liable
2925 occurrences across the corpus
The Jerusalem Talmud
HALAKHAH: “They are not liable for hearing the sound of an imprecation,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the reason of Rebbi Yose the Galilean is, if he is poor and cannot afford it. Somebody who is apt to fall into poverty; this excludes the Anointed who is not apt to fall into poverty. [ They objected: There is the prince who is not apt to fall into poverty.] Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, it shall be if he becomes guilty of any of these. He who can be liable for all of them is liable for part of them; but one who cannot be liable for all of them is not liable for part of them. Rebbi Isaac asked: Then he should not become impure by skin disease since he is not apt (easily and then) [to fall] into poverty or the deepest of poverty. Rav Hoshaia asked: Then a woman should not be liable for entering the Temple. Does the woman not bring? Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The reason of Rebbi Aqiba, this is the offering of Aaron and his sons. This one he brings; he does not bring another tenth of an ephah. Rebbi Zeˋira asked before Rebbi Yasa may he not bring a voluntary offering? He told him, yes. He does not bring an obligatory one; he may bring a voluntary one.
HALAKHAH: “They are not liable for hearing the sound of an imprecation,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the reason of Rebbi Yose the Galilean is, if he is poor and cannot afford it. Somebody who is apt to fall into poverty; this excludes the Anointed who is not apt to fall into poverty. [ They objected: There is the prince who is not apt to fall into poverty.] Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, it shall be if he becomes guilty of any of these. He who can be liable for all of them is liable for part of them; but one who cannot be liable for all of them is not liable for part of them. Rebbi Isaac asked: Then he should not become impure by skin disease since he is not apt (easily and then) [to fall] into poverty or the deepest of poverty. Rav Hoshaia asked: Then a woman should not be liable for entering the Temple. Does the woman not bring? Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The reason of Rebbi Aqiba, this is the offering of Aaron and his sons. This one he brings; he does not bring another tenth of an ephah. Rebbi Zeˋira asked before Rebbi Yasa may he not bring a voluntary offering? He told him, yes. He does not bring an obligatory one; he may bring a voluntary one.
HALAKHAH: “They are not liable for hearing the sound of an imprecation,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the reason of Rebbi Yose the Galilean is, if he is poor and cannot afford it. Somebody who is apt to fall into poverty; this excludes the Anointed who is not apt to fall into poverty. [ They objected: There is the prince who is not apt to fall into poverty.] Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, it shall be if he becomes guilty of any of these. He who can be liable for all of them is liable for part of them; but one who cannot be liable for all of them is not liable for part of them. Rebbi Isaac asked: Then he should not become impure by skin disease since he is not apt (easily and then) [to fall] into poverty or the deepest of poverty. Rav Hoshaia asked: Then a woman should not be liable for entering the Temple. Does the woman not bring? Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The reason of Rebbi Aqiba, this is the offering of Aaron and his sons. This one he brings; he does not bring another tenth of an ephah. Rebbi Zeˋira asked before Rebbi Yasa may he not bring a voluntary offering? He told him, yes. He does not bring an obligatory one; he may bring a voluntary one.
HALAKHAH: “They are not liable for hearing the sound of an imprecation,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the reason of Rebbi Yose the Galilean is, if he is poor and cannot afford it. Somebody who is apt to fall into poverty; this excludes the Anointed who is not apt to fall into poverty. [ They objected: There is the prince who is not apt to fall into poverty.] Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, it shall be if he becomes guilty of any of these. He who can be liable for all of them is liable for part of them; but one who cannot be liable for all of them is not liable for part of them. Rebbi Isaac asked: Then he should not become impure by skin disease since he is not apt (easily and then) [to fall] into poverty or the deepest of poverty. Rav Hoshaia asked: Then a woman should not be liable for entering the Temple. Does the woman not bring? Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The reason of Rebbi Aqiba, this is the offering of Aaron and his sons. This one he brings; he does not bring another tenth of an ephah. Rebbi Zeˋira asked before Rebbi Yasa may he not bring a voluntary offering? He told him, yes. He does not bring an obligatory one; he may bring a voluntary one.
MISHNAH: For all commandments of the Torah where one is liable to extirpation for willful infraction and a purification sacrifice for unintentional infraction, the individual brings a sheep or a she-goat, the Prince a he-goat, and the Anointed or the Court bring a bull. For idolatry the individual, the Prince, and the Anointed bring a she-goat, the Court bring a bull as elevation offering and a goat as purification sacrifice. For a suspended reparation sacrifice the individual and the Prince are liable but the Anointed and the Court are not liable. For a certain reparation sacrifice the individual, and the Prince, and the Anointed are liable but the Court is not liable. For hearing a sound, or expression of the lips, or the impurity of the Temple and its sancta, the Court is not liable, the individual, and the Prince, and the Anointed are liable but the Anointed is not liable for the impurity of the Temple and its sancta, the words of Rebbi Simeon. What do they bring? A variable sacrifice. Rebbi Eliezer says, the Prince brings a goat.
MISHNAH: For all commandments of the Torah where one is liable to extirpation for willful infraction and a purification sacrifice for unintentional infraction, the individual brings a sheep or a she-goat, the Prince a he-goat, and the Anointed or the Court bring a bull. For idolatry the individual, the Prince, and the Anointed bring a she-goat, the Court bring a bull as elevation offering and a goat as purification sacrifice. For a suspended reparation sacrifice the individual and the Prince are liable but the Anointed and the Court are not liable. For a certain reparation sacrifice the individual, and the Prince, and the Anointed are liable but the Court is not liable. For hearing a sound, or expression of the lips, or the impurity of the Temple and its sancta, the Court is not liable, the individual, and the Prince, and the Anointed are liable but the Anointed is not liable for the impurity of the Temple and its sancta, the words of Rebbi Simeon. What do they bring? A variable sacrifice. Rebbi Eliezer says, the Prince brings a goat.
MISHNAH: For all commandments of the Torah where one is liable to extirpation for willful infraction and a purification sacrifice for unintentional infraction, the individual brings a sheep or a she-goat, the Prince a he-goat, and the Anointed or the Court bring a bull. For idolatry the individual, the Prince, and the Anointed bring a she-goat, the Court bring a bull as elevation offering and a goat as purification sacrifice. For a suspended reparation sacrifice the individual and the Prince are liable but the Anointed and the Court are not liable. For a certain reparation sacrifice the individual, and the Prince, and the Anointed are liable but the Court is not liable. For hearing a sound, or expression of the lips, or the impurity of the Temple and its sancta, the Court is not liable, the individual, and the Prince, and the Anointed are liable but the Anointed is not liable for the impurity of the Temple and its sancta, the words of Rebbi Simeon. What do they bring? A variable sacrifice. Rebbi Eliezer says, the Prince brings a goat.
MISHNAH: For all commandments of the Torah where one is liable to extirpation for willful infraction and a purification sacrifice for unintentional infraction, the individual brings a sheep or a she-goat, the Prince a he-goat, and the Anointed or the Court bring a bull. For idolatry the individual, the Prince, and the Anointed bring a she-goat, the Court bring a bull as elevation offering and a goat as purification sacrifice. For a suspended reparation sacrifice the individual and the Prince are liable but the Anointed and the Court are not liable. For a certain reparation sacrifice the individual, and the Prince, and the Anointed are liable but the Court is not liable. For hearing a sound, or expression of the lips, or the impurity of the Temple and its sancta, the Court is not liable, the individual, and the Prince, and the Anointed are liable but the Anointed is not liable for the impurity of the Temple and its sancta, the words of Rebbi Simeon. What do they bring? A variable sacrifice. Rebbi Eliezer says, the Prince brings a goat.
