prohibition
613 occurrences across the corpus
The Jerusalem Talmud
“Ben Bathyra permits horses.” Ben Bathyra said this only about a male horse because it kills its owner in war. Some say, because it runs after females, and some say, because it stands still to urinate. What is between them? A gelding. He who says because it runs after females, it does not run. He who says because it stands still to urinate, this one also stands still to urinate. [Rebbi Aḥa in the name of] Rebbi Tanḥum bar Ḥiyya: If it gets old he binds it to the grindstone. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Huna: Ben Bathyra and Rebbi Nathan both said the same, as it was stated: “If he carried out domestic animals, wild animals, or birds, whether alive or dead, he is liable. Rebbi Nathan says, dead he is liable, alive he is not liable.” The rabbis hold that he is liable for a purification sacrifice and they answer him so? They answer following his own argument. Following your argument, since you are saying because of rabbinic Sabbath prohibition, also we hold that if it gets old he binds it to the grindstone. Rebbi says, I am saying that it is forbidden for two reasons, as a weapon and as a large animal. It was stated so: A large wild animal is like a (small) [large] domestic animal. Who stated this? Rebbi. The words of the Sages: Rebbi Bisna, Rebbi Ḥanan bar Abba in the name of Rav: A wild animal is like a (large) [small] domestic animal.
Rebbi Simeon, Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Yose bar Ḥanina: a Jewish braider should not braid a Gentile because of “do not give on them charm.” Also a Jew should not be a Gentile’s best man because of do not contract marriage with them. Rebbi Isaac from Gufta asked before Rebbi Mana: It is forbidden to go to their wedding feasts, not a fortiori to become his best man? He told him, to put a biblical prohibition on it.
MISHNAH: The following Gentile properties are forbidden and the prohibition is of usufruct: Wine, and vinegar which originally was wine, and Hadrianic pottery, and heart-removed skins. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, if the tear is circular they are forbidden, oblong permitted. Meat brought into a pagan Temple is permitted but what leaves is forbidden because it is sacrifice to the dead, the words of Rebbi Aqiba. It is forbidden to trade with those who go to ugliness.
“And Hadrianic pottery.” Rebbi Ze`ira in the name of Rebbi Jeremiah: does practice follow Rebbi Meïr? As it was stated, “Hadrianic pottery is prohibited and its prohibition is of usufruct, the words of Rebbi Meïr, but the Sages say, its prohibition is not of usufruct.” Rebbi Jeremiah asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: what is the status of the cloth about which we stated here? He was offended by this and told him, even for him who permits there, here it is forbidden. There, the prohibition is not visible, here the prohibition is visible. May one use it to support the legs of a couch? Rebbi Eleazar says it is permitted, Rebbi Joḥanan says it is forbidden.
“And Hadrianic pottery.” Rebbi Ze`ira in the name of Rebbi Jeremiah: does practice follow Rebbi Meïr? As it was stated, “Hadrianic pottery is prohibited and its prohibition is of usufruct, the words of Rebbi Meïr, but the Sages say, its prohibition is not of usufruct.” Rebbi Jeremiah asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: what is the status of the cloth about which we stated here? He was offended by this and told him, even for him who permits there, here it is forbidden. There, the prohibition is not visible, here the prohibition is visible. May one use it to support the legs of a couch? Rebbi Eleazar says it is permitted, Rebbi Joḥanan says it is forbidden.
“And Hadrianic pottery.” Rebbi Ze`ira in the name of Rebbi Jeremiah: does practice follow Rebbi Meïr? As it was stated, “Hadrianic pottery is prohibited and its prohibition is of usufruct, the words of Rebbi Meïr, but the Sages say, its prohibition is not of usufruct.” Rebbi Jeremiah asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: what is the status of the cloth about which we stated here? He was offended by this and told him, even for him who permits there, here it is forbidden. There, the prohibition is not visible, here the prohibition is visible. May one use it to support the legs of a couch? Rebbi Eleazar says it is permitted, Rebbi Joḥanan says it is forbidden.
“And Hadrianic pottery.” Rebbi Ze`ira in the name of Rebbi Jeremiah: does practice follow Rebbi Meïr? As it was stated, “Hadrianic pottery is prohibited and its prohibition is of usufruct, the words of Rebbi Meïr, but the Sages say, its prohibition is not of usufruct.” Rebbi Jeremiah asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: what is the status of the cloth about which we stated here? He was offended by this and told him, even for him who permits there, here it is forbidden. There, the prohibition is not visible, here the prohibition is visible. May one use it to support the legs of a couch? Rebbi Eleazar says it is permitted, Rebbi Joḥanan says it is forbidden.
MISHNAH: Gentiles’ wine skins and jugs containing an Israel’s wine are forbidden and their prohibition is one of usufruct, the words of Rebbi Meïr; but the Sages say that their prohibition is not one of usufruct.
MISHNAH: Gentiles’ wine skins and jugs containing an Israel’s wine are forbidden and their prohibition is one of usufruct, the words of Rebbi Meïr; but the Sages say that their prohibition is not one of usufruct.
MISHNAH: Gentiles’ grape kernels and skins are forbidden and the prohibition is of usufruct, the words of Rebbi Meïr. But the Sages say, moist they are forbidden, dry permitted.
MISHNAH: Fish sauce, cheese, and theriac of Gentiles are forbidden and the prohibition is of usufruct, the words of Rebbi Meïr. But the Sages say, theitr prohibition is not of usufruct.
MISHNAH: Fish sauce, cheese, and theriac of Gentiles are forbidden and the prohibition is of usufruct, the words of Rebbi Meïr. But the Sages say, theitr prohibition is not of usufruct.
MISHNAH: The following matters of Gentiles are forbidden but their prohibition is not of usufruct: Milk which the Gentile milked when no Jew was seeing him, bread, their oil, and anything preserved by cooking. Rebbi and his court permitted oil. Preserves in which usually wine is used, and vinegar, and pieces of triton, and fish sauce not containing a whole fish, and hallec, and a lump of asa foetida, and salqonarit salt; these are forbidden but their prohibition is not of usufruct:
MISHNAH: The following matters of Gentiles are forbidden but their prohibition is not of usufruct: Milk which the Gentile milked when no Jew was seeing him, bread, their oil, and anything preserved by cooking. Rebbi and his court permitted oil. Preserves in which usually wine is used, and vinegar, and pieces of triton, and fish sauce not containing a whole fish, and hallec, and a lump of asa foetida, and salqonarit salt; these are forbidden but their prohibition is not of usufruct:
Their bread. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Jonathan. Bread is of the practices of obfuscation. [Rebbi Yose said, so I asked before Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa: What means “of the practices of obfuscation?] Do I say, at a place where Jewish bread is available it is logical that Gentile bread should be forbidden and they obfuscated about it and permitted it? Or at a place where Jewish bread is not available it is logical that Gentile bread should be permitted and they obfuscated about it and forbade it? Rebbi Mana said, is there any obfuscation for prohibition? But is bread not like cooking of Gentiles? Are we saying: At a place where no Jewish cooking is available it is logical that Gentile cooking should be permitted? But it must be the following: At a place where Jewish bread is not available it is logical that Gentile bread should be forbidden and they obfuscated about it and permitted it because of the necessities of life. The rabbis of Caesarea in the name of Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa: Following the words of him who was permitting, but only from the store; but one does not do this.
