2652 occurrences across the corpus

The Jerusalem Talmud

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 1:32

Rebbi Eleazar asked, what about a male who sleeps with a manumitted slave girl? Let us hear from the following: I could think that a male who sleeps with a Gentile slave has to pay; the verse says: “He shall take her as wife by the bride price.” If he can marry her. This excludes the [gentile] slave (or any) whom he cannot marry. Only because he cannot marry her! Therefore, if he can marry her, she collects the fine, and any who collects the fine has a ketubah. Rebbi Yudan said, does that depend on a fine? Look, the adult collects no fine but her ketubah is 200, the virgin after marriage collects a fine but her ketubah is a mina! Rebbi Ze‘ira said before Rebbi Mana, explain it if she was converted or freed before she reached three years and one day. He said to him, any woman who was converted or manumitted before she reached three years and one day is like an Israel.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 1:34

It was stated: A claim of non-virginity may be brought within thirty days, the words of Rebbi Meïr. But the Sages say, immediately. Where do we hold? If he copulated, immediately. If he did not copulate, even after a longer delay. But we must deal with the case that it was not spelled out. Rebbi Meïr said, it is credible that a man may hold himself back for thirty days. But the Sages say, a man does not hold himself back even for one day. Rebbi Jeremiah asked: According to Rebbi Meïr, would a man be believed to assert that he held himself back for thirty days in order to make the child of unknown paternity? Let us hear from the following: “If the sister-in-law claims within thirty days that she was not copulated with, one forces him to perform ḥalîṢah with her. After thirty days, one asks him to perform ḥalîṢah with her.” And Rebbi Eleazar said, this is Rebbi Meïr’s. And Rebbi Eleazar said, that refers only to her, but not to her co-wife. As you say there, she is not believed to damage her co-wife, so here, he is not believed to damage his son.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 2:4

If somebody claimed a mina, the [defendant] denied it, and the [claimant] produced witnesses that the [defendant] owes him 50 [zuz]. The older Rebbi Ḥiyya said, [the defendant] has to swear about the remainder. Rebbi Joḥanan says, he does not have to swear. The older Rebbi Ḥiyya learned it from two who are grabbing a toga, as we have stated there: “Two are grabbing a toga, one says, I found it, and the other says, I found it.” The one who grabs half of it is as if he brought witnesses that that half belongs to him. The other says, “it belongs to me entirely”, and the fact that he grabs half of it is as if he brought witnesses that this half belongs to him. The one who says, “it belongs to me entirely”, swears that not the entire [toga] is the other’s. But he did not hear that Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan that this oath is a rabbinic institution, that a man should not see another in the market and tell him, the toga which you are wearing is mine, come and split your toga with me! Rebbi Abin in the name of Rav: My uncle agrees in the case of a document. How is that? He claimed a mina, the [defendant] denied it, and the [claimant] produced a document that the [defendant] owed him 50 [zuz]. He has only fifty. And Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, we can understand it from the following: “‘The amount of … tetradrachmas’ and it was illegible, he owes no less than two. “If it is more, if the lender says five but the borrower says three, Ben Azzay says since he partially agreed to the claim, he has to swear, but the Sages say, what he agreed to is not of the kind which was claimed. Because it was not of the kind which was claimed! Therefore, if it were of the kind which was claimed, he would be obligated. And is it not here that the agreed sum was part of the claim? Everybody agrees that he owes her a mina. But she claimsanother mina from him, to which he does not agree. The burden of proof is on the claimant.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 2:41

And even a minor. Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: Even a minor, even a relative. Even an underage relative? Let us hear from the following: Ḥananiah from Cartes was kidnapped, he, his son, and his wife. They came before Rebbi Ḥanina who did not receive them. They came before Rebbi Joshua ben Levi who received them. This implies, even an underage relative.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 3:37

HALAKHAH: “About an orphan girl who had been preliminarily married and was divorced,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said, it turns out that Rebbi Eleazar follows the opinion of his teacher Rebbi Aqiba. Just as Rebbi Aqiba said that she can collect the fine and it belongs to her, so Rebbi Eleazar said that she can collect the fine and it belongs to her. Then also for a seduced one? Rebbi Jeremiah said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar, explain it that she remitted it to him. Can anybody remit anthing that does not belong to him? Explain it for an orphan; as it was stated in the House of Rebbi thus: The orphan, Rebbi Eleazar said that the rapist has to pay her but the seducer does not. Can anybody remit something which is not in his possession? Let us hear from the following, as Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya said in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ura: The fine is not due from the first moment on. As we have stated there: “If she came to court before her father died, [the payments due] belong to her father and if the father died they belong to the brothers.” If you say that the fine is due from the first moment, it would belong to the brothers from the first moment! Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav Ḥisda: The Mishnah deals with shame and diminution of value. As Rebbi Mana said, how is it? The rapist is obligated for everything and the seducer is free from everything. Rebbi Abin said, [Rebbi] Shammai asked: What does it mean that the rapist has to pay but the seducer does not? The rapist has to pay everything but the seducer is free [from paying] for shame and diminution of value but is obligated for the fine. That is Rebbi Aqiba’s. Or, the rapist is free [from paying] for shame and diminution of value but is obligated for the fine but the seducer is free from everything? That is Rebbi Yose the Galilean’s.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 3:45

HALAKHAH: “One who says, I seduced X’s daughter,” etc. Rebbi Isaac asked: Would he have to pay the slave’s value on his own testimony? What is his problem? Are the entire 30 [šeqel] a fine or is only the excess over his value a fine? If you say, the entire 30 [šeqel] are a fine, he does not pay. If you say, the excess over his value is a fine, he pays. There, we have stated: “‘Your ox killed my slave’! The other said, ‘he did not kill’. ‘I want you to swear’ and he said ‘Amen’, he is free.” Rebbi Ḥaggai said before Rebbi Yose, explain it if he killed a slave afflicted with boils. He said to him, what does it say afterwards? “‘Your ox killed my son’! The other said, ‘he did not kill’. ‘I want you to swear’ and he said ‘Amen’, he is obligated.” Why do you not explain it that he was afflicted with boils, then he would be free. Rebbi Ḥaggai said before Rebbi Yose, explain it following him who says “he shall pay the redemption of his person”, the one’s who caused the damage. He said to him, if following him who says “he shall pay the redemption of his person”, the one’s who caused the damage, everything is a fine. Can one say to him, be also in the clear with Heaven? Let us hear from the following: It happened that Rabban Gamliel knocked out his slave Tebi’s tooth. He came to Rebbi Joshua and said to him, I found a reason to free my slave Tebi. He said to him, what do you have in your hand? Fines can be imposed only by witnesses! Could they not say to him, do your duty before Heaven? That means one does not tell him, do your duty before Heaven! Rebbi Gamliel ben Avina asked before Rebbi Mana: Does Rabban Gamliel follow him who said, it is permitted to manumit? He said to him, the story in itself implies that it is forbidden to manumit since, otherwise, he could have freed him immediately!

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 4:45

“If somebody who works his wife’s property has the intention of divorcing her and goes and takes from the ground, he is quick and is rewarded. If somebody who works the property of prisoners heard that they prepare to return, goes and takes from the ground, he is quick and is rewarded. These are properties of prisoners: In any case where his father, brother, or any person from whom he might inherit, went overseas; it was heard that they died, and he went to work the inheritance. But property of abandoning persons one takes out of their hands. These are properties of abandoning persons: In any case where his father or any person from whom he might inherit went overseas, he did not hear that they died, but he went to work the inheritance. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel said, I heard that there is no difference between prisoners and abandoning persons. But property of broken persons one takes out of their hands. These are properties of broken persons: In any case where his father, brother, or any person from whom he might inherit, went overseas, and his whereabouts are not known. Samuel says, the prisoner is one who left involuntarily. If he had left voluntarily he would have given him instructions. The abandoning person is one who left voluntarily. You should know that he had the intention of keeping [the relative] off his property since he left voluntarily and did not give him instructions. Rebbi Abba, Rav Jehudah in the name of Samuel: Movables do not fall under the rules of broken people. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rav: Those date palms of Babylonia which do not need grafting, is it not reasonable that we should treat them like standing grain ready to be harvested and grapes ready to be harvested?

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 5:5

You say that the father decides for his daughter; even if she is an adult? Let us hear from the following: The father decides for his daughter, but the mother does not decide for her daughter, nor the brother for his sister. Is there a difference about his sister whether she is an adolescent or an adult? So here, there is no difference whether she is an adolescent or an adult. Rebbi Abba from Carthage asked, even a third party? They said, even if she be an adult? A third party, let us hear from the following: The father decides for his daughter, but the mother does not decide for her daughter, nor the brother for his sister. So much more for the adult. Also in money matters it is so: Give your daughter to X and I shall give you so-and-so much. Buy this field and I shall give you so-and-so much.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 5:5

You say that the father decides for his daughter; even if she is an adult? Let us hear from the following: The father decides for his daughter, but the mother does not decide for her daughter, nor the brother for his sister. Is there a difference about his sister whether she is an adolescent or an adult? So here, there is no difference whether she is an adolescent or an adult. Rebbi Abba from Carthage asked, even a third party? They said, even if she be an adult? A third party, let us hear from the following: The father decides for his daughter, but the mother does not decide for her daughter, nor the brother for his sister. So much more for the adult. Also in money matters it is so: Give your daughter to X and I shall give you so-and-so much. Buy this field and I shall give you so-and-so much.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 5:20

Rebbi Jeremiah asked: If somebody dedicated his slave’s earnings and the latter was a hunter, what are the rules? Let us hear from the following: If somebody dedicates his slave, that one is dedicated but his earnings are profane. His [slave’s] earnings, he is profane and his earnings are dedicated. Rebbi Joḥanan said, if somebody cuts off the hands of another person’s slave, that one’s owner collects the payments for his injuries, his pain, his shame, and impairment but he shall go out and subsist on alms. Did we not state: If somebody dedicates his slave, that one takes out his provisions but the remainder is dedicated. Rebbi Abba bar Mamal said, nobody thinks that he should die. [ ] more than for slaves. Did not Rebbi Joḥanan say, if somebody cuts off the hands of another person’s slave, that one’s owner collects the payments for his damages, his pain, his shame, and impairment but he shall go out and subsist on alms. The rabbis of Caesarea in the name of Rebbi Aḥa: Jews are obligated to care for amputees, even slaves. Rebbi Joḥanan gave to his slave from everything he himself ate and quoted for this: “Did not his Maker make me in the belly and formed me likewise in a womb?”

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 5:36

Following Rebbi Eliezer, how far can he deduct? Let us hear from the following: Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: One writes a bill of rebellion for the husband of a preliminarily married woman, or a sick one, a menstruating woman or one who is waiting for her levir. Where do we hold? If she rebelled against him when she was having her period, the Torah made her rebel against him! But we must hold that she rebelled against him before she had her period and now she has it. At that moment she would not be able to rebel but you say one writes, therefore one also deducts. From where does one deduct? From the additions to her ketubah. Let us hear from the following: “Rebbi Yose says, he continues to reduce, for maybe an inheritance will come to her from outside and he would be able to collect from it.” He mentioned only inheritance, which is infrequent. That means he deducts from the additions to he ketubah. Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Samuel: One writes a bill of rebellion for a preliminarily married woman, but one does not write a bill of rebellion for one who is waiting for her levir. But did not Rebbi Ḥiyya state that one writes a bill of rebellion on the ketubah of a menstruating woman or a sick one, a preliminarily married woman or one who is waiting for her levir? There, according to the first Mishnah, here according to the later Mishnah. Rebbi Yose bar Abun said, even if you say according to the later Mishnah, ”the later Court [instituted that] one warns her for four weeks, then she writes a receipt for her ketubah and leaves.”