MISHNAH: For all commandments of the Torah where one is liable to extirpation for willful infraction and a purification sacrifice for unintentional infraction, the individual brings a sheep or a she-goat, the Prince a he-goat, and the Anointed or the Court bring a bull. For idolatry the individual, the Prince, and the Anointed bring a she-goat, the Court bring a bull as elevation offering and a goat as purification sacrifice. For a suspended reparation sacrifice the individual and the Prince are liable but the Anointed and the Court are not liable. For a certain reparation sacrifice the individual, and the Prince, and the Anointed are liable but the Court is not liable. For hearing a sound, or expression of the lips, or the impurity of the Temple and its sancta, the Court is not liable, the individual, and the Prince, and the Anointed are liable but the Anointed is not liable for the impurity of the Temple and its sancta, the words of Rebbi Simeon. What do they bring? A variable sacrifice. Rebbi Eliezer says, the Prince brings a goat.
MISHNAH: For all commandments of the Torah where one is liable to extirpation for willful infraction and a purification sacrifice for unintentional infraction, the individual brings a sheep or a she-goat, the Prince a he-goat, and the Anointed or the Court bring a bull. For idolatry the individual, the Prince, and the Anointed bring a she-goat, the Court bring a bull as elevation offering and a goat as purification sacrifice. For a suspended reparation sacrifice the individual and the Prince are liable but the Anointed and the Court are not liable. For a certain reparation sacrifice the individual, and the Prince, and the Anointed are liable but the Court is not liable. For hearing a sound, or expression of the lips, or the impurity of the Temple and its sancta, the Court is not liable, the individual, and the Prince, and the Anointed are liable but the Anointed is not liable for the impurity of the Temple and its sancta, the words of Rebbi Simeon. What do they bring? A variable sacrifice. Rebbi Eliezer says, the Prince brings a goat.
MISHNAH: For all commandments of the Torah where one is liable to extirpation for willful infraction and a purification sacrifice for unintentional infraction, the individual brings a sheep or a she-goat, the Prince a he-goat, and the Anointed or the Court bring a bull. For idolatry the individual, the Prince, and the Anointed bring a she-goat, the Court bring a bull as elevation offering and a goat as purification sacrifice. For a suspended reparation sacrifice the individual and the Prince are liable but the Anointed and the Court are not liable. For a certain reparation sacrifice the individual, and the Prince, and the Anointed are liable but the Court is not liable. For hearing a sound, or expression of the lips, or the impurity of the Temple and its sancta, the Court is not liable, the individual, and the Prince, and the Anointed are liable but the Anointed is not liable for the impurity of the Temple and its sancta, the words of Rebbi Simeon. What do they bring? A variable sacrifice. Rebbi Eliezer says, the Prince brings a goat.
MISHNAH: For all commandments of the Torah where one is liable to extirpation for willful infraction and a purification sacrifice for unintentional infraction, the individual brings a sheep or a she-goat, the Prince a he-goat, and the Anointed or the Court bring a bull. For idolatry the individual, the Prince, and the Anointed bring a she-goat, the Court bring a bull as elevation offering and a goat as purification sacrifice. For a suspended reparation sacrifice the individual and the Prince are liable but the Anointed and the Court are not liable. For a certain reparation sacrifice the individual, and the Prince, and the Anointed are liable but the Court is not liable. For hearing a sound, or expression of the lips, or the impurity of the Temple and its sancta, the Court is not liable, the individual, and the Prince, and the Anointed are liable but the Anointed is not liable for the impurity of the Temple and its sancta, the words of Rebbi Simeon. What do they bring? A variable sacrifice. Rebbi Eliezer says, the Prince brings a goat.
HALAKHAH: “For all commandments of the Torah,” etc. Halakhah 8:“For a suspended sacrifice the individual and the Prince are liable,” etc. A person, to include the Prince. Should it include the Anointed? “And sinned inadvertently.” Any depending on acting inadvertently. This excludes the Anointed who is not depending on acting inadvertently. But following Rebbi who said, the Anointed is depending on acting inadvertently? One dependent on acting inadvertently in any situation. This excludes the Anointed who is not dependent on acting inadvertently in any situation. A person, to include the Prince and the Anointed. Here you say, to include the prince, and there you say, to include the Anointed? Like the purification sacrifices is the reparation sacrifice. Just as the purification sacrifice atones and wipes clean, also the reparation sacrifice atones and wipes clean. This excludes the suspended reparation sacrifice which atones but leaves a residue.
So is the Mishnah: “but the Anointed is not liable for the impurity of the Temple and its sancta, everybody’s opinion, and neither is the Prince for hearing a sound, the words of Rebbi Simeon.” Rebbi Joḥanan said, and the Sanctuary he shall not leave, nor desecrate. Therefore, if he left, he would not desecrate. Rebbi Ashian, Rebbi Jonah: Rebbi Abun bar Cahana found a difficulty. Is it not written, a widow, or a divorcee, or a desecrated, a harlot, these he shall not marry, therefore if he married he would not desecrate? What about it? Ḥizqiah said, this person would be extirpated from the community. One whose sacrifice is identical to that of the community. This excludes the Anointed whose sacrifice is not equal to that of the community. They objected, is not also the Prince’s sacrifice not equal to that of the community? It is equal on the day of Atonement. But his brothers the priests are not equal on the day of Atonement! They are equal on the other days of the year. Rebbi Yudan bar Shalom said, they are equal in that the blood is given outside.
MISHNAH: If they sinned before being appointed; when afterwards they were appointed, they remain commoners. Rebbi Simeon says, if it became known to them before they were appointed, they are obligated; if after they were appointed they are not liable. Who is the Prince? This is the king, as it is said, if he transgressed one of the commandments of the Eternal, his God; a Prince who has none above him but the Eternal, his God. And who is the Anointed? This is one anointed with the anointing oil, not one clothed in multiple garb. The only difference between the priest anointed with the anointing oil and the one clothed in multiple garb is the bull brought for all commandments. And the only difference between an officiating High Priest and a deposed one is the bull of the Day of Atonement and the tenth of an ephah. Both are equal in the office of the day of Atonement, commanded about the virgin, and prohibited for a widow, and do not defile themselves for close relatives, and may not let their hair grow or rend their garments, and let the homicide return.
HALAKHAH: “If they sinned before being appointed,” etc. The colleagues say that the reason of Rebbi Simeon is because greatness atones. Rebbi Yose said, because his sin and his knowledge are not equal. What is the difference between them? Referring to the beginning of the Chapter: “An Anointed Priest who sinned and then was removed from his anointed status, or a Prince who sinned and then was removed from his exalted status. The Anointed Priest brings a bull and the Prince brings a goat;” if there is any doubt whether they sinned. He who said, because greatness atones; just as it atones for the certain [sin] so it atones for the doubt. He who said. because his sin and his knowledge are not equal; his sin and his knowledge are not equal. If they sinned before they were appointed and after they were appointed they breached, for him who said, because greatness atones, greatness atoned for the first, but he is liable for the second and the third. For him who said, because his sin and his knowledge are not equal. If they sinned regarding hearing a sound, or expression of the lips, or the impurity of the Temple and its sancta, for him who said, because his sin and his knowledge are not equal, here his sin and his knowledge are equal. For him who said, because greatness atones, even in this case greatness atones.
Rebbi Mattania said: Greatness cannot atone (until his greatness becomes known to him) [unless his error became known to him.] If he ate half the volume of an olive before he was appointed and half the volume of an olive after he was appointed, even in one oblivion he is not liable. A doubt of half the volume of an olive before he was appointed and a doubt of half the volume of an olive after he was appointed: he brings a suspended reparation offering. Do we find anything where for the actual offense he is not liable but for a doubt he is liable? We do not find this! If he ate the volume of two olives, the true nature of one of them became known to him, the other remained for him in doubt. Rebbi Jacob the Southerner asked before Rebbi Yose: As you take it, if he ate forbidden fat, it atoned. [If he ate permitted fat, it atoned.] Rebbi Yose said, anything which convinced him to bring a suspended reparation offering, the knowledge of the doubt establishes his transgression. So we find a case where for the actual offense he is not liable but for a doubt he is liable.