If he worked for him half a day in prohibition and half a day in permission. If he was selling profane [food] and Second Tithe together, [the buyer] has the choice of treating as profane what he chooses and as Second Tithe what he chooses. Is this the same here? Let us hear from the following. If somebody hires a worker to bring wine to a sick person; if he delivered [the employer] has to pay him, otherwise he does not have to pay him. But if he told him, wine for a sick person from place X, an apple for a sick person from place X, whether or not he delivered he has to pay him, for he pays the wages of his feet. And here, does he not pay the wages of his feet?
And the calf whose neck was broken. There, there. Since there mentioned further describes a prohibition of usufruct, also there said here implies prohibition of usufruct.
And the calf whose neck was broken. There, there. Since there mentioned further describes a prohibition of usufruct, also there said here implies prohibition of usufruct.
And the birds of the sufferer from skin disease. Any pure bird you may eat, this is the living bird. But the following you may not eat of them, that is the slaughtered one. Or the other way around? Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Ismael: The Torah has no prohibition of usufruct which applies to any living thing.
MISHNAH: He who takes the mother with the young, Rebbi Jehudah says he is flogged but does not have to send away. But the Sages say, he sends away and is not flogged. This is the principle: One is not liable for any prohibition coupled with a positive commandment.
MISHNAH: All those subject to extirpation are no longer liable to extirpation once they were flogged, as it is said, your brother would be despicable in your eyes. After he was flogged, he is your brother, the words of Rebbi Ḥanania ben Gamliel. And since one who commits a transgression may lose his soul because of it, if one fulfills a commandment certainly his soul shall be given to him. Rebbi Simeon says, from its place it can be inferred as it is written, the souls of the perpetrators will be extirpated, and it says, that a human shall do and live in them. Therefore, to anybody who quietly does not transgress a prohibition is given reward like somebody keeping the Commandments. Rebbi Simeon ben Rebbi says, does it not say, only be strong not to eat blood, for blood is the life? Since one who desists from blood, from which a person recoils, receives reward, if one desists of robbery and sexual offenses, which a person desires and cherishes, certainly he should acquire the merit for himself, his descendants, and his descendants’ descendants to the end of all generations.
MISHNAH: They are not liable for a positive commandment or a prohibition in the Temple; one does not bring a suspended reparation sacrifice for a positive commandment or a prohibition in the Temple. But they are liable for a positive commandment or a prohibition about the menstruating woman; one brings a suspended reparation sacrifice for a positive commandment or a prohibition about the menstruating woman. What is the positive commandment about the menstruating woman? Separate from the menstruating woman. The prohibition, do not copulate with a menstruating woman.
MISHNAH: They are not liable for a positive commandment or a prohibition in the Temple; one does not bring a suspended reparation sacrifice for a positive commandment or a prohibition in the Temple. But they are liable for a positive commandment or a prohibition about the menstruating woman; one brings a suspended reparation sacrifice for a positive commandment or a prohibition about the menstruating woman. What is the positive commandment about the menstruating woman? Separate from the menstruating woman. The prohibition, do not copulate with a menstruating woman.
MISHNAH: They are not liable for a positive commandment or a prohibition in the Temple; one does not bring a suspended reparation sacrifice for a positive commandment or a prohibition in the Temple. But they are liable for a positive commandment or a prohibition about the menstruating woman; one brings a suspended reparation sacrifice for a positive commandment or a prohibition about the menstruating woman. What is the positive commandment about the menstruating woman? Separate from the menstruating woman. The prohibition, do not copulate with a menstruating woman.
MISHNAH: They are not liable for a positive commandment or a prohibition in the Temple; one does not bring a suspended reparation sacrifice for a positive commandment or a prohibition in the Temple. But they are liable for a positive commandment or a prohibition about the menstruating woman; one brings a suspended reparation sacrifice for a positive commandment or a prohibition about the menstruating woman. What is the positive commandment about the menstruating woman? Separate from the menstruating woman. The prohibition, do not copulate with a menstruating woman.
MISHNAH: They are not liable for a positive commandment or a prohibition in the Temple; one does not bring a suspended reparation sacrifice for a positive commandment or a prohibition in the Temple. But they are liable for a positive commandment or a prohibition about the menstruating woman; one brings a suspended reparation sacrifice for a positive commandment or a prohibition about the menstruating woman. What is the positive commandment about the menstruating woman? Separate from the menstruating woman. The prohibition, do not copulate with a menstruating woman.
HALAKHAH: “They are not liable for a positive commandment or a prohibition in the Temple,” etc. Cahana said, is it impossible that there was knowledge at the beginning and knowledge at the end and oblivion in between? Rebbi Samuel ben Eudaimon objected before Rebbi Mana: Could that be for the teachers? He told him, we have a problem with those entering and you bring us teachers? What about it? Rebbi Samuel bar Rav Isaac said, commandments, commandments. Since commandments mentioned there are about fixed-value [offerings], here also about fixed-value [offerings].
The Babylonian Talmud
Bar Kappara taught : Whoever calls Abraham " Abram " transgresses a command ; as it is said, "Thy name shall be Abraham" (Gen. xvii. 5). R. Eliezer says: He transgresses a prohibition ; as it is said, "Thy name shall no more be called Abram" (ibid.).
Come and hear: Great is the duty of honouring one's fellow-creatures, since it sets aside a prohibition enjoined by the Torah.
Why should this be so? Let one say, "There is no wisdom nor understanding nor counsel against the Lord" ! Rab b. Shaba explained it in the presence of Rab Kahana as referring to the prohibition, "Thou shalt not turn aside from the sentence which they shall declare unto thee" (Deut. xvii. 11). They laughed at him, for is not the prohibition, "Thou shalt not turn aside" enjoined by the Torah!
Why should this be so? Let one say, "There is no wisdom nor understanding nor counsel against the Lord" ! Rab b. Shaba explained it in the presence of Rab Kahana as referring to the prohibition, "Thou shalt not turn aside from the sentence which they shall declare unto thee" (Deut. xvii. 11). They laughed at him, for is not the prohibition, "Thou shalt not turn aside" enjoined by the Torah!
Rab Kahana said to them : A great man having expressed an opinion, you should not laugh at him. We base the authority for all the dicta of the Rabbis upon the prohibition, "Thou shalt not turn aside" ; but for the duty of honouring a fellow-creature the Rabbis give permission.
It is different here ; for it is written, "And hide thyself from them." May one, then, conclude from this? We cannot draw an inference about a prohibition from a case involving only financial loss.