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 5:36

Following Rebbi Eliezer, how far can he deduct? Let us hear from the following: Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: One writes a bill of rebellion for the husband of a preliminarily married woman, or a sick one, a menstruating woman or one who is waiting for her levir. Where do we hold? If she rebelled against him when she was having her period, the Torah made her rebel against him! But we must hold that she rebelled against him before she had her period and now she has it. At that moment she would not be able to rebel but you say one writes, therefore one also deducts. From where does one deduct? From the additions to her ketubah. Let us hear from the following: “Rebbi Yose says, he continues to reduce, for maybe an inheritance will come to her from outside and he would be able to collect from it.” He mentioned only inheritance, which is infrequent. That means he deducts from the additions to he ketubah. Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Samuel: One writes a bill of rebellion for a preliminarily married woman, but one does not write a bill of rebellion for one who is waiting for her levir. But did not Rebbi Ḥiyya state that one writes a bill of rebellion on the ketubah of a menstruating woman or a sick one, a preliminarily married woman or one who is waiting for her levir? There, according to the first Mishnah, here according to the later Mishnah. Rebbi Yose bar Abun said, even if you say according to the later Mishnah, ”the later Court [instituted that] one warns her for four weeks, then she writes a receipt for her ketubah and leaves.”

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 7:17

MISHNAH: The following leave without ketubah: Any one violating the laws of Moses or Jews. What is the law of Moses? She feeds him what is not tithed, or makes him sleep with her when she is menstruating, or does not cut ḥallah, or makes vows which she does not keep. And what is the law of Jews: She leaves home with her hair in disorder, or spins in public, or speaks with everybody. Abba Saul says, also one who curses his parents in his presence. Rebbi Tarphon says, also the big-voiced. What is the big-voiced? Any who speaks inside her house and her neighbors hear her voice.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 7:21

Abba Saul says, also one who curses their child in his parents’ presence. Rebbi Tarphon says, also the big-voiced. What is the big-voiced? Samuel says, any who speaks and her women neighbors hear her voice. Rav says, any one whose voice is heard by other people from bed to bed during intercourse.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 7:27

Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, the Mishnah deals with the case that he married her preliminarily conditionally but definitively silently. But if he married her preliminarily silently and definitively silently, she can claim her ketubah. Rebbi Joḥanan said, even if he married her preliminarily silently and definitively silently, she has no ketubah. Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: But she needs a bill of divorce from him even if he married her preliminarily conditionally but definitively silently. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Mana: In case he married her preliminarily silently and divorced her after the preliminary marriage, what does Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish say? Let us hear from the following: “If she had bodily defects, as long as she is in her father’s house, the father has to prove.” This implies that if the father proved his case, she can claim her ketubah. What do you see to say, if he married her preliminarily silently and divorced her after the preliminary marriage! Where do we hold? Since afterwards [it is stated]: “When was this said? For hidden defects, but he has no claim about visible defects.” If he [made it conditional], could he not also claim for visible ones? But did not the colleagues say before Rebbi Yose: Should we say that the following statement disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? “Once she entered her husband’s domain, the husband has to prove.” This implies that if the husband proved his case, she has no claim to ketubah. But by the statement of Rebbi Simeon ban Laqish, she has a claim to ketubah. Rebbi Cohen in the name of the rabbis of Caesarea: The Mishnah deals with the case that he definitively married her but did not sleep with her; Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish speaks about the case that he definitively married her and slept with her; I am saying that she was acceptable to him since he took her to bed.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 7:31

HALAKHAH: “If a man developed defects,” etc. Rav Jehudah in the name of Rav: So is the Mishnah, “if he had.” But if they developed newly, one forces him to divorce. Rebbi Abba bar Cahana in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Practice follows Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel. There came a case before Rebbi Jeremiah about a kopeaḥ, and he forced him. It turns out that following Rav if he did not become so, following Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel if he became so. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel follows Rebbi Meïr. Which [statement of] Rebbi Meïr? The former or the later? If the former, until she made a condition. If the later, even if he made a condition it is nothing. But this Mishnah turns out following Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel; does “the following one forces to divorce” [follows] the rabbis? Let us hear from the following: “Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, if it was a major defect, e. g., blind in one eye, amputated of one of his hands, lame in one of his legs, immediately he shall divorce and pay the ketubah.” This Mishnah turns out following Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel; “the following one forces to divorce” [follows] the rabbis.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 8:10

HALAKHAH: “If she inherited money; real estate should be bought,” etc. Rebbi Jeremiah said, this is Rebbi Meïr’s opinion since Rebbi Meïr considers standing [produce] as if it were cut. Rebbi Yose said, he did not hear that Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, Rebbi Meïr said this only for standing grain ready to be harvested and grapes ready to be harvested; therefore not unripe produce. But here, even unripe produce. Rebbi Jeremiah asked, are not the arguments of Rebbi Meïr contradictory? There, he did not consider standing [produce] as if it were cut, but here he considers standing [produce] as if it were cut. Rebbi Joḥanan said, Rebbi Meïr does not consider standing [produce] as if it were cut. But if you see cut grain, you empower the woman; if you see an unseeded field, you empower the man. In case of doubt you estimate how much it is worth unseeded and how much seeded. If before it was seeded it was worth (two denars) and when it was seeded (one denar), with that denar real estate should be bought and he reaps its yield.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 8:24

Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: One does not say “his” but [ ]. In which respect? In case the heir took it, one removes it from his hand. Does one have the same rule for the creditor? Was it not stated: If either the heir or the creditor took it, one takes it from their hands? Rebbi Aḥa bar Ulla said, let us hear from the following: “If he dedicated 90 minas but his debt was 100 minas, [the creditor] adds another denar and redeems these properties.” Not necessarily a denar, but anything, that a dedication should not be seen to be profanated without redemption. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: One would be guilty of complete larceny. That is difficult. If one would be guilty of complete larceny, should if not be redeemed for its full value? If it can be redeemed for less than its full value, one should not be guilty of complete larceny! What are we talking about? If it is connected to the ground, can there be larceny about real estate? But we talk about standing grain. Since if the administrator misbehaved and took it, one does not take it from his hand; the administrator and the heir follow the same rule. Also if the heir misbehaved and took it, one does not take it from his hand. Rebbi Samuel, Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The same rule holds for an ox. Can you say that an ox is real estate? Rebbi Tanḥum bar Mari in the name of Rebbi Yose: They made the rules for an ox parallel those of dedications that lost their value. Here, you say one takes it from his hand, but there you say, one does not take it from his hand. Since you diminished the woman’s power in that her ketubah is a lien only on the properties of her first husband, you strengthened her power in this matter that if the heir came and took it, one removes it from his hand. It was stated thus: Trees and cutting, old or young, one removes from their hands.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 9:6

It is reasonable according to Rebbi Jehudah, if he wrote: “I shall have nothing to do with your properties and the revenues,” that he cannot take the revenues. Even if he wrote: “I shall have nothing to do with this field and its yield,” he cannot eat its yield. It is reasonable according to the rabbis; if he wrote: “I shall have nothing to do with this field and its yield,” can he eat its yield? Even if he wrote, “I shall have nothing to do with your properties and its yields,” can he eat its yield? Let us hear from the following, as Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rav Jehudah said in the name of Rav: If somebody writes a field over to his wife, he has no right to its yield. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, a baraita says so “What are revenues derived from revenues? He sells the produce, buys real estate, and eats its revenue.” Since he wrote, “I shall have nothing to do with your properties and their yields,” is that not as if he wrote a field over to his wife, and you say, he has neither revenue nor revenue from revenue! That means, there is no difference in the opinion of Rebbi Jehudah whether he wrote “I shall have nothing to do with this field and its yield,” or he wrote “I shall have nothing to do with your properties and their revenues,” he cannot take any revenue. Similarly, for the rabbis it makes no difference whether he wrote “I shall have nothing to do with your properties and their revenues,” or he wrote “I shall have nothing to do with this field and its yield,” he can take its yield.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 9:25

There, we have stated: “If somebody leases a cow from another person and lends it to a third party; if it died naturally, the lessee has to swear that it died naturally and the borrower has to pay to the lessee.” Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lend to others. Also Rebbi Ḥiyya stated thus: “The borrower cannot lend, nor the lessee lease, nor the borrower lease, nor the lessee lend, nor the trustee give to another unless they received permission from the owners. And all who changed the titles without the owners’ knowledge are liable. But the borrower is liable even if he did not change.” But it is because we stated: “An unpaid watchman can stipulate to be exempt from an oath and the borrower may stipulate that he not have to pay.” This means that even if he stipulated to be exempt that he is obligated. What if he wanted to let the borrower swear? Let us hear from the following: “If he wrote to her: ‘I have no vow or oath against you,’ he cannot make her swear, but he can ask an oath from the heirs or her business associates.” This implies that if he wanted to make the borrower swear, he can force him to swear. The first case teaches about the second and the second about the first. The first case teaches about the second, that if he wanted to make the borrower swear, he can force him to swear. The second case teaches about the first, that if he wants to force the wife to swear, that he can make her swear. Rebbi Ḥanina said, it is not necessary to derive the first case from the second, and what does one learn for the second case from the first? Following what Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lend to others. And here, only if he gave permission to let her sons be stewards. Rebbi Yose said, he has to pay the lease all the time it is leased to him. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked Rebbi Abuna: If the owners borrowed it and it died? He said to him, in that case we say, they ate it. Rebbi Yose bar Abun said, if they ate it, they ate their own property. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Yasa: How does one act? He said to him, there are two against four; one does not act following the argument. He said to him, they are two against two! Rebbi Eleazar is the elder Rebbi Ḥiyya’s student; Rebbi Joḥanan is Rebbi Yannai’s student.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 10:18

HALAKHAH: “If somebody was married to four women when he died,” etc. Rebbi Abuna in the name of Rebbi Samuel: Following Ben Nanas, if one document was produced against (the wife) buyers, they all divide evenly. Rebbi Aqiba said before Rebbi Mana: Does this not disagree with Rebbi Samuel, since Samuel said, sharpness of the judges? As in the case of two mortgages written on one field, to whom they want to hand it over in possession they hand it over. And here, he says so? Not with two mortgages, what about one? He did not hear what Rebbi Abin said in the name of Samuel: There is no difference, whether two mortgages were written on two fields or two mortgages were written on one field, to whom the court decide they hand it over in possession. Rebbi instituted that one follows Ben Nanas in matters of annona, head taxes, and real estate taxes.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 10:21

HALAKHAH: “If somebody was married to two wives,” etc. Rebbi Yose said, this means that if somebody borrowed from two persons and the second comes and says to him, get up and let us settle, and [the borrower] says, will not in the end the first hear of it and come to foreclose, he [the second lender] may say let us settle, and if he forecloses, he forecloses. If he settled, one may assume that the first will come and foreclose. If he settled with the first, Rebbi Phineas said, such a case came before Rebbi Jeremiah who said, he settled. Rebbi Yose said, did he not write “what I shall acquire”? It happens only with an heir. Rebbi Ḥanina said, even with a creditor it can happen if he did not write “anything I shall acquire”, or if he said, “you shall not be paid except from this.” Rav Mattaniah said, this follows him who said, for ketubah but not for stipulations. But for him who said, for ketubah and for stipulations, does it not return?