Rebbi Mattania said: Greatness cannot atone (until his greatness becomes known to him) [unless his error became known to him.] If he ate half the volume of an olive before he was appointed and half the volume of an olive after he was appointed, even in one oblivion he is not liable. A doubt of half the volume of an olive before he was appointed and a doubt of half the volume of an olive after he was appointed: he brings a suspended reparation offering. Do we find anything where for the actual offense he is not liable but for a doubt he is liable? We do not find this! If he ate the volume of two olives, the true nature of one of them became known to him, the other remained for him in doubt. Rebbi Jacob the Southerner asked before Rebbi Yose: As you take it, if he ate forbidden fat, it atoned. [If he ate permitted fat, it atoned.] Rebbi Yose said, anything which convinced him to bring a suspended reparation offering, the knowledge of the doubt establishes his transgression. So we find a case where for the actual offense he is not liable but for a doubt he is liable.
Rebbi Mattania said: Greatness cannot atone (until his greatness becomes known to him) [unless his error became known to him.] If he ate half the volume of an olive before he was appointed and half the volume of an olive after he was appointed, even in one oblivion he is not liable. A doubt of half the volume of an olive before he was appointed and a doubt of half the volume of an olive after he was appointed: he brings a suspended reparation offering. Do we find anything where for the actual offense he is not liable but for a doubt he is liable? We do not find this! If he ate the volume of two olives, the true nature of one of them became known to him, the other remained for him in doubt. Rebbi Jacob the Southerner asked before Rebbi Yose: As you take it, if he ate forbidden fat, it atoned. [If he ate permitted fat, it atoned.] Rebbi Yose said, anything which convinced him to bring a suspended reparation offering, the knowledge of the doubt establishes his transgression. So we find a case where for the actual offense he is not liable but for a doubt he is liable.
Rebbi Mattania said: Greatness cannot atone (until his greatness becomes known to him) [unless his error became known to him.] If he ate half the volume of an olive before he was appointed and half the volume of an olive after he was appointed, even in one oblivion he is not liable. A doubt of half the volume of an olive before he was appointed and a doubt of half the volume of an olive after he was appointed: he brings a suspended reparation offering. Do we find anything where for the actual offense he is not liable but for a doubt he is liable? We do not find this! If he ate the volume of two olives, the true nature of one of them became known to him, the other remained for him in doubt. Rebbi Jacob the Southerner asked before Rebbi Yose: As you take it, if he ate forbidden fat, it atoned. [If he ate permitted fat, it atoned.] Rebbi Yose said, anything which convinced him to bring a suspended reparation offering, the knowledge of the doubt establishes his transgression. So we find a case where for the actual offense he is not liable but for a doubt he is liable.
Rebbi Mattania said: Greatness cannot atone (until his greatness becomes known to him) [unless his error became known to him.] If he ate half the volume of an olive before he was appointed and half the volume of an olive after he was appointed, even in one oblivion he is not liable. A doubt of half the volume of an olive before he was appointed and a doubt of half the volume of an olive after he was appointed: he brings a suspended reparation offering. Do we find anything where for the actual offense he is not liable but for a doubt he is liable? We do not find this! If he ate the volume of two olives, the true nature of one of them became known to him, the other remained for him in doubt. Rebbi Jacob the Southerner asked before Rebbi Yose: As you take it, if he ate forbidden fat, it atoned. [If he ate permitted fat, it atoned.] Rebbi Yose said, anything which convinced him to bring a suspended reparation offering, the knowledge of the doubt establishes his transgression. So we find a case where for the actual offense he is not liable but for a doubt he is liable.
One ate the volume of an olive before he was appointed and the volume of an olive after he was appointed. If it was in one oblivion, he is liable only for one [sacrifice]. If the volume of an olive was in doubt before he was appointed, and the volume of an olive was in doubt after he was appointed, in one oblivion he is liable only for one, in two forgettings he is liable for two [sacrifices.]
One ate the volume of an olive before he was appointed and the volume of an olive after he was appointed. If it was in one oblivion, he is liable only for one [sacrifice]. If the volume of an olive was in doubt before he was appointed, and the volume of an olive was in doubt after he was appointed, in one oblivion he is liable only for one, in two forgettings he is liable for two [sacrifices.]
One ate the volume of an olive before he was appointed and the volume of an olive after he was appointed. If it was in one oblivion, he is liable only for one [sacrifice]. If the volume of an olive was in doubt before he was appointed, and the volume of an olive was in doubt after he was appointed, in one oblivion he is liable only for one, in two forgettings he is liable for two [sacrifices.]
If he ate five times the volume of an olive; the doubt became known to him before he was appointed (and in court) [as the certainty] after he was removed. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish he is not liable; in the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan he is liable. Did Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish state to free from liability, not rather to insist on liability? But it must be as follows: He ate five times the volume of an olive. The doubt became known to him before he was appointed; the certainty after he was appointed. Following the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish who said, the knowledge about his doubt determines his kind of transgression, he must say that one is liable. Following the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan who said, the knowledge about his doubt does not determine his kind of transgression, he must say that one is not liable. Everybody agrees that if the first one was still in existence it is pushed aside. What should be done with it? Rebbi Yasa said, it is suspended for atonement. Rebbi Zeˋira said, if neither itself not its blood are usable, it dies immediately.
If he ate five times the volume of an olive; the doubt became known to him before he was appointed (and in court) [as the certainty] after he was removed. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish he is not liable; in the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan he is liable. Did Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish state to free from liability, not rather to insist on liability? But it must be as follows: He ate five times the volume of an olive. The doubt became known to him before he was appointed; the certainty after he was appointed. Following the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish who said, the knowledge about his doubt determines his kind of transgression, he must say that one is liable. Following the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan who said, the knowledge about his doubt does not determine his kind of transgression, he must say that one is not liable. Everybody agrees that if the first one was still in existence it is pushed aside. What should be done with it? Rebbi Yasa said, it is suspended for atonement. Rebbi Zeˋira said, if neither itself not its blood are usable, it dies immediately.
If he ate five times the volume of an olive; the doubt became known to him before he was appointed (and in court) [as the certainty] after he was removed. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish he is not liable; in the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan he is liable. Did Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish state to free from liability, not rather to insist on liability? But it must be as follows: He ate five times the volume of an olive. The doubt became known to him before he was appointed; the certainty after he was appointed. Following the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish who said, the knowledge about his doubt determines his kind of transgression, he must say that one is liable. Following the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan who said, the knowledge about his doubt does not determine his kind of transgression, he must say that one is not liable. Everybody agrees that if the first one was still in existence it is pushed aside. What should be done with it? Rebbi Yasa said, it is suspended for atonement. Rebbi Zeˋira said, if neither itself not its blood are usable, it dies immediately.
If he ate five times the volume of an olive; the doubt became known to him before he was appointed (and in court) [as the certainty] after he was removed. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish he is not liable; in the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan he is liable. Did Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish state to free from liability, not rather to insist on liability? But it must be as follows: He ate five times the volume of an olive. The doubt became known to him before he was appointed; the certainty after he was appointed. Following the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish who said, the knowledge about his doubt determines his kind of transgression, he must say that one is liable. Following the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan who said, the knowledge about his doubt does not determine his kind of transgression, he must say that one is not liable. Everybody agrees that if the first one was still in existence it is pushed aside. What should be done with it? Rebbi Yasa said, it is suspended for atonement. Rebbi Zeˋira said, if neither itself not its blood are usable, it dies immediately.
