32 occurrences across the corpus

The Works of Flavius Josephus

The Wars of the Jews, Book II 8:9

But in the judgments they exercise they are most accurate and just, nor do they pass sentence by the votes of a court that is fewer than a hundred. And as to what is once determined by that number, it is unalterable. What they most of all honor, after God himself, is the name of their legislator [Moses], whom if any one blaspheme he is punished capitally. They also think it a good thing to obey their elders, and the major part. Accordingly, if ten of them be sitting together, no one of them will speak while the other nine are against it. They also avoid spitting in the midst of them, or on the right side. Moreover, they are stricter than any other of the Jews in resting from their labors on the seventh day; for they not only get their food ready the day before, that they may not be obliged to kindle a fire on that day, but they will not remove any vessel out of its place, nor go to stool thereon. Nay, on other days they dig a small pit, a foot deep, with a paddle [which kind of hatchet is given them when they are first admitted among them]; and covering themselves round with their garment, that they may not affront the Divine rays of light, they ease themselves into that pit, after which they put the earth that was dug out again into the pit; and even this they do only in the more lonely places, which they choose out for this purpose; and although this easement of the body be natural, yet it is a rule with them to wash themselves after it, as if it were a defilement to them.

The Wars of the Jews, Book IV 2:2

Now Titus, as he rode out to Gischala, found it would be easy for him to take the city upon the first onset; but knew withal, that if he took it by force, the multitude would be destroyed by the soldiers without mercy. [Now he was already satiated with the shedding of blood, and pitied the major part, who would then perish, without distinction, together with the guilty.] So he was rather desirous the city might be surrendered up to him on terms. Accordingly, when he saw the wall full of those men that were of the corrupted party, he said to them, That he could not but wonder what it was they depended on, when they alone staid to fight the Romans, after every other city was taken by them, especially when they have seen cities much better fortified than theirs is overthrown by a single attack upon them; while as many as have intrusted themselves to the security of the Romans' right hands, which he now offers to them, without regarding their former insolence, do enjoy their own possessions in safety; for that while they had hopes of recovering their liberty, they might be pardoned; but that their continuance still in their opposition, when they saw that to be impossible, was inexcusable; for that if they will not comply with such humane offers, and right hands for security, they should have experience of such a war as would spare nobody, and should soon be made sensible that their wall would be but a trifle, when battered by the Roman machines; in depending on which they demonstrate themselves to be the only Galileans that were no better than arrogant slaves and captives.

The Writings of Origen

Against Celsus, Book VII 15:1

After assuming that some things were foretold which are impossible in themselves, and inconsistent with the character of God, he says: “If these things were predicted of the Most High God, are we bound to believe them of God simply because they were predicted?” And thus he thinks he proves, that although the prophets may have foretold truly such things of the Son of God, yet it is impossible for us to believe in those prophecies declaring that He would do or suffer such things. To this our answer is that the supposition is absurd, for it combines two lines of reasoning which are opposed to each other, and therefore mutually destructive. This may be shown as follows. The one argument is: “If any true prophets of the Most High say that God will become a slave, or suffer sickness, or die, these things will come to God; for it is impossible that the prophets of the great God should utter lies.” The other is: “If even true prophets of the Most High God say that these same things shall come to pass, seeing that these things foretold are by the nature of things impossible, the prophecies are not true, and therefore those things which have been foretold will not happen to God.” When, then, we find two processes of reasoning in both of which the major premiss is the same, leading to two contradictory conclusions, we use the form of argument called “the theorem of two propositions,” to prove that the major premiss is false, which in the case before us is this, “that the prophets have foretold that the great God should become a slave, suffer sickness, or die.” We conclude, then, that the prophets never foretold such things; and the argument is formally expressed as follows: 1st, Of two things, if the first is true, the second is true; 2d, if the first is true, the second is not true, therefore the first is not true. The concrete example which the Stoics give to illustrate this form of argument is the following: 1st, If you know that you are dead, you are dead; 2d, if you know that you are dead, you are not dead. And the conclusion is—“you do not know that you are dead.” These propositions are worked out as follows: If you know that you are dead, that which you know is certain; therefore you are dead. Again, if you know that you are dead, your death is an object of knowledge; but as the dead know nothing, your knowing this proves that you are not dead. Accordingly, by joining the two arguments together, you arrive at the conclusion—“you do not know that you are dead.” Now the hypothesis of Celsus which we have given above is much of the same kind.

