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The Babylonian Talmud
"And he would return into the camp" etc. (ibid.). R. Abbahu said : The Holy One, blessed be He, spake to Moses, "Now will they say, The Master is angry and the disciple is angry; what will become of Israel? If thou wilt restore the tent to its place [within the camp], well and good ; but if not, Joshua the son of Nun, thy disciple, will minister in thy stead."
R. Abin the Levite also said : One who takes leave of his friend should not say to him, "Go in peace" but "Go to peace"; because in the case of Jethro who said to Moses "Go to peace" (Exod. iv. 18), the latter advanced and prospered ; but in the case of David who said to Absalom "Go in peace" (II Sam. xv. 9), the latter went and was hanged.
R. Abin the Levite also said : One who takes leave of the dead should not say to him, "Go to peace" but "Go in peace" ; as it is said, "But thou shalt go to thy fathers in peace" (Gen. xv. 15).
"Great peace have they that love Thy law; and there is no stumbling for them" (Ps. cxix. 165). "Peace be within thy walls, and prosperity within thy palaces" (ibid, cxxii. 7). "For my brethren and companions' sakes, I will now say, Peace be within thee" (ibid. v. 8). "For the sake of the house of the Lord our God, I will seek thy good" (ibid. v. 9). "The Lord will give strength unto His people ; the Lord will bless His people with peace" (ibid. xxix. 11)[2]
And, if you wish, you may say that even with a toraitic mitzvah a remedy may be given, but with regard to the sukkah, since there are many rules about it, it was briefly stated, invalid. [While in the case of a cross-beam over] an alley, since it has only one rule, it taught a remedy.
Everybody did not say like Rabbah, [because] that is knowledge through the generations.
Also, they did not say like Rabbi Zeira, [because] it was writing about the days of Mashiah.
And Rabi Zeira? If that were true, let it say "and a canopy will be for shade in the daytime." And what [does it say]? "And a Sukkah will be for shade in the daytime." We learn both things from this.
And Rabi Zeira? If that were true, let it say "and a canopy will be for shade in the daytime." And what [does it say]? "And a Sukkah will be for shade in the daytime." We learn both things from this.
Also, they did not say like Rava because of Abaye's question.
but [as regards] R. Huna and R. Chanan b. Rabbah,can we say that they differ on [what minimum of extent constitutes] the kashrus of the Sukkah the former, holding the opinion that the kashrus of the Sukkah [depends upon its being a minimum of] four amos [square] while the latter holds that The kashrus of the Sukkah [depends, upon its capacity of] containing his head, the greater part of his body, and his table?
This, furthermore, may be deduced also [from the wording], for it was stated, ‘If his head and the greater part of his body were within the Sukkah but his table was within the house, Bais Shammai [says] it's pasul, and Bais Hillel [says] it's Kosher;' but if it is [as you say] it should read, [If the Sukkah can] contain, or cannot contain [his head, etc.].
While in another [Baraitha] it has been taught: Rabbi says: Any Sukkah which is not four amos square is invalid, while the Sages say: Even if it can contain only his head, and the greater part of his body it is kosher. Whereas of ‘his table’ there is no mention. Does a contradiction not arise between the two [Baraisas]? We must consequently infer therefrom that: One is from Bais Shammai, and one is from Bais Hillel.
Mar Zutra said: The wording of this Mishnah also proves it, since is says: ‘Bais Shammai declare it pasul, and Bais Hillel says it's Kosher’, and if it were [as you say] it should read Bais Shammai say’, He has not fulfilled his obligation while Bais Hillel say that he has.
Mar Zutra said: The wording of this Mishnah also proves it, since is says: ‘Bais Shammai declare it pasul, and Bais Hillel says it's Kosher’, and if it were [as you say] it should read Bais Shammai say’, He has not fulfilled his obligation while Bais Hillel say that he has.
Mar Zutra said: The wording of this Mishnah also proves it, since is says: ‘Bais Shammai declare it pasul, and Bais Hillel says it's Kosher’, and if it were [as you say] it should read Bais Shammai say’, He has not fulfilled his obligation while Bais Hillel say that he has.