If one ate half the volume of an olive before he was appointed, half the volume of an olive after he was appointed, half the volume of an olive after he was removed from office. Since [no] obligation of a sacrifice came in between, do they combine? Let us hear from the following: Before him were three [olive sized pieces]. He ate the first but did not realize it; the second (and the third) while he was oblivious of the first. He was informed of the first but was not informed of the second. [He ate] the third while oblivious of the second. Afterwards he was informed about all of them. Rebbi Joḥanan said, he is liable for the first and the second but not liable for the third. Rebbi Yose said, the second depends on his intention. If he wishes, he atones for it with the first; if he wishes, he atones for it with the third. The colleagues compare it to four half-olives. If he was intelligent, he brings one sacrifice; otherwise, he brings two sacrifices. How is that? He brings one for the first and the second together; one for the third and fourth together. (Rebbi Yose compares it to full olive sizes. If he was intelligent, he brings two sacrifices; otherwise, he brings three sacrifices. How is that? He brings one for the first and the second together, and one for the third and fourth together.) If he brought for the middle ones, he is not liable for the first and the fourth. Rebbi Yose compares it to full olive sizes. If he was intelligent, he brings two sacrifices; otherwise, he brings three sacrifices. How is that? He brings one for the first and the second together, and one for the third and fourth together. If he brought for the middle ones, he is liable for the first separately and for the fourth separately.
If one ate half the volume of an olive before he was appointed, half the volume of an olive after he was appointed, half the volume of an olive after he was removed from office. Since [no] obligation of a sacrifice came in between, do they combine? Let us hear from the following: Before him were three [olive sized pieces]. He ate the first but did not realize it; the second (and the third) while he was oblivious of the first. He was informed of the first but was not informed of the second. [He ate] the third while oblivious of the second. Afterwards he was informed about all of them. Rebbi Joḥanan said, he is liable for the first and the second but not liable for the third. Rebbi Yose said, the second depends on his intention. If he wishes, he atones for it with the first; if he wishes, he atones for it with the third. The colleagues compare it to four half-olives. If he was intelligent, he brings one sacrifice; otherwise, he brings two sacrifices. How is that? He brings one for the first and the second together; one for the third and fourth together. (Rebbi Yose compares it to full olive sizes. If he was intelligent, he brings two sacrifices; otherwise, he brings three sacrifices. How is that? He brings one for the first and the second together, and one for the third and fourth together.) If he brought for the middle ones, he is not liable for the first and the fourth. Rebbi Yose compares it to full olive sizes. If he was intelligent, he brings two sacrifices; otherwise, he brings three sacrifices. How is that? He brings one for the first and the second together, and one for the third and fourth together. If he brought for the middle ones, he is liable for the first separately and for the fourth separately.
If one ate half the volume of an olive before he was appointed, half the volume of an olive after he was appointed, half the volume of an olive after he was removed from office. Since [no] obligation of a sacrifice came in between, do they combine? Let us hear from the following: Before him were three [olive sized pieces]. He ate the first but did not realize it; the second (and the third) while he was oblivious of the first. He was informed of the first but was not informed of the second. [He ate] the third while oblivious of the second. Afterwards he was informed about all of them. Rebbi Joḥanan said, he is liable for the first and the second but not liable for the third. Rebbi Yose said, the second depends on his intention. If he wishes, he atones for it with the first; if he wishes, he atones for it with the third. The colleagues compare it to four half-olives. If he was intelligent, he brings one sacrifice; otherwise, he brings two sacrifices. How is that? He brings one for the first and the second together; one for the third and fourth together. (Rebbi Yose compares it to full olive sizes. If he was intelligent, he brings two sacrifices; otherwise, he brings three sacrifices. How is that? He brings one for the first and the second together, and one for the third and fourth together.) If he brought for the middle ones, he is not liable for the first and the fourth. Rebbi Yose compares it to full olive sizes. If he was intelligent, he brings two sacrifices; otherwise, he brings three sacrifices. How is that? He brings one for the first and the second together, and one for the third and fourth together. If he brought for the middle ones, he is liable for the first separately and for the fourth separately.
If one ate half the volume of an olive before he was appointed, half the volume of an olive after he was appointed, half the volume of an olive after he was removed from office. Since [no] obligation of a sacrifice came in between, do they combine? Let us hear from the following: Before him were three [olive sized pieces]. He ate the first but did not realize it; the second (and the third) while he was oblivious of the first. He was informed of the first but was not informed of the second. [He ate] the third while oblivious of the second. Afterwards he was informed about all of them. Rebbi Joḥanan said, he is liable for the first and the second but not liable for the third. Rebbi Yose said, the second depends on his intention. If he wishes, he atones for it with the first; if he wishes, he atones for it with the third. The colleagues compare it to four half-olives. If he was intelligent, he brings one sacrifice; otherwise, he brings two sacrifices. How is that? He brings one for the first and the second together; one for the third and fourth together. (Rebbi Yose compares it to full olive sizes. If he was intelligent, he brings two sacrifices; otherwise, he brings three sacrifices. How is that? He brings one for the first and the second together, and one for the third and fourth together.) If he brought for the middle ones, he is not liable for the first and the fourth. Rebbi Yose compares it to full olive sizes. If he was intelligent, he brings two sacrifices; otherwise, he brings three sacrifices. How is that? He brings one for the first and the second together, and one for the third and fourth together. If he brought for the middle ones, he is liable for the first separately and for the fourth separately.
Rebbi Isaac asked: Is it the same with the eating of half loaves? Rebbi Yose said, this question of Rebbi Isaac is nothing. (Is it written) [Does] the matter depend on eating half loaves? If one ate the volume of half an olive during the time allotted for this half loaf and another volume of half an olive during the time allotted for that half loaf, is that anything? If one ate the volume of several olives during times allotted for several half-loaves in one oblivion, he is liable only for one [sacrifice]. The rabbis of Caesarea say, instead of comparing it to kinds of fat, why not compare it to [the laws of] Sabbath? If he wove a single thread for one cloth and a single thread for another cloth, is that anything? If he wove several threads for several pieces of cloth in one oblivion, he is liable only for one [sacrifice]. Was there not an obligation for a sacrifice in the meantime, and you say that they are counted together? Rebbi Abun said, there it is about the obligation of a sacrifice; but here [a change] of sacrifice.
Rebbi Isaac asked: Is it the same with the eating of half loaves? Rebbi Yose said, this question of Rebbi Isaac is nothing. (Is it written) [Does] the matter depend on eating half loaves? If one ate the volume of half an olive during the time allotted for this half loaf and another volume of half an olive during the time allotted for that half loaf, is that anything? If one ate the volume of several olives during times allotted for several half-loaves in one oblivion, he is liable only for one [sacrifice]. The rabbis of Caesarea say, instead of comparing it to kinds of fat, why not compare it to [the laws of] Sabbath? If he wove a single thread for one cloth and a single thread for another cloth, is that anything? If he wove several threads for several pieces of cloth in one oblivion, he is liable only for one [sacrifice]. Was there not an obligation for a sacrifice in the meantime, and you say that they are counted together? Rebbi Abun said, there it is about the obligation of a sacrifice; but here [a change] of sacrifice.
If one ate the volume of an olive before he was appointed, the volume of an olive after he was appointed, and the volume of an olive after he was removed from office. In the opinion of the colleagues who say, because high office atones, the office atoned for the first and he is liable for the second and the third. In the opinion of Rebbi Yose who said, because his sin and his knowledge are not equal, he is liable for the first and the second, but not liable for the third. He ate the size of an olive. If it is in doubt whether he ate before he was appointed or after he was appointed, or whether it was before he converted or after he converted, or whether it was before he had grown two pubic hairs or after he had grown two pubic hairs, he brings a suspended reparation sacrifice.
