2925 occurrences across the corpus

The Jerusalem Talmud

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 8:12

Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: “Guarding” is mentioned for the unpaid keeper and “guarding” is mentioned for the paid keeper, but “guarding” mentioned for the unpaid keeper is not similar to “guarding” mentioned for the recipient of a fee. “Guarding” mentioned for the unpaid keeper; if he guarded it sufficiently he is not liable. For a paid keeper one estimates it only relative to his body. Therefore one judges him; if the guarding was appropriate he is not liable, otherwise he is liable. One does not say, if another had been there, he could have saved. If he saved, he is not liable; if he did not save, he is liable.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 8:12

Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: “Guarding” is mentioned for the unpaid keeper and “guarding” is mentioned for the paid keeper, but “guarding” mentioned for the unpaid keeper is not similar to “guarding” mentioned for the recipient of a fee. “Guarding” mentioned for the unpaid keeper; if he guarded it sufficiently he is not liable. For a paid keeper one estimates it only relative to his body. Therefore one judges him; if the guarding was appropriate he is not liable, otherwise he is liable. One does not say, if another had been there, he could have saved. If he saved, he is not liable; if he did not save, he is liable.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 8:12

Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: “Guarding” is mentioned for the unpaid keeper and “guarding” is mentioned for the paid keeper, but “guarding” mentioned for the unpaid keeper is not similar to “guarding” mentioned for the recipient of a fee. “Guarding” mentioned for the unpaid keeper; if he guarded it sufficiently he is not liable. For a paid keeper one estimates it only relative to his body. Therefore one judges him; if the guarding was appropriate he is not liable, otherwise he is liable. One does not say, if another had been there, he could have saved. If he saved, he is not liable; if he did not save, he is liable.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 8:12

Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: “Guarding” is mentioned for the unpaid keeper and “guarding” is mentioned for the paid keeper, but “guarding” mentioned for the unpaid keeper is not similar to “guarding” mentioned for the recipient of a fee. “Guarding” mentioned for the unpaid keeper; if he guarded it sufficiently he is not liable. For a paid keeper one estimates it only relative to his body. Therefore one judges him; if the guarding was appropriate he is not liable, otherwise he is liable. One does not say, if another had been there, he could have saved. If he saved, he is not liable; if he did not save, he is liable.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 8:13

Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia: “Grabbing” is mentioned for the unpaid keeper and “grabbing” is mentioned for the paid keeper, but “grabbing” mentioned for the unpaid keeper is not comparable to “grabbing” mentioned for the paid keeper. “Grabbing” mentioned for the unpaid keeper does not make him liable unless he move it. “Grabbing” mentioned for the paid keeper, he is liable from the moment he puts his staff and his bag on it. Rebbi Yose ben Nehorai heard this and said, I am not accepting this, but in any case he is not liable unless he move it. Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: But did not Rebbi Hoshaia state it in this way? If “grabbing” had not been mentioned for the unpaid keeper as unnecessary, I would have inferred from the recipient of a fee. Since the recipient of a fee, with whom the Torah was strict, does not become liable unless he move it, it is only logical that an unpaid keeper, with whom the Torah was lenient, not be liable unless he move it. For which purpose was “grabbing” mentioned for the unpaid keeper since it was unnecessary? To be strict with the recipient of a fee; from the moment he puts his staff or his bag on it he is liable. Rebbi Yose said, if you say so, you infer about the premise to restrict it. For one could say to him, since the recipient of a fee, with whom the Torah was strict, does not become liable unless he move it, the unpaid keeper, with whom the Torah was lenient, should not be liable even if he move it. But it must be the following: “Grabbing” should not have been mentioned for the paid keeper as unnecessary, for I would have inferred from the unpaid keeper. Since the unpaid keeper, with whom the Torah was lenient, is not liable unless he move it, the recipient of a fee, with whom the Torah was strict, becomes liable when he moves it. For which purpose was “grabbing” mentioned for the recipient of a fee since it was unnecessary? To be strict; from the moment he puts his staff or his bag on it he is liable.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 8:13

Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia: “Grabbing” is mentioned for the unpaid keeper and “grabbing” is mentioned for the paid keeper, but “grabbing” mentioned for the unpaid keeper is not comparable to “grabbing” mentioned for the paid keeper. “Grabbing” mentioned for the unpaid keeper does not make him liable unless he move it. “Grabbing” mentioned for the paid keeper, he is liable from the moment he puts his staff and his bag on it. Rebbi Yose ben Nehorai heard this and said, I am not accepting this, but in any case he is not liable unless he move it. Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: But did not Rebbi Hoshaia state it in this way? If “grabbing” had not been mentioned for the unpaid keeper as unnecessary, I would have inferred from the recipient of a fee. Since the recipient of a fee, with whom the Torah was strict, does not become liable unless he move it, it is only logical that an unpaid keeper, with whom the Torah was lenient, not be liable unless he move it. For which purpose was “grabbing” mentioned for the unpaid keeper since it was unnecessary? To be strict with the recipient of a fee; from the moment he puts his staff or his bag on it he is liable. Rebbi Yose said, if you say so, you infer about the premise to restrict it. For one could say to him, since the recipient of a fee, with whom the Torah was strict, does not become liable unless he move it, the unpaid keeper, with whom the Torah was lenient, should not be liable even if he move it. But it must be the following: “Grabbing” should not have been mentioned for the paid keeper as unnecessary, for I would have inferred from the unpaid keeper. Since the unpaid keeper, with whom the Torah was lenient, is not liable unless he move it, the recipient of a fee, with whom the Torah was strict, becomes liable when he moves it. For which purpose was “grabbing” mentioned for the recipient of a fee since it was unnecessary? To be strict; from the moment he puts his staff or his bag on it he is liable.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 8:13

Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia: “Grabbing” is mentioned for the unpaid keeper and “grabbing” is mentioned for the paid keeper, but “grabbing” mentioned for the unpaid keeper is not comparable to “grabbing” mentioned for the paid keeper. “Grabbing” mentioned for the unpaid keeper does not make him liable unless he move it. “Grabbing” mentioned for the paid keeper, he is liable from the moment he puts his staff and his bag on it. Rebbi Yose ben Nehorai heard this and said, I am not accepting this, but in any case he is not liable unless he move it. Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: But did not Rebbi Hoshaia state it in this way? If “grabbing” had not been mentioned for the unpaid keeper as unnecessary, I would have inferred from the recipient of a fee. Since the recipient of a fee, with whom the Torah was strict, does not become liable unless he move it, it is only logical that an unpaid keeper, with whom the Torah was lenient, not be liable unless he move it. For which purpose was “grabbing” mentioned for the unpaid keeper since it was unnecessary? To be strict with the recipient of a fee; from the moment he puts his staff or his bag on it he is liable. Rebbi Yose said, if you say so, you infer about the premise to restrict it. For one could say to him, since the recipient of a fee, with whom the Torah was strict, does not become liable unless he move it, the unpaid keeper, with whom the Torah was lenient, should not be liable even if he move it. But it must be the following: “Grabbing” should not have been mentioned for the paid keeper as unnecessary, for I would have inferred from the unpaid keeper. Since the unpaid keeper, with whom the Torah was lenient, is not liable unless he move it, the recipient of a fee, with whom the Torah was strict, becomes liable when he moves it. For which purpose was “grabbing” mentioned for the recipient of a fee since it was unnecessary? To be strict; from the moment he puts his staff or his bag on it he is liable.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 8:13

Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia: “Grabbing” is mentioned for the unpaid keeper and “grabbing” is mentioned for the paid keeper, but “grabbing” mentioned for the unpaid keeper is not comparable to “grabbing” mentioned for the paid keeper. “Grabbing” mentioned for the unpaid keeper does not make him liable unless he move it. “Grabbing” mentioned for the paid keeper, he is liable from the moment he puts his staff and his bag on it. Rebbi Yose ben Nehorai heard this and said, I am not accepting this, but in any case he is not liable unless he move it. Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: But did not Rebbi Hoshaia state it in this way? If “grabbing” had not been mentioned for the unpaid keeper as unnecessary, I would have inferred from the recipient of a fee. Since the recipient of a fee, with whom the Torah was strict, does not become liable unless he move it, it is only logical that an unpaid keeper, with whom the Torah was lenient, not be liable unless he move it. For which purpose was “grabbing” mentioned for the unpaid keeper since it was unnecessary? To be strict with the recipient of a fee; from the moment he puts his staff or his bag on it he is liable. Rebbi Yose said, if you say so, you infer about the premise to restrict it. For one could say to him, since the recipient of a fee, with whom the Torah was strict, does not become liable unless he move it, the unpaid keeper, with whom the Torah was lenient, should not be liable even if he move it. But it must be the following: “Grabbing” should not have been mentioned for the paid keeper as unnecessary, for I would have inferred from the unpaid keeper. Since the unpaid keeper, with whom the Torah was lenient, is not liable unless he move it, the recipient of a fee, with whom the Torah was strict, becomes liable when he moves it. For which purpose was “grabbing” mentioned for the recipient of a fee since it was unnecessary? To be strict; from the moment he puts his staff or his bag on it he is liable.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 8:13

Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia: “Grabbing” is mentioned for the unpaid keeper and “grabbing” is mentioned for the paid keeper, but “grabbing” mentioned for the unpaid keeper is not comparable to “grabbing” mentioned for the paid keeper. “Grabbing” mentioned for the unpaid keeper does not make him liable unless he move it. “Grabbing” mentioned for the paid keeper, he is liable from the moment he puts his staff and his bag on it. Rebbi Yose ben Nehorai heard this and said, I am not accepting this, but in any case he is not liable unless he move it. Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: But did not Rebbi Hoshaia state it in this way? If “grabbing” had not been mentioned for the unpaid keeper as unnecessary, I would have inferred from the recipient of a fee. Since the recipient of a fee, with whom the Torah was strict, does not become liable unless he move it, it is only logical that an unpaid keeper, with whom the Torah was lenient, not be liable unless he move it. For which purpose was “grabbing” mentioned for the unpaid keeper since it was unnecessary? To be strict with the recipient of a fee; from the moment he puts his staff or his bag on it he is liable. Rebbi Yose said, if you say so, you infer about the premise to restrict it. For one could say to him, since the recipient of a fee, with whom the Torah was strict, does not become liable unless he move it, the unpaid keeper, with whom the Torah was lenient, should not be liable even if he move it. But it must be the following: “Grabbing” should not have been mentioned for the paid keeper as unnecessary, for I would have inferred from the unpaid keeper. Since the unpaid keeper, with whom the Torah was lenient, is not liable unless he move it, the recipient of a fee, with whom the Torah was strict, becomes liable when he moves it. For which purpose was “grabbing” mentioned for the recipient of a fee since it was unnecessary? To be strict; from the moment he puts his staff or his bag on it he is liable.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 8:13

Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia: “Grabbing” is mentioned for the unpaid keeper and “grabbing” is mentioned for the paid keeper, but “grabbing” mentioned for the unpaid keeper is not comparable to “grabbing” mentioned for the paid keeper. “Grabbing” mentioned for the unpaid keeper does not make him liable unless he move it. “Grabbing” mentioned for the paid keeper, he is liable from the moment he puts his staff and his bag on it. Rebbi Yose ben Nehorai heard this and said, I am not accepting this, but in any case he is not liable unless he move it. Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: But did not Rebbi Hoshaia state it in this way? If “grabbing” had not been mentioned for the unpaid keeper as unnecessary, I would have inferred from the recipient of a fee. Since the recipient of a fee, with whom the Torah was strict, does not become liable unless he move it, it is only logical that an unpaid keeper, with whom the Torah was lenient, not be liable unless he move it. For which purpose was “grabbing” mentioned for the unpaid keeper since it was unnecessary? To be strict with the recipient of a fee; from the moment he puts his staff or his bag on it he is liable. Rebbi Yose said, if you say so, you infer about the premise to restrict it. For one could say to him, since the recipient of a fee, with whom the Torah was strict, does not become liable unless he move it, the unpaid keeper, with whom the Torah was lenient, should not be liable even if he move it. But it must be the following: “Grabbing” should not have been mentioned for the paid keeper as unnecessary, for I would have inferred from the unpaid keeper. Since the unpaid keeper, with whom the Torah was lenient, is not liable unless he move it, the recipient of a fee, with whom the Torah was strict, becomes liable when he moves it. For which purpose was “grabbing” mentioned for the recipient of a fee since it was unnecessary? To be strict; from the moment he puts his staff or his bag on it he is liable.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 8:13

Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia: “Grabbing” is mentioned for the unpaid keeper and “grabbing” is mentioned for the paid keeper, but “grabbing” mentioned for the unpaid keeper is not comparable to “grabbing” mentioned for the paid keeper. “Grabbing” mentioned for the unpaid keeper does not make him liable unless he move it. “Grabbing” mentioned for the paid keeper, he is liable from the moment he puts his staff and his bag on it. Rebbi Yose ben Nehorai heard this and said, I am not accepting this, but in any case he is not liable unless he move it. Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: But did not Rebbi Hoshaia state it in this way? If “grabbing” had not been mentioned for the unpaid keeper as unnecessary, I would have inferred from the recipient of a fee. Since the recipient of a fee, with whom the Torah was strict, does not become liable unless he move it, it is only logical that an unpaid keeper, with whom the Torah was lenient, not be liable unless he move it. For which purpose was “grabbing” mentioned for the unpaid keeper since it was unnecessary? To be strict with the recipient of a fee; from the moment he puts his staff or his bag on it he is liable. Rebbi Yose said, if you say so, you infer about the premise to restrict it. For one could say to him, since the recipient of a fee, with whom the Torah was strict, does not become liable unless he move it, the unpaid keeper, with whom the Torah was lenient, should not be liable even if he move it. But it must be the following: “Grabbing” should not have been mentioned for the paid keeper as unnecessary, for I would have inferred from the unpaid keeper. Since the unpaid keeper, with whom the Torah was lenient, is not liable unless he move it, the recipient of a fee, with whom the Torah was strict, becomes liable when he moves it. For which purpose was “grabbing” mentioned for the recipient of a fee since it was unnecessary? To be strict; from the moment he puts his staff or his bag on it he is liable.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 8:13

Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia: “Grabbing” is mentioned for the unpaid keeper and “grabbing” is mentioned for the paid keeper, but “grabbing” mentioned for the unpaid keeper is not comparable to “grabbing” mentioned for the paid keeper. “Grabbing” mentioned for the unpaid keeper does not make him liable unless he move it. “Grabbing” mentioned for the paid keeper, he is liable from the moment he puts his staff and his bag on it. Rebbi Yose ben Nehorai heard this and said, I am not accepting this, but in any case he is not liable unless he move it. Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: But did not Rebbi Hoshaia state it in this way? If “grabbing” had not been mentioned for the unpaid keeper as unnecessary, I would have inferred from the recipient of a fee. Since the recipient of a fee, with whom the Torah was strict, does not become liable unless he move it, it is only logical that an unpaid keeper, with whom the Torah was lenient, not be liable unless he move it. For which purpose was “grabbing” mentioned for the unpaid keeper since it was unnecessary? To be strict with the recipient of a fee; from the moment he puts his staff or his bag on it he is liable. Rebbi Yose said, if you say so, you infer about the premise to restrict it. For one could say to him, since the recipient of a fee, with whom the Torah was strict, does not become liable unless he move it, the unpaid keeper, with whom the Torah was lenient, should not be liable even if he move it. But it must be the following: “Grabbing” should not have been mentioned for the paid keeper as unnecessary, for I would have inferred from the unpaid keeper. Since the unpaid keeper, with whom the Torah was lenient, is not liable unless he move it, the recipient of a fee, with whom the Torah was strict, becomes liable when he moves it. For which purpose was “grabbing” mentioned for the recipient of a fee since it was unnecessary? To be strict; from the moment he puts his staff or his bag on it he is liable.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 8:13

Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia: “Grabbing” is mentioned for the unpaid keeper and “grabbing” is mentioned for the paid keeper, but “grabbing” mentioned for the unpaid keeper is not comparable to “grabbing” mentioned for the paid keeper. “Grabbing” mentioned for the unpaid keeper does not make him liable unless he move it. “Grabbing” mentioned for the paid keeper, he is liable from the moment he puts his staff and his bag on it. Rebbi Yose ben Nehorai heard this and said, I am not accepting this, but in any case he is not liable unless he move it. Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: But did not Rebbi Hoshaia state it in this way? If “grabbing” had not been mentioned for the unpaid keeper as unnecessary, I would have inferred from the recipient of a fee. Since the recipient of a fee, with whom the Torah was strict, does not become liable unless he move it, it is only logical that an unpaid keeper, with whom the Torah was lenient, not be liable unless he move it. For which purpose was “grabbing” mentioned for the unpaid keeper since it was unnecessary? To be strict with the recipient of a fee; from the moment he puts his staff or his bag on it he is liable. Rebbi Yose said, if you say so, you infer about the premise to restrict it. For one could say to him, since the recipient of a fee, with whom the Torah was strict, does not become liable unless he move it, the unpaid keeper, with whom the Torah was lenient, should not be liable even if he move it. But it must be the following: “Grabbing” should not have been mentioned for the paid keeper as unnecessary, for I would have inferred from the unpaid keeper. Since the unpaid keeper, with whom the Torah was lenient, is not liable unless he move it, the recipient of a fee, with whom the Torah was strict, becomes liable when he moves it. For which purpose was “grabbing” mentioned for the recipient of a fee since it was unnecessary? To be strict; from the moment he puts his staff or his bag on it he is liable.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 8:13

Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia: “Grabbing” is mentioned for the unpaid keeper and “grabbing” is mentioned for the paid keeper, but “grabbing” mentioned for the unpaid keeper is not comparable to “grabbing” mentioned for the paid keeper. “Grabbing” mentioned for the unpaid keeper does not make him liable unless he move it. “Grabbing” mentioned for the paid keeper, he is liable from the moment he puts his staff and his bag on it. Rebbi Yose ben Nehorai heard this and said, I am not accepting this, but in any case he is not liable unless he move it. Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: But did not Rebbi Hoshaia state it in this way? If “grabbing” had not been mentioned for the unpaid keeper as unnecessary, I would have inferred from the recipient of a fee. Since the recipient of a fee, with whom the Torah was strict, does not become liable unless he move it, it is only logical that an unpaid keeper, with whom the Torah was lenient, not be liable unless he move it. For which purpose was “grabbing” mentioned for the unpaid keeper since it was unnecessary? To be strict with the recipient of a fee; from the moment he puts his staff or his bag on it he is liable. Rebbi Yose said, if you say so, you infer about the premise to restrict it. For one could say to him, since the recipient of a fee, with whom the Torah was strict, does not become liable unless he move it, the unpaid keeper, with whom the Torah was lenient, should not be liable even if he move it. But it must be the following: “Grabbing” should not have been mentioned for the paid keeper as unnecessary, for I would have inferred from the unpaid keeper. Since the unpaid keeper, with whom the Torah was lenient, is not liable unless he move it, the recipient of a fee, with whom the Torah was strict, becomes liable when he moves it. For which purpose was “grabbing” mentioned for the recipient of a fee since it was unnecessary? To be strict; from the moment he puts his staff or his bag on it he is liable.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 8:13

Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia: “Grabbing” is mentioned for the unpaid keeper and “grabbing” is mentioned for the paid keeper, but “grabbing” mentioned for the unpaid keeper is not comparable to “grabbing” mentioned for the paid keeper. “Grabbing” mentioned for the unpaid keeper does not make him liable unless he move it. “Grabbing” mentioned for the paid keeper, he is liable from the moment he puts his staff and his bag on it. Rebbi Yose ben Nehorai heard this and said, I am not accepting this, but in any case he is not liable unless he move it. Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: But did not Rebbi Hoshaia state it in this way? If “grabbing” had not been mentioned for the unpaid keeper as unnecessary, I would have inferred from the recipient of a fee. Since the recipient of a fee, with whom the Torah was strict, does not become liable unless he move it, it is only logical that an unpaid keeper, with whom the Torah was lenient, not be liable unless he move it. For which purpose was “grabbing” mentioned for the unpaid keeper since it was unnecessary? To be strict with the recipient of a fee; from the moment he puts his staff or his bag on it he is liable. Rebbi Yose said, if you say so, you infer about the premise to restrict it. For one could say to him, since the recipient of a fee, with whom the Torah was strict, does not become liable unless he move it, the unpaid keeper, with whom the Torah was lenient, should not be liable even if he move it. But it must be the following: “Grabbing” should not have been mentioned for the paid keeper as unnecessary, for I would have inferred from the unpaid keeper. Since the unpaid keeper, with whom the Torah was lenient, is not liable unless he move it, the recipient of a fee, with whom the Torah was strict, becomes liable when he moves it. For which purpose was “grabbing” mentioned for the recipient of a fee since it was unnecessary? To be strict; from the moment he puts his staff or his bag on it he is liable.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 8:14

MISHNAH: He said to the unpaid keeper, “where is my ox?” He told him, “it died,” but it broke, or was abducted, or stolen, or lost. “It broke,” but it died, or was abducted, or stolen, or lost. “”It was abducted,” but it died, or broke, or was stolen, or lost. “It was stolen,” but it died, or broke, or was abducted, or lost. “It was lost,” but it died, or broke, or was abducted, or stolen. “I want you to swear;” he answered “Amen”. He is not liable.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 8:15

HALAKHAH: “He said to the unpaid keeper,” etc. Rav said, he is not liable for a keeper’s oath but is liable because of a blurted oath. Rebbi Joḥanan said, since it is a religious duty to appease him, he is not liable because of a blurted oath. In Rav’s opinion, is there no religious duty to appease him? One appeases with truthful statements, not with lies.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 8:15

HALAKHAH: “He said to the unpaid keeper,” etc. Rav said, he is not liable for a keeper’s oath but is liable because of a blurted oath. Rebbi Joḥanan said, since it is a religious duty to appease him, he is not liable because of a blurted oath. In Rav’s opinion, is there no religious duty to appease him? One appeases with truthful statements, not with lies.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 8:15

HALAKHAH: “He said to the unpaid keeper,” etc. Rav said, he is not liable for a keeper’s oath but is liable because of a blurted oath. Rebbi Joḥanan said, since it is a religious duty to appease him, he is not liable because of a blurted oath. In Rav’s opinion, is there no religious duty to appease him? One appeases with truthful statements, not with lies.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 8:16

Rebbi Joḥanan asked: May the oath of a deviant woman be liable for a blurted oath? Where do we hold? If she is in error in sin and oath she is not deviant. If she is intentional in sin and error there is no sacrifice. Rav follows Rebbi Aqiba. If Rebbi Ismael would argue like Rebbi Meïr it would follow, since Rebbi Meïr said: “Amen that I was not defiled, Amen that I shall not be defiled.” But you may question this.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 8:17

MISHNAH: “Where is my ox?” He told him, “I do not know.” “What are you telling?” But if had died, or broke, or was abducted, or stolen, or lost. “I want you to swear;” he answered “Amen”. He is not liable. “Where is my ox?” He told him, “it was lost.” “I want you to swear;” he answered “Amen”. Witnesses testify that he ate it: he has to pay its value. If he confessed himself he pays the value, and a fifth, and a reparation sacrifice. “Where is my ox?” He told him, “it was stolen.” “I want you to swear;” he answered “Amen”. Witnesses testify that he stole it: he has to pay double restitution. If he confessed himself he pays the value, and a fifth, and a reparation sacrifice. He said to a person on the market, “where is my ox which you stole?” This one says, “I did not steal,” but witnesses testify that he stole it: he has to pay double restitution. If he slaughtered or sold it, he pays quadruple or quintuple restitution. If he saw that witnesses appeared and said, “I stole but did neither slaughter nor sell,” he only pays its value.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 8:20

Rebbi Joḥanan said, if somebody claims against another a claim of thief he pays double restitution. If he slaughtered or sold, he pays quadruple or quintuple restitution. There, they say, he pays quadruple or quintuple restitution. Rebbi Pedat in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia: There we state and it supports Rebbi Joḥanan: “‘Where is my ox?’ He told him, ‘it was lost.’ ‘I want you to swear;’ he answered ‘Amen’. Witnesses testify that he ate it; he has to pay its value. If he confessed himself he pays the value, and a fifth, and a reparation sacrifice.” Is there eating without slaughtering? Rebbi Ḥaggai said, explain it if another slaughtered. And the following said so: He said to one in the market place, “where is my ox which you stole?” He says, “I did not steal.” “I want you to swear,” and he says “Amen.” He is (not) liable. Because he is one in the market place. But if he said it to one of the keepers, that one would be liable. The baraita when he ate it and then swore. What Rebbi Joḥanan said, if he swore and after that ate it.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 8:20