The fact is that they differ on two [points]. They differ on a small Sukkah and they differ on a large Sukkah. But the text is defective and is to be read like this: ‘He whose head and the greater part of his body were within the Sukkah and his table within the house, Bais Shammai say, He has not fulfilled his obligation and Bais Hillel says: He has. and if it is [able to contain only his head and the major part of his body alone, Beth Shammai says it's pasul and Bais Hillel says it's Kosher.’
Must we say that it agrees with Rabi, and not with the Rabbis? No! One can even say that it agrees with the Rabbis. The Rabbis say it only with regard to a Sukkah which is a temporary dwelling, but with regard to a house which is a permanent dwelling, even the Rabbis admit that if it has an area of four amos, people live in it, otherwise, they do not dwell within.
Must we say that it agrees with Rabi, and not with the Rabbis? No! One can even say that it agrees with the Rabbis. The Rabbis say it only with regard to a Sukkah which is a temporary dwelling, but with regard to a house which is a permanent dwelling, even the Rabbis admit that if it has an area of four amos, people live in it, otherwise, they do not dwell within.
Must we say that it agrees with Rabi, and not with the Rabbis? No! One can even say that it agrees with the Rabbis. The Rabbis say it only with regard to a Sukkah which is a temporary dwelling, but with regard to a house which is a permanent dwelling, even the Rabbis admit that if it has an area of four amos, people live in it, otherwise, they do not dwell within.
We should say rather, Eruv's of courtyards [are placed] in a house of the courtyard, and the Shittufs of alleys in a courtyard of the alley; and this is no worse than a courtyard in an alley.
Say rather, The law of division does not apply to it, as [it does in the case of] a courtyard. For R' Huna ruled, ‘A courtyard is divided according to the number of its doors.’ (and) R' Chisda said, ‘Four amos are given for each door and the remainder is divided equally’.
[A sukkah] was ten tefah tall, and palm leaves descend fall within ten. Abaye thought to say: If the sun is greater than the shade, then it is valid.
What does this teach me? That we can say that the wall bends? We already learned this in a Mishnah: A house [where some of the roof] is removed, and sekhakh is placed above it. If the distance from the wall to the sekhakh is four amah, then it is invalid. See, less than [four amah] is valid!
Why do we say there ‘less than four cubits’, and here ‘less than three handbreadths’?
Moreover, they dispute concerning the middle of the roof only but if he put [poles up] on the edge of the roof they all agree that it is valid. Shall we say then that this will refute R. Huna on two points?
Our rabbis taught: If he drove four poles into the ground and covered them with the skhakh, R. Jacob says: found that on being planed and smoothed there would remain the width of a handbreadth on this side and on this side, they are treated as a two-sided pillar, but if not, they cannot be treated as two-sided pillars for R. Jacob used to say, the prescribed minimum width of a two-sided pillar of a sukkah is a handbreadth. But the sages say: only if two [of the adjacent walls] are proper [walls], may the width of the third be only a handbreadth.
Our rabbis taught: If he drove four poles into the ground and covered them with the skhakh, R. Jacob says: found that on being planed and smoothed there would remain the width of a handbreadth on this side and on this side, they are treated as a two-sided pillar, but if not, they cannot be treated as two-sided pillars for R. Jacob used to say, the prescribed minimum width of a two-sided pillar of a sukkah is a handbreadth. But the sages say: only if two [of the adjacent walls] are proper [walls], may the width of the third be only a handbreadth.
This is correct according to the authority who holds that the border was below, but according to the authority who holds that it was above what can one say? It is only an accessory
But how do we know that the height of the interior space exclusive of the skhakh, must be ten [handbreadths]. Say that it might include the skhakh!
For how much [then] were the ark and cover? Eight and a half, so that eleven and a half handbreadths are left. Shall we [therefore] say that a Sukkah must be [at least] eleven and a half [handbreadths high]?
"A land of olive-oil" [is an allusion to the] land all of whose [minimum] standards [for mandated and forbidden things] is the bulk of an olive. How can it possibly mean all minimum measures? But aren't there those which we have just mentioned? Say rather, ‘The majority of whose [minimum] measures are the bulk of an olive....
[As for the laws of] partitions, these are those referred to above. That works according to R. Judah, but according to R. Meir what can one say?
And if you wish you can say that they all agree that the traditional reading is authoritative but they differ on this; .one Master holds that. the skhakh needs a Scriptural reference, while the other Master holds that it does not.