If one ate the volume of an olive before he was appointed, the volume of an olive after he was appointed, and the volume of an olive after he was removed from office. In the opinion of the colleagues who say, because high office atones, the office atoned for the first and he is liable for the second and the third. In the opinion of Rebbi Yose who said, because his sin and his knowledge are not equal, he is liable for the first and the second, but not liable for the third. He ate the size of an olive. If it is in doubt whether he ate before he was appointed or after he was appointed, or whether it was before he converted or after he converted, or whether it was before he had grown two pubic hairs or after he had grown two pubic hairs, he brings a suspended reparation sacrifice.
If one ate the volume of an olive before he was appointed, the volume of an olive after he was appointed, and the volume of an olive after he was removed from office. In the opinion of the colleagues who say, because high office atones, the office atoned for the first and he is liable for the second and the third. In the opinion of Rebbi Yose who said, because his sin and his knowledge are not equal, he is liable for the first and the second, but not liable for the third. He ate the size of an olive. If it is in doubt whether he ate before he was appointed or after he was appointed, or whether it was before he converted or after he converted, or whether it was before he had grown two pubic hairs or after he had grown two pubic hairs, he brings a suspended reparation sacrifice.
If he ate five times the volume of an olive; the doubt became known to him before he was appointed, and (in court) after he was appointed. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish he is liable; in the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan he is not liable. Did Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish state to insist on liability, not rather to free from liability? But it must be as follows: He ate five times the volume of an olive. The doubt became known to him after he was appointed; (in court) after he was removed. Following the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish who said, if the sin was partially atoned for it was not totally atoned, he must say that he is not liable. Following the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan who said, if the sin was partially atoned for it was totally atoned, he must say that one is liable. Everybody agrees that if the first one was still in existence it is pushed aside. What should be done with it? Rebbi Yasa said, it is suspended for atonement. Rebbi Zeˋira said, if neither it nor its blood are usable it dies immediately.
If he ate five times the volume of an olive; the doubt became known to him before he was appointed, and (in court) after he was appointed. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish he is liable; in the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan he is not liable. Did Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish state to insist on liability, not rather to free from liability? But it must be as follows: He ate five times the volume of an olive. The doubt became known to him after he was appointed; (in court) after he was removed. Following the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish who said, if the sin was partially atoned for it was not totally atoned, he must say that he is not liable. Following the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan who said, if the sin was partially atoned for it was totally atoned, he must say that one is liable. Everybody agrees that if the first one was still in existence it is pushed aside. What should be done with it? Rebbi Yasa said, it is suspended for atonement. Rebbi Zeˋira said, if neither it nor its blood are usable it dies immediately.
If he ate five times the volume of an olive; the doubt became known to him before he was appointed, and (in court) after he was appointed. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish he is liable; in the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan he is not liable. Did Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish state to insist on liability, not rather to free from liability? But it must be as follows: He ate five times the volume of an olive. The doubt became known to him after he was appointed; (in court) after he was removed. Following the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish who said, if the sin was partially atoned for it was not totally atoned, he must say that he is not liable. Following the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan who said, if the sin was partially atoned for it was totally atoned, he must say that one is liable. Everybody agrees that if the first one was still in existence it is pushed aside. What should be done with it? Rebbi Yasa said, it is suspended for atonement. Rebbi Zeˋira said, if neither it nor its blood are usable it dies immediately.
If he ate five times the volume of an olive; the doubt became known to him before he was appointed, and (in court) after he was appointed. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish he is liable; in the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan he is not liable. Did Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish state to insist on liability, not rather to free from liability? But it must be as follows: He ate five times the volume of an olive. The doubt became known to him after he was appointed; (in court) after he was removed. Following the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish who said, if the sin was partially atoned for it was not totally atoned, he must say that he is not liable. Following the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan who said, if the sin was partially atoned for it was totally atoned, he must say that one is liable. Everybody agrees that if the first one was still in existence it is pushed aside. What should be done with it? Rebbi Yasa said, it is suspended for atonement. Rebbi Zeˋira said, if neither it nor its blood are usable it dies immediately.
The Babylonian Talmud
Rab Obadiah taught in the presence of Raba : "And ye shall teach" (Deut. xi. 19), i.e. let thy teaching be perfect — let one make a brief pause between words which are liable to be jumbled together,
Rab Judah said in the name of Rab : Who finds diverse kinds in his garment must divest himself thereof even in the street. What is the reason ? [As it is said,] "There is no wisdom nor understanding nor counsel against the Lord" (Prov. xxi. 30) — i.e. wherever the Divine Name is liable to be profaned, we pay no respect to a teacher.
Rabbah b. Bar Hannah also stated that R. Johanan said in the name of R. Judah b. R. El'ai : Come and see that the later generations are not like the former generations. The former generations used to bring their fruits home by way of the kitchen-garden in order to make them liable to the tithe ; whereas the later generations bring their fruits home by way of the roof, or courts, or enclosures in order to exempt them from the tithe. For R. Jannai has said : Produce is not subject to the tithe until it sees the face of the house ; as it is said, "I have put away the hallowed things out of my house" (Deut. xxvi. 13).
"If there is a Mezuzah, one does ; but if there is no Mezuzah, one does not ? Then, in the case of a Synagogue or House of Study which has no Mezuzah, there also one should not honour a man [by making way for him]!" "Nay, [the meaning is,] A door which is liable to have a Mezuzah affixed."
It ought to be "And I said"; "but it spared"! It ought to be "but I spared." R. Eleazar said : Thus spake David to Saul, "According to the Torah, thou art liable to be put to death, because thou art a pursuer ; and the Torah declares that if one comes to kill thee, kill him first. But the modesty which is manifest in thee has spared thee." In what did [Saul's modesty] consist? For it is written, "And he came to the sheep-cotes by the way, where was a cave ; and Saul went in to cover his feet" (ibid. 5:4).
We have learned elsewhere: All [hotzlot] mats are [liable to become] impure by corpse impurity, the words of Rabbi Dosa. But the Sages say: [Also by] midras impurity.
In the name of R. Shila they said: The bridegroom is exempt, but the groomsmen and the wedding guests are liable.
The main text: R. Assi said: An etrog of second tithe, according to R. Meir, a person cannot fulfill his obligation on the Festival with it, and according to the Sages he may fulfill his obligation with it on the Festival. Matzah of second tithe, according to R. Meir, a person cannot fulfill his obligation on Pesah with it, and according to the Sages one may fulfill his obligation with it on Pesah. Dough of second tithe, according to R. Meir, is exempt from hallah and according to the Sages it is liable to hallah.
Can we say that the following supports [this view]: Dough of second tithe is exempt from hallah, according to R. Meir, while the Sages say that it is liable? Can we say that the following supports [this view]! It is the identical statement!
1) If the first day of the festival falls on Shabbat, all the people bring their lulavim to the synagogue [on Friday]. 2) The next day they arise early [and come to the synagogue] and each one recognizes his own [lulav] and takes it, since the sages said “one cannot fulfill his obligation on the first day of the festival with his friend’s lulav.” 3) But on the other days of the festival one may fulfill his obligation with the lulav of his fellow. 4) Rabbi Yose says: if the first day of the festival fell on Shabbat, and he forgot and carried out his lulav into the public domain, he is not liable, since he brought it out while under the influence [of a religious act].
R. Yose says: If the first day of the festival [fell on Shabbat, and he forgot and carried out his lulav into the public domain, he is not liable, since he brought it out while under the influence of a religious act]. Abaye said:
They taught [that he is not liable] only when he had not yet fulfilled his obligation, but if he had fulfilled his obligation, he is liable. But once he lifts it up, he has fulfilled his obligation! Abaye answered: This is a case] where he held it upside down.
They taught [that he is not liable] only when he had not yet fulfilled his obligation, but if he had fulfilled his obligation, he is liable. But once he lifts it up, he has fulfilled his obligation! Abaye answered: This is a case] where he held it upside down.