Against Celsus, Book VII 15:1

After assuming that some things were foretold which are impossible in themselves, and inconsistent with the character of God, he says: “If these things were predicted of the Most High God, are we bound to believe them of God simply because they were predicted?” And thus he thinks he proves, that although the prophets may have foretold truly such things of the Son of God, yet it is impossible for us to believe in those prophecies declaring that He would do or suffer such things. To this our answer is that the supposition is absurd, for it combines two lines of reasoning which are opposed to each other, and therefore mutually destructive. This may be shown as follows. The one argument is: “If any true prophets of the Most High say that God will become a slave, or suffer sickness, or die, these things will come to God; for it is impossible that the prophets of the great God should utter lies.” The other is: “If even true prophets of the Most High God say that these same things shall come to pass, seeing that these things foretold are by the nature of things impossible, the prophecies are not true, and therefore those things which have been foretold will not happen to God.” When, then, we find two processes of reasoning in both of which the major premiss is the same, leading to two contradictory conclusions, we use the form of argument called “the theorem of two propositions,” to prove that the major premiss is false, which in the case before us is this, “that the prophets have foretold that the great God should become a slave, suffer sickness, or die.” We conclude, then, that the prophets never foretold such things; and the argument is formally expressed as follows: 1st, Of two things, if the first is true, the second is true; 2d, if the first is true, the second is not true, therefore the first is not true. The concrete example which the Stoics give to illustrate this form of argument is the following: 1st, If you know that you are dead, you are dead; 2d, if you know that you are dead, you are not dead. And the conclusion is—“you do not know that you are dead.” These propositions are worked out as follows: If you know that you are dead, that which you know is certain; therefore you are dead. Again, if you know that you are dead, your death is an object of knowledge; but as the dead know nothing, your knowing this proves that you are not dead. Accordingly, by joining the two arguments together, you arrive at the conclusion—“you do not know that you are dead.” Now the hypothesis of Celsus which we have given above is much of the same kind.

The Mishnah

Mishnah Ketubot 7:9

A man in whom defects have arisen [after marriage] cannot be forced to divorce [his wife]. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel said: To what does this apply: to minor defects, but with regard to major defects he can be forced to divorce her.

Mishnah Eduyot 6:2

Rabbi Joshua and Rabbi Nehunia ben Elinathan, a man of Kefar Habavli, testified concerning a limb [separated] from a corpse that it is impure; whereas Rabbi Eliezer says: they declared [this] only of a limb from a living [man]. They said to him: is not there an inference from the minor to the major (kal vehomer): If in the case of a living man [who is himself pure] a limb severed from him is impure, how much more in the case of a corpse [which is itself impure] should a limb severed from it be impure! He said to them: they have [nevertheless] declared it only of a limb from a living man. Another answer: The impurity of living men is greater than the impurity of corpses, because a living man causes that on which he lies and sits to become capable of making impure a man and clothing, and [he causes also] what is over him to transfer impurity to foods and liquids- which is defilement that a corpse does not cause.

Pirkei Avot (Mishnah Avot) 4:2

Ben Azzai said: Be quick in performing a minor commandment as in the case of a major one, and flee from transgression; For one commandment leads to another commandment, and transgression leads to another transgression; For the reward for performing a commandment is another commandment and the reward for committing a transgression is a transgression.

Mishnah Tevul Yom 1:1

If one had collected hallah [portions] with the intention of keeping them separate, but in the meantime they had become stuck together: Bet Shammai say: they are connected in the case of a tevul yom. But Bet Hillel say: they are not connected. Pieces of dough [of terumah] that had become stuck together, Or loaves that had become joined, or one who bakes a batter-cake on top of another batter-cake before it could form a crust in the oven, or the froth on the water that was bubbling, or the first scum that rises when boiling groats of beans, or the scum of new wine (r. Judah says: also that of rice): Bet Shammai say: they are connected in the case of a tevul yom. But Bet Hillel say: they are not connected. They agree [that they serve as connectives] if they come into contact with other kinds of uncleanness, whether they be of minor or major grades.