And if you wish you can say hat they are unanimous that the traditional Scriptural text is authoritative, but they differ on this principle; one Master holds that the tradition comes to diminish while the other holds that tradition comes and adds to it.
And if you wish you can say that both agree that tradition comes to diminish and that the traditional Scriptural text is authoritative, but they differ as to whether one uses first [references] for exegesis: one Master holds that we do expound upon first references, and the other Master holds that we do not.
R. Simon (or, as some say, R. Joshua b. Levi) ruled: One makes [the additional wall of the width of] a loose handbreadth and places it within three handbreadths of the wall, since whatever is less than three handbreadths from the wall is regarded as joined to the wall.
R. Simon (or, as some say, R. Joshua b. Levi) says, He makes a strip of slightly more than four [handbreadths] and places it within three handbreadths of the wall, since whatever is less than three handbreadths from the wall is regarded as joined to the wall.
But why did you say in the previous case that one loose handbreadth suffices while here you say that there must be a strip of four handbreadths? There where there are two valid walls, a loose handbreadth suffices, but here where there are not two valid walls, if there is a strip of four handbreadths it is valid, otherwise, it is not [valid].
But why did you say in the previous case that one loose handbreadth suffices while here you say that there must be a strip of four handbreadths? There where there are two valid walls, a loose handbreadth suffices, but here where there are not two valid walls, if there is a strip of four handbreadths it is valid, otherwise, it is not [valid].
There are others that say: Rava said: And it is also valid if it has the form of a doorway.
There are others that say: Rava said: And it also requires the form of a doorway.
The ‘others’? As it has been taught: Others say: A sukkah made like a dovecote is invalid, since it has no corners.
Say that we say that [where the discrepancy is] small he might approximate, but could such an assumption be made [where the discrepancy is] big?
Say that we say that [where the discrepancy is] small he might approximate, but could such an assumption be made [where the discrepancy is] big?
Say that we give approximate figures in order to create a where this makes the law lenient?
The rabbis of Caesarea (and some say, the judges of Caesarea) say: The circumference of a circle inscribed in a square is a quarter;
The rabbis of Caesarea (and some say, the judges of Caesarea) say: The circumference of a circle inscribed in a square is a quarter;
Now to what case does this refer? Now to what case does this refer? If I say where he did not interweave them, then behold he joins the invalid covering to the valid one? Rather it refers to a case where one did interweave them; and we learn from here that we don't decree against this?What might you have thought? That [this is permissible] only ex post facto but not ab initio, hence we were informed
R. Hisda and Rabbah son of R. Huna say: Four [handbreadths], since we do not find a place of any [legal] importance to be less than four [handbreadths]. And Shmuel says,
What does it mean ‘there are no occupants’? If we say, actual occupants, are then occupants [it could be objected] a determining factor? Rather we must say that ‘there are no occupants' means that the Sukkah is unsuitable for occupation? How so? Because it is less than ten handbreadths high. We could therefore infer that the first opinion [in the Mishnah] holds that even if it is unsuitable for occupation it is still invalid?
What does it mean ‘there are no occupants’? If we say, actual occupants, are then occupants [it could be objected] a determining factor? Rather we must say that ‘there are no occupants' means that the Sukkah is unsuitable for occupation? How so? Because it is less than ten handbreadths high. We could therefore infer that the first opinion [in the Mishnah] holds that even if it is unsuitable for occupation it is still invalid?
When R. Dimi came he said: In the West they say if the lower one cannot bear the weight of the bolsters and the cushions of the upper one, the lower one is valid.
Can we say that the following supports [R. Hisda's view]: If he covered it according to the rule, and adorned it with embroidered hangings and sheets, and hung in it nuts, almonds, peaches, pomegranates, bunches of grapes, wreaths of ears of corn, [vials of] wine, oil or fine flour, it is forbidden to make use of them
Minyamin, the servant of R. Ashi, had his shirt soaked in water, and he spread it out on their Sukkah. R. Ashi said to him, ‘Remove it, lest they say that it is permissible to use as a covering something which is susceptible to impurity. ‘But can they not see that it is wet?’ ‘I mean [the first answered] when it is dry.'