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 11:29

There, we have stated: “A forced bill of divorce is valid in Israel; it is invalid from Gentiles.” Samuel said, it is invalid and disqualifies for the priesthood. Samuel said, one does not force, only disqualify. Samuel said, one does not force except for example a widow married to a High Priest, a divorcee or one freed by ḥalîṣah for a simple priest. But did we not state: “Secondarily forbidden”? Did he not say “for example”? But did we not state: “A person who by a vow forbids his wife to have any usufruct from him, up to 30 days he shall appoint a caretaker; after 30 days he shall divorce her and pay ketubah”! We heard that he shall divorce; did we hear that one forces him?

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 12:4

There, we have stated: “The female children you will have by me shall live in my house and be supported by my estate,” and it was stated about this: They will be clothed with garments supplied by me. For whom does the daughter work? Let us hear from the following: “The husband has to sustain her and they pay the cost of her sustenance.” This means, he feeds her but she works for her husband. Rebbi Yose said, this means that if somebody had agreed to sustain his daughter-in-law, he has to sustain her, but she works for his son. If he wants her to be with him but she does not want to, the law is with her, as we have stated: “They pay the cost of her sustenance.” If she fell ill, it is as if she had married. If she died, is it as if she had married? If she died, she already is dead.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 13:9

HALAKHAH: “If somebody went overseas,” etc. Rebbi Abba bar Mamal asked: If somebody pays off somebody else’s debt without the latter’s knowledge, is that the disagreement of Ḥanan and the High Priests’ sons? Rebbi Yose said, there the reason of the High Priest’s sons is that he would not expect his wife to starve. But here, [the debtor could say:] “I could negotiate with him and he would forgive some.” Think of it, if [the loan] was on a pledge! “I could negotiate with him and he would return my pledge.” So far about a creditor who does not push [for repayment]. Even for a creditor who pushes, we can hear from the following: “He may give his šeqel.” If somebody does not pay his šeqel, does one not take a pledge from him? This says, even for a creditor who pushes. You should know that this is so, as we have stated: “He can bring for him nests for males or females suffering from genital discharges, nests for childbirth, purification and reparation offerings” since nothing of these comes to [the other person’s] hand. And here also, that nothing should come into his hand.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 13:10

Rebbi Joshua ben Levi says, nobody is held responsible for his neighbor except for annona and head-tax. Rav said, anything for which one is held responsible for one’s neighbor has to be repaid. The strength of Rav is from the following: “He who appropriated a field and oppressors took it.” He did not hear that Rebbi Joḥanan said, they exacted a fine from a robber. Rebbi Abin asked, what is greater? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun, and Rebbi Ḥiyya ben Julianus both said in the name of Samuel; one said, it is like annona and head-tax; the other said, it is not like annona and head-tax.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 13:13

Who is the Tanna of “the gain should be given to the sacred fund”? Rebbi Meïr! For Rebbi Meïr said, one commits sacrilege with prohibitions. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya asked: If somebody made a vow [to forbid] a loaf to himself, can he use it to warm his hands? Let us hear from the following: “If he said, this loaf shall be dedicated, if he or another person ate it, they committed sacrilege; therefore, it can be redeemed. But if he said, it is for me [as if dedicated], if he ate it he committed sacrilege on goodwill but others would not commit sacrilege.” He said only, if he ate it. Therefore, to warm his hands is permitted. The students of Rebbi Jonah in the name of Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya: That is if he said I shall not eat it nor taste it; if he forbade only eating to himself. But the question was, if somebody made a vow [to forbid] a loaf to himself, can he use it to warm his hands?

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 13:16

HALAKHAH: “Admon promulgated seven [rules],” etc. How large is a large estate? Rebbi Ze‘ura, Rav Jehudah in the name of Rav: That there should be twelve months of sustenance for all of them. Samuel heard this and said, this is the opinion of Rabban Gamliel ben Rebbi, but the Sages say, until they reach adulthood or are married. They asked before Rebbi Yose, what did you hear from Rebbi Joḥanan? He said to them, let us explain the words of the Sages by their words! Nathan bar Hoshaia asked before Rebbi Joḥanan, if there was sustenance for twelve months but the estate diminished in value? He answered him, since the heirs started to eat with permission, they continue to eat until the last coin is gone.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 13:17

When does one appraise for them? Rebbi Mana said, one appraises at the end. Rebbi Ḥanina said to him, the words of the rabbis imply that one does not listen to you, for Nathan bar Hoshaia asked before Rebbi Joḥanan, if there was sustenance for twelve months but the estate diminished in value? He answered him, since the heirs started to eat with permission, they continue to eat until the last coin is gone! Therefore, one appraises at the start. Rav Ḥisda asked: If there was sustenance for twelve months and then the property increased in value? Let us hear from the following, for Rebbi Ḥanina, Rebbi Yasa said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If the heirs sold, they sold from their own property. So here, if it increased in value, their property value increased. If the estate was not sufficient for twelve months’ sustenance, may the sons say to the daughters, take what is yours and leave! Rebbi Abba said, is that a question? The Mishnah says that they cannot say so to them, as we have stated there: “If the orphans say, we accept the properties of our father for the value of an extra denar in order to take their mother’s ketubah; one does not listen to them but one appraises the properties in court.”

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 13:18

As you say, after deduction for her ketubah, after deduction of burial costs, after deduction of loans by witnesses or by contract. After deduction for daughters’ dowries? For him who says, one forecloses from mortgaged property for daughters’ dowries, the dowries are privileged. For him who says, one does not foreclose from mortgaged property for daughters’ dowries, the dowries are not privileged. Let us hear from the following: The widow and the sons are of equal rank. The widow and the daughters are of equal rank. The widow does not push the sons aside and the widow does not push the daughters aside. How is that? If there was enough for 12 months sustenance and a widow to sustain. That explains that sometimes the widow pushes out the sons by means of the daughters. Just as she pushes out the sons by means of the daughters, should she not push them out by means of the sons? She might claim her ketubah and lose her right to sustenance.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 1:16

HALAKHAH: “If somebody says qônām, or qônāḥ,” etc. So far for himself. Can one dedicate to Heaven by saying qônām? Let us hear from the following: One said to another, lend me your spade. He said, qônām the spade if I have it, qônām my property on me. If he has a spade, his property would be forbidden for this one “has no spade”. Rebbi Taḥlifa from Caesarea said, there is a difference, for he used the same expression to attach the spade and to attach his property. As you look at it, if the spade is sanctified, so is his property. If the spade is not sanctified, neither is his property. If he said, qônām the spade if I have it, and added qônām my property on me, if he owns a spade, his property is forbidden. That is correct. Rebbi Joshua ben Ḥananiah said, if he had said “my property”, it would be permitted for he stopped. That is correct. He only asserted that the person had no spade. Therefore, if he has a spade, his property is forbidden. That means that the spade was sanctified. That means that the property was sanctified. This means that a person may dedicate to Heaven using the expression qônām.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 1:34

‘My going [is forbidden] to you, my speech [is forbidden] to you,’ he said nothing. Why? Because he referred the vow to something immaterial. “Vow, vow”. Just as “vow” which was said there refers to something (im-)material, so “vow” said here refers to something (im)material. ‘My eye [is forbidden] to see for you, my ear [is forbidden] to hear you,’ he is forbidden. You say, ‘my hand [is forbidden] to work with you,’ he is forbidden. If he ploughed with him on the ground, what is forbidden to him? Up to the amount of his wages or any improvement of the ground? If he fenced in an oven with him, what is forbidden to him? Up to the amount of his wages or any improvement of the oven?

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 2:3

“One who says to his wife, you are for me like my mother”. Your cohabitation is for me like cohabitation with my mother, like my mother’s flesh; he did not say anything. If he said, this loaf is for me like cohabitation with my mother, what? Let us hear from the following: A qônām that I shall not sleep with you, Rav says, he is forbidden, Samuel says he is permitted. How does Samuel uphold “he shall not profanate his word”? As if he shall not profanate his word. Rav sticks with his opinion: The Tannaїm in the House of Rav disagree: “From where that one may not make and dissolve vows which are dissolved for you from Heaven but people consider them as binding? The verse says, ‘he shall not profanate his word.’ He should not make his words profane.”

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 2:10

HALAKHAH: “A vow inside a vow is possible,” etc. Rebbi Yose asked: An oath, an oath, an oath that I shall not eat, but he ate? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, let us hear from the following: “An oath that I shall not eat this loaf, an oath that I shall not eat, an oath that I shall not eat. If he ate, he is guilty only once.” Because he said this. Therefore, if he had not said this, he would be guilty for each of the oaths. Avime the brother of Ḥefa said, I studied vows, I studied oaths. Ḥefa wanted to examine him: There were five loaves before him and he said, an oath that I shall not eat this loaf. Then he said, these two loaves. Then he said, these three loaves. Then he said, these four loaves. Then he said, these five loaves. Then he ate the first, what are the rules? He said to him, he is guilty for each [oath] separately. He said to him, he is guilty only once. From the moment he mentioned “oath” about it, he made it like carcass meat. From there on he is as if he wanted to apply oaths to prohibitions, but no oath can be applied to prohibitions. He examined him a second time. There were five loaves and he said, an oath about these five loaves. Then he said, these four. Then he said, these three. Then he said, these two. Then he said, this single one. Then he ate all of them? He said to him, he is guilty only once. He said to him, he is guilty for each [oath] separately. If somebody had said, an oath that I shall not eat five, and he ate four, would he be free from punishment? Rebbi Yose said, it is reasonable following Ḥefa’s brother in the last case, following Ḥefa in the first.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 2:13

“This is for me like heave, if Temple heave, he is forbidden,” therefore ‘heave of thanksgiving’ is permitted. “If heave from the threshing floor, he is permitted,” therefore ‘heave of thanksgiving’ is forbidden. Here you say, forbidden; there, you say, permitted. Let us hear from the following: “Like Aaron’s ḥallah and his heave” is permitted, therefore ‘heave of thanksgiving’ is forbidden.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 3:10

“Vain” and “untruth” both were said together, which is impossible for the mouth to say and the ear to hear. “Remember” and “keep” both were said together, which is impossible for the mouth to say and the ear to hear. “Its desecrator shall be put to death” and “two unblemished one year old sheep” both were said together, which is impossible for the mouth to say and the ear to hear. “The nakedness of your brother’s wife you shall not uncover”, “her brother-in-law shall come to her”, both were said together. “You shall not move real property from one tribe to another,” “any daughter inheriting real property,” both together. “Fringes you shall make for yourself,” “do not wear sha‘ṭnez”, both were said together. And so it says, “God spoke once, two I heard from this.” And it is written: “Is not my word like fire, says the Eternal, and like a hammer which shatters a rock.”

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 3:10

“Vain” and “untruth” both were said together, which is impossible for the mouth to say and the ear to hear. “Remember” and “keep” both were said together, which is impossible for the mouth to say and the ear to hear. “Its desecrator shall be put to death” and “two unblemished one year old sheep” both were said together, which is impossible for the mouth to say and the ear to hear. “The nakedness of your brother’s wife you shall not uncover”, “her brother-in-law shall come to her”, both were said together. “You shall not move real property from one tribe to another,” “any daughter inheriting real property,” both together. “Fringes you shall make for yourself,” “do not wear sha‘ṭnez”, both were said together. And so it says, “God spoke once, two I heard from this.” And it is written: “Is not my word like fire, says the Eternal, and like a hammer which shatters a rock.”