Mishnah Tevul Yom 2:1

Liquids that come out of a tevul yom are like those which he has touched: neither of them causes defilement. With regard to all others that are unclean, be they of minor or major [degree], the liquids that come out of them are like those they touch; both have first degree impurity. Except for liquid that is a "father of impurity."

The Jerusalem Talmud

Jerusalem Talmud Terumot 2:15

It was stated: “Rebbi Jehudah said, about what was this said? About Great Heave which must be given from what is earmarked. But for the heave of the tithe, everything is supposed to be whole. If he gave Great Heave and heave of the tithe together, it is not whole.” Jehudah ben Rebbi said, he certainly did not want to overstep the words of the Torah in giving heave of the tithe before the Great Heave. Rebbi Abba bar Mamal objected: Did we not state that “one may not give heave from impure produce for pure”? Think about it, when he did it and said, I did not intend to transgress the words of the Torah! Rebbi Abba bar Mamal said, if you say so, you let him flee from a minor sin to a major one! Ṭevel is a deadly sin, but an impure person who ate pure food oversteps a positive commandment.

Jerusalem Talmud Orlah 3:9

A baraita supports both of them. The baraita supports Rebbi Eleazar. “(Ex. 13:3) ‘Sour bread shall not be eaten’, to make the feeder equal to the eater. You say for this, or is it only to forbid its usufruct? Since it says (Deut. 16:3): ‘You shall not eat sour bread with it,’ we learned that usufruct is forbidden. Therefore, why does the verse say, sour bread shall not be eaten? To make the feeder equal to the eater, the words of Rebbi Josia. Rebbi Isaac says, this is unnecessary. Since for crawling things, a minor prohibition, He made the feeder equal to the eater; regarding sour bread which is a major prohibition it should only be logical that he feeder be equal to the eater. Therefore, why does the verse say, sour bread shall not be eaten? The verse comes only to forbid its usufruct.” Since it is written “sour bread shall not be eaten.” Therefore, from “you shall not eat” one cannot infer anything. This supports Rebbi Joḥanan.

Jerusalem Talmud Bikkurim 2:43

HALAKHAH: Rebbi Abba, Rav Huna in the name of Rav: If he was warned, he is whipped. But did we not state: “But one is not guilty because of the blood of crawling beings”? Rebbi Abba said, one is not subject to extirpation for it. But was it not stated: “The blood of two-legged beings which have no minor impurity, the blood of crawling things which have no major impurity”? Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Ada said, that is, if they warned him because of blood. But if they warned him because of abomination, he is whipped.

Jerusalem Talmud Pesachim 2:10

A baraita supports both of them. The baraita supports Rebbi Eleazar. Sour bread shall not be eaten, to make the feeder equal to the eater. And you say for this, or is it only to forbid its usufruct? Since it says: You shall not eat sour bread with it, we learned that usufruct is forbidden. Therefore, why does the verse say, sour bread shall not be eaten? To make the feeder equal to the eater, the words of Rebbi Josia. Rebbi Isaac says, this is unnecessary. Since for crawling things, a minor prohibition, He made the feeder equal to the eater; regarding sour bread which is a major prohibition it should only be logical that we consider the feeder to be equal to the eater. Therefore, why does the verse say, sour bread shall not be eaten? The verse serves only to forbid its usufruct. Since it is written, sour bread shall not be eaten, therefore from you shall not eat one cannot infer anything. This supports Rebbi Joḥanan .

