbath. Also, Rebbi Jehudah says, once he divorces her, he is no longer obligated for her, for she writes to him “any other obligations that come to you from earlier times.”
“And Rebbi Joshua [follows] the House of Hillel.” For the House of Hillel say, even if she burned his food. Therefore, he says it is optional. If he wants to declare his jealousy, he declares his jealousy; if he wants to divorce her, he divorces her.
It was stated in the name of Rebbi Jehudah: A person brings for his wife any sacrifice she is obligated for, even if she ate suet or desecrated the Sabbath. Also, Rebbi Jehudah says, once he divorces her, he is no longer obligated for her, for he writes to her “any other obligations that come to me because of you from earlier times.”
MISHNAH: The seducer pays for three things and the rapist for four. The seducer pays for shame, diminution of value, and fine. The rapist in addition pays for suffering; the seducer does not pay for suffering. The rapist pays immediately, the seducer only if he divorces her. The rapist drinks from his pot; the seducer may divorce if he wishes.
“The seducer only if he divorces her,” etc. Rav Ḥisda said, if he does not want to keep her. But if he decides to keep her, he does not give anything. Rebbi Ismael stated: “He should weigh silver appropriate for the bride-price of virgins”, which indicates that his obligation is for him that of bride-price, and bride-price is the ketubah; as it also says “add for me much bride-price and gifts.”
Rebbi Jehudah insists on interpreting the contract text. Rebbi Jehudah explained: A man brings for his wife any sacrifice she is obligated for, even if she ate suet or desecrated the Sabbath. Also, Rebbi Jehudah says, once he divorces her, he is no longer obligated for her, for she writes to him “any other obligations that may come to you from me from earlier times.”
HALAKHAH: “Even though they said that a virgin collects 200,” etc. How does he become indebted to her? Do not Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both say, if somebody writes a debenture for another person under the assumption that he owes him and it turns out that he does not owe, [he does not have] to give to him! He wants to give much to be called X’s son-in-law. That is, if he decided this at the time of the preliminary marriage. What if he decided this at the time of the definitive marriage? He wants to give much for sexual relations with her, which are sweet. That is if he slept with her. If he did not sleep with her? He wants to give much for the acquisition he made. If he had decided at the preliminary marriage, at the definitive marriage, he already is called X’s son-in-law, sexual relations are nothing new, there is no new acquisition; from thereon he wants to give much that she should not change her mind. But can she? Was it not stated that “a man divorces only by his own will”? Rebbi Abin said, she makes his life miserable and he frees her.
MISHNAH: Two bills of divorce and two ketubot, she collects two ketubot. Two ketubot and one bill of divorce, or one ketubah and two bills of divorce, or one ketubah, and a bill of divorce, and death; she collects only one ketubah since a person who divorces his wife and takes her back, takes her back on the basis of her prior ketubah. If a minor was married off by his father, [his wife’s] ketubah is valid since he kept her by that understanding. If a proselyte converted together with his wife, her ketubah is valid since he kept her by that understanding.
“Rebbi Joḥanan ben Nuri said, he should dissolve.” Rebbi Hila said, the reason of Rebbi Joḥanan ben Nuri is that even if he knows that if he divorces her she would be forbidden to return to him, she needles him until he divorces her.
“Rebbi Joḥanan ben Nuri said, he should dissolve.” Rebbi Hila said, the reason of Rebbi Joḥanan ben Nuri is that even if he knows that if he divorces her she would be forbidden to return to him, she needles him until he divorces her.