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 3:10

“Vain” and “untruth” both were said together, which is impossible for the mouth to say and the ear to hear. “Remember” and “keep” both were said together, which is impossible for the mouth to say and the ear to hear. “Its desecrator shall be put to death” and “two unblemished one year old sheep” both were said together, which is impossible for the mouth to say and the ear to hear. “The nakedness of your brother’s wife you shall not uncover”, “her brother-in-law shall come to her”, both were said together. “You shall not move real property from one tribe to another,” “any daughter inheriting real property,” both together. “Fringes you shall make for yourself,” “do not wear sha‘ṭnez”, both were said together. And so it says, “God spoke once, two I heard from this.” And it is written: “Is not my word like fire, says the Eternal, and like a hammer which shatters a rock.”

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 3:20

If he transgressed and offered [a vow], how is that in the opinion of the House of Shammai? Let us hear from the following: “The House of Shammai say, his wife is permitted but his children are forbidden.” That means, if he transgressed and offered [a vow], in the opinion of the House of Shammai he is permitted. They wanted to say, vows but not oaths. It was found stated: Rebbi Ismael says, “do not swear falsely in My Name,” you may swear to assessors and to people who condemn property and to toll collectors.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 4:5

HALAKHAH: “If one is under a vow [not to have] usufruct from another,” etc. Rebbi Abba bar Mamal asked: If somebody pays off somebody else’s debt without the latter’s knowledge, is that the disagreement of Ḥanan and the High Priests’ sons? Rebbi Yose said, there the reason of the High Priest’s sons is that nobody expects his wife to die from hunger. But here, [the debtor could say:] “I could negotiate with him and he would forgive some.” Think of it, if [the loan] was on a pledge! “I could negotiate with him and he would return my pledge.” So far about a creditor who does not push [for repayment]. Even for a creditor who pushes, we can hear from the following: “He may give his šeqel. If somebody does not pay his šeqel, does one not take a pledge from him? This says, even for a creditor who pushes. You should know that this is so, as we have stated: “He can bring for him nests for males or females suffering from genital discharges, nests for childbirth, purification and reparation offerings” since nothing of these comes to [the other person’s] hand. And here also, that nothing should come into his hand.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 4:6

Rebbi Joshua ben Levi says, nobody is held responsible for his neighbor except for annona and head-tax. Rav said, anything for which one is held responsible for one’s neighbor has to be repaid. The strength of Rav is from the following: “He who appropriated a field and oppressors took it.” He did not hear that Rebbi Joḥanan said, they exacted a fine from a robber. Rebbi Abin asked, (who was the father of) Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun, and Rebbi Ḥiyya ben Julianus both said in the name of Samuel; one said, it is like annona and head-tax; the other one said, it is not like annona and head-tax.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 4:9

Who is the Tanna of “the gain should be given to the sacred fund”? Rebbi Meïr! For Rebbi Meïr said, one commits sacrilege with prohibitions. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya asked: If somebody made a vow [to forbid] a loaf to himself, can he use it to warm his hands? Let us hear from the following: “If he said, this loaf shall be dedicated, if he or another person ate it, they committed sacrilege; therefore, it can be redeemed. But if he said, it is for me [as if dedicated], if he ate it he committed sacrilege on goodwill but others would not commit sacrilege.” He said only, if he ate it. Therefore, to warm his hands is permitted. The students of Rebbi Jonah in the name of Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya: That is if he said I shall not eat it nor taste it; if he forbade only eating to himself. But the question was, if somebody made a vow [to forbid] a loaf to himself, can he use it to warm his hands?

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 4:29

HALAKHAH: “If he had his house to build, his fence to repair,” etc. May he say, he who works will not lose? Let us hear from the following. In the days of Rebbi Immi there was a fire in the village. Rebbi Immi sent a crier to the markets of the Gentiles saying: “He who works will not lose.” Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Yose said, that was danger to life. But if there was danger to life, Rebbi Immi himself should have fought the fire! Did we not state, in any case of danger to life one does not say that [the necessary work] be done by Gentiles or minors, but [it should be done] even by important Jewish persons. It happened that there was a fire in the courtyard of Yose ben Simai in Šiḥin, and the garrison of the barracks of Sepphoris came to fight it but he did not let them fight it; he said, let the collector collect his due. Immediately there formed a cloud, there was rain which extinguished it. After the Sabbath he sent to each of them a tetradrachma and to their commander 50 denarii. Rebbi Ḥanina said, there was no need for him to do that A Samaritan was a neighbor of Rebbi Jonah. There was a fire in Rebbi Jonah’s neighborhood; he wanted to fight it but Rebbi Jonah did not let him. He said to him, because of my property! He said, yes. And everything was saved. Rebbi Jonah from Kefar-Immi spread his garment over the grain stack and the fire retreated from it.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 4:32

So far, if he abandoned it for a longer period of time. But if he abandoned only for a short time? Let us hear from the following: “If he abandoned his field, he may cancel his action during three days.” Rebbi Ze‘ira said, it says only “three days”. Therefore, after three days he may not cancel his action. Rebbi Simeon Dayana stated before Rebbi Ze‘ira: Even after three he may cancel his action. He said to him, since you say after three days, is it the same after three or after many? A baraita supports Rebbi Ze‘ira: “About when is this said? If he abandoned in an unspecified way. But if he said: My field shall be abandoned one day, one week, one month, one year, a sabbatical period, as long as nobody took it over, either he or another person, he may cancel. But after somebody acquired it, either he or somebody else, he cannot cancel.” This means that short or long periods are the same. It also means that they were not worried about dishonesty. This means that a person may abandon and reacquire. That obviously answers Rebbi Zeïra’s question, since Rebbi Zeira had said, are short and long times the same?

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 5:10

“This, your house,” because of what do you catch him? Because of “your house,” “this”? If it collapsed and he himself rebuilt it, is it not “this”? Let us hear from the following: “If somebody said to his heirs, give a wedding house to my son or a widow’s house to my daughter, if it collapsed, the heirs are required to rebuild it.” There, we have stated: “If somebody says to his son, ‘a qônām that you can not enjoy anything from me,’ if he dies, [the son] inherits. ‘During my lifetime and after my death,’ if he dies, [the son] does not inherit.” [Did we not state, ‘during my lifetime’, [the son] inherits; ‘after my death’, [the son] inherits?] What is the difference between the one who says it one by one and the one who says it by twos? Rav Jeremiah and Rebbi Yose [ben Ḥanina] both say, ‘a qônām that I cannot enjoy these my properties during my lifetime and after my death,’ from the moment he said “these” he forbade to him during his lifetime and after his death. Rebbi Yose said, we have stated in Nedarim what we did not state in S̄ebuot: “A qônām that I shall not enter your house, or that I shall not buy your field, if the owner died or sold it, the other is permitted. That I shall not enter this house, or that I shall not buy this field, if the owner died or sold it, the other is forbidden.” Because he said “this”. Therefore, if he had not said “this”, he would have forbidden to him both during his lifetime and after his death.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 6:5

Reading of Rashba (Novellae ad 49a): Is one who makes a vow to abstain from cooked food permitted a thick dish? Let us hear from the following: “He is forbidden soft dishes and permitted thick ones.” Since a dish which would be forbidden roasted or scalded is permitted as a thick dish, regarding “cooked food” which permits roasted and scalded, is it not logical that he be permitted the thick dish? Are there arguments de minore ad majus in matters of vows? But it must be so: Since a dish which is forbidden roasted or scalded is permitted as a thick dish, the cooked which is permitted roasted or scalded is permitted as a thick dish.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 7:6

If somebody makes a vow to abstain from vegetables, would he be permited dried ones? Let us hear from the following: “He is forbidden fresh Egyptian beans and permitted dried ones.” He mentioned only Egyptian beans, a kind which has a threshing floor. Therefore, anything which has no threshing floor is forbidden even if dried. If somebody makes a vow to abstain from bulbous plants he is forbidden green melon, squash, water melon, sweet melon and all tree fruits. If somebody makes a vow to abstain from sheep meat, he is permitted lambs, pidgeon chicks, and milk. But if he said, which grew this year, he is forbidden all of these. If somebody makes a vow to abstain from cider, he is forbidden everything sweet and permitted wine. That is, following those who say that vows are interpreted in the vernacular. But following those who say, vows are interpreted in biblical Hebrew, the Torah used “cider” as an expression for wine; “your cider”, that is wine.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 8:13

HALAKHAH: ‘Until the fig harvest, until there be fig harvest’, etc. “baskets”. Baskets of figs or baskets of raisins? Let us hear from this: “Until they fold the knives”. You have to say, knives for figs, not knives for raisins. Let us hear from the following: A load of raisins came up to Tiberias. Gamliel the twin asked Rebbi Abba bar Zavda. He said to him: All of the Land of Israel does not produce a load of raisins. But so he said to him: No single place in the land of Israel produces a load of raisins.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 8:13

HALAKHAH: ‘Until the fig harvest, until there be fig harvest’, etc. “baskets”. Baskets of figs or baskets of raisins? Let us hear from this: “Until they fold the knives”. You have to say, knives for figs, not knives for raisins. Let us hear from the following: A load of raisins came up to Tiberias. Gamliel the twin asked Rebbi Abba bar Zavda. He said to him: All of the Land of Israel does not produce a load of raisins. But so he said to him: No single place in the land of Israel produces a load of raisins.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 9:12

(As) we have stated there: “One sells a synagogue only conditionally”. So far if it was built as a synagogue. How is the situation if the building was first built for profane use and then dedicated? Let us hear from the following: “A qônām that I shall not enter this house and it was turned into a synagogue.” That implies that if it was built as a courtyard and afterwards was dedicated that it becomes holy. How? When does it become holy, immediately or when it is used? Let us hear from the following: “If somebody makes a chest for a Torah scroll, or wrappings for a Torah scroll, before they were used for a Torah scroll they may be used for private use; after they were used for a Torah scroll they may not be used for private use.” Since these were made for holy use but became holy only when used, that which was built as a courtyard not so much more? What is the status of those if they were made for profane use and then dedicated? They become holy.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 9:12

(As) we have stated there: “One sells a synagogue only conditionally”. So far if it was built as a synagogue. How is the situation if the building was first built for profane use and then dedicated? Let us hear from the following: “A qônām that I shall not enter this house and it was turned into a synagogue.” That implies that if it was built as a courtyard and afterwards was dedicated that it becomes holy. How? When does it become holy, immediately or when it is used? Let us hear from the following: “If somebody makes a chest for a Torah scroll, or wrappings for a Torah scroll, before they were used for a Torah scroll they may be used for private use; after they were used for a Torah scroll they may not be used for private use.” Since these were made for holy use but became holy only when used, that which was built as a courtyard not so much more? What is the status of those if they were made for profane use and then dedicated? They become holy.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 10:7

HALAKHAH: “If the father died, his power is not voided in favor of the husband,” etc. They wanted to say that if the father had dissolved his part and died, his power is not voided in favor of the husband. Let us hear from the following: “The way of learned people is that, before his daughter left his house, he told her: ‘Any vows which you had vowed in my house are dissolved’.” This implies that if the father had dissolved his part and died, his power is not voided in favor of the husband.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 10:8

If the husband died, his power is voided in favor of the husband.” They wanted to say, after the husband had dissolved his part. But if the husband had not dissolved his part when he died, the power is not voided in favor of the father. Let us hear from the following: “If she made a vow while being preliminarily married. If she was divorced on the same day, preliminarily married on the same day, even a hundred times, her father and her last husband dissolve her vows.” That means, even if the husband had not dissolved his part and died, his power is voided in favor of the father.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 10:27