But in the other case, they differ in reasoning; R. Meir holds that his return must be equal to his defilement — as his defilement is only possible by means of something of the minimum size of an egg, so must his return be necessitated by holy flesh of the minimum size of an egg. R. Judah, however, holds that his return must be equal to his prohibition — as his prohibition is with something of the minimum size of an olive, so must his return be necessitated by holy flesh of the minimum size of an olive.
But in the other case, they differ in reasoning; R. Meir holds that his return must be equal to his defilement — as his defilement is only possible by means of something of the minimum size of an egg, so must his return be necessitated by holy flesh of the minimum size of an egg. R. Judah, however, holds that his return must be equal to his prohibition — as his prohibition is with something of the minimum size of an olive, so must his return be necessitated by holy flesh of the minimum size of an olive.
There is certainly also a prohibition [about the light kindled by an Israelite from a gentile], but when he says the benediction he does so over the additional part which is permitted. If so, a light kindled by a gentile from a gentile should also be allowed !
Our Rabbis have taught : He who wishes to exercise his natural functions, if in Judea he should not face East or West but North or South ; if in Galilee, he should only face East or West. R. Jose, however, permits it [in any direction] because he used to say that the prohibition only applies to one who can see [the Temple], when there is no barrier, and at the time when the Shekinah rests [upon the Sanctuary]. But the Sages prohibit it.
There is another teaching : He who wishes to exercise his natural functions, if in Judea he must not face East or West, but North or South ; but in Galilee, North and South are prohibited, East or West is permitted. R. Jose, however, permits it [in any direction], because he used to say that the prohibition only applies to one who can see [the Temple]. R. Judah says : It is prohibited while the Temple is standing ; but when the Temple is no longer standing it is permitted. R. 'Akiba prohibits it in all circumstances.
He replied : The Tanna derives it from the shoe, and thou sayest [it should be derived] from the short cut — how can that be? For there is a teaching : A man must not enter the Temple Mount with his staff in his hand, his shoe upon his foot, and his money tied up in his cloth or in his money-bag thrown over his shoulder, nor may he make it a short cut ; and [the prohibition of] expectoration is derived a fortiori from the shoe — as in the case of a shoe which is not in itself contemptible the Torah declares, "Put off thy shoes from off thy feet" (Exod. iii. 5), must not expectoration, which is in itself contemptible, be all the more forbidden !
and I say that with reference to the Temple Mount where [the wearing of] a shoe is forbidden, let one derive [the prohibition against expectoration] from a shoe; but with reference to the Synagogue where one is permitted [to wear] shoes, instead of deriving permission [to expectorate, by analogy] from a shoe, let him derive a prohibition [against expectoration, by analogy] from the short cut !
and I say that with reference to the Temple Mount where [the wearing of] a shoe is forbidden, let one derive [the prohibition against expectoration] from a shoe; but with reference to the Synagogue where one is permitted [to wear] shoes, instead of deriving permission [to expectorate, by analogy] from a shoe, let him derive a prohibition [against expectoration, by analogy] from the short cut !
And the point was raised, [How can it be said that], The Eruv of courtyards [are placed] in a courtyard? And the Tana says: If a man placed his Eruv in a gatehouse or in an exedra (a semicircular recess), or in a balcony, it is asur and he who dwells within it cannot be a cause of prohibition?
Judah speaks only there with regard to the eruv of courtyards, which is of rabbinical origin, but here, with regard to the sukkah which is from the Torah, he does not [say so]. ‘Nor does R. Yose hold the opinion of R. Judah,’ for R. Yose speaks only here with regard to the Sukkah which is merely a positive commandment but with regard to Shabbat, which is a prohibition punishable by stoning, he does not say so.
What is the practical difference between them? For instance in a case where he called it terumah except for its outer peel. According to the one who explains: Because he renders it susceptible [to ritual uncleanness], the prohibition does apply. According to the one who explains, because he diminishes it, the prohibition does not apply.
What is the practical difference between them? For instance in a case where he called it terumah except for its outer peel. According to the one who explains: Because he renders it susceptible [to ritual uncleanness], the prohibition does apply. According to the one who explains, because he diminishes it, the prohibition does not apply.
It is R. Judah who was mistaken. He thought that He thought that [R. Yohanan b. Zakkai] meant that it was forbidden as a rabbinical prohibition, but it is not so. He meant it as a Torah prohibition. But does it not say, "He instituted"? What is meant by "He instituted" is that he expounded (the Torah) and instituted the law accordingly.
It is R. Judah who was mistaken. He thought that He thought that [R. Yohanan b. Zakkai] meant that it was forbidden as a rabbinical prohibition, but it is not so. He meant it as a Torah prohibition. But does it not say, "He instituted"? What is meant by "He instituted" is that he expounded (the Torah) and instituted the law accordingly.
Because it is something that can be classed with the enjoyment of meat and wine. An objection was raised against Raba. We read: "A maiden that has reached maturity should not neglect herself during the days of her mourning for her father." This statement indicates that a maiden who did not reach maturity is in duty bound to neglect herself. Now, in what respect is she supposed to neglect herself? By abstaining from warm baths? And is not a mature maiden allowed to neglect herself in this way? Did not R. Ḥisda say, a mourner is not allowed to put even a finger into warm water? You must therefore admit that the prohibition of self-neglect refers only to bathing in cold water (which proves that to other mourners cold bathing, too, is forbidden)! Answer: No, by neglect is meant only painting the eyelids and fixing the hair.
Some give the passage in the following version: Raba said, a mourner is not allowed to bathe either in warm or in cold water during the seven days. Why should bathing be different from the enjoyment of meat and wine? In the case of meat and wine, indulgence is permitted because it is done merely to lessen the mourner's suffering, while bathing is a matter of (avoidable) pleasure. Is not Raba's statement supported by the following passage: "A maiden that has reached maturity should not neglect herself during the days of her mourning for her father?" This wording certainly indicates that a maiden who did not yet reach maturity is in duty bound to neglect herself. Now, what is meant by neglect? Does it mean abstaining from bathing in warm water? Is a maiden of maturity, then, not allowed so to neglect herself? Did not R. Ḥisda say, a mourner is not allowed to put even a finger into warm water? You must therefore admit that the prohibition of neglect refers only to bathing in cold water! Answer: No, by neglect is meant painting her eyelids and fixing her hair.