HALAKHAH: If one says, “give this bill of divorce to my wife,” etc. Elsewhere you say that “give” means “bring”, but here you say that “give” means “acquire”! So is the Mishnah: “Acquire this bill of divorce for my wife; acquire this document of manumission for my slave.” The formulation of the Mishnah says so: “Because one may bestow benefit on a person in his absence but put a detriment on a person only in his presence.” Rebbi Meïr says, it is a detriment for either of them, but the Sages say it is a benefit for the slave but a detriment for the wife. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said, Rebbi Joḥanan asked: Think of it, if he was the slave of a rich person, would it not be a detriment for the slave? The colleagues said, Rebbi Joḥanan asked: Think of it, if she was the wife of a man suffering from boils, would it not be a benefit for the woman? You have only the following: If one sells his slave without the latter’s knowledge, is the sale of the slave not valid? If one divorces his wife without her knowledge, is the divorce valid because she was acquired by him? Rebbi Abin said, he is his property but he disqualifies him for heave.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody brings a bill of divorce from overseas,” etc. One understands “it was written before me” but not “it was signed before me”, but “it was signed before me” but not “it was written before me”? Is not a bill of divorce validated by its signatures? That must follow Rebbi Jehudah, for Rebbi Jehudah invalidates forms. Following Rebbi Jehudah outside the Land as for one who divorces in the Land of Israel. Are there forms of bills of divorce outside the Land for divorces outside the Land? It is necessary for him to know that it is a bill of divorce and that he be appointed as an agent; he would not know that it was a bill of divorce unless it was written completely before him. Rebbi Ḥanin stated: It is permitted that he enter and leave.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody brings a bill of divorce from overseas,” etc. One understands “it was written before me” but not “it was signed before me”, but “it was signed before me” but not “it was written before me”? Is not a bill of divorce validated by its signatures? That must follow Rebbi Jehudah, for Rebbi Jehudah invalidates forms. Following Rebbi Jehudah outside the Land as for one who divorces in the Land of Israel. Are there forms of bills of divorce outside the Land for divorces outside the Land? It is necessary for him to know that it is a bill of divorce and that he be appointed as an agent; he would not know that it was a bill of divorce unless it was written completely before him. Rebbi Ḥanin stated: It is permitted that he enter and leave.
MISHNAH: Every bill of divorce which was not written for a particular wife is invalid. How? If one was walking in the market and heard the scribes dictating “Mr. X divorces his wife Y from place Z” and said, these are mine and my wife’s names, it is invalid and cannot be used to divorce by. In addition, if he wrote [a bill] to divorce his wife but had second thoughts, and a fellow townsman came and said to him, my name is identical with yours and my wife’s name is identical with your wife’s, it is invalid and cannot be used to divorce by. In addition, if he had two wives with identical names and wrote a document to divorce the older one by, he cannot use it to divorce the younger. In addition, if he said to the scribe: write that I may divorce either one I wish, it is invalid and cannot be used to divorce either one.
This does not disagree with what Rebbi Joḥanan said, since Rebbi Joḥanan said, if an agent handed over to another agent, the first one is responsible. Rebbi Abba the son of Rebbi Ḥiyya: Because of a condition of the divorce. What is the difference between them? If the husband came earlier and took it. If you say, because of a condition of the divorce, that is understandable. If you say, because I do not want to see my valuables in somebody else’s hand, his valuables are not in somebody else’s hand. Is it the same for preliminary marriages? What is the difference between divorces and preliminary marriages? One can divorce through the agency of anybody. One cannot preliminarily marry through the agency of anybody.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody sent a bill of divorce to his wife,” etc. This disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan, since Rebbi Joḥanan said that a person invalidates the agent appointed by him by a declaration. He explains it by the stringency of the rules of incest. If he appointed an agent to deliver the bill of divorce, the latter has to deliver it in the presence of two [witnesses]; the agent is not counted as one of the two. If another agent went to invalidate the bill of divorce, he has to invalidate it in the presence of two [witnesses] and the agent is counted as one of the two. If he met him on the road and asked him, what about the bill of divorce I gave you? He answered, I delivered it to her. While they were talking there, he dropped it. He said, did you not tell me that you delivered it to her? He explained, I delivered it to her and she said, keep it for me. What? Can he be believed since it is in his power to divorce, or can he not be believed because it is in his hand? If the agent fell sick, how do you treat this? By the rules of divorces or the rules of preliminary marriages? By the rules of divorces one can divorce through the agency of anybody. By the rules of preliminary marriages one cannot preliminarily marry through the agency of anybody.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody sent a bill of divorce to his wife,” etc. This disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan, since Rebbi Joḥanan said that a person invalidates the agent appointed by him by a declaration. He explains it by the stringency of the rules of incest. If he appointed an agent to deliver the bill of divorce, the latter has to deliver it in the presence of two [witnesses]; the agent is not counted as one of the two. If another agent went to invalidate the bill of divorce, he has to invalidate it in the presence of two [witnesses] and the agent is counted as one of the two. If he met him on the road and asked him, what about the bill of divorce I gave you? He answered, I delivered it to her. While they were talking there, he dropped it. He said, did you not tell me that you delivered it to her? He explained, I delivered it to her and she said, keep it for me. What? Can he be believed since it is in his power to divorce, or can he not be believed because it is in his hand? If the agent fell sick, how do you treat this? By the rules of divorces or the rules of preliminary marriages? By the rules of divorces one can divorce through the agency of anybody. By the rules of preliminary marriages one cannot preliminarily marry through the agency of anybody.