May one permit vows in the night? Since vows under the husband’s jurisdiction, about which “on the day” is written, he may dissolve in the night, vows under the jurisdiction of the Elder, where “on the day” is not written, not so much more? Can one permit through an interpreter? Let us hear from the following: Rebbi Abba bar Ẓutra was made an interpreter for Rebbi Joḥanan in the case of a woman who did not know Syriac.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 10:30

May one appoint Elders for selected topics? Let us hear from the following: Rebbi appointed Rav to invalidate vows and to see stains. After his death, [Rav] asked his son for [permission to see] defects of firstlings. He said to him, I shall not add to what my father gave you. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, he gave him everything: To sit in judgment alone, to invalidate vows, to see stains, and to see outside blemishes. After his death, [Rav] asked his son for [permission to see] hidden defects. He said to him, I shall not add to what my father gave you. Even though you say, one appoints Elders for selected topics, only if he is competent for everything. As the following: Rebbi Joshua ben Levi ordained all his students, but he was sorry about one who had a defect in his eye and he could not ordain him; so he ordained him for selected topics. That implies that one who is competent in one thing has to be competent in everything, and one who is not competent in everything cannot be declared competent in one thing.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 10:31

May one appoint Elders for a fixed time? Let us hear from the following: Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba went to Rebbi Eleazar and asked him to intervene with the Patriarch Rebbi Jehudah, that the latter should write him a letter of recommendation for seeking a livelihood in a foreign country. He intervened, and [the Patriarch] wrote for him: Here we are sending you as our representative a great personality with all our powers until he shall return to us. Rebbi Ḥizqiah, Rebbi Dositheus, Rebbi Abba bar Zamina in the name of the old Rebbi Dositheus: He wrote him the following. Here we are sending you a great personality who will not be ashamed to say “1 did not learn this”.

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 2:8

HALAKHAH: “If he said: ‘this cow said,’ ” etc. If he saw a Gentile passing by and said, “look what this Gentile said.” Then he is a nazir. Does this mean that he is a nazir because Gentiles cannot make a vow of nazir? He has not said anything! Let us hear from the following: “If he said: ‘this cow said’ ”. You said this only because he spoke the word nezirut. And here, he spoke the word nezirut. If he saw a Jew passing by and said, “look what this Jew said.” Then he is a nazir. He had not said anything. Does this mean that he is a nazir because Jews make a vow of nazir? Should we say that nevertheless he is a nazir or is he studying the case? So I am saying, “for example, if he was reading the Torah and mentioned nazir,naziq.”

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 2:10

Unless the cow stood up, unless the door was opened? Let us hear from the following: “The House of Shammai say, they are all nezirim. But the House of Hillel say, only those are nezirim whose words turned out not to be true.” So is the Mishnah: “Whose words turned out not to be true;” it is formulated in the opposite, as not to say that she should not bury her son. Even if the cow did not stand up, even if the door was not opened.

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 3:5

HALAKHAH: “If somebody vowed two neziriot,” etc. If he finished his first period of nezirut and started to lean on the second, when they did not find an opening for the first while they found an opening for the second, the second can be used for the first. Where do we hold? If he said, “I am a nazir twice,” a vow which is partially annulled is totally annulled. If he said, “I am a nazir for these 30 days and those 30 days,” in this case the second cannot be used for the first. But we must hold that he said, “I am a nazir and nazir.” If he said, “these are for nezirut.” But if he said, “these are for my nezirut; those are for the other nezirut,” in this case the second cannot be used for the first. Rebbi Eleazar said, if he finished the first nezirut, as soon as he brought a sacrifice and shaved, the first is credited for the second. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa commanded the colleagues: If you hear anything formulated by Rebbi Eleazar, you should know that Rebbi Joḥanan disagrees: not unless he brings all his sacrifices, following the rabbis; but following Rebbi Simeon even if he brings only one sacrifice. If he dedicated both together, he has only one in his hand. If he dedicated each of them separately or brought each of them for the other, he did not acquit himself [of his obligation]. This means that as far as holiness goes, they became holy. But did not Rebbi Ḥiyya state: “His sacrifice to the Eternal for his nezirut,” i. e., that his vow of nazir should precede his sacrifice, rather than that his sacrifice precede his vow of nazir. It is different, because he still is in nezirut. One understands the second for the first. The first for the second? Rebbi Jehudah said, this supports Rebbi Eleazar. But did not Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa command the colleagues: If you hear anything formulated by Rebbi Eleazar, you should know that Rebbi Joḥanan disagrees; not unless he brings all his sacrifices. They wanted to say, following the rabbis. But here, we hold with Rebbi Simeon. Rebbi Ḥinena in the name of Rebbi Phineas: Explain it for his nezirut and the nezirut he pledged for his son. In that, the second can be used for the first. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, did we not argue about one who said, “I am a nazir”? He really should be a nazir only once. You were severe with him and obligated him to be a nazir twice. Is it not enough that you were severe with him and obligated him to be a nazir twice, that now you say, he has nothing in his hands?

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 3:5

HALAKHAH: “If somebody vowed two neziriot,” etc. If he finished his first period of nezirut and started to lean on the second, when they did not find an opening for the first while they found an opening for the second, the second can be used for the first. Where do we hold? If he said, “I am a nazir twice,” a vow which is partially annulled is totally annulled. If he said, “I am a nazir for these 30 days and those 30 days,” in this case the second cannot be used for the first. But we must hold that he said, “I am a nazir and nazir.” If he said, “these are for nezirut.” But if he said, “these are for my nezirut; those are for the other nezirut,” in this case the second cannot be used for the first. Rebbi Eleazar said, if he finished the first nezirut, as soon as he brought a sacrifice and shaved, the first is credited for the second. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa commanded the colleagues: If you hear anything formulated by Rebbi Eleazar, you should know that Rebbi Joḥanan disagrees: not unless he brings all his sacrifices, following the rabbis; but following Rebbi Simeon even if he brings only one sacrifice. If he dedicated both together, he has only one in his hand. If he dedicated each of them separately or brought each of them for the other, he did not acquit himself [of his obligation]. This means that as far as holiness goes, they became holy. But did not Rebbi Ḥiyya state: “His sacrifice to the Eternal for his nezirut,” i. e., that his vow of nazir should precede his sacrifice, rather than that his sacrifice precede his vow of nazir. It is different, because he still is in nezirut. One understands the second for the first. The first for the second? Rebbi Jehudah said, this supports Rebbi Eleazar. But did not Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa command the colleagues: If you hear anything formulated by Rebbi Eleazar, you should know that Rebbi Joḥanan disagrees; not unless he brings all his sacrifices. They wanted to say, following the rabbis. But here, we hold with Rebbi Simeon. Rebbi Ḥinena in the name of Rebbi Phineas: Explain it for his nezirut and the nezirut he pledged for his son. In that, the second can be used for the first. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, did we not argue about one who said, “I am a nazir”? He really should be a nazir only once. You were severe with him and obligated him to be a nazir twice. Is it not enough that you were severe with him and obligated him to be a nazir twice, that now you say, he has nothing in his hands?

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 3:16

Rebbi Yose said, what is his problem? Of a pure nazir. But for an impure nazir, it is obvious to him that they cannot be combined. Rebbi Mana said before Rebbi Yose: Is that not an argument of “so much more”? Since for days which are counted neither for his nor for his son’s nezirut, you say that they are combined, days which are counted for his and for his son’s nezirut, it would only be logical that they should be combined! Rebbi Mana said, there he is not in a state to receive a warning, but here he is in a state to receive a warning. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya asked: Since you say there about Rebbi Eliezer, at the start only if he has something to omit; at the end even if he has nothing to omit? Rebbi Ze‘ira said before Rebbi Mana, is that not a Mishnah? “If he became impure on day 101, he invalidated 30; Rebbi Eliezer said, he invalidated only seven.” He said, we hear that he invalidates; did we hear that he brings a sacrifice?

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 3:16

Rebbi Yose said, what is his problem? Of a pure nazir. But for an impure nazir, it is obvious to him that they cannot be combined. Rebbi Mana said before Rebbi Yose: Is that not an argument of “so much more”? Since for days which are counted neither for his nor for his son’s nezirut, you say that they are combined, days which are counted for his and for his son’s nezirut, it would only be logical that they should be combined! Rebbi Mana said, there he is not in a state to receive a warning, but here he is in a state to receive a warning. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya asked: Since you say there about Rebbi Eliezer, at the start only if he has something to omit; at the end even if he has nothing to omit? Rebbi Ze‘ira said before Rebbi Mana, is that not a Mishnah? “If he became impure on day 101, he invalidated 30; Rebbi Eliezer said, he invalidated only seven.” He said, we hear that he invalidates; did we hear that he brings a sacrifice?

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 3:20

HALAKHAH: “If two groups of witnesses,” etc. Rav said, they differ in the overall testimony. But in detail, everybody agrees that five contains two, and that he has to be a nazir for two periods. Rebbi Joḥanan said, they differ in counting. But in an overall testimony, everybody agrees that the testimonies contradict one another and there is no nezirut. What is overall and what is counting? Overall, this one says two, the other one says five. Counting, this one says one, two, the other one says three, four, five. Rav said, if testimony was contradictory in its essence, the testimony is not void. Rebbi Joḥanan said, if testimony was contradictory in itself, the testimony is void. In the opinion of everybody, if testimony was contradictory in some aspects that belong after the fact, the testimony is not void. Rebbi Joḥanan is consistent in what he said, since Rebbi Abba, Rebbi Ḥiyya, said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, if it was agreed that he counted but one [witness] said, he counted from a wallet and the other said, he counted from a bundle, that contradicts the essence of the testimony, and Rav will agree that the testimony is void. Where do they disagree? If there were two groups of witnesses, these say he counted from a wallet and the others say he counted from a bundle. That contradicts the essence of the testimony, the testimony is void, but according to Rav, the testimony is not void. If one [witness] said, he killed him with a mace, the other [witness] said, he killed him with a sword, that contradicts the essence of the testimony; the testimony is void and Rav will agree that the testimony is void. Where do they disagree? If there were two groups of witnesses, these say he killed him with a mace and the others say, he killed him with a sword. That contradicts the essence of the testimony; the testimony is void, but according to Rav, the testimony is not void. If these say, he ran away to the South and those say, he ran away to the North, everybody agrees that the testimony was contradictory in some aspects that refer [to] the facts, the testimony is not void. The strength of Rav comes from the following: “Rebbi Jehudah and Rebbi Simeon say, since both agree that he is not alive they can remarry.” He did nor hear that Rebbi Eleazar said, Rebbi Eliezer concedes in the case of witnesses. What is the difference between witnesses and the co-wife? They do not consider the co-wife’s words compared to that of her companion. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “Both in investigations and in cross examinations, if they contradict one another their testimony is void.” Rebbi Mana said, Rav will explain that as referring to single witness against single witness. Rebbi Abun said, even if you say groups and groups. There is a difference in criminal cases, as it is written: “Justice, justice you shall pursue”.