Our Rabbis have taught: A king should have his hair trimmed every day, a high priest every Friday, an ordinary priest once a month. A king everyday—what is the reason? Said R. 'Abba b. Zabda in the name of Rab, because it is written (Is., 33. 17): "Thine eyes shall see the king in his beauty." A high priest every Friday—what is the reason? Said R. Samuel b. R. Isaac, because new divisions of priests come in every Saturday. An ordinary priest once a month—what is the reason? This rule is derived from the occurrence of the word pera' (lock) both in connection with the Nazirite and the priest, for it is written in one place (Ez., 44. 20): "Neither shall they (the priests) shave their heads nor suffer their locks to grow long," and it is written in another place (Num., 6. 5): "He (the Nazirite) shall let the locks of the hair of his head grow long," which leads us to the analogy that just as there (in the instance of the Nazirite) the growing of the locks is meant for a period of thirty days, so also here (in the instance of the priests). But whence do you know it to be so in the case of the Nazirite himself? Scripture (ibid.) uses the word yihyeh (יהיה = he shall be), the numerical value of which is thirty. Said R. Papa to 'Abbayi: Is it not possible that the verse (in Ezekiel) means to say that they should not suffer their locks to grow at all? If it were written, Abbayi replied, "they shall not suffer locks to grow long," your interpretation might be correct, but since it is written, "the locks they shall not suffer to grow long", it indicates that they may have locks, but must not let them grow too long. If so, the law ought to apply also to the priests of the present time! No, the prohibition of growing the hair is analogous to that of drinking of wine, so that just as the latter applies only to the time when they enter the Temple for service, so also the former applies only to the time when they might enter the Temple, but when there is no Temple which they might enter, they may let the hair grow. But is it true that wine is permitted when there is no Temple to enter? Does not the following Baraita intimate the contrary? Rabbi says, I would say that a priest should never drink wine, but what can I do, seeing that his misfortune has turned out to be his benefit, whereupon 'Abbayi asked according to whose view the priests of our time drink wine
It is said above, "from the first day of the month of Nisan", etc.—why from the first? Why does he not say from the second day of Nisan, since the first day of Nisan is a holiday, on which mourning is anyhow forbidden? Said Raba: The first of Nisan is mentioned in order that the prohibition may include also the preceding day. But could not this be inferred from the fact that the day following is New Moon? The New Moon is of biblical origin, and biblical laws require no reënforcement, for it is stated in a Baraita: The prohibition (of fasting and mourning) on the days recorded in the Scroll of Fasts includes also, in each case, the preceding as well as the following day; as regards, however, the Sabbaths and holidays, fasting on these days is forbidden, but is permitted on the days preceding or following them. Why is such a difference made between the two? Because these (Sabbaths and holidays) are biblical laws, which need no reënforcement, while the others are soferic laws, which need reënforcement.
It is said above, "from the first day of the month of Nisan", etc.—why from the first? Why does he not say from the second day of Nisan, since the first day of Nisan is a holiday, on which mourning is anyhow forbidden? Said Raba: The first of Nisan is mentioned in order that the prohibition may include also the preceding day. But could not this be inferred from the fact that the day following is New Moon? The New Moon is of biblical origin, and biblical laws require no reënforcement, for it is stated in a Baraita: The prohibition (of fasting and mourning) on the days recorded in the Scroll of Fasts includes also, in each case, the preceding as well as the following day; as regards, however, the Sabbaths and holidays, fasting on these days is forbidden, but is permitted on the days preceding or following them. Why is such a difference made between the two? Because these (Sabbaths and holidays) are biblical laws, which need no reënforcement, while the others are soferic laws, which need reënforcement.
will apply here. There the first of Nisan was mentioned to extend the prohibition to the day preceding. Here the festival is included in order to extend the prohibition to the day following. With whose view does this tally? With that of R. Jose, who said that the prohibition includes "both the preceding and the following day?" If so, why base the inclusion of the twenty-ninth of Adar on the fact that it is the day preceding the first of Nisan, on which day the Daily Offering was established, when the prohibition might have been derived from the fact that it follows upon the twenty-eighth of Adar (which was likewise proclaimed a holiday) as we read: On the twenty-eighth of Adar the good news reached the Jews that they were no longer to be restrained from the study of the Torah? [It had namely happened that the wicked government issued a decree against Israel, that they should not study the Torah nor circumcize their children, and that they should profane the Sabbath, whereupon Judah b. Shammu'a and his colleagues took counsel with a prominent lady with whom all the noblemen of Rome associated, who advised them to make an appeal during the night; they made the appeal during the night, saying: "O Heavens! Are we not your brethren, are we not the sons of one father and one mother? Wherein do we differ from all other nations and tongues, that you issue such cruel decrees against us?", whereupon the decrees were annulled and the day was declared a holiday.] Said 'Abbayi in reply to the above: The twenty-eighth of Adar would be of no avail for the last day if it were a full month. R. 'Ashi said, the same thing would be true if Adar was deficient, for on a day following immediately upon a holiday only fasting is forbidden, while mourning is allowed, whereas the twenty-ninth of Adar, being placed between two holidays, has been made as important as if it were itself a holiday.
will apply here. There the first of Nisan was mentioned to extend the prohibition to the day preceding. Here the festival is included in order to extend the prohibition to the day following. With whose view does this tally? With that of R. Jose, who said that the prohibition includes "both the preceding and the following day?" If so, why base the inclusion of the twenty-ninth of Adar on the fact that it is the day preceding the first of Nisan, on which day the Daily Offering was established, when the prohibition might have been derived from the fact that it follows upon the twenty-eighth of Adar (which was likewise proclaimed a holiday) as we read: On the twenty-eighth of Adar the good news reached the Jews that they were no longer to be restrained from the study of the Torah? [It had namely happened that the wicked government issued a decree against Israel, that they should not study the Torah nor circumcize their children, and that they should profane the Sabbath, whereupon Judah b. Shammu'a and his colleagues took counsel with a prominent lady with whom all the noblemen of Rome associated, who advised them to make an appeal during the night; they made the appeal during the night, saying: "O Heavens! Are we not your brethren, are we not the sons of one father and one mother? Wherein do we differ from all other nations and tongues, that you issue such cruel decrees against us?", whereupon the decrees were annulled and the day was declared a holiday.] Said 'Abbayi in reply to the above: The twenty-eighth of Adar would be of no avail for the last day if it were a full month. R. 'Ashi said, the same thing would be true if Adar was deficient, for on a day following immediately upon a holiday only fasting is forbidden, while mourning is allowed, whereas the twenty-ninth of Adar, being placed between two holidays, has been made as important as if it were itself a holiday.
will apply here. There the first of Nisan was mentioned to extend the prohibition to the day preceding. Here the festival is included in order to extend the prohibition to the day following. With whose view does this tally? With that of R. Jose, who said that the prohibition includes "both the preceding and the following day?" If so, why base the inclusion of the twenty-ninth of Adar on the fact that it is the day preceding the first of Nisan, on which day the Daily Offering was established, when the prohibition might have been derived from the fact that it follows upon the twenty-eighth of Adar (which was likewise proclaimed a holiday) as we read: On the twenty-eighth of Adar the good news reached the Jews that they were no longer to be restrained from the study of the Torah? [It had namely happened that the wicked government issued a decree against Israel, that they should not study the Torah nor circumcize their children, and that they should profane the Sabbath, whereupon Judah b. Shammu'a and his colleagues took counsel with a prominent lady with whom all the noblemen of Rome associated, who advised them to make an appeal during the night; they made the appeal during the night, saying: "O Heavens! Are we not your brethren, are we not the sons of one father and one mother? Wherein do we differ from all other nations and tongues, that you issue such cruel decrees against us?", whereupon the decrees were annulled and the day was declared a holiday.] Said 'Abbayi in reply to the above: The twenty-eighth of Adar would be of no avail for the last day if it were a full month. R. 'Ashi said, the same thing would be true if Adar was deficient, for on a day following immediately upon a holiday only fasting is forbidden, while mourning is allowed, whereas the twenty-ninth of Adar, being placed between two holidays, has been made as important as if it were itself a holiday.