Rebbi Joḥanan said, if somebody claims against another a claim of thief he pays double restitution. If he slaughtered or sold, he pays quadruple or quintuple restitution. There, they say, he pays quadruple or quintuple restitution. Rebbi Pedat in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia: There we state and it supports Rebbi Joḥanan: “‘Where is my ox?’ He told him, ‘it was lost.’ ‘I want you to swear;’ he answered ‘Amen’. Witnesses testify that he ate it; he has to pay its value. If he confessed himself he pays the value, and a fifth, and a reparation sacrifice.” Is there eating without slaughtering? Rebbi Ḥaggai said, explain it if another slaughtered. And the following said so: He said to one in the market place, “where is my ox which you stole?” He says, “I did not steal.” “I want you to swear,” and he says “Amen.” He is (not) liable. Because he is one in the market place. But if he said it to one of the keepers, that one would be liable. The baraita when he ate it and then swore. What Rebbi Joḥanan said, if he swore and after that ate it.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 8:21

“He said to the recipient of a fee,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said, one who claims before his neighbor a claim of thief in a case of loss is liable. “Where is my lost object?” He told him, “it was stolen.” Rebbi Joḥanan said, one who claims before his neighbor a claim of thief is liable only after an oath. What is the reason? It is said here “grabbing” and it says there “grabbing.” Since “grabbing” mentioned there only applies after an oath, so also “grabbing” mentioned here only applies after an oath. Rebbi Joḥanan said, one who claims a claim of loss, swore to him, and afterwards claimed a claim of thief is not liable. Rebbi Joḥanan asked: May one be liable for a blurted oath in case of an oath regarding a claim of thief? The argument of Rebbi Joḥanan seems to be inverted. There he said, if he claimed a claim of loss, swore to him, and afterwards claimed a claim of thief is not liable. And here he says so? There it is obvious to him, here it is problematic for him. What is problematic for him? He saw and found it simple. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Joseph said, one who claims before his neighbor a claim of thief is liable only after he denied in court. Where do we hold? If about him who already owes an oath to his neighbor, even if he was swearing out of court he is liable. But we must hold about him who saw them coming. They wanted to make him swear but he jumped in and swore. Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: When it was standing at his feeding trough. Rebbi Ze`ira asked: how was it said? “If it was standing” or “even if it was standing”? If you say “even if it was standing,” it makes no difference. If you say “if it was standing,” then the argument of Rebbi Joḥanan is inverted. There, he said, if he claimed before him a claim of loss, had been swearing to him, selected a sacrifice, and then claimed a claim of duress, he is not liable. But here you are saying so? Rebbi La said, there is a difference since he absolved himself of confession by the oath. They objected to the opinion of Rebbi Ze`ira: “‘Where is my ox?’ He told him, ‘it was stolen.’ ‘I want you to swear;’ he answered ‘Amen’. Witnesses testify that he stole it: he has to pay double restitution. If he confessed himself he pays the value, and a fifth, and a reparation sacrifice.” But here when he moved it by claiming that it was lost. Afterwards he claimed a claim of thief and is not liable. Explain it that he swore to him but slaughtered it afterwards. The students of Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Julianus say, explain it that he slaughtered it when it was lying down. Is there slaughter without sale? Following Symmachos who said, there can be slaughter and sale without theft. Samuel said, if there came no witnesses of the theft, but there came witnesses of the slaughter; he is liable.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 8:21

“He said to the recipient of a fee,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said, one who claims before his neighbor a claim of thief in a case of loss is liable. “Where is my lost object?” He told him, “it was stolen.” Rebbi Joḥanan said, one who claims before his neighbor a claim of thief is liable only after an oath. What is the reason? It is said here “grabbing” and it says there “grabbing.” Since “grabbing” mentioned there only applies after an oath, so also “grabbing” mentioned here only applies after an oath. Rebbi Joḥanan said, one who claims a claim of loss, swore to him, and afterwards claimed a claim of thief is not liable. Rebbi Joḥanan asked: May one be liable for a blurted oath in case of an oath regarding a claim of thief? The argument of Rebbi Joḥanan seems to be inverted. There he said, if he claimed a claim of loss, swore to him, and afterwards claimed a claim of thief is not liable. And here he says so? There it is obvious to him, here it is problematic for him. What is problematic for him? He saw and found it simple. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Joseph said, one who claims before his neighbor a claim of thief is liable only after he denied in court. Where do we hold? If about him who already owes an oath to his neighbor, even if he was swearing out of court he is liable. But we must hold about him who saw them coming. They wanted to make him swear but he jumped in and swore. Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: When it was standing at his feeding trough. Rebbi Ze`ira asked: how was it said? “If it was standing” or “even if it was standing”? If you say “even if it was standing,” it makes no difference. If you say “if it was standing,” then the argument of Rebbi Joḥanan is inverted. There, he said, if he claimed before him a claim of loss, had been swearing to him, selected a sacrifice, and then claimed a claim of duress, he is not liable. But here you are saying so? Rebbi La said, there is a difference since he absolved himself of confession by the oath. They objected to the opinion of Rebbi Ze`ira: “‘Where is my ox?’ He told him, ‘it was stolen.’ ‘I want you to swear;’ he answered ‘Amen’. Witnesses testify that he stole it: he has to pay double restitution. If he confessed himself he pays the value, and a fifth, and a reparation sacrifice.” But here when he moved it by claiming that it was lost. Afterwards he claimed a claim of thief and is not liable. Explain it that he swore to him but slaughtered it afterwards. The students of Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Julianus say, explain it that he slaughtered it when it was lying down. Is there slaughter without sale? Following Symmachos who said, there can be slaughter and sale without theft. Samuel said, if there came no witnesses of the theft, but there came witnesses of the slaughter; he is liable.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 8:21

“He said to the recipient of a fee,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said, one who claims before his neighbor a claim of thief in a case of loss is liable. “Where is my lost object?” He told him, “it was stolen.” Rebbi Joḥanan said, one who claims before his neighbor a claim of thief is liable only after an oath. What is the reason? It is said here “grabbing” and it says there “grabbing.” Since “grabbing” mentioned there only applies after an oath, so also “grabbing” mentioned here only applies after an oath. Rebbi Joḥanan said, one who claims a claim of loss, swore to him, and afterwards claimed a claim of thief is not liable. Rebbi Joḥanan asked: May one be liable for a blurted oath in case of an oath regarding a claim of thief? The argument of Rebbi Joḥanan seems to be inverted. There he said, if he claimed a claim of loss, swore to him, and afterwards claimed a claim of thief is not liable. And here he says so? There it is obvious to him, here it is problematic for him. What is problematic for him? He saw and found it simple. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Joseph said, one who claims before his neighbor a claim of thief is liable only after he denied in court. Where do we hold? If about him who already owes an oath to his neighbor, even if he was swearing out of court he is liable. But we must hold about him who saw them coming. They wanted to make him swear but he jumped in and swore. Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: When it was standing at his feeding trough. Rebbi Ze`ira asked: how was it said? “If it was standing” or “even if it was standing”? If you say “even if it was standing,” it makes no difference. If you say “if it was standing,” then the argument of Rebbi Joḥanan is inverted. There, he said, if he claimed before him a claim of loss, had been swearing to him, selected a sacrifice, and then claimed a claim of duress, he is not liable. But here you are saying so? Rebbi La said, there is a difference since he absolved himself of confession by the oath. They objected to the opinion of Rebbi Ze`ira: “‘Where is my ox?’ He told him, ‘it was stolen.’ ‘I want you to swear;’ he answered ‘Amen’. Witnesses testify that he stole it: he has to pay double restitution. If he confessed himself he pays the value, and a fifth, and a reparation sacrifice.” But here when he moved it by claiming that it was lost. Afterwards he claimed a claim of thief and is not liable. Explain it that he swore to him but slaughtered it afterwards. The students of Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Julianus say, explain it that he slaughtered it when it was lying down. Is there slaughter without sale? Following Symmachos who said, there can be slaughter and sale without theft. Samuel said, if there came no witnesses of the theft, but there came witnesses of the slaughter; he is liable.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 8:21

“He said to the recipient of a fee,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said, one who claims before his neighbor a claim of thief in a case of loss is liable. “Where is my lost object?” He told him, “it was stolen.” Rebbi Joḥanan said, one who claims before his neighbor a claim of thief is liable only after an oath. What is the reason? It is said here “grabbing” and it says there “grabbing.” Since “grabbing” mentioned there only applies after an oath, so also “grabbing” mentioned here only applies after an oath. Rebbi Joḥanan said, one who claims a claim of loss, swore to him, and afterwards claimed a claim of thief is not liable. Rebbi Joḥanan asked: May one be liable for a blurted oath in case of an oath regarding a claim of thief? The argument of Rebbi Joḥanan seems to be inverted. There he said, if he claimed a claim of loss, swore to him, and afterwards claimed a claim of thief is not liable. And here he says so? There it is obvious to him, here it is problematic for him. What is problematic for him? He saw and found it simple. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Joseph said, one who claims before his neighbor a claim of thief is liable only after he denied in court. Where do we hold? If about him who already owes an oath to his neighbor, even if he was swearing out of court he is liable. But we must hold about him who saw them coming. They wanted to make him swear but he jumped in and swore. Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: When it was standing at his feeding trough. Rebbi Ze`ira asked: how was it said? “If it was standing” or “even if it was standing”? If you say “even if it was standing,” it makes no difference. If you say “if it was standing,” then the argument of Rebbi Joḥanan is inverted. There, he said, if he claimed before him a claim of loss, had been swearing to him, selected a sacrifice, and then claimed a claim of duress, he is not liable. But here you are saying so? Rebbi La said, there is a difference since he absolved himself of confession by the oath. They objected to the opinion of Rebbi Ze`ira: “‘Where is my ox?’ He told him, ‘it was stolen.’ ‘I want you to swear;’ he answered ‘Amen’. Witnesses testify that he stole it: he has to pay double restitution. If he confessed himself he pays the value, and a fifth, and a reparation sacrifice.” But here when he moved it by claiming that it was lost. Afterwards he claimed a claim of thief and is not liable. Explain it that he swore to him but slaughtered it afterwards. The students of Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Julianus say, explain it that he slaughtered it when it was lying down. Is there slaughter without sale? Following Symmachos who said, there can be slaughter and sale without theft. Samuel said, if there came no witnesses of the theft, but there came witnesses of the slaughter; he is liable.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 8:21

“He said to the recipient of a fee,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said, one who claims before his neighbor a claim of thief in a case of loss is liable. “Where is my lost object?” He told him, “it was stolen.” Rebbi Joḥanan said, one who claims before his neighbor a claim of thief is liable only after an oath. What is the reason? It is said here “grabbing” and it says there “grabbing.” Since “grabbing” mentioned there only applies after an oath, so also “grabbing” mentioned here only applies after an oath. Rebbi Joḥanan said, one who claims a claim of loss, swore to him, and afterwards claimed a claim of thief is not liable. Rebbi Joḥanan asked: May one be liable for a blurted oath in case of an oath regarding a claim of thief? The argument of Rebbi Joḥanan seems to be inverted. There he said, if he claimed a claim of loss, swore to him, and afterwards claimed a claim of thief is not liable. And here he says so? There it is obvious to him, here it is problematic for him. What is problematic for him? He saw and found it simple. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Joseph said, one who claims before his neighbor a claim of thief is liable only after he denied in court. Where do we hold? If about him who already owes an oath to his neighbor, even if he was swearing out of court he is liable. But we must hold about him who saw them coming. They wanted to make him swear but he jumped in and swore. Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: When it was standing at his feeding trough. Rebbi Ze`ira asked: how was it said? “If it was standing” or “even if it was standing”? If you say “even if it was standing,” it makes no difference. If you say “if it was standing,” then the argument of Rebbi Joḥanan is inverted. There, he said, if he claimed before him a claim of loss, had been swearing to him, selected a sacrifice, and then claimed a claim of duress, he is not liable. But here you are saying so? Rebbi La said, there is a difference since he absolved himself of confession by the oath. They objected to the opinion of Rebbi Ze`ira: “‘Where is my ox?’ He told him, ‘it was stolen.’ ‘I want you to swear;’ he answered ‘Amen’. Witnesses testify that he stole it: he has to pay double restitution. If he confessed himself he pays the value, and a fifth, and a reparation sacrifice.” But here when he moved it by claiming that it was lost. Afterwards he claimed a claim of thief and is not liable. Explain it that he swore to him but slaughtered it afterwards. The students of Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Julianus say, explain it that he slaughtered it when it was lying down. Is there slaughter without sale? Following Symmachos who said, there can be slaughter and sale without theft. Samuel said, if there came no witnesses of the theft, but there came witnesses of the slaughter; he is liable.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 8:21