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 5:9

There, we have stated: “The public sale of orphans’ property goes on for 30 days, the public sale of Temple property goes on for 30 days, and they are publicly announed mornings and evenings.” Rebbi Mana said, Rebbi Eliezer is afraid of trickery, Rebbi Joshua is not afraid of trickery. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, Rebbi Eliezer follows the House of Shammai and Rebbi Joshua the House of Hillel. Rebbi Eliezer follows the House of Shammai, since the House of Shammai say, a person may ask about his dedication; could he say that he does not have to vow usufruct? Rebbi Joshua follows the House of Hillel, since the House of Hillel say, a person may not ask about his dedication; could he say that he has to vow usufruct? In any case, could not a man ask about his vow of usufruct? Rebbi Joshua agrees that a guarantor must execute a vow of usufruct. What does Rebbi Joshua say about a gift? Since he gives voluntarily, he does not have to vow usufruct, or since [the recipient’s] power is small and [the donor] may change his mind, does he have to vow usufruct? Let us hear from the following: The husband of a relative of Rebbi Ḥaggai owed on a document. The creditor came and foreclosed. The case came before Rebbi Aḥa, who said, he owes a vow of usufruct. Rebbi Yose said, he does not have to vow usufruct. The colleagues said before Rebbi Aḥa [and] Rebbi Yose: Does Rebbi Aḥa say it correctly? Since if he takes her back, does not the creditor come and foreclose? Rebbi Yose said to them, she turns it into jewelry or keeps it as additions to her dowry. Rebbi Ḥaggai said, by Moses! Rebbi Yose says it correctly. It was executed following Rebbi Aḥa.

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 7:29

“Which corpse has decay? One who was buried naked in a marble coffin, or on a stone floor, or on a marble table. But if he was buried in a wooden casket or on a woooden plank; that is not decay but graves’ dust and needs somewhat more than a spoonful.” Rebbi Joḥanan said, if even the smallest attachment was buried with him, there is no decay. Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Of two corpses which were buried together, each one becomes an attachment for the other. This is automatic; could one alone be an attachment to another? Abba bar Nathan objected: Think of it, that somebody brought half a spoonful from one and half a spoonful from the other! He was considering it when he was seen laughing; he was offended by him and he died. Rebbi Yose said, there this man is gone and we did hear nothing about it. What about it? There, neither of them will produce a spoonful of decayed matter, but here, each of them can generate a spoonful of decay.

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 7:30

If his foot was cut off, from above the joint there is no “decay”, from below the joint there is “decay”. If it was buried together with him, from below the joint it becomes an attachment to him, from above the joint it does not become an attachment to him. The colleagues asked before Rebbi Samuel ben Eudaimon: If he bound from below the joint as attachment? He said to them, if it were so, even if it was not cut I should consider it as if cut and it should be an attachment! Since it is connected to him, it forms one body. If there is something missing, can it have “decay”? Let us hear from the following: If it is imcomplete, there is no “decay”, it does not require the surrounding earth, and it is not part of a row of graves. Rebbi Joḥanan asked, how much must be missing that it have no “decay”? Might it follow what we have stated there: “That he will die if it was removed.” Is it the same here? Think of it, if the esophagus was perforated, nothing was missing but he could not survive. You have only the following: If his foot was cut off, from below the joint there is “decay”, from above the joint there is no “decay”. If it was buried together with him, from below the joint it becomes an attachment to him, from above the joint it does not become an attachment to him.

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 7:31

Do stillbirths generate “decay”? For him who says that their blood induces impurity by a quartarius they generate “decay”; for him who says that their blood does not induce impurity by a quartarius, do they generate “decay”? Let us hear from the following: “Why is the dust from small heaps impure? Because women bury there their stillbirths.” Rebbi Yudan, the father of Rebbi Mattaniah, said: Would it not be reasonable otherwise, that lepers bury their limbs there? You must say that it is because of “decay”, not because a bone the size of a lentil, since it was stated: “If he took some dust from it and replaced it, [the small heap] is pure.” Explain it following Tannaïm, as it was stated: If one removed it, it remains impure; Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel declares it pure.

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 8:23

Does the obligatory shaving push aside the rules of voluntary shaving? Let us hear from the following: “He shaves his head, his beard, and his eyebrows in the way sufferers from skin disease shave.” But there one could say, maybe it was an obligatory shaving. Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rebbi Yudan: The Mishnah says so; “for Rebbi Simeon says, when one of the bloods was sprinkled, the nazir is permitted to drink wine and to defile himself with the dead.” Is he not forbidden because of “do not destroy”? Samuel bar Abba said, explain it if he was a eunuch. But did we not state “the beard”? How can you say, a eunuch? You have only what Rebbi Jacob said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If he removed it from bottom to top it is forbidden. Rebbi Yose bar Abin said, there is no difference between bottom to top or top to bottom.

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 9:33

If he hit him on his hand and it withered. The physicians said, if it is amputated he will live. Does he have to pay for the [hand]? Let us hear from the following: “If people quarrel,” “if people brawl.” Is not quarrel brawl and brawl quarrel? Why does the verse say, “if people quarrel, if people brawl”? To apply the rules of the unintended to the intended and of the intended to the unintended. It must be the following: If he hit him on his hand and it withered. The physicians said, if it is amputated he will live. Does he have to pay for the [hand]? Since you say there, it is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he pay for the hand, so here it is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he pay for the hand.

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 9:34

MISHNAH: Samuel was a nazir following the words of Rebbi Nahorai, as it is said: “A shaving knife shall not come on his head.” It is said about Samson “a shaving knife”, and it is said about Samuel “a shaving knife”. Since “a shaving knife” mentioned for Samson refers to nazir, so “a shaving knife” mentioned for Samuel refers to nazir. Rebbi Yose said, but fear is only of flesh and blood! Rebbi Nahorai answered him: Was it not said: “Samuel said, how can I go? Will not Saul hear of it and kill me?” The fear of flesh and blood already was on him.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 1:14

Everybody agrees that if [the husband] comes and protests, his protest is invalid. That is, if he protested after she remarried. If he protested before she remarried and then she remarried? Let us hear from the following: It happened that somebody brought a bill of divorce before Rebbi Ismael. He asked him, from where are you? He answered, from Kefar Simai in the region of Acco. He said to him, then you have to say, “it was written and signed in my presence;” you do not need witnesses. After [that person] left, Rebbi Ilai said to him, my teacher, is not Kefar Simai in the Land of Israel, closer to Sepphoris than to Acco? He answered, since the matter was resolved in a permissive way; it stands. What means “since the matter was resolved in a permissive way; it stands”? Rebbi Ze‘ira said, that if [the husband] came and protested, his protest would be invalid. But does a person who brings a bill of divorce from the Land of Israel for delivery in the Land of Israel have to say, “it was written and signed in my presence”? Therefore, there cannot be any difference whether he protested after she remarried or before she remarried and then she remarried.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 2:3

Rebbi Yose asked: If he said, “it was written and signed before me, but it was in the sole possession of the husband between writing and signing”? Let us hear from the following: “If one said ‘it was written before me’ and another ‘it was signed before me’, it is invalid.” That is, because one said, “it was written before me” and another, “it was signed before me”; this implies that if one said, “it was written and signed before me, but it was in the sole possession of the husband between writing and signing”, it is valid. Rav Ḥisda asked: half of an institution and half as biblical decree? If he said, “it was written and signed before me, but it was in the sole possession of the husband between writing and signing”? Let us hear from the following: “If one said ‘it was written before me’ and another ‘it was signed before me’, it is invalid.” That is, because one said “it was written before me” and another “it was signed before me”; this implies that if one said, “it was written and signed before me, but it was in the sole possession of the husband for an hour,” it is valid.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 2:3

Rebbi Yose asked: If he said, “it was written and signed before me, but it was in the sole possession of the husband between writing and signing”? Let us hear from the following: “If one said ‘it was written before me’ and another ‘it was signed before me’, it is invalid.” That is, because one said, “it was written before me” and another, “it was signed before me”; this implies that if one said, “it was written and signed before me, but it was in the sole possession of the husband between writing and signing”, it is valid. Rav Ḥisda asked: half of an institution and half as biblical decree? If he said, “it was written and signed before me, but it was in the sole possession of the husband between writing and signing”? Let us hear from the following: “If one said ‘it was written before me’ and another ‘it was signed before me’, it is invalid.” That is, because one said “it was written before me” and another “it was signed before me”; this implies that if one said, “it was written and signed before me, but it was in the sole possession of the husband for an hour,” it is valid.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 2:18

What is Rebbi Yose the Galilean’s reason? “Scroll.” Since a scroll is special in not being a living being, so no living being. Since a scroll is not food, so no food. What is the rabbis’ reason? “Scroll.” Since a scroll is detached, so everything detached. Are stalks of food in Rebbi Yose the Galilean’s opinion like food? Let us hear from the following: If he wrote it on a deer’s antlers, shaved it off, had it signed, and gave it to him, it is valid. Because he shaved it off before he had it signed. Therefore, not if he had it signed and afterwards shaved it off. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Miasha: Only if he wrote on the male horn. But if he wrote on the sheath it is as if separated and is valid. Rebbi Jonah asked: Is that the same for preparation of produce? If he desired that it should rain on an animal and [the rain] dropped from the animal on food. There, Rebbi Yose said “a scroll”, since a scroll is special in not being a living being, so no living being; and here, does he say so? There is a difference since it is written, “any drinkable drink in any vessel shall be impure”. Then also if it rained into cisterns, ditches and caves? There is a difference here, for it is written: “a vessel”.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 2:25

HALAKHAH: “If the minor received it and became an adult,” etc. There came a case before Rebbi Immi that a slave brought a bill of divorce; [he declared it] valid. Rebbi Abba said to him, did not Rebbi Ḥiyya state that if a slave brought a bill of divorce, it would be invalid? Rebbi Assi said, if not for Rebbi Abba, we would have permitted a married woman! Even if you say that Rebbi Assi did not accept what Rebbi Ḥiyya stated, did he not accept what the rabbis said? Let us hear from the following which Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rebbi Ḥiyya said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It is reasonable that a slave could accept a bill of manumission [for delivery] but he should not accept [a bill of divorce] as we do. They thought, he formulated “he should not accept,” therefore, if he transgressed and accepted, it would be valid. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rav Hoshaiah: It happened that she was a Cohen’s wife and they were not afraid of a hint of invalidity.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 3:12

HALAKHAH: “If somebody transports a bill of divorce and loses it,” etc. What means “on the spot”? Rebbi Joḥanan said, as long as nobody passed by there. Rebbi Jacob bar Idi, Rebbi Simeon bar Abba in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: as long as three people did not pass by there. If a Gentile passed by there? Let us hear from the following: Abba bar bar Ḥana transported a bill of divorce; he lost it and a Saracen found it. The case came before Rebbi Joḥanan; they declared [the bill] valid. This means that if a Gentile passed by it is valid. Could we say that he had a mark to identify it? But was it not stated: There are no marks for bills of divorce. That is, if he said, two or three lines. But here, the ה in it had a spot. Rebbi Ezra asked before Rebbi Mana: Why is it invalid here? I say, it was another [husband] whose name was like his name. Think of it, if they checked out that entire place and did not find another man whose name was like his name! But it is because of the severity of adultery. But did we not state: “They went and found nobody but let his wife remarry; they went there, did not recognize him, and let his wife remarry”? Rebbi Mana told him: This man had two bills of divorce in his hand, one valid, the other invalid. He lost the valid one and threw away the invalid. When he found it, I say that what he found was the invalid bill.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 3:28

Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Uqba in the name of Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina: The Mishnah speaks of the heirs in priesthood and Levitic status. But concerning the poor, the poor has no inheritance. Bar Qappara stated: No person is immune from this; if not he then his son, if not his son then his grandson. This means, he can change the terms. Can the creditor change the terms? Let us hear from the following: “If somebody lends money to a first rich and then poor person he cannot separate for him, for one does not separate for what was lost and the poor acquired what is in his hand.” This implies that the creditor cannot change the terms.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 3:34

Rebbi Crispus asked: Does he check every year or only once every three years? Let us hear from the following: If somebody sells unspecified wine to another person, he has to warrant it until after Tabernacles. Rebbi Yudan said, explain it for those Galileans who harvest only after the beginning of Tabernacles and you cannot deduce anything. That which was said, “old from the preceding year, very old aged three years”, should we say because of the tasting? This means that any time it is declared old he has to warrant it for two years. This means that very old [wine] has to be warranted until Tabernacles. This means that he has to check every year. How does he check? May one check one amphora on which all others depend that they would not become vinegar? Rebbi Shammai said, there are people who knock on the barrel from the outside and know what is inside.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 4:6

If he transgressed and annulled? Let us hear from the following: “If he annulled it is annulled, the words of Rebbi. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, he can neither annul it nor add to his condition.” Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says it correctly. What is the reason of Rebbi? It is the word of the Torah that he has the power to annul but they said, he shall not annul. Can their word uproot the words of the Torah? But is it not from the Torah that one may [give as heave] olives for oil and grapes for wine, but because of robbing the tribe they said not only that one may not give heave [in this way] but if he transgressed and gave, his heave is not heave. Rebbi Oshaia bar Abba said to Rebbi Yudan the Prince: Who could tell exactly what your ancestor meant?