will apply here. There the first of Nisan was mentioned to extend the prohibition to the day preceding. Here the festival is included in order to extend the prohibition to the day following. With whose view does this tally? With that of R. Jose, who said that the prohibition includes "both the preceding and the following day?" If so, why base the inclusion of the twenty-ninth of Adar on the fact that it is the day preceding the first of Nisan, on which day the Daily Offering was established, when the prohibition might have been derived from the fact that it follows upon the twenty-eighth of Adar (which was likewise proclaimed a holiday) as we read: On the twenty-eighth of Adar the good news reached the Jews that they were no longer to be restrained from the study of the Torah? [It had namely happened that the wicked government issued a decree against Israel, that they should not study the Torah nor circumcize their children, and that they should profane the Sabbath, whereupon Judah b. Shammu'a and his colleagues took counsel with a prominent lady with whom all the noblemen of Rome associated, who advised them to make an appeal during the night; they made the appeal during the night, saying: "O Heavens! Are we not your brethren, are we not the sons of one father and one mother? Wherein do we differ from all other nations and tongues, that you issue such cruel decrees against us?", whereupon the decrees were annulled and the day was declared a holiday.] Said 'Abbayi in reply to the above: The twenty-eighth of Adar would be of no avail for the last day if it were a full month. R. 'Ashi said, the same thing would be true if Adar was deficient, for on a day following immediately upon a holiday only fasting is forbidden, while mourning is allowed, whereas the twenty-ninth of Adar, being placed between two holidays, has been made as important as if it were itself a holiday.
It was reported: R. Ḥiyya b. 'Ashi said in the name of Rab, the law is in accordance with R. Jose, but Samuel said, it is in accordance with R. Meir. Did Samuel say so? Is it not stated in a Baraita: R. Simeon b. Gamaliel said: Why is the word behon (בהון = on them) used (in the Scroll of Fasts) twice in succession? In order to indicate that the prohibition applies only to the days specified, but not to the days immediately preceding or following them—to which Samuel remarked that the law is in accordance with R. Simeon b. Gamaliel! Answer: Originally Samuel was of the opinion that there was no authority as lenient in the matter as was R. Meir, and therefore he said that the law is in accordance with R. Meir, but when he heard of the view of R. Simeon b. Gamaliel, who is still more lenient, he said, the law is in accordance with R. Simeon b. Gamaliel. Bali, too, said in the name of R. Ḥiyya b. 'Abba, who had it from R. Johanan: The law is in accordance with R. Jose, whereupon R. Ḥiyya b. Abba said to Bali, I must inform you that when R. Johanan said the law is in accordance with R. Jose, he referred only to those days on which the Scroll of Fasts forbids fasting (but not mourning). Did R. Johanan say so? Did he not say, the law always follows the anonymous opinion of a Mishnah? Now, we read in an anonymous Mishnah: Although it has been decided that under certain circumstances the Megillah of Esther should be read several days before, instead of after, Purim,
R. Benjamin b. Jephet also said in the name of R. Eleazar that the prohibition of washing refers only to washing for immediate wear, but washing for the purpose of putting aside is allowed. An objection was again raised from the following Baraita: It is not allowed to wash before the ninth of Ab (within the same week) even when the intention is to put the clothes aside for use after the ninth of Ab; our (Babylonian) fine laundry work is under the same rule as their (Palestinian) plain washing; linen garments are not subject to the law forbidding laundering! This, indeed, is a refutation.
R. Isaac b. Jacob Bar-Giyore sent the following statement in the name of R. Johanan: Although it was said that linen garments are not subject to the law forbidding washing, it is nevertheless forbidden to put on washed linen garments during the week in which the ninth of Ab occurs. Said Rab, this prohibition applies only to the days preceding the ninth (within the same week), but on the days following, the wearing is permitted. Samuel, however, said, it is forbidden even on the days following. An objection was raised from this Baraita: During the week in which the ninth of Ab occurs, one is not allowed to cut one's hair or to wash one's clothes. What is the exact meaning of this law? It is as follows: If the ninth happens to be on Sunday, it is allowed to wash during all the following days of the week; if it be on Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, or Thursday, it is not allowed to wash on any of the days (of the week) preceding it, while on the days following, it is allowed; if the ninth happens to be on Friday, it is allowed to wash on Thursday for the honor of the Sabbath; if, however, one failed to wash on Thursday, he may do so on Friday from Minḥah time and onward, but prior to Minḥah time it is forbidden. ['Abbayi, however, or, as some say, R. 'Aḥa b. Jacob, deprecated this deed.] If the ninth be on Monday or Thursday, three men are called up to read the Torah, the last one of whom reads also the Haftarah, but if it be on Tuesday or Wednesday, one man reads both the Torah and the Haftarah; R. Jose said, always three men must read the Torah, the last one of whom also reads the Haftarah. Now, is not this Baraita (which teaches explicitly that on the days following the ninth, washing is allowed) a refutation of Samuel? Samuel can answer that the Tannaim differ regarding this matter, for it is taught in a Baraita: If the ninth of Ab or the eve of the ninth of Ab is on Saturday, one may continue eating as much as one wants and one may place on his table a royal banquet like that of king Solomon in his time; cutting the hair and washing clothes are forbidden from the first of the month of Ab to the day of the fast; this is the opinion of R. Meir; R. Judah said, cutting the hair and washing are forbidden during the entire month; Rabban Simeon b. Gamaliel says, they are forbidden only during the week in which the ninth occurs. Another Baraita teaches: Mourning must be observed from the first of the month to the day of the fast; this is the opinion of R. Meir; R. Judah says, it must be observed during the entire month; Rabban Simeon b. Gamaliel says, only during the week in which the ninth occurs.
Said Raba, the law is in accordance with R. Meir; Raba further said, the law is in accordance with Rabban Simeon b. Gamaliel. Both these statements of Raba were made for the purpose of indicating a lenient view, and both were needed; for if he had said only the law is in accordance with R. Meir, one might have understood it to mean that the prohibition is in force from the very beginning of the month to the fast day (as is actually the opinion of R. Meir), therefore he adds that the law is in accordance with Rabban Simeon b. Gamaliel (who restricts it to the week of the ninth); if, on the other hand, he had said only the law is in accordance with Rabban Simeon b. Gamaliel, one might have understood him to mean that the prohibition extends even to the days following immediately upon the ninth (as is the opinion of Rabban Simeon), therefore he said also the law is in accordance with R. Meir (who denies this).