R. Hisda and Rabbah son of R. Huna once came to the house of the exilarch, And R. Nahman sheltered them in a Sukkah whose decorations were separated four handbreadths [from the skhakh]. They were silent and they didn't say a word to him. He said to them, ‘Have our rabbis retracted their teaching’? They answered him: We are messengers performing a mitzvah, and [therefore] we are free from the obligation of the Sukkah.
Why then does he not say, "the halachah is according to R. Judah?
R. Huna said to him: That has been said by Shmuel! R. Joseph turned away his face [in annoyance] and retorted, Did I say to you that Shmuel did not say it? Rav said it and Shmuel also said it. R. Huna said back to him: This is what I meant to say to you: that, Shmuel said it, and not Rav, for Rav declares it valid [without shaking], As in the case of R. Amram the Pious who attached fringes to the aprons of the women of his house. He hung them but he did not cut off the ends of the threads.
R. Huna said to him: That has been said by Shmuel! R. Joseph turned away his face [in annoyance] and retorted, Did I say to you that Shmuel did not say it? Rav said it and Shmuel also said it. R. Huna said back to him: This is what I meant to say to you: that, Shmuel said it, and not Rav, for Rav declares it valid [without shaking], As in the case of R. Amram the Pious who attached fringes to the aprons of the women of his house. He hung them but he did not cut off the ends of the threads.
R. Huna said to him: That has been said by Shmuel! R. Joseph turned away his face [in annoyance] and retorted, Did I say to you that Shmuel did not say it? Rav said it and Shmuel also said it. R. Huna said back to him: This is what I meant to say to you: that, Shmuel said it, and not Rav, for Rav declares it valid [without shaking], As in the case of R. Amram the Pious who attached fringes to the aprons of the women of his house. He hung them but he did not cut off the ends of the threads.
But does Shmuel hold that we do not say that their cutting is their making? But didn't Shmuel in fact teach in the name of R. Hiyya, If one attached [tzitzit] to two corners at one time and then cut the ends of these threads, the tzitzit are valid Does not this ,mean that he first knotted them and then cut them? No, he cut them first and afterwards knotted them.
How so? If you say that it is a case where one did not cut them, why did he give the reason ‘"You shall make" but not from that which is already made’? Let him rather give the reason that they are joined to the ground? Consequently it must be a case where he cut them, and yet it is taught that they are invalid. Learn from this that we do not say that their cutting is their making. And this is a refutation of Rav?
How so? If you say that it is a case where one did not cut them, why did he give the reason ‘"You shall make" but not from that which is already made’? Let him rather give the reason that they are joined to the ground? Consequently it must be a case where he cut them, and yet it is taught that they are invalid. Learn from this that we do not say that their cutting is their making. And this is a refutation of Rav?
Can we say that [their dispute matches the dispute of] the following tannaim?: If one transgressed and plucked them, [the hadas is] invalid, the words of R. Shimon b. Yehozadak. But the Sages declare it valid.
Do they [then] not dispute this principle? That the one who declared it valid is of the opinion that with regard to the Sukkah we say that ‘their cutting is their making', and[therefore] with regard to lulav we also say that their plucking is their making; while the one who declares it invalid is of the opinion that with regard to the Sukkah we do not say that ‘their cutting is their making, and [therefore] with regard to lulav also we do not say that their plucking is their making?
Do they [then] not dispute this principle? That the one who declared it valid is of the opinion that with regard to the Sukkah we say that ‘their cutting is their making', and[therefore] with regard to lulav we also say that their plucking is their making; while the one who declares it invalid is of the opinion that with regard to the Sukkah we do not say that ‘their cutting is their making, and [therefore] with regard to lulav also we do not say that their plucking is their making?
Do they [then] not dispute this principle? That the one who declared it valid is of the opinion that with regard to the Sukkah we say that ‘their cutting is their making', and[therefore] with regard to lulav we also say that their plucking is their making; while the one who declares it invalid is of the opinion that with regard to the Sukkah we do not say that ‘their cutting is their making, and [therefore] with regard to lulav also we do not say that their plucking is their making?
Do they [then] not dispute this principle? That the one who declared it valid is of the opinion that with regard to the Sukkah we say that ‘their cutting is their making', and[therefore] with regard to lulav we also say that their plucking is their making; while the one who declares it invalid is of the opinion that with regard to the Sukkah we do not say that ‘their cutting is their making, and [therefore] with regard to lulav also we do not say that their plucking is their making?