There, we have stated: “One writes a bill of divorce for a man even if his wife is not with him, and a receipt for a woman even if her husband is not with her, and the husband pays the fee.” Rebbi Abba said, he has to know both of them. Rebbi La said, he has to know the husband for the bill of divorce and the wife for her receipt. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya asked before Rebbi [ ]: Think of it, if he brought another woman and divorced by means of her. He said to him, let the witnesses come and testify. But did not Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish say that they considered witnesses who signed a document as if their testimony had been cross-examined in court? There, if they said, we did not sign at all. But here if they say, we signed this but not that. The Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Abba: “In earlier times, his name and her name and the names of his and her towns could change.” If he knows them, why would he change their names? There are people who know others by sight but do not know their names. The Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Ilai: “Rabban Gamliel the Elder instituted that one should write Mr. X and all his names, Mrs. Y and all her names, because of the public good.” The Mishnah about one who is forced to divorce, Rebbi Ila speaks about one who divorces on his initiative; some want to say if he divorces at another place.
There, we have stated: “One writes a bill of divorce for a man even if his wife is not with him, and a receipt for a woman even if her husband is not with her, and the husband pays the fee.” Rebbi Abba said, he has to know both of them. Rebbi La said, he has to know the husband for the bill of divorce and the wife for her receipt. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya asked before Rebbi [ ]: Think of it, if he brought another woman and divorced by means of her. He said to him, let the witnesses come and testify. But did not Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish say that they considered witnesses who signed a document as if their testimony had been cross-examined in court? There, if they said, we did not sign at all. But here if they say, we signed this but not that. The Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Abba: “In earlier times, his name and her name and the names of his and her towns could change.” If he knows them, why would he change their names? There are people who know others by sight but do not know their names. The Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Ilai: “Rabban Gamliel the Elder instituted that one should write Mr. X and all his names, Mrs. Y and all her names, because of the public good.” The Mishnah about one who is forced to divorce, Rebbi Ila speaks about one who divorces on his initiative; some want to say if he divorces at another place.
MISHNAH: If somebody divorces his wife because of bad reputation, he cannot take her back; because of a vow, he cannot take her back. Rebbi Jehudah says, for any vow known in public, he cannot take her back; not known in public, he can take her back. Rebbi Meїr says, for any vow which needs investigation by a Sage, he cannot take her back; if it does not need investigation by a Sage, he can take her back. Rebbi Eleazar said, they forbade one because of the other. Rebbi Yose ben Jehudah said, it happened in Sidon that one said to his wife, a qonam if I do not divorce you, and he divorced her, and the Sages permitted him to take her back, for the public good.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody divorces his wife because of bad reputation,” etc. And it was stated: “Why did the Sages say that he who divorces his wife because of bad reputation cannot take her back? For if he divorced his wife because of bad reputation, when she went, married another, and bore him children, after some time it turned out that the accusations were baseless and he said, if I had known that the accusations were baseless, even if somebody had offered me a hundred minas for my wife I would not have divorced her, then the bill of divorce would be invalidated and her children bastards. But since he knows that if he divorces her, she will be forbidden to return to him, from the start he gives her a perfect bill of divorce.”