Said Raba, the law is in accordance with R. Meir; Raba further said, the law is in accordance with Rabban Simeon b. Gamaliel. Both these statements of Raba were made for the purpose of indicating a lenient view, and both were needed; for if he had said only the law is in accordance with R. Meir, one might have understood it to mean that the prohibition is in force from the very beginning of the month to the fast day (as is actually the opinion of R. Meir), therefore he adds that the law is in accordance with Rabban Simeon b. Gamaliel (who restricts it to the week of the ninth); if, on the other hand, he had said only the law is in accordance with Rabban Simeon b. Gamaliel, one might have understood him to mean that the prohibition extends even to the days following immediately upon the ninth (as is the opinion of Rabban Simeon), therefore he said also the law is in accordance with R. Meir (who denies this).
Our Rabbis have taught: All the laws that apply to a mourner apply also to the ninth of Ab; on that day eating, drinking, bathing, anointing, wearing shoes, and cohabitation are forbidden; it is also forbidden to read in the Pentateuch, the Prophets and the Hagiographa, or to study the Mishnah, Midrash, Talmud, Halakot and Haggadot; one may read, however, parts of the Torah which he was not used to read before, and study parts of the Mishnah etc., which he was not used to study before; one may read also the Book of Lamentations, Job, and the sad portions of Jeremiah; the children are not free from school; this is the opinion of R. Meir; R. Judah says, one is not allowed to read even parts of the Torah which he was not used to read before, nor to study parts of the Mishnah which he was not used to study before, but he may read the Lamentations, Job, and the sad portions of Jeremiah; and the children are free from school; the reason for the prohibition (of study) is that it is said (Ps., 19. 9): "The precepts of the Lord are right, rejoicing the heart."
It was necessary to state the rule [separately] in the case of Purim. For you might suggest that we should forbid this because of the prohibition of Rabbah. We are therefore told that this is not so.
GEMARA. We understand [the prohibition of saying] “We give thanks, we give thanks,” because it looks like there are two Powers; also of “Your name should be mentioned for the good”, because it implies, for good, yes, for evil, no, and we have learned: One is obligated to bless [God] for evil in the same way as he blesses for good. But what is the reason for prohibiting, “May Your mercy reach the nest of a bird”?
There is another Baraitha, viz., "Six days thou shalt eat blistered cakes, and on the seventh day there shall be a prohibition of work to the Lord" (Deut. xvi. 8). As on the seventh day work is prohibited, so on the six days work is prohibited. I should have thought perhaps, as on the seventh day there is a prohibition from all work, so on the six days there is a prohibition from all work. But no; for the teaching says, And on the seventh day there is a prohibition, thus indicating that on the seventh day there is a prohibition from all work, and that on the six days there is not a prohibition from all work. Behold, Holy Writ has communicated it only to wise men, to tell thee which is a forbidden day and which is a lawful day, which is forbidden work and which is lawful work.
There is another Baraitha, viz., "Six days thou shalt eat blistered cakes, and on the seventh day there shall be a prohibition of work to the Lord" (Deut. xvi. 8). As on the seventh day work is prohibited, so on the six days work is prohibited. I should have thought perhaps, as on the seventh day there is a prohibition from all work, so on the six days there is a prohibition from all work. But no; for the teaching says, And on the seventh day there is a prohibition, thus indicating that on the seventh day there is a prohibition from all work, and that on the six days there is not a prohibition from all work. Behold, Holy Writ has communicated it only to wise men, to tell thee which is a forbidden day and which is a lawful day, which is forbidden work and which is lawful work.
There is another Baraitha, viz., "Six days thou shalt eat blistered cakes, and on the seventh day there shall be a prohibition of work to the Lord" (Deut. xvi. 8). As on the seventh day work is prohibited, so on the six days work is prohibited. I should have thought perhaps, as on the seventh day there is a prohibition from all work, so on the six days there is a prohibition from all work. But no; for the teaching says, And on the seventh day there is a prohibition, thus indicating that on the seventh day there is a prohibition from all work, and that on the six days there is not a prohibition from all work. Behold, Holy Writ has communicated it only to wise men, to tell thee which is a forbidden day and which is a lawful day, which is forbidden work and which is lawful work.
There is another Baraitha, viz., "Six days thou shalt eat blistered cakes, and on the seventh day there shall be a prohibition of work to the Lord" (Deut. xvi. 8). As on the seventh day work is prohibited, so on the six days work is prohibited. I should have thought perhaps, as on the seventh day there is a prohibition from all work, so on the six days there is a prohibition from all work. But no; for the teaching says, And on the seventh day there is a prohibition, thus indicating that on the seventh day there is a prohibition from all work, and that on the six days there is not a prohibition from all work. Behold, Holy Writ has communicated it only to wise men, to tell thee which is a forbidden day and which is a lawful day, which is forbidden work and which is lawful work.
There is another Baraitha, viz., "Six days thou shalt eat blistered cakes, and on the seventh day there shall be a prohibition of work to the Lord" (Deut. xvi. 8). As on the seventh day work is prohibited, so on the six days work is prohibited. I should have thought perhaps, as on the seventh day there is a prohibition from all work, so on the six days there is a prohibition from all work. But no; for the teaching says, And on the seventh day there is a prohibition, thus indicating that on the seventh day there is a prohibition from all work, and that on the six days there is not a prohibition from all work. Behold, Holy Writ has communicated it only to wise men, to tell thee which is a forbidden day and which is a lawful day, which is forbidden work and which is lawful work.
There is another Baraitha, viz., "Six days thou shalt eat blistered cakes, and on the seventh day there shall be a prohibition of work to the Lord" (Deut. xvi. 8). As on the seventh day work is prohibited, so on the six days work is prohibited. I should have thought perhaps, as on the seventh day there is a prohibition from all work, so on the six days there is a prohibition from all work. But no; for the teaching says, And on the seventh day there is a prohibition, thus indicating that on the seventh day there is a prohibition from all work, and that on the six days there is not a prohibition from all work. Behold, Holy Writ has communicated it only to wise men, to tell thee which is a forbidden day and which is a lawful day, which is forbidden work and which is lawful work.