No! Everyone agrees that with regard to the Sukkah we do not say that their cutting is their making, but here they differ on the principle whether we deduce the law of lulav from that of Sukkah. The one who declares it valid is of the opinion that we do not deduce lulav from Sukkah, while the one who declares it invalid says that we do deduce lulav from sukkah.
And if you wish you may say hat if we were of the opinion that the [components of the] lulav must be tied together, [we must admit that] all agree that we do deduce the law of lulav from that of Sukkah. But here they dispute on the following: One Master holds the opinion that it must be tied together while the other holds that it need not be tied together; and their dispute is the same as that of the following tannaim as it has been taught: A lulav, whether [its components] be tied together or not, is valid. R. Judah says: If tied together it is valid, if not, it is invalid.
That is satisfactory according to the one who says that [the sukkot of the wilderness were] clouds of glory, but according to the one who says [the Israelites] made for themselves real sukkot, what can one say? For it has been taught: "For I made the children of Israel to dwell in booths" (Leviticus 23:43): These were clouds of glory, the words of R. Eliezer. R. Akiva says: They made for themselves real sukkot. Now this is satisfactory according to R. Eliezer, but according to R. Akiva, what can one say?
That is satisfactory according to the one who says that [the sukkot of the wilderness were] clouds of glory, but according to the one who says [the Israelites] made for themselves real sukkot, what can one say? For it has been taught: "For I made the children of Israel to dwell in booths" (Leviticus 23:43): These were clouds of glory, the words of R. Eliezer. R. Akiva says: They made for themselves real sukkot. Now this is satisfactory according to R. Eliezer, but according to R. Akiva, what can one say?
R. Yirmiyah said: Let us see: R. Hiyya b. Abba said in the name of R. Yohanan: Why did they say that bundles of straw, bundles of wood, and bundles of brushwood may not serve as skhakh? Because it may happen that a man returns in the evening from the field with his bundle on his shoulder, and he raises it up and places it on his sukkah to dry it, and then he might decide to leave it there as a skhakh, but the Torah said, "You shall make," [which implies], but not from that which is made. Now since this is a decree lest one use his store-house [as a Sukkah] the other must have been forbidden on the ground of ‘you shall make’ [which implies], but not from that which is made.
And R. Yohanan could say to you that here where it states, "One may not use them as skhakh" it means that only at the outset it is invalid,
It was also taught in a baraita: Reeds and forked reeds may be used as skhakh. As to reeds, this is obvious? — Say: Forked reeds may be used as a Sukkah-covering.
Say rather: Unless at the outset, [it contains] no more than the number permitted for its remnant, one.
R. Huna the son of R. Joshua said: one can even say that [it is valid even if] he does not loosen them, since a binding which is not made to be carried is not considered a binding.
Shall we say that the [ruling of] R. Menashya b. Gada is a dispute between tannas? For it has been taught: Boughs of fig-trees on which there are figs, branches of vines on which there are grapes, or straws on which there are ears of grain, palm-branches on which there are dates, all these, if the inedible part is greater than the edible are valid [for skhakh], otherwise, they are invalid. ‘Others’ say, [they are not valid] unless the straw is more than both the ‘handle’ and the food.
Shall we say that the [ruling of] R. Menashya b. Gada is a dispute between tannas? For it has been taught: Boughs of fig-trees on which there are figs, branches of vines on which there are grapes, or straws on which there are ears of grain, palm-branches on which there are dates, all these, if the inedible part is greater than the edible are valid [for skhakh], otherwise, they are invalid. ‘Others’ say, [they are not valid] unless the straw is more than both the ‘handle’ and the food.
To R. Abba this is certainly a tannaitic dispute. But shall we say that it is also a tannaitic dispute according to R. Menashye bar Gada? All agree that he who harvests grain for skhakh does not render the ‘handles’ susceptible to uncleanliness, but here we are dealing with a particular case where he harvests them for food, and then changed his mind [and used them] for skhakh.
And if you will say that this refers only to vessels which are of importance but that ‘handles’ which are needed only as aids for the eating of the food, are made [susceptible to uncleanness] by intention and are also unmade by intention [it may be objected], But have we not learned: The handles of all foodstuffs that are threshed in the threshing-floor are insusceptible to ritual uncleanliness, and R. Yose declares them susceptible?