What might you have thought? There [in the mishnah] he is not liable when he errs in connection with a mitzvah, because he performs a mitzvah, but here where he erred in connection with a mitzvah but he does not perform another mitzvah, I might have said that he is liable, therefore he informs us [that even here he is exempt].
What might you have thought? There [in the mishnah] he is not liable when he errs in connection with a mitzvah, because he performs a mitzvah, but here where he erred in connection with a mitzvah but he does not perform another mitzvah, I might have said that he is liable, therefore he informs us [that even here he is exempt].
They objected: R. Yose says: One who slaughters a daily offering which has not been properly examined on Shabbat, he is liable to bring a sin-offering and another daily offering must be offered.
Similarly if a city is visited by an epidemic, or its houses are falling in, etc. It was taught: The falling in of houses here spoken of refers to sound houses and not shaky ones, to such as are not liable to fall in and not to such as are liable to fall in. Are not "sound" and "not liable to fall in," the same? And are not "shaky" and "liable to fall in," the same? No, we must needs distinguish between the two, as for instance in a case where the walls (were sound but) fell, because they were too high or stood on the banks of a river.
Similarly if a city is visited by an epidemic, or its houses are falling in, etc. It was taught: The falling in of houses here spoken of refers to sound houses and not shaky ones, to such as are not liable to fall in and not to such as are liable to fall in. Are not "sound" and "not liable to fall in," the same? And are not "shaky" and "liable to fall in," the same? No, we must needs distinguish between the two, as for instance in a case where the walls (were sound but) fell, because they were too high or stood on the banks of a river.
Similarly if a city is visited by an epidemic, or its houses are falling in, etc. It was taught: The falling in of houses here spoken of refers to sound houses and not shaky ones, to such as are not liable to fall in and not to such as are liable to fall in. Are not "sound" and "not liable to fall in," the same? And are not "shaky" and "liable to fall in," the same? No, we must needs distinguish between the two, as for instance in a case where the walls (were sound but) fell, because they were too high or stood on the banks of a river.
Similarly if a city is visited by an epidemic, or its houses are falling in, etc. It was taught: The falling in of houses here spoken of refers to sound houses and not shaky ones, to such as are not liable to fall in and not to such as are liable to fall in. Are not "sound" and "not liable to fall in," the same? And are not "shaky" and "liable to fall in," the same? No, we must needs distinguish between the two, as for instance in a case where the walls (were sound but) fell, because they were too high or stood on the banks of a river.
R. Judah was once informed that a pest broke out among the swine and he ordered a public fast. Are we to say that R. Judah was of the opinion that an epidemic which breaks out among one kind (of living beings) is liable to spread also among the other kinds? No, it is different in the case of swine, because their intestines are similar to those of human beings.
From where is this derived? — As R. Shmuel b. Yitzchak taught in front of R. Huna: “Then the priest shall pronounce him clean; it is a scab; and he shall wash his clothes and be clean” (Leviticus 13:6); he is clean at the outset from having been liable to rend garments and loosen the hair.
How have you explained [the Mishnah]? As not agreeing with R. Meir. What about the end of the mishnah: There is no difference between a serving [high] priest and one whose time has passed except the bull of Yom HaKippurim and the tenth of the ephah. But we can infer that in all other matters they are the same; and so we come to the view of R. Meir, as it has been taught, If something happened to disqualify him and they appointed another priest to take his place, when the first returns to his service the second is still liable to all the obligations of the high priesthood, the words of R. Meir. R. Yose said: The first returns to his service whereas the second is not qualified to act as a high priest or as an ordinary priest.
But did not R. Yohanan said: Any talmid hakham in front of whom someone else blesses, even a high priest, who is all ignoramus, that talmid hakham is liable for the death penalty, as it says, “All that hate me [mesanai] love death” (Proverbs 8:36); read not mesanai [that hate me], but masni’ai [that cause me to be hated]?
Trespasses. But there is much in Holy Writ concerning them. Ramai bar Chama said, It was only necessary in order to agree with the following Mishnah, If the messenger has done his commission, it is the master of the house who has trespassed; if the messenger has not done his commission, the messenger has trespassed (Kiddushin, 42b, ii. 12, N'darim, 54a, ii. 7, M'ila, 20a, ii. 13, K'thuboth, 28b, ii. 16). But if he has done his commission, how has the master trespassed? And is it possible that the one should be guilty and the other liable to the punishment? This is as mountains suspended by a hair. Rabba said, But what is the difficulty? Perhaps a trespass is different. But one learns the law on this subject from the analogy of the two words, viz., "sin" in the present case, and "sin" used of the heave-offering. As in the one case, the man's messenger represents him, so in the other the man's messenger represents him. But Rabba said, It was only necessary in order to agree with the Baraitha, The master of the house remembered and the messenger did not remember. The messenger has trespassed. What then has the poor messenger done? This is as mountains suspended by a hair. Rab Ashi said, What is the difficulty? Perhaps it is more difficult than in the case of one who takes sacred money for ordinary uses. But Rab Ashi said, It was only necessary in order to agree with the canonical Mishnah, If a man have taken a stone or a beam of the sanctuary, behold, he has not trespassed. If he have given it to his neighbour, he has trespassed, but his neighbour has not trespassed (M'ilah, 9b, ii. 16, Baba Kamma, 20b, ii. 24, Baba M'tsia', 99b, ii. 3). But most assuredly he has appropriated it. What is it to me whether it be the man himself or his neighbour? This is as mountains suspended by a hair. And what is the difficulty? Perhaps it is in accordance with the words of Samuel. For Samuel said, It is thus in the case
There is a Baraitha, Be ye clean, lest ye touch the table or the lamp. And yet we have a Baraitha to this effect, viz., What is the reason that we are not taught this with reference to the lamp? It is because the table is called in Holy Writ perpetual, the lamp is not called in Holy Writ perpetual. And another says, Since Holy Writ says, "and the lamp over against the table" (Ex. xxvi. 35), it is as though it were called in Holy Writ perpetual. But another says, It was only to fix its place that it comes. But you may get it out for me in this way. For it is a vessel of wood which is made to rest; and every vessel of wood which is made to rest, is not liable to uncleanness. What is the reason then that it is liable to uncleanness? Because it is like a sack in this respect, and therefore can contract uncleanness. As a sack is moveable, whether empty or full, so also everything which is moveable whether empty or full is liable to cleansing. This also is moveable, whether empty or full. As is the teaching of Resh Lakish; for Resh Lakish said, What is the meaning of the passage, "upon the clean table?" (Lev. xxiv. 6) Undoubtedly it implies that it might be unclean. And why? It is a vessel of wood made to rest, and as such it does not receive uncleanness; but it informs us that they raise it up, and exhibit the shewbread on it to those who come up to the festival, and one says to them, Look at the love of God in giving you food. Its end was like its placing. For R. Joshua ben Levi said, A great miracle was wrought in the shewbread. As its placing was miraculous, so was its end; for it is said, "to put hot bread in the day that it was taken away" (1 Sam. xxi. 6). But you may get it out for me in this way. It is because it is overlaid. For lo, there is a canonical Mishnah, The table or the tripod table, which have had a piece broken off, or have been covered with marble, and there has been left on them a place to rest cups, may become unclean. R. Jehudah says, A place to rest cakes (Kelim, xxii. 1). And if thou sayest, It is a different matter with shittim wood, which is esteemed highly, and is not valueless, this is all right according to what Resh Lakish says. For he said, Their teaching only refers to tables made of woods that come from the province of the sea. But in the case of a vessel of Mismim it is not valueless. This is very good. But according to R. Jochanan who says, Even in the case of a vessel of Mismim also it is valueless, what is there to say? And if thou sayest, The one is the case of an overlaid article which stands, and the other, of an overlaid article which does not stand. Lo, Resh Lakish asks from R. Jochanan, Does the Mishnah treat of an overlaid article which stands, or of an overlaid article which does not stand? of one which has its extremities covered, or of one which has not its extremities covered? And he said to him, There is no difference in this respect between an overlaid article which stands and an overlaid article which does not stand. There is no difference in this respect between one which has its extremities covered, and one which has not its extremities covered. But it is the table itself which makes the difference.