Jerusalem Talmud Yoma 8:27

Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish asked, what could He have said instead of will not be deprived? “Shall not eat”? All eating in the Torah is by the volume of an olive, but here by the volume of a date. Rav Hoshaia said, “watch yourself, lest, not be deprived,” would be three warnings. Rebbi Ḥuna said, watch yourself regarding the saying which I said to you, watch yourself in matters of skin disease to be very careful and act, etc. Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: Punishment could [not] have been said about work since it is unnecessary. I could have inferred it from deprivation. [Since for deprivation] which is minor one is liable to extirpation, for work which is major it should be logical that one should be liable for extirpation. Therefore punishment was spelled out for work only to imply a warning preceding it. Since the punishment indicated for work is preceded by a warning, also the punishment indicated for deprivation is preceded by a warning. Rebbi Zeˋira said, this implies that one may infer about an “equal cut” even if it is free only on one side. Rebbi Yudan said, Is that not Rebbi Aqiba’s? And Rebbi Aqiba said, one infers about an “equal cut” even if it is not free.

Jerusalem Talmud Beitzah 1:3

“Everybody agrees that an egg of which a major part was laid before the start of the holiday may be eaten on the holiday”. Where do they disagree? If a minor part came out, where the House of Shammai say that it may be eaten, but the House of Hillel say that it may not be eaten. “ Just as it is forbidden as food so it is forbidden to be moved. If one was mixed with a hundred or a thousand, they are all forbidden”. How? Following him who said, if the preparation is in doubt it is forbidden; but him who said, if the preparation is in doubt it is permitted, here he agrees that it is forbidden. For wind-fall there is a doubt where it fell today or fell yesterday, but here one is forbidden and it is proof for all of them.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 7:30

MISHNAH: If a man developed defects, one does not force him to divorce. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel said, when has this been said? For minor defects. But for major defects one forces him to divorce.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 7:31

HALAKHAH: “If a man developed defects,” etc. Rav Jehudah in the name of Rav: So is the Mishnah, “if he had.” But if they developed newly, one forces him to divorce. Rebbi Abba bar Cahana in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Practice follows Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel. There came a case before Rebbi Jeremiah about a kopeaḥ, and he forced him. It turns out that following Rav if he did not become so, following Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel if he became so. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel follows Rebbi Meïr. Which [statement of] Rebbi Meïr? The former or the later? If the former, until she made a condition. If the later, even if he made a condition it is nothing. But this Mishnah turns out following Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel; does “the following one forces to divorce” [follows] the rabbis? Let us hear from the following: “Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, if it was a major defect, e. g., blind in one eye, amputated of one of his hands, lame in one of his legs, immediately he shall divorce and pay the ketubah.” This Mishnah turns out following Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel; “the following one forces to divorce” [follows] the rabbis.

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 4:23

Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav: Money can be non-designated, no animal can be non-designated. Rav Sheshet said, it was stated thus: “I might think that one could not satisfy his obligation with his father’s sacrifice, with an animal which he dedicated, whether from a minor sin for a major sin, or from a major sin for a minor sin, or from a minor sin for a minor sin, or from a major sin for a major sin, since he cannot shave for his nezirut with his father’s animal; but he could satisfy his obligation with his father’s sacrifice, with money he dedicated, whether from a minor sin for a major sin, or from a major sin for a minor sin, or from a minor sin for a minor sin, or from a major sin for a major sin, since he can shave on money for his nezirut, any time it is not designated, but not if it is designated. The verse says, ‘his sacrifice’, he can only satisfy his obligation with his sacrifice, not with his father’s sacrifice.” Talking about money, one mentions “not designated”.

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 4:23

Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav: Money can be non-designated, no animal can be non-designated. Rav Sheshet said, it was stated thus: “I might think that one could not satisfy his obligation with his father’s sacrifice, with an animal which he dedicated, whether from a minor sin for a major sin, or from a major sin for a minor sin, or from a minor sin for a minor sin, or from a major sin for a major sin, since he cannot shave for his nezirut with his father’s animal; but he could satisfy his obligation with his father’s sacrifice, with money he dedicated, whether from a minor sin for a major sin, or from a major sin for a minor sin, or from a minor sin for a minor sin, or from a major sin for a major sin, since he can shave on money for his nezirut, any time it is not designated, but not if it is designated. The verse says, ‘his sacrifice’, he can only satisfy his obligation with his sacrifice, not with his father’s sacrifice.” Talking about money, one mentions “not designated”.