HALAKHAH: “If somebody divorces his wife because of bad reputation,” etc. And it was stated: “Why did the Sages say that he who divorces his wife because of bad reputation cannot take her back? For if he divorced his wife because of bad reputation, when she went, married another, and bore him children, after some time it turned out that the accusations were baseless and he said, if I had known that the accusations were baseless, even if somebody had offered me a hundred minas for my wife I would not have divorced her, then the bill of divorce would be invalidated and her children bastards. But since he knows that if he divorces her, she will be forbidden to return to him, from the start he gives her a perfect bill of divorce.”
HALAKHAH: “If somebody divorces his wife because of bad reputation,” etc. And it was stated: “Why did the Sages say that he who divorces his wife because of bad reputation cannot take her back? For if he divorced his wife because of bad reputation, when she went, married another, and bore him children, after some time it turned out that the accusations were baseless and he said, if I had known that the accusations were baseless, even if somebody had offered me a hundred minas for my wife I would not have divorced her, then the bill of divorce would be invalidated and her children bastards. But since he knows that if he divorces her, she will be forbidden to return to him, from the start he gives her a perfect bill of divorce.”
It was stated: “Why did they say that he who divorces his wife because of a vow cannot take her back? For if he divorced his wife because of a vow, when she went, married another, and bore him children, after some time it turned out that the vow was void and he said, if I had known that the vow was void, even if somebody had offered me a hundred minas for my wife I would not have divorced her, then the bill of divorce would be invalidated and her child a bastard. But since he knows that if he divorces her, she will be forbidden to return to him, from the start he gives her a perfect bill of divorce.” Rebbi Ze‘ira said, you can see that he was looking for a pretext to divorce her since it must have been a vow which does not need investigation by a Sage! Rebbi Ze‘ira said, you can see that he was looking for a pretext to divorce her since it must have been a vow which was not public knowledge! “Rebbi Eleazar said, they forbade one because of the other.” The law should be that he can take her back even if it was a vow which needs investigation by a Sage, for the Elder uproots the vow. Why did they forbid a vow which needs investigation by a Sage? Because of a vow which does not need investigation by a Sage.
It was stated: “Why did they say that he who divorces his wife because of a vow cannot take her back? For if he divorced his wife because of a vow, when she went, married another, and bore him children, after some time it turned out that the vow was void and he said, if I had known that the vow was void, even if somebody had offered me a hundred minas for my wife I would not have divorced her, then the bill of divorce would be invalidated and her child a bastard. But since he knows that if he divorces her, she will be forbidden to return to him, from the start he gives her a perfect bill of divorce.” Rebbi Ze‘ira said, you can see that he was looking for a pretext to divorce her since it must have been a vow which does not need investigation by a Sage! Rebbi Ze‘ira said, you can see that he was looking for a pretext to divorce her since it must have been a vow which was not public knowledge! “Rebbi Eleazar said, they forbade one because of the other.” The law should be that he can take her back even if it was a vow which needs investigation by a Sage, for the Elder uproots the vow. Why did they forbid a vow which needs investigation by a Sage? Because of a vow which does not need investigation by a Sage.
MISHNAH: If somebody divorces his wife because she is a she-ram, Rebbi Jehudah says, he cannot take her back, but the Sages say, he may take her back. If she was married to another man, had children by him, and requests her ketubah, Rebbi Jehudah says, he tells her: Your silence would be better than your talking.
HALAKHAH: It was stated: “Why did they say that he who divorces his wife as a she-ram cannot take her back? For if he divorced his wife as a she-ram, when she went, married another man, and bore him children, and he said, if I had known that she can have children, even if somebody had offered me a hundred minas for my wife I would not have divorced her, then the bill of divorce would be invalidated and her child a bastard. But since he knows that if he divorces her, she will be forbidden to return to him, from the start he gives her a perfect bill of divorce.” Rebbi Ze‘ira said, you can see that he was looking for a pretext to divorce her since there are women she-rams who are married and since [their husbands] are satisfied with them they keep them.