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 4:23

There, we have stated: “One does not marry women on a holiday.” Simeon bar Abba in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Because of refraining from being fruitful and increase. They asked before Rebbi Yose: May a slave marry a woman on a holiday? He told them, let us hear from the following: “Shall he be alone? But the world was created only for procreation and increase!” And Rebbi Simeon bar Abba said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Anybody commanded to be fruitful and increase is forbidden to marry on a holiday.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 5:10

If there is only best quality, one collects from the best quality, [only] average quality one collects from average quality, [only] worst quality one collects from worst quality. Best and average, torts are assessed from best quality, creditors and a woman’s ketubah from average. Average and worst, torts and creditors are assessed from average, a woman’s ketubah from worst. If his best quality was like everybody’s best quality, it is best quality. If his average quality was like everybody’s average quality, it is average quality. If his worst quality was like everybody’s worst quality, it is worst quality. If his best quality was like everybody’s average? Rebbi Ze‘ira and Rebbi Ila asked: Let us hear from the following: Average and worst, torts and creditors are assessed from average, a woman’s ketubah from worst. But just as you need in the case that you have best and average quality, torts push creditors to the average, so in this case, of average and worst quality, should not torts push creditors to the worst quality? Rebbi Yose bar Abun in the name of Rav Ḥisda: Explain it that he had best quality which he sold, and the creditors were already pushed to average quality.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 5:35

Rav Hamnuna in the name of Rebbi Assi: An underage girl has no definitive marriage to let her eat heave. Rebbi Immi said, a Mishnah said so, “married to a Cohen she eats heave.” Rebbi Abin asked: If she was definitively married but had no intercourse, [the husband] sent her to her father’s house and she grew up, may she eat heave? Let us hear from the following: “Based on her earlier definitive marriage.”

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 5:36

“If somebody stole a log and used it in building. The House of Shammai say, he has to tear down the entire building and return it. But the House of Hillel say, for the benefit of repenting sinners, that he has to pay its full value.” Rebbi Eleazar said, where do they disagree? If he stole it planed, but if he stole and planed it himself, he owes him money. If he stole and planed it on the spot, what is the rule? Let us hear from the following: “If somebody appropriates another person’s ruin and rebuilds it without prermission, one appraises it and his hand is weak. If he wants to take his logs and stones, one does not listen to him.” Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: It was asked in the name of Rav Naḥman bar Jacob: If somebody stores his bundle in somebody else’s ruin and wants to take it from there, does one not listen to him? He had not heard that Rebbi Jacob bar Idi said in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: Because of civilisation. Rebbi Yose said, this is correct. We would have thought that they disagree only in the Land, but not outside the Land. Since Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, because of civilisation, this implies that there is no difference between the Land and outside the Land. If he wants to take [the value of] his logs and stones, what is the rule? One tells him, wait until he dwells in it. Samuel said, one pays him immediately.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 5:49

Rebbi Aḥa and Rebbi Tanḥum bar Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Simai: In a city of only Cohanim, all of them lift their hands. For whom do they recite the blessing? For their brothers to the North and South. Who answers after them? Women and children. Abbaie bar Benjamin stated: People who stand behind the Cohanim are not included in the blessing. For those in front of them, Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said that even an iron wall does not interrupt. Those who stand to their side? Let us hear from the following: “If he intended to sprinkle before himself but sprinkled behind himself, behind himself but sprinkled before himself; his sprinkling is invalid. Before himself but sprinkled sideways, his sprinkling is valid.” This implies that those who stand to their side are included in the blessing. Rav Ḥisda said, it is necessary that the organizer be an Israel. Rav Ḥisda said, if there was one Cohen, he says “Cohen.” For two, he says “Cohanim.” But Rav Huna said, even for one he says “Cohanim” since he only calls the tribe, lest you say, probably person X is an adulterer or a murderer, and he shall bless us? The Holy, praise to Him, said: Who blesses you? Am not I blessing you? As it was said: “They shall put My name over the Children of Israel and I shall bless them.”

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 6:27

If it was doubtful whether he jumped or the wind pushed him? Let us hear from the following: Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, if he fell down immediately, it is a bill of divorce; if he fell after some time it is no bill of divorce. But is “immediately” not a case of doubt whether he jumped or the wind pushed him? This implies that in case of doubt whether he jumped or the wind pushed him, it is a bill of divorce.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 7:7

Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa, Rebbi Ḥiyya, in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: One disagrees with this Tanna. They say, does not a Mishnah disagree: “If he became deaf-mute or insane, he may never divorce.” Why can he not write and have others execute his written instructions? They upheld it, if he was illiterate. Rebbi Abba bar Mamal objected, does not a baraita disagree: “If he wrote himself, or told the scribe to write and the witnesses to sign, even though the scribe wrote, the witnesses signed, they gave him [the bill] and he in turn gave it to her, it is no divorce.” Rebbi Assi said, complete the sentence and there is no disgreement: “it is no divorce unless they hear his voice.” But even if he gave a sign with his head you say it is invalid, (here also it is invalid). Rebbi Mana said, it is valid: hearing the voice has the same status as seeing him nod his head!

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 7:8

Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Mana: Just as you say that three times he must give a sign with his head, (must one equally hear his voice three times)? He said to him, hearing his voice once, giving a sign with his head three times.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:33

HALAKHAH: “That is how the punctilious in Jerusalem used to write. A forced bill of divorce among Jews is valid, from Gentiles it is invalid”. Samuel said, it is invalid and disqualifies from the priesthood. Samuel said, one does not force, only disqualify. Samuel said, one does not force except for example a widow married to a High Priest, a divorcee or one freed by ḥalȋṣah in the case of a simple priest. But did we not state: “Secondarily forbidden”? Did he not say “for example”? But did we not state: “A person who by a vow forbids his wife to have any usufruct from him for up to 30 days shall appoint a caretaker; after 30 days he shall divorce her and pay ketubah”! We heard that he shall divorce; did we hear that one forces him?

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:40

From where even if he fell ill? The verse says, “in the seventh year he shall leave into freedom gratis.” I could think, even if he fled; the verse says, “six years he shall work.” What did you see to include this and to exclude that? After the verse included, it excluded. I am including the one who remains in his power and am exluding the one who is not in his power. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya said that Rav Hoshaia asked: I understand that if he fell ill and fled afterwards, he has to make up [the time lost]. If he fled and then fell ill? Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Ada said, let us hear from the following: “If a woman rebels against her husband, one writes him a bill of rebellion on her ketubah.” And Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: One writes a bill of rebellion on the ketubah of a menstruating woman or a sick one, a preliminarily married one and one waiting for her levir. Where do we hold? If she rebelled against him while she was menstruating, the Torah instructed her to rebel. But we must hold that she rebelled when she was not menstruating and then started menstruating. Here she is unable to rebel, nevertheless you say, one writes. Here also, if he rebelled and then fell ill he has to make up. For he can say to him, if you had stayed with me, you would not have become sick. Rebbi Ḥinena said, that argument even works in the first case. If he fell ill and fled afterwards, he has to make up, since he can say to him, if you had stayed with me, you would have recuperated sooner.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:75

If he picked up a find and said, for the purpose that I own it rather than my master. Does he and his master own it automatically or does he own it but not his master? Let us hear from the following: “If a person is by a vow prevented from benefitting his son-in-law but wants to give money to his daughter, he says to her: These coins are given to you as a gift on condition that your husband have no claim to them, except what you put into your mouth.” It was stated: “Neither do you”. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, who stated “neither do you”? Rebbi Meïr since Rebbi Meïr makes the hand of a slave the hand of his master. For a gift [we follow] Rebbi Meïr that the wife’s hand is her husband’s hand; for a find [do we follow] the rabbis? Rebbi Ze‘ira said before Rebbi Mana, is there not a difference, for he is as if he acquired by somebody else’s opinion? He said to him, is it not a case a fortiori? Since in her case, when she would acquire by somebody else’s opinion, you say that what a wife acquired, her husband acquired: here where he acquires by his own opinion, a fortiori what the slave acquired his master must acquire.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:77

It is obvious that a slave may accept a gift by one third party to another, by a third party to his master, [but] not from his master to himself. From a third party to himself is in dispute between Rebbi Meïr and the Sages. If one said: Here [I am giving] you this money on condition that your master have no power over it, the slave acquired it and with him his master, the words of Rebbi Meïr. But the Sages say, the slave acquired it [but not] his master. What is the problem? From his master to a third party. Since the slave may receive from a third party for his master, may he receive from his master for a third party? Let us hear from the following: “If somebody borrowed a cow and [the lender] sent her to him through his slave, his son, or his agent.” Does this not mean that the slave is able to transfer rights from his master to a third party? Rebbi Eleazar said, explain it for a Hebrew slave. Rebbi Joḥanan said, you have to explain if for a Canaanite slave; explain it that he said, open [the gate] for her and she will come by herself, as we have stated: “If he led her, drew her to himself, called her and she followed him, he is responsible as a borrower.” Rebbi Zeïra understood it from here: “But he cannot make them acquire through his underage son or daughter or his Canaanite male or female slave, because their hand is not like his hand.” Does this not imply that a slave is not able to transfer rights from his master to another person? Explain it following Rebbi Meïr since Rebbi Meïr makes the hand of the slave the hand of his master. But did we not state “his wife”? Rebbi Meïr holds that the hand of the wife is the hand of her husband! Rebbi Ḥananiah said in the name of Rebbi Phineas, explain it following the Tanna who stated: “His wife cannot redeem Second Tithe for him. Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar says in the name of Rebbi Meïr, his wife can redeem Second Tithe for him.” For that Tanna, Rebbi Meïr makes the hand of the slave the hand of his master but not the hand of the wife the hand of her husband!