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 4:23

Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav: Money can be non-designated, no animal can be non-designated. Rav Sheshet said, it was stated thus: “I might think that one could not satisfy his obligation with his father’s sacrifice, with an animal which he dedicated, whether from a minor sin for a major sin, or from a major sin for a minor sin, or from a minor sin for a minor sin, or from a major sin for a major sin, since he cannot shave for his nezirut with his father’s animal; but he could satisfy his obligation with his father’s sacrifice, with money he dedicated, whether from a minor sin for a major sin, or from a major sin for a minor sin, or from a minor sin for a minor sin, or from a major sin for a major sin, since he can shave on money for his nezirut, any time it is not designated, but not if it is designated. The verse says, ‘his sacrifice’, he can only satisfy his obligation with his sacrifice, not with his father’s sacrifice.” Talking about money, one mentions “not designated”.

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 4:23

Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav: Money can be non-designated, no animal can be non-designated. Rav Sheshet said, it was stated thus: “I might think that one could not satisfy his obligation with his father’s sacrifice, with an animal which he dedicated, whether from a minor sin for a major sin, or from a major sin for a minor sin, or from a minor sin for a minor sin, or from a major sin for a major sin, since he cannot shave for his nezirut with his father’s animal; but he could satisfy his obligation with his father’s sacrifice, with money he dedicated, whether from a minor sin for a major sin, or from a major sin for a minor sin, or from a minor sin for a minor sin, or from a major sin for a major sin, since he can shave on money for his nezirut, any time it is not designated, but not if it is designated. The verse says, ‘his sacrifice’, he can only satisfy his obligation with his sacrifice, not with his father’s sacrifice.” Talking about money, one mentions “not designated”.

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 4:23

Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav: Money can be non-designated, no animal can be non-designated. Rav Sheshet said, it was stated thus: “I might think that one could not satisfy his obligation with his father’s sacrifice, with an animal which he dedicated, whether from a minor sin for a major sin, or from a major sin for a minor sin, or from a minor sin for a minor sin, or from a major sin for a major sin, since he cannot shave for his nezirut with his father’s animal; but he could satisfy his obligation with his father’s sacrifice, with money he dedicated, whether from a minor sin for a major sin, or from a major sin for a minor sin, or from a minor sin for a minor sin, or from a major sin for a major sin, since he can shave on money for his nezirut, any time it is not designated, but not if it is designated. The verse says, ‘his sacrifice’, he can only satisfy his obligation with his sacrifice, not with his father’s sacrifice.” Talking about money, one mentions “not designated”.

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 4:23

Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav: Money can be non-designated, no animal can be non-designated. Rav Sheshet said, it was stated thus: “I might think that one could not satisfy his obligation with his father’s sacrifice, with an animal which he dedicated, whether from a minor sin for a major sin, or from a major sin for a minor sin, or from a minor sin for a minor sin, or from a major sin for a major sin, since he cannot shave for his nezirut with his father’s animal; but he could satisfy his obligation with his father’s sacrifice, with money he dedicated, whether from a minor sin for a major sin, or from a major sin for a minor sin, or from a minor sin for a minor sin, or from a major sin for a major sin, since he can shave on money for his nezirut, any time it is not designated, but not if it is designated. The verse says, ‘his sacrifice’, he can only satisfy his obligation with his sacrifice, not with his father’s sacrifice.” Talking about money, one mentions “not designated”.

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 4:23

Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav: Money can be non-designated, no animal can be non-designated. Rav Sheshet said, it was stated thus: “I might think that one could not satisfy his obligation with his father’s sacrifice, with an animal which he dedicated, whether from a minor sin for a major sin, or from a major sin for a minor sin, or from a minor sin for a minor sin, or from a major sin for a major sin, since he cannot shave for his nezirut with his father’s animal; but he could satisfy his obligation with his father’s sacrifice, with money he dedicated, whether from a minor sin for a major sin, or from a major sin for a minor sin, or from a minor sin for a minor sin, or from a major sin for a major sin, since he can shave on money for his nezirut, any time it is not designated, but not if it is designated. The verse says, ‘his sacrifice’, he can only satisfy his obligation with his sacrifice, not with his father’s sacrifice.” Talking about money, one mentions “not designated”.