HALAKHAH: It was stated: “Why did they say that he who divorces his wife as a she-ram cannot take her back? For if he divorced his wife as a she-ram, when she went, married another man, and bore him children, and he said, if I had known that she can have children, even if somebody had offered me a hundred minas for my wife I would not have divorced her, then the bill of divorce would be invalidated and her child a bastard. But since he knows that if he divorces her, she will be forbidden to return to him, from the start he gives her a perfect bill of divorce.” Rebbi Ze‘ira said, you can see that he was looking for a pretext to divorce her since there are women she-rams who are married and since [their husbands] are satisfied with them they keep them.
If somebody divorces his wife she should not live in the same courtyard or the same place. If the courtyard was the wife’s property, the husband has to move out, if the husband’s, the wife has to move out. If it was common property, who has to move because of whom? The woman because of the man, unless they can manage to have separate exits. When has this been said? If they were definitively married, not if they were not definitively married. But the wife of a Cohen if she was not definitively married, as well as the status of a preliminarily married woman in Jehudah, is that of one definitively married. Nobody has to move if a person gives ḥalȋṣah to his sister-in-law even if he had “bespoken” her since “bespeaking” does not fully acquire.
MISHNAH: If five wrote collectively a bill of divorce, the man A divorces B and C D and the witnesses sign at the end, all are valid and [the bill] shall be delivered to each of them. If one wrote the text separately for each of them and the witnesses sign at the end, [only] the one with which the witnesses are read is valid.
HALAKHAH: “Five who wrote collectively a bill of divorce,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: “And I am greeting X,” one can assume that he signed regarding everything; “I am greeting X,” he signed only for the greeting. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, even if he said “I am greeting X,” one can assume that he signed regarding everything. What means “collectively” for Rebbi Joḥanan? X divorces Y and Z U. What means “collectively” for Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? We, X and Z, divorce our wives at place A. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, Rebbi Joḥanan agrees that if he mentions divorce for each one separately he needs a text and witnesses for each one separately. The strength of Rebbi Joḥanan is from the following: “ ‘That I shall not benefit, a qorbān for this one or that one’; each single one needs a separate opening.” Rebbi Yose said, the Mishnah supports Rebbi Joḥanan: “If he wrote a separate text for each of them and the witnesses signed at the end, [only] the one with which the witnesses are read is valid.” Samuel said, the detailed statement for Rebbi Meїr is the general statement for Rebbi Jehudah and the detailed statement for Rebbi Jehudah is the general statement for Rebbi Meїr. [Rebbi] Samuel said in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira, the words of the rabbis show that the detailed statement for Rebbi Meїr is not the general statement for Rebbi Jehudah and the detailed statement for Rebbi Jehudah is not the general statement for Rebbi Meїr, since Rebbi Joḥanan said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: “and I am greeting X,” one can assume that he signed regarding everything; “I am greeting X,” he signed only for the greeting. If you would say that the detailed statement for Rebbi Meїr is the general statement for Rebbi Jehudah, even if he said “and I am greeting X,” can one assume that he signed regarding everything? How is this? Rebbi Yose said, a Mishnah implies that the detailed statement for Rebbi Jehudah is not the general statement for Rebbi Meїr, as we have stated there: “Rebbi Meїr says, even ‘wheat, and barley, and spelt’ makes him guilty for each one separately”, but nobody says “even” unless he refers to an earlier statement. How is this? Rebbi Ḥanina said, in Rebbi Meїr’s opinion, [whether] he said “wheat, and barley, and spelt”, [or “wheat, barley, spelt] is a general statement and particulars. [In Rebbi Jehudah’s opinion,] if he said, “wheat grains, barley grains, and spelt grains”, it is a general statement without particulars.