There is a Baraitha, Be ye clean, lest ye touch the table or the lamp. And yet we have a Baraitha to this effect, viz., What is the reason that we are not taught this with reference to the lamp? It is because the table is called in Holy Writ perpetual, the lamp is not called in Holy Writ perpetual. And another says, Since Holy Writ says, "and the lamp over against the table" (Ex. xxvi. 35), it is as though it were called in Holy Writ perpetual. But another says, It was only to fix its place that it comes. But you may get it out for me in this way. For it is a vessel of wood which is made to rest; and every vessel of wood which is made to rest, is not liable to uncleanness. What is the reason then that it is liable to uncleanness? Because it is like a sack in this respect, and therefore can contract uncleanness. As a sack is moveable, whether empty or full, so also everything which is moveable whether empty or full is liable to cleansing. This also is moveable, whether empty or full. As is the teaching of Resh Lakish; for Resh Lakish said, What is the meaning of the passage, "upon the clean table?" (Lev. xxiv. 6) Undoubtedly it implies that it might be unclean. And why? It is a vessel of wood made to rest, and as such it does not receive uncleanness; but it informs us that they raise it up, and exhibit the shewbread on it to those who come up to the festival, and one says to them, Look at the love of God in giving you food. Its end was like its placing. For R. Joshua ben Levi said, A great miracle was wrought in the shewbread. As its placing was miraculous, so was its end; for it is said, "to put hot bread in the day that it was taken away" (1 Sam. xxi. 6). But you may get it out for me in this way. It is because it is overlaid. For lo, there is a canonical Mishnah, The table or the tripod table, which have had a piece broken off, or have been covered with marble, and there has been left on them a place to rest cups, may become unclean. R. Jehudah says, A place to rest cakes (Kelim, xxii. 1). And if thou sayest, It is a different matter with shittim wood, which is esteemed highly, and is not valueless, this is all right according to what Resh Lakish says. For he said, Their teaching only refers to tables made of woods that come from the province of the sea. But in the case of a vessel of Mismim it is not valueless. This is very good. But according to R. Jochanan who says, Even in the case of a vessel of Mismim also it is valueless, what is there to say? And if thou sayest, The one is the case of an overlaid article which stands, and the other, of an overlaid article which does not stand. Lo, Resh Lakish asks from R. Jochanan, Does the Mishnah treat of an overlaid article which stands, or of an overlaid article which does not stand? of one which has its extremities covered, or of one which has not its extremities covered? And he said to him, There is no difference in this respect between an overlaid article which stands and an overlaid article which does not stand. There is no difference in this respect between one which has its extremities covered, and one which has not its extremities covered. But it is the table itself which makes the difference.
There is a Baraitha, Be ye clean, lest ye touch the table or the lamp. And yet we have a Baraitha to this effect, viz., What is the reason that we are not taught this with reference to the lamp? It is because the table is called in Holy Writ perpetual, the lamp is not called in Holy Writ perpetual. And another says, Since Holy Writ says, "and the lamp over against the table" (Ex. xxvi. 35), it is as though it were called in Holy Writ perpetual. But another says, It was only to fix its place that it comes. But you may get it out for me in this way. For it is a vessel of wood which is made to rest; and every vessel of wood which is made to rest, is not liable to uncleanness. What is the reason then that it is liable to uncleanness? Because it is like a sack in this respect, and therefore can contract uncleanness. As a sack is moveable, whether empty or full, so also everything which is moveable whether empty or full is liable to cleansing. This also is moveable, whether empty or full. As is the teaching of Resh Lakish; for Resh Lakish said, What is the meaning of the passage, "upon the clean table?" (Lev. xxiv. 6) Undoubtedly it implies that it might be unclean. And why? It is a vessel of wood made to rest, and as such it does not receive uncleanness; but it informs us that they raise it up, and exhibit the shewbread on it to those who come up to the festival, and one says to them, Look at the love of God in giving you food. Its end was like its placing. For R. Joshua ben Levi said, A great miracle was wrought in the shewbread. As its placing was miraculous, so was its end; for it is said, "to put hot bread in the day that it was taken away" (1 Sam. xxi. 6). But you may get it out for me in this way. It is because it is overlaid. For lo, there is a canonical Mishnah, The table or the tripod table, which have had a piece broken off, or have been covered with marble, and there has been left on them a place to rest cups, may become unclean. R. Jehudah says, A place to rest cakes (Kelim, xxii. 1). And if thou sayest, It is a different matter with shittim wood, which is esteemed highly, and is not valueless, this is all right according to what Resh Lakish says. For he said, Their teaching only refers to tables made of woods that come from the province of the sea. But in the case of a vessel of Mismim it is not valueless. This is very good. But according to R. Jochanan who says, Even in the case of a vessel of Mismim also it is valueless, what is there to say? And if thou sayest, The one is the case of an overlaid article which stands, and the other, of an overlaid article which does not stand. Lo, Resh Lakish asks from R. Jochanan, Does the Mishnah treat of an overlaid article which stands, or of an overlaid article which does not stand? of one which has its extremities covered, or of one which has not its extremities covered? And he said to him, There is no difference in this respect between an overlaid article which stands and an overlaid article which does not stand. There is no difference in this respect between one which has its extremities covered, and one which has not its extremities covered. But it is the table itself which makes the difference.
Ulah said, ... It is derived from the defaming husband; just as the defaming husband is a sin without action, so too here all sins without action are liable to lashes. [This cannot be correct.] What do we find regarding the defaming husband? He receives lashes and still pays.
Rather Reish Lakish said, is is derived from false witnesses. Just as false witnesses is a sin without action, so too here a sin without action is liable to lashes. What [is the connection] to false witnesses, that does not require a warning?
The sin of a defaming husband does require a warning. And the argument will resume, neither sin is similar to the other. The common characteristic of them is that they are both sins without action and liable to lashes. So too all sins without action are liable to lashes.
The sin of a defaming husband does require a warning. And the argument will resume, neither sin is similar to the other. The common characteristic of them is that they are both sins without action and liable to lashes. So too all sins without action are liable to lashes.
MISHNA: [The false witnesses] divide the monetary payment but not the lashes. How is this? If they testified that a person was obligated to pay 200 zuz [a unit of currency] to his fellow and were then found to be false, they split the payment between them, but if they testified that a person was liable to forty lashes and were then found to be false, each [of the false witnesses] gets forty lashes.
Rava says, We need to fulfill the requirement of (Deuteronomy 19, 19) "as he plotted to do his brother" and we can not. [He plotted to make his fellow liable a full forty lashes.] If so, than money should also [not be able to be divided]. Money combines, while lashes do not combine.
What is this [statement of Rava] coming to reach us? We [already] learned this in a mishna. "Therefore, if one of the [two groups that testified someone was liable for the death penalty] is found to be zomemim, he [the person they were testifying against] and they [the zomemim] are executed, and the second [group of witnesses, who haven't been found to be zomemim] is free.
and even if they [the second group of witnesses] say that the person stole [the animal] and slaughtered or sold it on [the previous] Friday, they [the first group of witnesses] are found liable to pay [the intended fine as zomemim] because at the time that they testified, the man [the accused] was not yet found liable to the fine.
and even if they [the second group of witnesses] say that the person stole [the animal] and slaughtered or sold it on [the previous] Friday, they [the first group of witnesses] are found liable to pay [the intended fine as zomemim] because at the time that they testified, the man [the accused] was not yet found liable to the fine.