“He said to the recipient of a fee,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said, one who claims before his neighbor a claim of thief in a case of loss is liable. “Where is my lost object?” He told him, “it was stolen.” Rebbi Joḥanan said, one who claims before his neighbor a claim of thief is liable only after an oath. What is the reason? It is said here “grabbing” and it says there “grabbing.” Since “grabbing” mentioned there only applies after an oath, so also “grabbing” mentioned here only applies after an oath. Rebbi Joḥanan said, one who claims a claim of loss, swore to him, and afterwards claimed a claim of thief is not liable. Rebbi Joḥanan asked: May one be liable for a blurted oath in case of an oath regarding a claim of thief? The argument of Rebbi Joḥanan seems to be inverted. There he said, if he claimed a claim of loss, swore to him, and afterwards claimed a claim of thief is not liable. And here he says so? There it is obvious to him, here it is problematic for him. What is problematic for him? He saw and found it simple. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Joseph said, one who claims before his neighbor a claim of thief is liable only after he denied in court. Where do we hold? If about him who already owes an oath to his neighbor, even if he was swearing out of court he is liable. But we must hold about him who saw them coming. They wanted to make him swear but he jumped in and swore. Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: When it was standing at his feeding trough. Rebbi Ze`ira asked: how was it said? “If it was standing” or “even if it was standing”? If you say “even if it was standing,” it makes no difference. If you say “if it was standing,” then the argument of Rebbi Joḥanan is inverted. There, he said, if he claimed before him a claim of loss, had been swearing to him, selected a sacrifice, and then claimed a claim of duress, he is not liable. But here you are saying so? Rebbi La said, there is a difference since he absolved himself of confession by the oath. They objected to the opinion of Rebbi Ze`ira: “‘Where is my ox?’ He told him, ‘it was stolen.’ ‘I want you to swear;’ he answered ‘Amen’. Witnesses testify that he stole it: he has to pay double restitution. If he confessed himself he pays the value, and a fifth, and a reparation sacrifice.” But here when he moved it by claiming that it was lost. Afterwards he claimed a claim of thief and is not liable. Explain it that he swore to him but slaughtered it afterwards. The students of Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Julianus say, explain it that he slaughtered it when it was lying down. Is there slaughter without sale? Following Symmachos who said, there can be slaughter and sale without theft. Samuel said, if there came no witnesses of the theft, but there came witnesses of the slaughter; he is liable.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 8:21

“He said to the recipient of a fee,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said, one who claims before his neighbor a claim of thief in a case of loss is liable. “Where is my lost object?” He told him, “it was stolen.” Rebbi Joḥanan said, one who claims before his neighbor a claim of thief is liable only after an oath. What is the reason? It is said here “grabbing” and it says there “grabbing.” Since “grabbing” mentioned there only applies after an oath, so also “grabbing” mentioned here only applies after an oath. Rebbi Joḥanan said, one who claims a claim of loss, swore to him, and afterwards claimed a claim of thief is not liable. Rebbi Joḥanan asked: May one be liable for a blurted oath in case of an oath regarding a claim of thief? The argument of Rebbi Joḥanan seems to be inverted. There he said, if he claimed a claim of loss, swore to him, and afterwards claimed a claim of thief is not liable. And here he says so? There it is obvious to him, here it is problematic for him. What is problematic for him? He saw and found it simple. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Joseph said, one who claims before his neighbor a claim of thief is liable only after he denied in court. Where do we hold? If about him who already owes an oath to his neighbor, even if he was swearing out of court he is liable. But we must hold about him who saw them coming. They wanted to make him swear but he jumped in and swore. Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: When it was standing at his feeding trough. Rebbi Ze`ira asked: how was it said? “If it was standing” or “even if it was standing”? If you say “even if it was standing,” it makes no difference. If you say “if it was standing,” then the argument of Rebbi Joḥanan is inverted. There, he said, if he claimed before him a claim of loss, had been swearing to him, selected a sacrifice, and then claimed a claim of duress, he is not liable. But here you are saying so? Rebbi La said, there is a difference since he absolved himself of confession by the oath. They objected to the opinion of Rebbi Ze`ira: “‘Where is my ox?’ He told him, ‘it was stolen.’ ‘I want you to swear;’ he answered ‘Amen’. Witnesses testify that he stole it: he has to pay double restitution. If he confessed himself he pays the value, and a fifth, and a reparation sacrifice.” But here when he moved it by claiming that it was lost. Afterwards he claimed a claim of thief and is not liable. Explain it that he swore to him but slaughtered it afterwards. The students of Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Julianus say, explain it that he slaughtered it when it was lying down. Is there slaughter without sale? Following Symmachos who said, there can be slaughter and sale without theft. Samuel said, if there came no witnesses of the theft, but there came witnesses of the slaughter; he is liable.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 8:21

“He said to the recipient of a fee,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said, one who claims before his neighbor a claim of thief in a case of loss is liable. “Where is my lost object?” He told him, “it was stolen.” Rebbi Joḥanan said, one who claims before his neighbor a claim of thief is liable only after an oath. What is the reason? It is said here “grabbing” and it says there “grabbing.” Since “grabbing” mentioned there only applies after an oath, so also “grabbing” mentioned here only applies after an oath. Rebbi Joḥanan said, one who claims a claim of loss, swore to him, and afterwards claimed a claim of thief is not liable. Rebbi Joḥanan asked: May one be liable for a blurted oath in case of an oath regarding a claim of thief? The argument of Rebbi Joḥanan seems to be inverted. There he said, if he claimed a claim of loss, swore to him, and afterwards claimed a claim of thief is not liable. And here he says so? There it is obvious to him, here it is problematic for him. What is problematic for him? He saw and found it simple. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Joseph said, one who claims before his neighbor a claim of thief is liable only after he denied in court. Where do we hold? If about him who already owes an oath to his neighbor, even if he was swearing out of court he is liable. But we must hold about him who saw them coming. They wanted to make him swear but he jumped in and swore. Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: When it was standing at his feeding trough. Rebbi Ze`ira asked: how was it said? “If it was standing” or “even if it was standing”? If you say “even if it was standing,” it makes no difference. If you say “if it was standing,” then the argument of Rebbi Joḥanan is inverted. There, he said, if he claimed before him a claim of loss, had been swearing to him, selected a sacrifice, and then claimed a claim of duress, he is not liable. But here you are saying so? Rebbi La said, there is a difference since he absolved himself of confession by the oath. They objected to the opinion of Rebbi Ze`ira: “‘Where is my ox?’ He told him, ‘it was stolen.’ ‘I want you to swear;’ he answered ‘Amen’. Witnesses testify that he stole it: he has to pay double restitution. If he confessed himself he pays the value, and a fifth, and a reparation sacrifice.” But here when he moved it by claiming that it was lost. Afterwards he claimed a claim of thief and is not liable. Explain it that he swore to him but slaughtered it afterwards. The students of Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Julianus say, explain it that he slaughtered it when it was lying down. Is there slaughter without sale? Following Symmachos who said, there can be slaughter and sale without theft. Samuel said, if there came no witnesses of the theft, but there came witnesses of the slaughter; he is liable.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 8:21

“He said to the recipient of a fee,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said, one who claims before his neighbor a claim of thief in a case of loss is liable. “Where is my lost object?” He told him, “it was stolen.” Rebbi Joḥanan said, one who claims before his neighbor a claim of thief is liable only after an oath. What is the reason? It is said here “grabbing” and it says there “grabbing.” Since “grabbing” mentioned there only applies after an oath, so also “grabbing” mentioned here only applies after an oath. Rebbi Joḥanan said, one who claims a claim of loss, swore to him, and afterwards claimed a claim of thief is not liable. Rebbi Joḥanan asked: May one be liable for a blurted oath in case of an oath regarding a claim of thief? The argument of Rebbi Joḥanan seems to be inverted. There he said, if he claimed a claim of loss, swore to him, and afterwards claimed a claim of thief is not liable. And here he says so? There it is obvious to him, here it is problematic for him. What is problematic for him? He saw and found it simple. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Joseph said, one who claims before his neighbor a claim of thief is liable only after he denied in court. Where do we hold? If about him who already owes an oath to his neighbor, even if he was swearing out of court he is liable. But we must hold about him who saw them coming. They wanted to make him swear but he jumped in and swore. Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: When it was standing at his feeding trough. Rebbi Ze`ira asked: how was it said? “If it was standing” or “even if it was standing”? If you say “even if it was standing,” it makes no difference. If you say “if it was standing,” then the argument of Rebbi Joḥanan is inverted. There, he said, if he claimed before him a claim of loss, had been swearing to him, selected a sacrifice, and then claimed a claim of duress, he is not liable. But here you are saying so? Rebbi La said, there is a difference since he absolved himself of confession by the oath. They objected to the opinion of Rebbi Ze`ira: “‘Where is my ox?’ He told him, ‘it was stolen.’ ‘I want you to swear;’ he answered ‘Amen’. Witnesses testify that he stole it: he has to pay double restitution. If he confessed himself he pays the value, and a fifth, and a reparation sacrifice.” But here when he moved it by claiming that it was lost. Afterwards he claimed a claim of thief and is not liable. Explain it that he swore to him but slaughtered it afterwards. The students of Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Julianus say, explain it that he slaughtered it when it was lying down. Is there slaughter without sale? Following Symmachos who said, there can be slaughter and sale without theft. Samuel said, if there came no witnesses of the theft, but there came witnesses of the slaughter; he is liable.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 8:21

“He said to the recipient of a fee,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said, one who claims before his neighbor a claim of thief in a case of loss is liable. “Where is my lost object?” He told him, “it was stolen.” Rebbi Joḥanan said, one who claims before his neighbor a claim of thief is liable only after an oath. What is the reason? It is said here “grabbing” and it says there “grabbing.” Since “grabbing” mentioned there only applies after an oath, so also “grabbing” mentioned here only applies after an oath. Rebbi Joḥanan said, one who claims a claim of loss, swore to him, and afterwards claimed a claim of thief is not liable. Rebbi Joḥanan asked: May one be liable for a blurted oath in case of an oath regarding a claim of thief? The argument of Rebbi Joḥanan seems to be inverted. There he said, if he claimed a claim of loss, swore to him, and afterwards claimed a claim of thief is not liable. And here he says so? There it is obvious to him, here it is problematic for him. What is problematic for him? He saw and found it simple. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Joseph said, one who claims before his neighbor a claim of thief is liable only after he denied in court. Where do we hold? If about him who already owes an oath to his neighbor, even if he was swearing out of court he is liable. But we must hold about him who saw them coming. They wanted to make him swear but he jumped in and swore. Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: When it was standing at his feeding trough. Rebbi Ze`ira asked: how was it said? “If it was standing” or “even if it was standing”? If you say “even if it was standing,” it makes no difference. If you say “if it was standing,” then the argument of Rebbi Joḥanan is inverted. There, he said, if he claimed before him a claim of loss, had been swearing to him, selected a sacrifice, and then claimed a claim of duress, he is not liable. But here you are saying so? Rebbi La said, there is a difference since he absolved himself of confession by the oath. They objected to the opinion of Rebbi Ze`ira: “‘Where is my ox?’ He told him, ‘it was stolen.’ ‘I want you to swear;’ he answered ‘Amen’. Witnesses testify that he stole it: he has to pay double restitution. If he confessed himself he pays the value, and a fifth, and a reparation sacrifice.” But here when he moved it by claiming that it was lost. Afterwards he claimed a claim of thief and is not liable. Explain it that he swore to him but slaughtered it afterwards. The students of Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Julianus say, explain it that he slaughtered it when it was lying down. Is there slaughter without sale? Following Symmachos who said, there can be slaughter and sale without theft. Samuel said, if there came no witnesses of the theft, but there came witnesses of the slaughter; he is liable.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 8:22

Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, if he saw that witnesses to the theft were approaching and he said “I stole,” since his confession is inoperative he is not liable. If he saw that witnesses to the slaughter were approaching and he said “I slaughtered,” since his confession is (another opinion: not) operative he is not liable (another opinion: is liable). Rebbi Ze`ira asked: that witnesses to rape were approaching and he said “I raped”? Rebbi Ḥanina said, the Mishnah follows Rebbi Simeon who said the main claim is for the fine. Therefore his confession is inoperative and he is not liable. But the rabbis say, the main claim is not for the fine. Therefore his confession is operative and he is liable.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 8:22

Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, if he saw that witnesses to the theft were approaching and he said “I stole,” since his confession is inoperative he is not liable. If he saw that witnesses to the slaughter were approaching and he said “I slaughtered,” since his confession is (another opinion: not) operative he is not liable (another opinion: is liable). Rebbi Ze`ira asked: that witnesses to rape were approaching and he said “I raped”? Rebbi Ḥanina said, the Mishnah follows Rebbi Simeon who said the main claim is for the fine. Therefore his confession is inoperative and he is not liable. But the rabbis say, the main claim is not for the fine. Therefore his confession is operative and he is liable.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 8:22

Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, if he saw that witnesses to the theft were approaching and he said “I stole,” since his confession is inoperative he is not liable. If he saw that witnesses to the slaughter were approaching and he said “I slaughtered,” since his confession is (another opinion: not) operative he is not liable (another opinion: is liable). Rebbi Ze`ira asked: that witnesses to rape were approaching and he said “I raped”? Rebbi Ḥanina said, the Mishnah follows Rebbi Simeon who said the main claim is for the fine. Therefore his confession is inoperative and he is not liable. But the rabbis say, the main claim is not for the fine. Therefore his confession is operative and he is liable.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 8:22

Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, if he saw that witnesses to the theft were approaching and he said “I stole,” since his confession is inoperative he is not liable. If he saw that witnesses to the slaughter were approaching and he said “I slaughtered,” since his confession is (another opinion: not) operative he is not liable (another opinion: is liable). Rebbi Ze`ira asked: that witnesses to rape were approaching and he said “I raped”? Rebbi Ḥanina said, the Mishnah follows Rebbi Simeon who said the main claim is for the fine. Therefore his confession is inoperative and he is not liable. But the rabbis say, the main claim is not for the fine. Therefore his confession is operative and he is liable.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 8:22

Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, if he saw that witnesses to the theft were approaching and he said “I stole,” since his confession is inoperative he is not liable. If he saw that witnesses to the slaughter were approaching and he said “I slaughtered,” since his confession is (another opinion: not) operative he is not liable (another opinion: is liable). Rebbi Ze`ira asked: that witnesses to rape were approaching and he said “I raped”? Rebbi Ḥanina said, the Mishnah follows Rebbi Simeon who said the main claim is for the fine. Therefore his confession is inoperative and he is not liable. But the rabbis say, the main claim is not for the fine. Therefore his confession is operative and he is liable.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 8:23

MISHNAH: He said to the borrower, “where is my ox?” He told him, “it died,” but it broke, or was abducted, or stolen, or lost. “It broke,” but it died, or was abducted, or stolen, or lost. “ ”It was abducted,” but it died, or broke, or was stolen, or lost. “It was stolen,” but it died, or broke, or was abducted, or lost. “It was lost,” but it died, or broke, or was abducted, or stolen. “I want you to swear;” he answered “Amen”. He is not liable. “Where is my ox?” He told him, “I do not know.” “What are you telling?” But if had died, or broke, or was abducted, or stolen, or lost. “I want you to swear;” he answered “Amen”. He is liable. He said to the recipient of a fee or to a renter, “where is my ox?” He told him, “it died,” but it broke or was abducted; “it broke,” but it died or was abducted; “it was abducted,” but it died or broke; “it was stolen,” but it was lost; “it was lost,” but it was stolen. “I want you to swear;” if he said “Amen”, he is not liable. “It died, or it broke, or it was abducted,” when it was stolen or lost. “I want you to swear;” if he said “Amen”, he is liable. “It was lost, or stolen,” when it died, or broke, or was abducted; he is not liable. This is the principle: Anybody who swears to his benefit is liable, to his detriment is not liable.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 8:23

MISHNAH: He said to the borrower, “where is my ox?” He told him, “it died,” but it broke, or was abducted, or stolen, or lost. “It broke,” but it died, or was abducted, or stolen, or lost. “ ”It was abducted,” but it died, or broke, or was stolen, or lost. “It was stolen,” but it died, or broke, or was abducted, or lost. “It was lost,” but it died, or broke, or was abducted, or stolen. “I want you to swear;” he answered “Amen”. He is not liable. “Where is my ox?” He told him, “I do not know.” “What are you telling?” But if had died, or broke, or was abducted, or stolen, or lost. “I want you to swear;” he answered “Amen”. He is liable. He said to the recipient of a fee or to a renter, “where is my ox?” He told him, “it died,” but it broke or was abducted; “it broke,” but it died or was abducted; “it was abducted,” but it died or broke; “it was stolen,” but it was lost; “it was lost,” but it was stolen. “I want you to swear;” if he said “Amen”, he is not liable. “It died, or it broke, or it was abducted,” when it was stolen or lost. “I want you to swear;” if he said “Amen”, he is liable. “It was lost, or stolen,” when it died, or broke, or was abducted; he is not liable. This is the principle: Anybody who swears to his benefit is liable, to his detriment is not liable.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 8:23

MISHNAH: He said to the borrower, “where is my ox?” He told him, “it died,” but it broke, or was abducted, or stolen, or lost. “It broke,” but it died, or was abducted, or stolen, or lost. “ ”It was abducted,” but it died, or broke, or was stolen, or lost. “It was stolen,” but it died, or broke, or was abducted, or lost. “It was lost,” but it died, or broke, or was abducted, or stolen. “I want you to swear;” he answered “Amen”. He is not liable. “Where is my ox?” He told him, “I do not know.” “What are you telling?” But if had died, or broke, or was abducted, or stolen, or lost. “I want you to swear;” he answered “Amen”. He is liable. He said to the recipient of a fee or to a renter, “where is my ox?” He told him, “it died,” but it broke or was abducted; “it broke,” but it died or was abducted; “it was abducted,” but it died or broke; “it was stolen,” but it was lost; “it was lost,” but it was stolen. “I want you to swear;” if he said “Amen”, he is not liable. “It died, or it broke, or it was abducted,” when it was stolen or lost. “I want you to swear;” if he said “Amen”, he is liable. “It was lost, or stolen,” when it died, or broke, or was abducted; he is not liable. This is the principle: Anybody who swears to his benefit is liable, to his detriment is not liable.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 8:23

MISHNAH: He said to the borrower, “where is my ox?” He told him, “it died,” but it broke, or was abducted, or stolen, or lost. “It broke,” but it died, or was abducted, or stolen, or lost. “ ”It was abducted,” but it died, or broke, or was stolen, or lost. “It was stolen,” but it died, or broke, or was abducted, or lost. “It was lost,” but it died, or broke, or was abducted, or stolen. “I want you to swear;” he answered “Amen”. He is not liable. “Where is my ox?” He told him, “I do not know.” “What are you telling?” But if had died, or broke, or was abducted, or stolen, or lost. “I want you to swear;” he answered “Amen”. He is liable. He said to the recipient of a fee or to a renter, “where is my ox?” He told him, “it died,” but it broke or was abducted; “it broke,” but it died or was abducted; “it was abducted,” but it died or broke; “it was stolen,” but it was lost; “it was lost,” but it was stolen. “I want you to swear;” if he said “Amen”, he is not liable. “It died, or it broke, or it was abducted,” when it was stolen or lost. “I want you to swear;” if he said “Amen”, he is liable. “It was lost, or stolen,” when it died, or broke, or was abducted; he is not liable. This is the principle: Anybody who swears to his benefit is liable, to his detriment is not liable.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 8:23

MISHNAH: He said to the borrower, “where is my ox?” He told him, “it died,” but it broke, or was abducted, or stolen, or lost. “It broke,” but it died, or was abducted, or stolen, or lost. “ ”It was abducted,” but it died, or broke, or was stolen, or lost. “It was stolen,” but it died, or broke, or was abducted, or lost. “It was lost,” but it died, or broke, or was abducted, or stolen. “I want you to swear;” he answered “Amen”. He is not liable. “Where is my ox?” He told him, “I do not know.” “What are you telling?” But if had died, or broke, or was abducted, or stolen, or lost. “I want you to swear;” he answered “Amen”. He is liable. He said to the recipient of a fee or to a renter, “where is my ox?” He told him, “it died,” but it broke or was abducted; “it broke,” but it died or was abducted; “it was abducted,” but it died or broke; “it was stolen,” but it was lost; “it was lost,” but it was stolen. “I want you to swear;” if he said “Amen”, he is not liable. “It died, or it broke, or it was abducted,” when it was stolen or lost. “I want you to swear;” if he said “Amen”, he is liable. “It was lost, or stolen,” when it died, or broke, or was abducted; he is not liable. This is the principle: Anybody who swears to his benefit is liable, to his detriment is not liable.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 8:23

MISHNAH: He said to the borrower, “where is my ox?” He told him, “it died,” but it broke, or was abducted, or stolen, or lost. “It broke,” but it died, or was abducted, or stolen, or lost. “ ”It was abducted,” but it died, or broke, or was stolen, or lost. “It was stolen,” but it died, or broke, or was abducted, or lost. “It was lost,” but it died, or broke, or was abducted, or stolen. “I want you to swear;” he answered “Amen”. He is not liable. “Where is my ox?” He told him, “I do not know.” “What are you telling?” But if had died, or broke, or was abducted, or stolen, or lost. “I want you to swear;” he answered “Amen”. He is liable. He said to the recipient of a fee or to a renter, “where is my ox?” He told him, “it died,” but it broke or was abducted; “it broke,” but it died or was abducted; “it was abducted,” but it died or broke; “it was stolen,” but it was lost; “it was lost,” but it was stolen. “I want you to swear;” if he said “Amen”, he is not liable. “It died, or it broke, or it was abducted,” when it was stolen or lost. “I want you to swear;” if he said “Amen”, he is liable. “It was lost, or stolen,” when it died, or broke, or was abducted; he is not liable. This is the principle: Anybody who swears to his benefit is liable, to his detriment is not liable.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 8:23

MISHNAH: He said to the borrower, “where is my ox?” He told him, “it died,” but it broke, or was abducted, or stolen, or lost. “It broke,” but it died, or was abducted, or stolen, or lost. “ ”It was abducted,” but it died, or broke, or was stolen, or lost. “It was stolen,” but it died, or broke, or was abducted, or lost. “It was lost,” but it died, or broke, or was abducted, or stolen. “I want you to swear;” he answered “Amen”. He is not liable. “Where is my ox?” He told him, “I do not know.” “What are you telling?” But if had died, or broke, or was abducted, or stolen, or lost. “I want you to swear;” he answered “Amen”. He is liable. He said to the recipient of a fee or to a renter, “where is my ox?” He told him, “it died,” but it broke or was abducted; “it broke,” but it died or was abducted; “it was abducted,” but it died or broke; “it was stolen,” but it was lost; “it was lost,” but it was stolen. “I want you to swear;” if he said “Amen”, he is not liable. “It died, or it broke, or it was abducted,” when it was stolen or lost. “I want you to swear;” if he said “Amen”, he is liable. “It was lost, or stolen,” when it died, or broke, or was abducted; he is not liable. This is the principle: Anybody who swears to his benefit is liable, to his detriment is not liable.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 8:24

HALAKHAH: It was stated: If it was neither to his benefit nor to his detriment, he is liable. Rebbi said, a baraita says so: “If he said to the borrower, the unpaid trustee, the recipient of a fee, or the renter, ‘where is my ox?’ This one said, ‘it died.’” May he tell him, “come and swear to me that you never thought of rustling it”? In any case he would not pay; what could he say? “Even if you would pay me a lot, I want from you what is mine.”

Jerusalem Talmud Avodah Zarah 1:41

Nowhere does one sell large animals to them.” Why? For a large animal there might be an obligation for a purification offering; for a small animal there can be no obligation for a purification offering. But does he not shear, does he not milk? One says, there it is liable, here he is liable. But if it is sold, is it not the Gentile’s animal? The Babylonian Rebbi Immi in the name of the rabbis there: Sometimes he sells it on trial and returns it after three days, then it turns out that he did do work with the Jew’s animal. Then on trial it should be forbidden, not on trial permitted. One is because of the other.