R. Huna said to them: Did I not tell you, say like me? They answered him: Did then the Master give us a reason and we did not accept it from him? He said to them: Did you ask me for a reason and I would not give you?
Can we say that the following provides support for his view: If [the sukkah] cannot contain his head, the major part of his body and his table, or if a breach has been made in it large enough for a kid to jump in headlong, or if he placed on it a plank four handbreadths wide, even if he puts in three handbreadths, it is invalid.
Mishnah: A [wooden] roof that has no plastering: Rabbi Judah says: Bet Shammai say that he should loosen [the planks] and remove one from between each two. And Bet Hillel say he should either loosen [the planks] or remove one from between two. Rabbi Meir says, he removes one from between two, but he does not loosen [the planks].
Mishnah: A [wooden] roof that has no plastering: Rabbi Judah says: Bet Shammai say that he should loosen [the planks] and remove one from between each two. And Bet Hillel say he should either loosen [the planks] or remove one from between two. Rabbi Meir says, he removes one from between two, but he does not loosen [the planks].
Indeed it is because of a decree lest one use ordinary roofing, and this is what they say: Even although he loosens them, if he removes one from between two, it is [valid], otherwise it is not.
Rather to say that the dispute in the former [mishnah] is on the question whether a we decree against something [that might lead to] the possible use of an ordinary roofing and that the dispute in the latter mishnah is also on the same question; but why should they dispute the same question twice?
Gemara: Can we say that this is a refutation of R. Huna, the son of R. Joshua, since it was stated: If the breach is equal to that which is standing, R. Papa says it is permitted, and R. Huna the son of R. Joshua says it is forbidden?
Rava said: one can even say that he does not make it larger, but if they were placed as the web, he places [the valid covering] as the woof; if as the woof, he places them as the web.
Or the long boards of a bed. Can we say that this supports [a statement of] R. Ammi b. Tavyomi, for R. Ammi b. Tavyomi said: If he covered the Sukkah with worn out vessels it is invalid?
A bed can become unclean [only] when it is assembled and be rendered clean only when it is assembled, the words of R. Eliezer, but the sages say it can become unclean when it is in parts and become clean when in parts. What are [these parts]? — R. Hanan said in the name of Rabbi, The long board and two legs or the short board and two legs.
Bet Shammai say: below, And Bet Hillel say: above. Rabbi Judah said: the partition could not be more effective than the wall between the two courtyards.
Bet Shammai say: below, And Bet Hillel say: above. Rabbi Judah said: the partition could not be more effective than the wall between the two courtyards.
Judah speaks only there with regard to the eruv of courtyards, which is of rabbinical origin, but here, with regard to the sukkah which is from the Torah, he does not [say so]. ‘Nor does R. Yose hold the opinion of R. Judah,’ for R. Yose speaks only here with regard to the Sukkah which is merely a positive commandment but with regard to Shabbat, which is a prohibition punishable by stoning, he does not say so.
Judah speaks only there with regard to the eruv of courtyards, which is of rabbinical origin, but here, with regard to the sukkah which is from the Torah, he does not [say so]. ‘Nor does R. Yose hold the opinion of R. Judah,’ for R. Yose speaks only here with regard to the Sukkah which is merely a positive commandment but with regard to Shabbat, which is a prohibition punishable by stoning, he does not say so.
And they said to me, this is no evidence since Rav and Shmuel both say that the reason it is valid is because [the roof is regarded as the continuation] of a ‘curved wall
And [what does] the other [say]? The laws of uncleanliness differ [from those of sukkah] since they have a tradition about them.
Will you then say that it is because it has salt water, and ‘an unclean fish, since it has no scales, cannot exist [in salt water, it could be retorted that] we see that they do exist? The reason in fact is that the muddy nature of this river does not allow unclean fish to breed in it. Ravina said: But at the present time that the Etan river and the Gamda river flow into it and they are forbidden.
we say that the edge of the roof [of the exedra is regarded as though it] descends and fills up [the space]. While Raba says it is invalid, since we do not say that the edge of the roof descends and fills up [the space].
we say that the edge of the roof [of the exedra is regarded as though it] descends and fills up [the space]. While Raba says it is invalid, since we do not say that the edge of the roof descends and fills up [the space].