In hallowed things. What is the reason of the prohibition? R. Ela said, Because the weight of the vessel interposes. But seeing that in a later case it is on account of the interposition, the first case cannot be on account of an interposition. For we are taught in the later case, And the manner of the heave-offering is not as the manner of the hallowed things. For in the case of hallowed things one looses a knot and wipes and cleanses and afterwards ties up again, but in the case of a heave-offering he ties up and afterwards cleanses. Nay, but both the earlier and later cases are because of interposition, and it was necessary that they should be separately mentioned, for if he had taught us the first only, I should say, This is the reason for the prohibition with reference to the hallowed things, viz., because of the vessel's weight, which actually exists. But in the latter case, where the vessel's weight is not an element, I should say, In regard to hallowed things also there is in this case no disqualifying interposition. And if he had taught us the latter only, I should say, This is the reason for the prohibition with reference to hallowed things, because
In hallowed things. What is the reason of the prohibition? R. Ela said, Because the weight of the vessel interposes. But seeing that in a later case it is on account of the interposition, the first case cannot be on account of an interposition. For we are taught in the later case, And the manner of the heave-offering is not as the manner of the hallowed things. For in the case of hallowed things one looses a knot and wipes and cleanses and afterwards ties up again, but in the case of a heave-offering he ties up and afterwards cleanses. Nay, but both the earlier and later cases are because of interposition, and it was necessary that they should be separately mentioned, for if he had taught us the first only, I should say, This is the reason for the prohibition with reference to the hallowed things, viz., because of the vessel's weight, which actually exists. But in the latter case, where the vessel's weight is not an element, I should say, In regard to hallowed things also there is in this case no disqualifying interposition. And if he had taught us the latter only, I should say, This is the reason for the prohibition with reference to hallowed things, because
In hallowed things. What is the reason of the prohibition? R. Ela said, Because the weight of the vessel interposes. But seeing that in a later case it is on account of the interposition, the first case cannot be on account of an interposition. For we are taught in the later case, And the manner of the heave-offering is not as the manner of the hallowed things. For in the case of hallowed things one looses a knot and wipes and cleanses and afterwards ties up again, but in the case of a heave-offering he ties up and afterwards cleanses. Nay, but both the earlier and later cases are because of interposition, and it was necessary that they should be separately mentioned, for if he had taught us the first only, I should say, This is the reason for the prohibition with reference to the hallowed things, viz., because of the vessel's weight, which actually exists. But in the latter case, where the vessel's weight is not an element, I should say, In regard to hallowed things also there is in this case no disqualifying interposition. And if he had taught us the latter only, I should say, This is the reason for the prohibition with reference to hallowed things, because
What real difference is there between what Raba and what R. Ela says? There is this difference between them. In the case of a basket and a wine-strainer which are filled with vessels and cleansed, according to the one who says, The prohibition is because of interposition, there is an interposition; but according to the one who says, The prohibition is for a precaution, lest haply needles and pipes should be dipped in a vessel, the mouth of which is not of the size of the pipe of a wine-skin, the answer is, there is no basket or wine-strainer the mouth of which is not of the size of the pipe of a wine-skin. And Raba has acted consistently with himself; for Raba said, In the case of a basket and wine-strainer, which are filled with vessels and dipped, all are clean; but in the case of a bath, which is divided by a basket or wine-strainer, he who seeks to cleanse there—the cleansing avails him nought, for lo, all the earth is trembling, and we require that there should be forty seahs of water in one place. And these words refer to a clean vessel, but in the case of an unclean vessel, seeing that the cleansing has gone up over the whole surface of the vessel, it has gone up also over the vessels which are in it. For there is a canonical Mishnah, viz., Vessels which are filled with vessels and are dipped, lo, these are clean, and if they are not dipped, the mingled waters must reach that amount of mingling which takes place by means of a communication as large as the pipe of a wine-skin (Mikvaoth, vi. 2). How is it that it says, And if they are not dipped? This is the meaning, viz., And if it is not necessary to dip them, still the mingled waters must reach that amount of mingling which takes place by means of a communication as large as the pipe of a wine-skin. And lo, as regards the sayings of Raba and R. Ela, they are the subject of a Baraitha. For there is a Baraitha, A basket and a wine-strainer which are filled with vessels and are dipped are clean as well for hallowed things as for a heave-offering. Abba Saul says, For a heave-offering, but not for hallowed things. If so, then is not a heave-offering also invalid? No, for to whom are we speaking? Is it not to teachers? teachers who are possessed of knowledge? But if so, the same rule will apply to hallowed things also. No, for a common person sees him and goes and dips. Then in the case of heave-offering also, a common person sees him and goes and dips. We need not receive it from him. Hallowed things also we need not receive from him. He would be angry. In the case of heave-offering also he would be angry.
What real difference is there between what Raba and what R. Ela says? There is this difference between them. In the case of a basket and a wine-strainer which are filled with vessels and cleansed, according to the one who says, The prohibition is because of interposition, there is an interposition; but according to the one who says, The prohibition is for a precaution, lest haply needles and pipes should be dipped in a vessel, the mouth of which is not of the size of the pipe of a wine-skin, the answer is, there is no basket or wine-strainer the mouth of which is not of the size of the pipe of a wine-skin. And Raba has acted consistently with himself; for Raba said, In the case of a basket and wine-strainer, which are filled with vessels and dipped, all are clean; but in the case of a bath, which is divided by a basket or wine-strainer, he who seeks to cleanse there—the cleansing avails him nought, for lo, all the earth is trembling, and we require that there should be forty seahs of water in one place. And these words refer to a clean vessel, but in the case of an unclean vessel, seeing that the cleansing has gone up over the whole surface of the vessel, it has gone up also over the vessels which are in it. For there is a canonical Mishnah, viz., Vessels which are filled with vessels and are dipped, lo, these are clean, and if they are not dipped, the mingled waters must reach that amount of mingling which takes place by means of a communication as large as the pipe of a wine-skin (Mikvaoth, vi. 2). How is it that it says, And if they are not dipped? This is the meaning, viz., And if it is not necessary to dip them, still the mingled waters must reach that amount of mingling which takes place by means of a communication as large as the pipe of a wine-skin. And lo, as regards the sayings of Raba and R. Ela, they are the subject of a Baraitha. For there is a Baraitha, A basket and a wine-strainer which are filled with vessels and are dipped are clean as well for hallowed things as for a heave-offering. Abba Saul says, For a heave-offering, but not for hallowed things. If so, then is not a heave-offering also invalid? No, for to whom are we speaking? Is it not to teachers? teachers who are possessed of knowledge? But if so, the same rule will apply to hallowed things also. No, for a common person sees him and goes and dips. Then in the case of heave-offering also, a common person sees him and goes and dips. We need not receive it from him. Hallowed things also we need not receive from him. He would be angry. In the case of heave-offering also he would be angry.
He answered him, You taught us, our rebbi, that one cannot derive a punishment from a fortiori. We see this in a beraisa [From what the Torah says,] (Leviticus 20, 17) "If a man should take his sister, the daughter of his father, or the daughter of his mother", I can only derive [that a person is forbidden from] the daughter of his father who isn't the daughter of his mother [half-sister from the father] and the daughter of his mother who isn't the daughter of his father [half-sister from the mother]. From where can I derive [the prohibition for] the daughter of his father and the daughter of his mother [his full sister]? The Torah teaches us this with the words ערות אחותו גילה.
This works out well if a slave or Samaritan is exiled by way of an Israelite or lashed. [He is exiled in a case where] he killed him [accidentally] and lashed [in a case where] he cursed him. But an Israelite who is exiled or lashed by way of Samaritan?! It works well with exile [in a case where] he killed him [accidentally]. But lashing, why? [If you say] because he cursed him, "the chieftain of your people do not curse" (Exodus 22:27)! [I.e. a Samaritan is not on of your people and thus this prohibition for which the punishment is lashes should not apply in this case]
A widow [who is] a divorcee [cohabiting with a high priest] is liable because of two prohibitions. A divorcee [who had also] received chalutzah [cohabiting with an ordinary priest] is only liable to one prohibition alone.