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:90

Rav Jehudah sent to Rebbi Eleazar: If a keeper give to another keeper. He answered, the first is responsible. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the second is responsible. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, the second is responsible. There, we have stated: “If somebody leases a cow from another person and lends it to a third party; if it died naturally, the lessee has to swear that it died naturally and the borrower has to pay to the lessee. Rebbi Yose said, how can this person make a deal with another’s cow? But the cow’s [price] has to be restituted to the owner.” Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lend to others. Also Rebbi Ḥiyya stated thus: “The borrower cannot lend, nor the lessee lease, nor the borrower lease, nor the lessee lend, nor the trustee give to another unless they received permission from the owners. And all who changed the titles without the owners’ knowledge are liable. But the borrower is liable even if he did not change.” But it is because we stated: “An unpaid watchman can stipulate to be exempt from an oath and the borrower may stipulate that he not have to pay.” This means that even if he stipulated to be exempt he is obligated. What if he wanted to let the borrower swear? Let us hear from the following: “If he wrote to her: ‘I have no vow or oath against you,’ he cannot make her swear, but he can ask an oath from the heirs or her business associates.” This implies that if he wanted to make the borrower swear, he can force him to swear. The second case teaches about the first, that if he wants to force the wife to swear, he can make her swear. Rebbi Ḥanina said, it is not necessary to derive the first case from the second, and what does one learn for the second case from the first? Following what Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lend to others. And here, only if he gave permission to let her sons be stewards. Rebbi Yose said, he has to pay the lease the entire time it is leased to him. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked Rebbi Abinna: If the owners borrowed it and it died? He said to him, we hold that they ate it. Rebbi Yose bar Abun said, if they ate it, they ate their own property. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Yasa: How does one act? He said to him, there are two against four; one does not act following the argument. He said to him, they are two against two! Rebbi Eleazar is the Elder Rebbi Ḥiyya’s student; Rebbi Joḥanan is Rebbi Yannai’s student.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:103

From where that non-guaranteed property may be acquired together with guaranteed property, by money, document, or by possession? Rebbi Yose in the name of Ḥizqiah; Rebbi Jonah, Rebbi Ḥanina Tortaya in the name of Ḥizqiah, it is written (2Chr. 21:3): “Their father gave them many gifts, silver and gold and delicacies, with fortified cities in Jehudah.” So far real estate and movables were at the same place. If real estate was at one place and movables elsewhere? Rebbi Abin bar Ḥiyya said, let us hear from the following: Rebbi Eliezer said to them, it happened that a man from Meron was dwelling in Jerusalem, who was rich in movables. He wanted to distribute them, to give them as gifts. They said to him, you cannot do that except if you acquire real estate. What did he do? He went and bought a rock near Jerusalem and said: The Northern part I give to X with a hundred amphoras of wine, the Southern part I give to Y with a hundred amphoras of oil. The matter came before the Sages and they upheld his words. Rebbi Ḥananiah said before Rebbi Mana: But was he not bedridden? For in general a person might give property rights only in writing, and here even orally. In general, a person might give only if real estate and movables are at the same place; here, however, the real estate was at one place and the movables elsewhere. He said to him: But is there a difference for Rebbi Eliezer? Is not the sick person for Rebbi Eliezer like the sick person for the rabbis? He said to him: The sick person for Rebbi Eliezer is like the healthy person for the rabbis.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:107

From where did they learn rollover of oaths? From the suspected wife: Amen from this man, Amen from any other man. That refers to subjects he is able to make her swear about. What about subjects he is not able to make her swear about? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, let us hear from the following: “Amen that I was not deviant preliminarily married and married, waiting for the levir and taken in.” Can he make her swear when she is preliminarily married or waiting for the levir? Nevertheless one rolls over.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:116

HALAKHAH: “Any commandment the father has to fulfill towards his son,” etc. “To circumcise him, to redeem him, to teach him Torah, to teach him a trade, and to marry him to a wife. Rebbi Aqiba says, also to teach him to swim in water.” To circumcise him, “on the eighth day, he shall circumcise the flesh of his foreskin.” “To redeem him,” as is written: “Any firstborn human among your sons you shall redeem.” To teach him Torah, “you shall teach them to your sons.” To teach him a trade, Rebbi Ismael stated: “Choose life,” that is a trade. To marry him to a wife, “make it known to your children and grandchildren.” When do you have children and grandchildren: if you marry off your sons when young. Rebbi Aqiba says, also to swim in water. “That you shall live together with your descendants.” How is this? Is it a commandment or is it obligatory? Let us hear from the following: Bar Tarima came to Rebbi Immi and said to him, talk to my father that he should marry me to a woman. He talked to [the father], but the latter refused. That means it is a commandment, for if it were obligatory, he should have forced him. From where that if his father did not do these things for him, he is required to do them himself? The verse says a human you shall redeem”, “you shall circumcise” them, “you shall study them”, “you shall know” yourself, “that you shall live.”

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:118

There, we have stated: “If they started, one does not interrupt.” What is the start of bathing? Rebbi Zeriqan in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina: When he opened his belt. Rav said, when he took off his shoe. Rebbi Joshua ben Levi used to hear the lesson of his grandson every Friday. Once he forgot and went bathing in the public baths of Tiberias; he was leaning on Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba’s shoulder. He remembered and left the public bath. He said, so it was: Rebbi Eleazar bar Yose said, he had taken off [his clothes]. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said to him, did our teacher not teach us, “if they started, one does not interrupt”? He said to him, Ḥiyya my son, is that unimportant in your eyes? For anyone who hears the lesson from his grandson is as if he heard it from Mount Sinai. What is the reason? “ You shall make them known to you sons and grandsons,” etc., “the day when you stood before the Eternal, your God, at Horeb.” Like the day when you stood before the Eternal, your God, at Horeb. Rebbi Ḥizqiah bar Jeremiah, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If you can link the tradition back to Moses, link it. Otherwise take either the very first or the very last [source]. Giddul said, anybody who quotes somebody should consider it as if the author of the quote stood before him. What is the reason? “Only in image a man wanders.” “Many a man professes good will, but where will you find one you can trust?” That is Rebbi Ze‘ira, as Rebbi Ze‘ira said, we do take the traditions of Rav Sheshet into account since he is blind. And Rebbi Ze‘ira said to Rebbi Yasa, does the Rabbi know Bar Pedaiah, that you quote in his name? He said to him, Rav Ada bar Aḥawa said it in his name.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 2:30

“If he married her definitively without inquiry”. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, the Mishnah deals with the case that he married her preliminarily conditionally but definitively silently. But if he married her preliminarily silently and definitively silently, she can claim her ketubah. Rebbi Joḥanan said, even if he married her preliminarily silently and definitively silently, she has no ketubah. Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: But she needs a bill of divorce from him even if he married her preliminarily conditionally but definitively silently. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Mana: In case he married her preliminarily silently and divorced her after the preliminary marriage, what does Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish say? Let us hear from the following: “If she had bodily defects, as long as she is in her father’s house, the father has to prove.” This implies that if he proved his case, she can claim her ketubah. What do you see to say, if he married her preliminarily silently and divorced her after the preliminary marriage! Where do we hold? Since afterwards [it is stated]: “When was this said? For hidden defects, but he has no claim about visible defects.” If he. made it conditional, could he not also claim for visible ones? But did not the colleagues say before Rebbi Yose: Should we say that the following statement disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? “Once she entered her husband’s domain, the husband has to prove.” This implies that if the husband proved his case, she has no claim to ketubah. But by the statement of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, she has a claim to ketubah. Rebbi Cohen in the name of the rabbis of Caesarea: The Mishnah deals with the case that he definitively married her but did not sleep with her; Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish speaks about the case that he definitively married her and slept with her; I am saying that she was acceptable to him since he took her to bed.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 2:33

HALAKHAH: “If somebody preliminarily marries two women with the value of a peruṭah,” etc. It was stated: “In all these cases, if they had intercourse they acquired. Rebbi Simeon [ben] Jehudah says in the name of Rebbi Simeon: In all these cases, if they had intercourse they did acquire since his intercourse was predicated on the preceding preliminary marriage.” What did they acquire? Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: They acquired for restrictions. Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: With any condition which refers to a preceding action, she is preliminarily married for restrictions. Rebbi Mana asked before Rebbi Yudan: Who is the Tanna who stated: “Any condition which refers to a preceding action is invalid”? This does not follow Rebbi Simeon. Rebbi Yudan in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: She is preliminarily married for restrictions. How is that: “I am marrying you preliminarily by intercourse on condition that rains should fall.” If rain fell, she is preliminarily married, otherwise she is not preliminarily married. Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: In matters of a preliminary marriage by a loan for restrictions, for real estate it was not acquired, for movables one does not deliver him to “Him Who exacted retribution.” If [the buyer] insists on the deal? Let us hear from the following: “You have wine to get from me, when he had no wine.” Therefore, if he had wine he would be obligated to deliver. Rebbi Ḥiyya stated, if he has wine he is obligated to deliver. Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac did (not) say there: You should know that Rebbi Ḥiyya instructed following Rebbi Joḥanan that a preliminary marriage by a loan is for restrictions. Rebbi Ze‘ira resented it. Why? Because they were restrictive in practice and he taught them leniency? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, they were lenient in practice and he taught them to be restrictive, that if another man came and married her preliminarily, his marriage would hold. Rebbi Yudan ben Rebbi Ḥanan said, if there is a doubt between adultery and no adultery, decide on no adultery.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 2:41

It was stated: “Concerning all of these, if he gave a name to their heave of the tithe or Second Tithe, what he did is done.” Rebbi Eleazar said, with the exception of the remainders of flour sacrifices. Rebbi Jeremiah said, the rest is in dispute. Rebbi Yose asked, what dispute? Where are we standing, if according to Rebbi Meïr, both for Second Tithe and for the remainders of flour sacrifices, he did not do anything. If according to Rebbi Jehudah, what he did is done. Rebbi Mana said, I went to Caesarea and heard Rebbi Ḥizqiah who was sitting there, stating: “If [a priest] preliminarily marries by means of his share in the holiest sacrifices or simple holy sacrifices, she is not married.” Rebbi Eleazar said, that is everybody’s opinion. Rebbi Joḥanan said, it is in dispute. I said to him, from whom did you hear this, and he said, from Rebbi Jeremiah. I said, this explains the matter! Rebbi Jeremiah, who heard that Rebbi Eleazar said, it is everybody’s opinion, he says it is in dispute. Rebbi Yose, who did not hear that, asked which dispute? If according to Rebbi Meïr, both for tithe and for the remainders of flour sacrifices, he did not do anything; if according to Rebbi Jehudah, what he did is done.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 2:41

It was stated: “Concerning all of these, if he gave a name to their heave of the tithe or Second Tithe, what he did is done.” Rebbi Eleazar said, with the exception of the remainders of flour sacrifices. Rebbi Jeremiah said, the rest is in dispute. Rebbi Yose asked, what dispute? Where are we standing, if according to Rebbi Meïr, both for Second Tithe and for the remainders of flour sacrifices, he did not do anything. If according to Rebbi Jehudah, what he did is done. Rebbi Mana said, I went to Caesarea and heard Rebbi Ḥizqiah who was sitting there, stating: “If [a priest] preliminarily marries by means of his share in the holiest sacrifices or simple holy sacrifices, she is not married.” Rebbi Eleazar said, that is everybody’s opinion. Rebbi Joḥanan said, it is in dispute. I said to him, from whom did you hear this, and he said, from Rebbi Jeremiah. I said, this explains the matter! Rebbi Jeremiah, who heard that Rebbi Eleazar said, it is everybody’s opinion, he says it is in dispute. Rebbi Yose, who did not hear that, asked which dispute? If according to Rebbi Meïr, both for tithe and for the remainders of flour sacrifices, he did not do anything; if according to Rebbi Jehudah, what he did is done.