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 4:23

Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav: Money can be non-designated, no animal can be non-designated. Rav Sheshet said, it was stated thus: “I might think that one could not satisfy his obligation with his father’s sacrifice, with an animal which he dedicated, whether from a minor sin for a major sin, or from a major sin for a minor sin, or from a minor sin for a minor sin, or from a major sin for a major sin, since he cannot shave for his nezirut with his father’s animal; but he could satisfy his obligation with his father’s sacrifice, with money he dedicated, whether from a minor sin for a major sin, or from a major sin for a minor sin, or from a minor sin for a minor sin, or from a major sin for a major sin, since he can shave on money for his nezirut, any time it is not designated, but not if it is designated. The verse says, ‘his sacrifice’, he can only satisfy his obligation with his sacrifice, not with his father’s sacrifice.” Talking about money, one mentions “not designated”.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 3:64

Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba went to Tyre. When he came before Rebbi Joḥanan, he asked him, what case did you handle? He said to him, a proselyte who had been circumcised but had not immersed himself. He asked him, why did you not injure him? Rebbi Joshua ben Levi told him, leave him alone, he acted correctly not to injure him. The argument of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi seems inverted. There, Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa, Rebbi Simeon bar Abba, Rebbi Joshua ben Levi, in the name of Rebbi Gamliel ben Rebbi: The child is neither qualified nor disqualified but dirtied. And here, he says so? Did we not state: If a proselyte was circumcised but not immersed, immersed but not circumcised, everything depends on circumcision, the words of Rebbi Eliezer. Rebbi Joshua says, immersion also is necessary. But Rebbi Joshua ben Levi follows what Bar Qappara stated, as Bar Qappara stated: A proselyte who was circumcised but not immersed is qualified since there is no proselyte who did not immerse himself for his emission of semen. Is that not difficult? The cleansing from a minor impurity is counted for him for a major impurity? Rebbi Yose ben Abun said, since either one is for the holiness of Israel, it is counted for him.

The Babylonian Talmud

Babylonian Talmud Berakhot 3:216

It may be taken that both these teachings apply to a male, and there is no contradiction : the former referring to the major function of nature, the other to the minor.

Babylonian Talmud Berakhot 3:217

But how canst thou understand it in this way? For if the second teaching refers to the minor function, why uncover a handbreadth behind ? Nay ; they should both be referred to the major function, and there is no contradiction : the first teaching applying to a male, the other to a female.

Babylonian Talmud Berakhot 3:294

how is this? The latter verse refers to the major natural function, the former to the minor. Infer, then, that the Torah forbids [the Shema' to be read] near to urine only when it is by fecal matter ; but if it has fallen upon the ground, it is permitted [by the Torah], but the Rabbis have decreed against it. Have the Rabbis decreed against it ? When it is certain [that urine is there] ; but if there is a doubt, they do not decree against it.

Babylonian Talmud Berakhot 9:142

There are three major books of the Hagiographa [to dream of which has significance]. Who dreams of the Book of Psalms may hope for piety ; of Proverbs, may hope for wisdom ; of Job, he should be concerned about punishment.

Babylonian Talmud Sukkah 1:45

The fact is that they differ on two [points]. They differ on a small Sukkah and they differ on a large Sukkah. But the text is defective and is to be read like this: ‘He whose head and the greater part of his body were within the Sukkah and his table within the house, Bais Shammai say, He has not fulfilled his obligation and Bais Hillel says: He has. and if it is [able to contain only his head and the major part of his body alone, Beth Shammai says it's pasul and Bais Hillel says it's Kosher.’

Babylonian Talmud Sukkah 1:372

Can we say that the following provides support for his view: If [the sukkah] cannot contain his head, the major part of his body and his table, or if a breach has been made in it large enough for a kid to jump in headlong, or if he placed on it a plank four handbreadths wide, even if he puts in three handbreadths, it is invalid.