Rebbi Yitzchak says liabilities of kares are included [in the punishment of malkus], but why is kares singled out by [the prohibition of cohabiting] with his sister? [To teach us that liabilities of kares] are only subject to kares but not malkus.
If so then a prohibition not involving an action should also [be liable to malkus, something which we know isn't true]? (Deuteronomy 28, 58), "to perform" is written.
A prohibition remedied by an positive commandment should also [be liable to malkus, something which we know isn't true]? [All malkus prohibitions must] similar to the prohibition of muzzling (Deuteronomy 25,4). [The prohibition of muzzling did not have a positive commandment to remedy it.]
A prohibition remedied by an positive commandment should also [be liable to malkus, something which we know isn't true]? [All malkus prohibitions must] similar to the prohibition of muzzling (Deuteronomy 25,4). [The prohibition of muzzling did not have a positive commandment to remedy it.]
A prohibition remedied by an positive commandment should also [be liable to malkus, something which we know isn't true]? [All malkus prohibitions must] similar to the prohibition of muzzling (Deuteronomy 25,4). [The prohibition of muzzling did not have a positive commandment to remedy it.]
Now that we have arrived at this, all of the previous could have also [been answered by saying that they weren't] comparable to the prohibition of muzzling.
Rava[, who explains the dispute between Rebbi Akiva and Rebbi Yishmael differently,] says, If [the witnesses] warned him [the sinner that he would be liable] to court execution, then everyone would agree that he is not both flogged and executed. When do they disagree? When [the witnesses] warned him [that he would be liable] to malkus, for Rebbi Yishmael holds that a prohibition that has a scriptural warning for court execution can also be liable to malkus, and Rebbi Akiva holds that a prohibition that has a scriptural warning for court execution cannot also be liable to malkus.
Rava[, who explains the dispute between Rebbi Akiva and Rebbi Yishmael differently,] says, If [the witnesses] warned him [the sinner that he would be liable] to court execution, then everyone would agree that he is not both flogged and executed. When do they disagree? When [the witnesses] warned him [that he would be liable] to malkus, for Rebbi Yishmael holds that a prohibition that has a scriptural warning for court execution can also be liable to malkus, and Rebbi Akiva holds that a prohibition that has a scriptural warning for court execution cannot also be liable to malkus.
And according Rebbi Akiva, if so then by liabilites of kares also, [we also should] say that a a prohibition that has a scriptural warning for kares [cannot also be liable to malkus]. Rav Mordechai said to Rav Ashi that this is what Avimi from Hagronia had said in the name of Rava, liabilities of kares do not need a scriptual warning [to obligate one with kares, thus freeing the warning to teach malkus], for the Pesach offering and circumcision are punished [with kares for not performing them] even though they have no scriptural warning.
There [by Pesach and circumcision] that isn't the reason [why one doesn't bring a sacrifice], rather it's because the whole Torah is compared to [the prohibition of] idolatry. Just as idolatry is a "sit and don't do" [a passive prohibition] so to all [times that one is obligated to bring a conciliatory sacrifice] is by a "sit and don't do", which excludes these [Peasch and circumcision] which are each a "get up and do" [an active commandment]
There [by Pesach and circumcision] that isn't the reason [why one doesn't bring a sacrifice], rather it's because the whole Torah is compared to [the prohibition of] idolatry. Just as idolatry is a "sit and don't do" [a passive prohibition] so to all [times that one is obligated to bring a conciliatory sacrifice] is by a "sit and don't do", which excludes these [Peasch and circumcision] which are each a "get up and do" [an active commandment]
Rebbi Yitzhak says, Liabilities of kares were included [in the Torah's prohibition of malkus], only why was kares repeated by [the prohibition of cohabiting with] his sister [kares b'achoso]? To punish him with kares and not malkus.
Rebbi Yitzhak says, Liabilities of kares were included [in the Torah's prohibition of malkus], only why was kares repeated by [the prohibition of cohabiting with] his sister [kares b'achoso]? To punish him with kares and not malkus.
And why was kares repeated by [the prohibition of cohabiting with] his sister according to the Rabbis [Rebbi Yishmael and Rebbi Akiva]? To [teach us that sacrifices are] separated [with regards to bringing a sacrifice for an inadvertent offence], as Rebbi Yochanon said that if a person did all [of these kares prohibitions] in one lapse of unawareness he is liable [to bring a chatos sacrifice] for each and every one of them.
They responded, This [case] we have not heard, but we have not heard, but we have heard that one who cohabits with five woman who are niddahs in one lapse of unawareness is liable [a separate offering] for each and every one, and it would appear that these [two] cases form a kal v'chomer, and just if [by the case of five] niddah[s] which is one prohibition, one is liable for each and every one, then here [by re'shia bar re'shia] where there are three separate prohibitions is it not more so?
And [what do the Rabbis, i.e. Rebbi Akiva and Rabbi Yishmael do with achoso d'reisha, if they do not learn out the principle of not deriving punishments]? That verse is needed to teach us that there is a separate kares prohibition for concocting [the anointing oil] and for anointing [with the original anointing oil].
Rabba bar bar Channa said in the name of Rebbi Yochanon, Any negative prohibition preceded by a positive commandment, [Lo saseh sh'kadmu asheh] is subject to malkus.
They asked him [Rebbi Yochanon] Did you say this? [that any prohibition preceded by a positive commandment is subject to flogging i.e. a lo saseah s'kedmu asseah]... He responded to them, No. [I retract what I said.] Rabbah said, By God! He said it. And it is backed by a posuk [verse] and a mishnah. It is written (Numbers 5,2) "And they shall send forth from the camp. etc. And they shall not defile their camps" [which is a lo saseah s'kedmu asseah] and it was taught in a mishna "One who enters the temple whilst impure [receives lashes].
Rav Pappa said to Rava But [a lo saseh sh'kedmu asseh] is not similar to the prohibition of muzzling, [so how can Rebbi Yochanon rule that one receives malkus]? Rava answered him, Just because the Torah writes by it an additional commandment, does that make it any less stringent?!
If so [that an extra commandment shouldn't detract from it, then the same argument can be made by] a lav sh'nituk l'asseh also, say that just because the Torah writes by it an extra commandment, does that make it any less stringent?! Rava explained [the difference] to him, That one [by a lav sh'nituk l'asseh the commandment] is coming to remove the prohibition.
That a teacher of baraisas taught in the presence of Rebbi Yochanon, Any prohibition that includes a [remedial] positive commandment, if he fulfills the commandment he is exempt, if he nullifies the commandment is he is liable.
But according to Rebbi Yochanon, this certainly is also a case of a prohibition without an action. [Why then does he not make the diuk that Reish Lakash made?]