“Even though the House of Shammai and the House of Hillel disagreed about co-wives, and sisters, and an old bill of divorce, and a woman doubtfully married, and someone who gives qiddushin in the value of a peruṭa, and someone who divorces his wife and spends the night with her in a hostelry, and a woman who receives qiddushin for at least a denar or the value of a denar, the House of Shammai did not refrain from marrying women from the House of Hillel or the House of Hillel from the House of Shammai but they behave truthfully and in peace, as it is said: ‘Love truth and peace.’ ” Bastardy is between them and you say so? How is that? If a first man gives her qiddushin for a peruṭa and a second [gives her afterwards)] for a denar, in the opinion of the House of Shammai she is betrothed to the second and her child by the first is a bastard. In the opinion of the House of Hillel she is betrothed to the first and her child by the second is a bastard. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The House of Shammai concede to the House of Hillel as a restriction. In that case, the House of Shammai should marry women from the House of Hillel since they concede to them. But the House of Hillel should not marry women from the House of Shammai since they do not concede to them. Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai: They all followed the same practice. If they followed the same practice, in this case we stated: “The House of Shammai sent and diminished it, since the House of Shammai say unless most of it is missing?” Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, the House of Shammai acted before the question came before the House of Hillel. After a question came before the House of Hillel, the House of Shammai were not touching it. Rebbi Abba Mari said, that is correct. Did we not state: “They declared impure all purities from before”, but not in the future. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, Rav and Samuel disagreed. One said both acted according to valid practice; the other said, each party followed their own practice. Bastardy is between them and you say so? The Omnipresent watched and no case ever happened.
“Give me the wheat, and the barley,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the words of Rebbi Jehudah imply collectively one sacrifice, in detail three sacrifices. How is this? A detail wheat, a detail barley, a detail spelt. Collectively one sacrifice, in detail three sacrifices. Detail a third wheat, detail a third barley, detail a third spelt, are these taken together? Come and see; although he holds many details, even so they can be formulated collectively or in detail. In which respect? To make him liable for sacrifices. If he held four kinds, two kinds in one detail, two kinds on two details. even so they can be formulated collectively or in detail. As Rebbi Joḥanan said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: “And I am greeting X,” one can assume that he signed concerning everything; “I am greeting X,” he signed only for the greeting. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, “I am greeting X,” one can assume that he signed concerning everything. What means “collectively”? Rebbi Joḥanan said, “X divorces Y and Z U.” What means “collectively”? Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, “We, X and Z, divorce our wives at place A.” Rebbi Ze`ira said, Rebbi Joḥanan agrees that if he mentions divorce for each one separately that he needs the typical text and witnesses for each one separately. The strength of Rebbi Joḥanan is from the following: “ ‘That I shall not benefit from this one; a qorban for this one and a qorban for that one.’ Each single one needs a separate opening.” Rebbi Yose said, the Mishnah supports Rebbi Joḥanan: “If he wrote a separate text for each of them and the witnesses signed at the end, [only] the one with which the witnesses are read is valid.”
The Babylonian Talmud
And from where does R. Yose the Galilean derive this? From [the words], ‘a scroll of divorce’; the scroll divorces and nothing else. And the others?
Why then was it repeated? If it is not needed for before [he divorces her], then let us use it for afterwards, that if he divorces her, he must take her back.
Why then was it repeated? If it is not needed for before [he divorces her], then let us use it for afterwards, that if he divorces her, he must take her back.
So rather "she shall be to him for a wife" should not have been stated by Motzei Shem Rah, and it could have been derived from Oneis. If by Oneis which doesn't have [the double punishment] of malkus and monetary payment, the Torah says, "she shall be to him for a wife", then is not Motzei Shem Rah even more so? Why then is it repeated [by Motzei Shem Rah, if it can just be derived from Oneis]? If it is not needed to teach us anything by Motzei Shem Rah, then apply this commandment by Oneis. If it is not needed before [he divorces her], apply it afterwards.
So rather "she shall be to him for a wife" should not have been stated with regards to Motzei Shem Rah, because she is already his wife. Why then was it said? If it is not needed to teach us anything by Motzei Shem Rah, then apply this commandment by Oneis. If it is not needed before [he divorces her], apply it afterwards.
But you can say, If it is not applicable before the Motzei Shem Rah [divorces his wife] apply it afterwards by itself [Motzei Shem Rah] that he does not recieve malkus for divorcing his wife [because he can remarry her].
Rebbi Ellazer asked him, Where is [the other case]? [Rebbi Yochanon] responded to him, when you look for it [you will find it]. He looked hard and found it. For it was taught in a baraisa An Oneiss who divorces his wife, if he is a Yisroel [a non-Kohen] he takes her back and does not recieve malkus. If he is a Kohen, however, [who is forbiden to marry a divorcee,] he is flogged and does not take her back.