If two [witnesses] come and say, A person stole [an animal], slaughtered or sold it, and had a [guilty] verdict on Sunday, and two [other witnesses] come and say that you [the first group] were with us on Sunday, but the person did steal the animal, slaughter or sell it, and receive a [guilty] verdict on [the previous] Friday, and even if they [the second group of witnesses] say that the person stole [the animal], slaughtered or sold it, and received a [guilty] verdict on Monday, they [the first group of witnesses] are not found liable to pay [the intended fine as zomemim] because at the time that they testified, the man [the accused] was already found liable to the fine.
If two [witnesses] come and say, A person stole [an animal], slaughtered or sold it, and had a [guilty] verdict on Sunday, and two [other witnesses] come and say that you [the first group] were with us on Sunday, but the person did steal the animal, slaughter or sell it, and receive a [guilty] verdict on [the previous] Friday, and even if they [the second group of witnesses] say that the person stole [the animal], slaughtered or sold it, and received a [guilty] verdict on Monday, they [the first group of witnesses] are not found liable to pay [the intended fine as zomemim] because at the time that they testified, the man [the accused] was already found liable to the fine.
The Sages said to them, But the Torah already says (Deuteronomy 19, 19), "And you should do to them [the zomemim] as they had plotted to do to their brother", which would imply that their brother [the victim] is still alive. If so then why does [the Torah] say, "a soul for a soul"? You might think that they [the zomemim] would be liable to be killed from the time that their testimony was accepted, Therefore the Torah says "a soul for a soul" to teach us that they [zomemim] aren't executed until they succeeded in having a verdict [for their victim].
From where do we learn this rule [that zomemim aren't liable if the victim had no verdict] by lashes? The Torah uses a gezariah shava of Rasha Rasha
From where do we learn this rule [that zomemim aren't liable if the victim had no verdict] by exile? The Torah uses a gezariah shava of Rotzaich Rotzaich
[Or] if he was ascending on a ladder and if he fell and killed him, this one is not [liable for] exile. This is the general rule: Anyone on his way down, [that person is liable for] exile. Anyone that is not on his way down, [that person is liable for] exile.
[Or] if he was ascending on a ladder and if he fell and killed him, this one is not [liable for] exile. This is the general rule: Anyone on his way down, [that person is liable for] exile. Anyone that is not on his way down, [that person is liable for] exile.
[Or] if he was ascending on a ladder and if he fell and killed him, this one is not [liable for] exile. This is the general rule: Anyone on his way down, [that person is liable for] exile. Anyone that is not on his way down, [that person is liable for] exile.
Acting willfully is obvious! He is liable for death!? (Rather) Rava said: Say [instead: “Through error”] excludes the one who says it is permitted [to do a prohibited action]. Abaye said to him: If he is one who says it is permitted, [then he falls into the category of] one who had no choice. [Rava] said to him: It is because I say that the one who said it is permitted [falls into the category of] one who was grossly negligent.
“Without awareness” (Deuteronomy 19:4) excludes intentionality. Intentionality is obvious! He is liable for death!? Rabbah said: This excludes [when] he intends to kill an animal and kills a person, [when he intends to kill] a Cutite and kills a Jew, [when he intends to kill] a stillbirth and kills a viable infant.
R' Abahu asked R' Yohanan a question: If a person was ascending a ladder and a rung broke under him and it fell and struck someone below and killed him, is this a situation of ascent [where he would be exempt] or descent [where he would be held liable]? He said to him: You've already touched on this [in an earlier baraita]—in a case of descending for the purpose of ascent [here, we mean that the rung is going downward for the purpose of the person ascending].
Does it not include a butcher? Here too, it also comes to include the case of the butcher— as it is taught in a baraita: a butcher who was cutting [meat]. One tanna teaches that [if he struck someone who was standing] before him, he would liable and [if the person was behind him], he would be exempt. Another tanna teaches that [if he struck someone behind him] he would be liable and if [he struck someone before him], he would be exempt. Another tanna teaches that whether the person was before him or behind him, he would liable. And another tanna teaches that whether he was before him or behind him, he would be exempt. This is not a difficulty.
Does it not include a butcher? Here too, it also comes to include the case of the butcher— as it is taught in a baraita: a butcher who was cutting [meat]. One tanna teaches that [if he struck someone who was standing] before him, he would liable and [if the person was behind him], he would be exempt. Another tanna teaches that [if he struck someone behind him] he would be liable and if [he struck someone before him], he would be exempt. Another tanna teaches that whether the person was before him or behind him, he would liable. And another tanna teaches that whether he was before him or behind him, he would be exempt. This is not a difficulty.
Does it not include a butcher? Here too, it also comes to include the case of the butcher— as it is taught in a baraita: a butcher who was cutting [meat]. One tanna teaches that [if he struck someone who was standing] before him, he would liable and [if the person was behind him], he would be exempt. Another tanna teaches that [if he struck someone behind him] he would be liable and if [he struck someone before him], he would be exempt. Another tanna teaches that whether the person was before him or behind him, he would liable. And another tanna teaches that whether he was before him or behind him, he would be exempt. This is not a difficulty.
Here [where he would be liable for the person standing before him but exempt if he were behind him] is when the knife is descending in front of him and ascending behind him. Here [where he is he is exempt for the person standing before him but liable for the person standing behind him] is when the upward motion is in front of him but the downward motion is behind him.
Here [where he would be liable for the person standing before him but exempt if he were behind him] is when the knife is descending in front of him and ascending behind him. Here [where he is he is exempt for the person standing before him but liable for the person standing behind him] is when the upward motion is in front of him but the downward motion is behind him.
Here [where he is liable in both situations] is when the downward motion is both in front of him and behind him. And here [where he is exempt in all cases] is when the upward motion is both in front of him and behind him.
[Now we return back to the debate between R' Abahu and R. Yohanan about the case of the fallen rung]. Let us say this same issue was the matter of a Tannaitic debate: One who is ascending a ladder and a rung falls. One tanna taught that he is liable and another taught that he is exempt. Was it not about this that they were disagreeing? One of them held that it was a case of descent [where he is liable] and one of them holds that he is ascending [where he is exempt].
[Now we return back to the debate between R' Abahu and R. Yohanan about the case of the fallen rung]. Let us say this same issue was the matter of a Tannaitic debate: One who is ascending a ladder and a rung falls. One tanna taught that he is liable and another taught that he is exempt. Was it not about this that they were disagreeing? One of them held that it was a case of descent [where he is liable] and one of them holds that he is ascending [where he is exempt].
And if you want, say that they both agree that the wood was not rotten and it is [still] not a difficulty: Here [where he would be exempt from exile] is when the rung has been fastened. Here, [where he would be liable] is when he did not fasten it.
Rather, Rav Aha son of Yaakov said: It's a case where he [the Israelite] testified against him [the Samaritan that he would be liable for lashing] and he was found guilty of falsely testifying [so whatever punishment he tried to give the Samaritan, he would suffer]. Similarly regarding a slave who testified against [an Israelite that would be punished with lashes] and was found to be a false witness—can a slave even give testimony?! [Therefore, this solution must be wrong because this half of the baraita doesn't make sense]. Rather, Rav Aha son of Rav Ika said: Here is what we are dealing with [where slave and Samaritan are lashed because of Israelite]: a case where he struck him with a wound
And they [Rav Hisda and Rava] go according to their principles, as it was stated [in an Amoraic teaching]: He thought that it was an animal and [after he killed him] it was found to be a person, or if he thought it was a non-Jew and it was found to be a resident foreigner, Rava says: He is liable. One who says it was permitted is [a case of] gross negligence. Rav Hisda says: He is exempt. One who says it was permitted is [a case of] freak accident.