Jerusalem Talmud Avodah Zarah 1:41

Nowhere does one sell large animals to them.” Why? For a large animal there might be an obligation for a purification offering; for a small animal there can be no obligation for a purification offering. But does he not shear, does he not milk? One says, there it is liable, here he is liable. But if it is sold, is it not the Gentile’s animal? The Babylonian Rebbi Immi in the name of the rabbis there: Sometimes he sells it on trial and returns it after three days, then it turns out that he did do work with the Jew’s animal. Then on trial it should be forbidden, not on trial permitted. One is because of the other.

Jerusalem Talmud Avodah Zarah 1:42

If he transgressed and sold one fines him. Just as one fines for practice so one fines for custom. From where that one fines for custom? A person sold his camel to an Aramean. The case came before Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish who fined him double to make him take back the camel. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, they fined the broker and called him son who brokers to Arameans. Does Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish follow Rebbi Jehudah? As it was stated in the name of Rebbi Jehuda: “If somebody buys an animal from a Gentile and it gave birth to a firstling, he buys it up to its worth and gives half of its worth to a Cohen. If it was given to him as contractor, he has to pay for up to ten times its worth and gives all of its worth to the Cohen. But the Sages say, since the finger of the Gentile in involved it is no longer liable as firstling.” Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish is more than Rebbi Jehudah. What Rebbi Jehudah said because of the practice of firstlings; but what Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said because of practice regarding a large animal.

Jerusalem Talmud Avodah Zarah 1:43

“Rebbi Jehudah permits damaged ones.” Rebbi Jehudah said this only for a damaged one which cannot be healed. They told him, may he not bring a male to it, he fertilizes it and it gives birth? He said to them, I also said this only about a male (horse) [damaged one] which cannot be healed. They told him, may he not bring a female to him, she is fertilized by him and gives birth? Rav Abin in the name of the rabbis there: This implies that one is forbidden to provide them with fetuses. There, we have stated: “If somebody buys a Non-Jew’s donkey fetus or who sells one to him even though he is not authorized, or one who enters into partnership, or accepts from him as contractor, or lets it in contract, is not liable for firstling.” Rebbi Ḥaggai asked before Rebbi Yose, does this not imply that one is forbidden to provide them with fetuses? He said to them, Rebbi Abin in the name of the rabbis there already preceded you: This implies that one is forbidden to provide them with fetuses.

Jerusalem Talmud Avodah Zarah 1:44

“Ben Bathyra permits horses.” Ben Bathyra said this only about a male horse because it kills its owner in war. Some say, because it runs after females, and some say, because it stands still to urinate. What is between them? A gelding. He who says because it runs after females, it does not run. He who says because it stands still to urinate, this one also stands still to urinate. [Rebbi Aḥa in the name of] Rebbi Tanḥum bar Ḥiyya: If it gets old he binds it to the grindstone. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Huna: Ben Bathyra and Rebbi Nathan both said the same, as it was stated: “If he carried out domestic animals, wild animals, or birds, whether alive or dead, he is liable. Rebbi Nathan says, dead he is liable, alive he is not liable.” The rabbis hold that he is liable for a purification sacrifice and they answer him so? They answer following his own argument. Following your argument, since you are saying because of rabbinic Sabbath prohibition, also we hold that if it gets old he binds it to the grindstone. Rebbi says, I am saying that it is forbidden for two reasons, as a weapon and as a large animal. It was stated so: A large wild animal is like a (small) [large] domestic animal. Who stated this? Rebbi. The words of the Sages: Rebbi Bisna, Rebbi Ḥanan bar Abba in the name of Rav: A wild animal is like a (large) [small] domestic animal.

Jerusalem Talmud Avodah Zarah 1:44

“Ben Bathyra permits horses.” Ben Bathyra said this only about a male horse because it kills its owner in war. Some say, because it runs after females, and some say, because it stands still to urinate. What is between them? A gelding. He who says because it runs after females, it does not run. He who says because it stands still to urinate, this one also stands still to urinate. [Rebbi Aḥa in the name of] Rebbi Tanḥum bar Ḥiyya: If it gets old he binds it to the grindstone. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Huna: Ben Bathyra and Rebbi Nathan both said the same, as it was stated: “If he carried out domestic animals, wild animals, or birds, whether alive or dead, he is liable. Rebbi Nathan says, dead he is liable, alive he is not liable.” The rabbis hold that he is liable for a purification sacrifice and they answer him so? They answer following his own argument. Following your argument, since you are saying because of rabbinic Sabbath prohibition, also we hold that if it gets old he binds it to the grindstone. Rebbi says, I am saying that it is forbidden for two reasons, as a weapon and as a large animal. It was stated so: A large wild animal is like a (small) [large] domestic animal. Who stated this? Rebbi. The words of the Sages: Rebbi Bisna, Rebbi Ḥanan bar Abba in the name of Rav: A wild animal is like a (large) [small] domestic animal.

Jerusalem Talmud Avodah Zarah 1:44

“Ben Bathyra permits horses.” Ben Bathyra said this only about a male horse because it kills its owner in war. Some say, because it runs after females, and some say, because it stands still to urinate. What is between them? A gelding. He who says because it runs after females, it does not run. He who says because it stands still to urinate, this one also stands still to urinate. [Rebbi Aḥa in the name of] Rebbi Tanḥum bar Ḥiyya: If it gets old he binds it to the grindstone. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Huna: Ben Bathyra and Rebbi Nathan both said the same, as it was stated: “If he carried out domestic animals, wild animals, or birds, whether alive or dead, he is liable. Rebbi Nathan says, dead he is liable, alive he is not liable.” The rabbis hold that he is liable for a purification sacrifice and they answer him so? They answer following his own argument. Following your argument, since you are saying because of rabbinic Sabbath prohibition, also we hold that if it gets old he binds it to the grindstone. Rebbi says, I am saying that it is forbidden for two reasons, as a weapon and as a large animal. It was stated so: A large wild animal is like a (small) [large] domestic animal. Who stated this? Rebbi. The words of the Sages: Rebbi Bisna, Rebbi Ḥanan bar Abba in the name of Rav: A wild animal is like a (large) [small] domestic animal.

Jerusalem Talmud Avodah Zarah 1:44

“Ben Bathyra permits horses.” Ben Bathyra said this only about a male horse because it kills its owner in war. Some say, because it runs after females, and some say, because it stands still to urinate. What is between them? A gelding. He who says because it runs after females, it does not run. He who says because it stands still to urinate, this one also stands still to urinate. [Rebbi Aḥa in the name of] Rebbi Tanḥum bar Ḥiyya: If it gets old he binds it to the grindstone. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Huna: Ben Bathyra and Rebbi Nathan both said the same, as it was stated: “If he carried out domestic animals, wild animals, or birds, whether alive or dead, he is liable. Rebbi Nathan says, dead he is liable, alive he is not liable.” The rabbis hold that he is liable for a purification sacrifice and they answer him so? They answer following his own argument. Following your argument, since you are saying because of rabbinic Sabbath prohibition, also we hold that if it gets old he binds it to the grindstone. Rebbi says, I am saying that it is forbidden for two reasons, as a weapon and as a large animal. It was stated so: A large wild animal is like a (small) [large] domestic animal. Who stated this? Rebbi. The words of the Sages: Rebbi Bisna, Rebbi Ḥanan bar Abba in the name of Rav: A wild animal is like a (large) [small] domestic animal.

Jerusalem Talmud Avodah Zarah 1:58

HALAKHAH: “Also in a case where they said to lease,” etc. Therefore, at a place where one is used to sell, he may sell even a dwelling and lease a dwelling. Rebbi Aḥa, Rebbi Tanḥum bar Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Yose: Even a small room as in the tannery of Sidon. Not only all of it, but even one room. “If there were two, one inside the other, the inner one is liable, the outer one is not liable.” If there was one and it was subdivided into two, two and combined into one? Rebbi Abin in the name of the rabbis there: This implies that if there was a field adjacent to a road it is forbidden to lease it to Gentiles because it is known by the name of the Jew and they plough there on Sabbaths and holidays.

Jerusalem Talmud Avodah Zarah 1:58

HALAKHAH: “Also in a case where they said to lease,” etc. Therefore, at a place where one is used to sell, he may sell even a dwelling and lease a dwelling. Rebbi Aḥa, Rebbi Tanḥum bar Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Yose: Even a small room as in the tannery of Sidon. Not only all of it, but even one room. “If there were two, one inside the other, the inner one is liable, the outer one is not liable.” If there was one and it was subdivided into two, two and combined into one? Rebbi Abin in the name of the rabbis there: This implies that if there was a field adjacent to a road it is forbidden to lease it to Gentiles because it is known by the name of the Jew and they plough there on Sabbaths and holidays.

Jerusalem Talmud Avodah Zarah 2:21

Rebbi Ḥanina said, (this means) [a baraita implies] that one does not heal through spilling blood, as we have stated there: “If most of his body was outside one does not touch him,” we suspect that he will live, “for one does not push aside one life before another life.” Not only if one would say, kill this person, but even if he tell him, injure that person. A Gentile against a Gentile, a Gentile against a Jew, is liable. A Jew against a Gentile is not liable. Rav Ḥisda asked, may one save the life of an adult with the life of a minor? Rebbi Jeremiah objected, did we not state, “If most of his body was outside one does not touch him, for one does not push aside one life before another life”? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Levi: There it is different for it is not known who is endangering whom.

Jerusalem Talmud Avodah Zarah 2:21

Rebbi Ḥanina said, (this means) [a baraita implies] that one does not heal through spilling blood, as we have stated there: “If most of his body was outside one does not touch him,” we suspect that he will live, “for one does not push aside one life before another life.” Not only if one would say, kill this person, but even if he tell him, injure that person. A Gentile against a Gentile, a Gentile against a Jew, is liable. A Jew against a Gentile is not liable. Rav Ḥisda asked, may one save the life of an adult with the life of a minor? Rebbi Jeremiah objected, did we not state, “If most of his body was outside one does not touch him, for one does not push aside one life before another life”? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Levi: There it is different for it is not known who is endangering whom.

Jerusalem Talmud Avodah Zarah 5:55

Why did we not state carcasses with them? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, it did state only things forbidden for usufruct. Carcass meat is permitted for usufruct. They objected, is there not leavened matter on Passover? Leavened matter makes liable to extirpation, but for these there is no extirpation.

Jerusalem Talmud Makkot 1:9

MISHNAH: “We testify against this man that he owes another 1’000 denars payable within 30 days” but he says, within ten years. One estimates how much a person would be willing to pay to have 1’000 denars at his disposal to return them after ten years instead of returning them after thirty days. “We testify against this man that he owes another 200 denars” and they are found to be plotting, they are flogged and have to pay since the title which brings him to flogging is not the one which brings him to restitution, the words of Rebbi Ṃeïr. But the Sages say, anybody who pays is not flogged. “We testify against this man that he is liable to be flogged 40 lashes” and they are found plotting, they are whipped 80 because of do not testify against your neighbor as a false witness and because of do to him as he plotted to do to his neighbor, the words of Rebbi Ṃeïr. But the Sages say, they only are flogged 40 times. One distributes money but one does not distribute floggings. How? If they testified that he owes another person 200 denars and were found plotting, one distributes between them. If they testified that he is liable to be flogged 40 lashes and were found plotting, each one of them is flogged 40 lashes.

Jerusalem Talmud Makkot 1:9

MISHNAH: “We testify against this man that he owes another 1’000 denars payable within 30 days” but he says, within ten years. One estimates how much a person would be willing to pay to have 1’000 denars at his disposal to return them after ten years instead of returning them after thirty days. “We testify against this man that he owes another 200 denars” and they are found to be plotting, they are flogged and have to pay since the title which brings him to flogging is not the one which brings him to restitution, the words of Rebbi Ṃeïr. But the Sages say, anybody who pays is not flogged. “We testify against this man that he is liable to be flogged 40 lashes” and they are found plotting, they are whipped 80 because of do not testify against your neighbor as a false witness and because of do to him as he plotted to do to his neighbor, the words of Rebbi Ṃeïr. But the Sages say, they only are flogged 40 times. One distributes money but one does not distribute floggings. How? If they testified that he owes another person 200 denars and were found plotting, one distributes between them. If they testified that he is liable to be flogged 40 lashes and were found plotting, each one of them is flogged 40 lashes.

Jerusalem Talmud Makkot 2:2

HALAKHAH: : “The following are exiled,” etc. Rebbi Jehudah declares him not liable unless the entire rope falls from his hand. Rebbi Simeon declares him not liable unless he let go the trowel completely. What Rebbi Simeon said refers to breaking of the rope. What Rebbi Jehudah said, was about letting the trowel go.

