2925 occurrences across the corpus

The Jerusalem Talmud

Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 1:2

HALAKHAH: “If the Court ruled.” etc. A person who would transgress; one would transgress; acting he would transgress; these are restrictions: the person depending on himself is liable, but one dependent on the Court is not liable. Everywhere it is said that a restriction after a restriction is an addition, but here it is said, a restriction after a restriction is to reduce? Rebbi Mattaniah said, it is different here since there is written a restriction after a restriction after a restriction.

Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 1:3

Rebbi Ḥaggai asked the colleagues: From where that he who eats with permission be not liable? What is the difference between him who thought that it was profane but it turned out to be heave, who is liable, and him who thought that he was a Cohen but it turned out that he was an Israel, who is not liable? They said to him, by the instruction of the court. He said to them, still I am having a problem. What is the difference between him who thought that it was weekday but it turned out that it was Sabbath, who is liable, and him who thought that it was a Passover sacrifice but it turned out to be a well-being offering, who is not liable. They said to him, because he slaughtered with permission. He said to them, still I am having a problem. What is the difference between him who thought that it was permitted but it turned out to be forbidden, who is liable, and him who thought that it was forbidden fat and it turned out to be permitted fat, who is not liable. They did not answer at all. He told them, let me tell you from myself: Or his transgression in which he sinned was made known to him; he has to bring. Rebbi Yossi came to visit them; they told him, that problem is hard for us. He asked them, why did you not answer him, or his transgression in which hesinned was made known to him; he has to bring? They told him, Ḥaggai asked the question, Ḥaggai gave the answer.

Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 1:3

Rebbi Ḥaggai asked the colleagues: From where that he who eats with permission be not liable? What is the difference between him who thought that it was profane but it turned out to be heave, who is liable, and him who thought that he was a Cohen but it turned out that he was an Israel, who is not liable? They said to him, by the instruction of the court. He said to them, still I am having a problem. What is the difference between him who thought that it was weekday but it turned out that it was Sabbath, who is liable, and him who thought that it was a Passover sacrifice but it turned out to be a well-being offering, who is not liable. They said to him, because he slaughtered with permission. He said to them, still I am having a problem. What is the difference between him who thought that it was permitted but it turned out to be forbidden, who is liable, and him who thought that it was forbidden fat and it turned out to be permitted fat, who is not liable. They did not answer at all. He told them, let me tell you from myself: Or his transgression in which he sinned was made known to him; he has to bring. Rebbi Yossi came to visit them; they told him, that problem is hard for us. He asked them, why did you not answer him, or his transgression in which hesinned was made known to him; he has to bring? They told him, Ḥaggai asked the question, Ḥaggai gave the answer.

Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 1:3

Rebbi Ḥaggai asked the colleagues: From where that he who eats with permission be not liable? What is the difference between him who thought that it was profane but it turned out to be heave, who is liable, and him who thought that he was a Cohen but it turned out that he was an Israel, who is not liable? They said to him, by the instruction of the court. He said to them, still I am having a problem. What is the difference between him who thought that it was weekday but it turned out that it was Sabbath, who is liable, and him who thought that it was a Passover sacrifice but it turned out to be a well-being offering, who is not liable. They said to him, because he slaughtered with permission. He said to them, still I am having a problem. What is the difference between him who thought that it was permitted but it turned out to be forbidden, who is liable, and him who thought that it was forbidden fat and it turned out to be permitted fat, who is not liable. They did not answer at all. He told them, let me tell you from myself: Or his transgression in which he sinned was made known to him; he has to bring. Rebbi Yossi came to visit them; they told him, that problem is hard for us. He asked them, why did you not answer him, or his transgression in which hesinned was made known to him; he has to bring? They told him, Ḥaggai asked the question, Ḥaggai gave the answer.

Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 1:3

Rebbi Ḥaggai asked the colleagues: From where that he who eats with permission be not liable? What is the difference between him who thought that it was profane but it turned out to be heave, who is liable, and him who thought that he was a Cohen but it turned out that he was an Israel, who is not liable? They said to him, by the instruction of the court. He said to them, still I am having a problem. What is the difference between him who thought that it was weekday but it turned out that it was Sabbath, who is liable, and him who thought that it was a Passover sacrifice but it turned out to be a well-being offering, who is not liable. They said to him, because he slaughtered with permission. He said to them, still I am having a problem. What is the difference between him who thought that it was permitted but it turned out to be forbidden, who is liable, and him who thought that it was forbidden fat and it turned out to be permitted fat, who is not liable. They did not answer at all. He told them, let me tell you from myself: Or his transgression in which he sinned was made known to him; he has to bring. Rebbi Yossi came to visit them; they told him, that problem is hard for us. He asked them, why did you not answer him, or his transgression in which hesinned was made known to him; he has to bring? They told him, Ḥaggai asked the question, Ḥaggai gave the answer.

Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 1:3

Rebbi Ḥaggai asked the colleagues: From where that he who eats with permission be not liable? What is the difference between him who thought that it was profane but it turned out to be heave, who is liable, and him who thought that he was a Cohen but it turned out that he was an Israel, who is not liable? They said to him, by the instruction of the court. He said to them, still I am having a problem. What is the difference between him who thought that it was weekday but it turned out that it was Sabbath, who is liable, and him who thought that it was a Passover sacrifice but it turned out to be a well-being offering, who is not liable. They said to him, because he slaughtered with permission. He said to them, still I am having a problem. What is the difference between him who thought that it was permitted but it turned out to be forbidden, who is liable, and him who thought that it was forbidden fat and it turned out to be permitted fat, who is not liable. They did not answer at all. He told them, let me tell you from myself: Or his transgression in which he sinned was made known to him; he has to bring. Rebbi Yossi came to visit them; they told him, that problem is hard for us. He asked them, why did you not answer him, or his transgression in which hesinned was made known to him; he has to bring? They told him, Ḥaggai asked the question, Ḥaggai gave the answer.

Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 1:3

Rebbi Ḥaggai asked the colleagues: From where that he who eats with permission be not liable? What is the difference between him who thought that it was profane but it turned out to be heave, who is liable, and him who thought that he was a Cohen but it turned out that he was an Israel, who is not liable? They said to him, by the instruction of the court. He said to them, still I am having a problem. What is the difference between him who thought that it was weekday but it turned out that it was Sabbath, who is liable, and him who thought that it was a Passover sacrifice but it turned out to be a well-being offering, who is not liable. They said to him, because he slaughtered with permission. He said to them, still I am having a problem. What is the difference between him who thought that it was permitted but it turned out to be forbidden, who is liable, and him who thought that it was forbidden fat and it turned out to be permitted fat, who is not liable. They did not answer at all. He told them, let me tell you from myself: Or his transgression in which he sinned was made known to him; he has to bring. Rebbi Yossi came to visit them; they told him, that problem is hard for us. He asked them, why did you not answer him, or his transgression in which hesinned was made known to him; he has to bring? They told him, Ḥaggai asked the question, Ḥaggai gave the answer.

Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 1:3

Rebbi Ḥaggai asked the colleagues: From where that he who eats with permission be not liable? What is the difference between him who thought that it was profane but it turned out to be heave, who is liable, and him who thought that he was a Cohen but it turned out that he was an Israel, who is not liable? They said to him, by the instruction of the court. He said to them, still I am having a problem. What is the difference between him who thought that it was weekday but it turned out that it was Sabbath, who is liable, and him who thought that it was a Passover sacrifice but it turned out to be a well-being offering, who is not liable. They said to him, because he slaughtered with permission. He said to them, still I am having a problem. What is the difference between him who thought that it was permitted but it turned out to be forbidden, who is liable, and him who thought that it was forbidden fat and it turned out to be permitted fat, who is not liable. They did not answer at all. He told them, let me tell you from myself: Or his transgression in which he sinned was made known to him; he has to bring. Rebbi Yossi came to visit them; they told him, that problem is hard for us. He asked them, why did you not answer him, or his transgression in which hesinned was made known to him; he has to bring? They told him, Ḥaggai asked the question, Ḥaggai gave the answer.

Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 1:4

In the opinion of Rebbi Ismael, who does not refer this verse to those obligated for purification sacrifices and certain reparation sacrifices for whom the Day of Atonement had passed, it is understandable. But what is the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba, who refers this verse to those obligated for purification sacrifices and certain reparation sacrifices for whom the Day of Atonement had passed, as we have stated: From where that those obligated for purification sacrifices and certain reparation sacrifices for whom the Day of Atonement had passed, are obligated to bring them after the Day of Atonement, but those obligated for suspended reparation offerings are no longer liable? The verse says, or his transgression in which he sinned was made known to him; he has to bring, even after the Day of Atonement. From the following: A person who would transgress; one would transgress; acting he would transgress; these are restrictions: the person depending on himself is liable, {but one dependent} on the Court is not liable.

Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 1:4

In the opinion of Rebbi Ismael, who does not refer this verse to those obligated for purification sacrifices and certain reparation sacrifices for whom the Day of Atonement had passed, it is understandable. But what is the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba, who refers this verse to those obligated for purification sacrifices and certain reparation sacrifices for whom the Day of Atonement had passed, as we have stated: From where that those obligated for purification sacrifices and certain reparation sacrifices for whom the Day of Atonement had passed, are obligated to bring them after the Day of Atonement, but those obligated for suspended reparation offerings are no longer liable? The verse says, or his transgression in which he sinned was made known to him; he has to bring, even after the Day of Atonement. From the following: A person who would transgress; one would transgress; acting he would transgress; these are restrictions: the person depending on himself is liable, {but one dependent} on the Court is not liable.

Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 1:4

In the opinion of Rebbi Ismael, who does not refer this verse to those obligated for purification sacrifices and certain reparation sacrifices for whom the Day of Atonement had passed, it is understandable. But what is the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba, who refers this verse to those obligated for purification sacrifices and certain reparation sacrifices for whom the Day of Atonement had passed, as we have stated: From where that those obligated for purification sacrifices and certain reparation sacrifices for whom the Day of Atonement had passed, are obligated to bring them after the Day of Atonement, but those obligated for suspended reparation offerings are no longer liable? The verse says, or his transgression in which he sinned was made known to him; he has to bring, even after the Day of Atonement. From the following: A person who would transgress; one would transgress; acting he would transgress; these are restrictions: the person depending on himself is liable, {but one dependent} on the Court is not liable.

Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 1:5

They only are liable for something that was clear to them and then covered from them. What is the reason? something was hidden, something that was clear to them and then hidden from them. In the opinion of Rebbi Ismael who said, it became hidden from him, therefore he had known, and he knew, these are two knowledges. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba who said, it became hidden, it became hidden, two times, therefore he had knowledge at the beginning and knowledge at the end and oblivion in between, something that was clear to them and then hidden from them.

Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 1:6

They are not liable unless they void part and confirm part. Samuel said, only if they ruled that it was permitted; but not if they ruled that it was not prosecutable. They are not liable unless instruction was given from the ashlar hall. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the reason of this Tanna: From that place which the Eternal will choose. Rebbi Mana bar Tanḥum said, if a hundred came together, only if they ruled unanimously. There, Rebbi Zeˋira said, only if they all rule for the same reason. And here, what?

Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 1:6

They are not liable unless they void part and confirm part. Samuel said, only if they ruled that it was permitted; but not if they ruled that it was not prosecutable. They are not liable unless instruction was given from the ashlar hall. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the reason of this Tanna: From that place which the Eternal will choose. Rebbi Mana bar Tanḥum said, if a hundred came together, only if they ruled unanimously. There, Rebbi Zeˋira said, only if they all rule for the same reason. And here, what?

Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 1:7

“And a single person went and acted inadvertently following their pronouncement.” Is there an intentional inadvertent action concerning an instruction by the Court? Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Our Mishnah, for example, if Simeon ben Azzai was sitting before them. Where do we hold? If he knows the entire Torah but does not know this detail, he is not Simeon ben Azzai. If he knows this particular subject but not the entire Torah, he is Simeon ben Azzai for this particular subject. But we must hold that he knows the entire Torah and knows the particular subject, but he errs to believe that the Torah said, after them, after them. If he errs to believe that the Torah said, after them, after them, he is not Simeon ben Azzai. As we have stated, I could think that if they tell you about right that it is left, and about left that it is right, you should listen to them? The verse says, “to go to the right or to the left;” that they should tell you about the right that it is right, and about the left that it is left. What about it? Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Hila: Because everywhere for an inadvertent sin one is not liable but for an intentional one is liable, and here even intentionally he is not liable.

Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 1:7

“And a single person went and acted inadvertently following their pronouncement.” Is there an intentional inadvertent action concerning an instruction by the Court? Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Our Mishnah, for example, if Simeon ben Azzai was sitting before them. Where do we hold? If he knows the entire Torah but does not know this detail, he is not Simeon ben Azzai. If he knows this particular subject but not the entire Torah, he is Simeon ben Azzai for this particular subject. But we must hold that he knows the entire Torah and knows the particular subject, but he errs to believe that the Torah said, after them, after them. If he errs to believe that the Torah said, after them, after them, he is not Simeon ben Azzai. As we have stated, I could think that if they tell you about right that it is left, and about left that it is right, you should listen to them? The verse says, “to go to the right or to the left;” that they should tell you about the right that it is right, and about the left that it is left. What about it? Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Hila: Because everywhere for an inadvertent sin one is not liable but for an intentional one is liable, and here even intentionally he is not liable.

Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 1:7

“And a single person went and acted inadvertently following their pronouncement.” Is there an intentional inadvertent action concerning an instruction by the Court? Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Our Mishnah, for example, if Simeon ben Azzai was sitting before them. Where do we hold? If he knows the entire Torah but does not know this detail, he is not Simeon ben Azzai. If he knows this particular subject but not the entire Torah, he is Simeon ben Azzai for this particular subject. But we must hold that he knows the entire Torah and knows the particular subject, but he errs to believe that the Torah said, after them, after them. If he errs to believe that the Torah said, after them, after them, he is not Simeon ben Azzai. As we have stated, I could think that if they tell you about right that it is left, and about left that it is right, you should listen to them? The verse says, “to go to the right or to the left;” that they should tell you about the right that it is right, and about the left that it is left. What about it? Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Hila: Because everywhere for an inadvertent sin one is not liable but for an intentional one is liable, and here even intentionally he is not liable.

Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 1:8

The colleagues in the name of Samuel. The Mishnah deals with an individual who complements the multitude. But any individual who acted on his own is not liable. Rebbi Joḥanan said, even any single individual who acted on his own brings a female sheep or goat. It is difficult. In Samuel’s opinion, would any single individual be atoned by two sacrifices? Rebbi Zeˋira in the name of Samuel: The individual is suspended. If a majority ate, the court brings. If a minority ate, each individual brings. For any ruling for which the court [bring] a bull, the individual does not bring a female sheep or goat. For any ruling for which the court bring a bull, the individual does not bring a female sheep; for any ruling for which the court does not bring a bull, the individual brings a female sheep or goat. Samuel explains the Mishnah by majority and minority. If a majority ate, since the court does not bring a bull, an individual brings a female sheep or goat.

Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 1:10

Samuel spoke about the Mishnah: “I still am saying, if a minority acted they are liable because the Court will not bring a bull for them. The verse says, [from] the people of the Land. Even [all of them] (part of them), even most of them.” Rebbi Joḥanan explains the Mishnah: I still am saying, if a minority acted without ruling they are liable because with instruction the Court will not bring a bull. Samuel said, but they bring a female sheep or goat. Rebbi Joḥanan said, they do not bring a female sheep or goat. According to Samuel, who infers liability from liability, it is understandable. According to Rebbi Joḥanan, who infers liability from exemption? The statement of a baraita disagrees with Samuel. Or his transgression in which he sinned was made known to him; this excludes the apostate. A baraita disagrees with Samuel, “A person who would transgress; one would transgress; acting he would transgress; these are restrictions: the person depending on himself is liable, but one dependent on the Court is not liable.” This disagrees with Samuel and cannot be confirmed.

Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 1:10

Samuel spoke about the Mishnah: “I still am saying, if a minority acted they are liable because the Court will not bring a bull for them. The verse says, [from] the people of the Land. Even [all of them] (part of them), even most of them.” Rebbi Joḥanan explains the Mishnah: I still am saying, if a minority acted without ruling they are liable because with instruction the Court will not bring a bull. Samuel said, but they bring a female sheep or goat. Rebbi Joḥanan said, they do not bring a female sheep or goat. According to Samuel, who infers liability from liability, it is understandable. According to Rebbi Joḥanan, who infers liability from exemption? The statement of a baraita disagrees with Samuel. Or his transgression in which he sinned was made known to him; this excludes the apostate. A baraita disagrees with Samuel, “A person who would transgress; one would transgress; acting he would transgress; these are restrictions: the person depending on himself is liable, but one dependent on the Court is not liable.” This disagrees with Samuel and cannot be confirmed.

Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 1:10

Samuel spoke about the Mishnah: “I still am saying, if a minority acted they are liable because the Court will not bring a bull for them. The verse says, [from] the people of the Land. Even [all of them] (part of them), even most of them.” Rebbi Joḥanan explains the Mishnah: I still am saying, if a minority acted without ruling they are liable because with instruction the Court will not bring a bull. Samuel said, but they bring a female sheep or goat. Rebbi Joḥanan said, they do not bring a female sheep or goat. According to Samuel, who infers liability from liability, it is understandable. According to Rebbi Joḥanan, who infers liability from exemption? The statement of a baraita disagrees with Samuel. Or his transgression in which he sinned was made known to him; this excludes the apostate. A baraita disagrees with Samuel, “A person who would transgress; one would transgress; acting he would transgress; these are restrictions: the person depending on himself is liable, but one dependent on the Court is not liable.” This disagrees with Samuel and cannot be confirmed.

Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 1:10

Samuel spoke about the Mishnah: “I still am saying, if a minority acted they are liable because the Court will not bring a bull for them. The verse says, [from] the people of the Land. Even [all of them] (part of them), even most of them.” Rebbi Joḥanan explains the Mishnah: I still am saying, if a minority acted without ruling they are liable because with instruction the Court will not bring a bull. Samuel said, but they bring a female sheep or goat. Rebbi Joḥanan said, they do not bring a female sheep or goat. According to Samuel, who infers liability from liability, it is understandable. According to Rebbi Joḥanan, who infers liability from exemption? The statement of a baraita disagrees with Samuel. Or his transgression in which he sinned was made known to him; this excludes the apostate. A baraita disagrees with Samuel, “A person who would transgress; one would transgress; acting he would transgress; these are restrictions: the person depending on himself is liable, but one dependent on the Court is not liable.” This disagrees with Samuel and cannot be confirmed.

Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 1:11

MISHNAH: If the Court gave an instruction; then they realized that they erred and reversed themselves; whether they brought their atonement or they did not bring their atonement, another person went and acted on their instructions, Rebbi Simeon declares him not liable, but Rebbi Eliezer says, it is in doubt. What is the doubt? If he remained at home, he is liable; if he went overseas he is not liable. Rebbi Aqiba said, I agree in this case that he is closer to not being liable than being liable. Ben Azzai asked him, what is the difference between him and the one staying at home? For one who stays at home might be informed but the other one could not be informed.

Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 1:11

MISHNAH: If the Court gave an instruction; then they realized that they erred and reversed themselves; whether they brought their atonement or they did not bring their atonement, another person went and acted on their instructions, Rebbi Simeon declares him not liable, but Rebbi Eliezer says, it is in doubt. What is the doubt? If he remained at home, he is liable; if he went overseas he is not liable. Rebbi Aqiba said, I agree in this case that he is closer to not being liable than being liable. Ben Azzai asked him, what is the difference between him and the one staying at home? For one who stays at home might be informed but the other one could not be informed.

Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 1:11

MISHNAH: If the Court gave an instruction; then they realized that they erred and reversed themselves; whether they brought their atonement or they did not bring their atonement, another person went and acted on their instructions, Rebbi Simeon declares him not liable, but Rebbi Eliezer says, it is in doubt. What is the doubt? If he remained at home, he is liable; if he went overseas he is not liable. Rebbi Aqiba said, I agree in this case that he is closer to not being liable than being liable. Ben Azzai asked him, what is the difference between him and the one staying at home? For one who stays at home might be informed but the other one could not be informed.

Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 1:11

MISHNAH: If the Court gave an instruction; then they realized that they erred and reversed themselves; whether they brought their atonement or they did not bring their atonement, another person went and acted on their instructions, Rebbi Simeon declares him not liable, but Rebbi Eliezer says, it is in doubt. What is the doubt? If he remained at home, he is liable; if he went overseas he is not liable. Rebbi Aqiba said, I agree in this case that he is closer to not being liable than being liable. Ben Azzai asked him, what is the difference between him and the one staying at home? For one who stays at home might be informed but the other one could not be informed.

Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 1:11

MISHNAH: If the Court gave an instruction; then they realized that they erred and reversed themselves; whether they brought their atonement or they did not bring their atonement, another person went and acted on their instructions, Rebbi Simeon declares him not liable, but Rebbi Eliezer says, it is in doubt. What is the doubt? If he remained at home, he is liable; if he went overseas he is not liable. Rebbi Aqiba said, I agree in this case that he is closer to not being liable than being liable. Ben Azzai asked him, what is the difference between him and the one staying at home? For one who stays at home might be informed but the other one could not be informed.

Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 1:15

Are consequences of a ruling like the ruling? Do ruling within ruling combine? How is that? If the public ate forbidden fat and designated their sacrifices. If you say that consequences of a ruling are like the ruling, the Court is liable. If you say that consequences of a ruling are not like the ruling, the Court is not liable. The following should be obvious to you: the consequences of a ruling are like the ruling. Do ruling within ruling combine with each other? How is that? If the Court ruled that the fat in the right side kidney was permitted but that of the left side and its cover was forbidden; then they reversed themselves and said the opposite. Most ate the first time, and most the second time. If you say that they combine, they are liable for one. But if you say that they do not combine, they are liable for two. Do two instructions about one kind of work combine? How is that? If a majority ate and a majority slaughtered. In Rebbi Meïr’s opinion they are once liable; in Rebbi Simeon’s opinion they are twice liable. If a minority ate the first time and a minority the second time. In Rebbi Meïr’s opinion they are liable; in Rebbi Simeon’s opinion they are not liable.

Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 1:15

Are consequences of a ruling like the ruling? Do ruling within ruling combine? How is that? If the public ate forbidden fat and designated their sacrifices. If you say that consequences of a ruling are like the ruling, the Court is liable. If you say that consequences of a ruling are not like the ruling, the Court is not liable. The following should be obvious to you: the consequences of a ruling are like the ruling. Do ruling within ruling combine with each other? How is that? If the Court ruled that the fat in the right side kidney was permitted but that of the left side and its cover was forbidden; then they reversed themselves and said the opposite. Most ate the first time, and most the second time. If you say that they combine, they are liable for one. But if you say that they do not combine, they are liable for two. Do two instructions about one kind of work combine? How is that? If a majority ate and a majority slaughtered. In Rebbi Meïr’s opinion they are once liable; in Rebbi Simeon’s opinion they are twice liable. If a minority ate the first time and a minority the second time. In Rebbi Meïr’s opinion they are liable; in Rebbi Simeon’s opinion they are not liable.

Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 1:15

Are consequences of a ruling like the ruling? Do ruling within ruling combine? How is that? If the public ate forbidden fat and designated their sacrifices. If you say that consequences of a ruling are like the ruling, the Court is liable. If you say that consequences of a ruling are not like the ruling, the Court is not liable. The following should be obvious to you: the consequences of a ruling are like the ruling. Do ruling within ruling combine with each other? How is that? If the Court ruled that the fat in the right side kidney was permitted but that of the left side and its cover was forbidden; then they reversed themselves and said the opposite. Most ate the first time, and most the second time. If you say that they combine, they are liable for one. But if you say that they do not combine, they are liable for two. Do two instructions about one kind of work combine? How is that? If a majority ate and a majority slaughtered. In Rebbi Meïr’s opinion they are once liable; in Rebbi Simeon’s opinion they are twice liable. If a minority ate the first time and a minority the second time. In Rebbi Meïr’s opinion they are liable; in Rebbi Simeon’s opinion they are not liable.

Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 1:15

Are consequences of a ruling like the ruling? Do ruling within ruling combine? How is that? If the public ate forbidden fat and designated their sacrifices. If you say that consequences of a ruling are like the ruling, the Court is liable. If you say that consequences of a ruling are not like the ruling, the Court is not liable. The following should be obvious to you: the consequences of a ruling are like the ruling. Do ruling within ruling combine with each other? How is that? If the Court ruled that the fat in the right side kidney was permitted but that of the left side and its cover was forbidden; then they reversed themselves and said the opposite. Most ate the first time, and most the second time. If you say that they combine, they are liable for one. But if you say that they do not combine, they are liable for two. Do two instructions about one kind of work combine? How is that? If a majority ate and a majority slaughtered. In Rebbi Meïr’s opinion they are once liable; in Rebbi Simeon’s opinion they are twice liable. If a minority ate the first time and a minority the second time. In Rebbi Meïr’s opinion they are liable; in Rebbi Simeon’s opinion they are not liable.

Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 1:15

Are consequences of a ruling like the ruling? Do ruling within ruling combine? How is that? If the public ate forbidden fat and designated their sacrifices. If you say that consequences of a ruling are like the ruling, the Court is liable. If you say that consequences of a ruling are not like the ruling, the Court is not liable. The following should be obvious to you: the consequences of a ruling are like the ruling. Do ruling within ruling combine with each other? How is that? If the Court ruled that the fat in the right side kidney was permitted but that of the left side and its cover was forbidden; then they reversed themselves and said the opposite. Most ate the first time, and most the second time. If you say that they combine, they are liable for one. But if you say that they do not combine, they are liable for two. Do two instructions about one kind of work combine? How is that? If a majority ate and a majority slaughtered. In Rebbi Meïr’s opinion they are once liable; in Rebbi Simeon’s opinion they are twice liable. If a minority ate the first time and a minority the second time. In Rebbi Meïr’s opinion they are liable; in Rebbi Simeon’s opinion they are not liable.

Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 1:15

Are consequences of a ruling like the ruling? Do ruling within ruling combine? How is that? If the public ate forbidden fat and designated their sacrifices. If you say that consequences of a ruling are like the ruling, the Court is liable. If you say that consequences of a ruling are not like the ruling, the Court is not liable. The following should be obvious to you: the consequences of a ruling are like the ruling. Do ruling within ruling combine with each other? How is that? If the Court ruled that the fat in the right side kidney was permitted but that of the left side and its cover was forbidden; then they reversed themselves and said the opposite. Most ate the first time, and most the second time. If you say that they combine, they are liable for one. But if you say that they do not combine, they are liable for two. Do two instructions about one kind of work combine? How is that? If a majority ate and a majority slaughtered. In Rebbi Meïr’s opinion they are once liable; in Rebbi Simeon’s opinion they are twice liable. If a minority ate the first time and a minority the second time. In Rebbi Meïr’s opinion they are liable; in Rebbi Simeon’s opinion they are not liable.

Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 1:15

Are consequences of a ruling like the ruling? Do ruling within ruling combine? How is that? If the public ate forbidden fat and designated their sacrifices. If you say that consequences of a ruling are like the ruling, the Court is liable. If you say that consequences of a ruling are not like the ruling, the Court is not liable. The following should be obvious to you: the consequences of a ruling are like the ruling. Do ruling within ruling combine with each other? How is that? If the Court ruled that the fat in the right side kidney was permitted but that of the left side and its cover was forbidden; then they reversed themselves and said the opposite. Most ate the first time, and most the second time. If you say that they combine, they are liable for one. But if you say that they do not combine, they are liable for two. Do two instructions about one kind of work combine? How is that? If a majority ate and a majority slaughtered. In Rebbi Meïr’s opinion they are once liable; in Rebbi Simeon’s opinion they are twice liable. If a minority ate the first time and a minority the second time. In Rebbi Meïr’s opinion they are liable; in Rebbi Simeon’s opinion they are not liable.

Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 1:15

Are consequences of a ruling like the ruling? Do ruling within ruling combine? How is that? If the public ate forbidden fat and designated their sacrifices. If you say that consequences of a ruling are like the ruling, the Court is liable. If you say that consequences of a ruling are not like the ruling, the Court is not liable. The following should be obvious to you: the consequences of a ruling are like the ruling. Do ruling within ruling combine with each other? How is that? If the Court ruled that the fat in the right side kidney was permitted but that of the left side and its cover was forbidden; then they reversed themselves and said the opposite. Most ate the first time, and most the second time. If you say that they combine, they are liable for one. But if you say that they do not combine, they are liable for two. Do two instructions about one kind of work combine? How is that? If a majority ate and a majority slaughtered. In Rebbi Meïr’s opinion they are once liable; in Rebbi Simeon’s opinion they are twice liable. If a minority ate the first time and a minority the second time. In Rebbi Meïr’s opinion they are liable; in Rebbi Simeon’s opinion they are not liable.

Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 1:16

Rebbi Zeˋira said, the time span is between them. Rebbi Meïr said, one gives him time until he may hear. Rebbi Simeon said, until he must have heard, and we have stated so: If the Court instructed in the upper market and a single person was in the lower market, or the Court on the ground floor and a single person on the upper floor, he is not liable until he actually heard.

Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 1:19

MISHNAH: If the Court ruled to uproot an entire subject; if they said, the menstruating woman is not mentioned in the Torah, Sabbath is not mentioned in the Torah, idolatry is not mentioned in the Torah, they are not liable. If they ruled to eliminate part and to confirm part, they are liable. How is that? If they said, the menstruating woman is mentioned in the Torah but one who copulates with one who is watching a day to the next day is not liable; Sabbath is mentioned in the Torah but one who brings from a private domain to a public domain is not liable; idolatry is mentioned in the Torah but one who prostrates himself is not liable; these are liable for it is said something was hidden, something but not an entire subject.

Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 1:19

MISHNAH: If the Court ruled to uproot an entire subject; if they said, the menstruating woman is not mentioned in the Torah, Sabbath is not mentioned in the Torah, idolatry is not mentioned in the Torah, they are not liable. If they ruled to eliminate part and to confirm part, they are liable. How is that? If they said, the menstruating woman is mentioned in the Torah but one who copulates with one who is watching a day to the next day is not liable; Sabbath is mentioned in the Torah but one who brings from a private domain to a public domain is not liable; idolatry is mentioned in the Torah but one who prostrates himself is not liable; these are liable for it is said something was hidden, something but not an entire subject.

Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 1:19

MISHNAH: If the Court ruled to uproot an entire subject; if they said, the menstruating woman is not mentioned in the Torah, Sabbath is not mentioned in the Torah, idolatry is not mentioned in the Torah, they are not liable. If they ruled to eliminate part and to confirm part, they are liable. How is that? If they said, the menstruating woman is mentioned in the Torah but one who copulates with one who is watching a day to the next day is not liable; Sabbath is mentioned in the Torah but one who brings from a private domain to a public domain is not liable; idolatry is mentioned in the Torah but one who prostrates himself is not liable; these are liable for it is said something was hidden, something but not an entire subject.

Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 1:19

MISHNAH: If the Court ruled to uproot an entire subject; if they said, the menstruating woman is not mentioned in the Torah, Sabbath is not mentioned in the Torah, idolatry is not mentioned in the Torah, they are not liable. If they ruled to eliminate part and to confirm part, they are liable. How is that? If they said, the menstruating woman is mentioned in the Torah but one who copulates with one who is watching a day to the next day is not liable; Sabbath is mentioned in the Torah but one who brings from a private domain to a public domain is not liable; idolatry is mentioned in the Torah but one who prostrates himself is not liable; these are liable for it is said something was hidden, something but not an entire subject.

Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 1:19

MISHNAH: If the Court ruled to uproot an entire subject; if they said, the menstruating woman is not mentioned in the Torah, Sabbath is not mentioned in the Torah, idolatry is not mentioned in the Torah, they are not liable. If they ruled to eliminate part and to confirm part, they are liable. How is that? If they said, the menstruating woman is mentioned in the Torah but one who copulates with one who is watching a day to the next day is not liable; Sabbath is mentioned in the Torah but one who brings from a private domain to a public domain is not liable; idolatry is mentioned in the Torah but one who prostrates himself is not liable; these are liable for it is said something was hidden, something but not an entire subject.

Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 1:19

MISHNAH: If the Court ruled to uproot an entire subject; if they said, the menstruating woman is not mentioned in the Torah, Sabbath is not mentioned in the Torah, idolatry is not mentioned in the Torah, they are not liable. If they ruled to eliminate part and to confirm part, they are liable. How is that? If they said, the menstruating woman is mentioned in the Torah but one who copulates with one who is watching a day to the next day is not liable; Sabbath is mentioned in the Torah but one who brings from a private domain to a public domain is not liable; idolatry is mentioned in the Torah but one who prostrates himself is not liable; these are liable for it is said something was hidden, something but not an entire subject.

Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 1:22

MISHNAH: If the Court ruled but one of them knew that it was in error and he told them, you are erring, or that the distinguished member of the Court was not there, or that one of them was a proselyte, or a bastard, or a Gibeonite, or a childless old man, it is not liable since it is said here “congregation” and it is said there “congregation”. Since in the congregation mentioned there, all of them were worthy of ordination, also the congregation here all have to be worthy of ordination.

Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 1:24

MISHNAH: If the Court ruled in error and the public acted in error, they have to bring a bull; intentionally but they acted in error, they bring a female sheep or goat; in error but they acted intentionally, they are not liable.

Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 1:25

HALAKHAH: “If the Court ruled in error,” etc. Does this not disagree with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? Since Rebbi Immi said in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Our Mishnah, for example, if Simeon ben Azzai was sitting before them. “Intentionally but they acted in error.” Is there intentional misdeed or error with respect of an instruction by the Court? The colleagues in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: If not most of the public accepted it. Rebbi Zeˋira in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, if they rebelled against their instruction. What is the difference between them? If they first accepted and then rebelled. In the opinions of the colleagues, since they rebelled, they are not liable. In the opinion of Rebbi Zeˋira, since at the first moment they accepted it, those are liable.

Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 1:25

HALAKHAH: “If the Court ruled in error,” etc. Does this not disagree with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? Since Rebbi Immi said in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Our Mishnah, for example, if Simeon ben Azzai was sitting before them. “Intentionally but they acted in error.” Is there intentional misdeed or error with respect of an instruction by the Court? The colleagues in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: If not most of the public accepted it. Rebbi Zeˋira in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, if they rebelled against their instruction. What is the difference between them? If they first accepted and then rebelled. In the opinions of the colleagues, since they rebelled, they are not liable. In the opinion of Rebbi Zeˋira, since at the first moment they accepted it, those are liable.

Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 1:29

HALAKHAH: “If the Court ruled and seven tribes acted,” etc. It was stated: Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar says in his name, if six sinned and they are a majority. Therefore seven even though they do not form a majority are liable. Rebbi Eleazar said, he only said “six and they are a majority”. Therefore for five, even though they are a majority, they are not liable. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, a baraita said so: Half of the tribes on condition that they be most of the population. And similarly, half of the population on condition that they be most of the tribes. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, the question of the Anointed Priest, is it as from the High Court or a lower court?

Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 1:29

HALAKHAH: “If the Court ruled and seven tribes acted,” etc. It was stated: Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar says in his name, if six sinned and they are a majority. Therefore seven even though they do not form a majority are liable. Rebbi Eleazar said, he only said “six and they are a majority”. Therefore for five, even though they are a majority, they are not liable. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, a baraita said so: Half of the tribes on condition that they be most of the population. And similarly, half of the population on condition that they be most of the tribes. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, the question of the Anointed Priest, is it as from the High Court or a lower court?

Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 1:30

MISHNAH: If the Court of one of the tribes ruled and that tribe acted on their pronouncement, that tribe is liable but any other tribes are not liable, the words of Rebbi Jehudah. But the Sages say, they are only liable for a ruling by the High Court, as it is said, if the entire congregation of Israel be in error, and something was hidden from the eyes of the congregation, not the congregation of that tribe.

Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 1:30

MISHNAH: If the Court of one of the tribes ruled and that tribe acted on their pronouncement, that tribe is liable but any other tribes are not liable, the words of Rebbi Jehudah. But the Sages say, they are only liable for a ruling by the High Court, as it is said, if the entire congregation of Israel be in error, and something was hidden from the eyes of the congregation, not the congregation of that tribe.

Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 1:30

MISHNAH: If the Court of one of the tribes ruled and that tribe acted on their pronouncement, that tribe is liable but any other tribes are not liable, the words of Rebbi Jehudah. But the Sages say, they are only liable for a ruling by the High Court, as it is said, if the entire congregation of Israel be in error, and something was hidden from the eyes of the congregation, not the congregation of that tribe.

Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 1:33

Rebbi Zeˋira in the name of Rav Hamnuna: Following Rebbi Meïr. There, it was stated: If the Court ruled and the public acted. If a member of the Court died, they are not liable. If a member of the public died, they are liable. Rebbi Meïr told them, if he relieves others of their liability, not so much more for himself? They told him, he can relieve others from their liability since they have where to hang on; he cannot relieve himself of liability since he has nothing to hang on.

Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 1:33

Rebbi Zeˋira in the name of Rav Hamnuna: Following Rebbi Meïr. There, it was stated: If the Court ruled and the public acted. If a member of the Court died, they are not liable. If a member of the public died, they are liable. Rebbi Meïr told them, if he relieves others of their liability, not so much more for himself? They told him, he can relieve others from their liability since they have where to hang on; he cannot relieve himself of liability since he has nothing to hang on.

Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 1:34

Rebbi Zeˋira in the name of Rav Ḥisdai. There, it was stated: “If the Court ruled, and they themselves acted, and they realized what they ruled about. If they erred in what they ruled, would they be liable? The verse says, if the sin became known, not that the sinners became known.” Anyway you take it, if about fat [ they ruled they are liable, if about Sabbath they ruled they are liable. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya said, this follows Rebbi Eliezer; it does not follow Rebbi Joshua. Rebbi Yose said, but] it follows Rebbi Joshua if they ruled and they did not know whether about idolatry or about any other commandment. If about idolatry by a bull, if about any other commandment a goat. Since it is in doubt whether a bull or [a bull and] a goat, it is a difference in sacrifice and he is not liable.

Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 1:34

Rebbi Zeˋira in the name of Rav Ḥisdai. There, it was stated: “If the Court ruled, and they themselves acted, and they realized what they ruled about. If they erred in what they ruled, would they be liable? The verse says, if the sin became known, not that the sinners became known.” Anyway you take it, if about fat [ they ruled they are liable, if about Sabbath they ruled they are liable. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya said, this follows Rebbi Eliezer; it does not follow Rebbi Joshua. Rebbi Yose said, but] it follows Rebbi Joshua if they ruled and they did not know whether about idolatry or about any other commandment. If about idolatry by a bull, if about any other commandment a goat. Since it is in doubt whether a bull or [a bull and] a goat, it is a difference in sacrifice and he is not liable.

Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 1:34

Rebbi Zeˋira in the name of Rav Ḥisdai. There, it was stated: “If the Court ruled, and they themselves acted, and they realized what they ruled about. If they erred in what they ruled, would they be liable? The verse says, if the sin became known, not that the sinners became known.” Anyway you take it, if about fat [ they ruled they are liable, if about Sabbath they ruled they are liable. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya said, this follows Rebbi Eliezer; it does not follow Rebbi Joshua. Rebbi Yose said, but] it follows Rebbi Joshua if they ruled and they did not know whether about idolatry or about any other commandment. If about idolatry by a bull, if about any other commandment a goat. Since it is in doubt whether a bull or [a bull and] a goat, it is a difference in sacrifice and he is not liable.

Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 1:34

Rebbi Zeˋira in the name of Rav Ḥisdai. There, it was stated: “If the Court ruled, and they themselves acted, and they realized what they ruled about. If they erred in what they ruled, would they be liable? The verse says, if the sin became known, not that the sinners became known.” Anyway you take it, if about fat [ they ruled they are liable, if about Sabbath they ruled they are liable. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya said, this follows Rebbi Eliezer; it does not follow Rebbi Joshua. Rebbi Yose said, but] it follows Rebbi Joshua if they ruled and they did not know whether about idolatry or about any other commandment. If about idolatry by a bull, if about any other commandment a goat. Since it is in doubt whether a bull or [a bull and] a goat, it is a difference in sacrifice and he is not liable.

Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 2:1

MISHNAH: If the Anointed Priest ruled for himself in error and acted in error, he brings a bull. If in error but he acted intentionally, or intentionally and he acted in error, he is not liable since the ruling of the Anointed Priest for himself is like the ruling of the Court for the public.

Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 2:2

HALAKHAH: “If the Anointed Priest ruled,” etc. A person; if the Anointed Priest.” This makes the Anointed like a private person. Since the private person is not liable if he ate on the Court’s ruling, also neither is this one liable if he ate on the Court’s ruling. Since the private person is liable if he ate without a ruling, this one also should be liable if he ate without a ruling; the verse says, for the fault of the people. As the people are liable only if they issued a ruling, this one also is liable only if he issued a ruling. There are Tannaïm who state that the people are the Court. Since the people are liable if they instructed and others acted, this one also should be liable if he ruled and others acted. The verse says, as he sinned. He brings for what he sinned but he does not bring for what others sinned. There are Tannaïm who state that the people are the public. Since the people are liable if others ruled and they acted, this one also should be liable if others ruled and he acted. The verse says, as he sinned. He brings for what he sinned but he does not bring for what others sinned. Rebbi Jacob in the name of Rebbi Eleazar. Only if he is competent to argue about practice. Otherwise, would we say the incompetents give instructions? The anointed who ate following the Court’s prescript is not liable; following another Anointed’s prescript he is liable. Following the Court’s prescript he is not liable, since the prescript of others is nothing compared to their prescripts. Following another Anointed’s prescript he is liable, on condition that he instructed similarly.

Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 2:2

HALAKHAH: “If the Anointed Priest ruled,” etc. A person; if the Anointed Priest.” This makes the Anointed like a private person. Since the private person is not liable if he ate on the Court’s ruling, also neither is this one liable if he ate on the Court’s ruling. Since the private person is liable if he ate without a ruling, this one also should be liable if he ate without a ruling; the verse says, for the fault of the people. As the people are liable only if they issued a ruling, this one also is liable only if he issued a ruling. There are Tannaïm who state that the people are the Court. Since the people are liable if they instructed and others acted, this one also should be liable if he ruled and others acted. The verse says, as he sinned. He brings for what he sinned but he does not bring for what others sinned. There are Tannaïm who state that the people are the public. Since the people are liable if others ruled and they acted, this one also should be liable if others ruled and he acted. The verse says, as he sinned. He brings for what he sinned but he does not bring for what others sinned. Rebbi Jacob in the name of Rebbi Eleazar. Only if he is competent to argue about practice. Otherwise, would we say the incompetents give instructions? The anointed who ate following the Court’s prescript is not liable; following another Anointed’s prescript he is liable. Following the Court’s prescript he is not liable, since the prescript of others is nothing compared to their prescripts. Following another Anointed’s prescript he is liable, on condition that he instructed similarly.

Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 2:2

HALAKHAH: “If the Anointed Priest ruled,” etc. A person; if the Anointed Priest.” This makes the Anointed like a private person. Since the private person is not liable if he ate on the Court’s ruling, also neither is this one liable if he ate on the Court’s ruling. Since the private person is liable if he ate without a ruling, this one also should be liable if he ate without a ruling; the verse says, for the fault of the people. As the people are liable only if they issued a ruling, this one also is liable only if he issued a ruling. There are Tannaïm who state that the people are the Court. Since the people are liable if they instructed and others acted, this one also should be liable if he ruled and others acted. The verse says, as he sinned. He brings for what he sinned but he does not bring for what others sinned. There are Tannaïm who state that the people are the public. Since the people are liable if others ruled and they acted, this one also should be liable if others ruled and he acted. The verse says, as he sinned. He brings for what he sinned but he does not bring for what others sinned. Rebbi Jacob in the name of Rebbi Eleazar. Only if he is competent to argue about practice. Otherwise, would we say the incompetents give instructions? The anointed who ate following the Court’s prescript is not liable; following another Anointed’s prescript he is liable. Following the Court’s prescript he is not liable, since the prescript of others is nothing compared to their prescripts. Following another Anointed’s prescript he is liable, on condition that he instructed similarly.

Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 2:2

HALAKHAH: “If the Anointed Priest ruled,” etc. A person; if the Anointed Priest.” This makes the Anointed like a private person. Since the private person is not liable if he ate on the Court’s ruling, also neither is this one liable if he ate on the Court’s ruling. Since the private person is liable if he ate without a ruling, this one also should be liable if he ate without a ruling; the verse says, for the fault of the people. As the people are liable only if they issued a ruling, this one also is liable only if he issued a ruling. There are Tannaïm who state that the people are the Court. Since the people are liable if they instructed and others acted, this one also should be liable if he ruled and others acted. The verse says, as he sinned. He brings for what he sinned but he does not bring for what others sinned. There are Tannaïm who state that the people are the public. Since the people are liable if others ruled and they acted, this one also should be liable if others ruled and he acted. The verse says, as he sinned. He brings for what he sinned but he does not bring for what others sinned. Rebbi Jacob in the name of Rebbi Eleazar. Only if he is competent to argue about practice. Otherwise, would we say the incompetents give instructions? The anointed who ate following the Court’s prescript is not liable; following another Anointed’s prescript he is liable. Following the Court’s prescript he is not liable, since the prescript of others is nothing compared to their prescripts. Following another Anointed’s prescript he is liable, on condition that he instructed similarly.

Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 2:2

HALAKHAH: “If the Anointed Priest ruled,” etc. A person; if the Anointed Priest.” This makes the Anointed like a private person. Since the private person is not liable if he ate on the Court’s ruling, also neither is this one liable if he ate on the Court’s ruling. Since the private person is liable if he ate without a ruling, this one also should be liable if he ate without a ruling; the verse says, for the fault of the people. As the people are liable only if they issued a ruling, this one also is liable only if he issued a ruling. There are Tannaïm who state that the people are the Court. Since the people are liable if they instructed and others acted, this one also should be liable if he ruled and others acted. The verse says, as he sinned. He brings for what he sinned but he does not bring for what others sinned. There are Tannaïm who state that the people are the public. Since the people are liable if others ruled and they acted, this one also should be liable if others ruled and he acted. The verse says, as he sinned. He brings for what he sinned but he does not bring for what others sinned. Rebbi Jacob in the name of Rebbi Eleazar. Only if he is competent to argue about practice. Otherwise, would we say the incompetents give instructions? The anointed who ate following the Court’s prescript is not liable; following another Anointed’s prescript he is liable. Following the Court’s prescript he is not liable, since the prescript of others is nothing compared to their prescripts. Following another Anointed’s prescript he is liable, on condition that he instructed similarly.

Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 2:2

HALAKHAH: “If the Anointed Priest ruled,” etc. A person; if the Anointed Priest.” This makes the Anointed like a private person. Since the private person is not liable if he ate on the Court’s ruling, also neither is this one liable if he ate on the Court’s ruling. Since the private person is liable if he ate without a ruling, this one also should be liable if he ate without a ruling; the verse says, for the fault of the people. As the people are liable only if they issued a ruling, this one also is liable only if he issued a ruling. There are Tannaïm who state that the people are the Court. Since the people are liable if they instructed and others acted, this one also should be liable if he ruled and others acted. The verse says, as he sinned. He brings for what he sinned but he does not bring for what others sinned. There are Tannaïm who state that the people are the public. Since the people are liable if others ruled and they acted, this one also should be liable if others ruled and he acted. The verse says, as he sinned. He brings for what he sinned but he does not bring for what others sinned. Rebbi Jacob in the name of Rebbi Eleazar. Only if he is competent to argue about practice. Otherwise, would we say the incompetents give instructions? The anointed who ate following the Court’s prescript is not liable; following another Anointed’s prescript he is liable. Following the Court’s prescript he is not liable, since the prescript of others is nothing compared to their prescripts. Following another Anointed’s prescript he is liable, on condition that he instructed similarly.

Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 2:2

HALAKHAH: “If the Anointed Priest ruled,” etc. A person; if the Anointed Priest.” This makes the Anointed like a private person. Since the private person is not liable if he ate on the Court’s ruling, also neither is this one liable if he ate on the Court’s ruling. Since the private person is liable if he ate without a ruling, this one also should be liable if he ate without a ruling; the verse says, for the fault of the people. As the people are liable only if they issued a ruling, this one also is liable only if he issued a ruling. There are Tannaïm who state that the people are the Court. Since the people are liable if they instructed and others acted, this one also should be liable if he ruled and others acted. The verse says, as he sinned. He brings for what he sinned but he does not bring for what others sinned. There are Tannaïm who state that the people are the public. Since the people are liable if others ruled and they acted, this one also should be liable if others ruled and he acted. The verse says, as he sinned. He brings for what he sinned but he does not bring for what others sinned. Rebbi Jacob in the name of Rebbi Eleazar. Only if he is competent to argue about practice. Otherwise, would we say the incompetents give instructions? The anointed who ate following the Court’s prescript is not liable; following another Anointed’s prescript he is liable. Following the Court’s prescript he is not liable, since the prescript of others is nothing compared to their prescripts. Following another Anointed’s prescript he is liable, on condition that he instructed similarly.

Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 2:2

HALAKHAH: “If the Anointed Priest ruled,” etc. A person; if the Anointed Priest.” This makes the Anointed like a private person. Since the private person is not liable if he ate on the Court’s ruling, also neither is this one liable if he ate on the Court’s ruling. Since the private person is liable if he ate without a ruling, this one also should be liable if he ate without a ruling; the verse says, for the fault of the people. As the people are liable only if they issued a ruling, this one also is liable only if he issued a ruling. There are Tannaïm who state that the people are the Court. Since the people are liable if they instructed and others acted, this one also should be liable if he ruled and others acted. The verse says, as he sinned. He brings for what he sinned but he does not bring for what others sinned. There are Tannaïm who state that the people are the public. Since the people are liable if others ruled and they acted, this one also should be liable if others ruled and he acted. The verse says, as he sinned. He brings for what he sinned but he does not bring for what others sinned. Rebbi Jacob in the name of Rebbi Eleazar. Only if he is competent to argue about practice. Otherwise, would we say the incompetents give instructions? The anointed who ate following the Court’s prescript is not liable; following another Anointed’s prescript he is liable. Following the Court’s prescript he is not liable, since the prescript of others is nothing compared to their prescripts. Following another Anointed’s prescript he is liable, on condition that he instructed similarly.

Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 2:2

HALAKHAH: “If the Anointed Priest ruled,” etc. A person; if the Anointed Priest.” This makes the Anointed like a private person. Since the private person is not liable if he ate on the Court’s ruling, also neither is this one liable if he ate on the Court’s ruling. Since the private person is liable if he ate without a ruling, this one also should be liable if he ate without a ruling; the verse says, for the fault of the people. As the people are liable only if they issued a ruling, this one also is liable only if he issued a ruling. There are Tannaïm who state that the people are the Court. Since the people are liable if they instructed and others acted, this one also should be liable if he ruled and others acted. The verse says, as he sinned. He brings for what he sinned but he does not bring for what others sinned. There are Tannaïm who state that the people are the public. Since the people are liable if others ruled and they acted, this one also should be liable if others ruled and he acted. The verse says, as he sinned. He brings for what he sinned but he does not bring for what others sinned. Rebbi Jacob in the name of Rebbi Eleazar. Only if he is competent to argue about practice. Otherwise, would we say the incompetents give instructions? The anointed who ate following the Court’s prescript is not liable; following another Anointed’s prescript he is liable. Following the Court’s prescript he is not liable, since the prescript of others is nothing compared to their prescripts. Following another Anointed’s prescript he is liable, on condition that he instructed similarly.

Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 2:2

HALAKHAH: “If the Anointed Priest ruled,” etc. A person; if the Anointed Priest.” This makes the Anointed like a private person. Since the private person is not liable if he ate on the Court’s ruling, also neither is this one liable if he ate on the Court’s ruling. Since the private person is liable if he ate without a ruling, this one also should be liable if he ate without a ruling; the verse says, for the fault of the people. As the people are liable only if they issued a ruling, this one also is liable only if he issued a ruling. There are Tannaïm who state that the people are the Court. Since the people are liable if they instructed and others acted, this one also should be liable if he ruled and others acted. The verse says, as he sinned. He brings for what he sinned but he does not bring for what others sinned. There are Tannaïm who state that the people are the public. Since the people are liable if others ruled and they acted, this one also should be liable if others ruled and he acted. The verse says, as he sinned. He brings for what he sinned but he does not bring for what others sinned. Rebbi Jacob in the name of Rebbi Eleazar. Only if he is competent to argue about practice. Otherwise, would we say the incompetents give instructions? The anointed who ate following the Court’s prescript is not liable; following another Anointed’s prescript he is liable. Following the Court’s prescript he is not liable, since the prescript of others is nothing compared to their prescripts. Following another Anointed’s prescript he is liable, on condition that he instructed similarly.

Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 2:2

HALAKHAH: “If the Anointed Priest ruled,” etc. A person; if the Anointed Priest.” This makes the Anointed like a private person. Since the private person is not liable if he ate on the Court’s ruling, also neither is this one liable if he ate on the Court’s ruling. Since the private person is liable if he ate without a ruling, this one also should be liable if he ate without a ruling; the verse says, for the fault of the people. As the people are liable only if they issued a ruling, this one also is liable only if he issued a ruling. There are Tannaïm who state that the people are the Court. Since the people are liable if they instructed and others acted, this one also should be liable if he ruled and others acted. The verse says, as he sinned. He brings for what he sinned but he does not bring for what others sinned. There are Tannaïm who state that the people are the public. Since the people are liable if others ruled and they acted, this one also should be liable if others ruled and he acted. The verse says, as he sinned. He brings for what he sinned but he does not bring for what others sinned. Rebbi Jacob in the name of Rebbi Eleazar. Only if he is competent to argue about practice. Otherwise, would we say the incompetents give instructions? The anointed who ate following the Court’s prescript is not liable; following another Anointed’s prescript he is liable. Following the Court’s prescript he is not liable, since the prescript of others is nothing compared to their prescripts. Following another Anointed’s prescript he is liable, on condition that he instructed similarly.

Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 2:2

HALAKHAH: “If the Anointed Priest ruled,” etc. A person; if the Anointed Priest.” This makes the Anointed like a private person. Since the private person is not liable if he ate on the Court’s ruling, also neither is this one liable if he ate on the Court’s ruling. Since the private person is liable if he ate without a ruling, this one also should be liable if he ate without a ruling; the verse says, for the fault of the people. As the people are liable only if they issued a ruling, this one also is liable only if he issued a ruling. There are Tannaïm who state that the people are the Court. Since the people are liable if they instructed and others acted, this one also should be liable if he ruled and others acted. The verse says, as he sinned. He brings for what he sinned but he does not bring for what others sinned. There are Tannaïm who state that the people are the public. Since the people are liable if others ruled and they acted, this one also should be liable if others ruled and he acted. The verse says, as he sinned. He brings for what he sinned but he does not bring for what others sinned. Rebbi Jacob in the name of Rebbi Eleazar. Only if he is competent to argue about practice. Otherwise, would we say the incompetents give instructions? The anointed who ate following the Court’s prescript is not liable; following another Anointed’s prescript he is liable. Following the Court’s prescript he is not liable, since the prescript of others is nothing compared to their prescripts. Following another Anointed’s prescript he is liable, on condition that he instructed similarly.

Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 2:2

HALAKHAH: “If the Anointed Priest ruled,” etc. A person; if the Anointed Priest.” This makes the Anointed like a private person. Since the private person is not liable if he ate on the Court’s ruling, also neither is this one liable if he ate on the Court’s ruling. Since the private person is liable if he ate without a ruling, this one also should be liable if he ate without a ruling; the verse says, for the fault of the people. As the people are liable only if they issued a ruling, this one also is liable only if he issued a ruling. There are Tannaïm who state that the people are the Court. Since the people are liable if they instructed and others acted, this one also should be liable if he ruled and others acted. The verse says, as he sinned. He brings for what he sinned but he does not bring for what others sinned. There are Tannaïm who state that the people are the public. Since the people are liable if others ruled and they acted, this one also should be liable if others ruled and he acted. The verse says, as he sinned. He brings for what he sinned but he does not bring for what others sinned. Rebbi Jacob in the name of Rebbi Eleazar. Only if he is competent to argue about practice. Otherwise, would we say the incompetents give instructions? The anointed who ate following the Court’s prescript is not liable; following another Anointed’s prescript he is liable. Following the Court’s prescript he is not liable, since the prescript of others is nothing compared to their prescripts. Following another Anointed’s prescript he is liable, on condition that he instructed similarly.

Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 2:2

HALAKHAH: “If the Anointed Priest ruled,” etc. A person; if the Anointed Priest.” This makes the Anointed like a private person. Since the private person is not liable if he ate on the Court’s ruling, also neither is this one liable if he ate on the Court’s ruling. Since the private person is liable if he ate without a ruling, this one also should be liable if he ate without a ruling; the verse says, for the fault of the people. As the people are liable only if they issued a ruling, this one also is liable only if he issued a ruling. There are Tannaïm who state that the people are the Court. Since the people are liable if they instructed and others acted, this one also should be liable if he ruled and others acted. The verse says, as he sinned. He brings for what he sinned but he does not bring for what others sinned. There are Tannaïm who state that the people are the public. Since the people are liable if others ruled and they acted, this one also should be liable if others ruled and he acted. The verse says, as he sinned. He brings for what he sinned but he does not bring for what others sinned. Rebbi Jacob in the name of Rebbi Eleazar. Only if he is competent to argue about practice. Otherwise, would we say the incompetents give instructions? The anointed who ate following the Court’s prescript is not liable; following another Anointed’s prescript he is liable. Following the Court’s prescript he is not liable, since the prescript of others is nothing compared to their prescripts. Following another Anointed’s prescript he is liable, on condition that he instructed similarly.

Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 2:3

MISHNAH: If he ruled for himself and acted for himself, it is atoned for himself. If he ruled with the public and acted with the public, it is atoned for him with the public. As the Court is not liable unless they instruct to void part and confirm part, so is the Anointed. Also for idolatry they are not liable unless they instruct to void part and confirm part.

Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 2:3

MISHNAH: If he ruled for himself and acted for himself, it is atoned for himself. If he ruled with the public and acted with the public, it is atoned for him with the public. As the Court is not liable unless they instruct to void part and confirm part, so is the Anointed. Also for idolatry they are not liable unless they instruct to void part and confirm part.

Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 2:4

HALAKHAH: “If he ruled for himself,” etc. The Court ruled, he ruled following them, and then changed. It is obvious that for him it is the equivalent of uprooting the whole. But if he ruled first, the Court then ruled following him, and afterwards they reversed themselves. Nevertheless is it for him the equivalent of uprooting the whole, or because he ruled first, but his ruling was overturned by their ruling, for him it should not be the equivalent of uprooting the whole? If the Court ruled and he ruled following them, it is obvious that he is not liable if he ate according to the ruling of the Court. But after the Court reversed itself, he is liable. Rebbi Yose said, is that not the Mishnah? “If he ruled for himself [and acted for himself], it is atoned for himself.” Because he ruled for himself and acted for himself. “But if he ruled with the public and acted with the public, it is atoned for him with the public.” Because he ruled with the public and acted with the public, but “if he ruled for himself [and acted for himself], it is atoned for himself.”

Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 2:4

HALAKHAH: “If he ruled for himself,” etc. The Court ruled, he ruled following them, and then changed. It is obvious that for him it is the equivalent of uprooting the whole. But if he ruled first, the Court then ruled following him, and afterwards they reversed themselves. Nevertheless is it for him the equivalent of uprooting the whole, or because he ruled first, but his ruling was overturned by their ruling, for him it should not be the equivalent of uprooting the whole? If the Court ruled and he ruled following them, it is obvious that he is not liable if he ate according to the ruling of the Court. But after the Court reversed itself, he is liable. Rebbi Yose said, is that not the Mishnah? “If he ruled for himself [and acted for himself], it is atoned for himself.” Because he ruled for himself and acted for himself. “But if he ruled with the public and acted with the public, it is atoned for him with the public.” Because he ruled with the public and acted with the public, but “if he ruled for himself [and acted for himself], it is atoned for himself.”

Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 2:5

MISHNAH: They are liable only for forgetting a topic with action in error; the same applies to the Anointed. Also for idolatry only for forgetting a topic with action in error.

Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 2:6

HALAKHAH: “They are liable only for forgetting,” etc. Rebbi Zeˋira in the name of Rav Jeremiah. The Mishnah is Rebbi Meïr’s or has inferences like Rebbi Meïr. Rebbi Yose said, Rebbi Meïr who said, it is an obligation of the Court. Rebbi Mana said, following Rebbi Meïr. There, it was stated: If the Court ruled and the public acted. If a member of the Court died, they are not liable. If a member of the public died, they are liable. Rebbi Meïr told them, if he relieves others of their liability, not so much more for himself? They told him, he can relieve others of their liability since they have where to hang on; he cannot relieve himself of liability since he has nothing to hang on.

Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 2:6

HALAKHAH: “They are liable only for forgetting,” etc. Rebbi Zeˋira in the name of Rav Jeremiah. The Mishnah is Rebbi Meïr’s or has inferences like Rebbi Meïr. Rebbi Yose said, Rebbi Meïr who said, it is an obligation of the Court. Rebbi Mana said, following Rebbi Meïr. There, it was stated: If the Court ruled and the public acted. If a member of the Court died, they are not liable. If a member of the public died, they are liable. Rebbi Meïr told them, if he relieves others of their liability, not so much more for himself? They told him, he can relieve others of their liability since they have where to hang on; he cannot relieve himself of liability since he has nothing to hang on.

Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 2:6

HALAKHAH: “They are liable only for forgetting,” etc. Rebbi Zeˋira in the name of Rav Jeremiah. The Mishnah is Rebbi Meïr’s or has inferences like Rebbi Meïr. Rebbi Yose said, Rebbi Meïr who said, it is an obligation of the Court. Rebbi Mana said, following Rebbi Meïr. There, it was stated: If the Court ruled and the public acted. If a member of the Court died, they are not liable. If a member of the public died, they are liable. Rebbi Meïr told them, if he relieves others of their liability, not so much more for himself? They told him, he can relieve others of their liability since they have where to hang on; he cannot relieve himself of liability since he has nothing to hang on.

Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 2:8

MISHNAH: They are liable only for something which when intentional is punishable by extirpation and when unintentional by a purification sacrifice. The same applies to the Anointed. Also for idolatry only for something which when intentional is punishable by extirpation and when unintentional by a purification sacrifice.

Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 2:9

HALAKHAH: “They are only liable for something which when intentional is punishable by extirpation,” etc. The commandments of the Eternal. I could think that this also includes those who eat abominations and crawling things. It says here from the eyes and it says there from the eyes. Just as from the eyes mentioned there means something which is punished by extirpation in case of intentional sin and needs a purification sacrifice for an inadvertent sin, so from the eyes mentioned here means something which is punished by extirpation in case of intentional sin and needs a purification sacrifice for an inadvertent sin. Or since from the eyes mentioned there means something that can lead to the death penalty, so from the eyes mentioned here should mean something that can lead to the death penalty? Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, from a place where all incest prohibitions were taken as one set [of sins] causing extirpation, the (married woman) [father’s wife] came out to tell you about the bastard. Rebbi said over which, over her. Since over her mentioned there refers to something which is punished by extirpation in case of intentional sin and needs a purification sacrifice for an inadvertent sin, so over which mentioned here means something for which one is punished by extirpation in case of intentional sin and needs a purification sacrifice for an inadvertent sin. Why does Rebbi not infer from from the eyes, from the eyes? [Rebbi Zeˋira said: If Rebbi would infer from from the eyes, from the eyes, then from the eyes mentioned there for the Anointed refers to action in error; also from the eyes mentioned here would have to refer to action in error. Therefore, Rebbi will not infer from from the eyes, from the eyes.] Rebbi Yose said: If Rebbi would infer from from the eyes, from the eyes, then since from the eyes mentioned there means something that can lead to the death penalty, so from the eyes mentioned here means something that can lead to the death penalty. Therefore, Rebbi does not infer from from the eyes, from the eyes. (Does Rebbi not have a book) [Will Rebbi not in the end have] to infer from the eyes, from the eyes? For if it is not so, from where would we have the rules for the individual, the chief, and the Anointed? Not from from the eyes, from the eyes? For if it is not so, from where would we have “unless they ruled to eliminate part and to confirm part”? Not from from the eyes, from the eyes? For if it is not so, from where would we have [the difference between] a ruling of the High Court and a ruling of a lower court? Rebbi Ḥanania said before Rebbi Mana: Would not Rebbi in the end have to infer from from the eyes, from the eyes? He told him, what do you want from Rebbi? Rebbi follows his own opinion, since Rebbi said, the Anointed refers to action in error. Intentional error is only written for the Court. It. It specifies about his sacrifice that for the singular commandment its blood should not be brought into the Sanctuary. Does this follow Rebbi, as Rebbi said, the Anointed refers to action in error; if it would follow the rabbis, there must be an instance of forgetting. (Rav) [Rebbi] Huna said, it was needed for the rabbis. Lest you say, because there is extirpation its blood should be brought into the Sanctuary. Therefore, it was necessary to say it, it specifies his sacrifice that for the singular commandment its blood should not be brought into the Sanctuary.

Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 2:10

MISHNAH: They are not liable for a positive commandment or a prohibition in the Temple; one does not bring a suspended reparation sacrifice for a positive commandment or a prohibition in the Temple. But they are liable for a positive commandment or a prohibition about the menstruating woman; one brings a suspended reparation sacrifice for a positive commandment or a prohibition about the menstruating woman. What is the positive commandment about the menstruating woman? Separate from the menstruating woman. The prohibition, do not copulate with a menstruating woman.

Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 2:10

MISHNAH: They are not liable for a positive commandment or a prohibition in the Temple; one does not bring a suspended reparation sacrifice for a positive commandment or a prohibition in the Temple. But they are liable for a positive commandment or a prohibition about the menstruating woman; one brings a suspended reparation sacrifice for a positive commandment or a prohibition about the menstruating woman. What is the positive commandment about the menstruating woman? Separate from the menstruating woman. The prohibition, do not copulate with a menstruating woman.

Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 2:11

HALAKHAH: “They are not liable for a positive commandment or a prohibition in the Temple,” etc. Cahana said, is it impossible that there was knowledge at the beginning and knowledge at the end and oblivion in between? Rebbi Samuel ben Eudaimon objected before Rebbi Mana: Could that be for the teachers? He told him, we have a problem with those entering and you bring us teachers? What about it? Rebbi Samuel bar Rav Isaac said, commandments, commandments. Since commandments mentioned there are about fixed-value [offerings], here also about fixed-value [offerings].

Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 2:12

But one never is liable for any positive commandment in the Torah! Rebbi Mattaniah said, we only came to state matters similar to the matter. How is that? If he entered the Temple impure, he is liable. If he entered pure but became impure, if he leaves on a long path he is liable, on a short one not liable. Similarly, if he was having sex with an impure woman, he is liable. If he was having sex with a pure one and she said to him, I became impure, if he leaves on a long path he is liable, on a short one not liable. What is his shortcut? He shall cool down.

Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 2:12

But one never is liable for any positive commandment in the Torah! Rebbi Mattaniah said, we only came to state matters similar to the matter. How is that? If he entered the Temple impure, he is liable. If he entered pure but became impure, if he leaves on a long path he is liable, on a short one not liable. Similarly, if he was having sex with an impure woman, he is liable. If he was having sex with a pure one and she said to him, I became impure, if he leaves on a long path he is liable, on a short one not liable. What is his shortcut? He shall cool down.

Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 2:12

But one never is liable for any positive commandment in the Torah! Rebbi Mattaniah said, we only came to state matters similar to the matter. How is that? If he entered the Temple impure, he is liable. If he entered pure but became impure, if he leaves on a long path he is liable, on a short one not liable. Similarly, if he was having sex with an impure woman, he is liable. If he was having sex with a pure one and she said to him, I became impure, if he leaves on a long path he is liable, on a short one not liable. What is his shortcut? He shall cool down.

Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 2:12

But one never is liable for any positive commandment in the Torah! Rebbi Mattaniah said, we only came to state matters similar to the matter. How is that? If he entered the Temple impure, he is liable. If he entered pure but became impure, if he leaves on a long path he is liable, on a short one not liable. Similarly, if he was having sex with an impure woman, he is liable. If he was having sex with a pure one and she said to him, I became impure, if he leaves on a long path he is liable, on a short one not liable. What is his shortcut? He shall cool down.

Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 2:12

But one never is liable for any positive commandment in the Torah! Rebbi Mattaniah said, we only came to state matters similar to the matter. How is that? If he entered the Temple impure, he is liable. If he entered pure but became impure, if he leaves on a long path he is liable, on a short one not liable. Similarly, if he was having sex with an impure woman, he is liable. If he was having sex with a pure one and she said to him, I became impure, if he leaves on a long path he is liable, on a short one not liable. What is his shortcut? He shall cool down.

Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 2:12

But one never is liable for any positive commandment in the Torah! Rebbi Mattaniah said, we only came to state matters similar to the matter. How is that? If he entered the Temple impure, he is liable. If he entered pure but became impure, if he leaves on a long path he is liable, on a short one not liable. Similarly, if he was having sex with an impure woman, he is liable. If he was having sex with a pure one and she said to him, I became impure, if he leaves on a long path he is liable, on a short one not liable. What is his shortcut? He shall cool down.

Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 2:12

But one never is liable for any positive commandment in the Torah! Rebbi Mattaniah said, we only came to state matters similar to the matter. How is that? If he entered the Temple impure, he is liable. If he entered pure but became impure, if he leaves on a long path he is liable, on a short one not liable. Similarly, if he was having sex with an impure woman, he is liable. If he was having sex with a pure one and she said to him, I became impure, if he leaves on a long path he is liable, on a short one not liable. What is his shortcut? He shall cool down.

Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 2:13

“What is the positive commandment about the menstruating woman?” Rebbi Abin said, Keep the Children of Israel away from their impurities. Rebbi Jonathan sent to ask Rebbi Simeon ben Rebbi Yose bar Lakonia, from where a warning for one having sex with an impure woman? He wanted to throw a stone after him; he told him, you are asking me something that children recite every day in the synagogue: To a woman in the separation ofher impurity you shall not come near to uncover her nakedness. He answered him, that is not my problem. My only problem is rather “if he was having sex with an impure woman, he is liable. If he was having sex with a pure one and she said to him, I became impure,” if he separates immediately, is he liable? He told him, I and you have the same problem. Let us go out and learn. They went out and heard the voice of a Tanna who stated following Ḥiskiah: If lying a man will lie with her. Not only that if he was having sex with an impure woman, he is liable. If he was having sex with a pure one and she said to him, I became impure, if he separates immediately, is he liable? The verse says, her secretion shall be, even if her secretion starts with him. What should he do? Rav Hoshaia, Rav Jehudah in the name of Samuel, he shall cool down. If he did not cool down? Rebbi Yose said, for him I am reading do not come near as “do not separate”. Closeness is separation. Rav Ḥuna in the name of Rav Abba: Those who say, be close to yourself, do not touch me for I sanctified you. Rebbi Zeˋira said, he should imagine that a sword is cutting into his flesh. Is everybody Rebbi Zeˋira? Rebbi Tanḥuma in the name of Rav Ḥuna: He shall press his fingertips on the wall, then he will cool down.

Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 2:13

“What is the positive commandment about the menstruating woman?” Rebbi Abin said, Keep the Children of Israel away from their impurities. Rebbi Jonathan sent to ask Rebbi Simeon ben Rebbi Yose bar Lakonia, from where a warning for one having sex with an impure woman? He wanted to throw a stone after him; he told him, you are asking me something that children recite every day in the synagogue: To a woman in the separation ofher impurity you shall not come near to uncover her nakedness. He answered him, that is not my problem. My only problem is rather “if he was having sex with an impure woman, he is liable. If he was having sex with a pure one and she said to him, I became impure,” if he separates immediately, is he liable? He told him, I and you have the same problem. Let us go out and learn. They went out and heard the voice of a Tanna who stated following Ḥiskiah: If lying a man will lie with her. Not only that if he was having sex with an impure woman, he is liable. If he was having sex with a pure one and she said to him, I became impure, if he separates immediately, is he liable? The verse says, her secretion shall be, even if her secretion starts with him. What should he do? Rav Hoshaia, Rav Jehudah in the name of Samuel, he shall cool down. If he did not cool down? Rebbi Yose said, for him I am reading do not come near as “do not separate”. Closeness is separation. Rav Ḥuna in the name of Rav Abba: Those who say, be close to yourself, do not touch me for I sanctified you. Rebbi Zeˋira said, he should imagine that a sword is cutting into his flesh. Is everybody Rebbi Zeˋira? Rebbi Tanḥuma in the name of Rav Ḥuna: He shall press his fingertips on the wall, then he will cool down.

Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 2:13

“What is the positive commandment about the menstruating woman?” Rebbi Abin said, Keep the Children of Israel away from their impurities. Rebbi Jonathan sent to ask Rebbi Simeon ben Rebbi Yose bar Lakonia, from where a warning for one having sex with an impure woman? He wanted to throw a stone after him; he told him, you are asking me something that children recite every day in the synagogue: To a woman in the separation ofher impurity you shall not come near to uncover her nakedness. He answered him, that is not my problem. My only problem is rather “if he was having sex with an impure woman, he is liable. If he was having sex with a pure one and she said to him, I became impure,” if he separates immediately, is he liable? He told him, I and you have the same problem. Let us go out and learn. They went out and heard the voice of a Tanna who stated following Ḥiskiah: If lying a man will lie with her. Not only that if he was having sex with an impure woman, he is liable. If he was having sex with a pure one and she said to him, I became impure, if he separates immediately, is he liable? The verse says, her secretion shall be, even if her secretion starts with him. What should he do? Rav Hoshaia, Rav Jehudah in the name of Samuel, he shall cool down. If he did not cool down? Rebbi Yose said, for him I am reading do not come near as “do not separate”. Closeness is separation. Rav Ḥuna in the name of Rav Abba: Those who say, be close to yourself, do not touch me for I sanctified you. Rebbi Zeˋira said, he should imagine that a sword is cutting into his flesh. Is everybody Rebbi Zeˋira? Rebbi Tanḥuma in the name of Rav Ḥuna: He shall press his fingertips on the wall, then he will cool down.

Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 2:13

“What is the positive commandment about the menstruating woman?” Rebbi Abin said, Keep the Children of Israel away from their impurities. Rebbi Jonathan sent to ask Rebbi Simeon ben Rebbi Yose bar Lakonia, from where a warning for one having sex with an impure woman? He wanted to throw a stone after him; he told him, you are asking me something that children recite every day in the synagogue: To a woman in the separation ofher impurity you shall not come near to uncover her nakedness. He answered him, that is not my problem. My only problem is rather “if he was having sex with an impure woman, he is liable. If he was having sex with a pure one and she said to him, I became impure,” if he separates immediately, is he liable? He told him, I and you have the same problem. Let us go out and learn. They went out and heard the voice of a Tanna who stated following Ḥiskiah: If lying a man will lie with her. Not only that if he was having sex with an impure woman, he is liable. If he was having sex with a pure one and she said to him, I became impure, if he separates immediately, is he liable? The verse says, her secretion shall be, even if her secretion starts with him. What should he do? Rav Hoshaia, Rav Jehudah in the name of Samuel, he shall cool down. If he did not cool down? Rebbi Yose said, for him I am reading do not come near as “do not separate”. Closeness is separation. Rav Ḥuna in the name of Rav Abba: Those who say, be close to yourself, do not touch me for I sanctified you. Rebbi Zeˋira said, he should imagine that a sword is cutting into his flesh. Is everybody Rebbi Zeˋira? Rebbi Tanḥuma in the name of Rav Ḥuna: He shall press his fingertips on the wall, then he will cool down.

Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 2:15

MISHNAH: They are not liable for hearing a sound, or expression of the lips, or the impurity of the Temple and its sancta. The same applies to the Prince, the words of Rebbi Yose the Galilean. Rebbi Aqiba says, the Prince is liable for all of them except the hearing of a sound since the king does not judge, nor may one judge him; he does not testify, nor may one testify against him.

Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 2:15

MISHNAH: They are not liable for hearing a sound, or expression of the lips, or the impurity of the Temple and its sancta. The same applies to the Prince, the words of Rebbi Yose the Galilean. Rebbi Aqiba says, the Prince is liable for all of them except the hearing of a sound since the king does not judge, nor may one judge him; he does not testify, nor may one testify against him.

Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 2:16

HALAKHAH: “They are not liable for hearing the sound of an imprecation,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the reason of Rebbi Yose the Galilean is, if he is poor and cannot afford it. Somebody who is apt to fall into poverty; this excludes the Anointed who is not apt to fall into poverty. [ They objected: There is the prince who is not apt to fall into poverty.] Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, it shall be if he becomes guilty of any of these. He who can be liable for all of them is liable for part of them; but one who cannot be liable for all of them is not liable for part of them. Rebbi Isaac asked: Then he should not become impure by skin disease since he is not apt (easily and then) [to fall] into poverty or the deepest of poverty. Rav Hoshaia asked: Then a woman should not be liable for entering the Temple. Does the woman not bring? Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The reason of Rebbi Aqiba, this is the offering of Aaron and his sons. This one he brings; he does not bring another tenth of an ephah. Rebbi Zeˋira asked before Rebbi Yasa may he not bring a voluntary offering? He told him, yes. He does not bring an obligatory one; he may bring a voluntary one.

Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 2:16

HALAKHAH: “They are not liable for hearing the sound of an imprecation,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the reason of Rebbi Yose the Galilean is, if he is poor and cannot afford it. Somebody who is apt to fall into poverty; this excludes the Anointed who is not apt to fall into poverty. [ They objected: There is the prince who is not apt to fall into poverty.] Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, it shall be if he becomes guilty of any of these. He who can be liable for all of them is liable for part of them; but one who cannot be liable for all of them is not liable for part of them. Rebbi Isaac asked: Then he should not become impure by skin disease since he is not apt (easily and then) [to fall] into poverty or the deepest of poverty. Rav Hoshaia asked: Then a woman should not be liable for entering the Temple. Does the woman not bring? Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The reason of Rebbi Aqiba, this is the offering of Aaron and his sons. This one he brings; he does not bring another tenth of an ephah. Rebbi Zeˋira asked before Rebbi Yasa may he not bring a voluntary offering? He told him, yes. He does not bring an obligatory one; he may bring a voluntary one.