105 occurrences across the corpus

The Babylonian Talmud

Babylonian Talmud Chagigah 1:67

R. Jochanan put this difficulty to Resh Lakish; "he shall be seen," "He shall see" (Exod. xxiii. 17; Deut. xvi. 16). As I am seen freely, so shall ye see me freely. But every one who comes and does not bring an offering, all the world agrees that he goes up and allows himself to be seen and goes away. But they differ in the case of one who comes and brings an offering. R. Jochanan says, The simple presenting of oneself in the Court is the real presenting of oneself, and so has no limit of times prescribed, while on the contrary the presenting of oneself for an offering has a limit of times prescribed. But Resh Lakish said, The presenting of oneself with an offering is alone the real presenting of oneself, for if it be the case of an offering also, there is no limit. He put this difficulty to him, "Let thy foot be seldom in thy neighbour's house" (Prov. xxv. 17). But here it has to do with sin-offerings and trespass-offerings. So is the opinion of R. Levi. For R. Levi adduces the passage, "Let thy foot be seldom in thy neighbour's house," and the passage, "I will come into thy house with burnt-offerings" (Ps. lxvi. 12). There is no difficulty. In the one case it has to do with sin-offerings and trespass-offerings, in the other with burnt-offerings and peace-offerings. There is a Baraitha also to this effect, viz., "Let thy foot be seldom in thy neighbour's house:" the passage speaks of sin-offerings and trespass-offerings; if thou sayest, Of sin-offerings and trespass-offerings? perhaps not, but of burnt-offerings and peace-offerings, as he says, "I will come into thy house with burnt-offerings, I will pay thee my vows" (Ps. lxvi. 12), for see, they actually speak there of burnt-offerings and peace-offerings; Nay, but look thou how I explain, "Let thy foot be seldom in thy neighbour's house," viz., that the passage is speaking of sin-offerings and trespass-offerings.

Babylonian Talmud Chagigah 2:49

Our Rabbis have taught thus, There is a story about Acher, that he was riding upon his horse on the sabbath, and R. Meir was walking behind him to learn the Law from his mouth. He said to him, Meir, turn thee backwards, for I have already measured by means of my horse's hoofs up to this point the limit of a sabbath day's journey. He said to him, Do thou also turn thyself back. He said to him, And have I not already said to thee, I have already heard from behind the curtain, "'Return, O backsliding children,' except Acher?" He forced him to enter a place of instruction. He said to a child, Repeat for me thy verse. He said to him, "There is no peace, saith the LORD, unto the wicked" (Is. xlviii. 22). He brought him into another synagogue. He said to a child, Repeat for me thy verse. He said to him, "For though thou wash thee with lye, and take thee much soap, yet thine iniquity is marked before me" (Jer. ii. 22). He brought him into another synagogue. He said

Babylonian Talmud Chagigah 2:96

And what is your authority for saying that common food does not want intention? Because there is a canonical Mishnah, If a wave of water, which is let loose and contains forty seahs, falls upon a man or upon vessels, they are clean (Chullin 31b, i. 1). For it teaches that a man is like vessels. As vessels have no intention, so a man has no intention. But whence do you gather that he has no intention? Perhaps we are dealing with the case of a man sitting and watching when the wave shall be let loose. And vessels are like a man. As a man utters his intention, so in the case of vessels persons exercise intention for them. And when thou sayest, It is the case of a man sitting and watching, what is the good of the story, for in that case he has an intention? Thou mightest have thought, It is to set a limit. Perhaps otherwise he would have gone to dip himself in a collection of stagnant rain-water. Thus also we limit it to the first fall, on account of the second being unlawful. We learn from this that we are not to limit it. And what is your authority for saying that men do not dip in the second fall? Because there is a Baraitha, viz., Men dip in the first, but do not dip in the second, that they may not dip in the air. But we also learn it hence, for there is a canonical Mishnah, If fruits have fallen into the midst of a reservoir of water, and if one whose hands are unclean should reach out and lay hold of them, his hands are clean, and the fruits are clean. But if he did this that he might wash his hands, his hands are clean, but the fruits are unclean (Makhshirin, iv. 7).

Babylonian Talmud Chagigah 2:96

And what is your authority for saying that common food does not want intention? Because there is a canonical Mishnah, If a wave of water, which is let loose and contains forty seahs, falls upon a man or upon vessels, they are clean (Chullin 31b, i. 1). For it teaches that a man is like vessels. As vessels have no intention, so a man has no intention. But whence do you gather that he has no intention? Perhaps we are dealing with the case of a man sitting and watching when the wave shall be let loose. And vessels are like a man. As a man utters his intention, so in the case of vessels persons exercise intention for them. And when thou sayest, It is the case of a man sitting and watching, what is the good of the story, for in that case he has an intention? Thou mightest have thought, It is to set a limit. Perhaps otherwise he would have gone to dip himself in a collection of stagnant rain-water. Thus also we limit it to the first fall, on account of the second being unlawful. We learn from this that we are not to limit it. And what is your authority for saying that men do not dip in the second fall? Because there is a Baraitha, viz., Men dip in the first, but do not dip in the second, that they may not dip in the air. But we also learn it hence, for there is a canonical Mishnah, If fruits have fallen into the midst of a reservoir of water, and if one whose hands are unclean should reach out and lay hold of them, his hands are clean, and the fruits are clean. But if he did this that he might wash his hands, his hands are clean, but the fruits are unclean (Makhshirin, iv. 7).

Babylonian Talmud Chagigah 2:96

And what is your authority for saying that common food does not want intention? Because there is a canonical Mishnah, If a wave of water, which is let loose and contains forty seahs, falls upon a man or upon vessels, they are clean (Chullin 31b, i. 1). For it teaches that a man is like vessels. As vessels have no intention, so a man has no intention. But whence do you gather that he has no intention? Perhaps we are dealing with the case of a man sitting and watching when the wave shall be let loose. And vessels are like a man. As a man utters his intention, so in the case of vessels persons exercise intention for them. And when thou sayest, It is the case of a man sitting and watching, what is the good of the story, for in that case he has an intention? Thou mightest have thought, It is to set a limit. Perhaps otherwise he would have gone to dip himself in a collection of stagnant rain-water. Thus also we limit it to the first fall, on account of the second being unlawful. We learn from this that we are not to limit it. And what is your authority for saying that men do not dip in the second fall? Because there is a Baraitha, viz., Men dip in the first, but do not dip in the second, that they may not dip in the air. But we also learn it hence, for there is a canonical Mishnah, If fruits have fallen into the midst of a reservoir of water, and if one whose hands are unclean should reach out and lay hold of them, his hands are clean, and the fruits are clean. But if he did this that he might wash his hands, his hands are clean, but the fruits are unclean (Makhshirin, iv. 7).