Jerusalem Talmud Makkot 2:2

HALAKHAH: : “The following are exiled,” etc. Rebbi Jehudah declares him not liable unless the entire rope falls from his hand. Rebbi Simeon declares him not liable unless he let go the trowel completely. What Rebbi Simeon said refers to breaking of the rope. What Rebbi Jehudah said, was about letting the trowel go.

Jerusalem Talmud Makkot 2:6

MISHNAH: If one threw a stone into the public domain and it killed someone, he is exiled. Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob says, if after the stone left his hand, the other one stuck out his head and received it, he is not liable.

Jerusalem Talmud Makkot 2:10

Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, if he was splitting wood in his courtyard, when a worker entered to collect his wages, and a splinter ricocheted and injured him, he is liable. If he died, he does not go into exile, for it is not like a forest. Rebbi Ḥanina stated, he is not liable. They do not disagree. What Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, when they did not see him. But what Rebbi Ḥiyya stated, when they saw him. When they did not see him, from the moment he told him: enter, should he not be liable? Rebbi Ḥiyya stated, he is not liable. Since he told him: enter, he has to take precautions. Some would say, since he told him to enter, it becomes like the courtyard of partners. Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Partners acquire from one another in a courtyard; they object to one another in a courtyard, and are mutually liable for damages. But did not Rav say, if he filled the entire public domain? This did not fill the entire public domain! Since they usually walk in the entire domain, it is as if he had filled the entire domain.

Jerusalem Talmud Makkot 2:10

Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, if he was splitting wood in his courtyard, when a worker entered to collect his wages, and a splinter ricocheted and injured him, he is liable. If he died, he does not go into exile, for it is not like a forest. Rebbi Ḥanina stated, he is not liable. They do not disagree. What Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, when they did not see him. But what Rebbi Ḥiyya stated, when they saw him. When they did not see him, from the moment he told him: enter, should he not be liable? Rebbi Ḥiyya stated, he is not liable. Since he told him: enter, he has to take precautions. Some would say, since he told him to enter, it becomes like the courtyard of partners. Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Partners acquire from one another in a courtyard; they object to one another in a courtyard, and are mutually liable for damages. But did not Rav say, if he filled the entire public domain? This did not fill the entire public domain! Since they usually walk in the entire domain, it is as if he had filled the entire domain.

Jerusalem Talmud Makkot 2:10

Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, if he was splitting wood in his courtyard, when a worker entered to collect his wages, and a splinter ricocheted and injured him, he is liable. If he died, he does not go into exile, for it is not like a forest. Rebbi Ḥanina stated, he is not liable. They do not disagree. What Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, when they did not see him. But what Rebbi Ḥiyya stated, when they saw him. When they did not see him, from the moment he told him: enter, should he not be liable? Rebbi Ḥiyya stated, he is not liable. Since he told him: enter, he has to take precautions. Some would say, since he told him to enter, it becomes like the courtyard of partners. Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Partners acquire from one another in a courtyard; they object to one another in a courtyard, and are mutually liable for damages. But did not Rav say, if he filled the entire public domain? This did not fill the entire public domain! Since they usually walk in the entire domain, it is as if he had filled the entire domain.

Jerusalem Talmud Makkot 2:10

Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, if he was splitting wood in his courtyard, when a worker entered to collect his wages, and a splinter ricocheted and injured him, he is liable. If he died, he does not go into exile, for it is not like a forest. Rebbi Ḥanina stated, he is not liable. They do not disagree. What Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, when they did not see him. But what Rebbi Ḥiyya stated, when they saw him. When they did not see him, from the moment he told him: enter, should he not be liable? Rebbi Ḥiyya stated, he is not liable. Since he told him: enter, he has to take precautions. Some would say, since he told him to enter, it becomes like the courtyard of partners. Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Partners acquire from one another in a courtyard; they object to one another in a courtyard, and are mutually liable for damages. But did not Rav say, if he filled the entire public domain? This did not fill the entire public domain! Since they usually walk in the entire domain, it is as if he had filled the entire domain.

Jerusalem Talmud Makkot 2:10

Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, if he was splitting wood in his courtyard, when a worker entered to collect his wages, and a splinter ricocheted and injured him, he is liable. If he died, he does not go into exile, for it is not like a forest. Rebbi Ḥanina stated, he is not liable. They do not disagree. What Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, when they did not see him. But what Rebbi Ḥiyya stated, when they saw him. When they did not see him, from the moment he told him: enter, should he not be liable? Rebbi Ḥiyya stated, he is not liable. Since he told him: enter, he has to take precautions. Some would say, since he told him to enter, it becomes like the courtyard of partners. Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Partners acquire from one another in a courtyard; they object to one another in a courtyard, and are mutually liable for damages. But did not Rav say, if he filled the entire public domain? This did not fill the entire public domain! Since they usually walk in the entire domain, it is as if he had filled the entire domain.

Jerusalem Talmud Makkot 2:14

MISHNAH: Where are they exiled to? To the cities of refuge. To the three in Transjordan and the three in the Land of Canaan, as it is said: Three cities you shall designate in Transjordan, etc. As long as those in the Land of Israel had not been selected, those in Transjordan were not receiving, as it is said, there shall be six cities of refuge, not until all six were receiving together. Roads were maintained from one to the other, as it is said: Maintain the road for yourselves, and divide the domain of your Land into three parts. One sends with them two scholars lest he kill him on the road, to argue with him. Rebbi Meïr says, he may argue for himself as it is said, this is the word of the homicide. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah says, at the start both the involuntary and the voluntary [homicide] go to the city of refuge; the court sends and brings them back from there. If one is found guilty by a death sentence, they execute him. If he is found not guilty in a capital case, he is freed. If he is found guilty to be exiled they return him to his place as it is said, the community shall return him to his city of refuge. Not only a [High Priest] anointed with the anointing oil, but also one wearing the many vestments, and one deposed from his office. Rebbi Jehudah says, also the one anointed for war returns the homicide. Therefore, the mothers of the [High] Priests support them with food and clothing, so they should not pray for the death of their sons. If sentence had been passed when the High Priest died, he is not exiled. If sentence had not yet been passed when the High Priest died, and sentence was passed after a successor had been appointed, he returns after the death of the second. If sentence was passed when there was no High Priest, or one who killed a High Priest, or a High Priest who killed, can never leave from there. He cannot leave from there, neither for a testimony of obligation, nor a testimony in a civil suit, nor a testimony in a criminal suit, not even if Israel needs him like Joab ben Ṣeruya, he cannot ever leave from there, as it is said there. There shall be his dwelling, there he shall die, there he shall be buried. Just as the city grants asylum, so does its domain grant asylum. If a murderer left the domain and was found by the avenger of the blood, Rebbi Yose the Galilean says, it is the obligation of the avenger of the blood and the right of everybody. Rebbi Aqiba says, it is the right of the avenger of the blood and nobody would be liable because of him. If a tree stands inside the domain but its crown is outside the domain, or the tree stands outside the domain but its crown is inside the domain, everything follows the crown. If somebody killed in one of these cities, he is exiled from quarter to quarter; but a Levite who killed is exiled from one city to another. Similarly, a homicide exiled to a city of refuge whom the citizens of the town wanted to honor, should say to them, I am a homicide. If they tell him, anyway, he should accept, for it is said, this is the word of a homicide.

Jerusalem Talmud Makkot 3:1

MISHNAH: The following are flogged: He who copulates with his sister, or his father’s sister, or his mother’s sister, or his wife’s sister, or his brother’s wife, or his father’s brother’s wife, or a menstruating woman. A widow for the High Priest, or a divorcee or one having received ḥalîṣah for a common priest. For a widow and divorcee one is liable because of two categories. For a divorcee having received ḥalîṣah one is only liable for one category.

Jerusalem Talmud Makkot 3:1

MISHNAH: The following are flogged: He who copulates with his sister, or his father’s sister, or his mother’s sister, or his wife’s sister, or his brother’s wife, or his father’s brother’s wife, or a menstruating woman. A widow for the High Priest, or a divorcee or one having received ḥalîṣah for a common priest. For a widow and divorcee one is liable because of two categories. For a divorcee having received ḥalîṣah one is only liable for one category.

Jerusalem Talmud Makkot 3:2

MISHNAH: An impure person who ate holy food, or who came into the Temple when impure. One who eats fat, or blood, or leftover, or piggul, or impure [sacrificial meat]. One who sacrifices outside, or one who eats leavened matter on Passover. One who eats or does work on the Day of Atonement, and one who compounds the oil, or compounds the incense, and who rubs with the anointing oil, and one who eats carcass or torn meat, abominations and crawling things. If one ate ṭevel or first tithe from which heave was not taken, or second tithe or dedicated food which was not redeemed. How much does he have to eat from ṭevel to be liable? Rebbi Simeon says, anything; but the Sages say, the volume of an olive. Rebbi Simeon told them, do you not agree that one who eats (carcass meat) [an ant] is liable? They told him, because it is a creature. He answered them, also a grain of wheat is a creature.

Jerusalem Talmud Makkot 3:2

MISHNAH: An impure person who ate holy food, or who came into the Temple when impure. One who eats fat, or blood, or leftover, or piggul, or impure [sacrificial meat]. One who sacrifices outside, or one who eats leavened matter on Passover. One who eats or does work on the Day of Atonement, and one who compounds the oil, or compounds the incense, and who rubs with the anointing oil, and one who eats carcass or torn meat, abominations and crawling things. If one ate ṭevel or first tithe from which heave was not taken, or second tithe or dedicated food which was not redeemed. How much does he have to eat from ṭevel to be liable? Rebbi Simeon says, anything; but the Sages say, the volume of an olive. Rebbi Simeon told them, do you not agree that one who eats (carcass meat) [an ant] is liable? They told him, because it is a creature. He answered them, also a grain of wheat is a creature.

Jerusalem Talmud Makkot 3:4

MISHNAH: He who takes the mother with the young, Rebbi Jehudah says he is flogged but does not have to send away. But the Sages say, he sends away and is not flogged. This is the principle: One is not liable for any prohibition coupled with a positive commandment.

Jerusalem Talmud Makkot 3:5

MISHNAH: One who shaves a bald spot on his head, and who shaves off his sideburns, and who shaves off the corners of his beard, and one who scratches one scratch for a deceased is liable. If he scratched one scratch for five deceased, or five scratches for one deceased, he is liable for each single one; for the head two, one for each side; for the beard two on each side and one for the chin. Rebbi Eleazar says, if he removed all at once he is liable only once. He is liable only if he took them off with a razor; Rebbi Eleazar says, even if he took them off with pincers or a plane.

Jerusalem Talmud Makkot 3:5

MISHNAH: One who shaves a bald spot on his head, and who shaves off his sideburns, and who shaves off the corners of his beard, and one who scratches one scratch for a deceased is liable. If he scratched one scratch for five deceased, or five scratches for one deceased, he is liable for each single one; for the head two, one for each side; for the beard two on each side and one for the chin. Rebbi Eleazar says, if he removed all at once he is liable only once. He is liable only if he took them off with a razor; Rebbi Eleazar says, even if he took them off with pincers or a plane.

Jerusalem Talmud Makkot 3:5

MISHNAH: One who shaves a bald spot on his head, and who shaves off his sideburns, and who shaves off the corners of his beard, and one who scratches one scratch for a deceased is liable. If he scratched one scratch for five deceased, or five scratches for one deceased, he is liable for each single one; for the head two, one for each side; for the beard two on each side and one for the chin. Rebbi Eleazar says, if he removed all at once he is liable only once. He is liable only if he took them off with a razor; Rebbi Eleazar says, even if he took them off with pincers or a plane.

Jerusalem Talmud Makkot 3:5

MISHNAH: One who shaves a bald spot on his head, and who shaves off his sideburns, and who shaves off the corners of his beard, and one who scratches one scratch for a deceased is liable. If he scratched one scratch for five deceased, or five scratches for one deceased, he is liable for each single one; for the head two, one for each side; for the beard two on each side and one for the chin. Rebbi Eleazar says, if he removed all at once he is liable only once. He is liable only if he took them off with a razor; Rebbi Eleazar says, even if he took them off with pincers or a plane.

Jerusalem Talmud Makkot 3:6

MISHNAH: One who writes a tattoo. If he designed but did not tattoo, or tattooed but did not design, he is not liable until he design and permanently color with ink of kohl or anything that leaves a mark. Rebbi Simeon ben Jehudah says, only if the writes the Name, as it is said, a tattoo design you shall not put on yourselves, I am the Eternal.

Jerusalem Talmud Makkot 3:7

MISHNAH: If a nazir was drinking wine a whole day long, he is liable only once. If one told him, do not drink, do not drink, if then he drinks he is liable for every single occasion. If he was defiling himself with corpses a whole day long, he is liable only once. If one told him, do not defile yourself, do not defile yourself, if then he defiles himself he is liable for every single occasion. If he was shaving a whole day long, he is liable only once. If one told him, do not shave, do not shave, if then he shaves he is liable for every single occasion. If he was dressed in kilaim a whole day long, he is liable only once. If one told him, do not dress, do not dress, and he took off and put on, he is liable for every single occasion.

Jerusalem Talmud Makkot 3:7

MISHNAH: If a nazir was drinking wine a whole day long, he is liable only once. If one told him, do not drink, do not drink, if then he drinks he is liable for every single occasion. If he was defiling himself with corpses a whole day long, he is liable only once. If one told him, do not defile yourself, do not defile yourself, if then he defiles himself he is liable for every single occasion. If he was shaving a whole day long, he is liable only once. If one told him, do not shave, do not shave, if then he shaves he is liable for every single occasion. If he was dressed in kilaim a whole day long, he is liable only once. If one told him, do not dress, do not dress, and he took off and put on, he is liable for every single occasion.

Jerusalem Talmud Makkot 3:7

MISHNAH: If a nazir was drinking wine a whole day long, he is liable only once. If one told him, do not drink, do not drink, if then he drinks he is liable for every single occasion. If he was defiling himself with corpses a whole day long, he is liable only once. If one told him, do not defile yourself, do not defile yourself, if then he defiles himself he is liable for every single occasion. If he was shaving a whole day long, he is liable only once. If one told him, do not shave, do not shave, if then he shaves he is liable for every single occasion. If he was dressed in kilaim a whole day long, he is liable only once. If one told him, do not dress, do not dress, and he took off and put on, he is liable for every single occasion.

Jerusalem Talmud Makkot 3:7

MISHNAH: If a nazir was drinking wine a whole day long, he is liable only once. If one told him, do not drink, do not drink, if then he drinks he is liable for every single occasion. If he was defiling himself with corpses a whole day long, he is liable only once. If one told him, do not defile yourself, do not defile yourself, if then he defiles himself he is liable for every single occasion. If he was shaving a whole day long, he is liable only once. If one told him, do not shave, do not shave, if then he shaves he is liable for every single occasion. If he was dressed in kilaim a whole day long, he is liable only once. If one told him, do not dress, do not dress, and he took off and put on, he is liable for every single occasion.

Jerusalem Talmud Makkot 3:7

MISHNAH: If a nazir was drinking wine a whole day long, he is liable only once. If one told him, do not drink, do not drink, if then he drinks he is liable for every single occasion. If he was defiling himself with corpses a whole day long, he is liable only once. If one told him, do not defile yourself, do not defile yourself, if then he defiles himself he is liable for every single occasion. If he was shaving a whole day long, he is liable only once. If one told him, do not shave, do not shave, if then he shaves he is liable for every single occasion. If he was dressed in kilaim a whole day long, he is liable only once. If one told him, do not dress, do not dress, and he took off and put on, he is liable for every single occasion.

Jerusalem Talmud Makkot 3:7

MISHNAH: If a nazir was drinking wine a whole day long, he is liable only once. If one told him, do not drink, do not drink, if then he drinks he is liable for every single occasion. If he was defiling himself with corpses a whole day long, he is liable only once. If one told him, do not defile yourself, do not defile yourself, if then he defiles himself he is liable for every single occasion. If he was shaving a whole day long, he is liable only once. If one told him, do not shave, do not shave, if then he shaves he is liable for every single occasion. If he was dressed in kilaim a whole day long, he is liable only once. If one told him, do not dress, do not dress, and he took off and put on, he is liable for every single occasion.

Jerusalem Talmud Makkot 3:7

MISHNAH: If a nazir was drinking wine a whole day long, he is liable only once. If one told him, do not drink, do not drink, if then he drinks he is liable for every single occasion. If he was defiling himself with corpses a whole day long, he is liable only once. If one told him, do not defile yourself, do not defile yourself, if then he defiles himself he is liable for every single occasion. If he was shaving a whole day long, he is liable only once. If one told him, do not shave, do not shave, if then he shaves he is liable for every single occasion. If he was dressed in kilaim a whole day long, he is liable only once. If one told him, do not dress, do not dress, and he took off and put on, he is liable for every single occasion.

Jerusalem Talmud Makkot 3:7

MISHNAH: If a nazir was drinking wine a whole day long, he is liable only once. If one told him, do not drink, do not drink, if then he drinks he is liable for every single occasion. If he was defiling himself with corpses a whole day long, he is liable only once. If one told him, do not defile yourself, do not defile yourself, if then he defiles himself he is liable for every single occasion. If he was shaving a whole day long, he is liable only once. If one told him, do not shave, do not shave, if then he shaves he is liable for every single occasion. If he was dressed in kilaim a whole day long, he is liable only once. If one told him, do not dress, do not dress, and he took off and put on, he is liable for every single occasion.

Jerusalem Talmud Makkot 3:8

MISHNAH: One might plough a single furrow and be liable because of it for eight prohibitions. If one ploughs with an ox and a donkey which had been sanctified for kilaim in a vineyard, in a Sabbatical year, on a holiday, he is a Cohen and a nazir at an impure place. Onias ben Ḥakhinai said, also if he wore kilaim. They told him, this is not of the same category. He told them, neither is the nazir of the same category.

Jerusalem Talmud Makkot 3:10

MISHNAH: One estimates him only for floggings divisible by three. If they estimated that he could receive forty; after he was flogged some, they said that he could not withstand forty, he is not liable. If they had estimated him for eighteen; after he was flogged they said that he could withstand forty, he is not liable. If he committed a transgression which involved two prohibitions, if they estimated him in one estimation he is flogged and then is no longer liable; otherwise he is flogged, recovers, and is flogged a second time.

Jerusalem Talmud Makkot 3:10

MISHNAH: One estimates him only for floggings divisible by three. If they estimated that he could receive forty; after he was flogged some, they said that he could not withstand forty, he is not liable. If they had estimated him for eighteen; after he was flogged they said that he could withstand forty, he is not liable. If he committed a transgression which involved two prohibitions, if they estimated him in one estimation he is flogged and then is no longer liable; otherwise he is flogged, recovers, and is flogged a second time.

Jerusalem Talmud Makkot 3:10

MISHNAH: One estimates him only for floggings divisible by three. If they estimated that he could receive forty; after he was flogged some, they said that he could not withstand forty, he is not liable. If they had estimated him for eighteen; after he was flogged they said that he could withstand forty, he is not liable. If he committed a transgression which involved two prohibitions, if they estimated him in one estimation he is flogged and then is no longer liable; otherwise he is flogged, recovers, and is flogged a second time.

Jerusalem Talmud Makkot 3:11

MISHNAH: How does one flog him? One binds both his hands on both sides of a pillar. The beadle grabs his clothing. If it tore, it tore; if it unravelled, it unravelled, until he uncovers his heart. A stone is put behind him on which the beadle stands with a strip of calf’s leather in his hand, folded one into two and two into four, and two strips go up and down in it. The handle is one hand-breadth long; its width is one hand-breadth, and it reaches to his belly. He flogs him one third on his front and two thirds on his back. He flogs him neither standing nor sitting but bending down as it is written, the judge shall make him fall and flog him on his front etc. The person who flogs, flogs with one hand with full force. The reader reads if you will not observe to fulfill all the words of this Torah etc.; the Eternal will your flogging exemplary, etc. and returns to the beginning of the verse. If he died under his hand, he is not liable. If he added a single strip and he died, he is exiled because of him. If he dirtied himself whether by feces or by urine, he is no longer liable. Rebbi Jehudah says, a man by feces, a woman by urine.

Jerusalem Talmud Makkot 3:11

MISHNAH: How does one flog him? One binds both his hands on both sides of a pillar. The beadle grabs his clothing. If it tore, it tore; if it unravelled, it unravelled, until he uncovers his heart. A stone is put behind him on which the beadle stands with a strip of calf’s leather in his hand, folded one into two and two into four, and two strips go up and down in it. The handle is one hand-breadth long; its width is one hand-breadth, and it reaches to his belly. He flogs him one third on his front and two thirds on his back. He flogs him neither standing nor sitting but bending down as it is written, the judge shall make him fall and flog him on his front etc. The person who flogs, flogs with one hand with full force. The reader reads if you will not observe to fulfill all the words of this Torah etc.; the Eternal will your flogging exemplary, etc. and returns to the beginning of the verse. If he died under his hand, he is not liable. If he added a single strip and he died, he is exiled because of him. If he dirtied himself whether by feces or by urine, he is no longer liable. Rebbi Jehudah says, a man by feces, a woman by urine.

Jerusalem Talmud Makkot 3:12

MISHNAH: All those subject to extirpation are no longer liable to extirpation once they were flogged, as it is said, your brother would be despicable in your eyes. After he was flogged, he is your brother, the words of Rebbi Ḥanania ben Gamliel. And since one who commits a transgression may lose his soul because of it, if one fulfills a commandment certainly his soul shall be given to him. Rebbi Simeon says, from its place it can be inferred as it is written, the souls of the perpetrators will be extirpated, and it says, that a human shall do and live in them. Therefore, to anybody who quietly does not transgress a prohibition is given reward like somebody keeping the Commandments. Rebbi Simeon ben Rebbi says, does it not say, only be strong not to eat blood, for blood is the life? Since one who desists from blood, from which a person recoils, receives reward, if one desists of robbery and sexual offenses, which a person desires and cherishes, certainly he should acquire the merit for himself, his descendants, and his descendants’ descendants to the end of all generations.

Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 1:1

MISHNAH: If the Court ruled to violate one of the commandments spelled out in the Torah and a single person went and acted inadvertently following their pronouncement, whether they acted and he acted simultaneously with them, or they acted and he followed their example, or they did not act but he did, he is not liable since he depended on the Court. If the Court ruled but one of them knew that they erred, or a student worthy of ordination went and acted following their pronouncement, whether they acted and he acted simultaneously with them, or they acted and he followed their example, or they did not act but he did, he is liable since he did not depend on the Court. This is the principle: The person depending on himself is liable, but one depending on the Court is not liable.

Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 1:1

MISHNAH: If the Court ruled to violate one of the commandments spelled out in the Torah and a single person went and acted inadvertently following their pronouncement, whether they acted and he acted simultaneously with them, or they acted and he followed their example, or they did not act but he did, he is not liable since he depended on the Court. If the Court ruled but one of them knew that they erred, or a student worthy of ordination went and acted following their pronouncement, whether they acted and he acted simultaneously with them, or they acted and he followed their example, or they did not act but he did, he is liable since he did not depend on the Court. This is the principle: The person depending on himself is liable, but one depending on the Court is not liable.

Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 1:1

MISHNAH: If the Court ruled to violate one of the commandments spelled out in the Torah and a single person went and acted inadvertently following their pronouncement, whether they acted and he acted simultaneously with them, or they acted and he followed their example, or they did not act but he did, he is not liable since he depended on the Court. If the Court ruled but one of them knew that they erred, or a student worthy of ordination went and acted following their pronouncement, whether they acted and he acted simultaneously with them, or they acted and he followed their example, or they did not act but he did, he is liable since he did not depend on the Court. This is the principle: The person depending on himself is liable, but one depending on the Court is not liable.

Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 1:1

MISHNAH: If the Court ruled to violate one of the commandments spelled out in the Torah and a single person went and acted inadvertently following their pronouncement, whether they acted and he acted simultaneously with them, or they acted and he followed their example, or they did not act but he did, he is not liable since he depended on the Court. If the Court ruled but one of them knew that they erred, or a student worthy of ordination went and acted following their pronouncement, whether they acted and he acted simultaneously with them, or they acted and he followed their example, or they did not act but he did, he is liable since he did not depend on the Court. This is the principle: The person depending on himself is liable, but one depending on the Court is not liable.

Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 1:2

HALAKHAH: “If the Court ruled.” etc. A person who would transgress; one would transgress; acting he would transgress; these are restrictions: the person depending on himself is liable, but one dependent on the Court is not liable. Everywhere it is said that a restriction after a restriction is an addition, but here it is said, a restriction after a restriction is to reduce? Rebbi Mattaniah said, it is different here since there is written a restriction after a restriction after a restriction.