viable
20 occurrences across the corpus
The Mishnah
A yavam performs halitzah for his yevamah, and she is subsequently found to be pregnant and she gives birth: If the child is viable, he is permitted to marry her relatives and she is permitted to marry his relatives, and he does not disqualify her from marrying a priest. If the child is not viable, he is forbidden to marry her relatives and she is forbidden to marry his relatives, and he disqualifies her from marrying a priest.
A yavam performs halitzah for his yevamah, and she is subsequently found to be pregnant and she gives birth: If the child is viable, he is permitted to marry her relatives and she is permitted to marry his relatives, and he does not disqualify her from marrying a priest. If the child is not viable, he is forbidden to marry her relatives and she is forbidden to marry his relatives, and he disqualifies her from marrying a priest.
A yavam marries his yevamah and she is subsequently found to be pregnant, and she gives birth: If the child is viable, he must divorce her and both are obligated to bring a sacrifice; If the child is not viable, he may retain her [as a wife]. If it is doubtful whether it is a nine-months child of the first [husband] or a seven-months child of the second [husband] he must divorce her, and the child is legitimate, and they must bring an asham talui.
A yavam marries his yevamah and she is subsequently found to be pregnant, and she gives birth: If the child is viable, he must divorce her and both are obligated to bring a sacrifice; If the child is not viable, he may retain her [as a wife]. If it is doubtful whether it is a nine-months child of the first [husband] or a seven-months child of the second [husband] he must divorce her, and the child is legitimate, and they must bring an asham talui.
If his wife miscarries, he does not become a nazirite. Rabbi Shimon says: [in this case] he should say, “If it was a viable child, behold, I am a nazirite from obligation; otherwise behold, I am a voluntary nazirite.” If [his wife] later bears a child, he then becomes a nazirite. Rabbi Shimon says: he should say, “If the first was a viable child, the first [naziriteship] was obligatory, and this one is voluntary; otherwise, the first one was voluntary, and the present one is obligatory.”
If his wife miscarries, he does not become a nazirite. Rabbi Shimon says: [in this case] he should say, “If it was a viable child, behold, I am a nazirite from obligation; otherwise behold, I am a voluntary nazirite.” If [his wife] later bears a child, he then becomes a nazirite. Rabbi Shimon says: he should say, “If the first was a viable child, the first [naziriteship] was obligatory, and this one is voluntary; otherwise, the first one was voluntary, and the present one is obligatory.”
If an ox was rubbing itself against a wall and it fell on a person; or if it intended to kill an animal and it killed a man; or if it intended to kill a gentile and it killed an Israelite; or if it intended to kill an untimely birth and it killed a viable infant, it is exempt [from death by stoning].
If he intended to kill an animal but killed a man, or [he intended to kill] a non-Jew and he killed an Israelite, or [if he intended to kill] a prematurely born child [who was bound to die in any case] and he killed a viable child, he is not liable. If he intended to strike him on his loins, and the blow was insufficient to kill [when struck] on his loins, but struck the heart instead, where it was sufficient to kill, and he died he is not liable. If he intended to strike him on the heart, where it was sufficient to kill but struck him on the loins, where it was not sufficient to kill, and yet he died, he is not liable. If he intended to strike an adult, and the blow was insufficient to kill [an adult], but the blow landed on a child, whom it was enough to kill, and he died, he is not liable. If he intended to strike a child with a blow sufficient to kill a child, but struck an adult, for whom it was insufficient to kill, and yet he died, he is not liable. But if he intended to strike his loins with sufficient force to kill, but struck the heart instead, he is liable. If he intended to strike an adult with a blow sufficient to kill an adult, but struck a child instead, and he died, he is liable. Rabbi Shimon said: “Even if he intended to kill one but killed another, he is not liable.”
There is one who is [counted as] a firstborn [with respect to] inheritance but not with respect to redemption from a priest; a firstborn with respect to redemption from a priest but not a firstborn [with respect] to inheritance; a firstborn [with respect to both] inheritance and redemption from a priest; and a firstborn [in respect] to neither inheritance nor redemption from a priest. Which is a firstborn [with respect] to inheritance but not to redemption from a priest? One which follows one which was not viable whose head came forth alive, or one born in the ninth month whose head came out dead, or when a woman aborts something that looks like an animal, beast or bird, the words of Rabbi Meir. But the sages say: [it is not considered an opening of the womb] until [the abortion] has the form of a human being. If [a woman] aborts a sandal or a placenta or a fetus having an articulated shape, or if an embryo came out by pieces, [the infant] which follows after them is a first-born [with respect] to inheritance but not a first-born for redemption from a priest. If one who never had children married a woman who had already given birth, even if she had given birth when she was a slave but is now free, or [had given birth] when she was a non-Jew but has since converted, if after coming to the Israelite she gave birth, [the infant] is considered a first-born [with respect] to inheritance but not a first-born for redemption from a priest. Rabbi Yose the Galilean says: [the infant] is a firstborn [with respect] to inheritance and for redemption from a priest, as it says: “Whatever opens the womb in Israel” (Exodus 13:2), meaning only if it opens the womb in Israel. If one had children already and married a woman who had never given birth previously Or if she converted when pregnant, or if she was freed when pregnant, and she gave birth; If she and a priestess gave birth, she and a Levite’s daughter, she and a woman who had already given birth; And similarly [if a woman] who did not wait three months after her husband's death, married and gave birth and it is not known if the infant was born in the ninth month since the death of the first [husband] or in the seventh month since she married the second, it is a firstborn for redemption from a priest but not a first-born [with respect] to inheritance. Which is a firstborn both [in respect] of inheritance and for redemption from a priest? If [a woman] miscarries a sac full of blood or full of water or full of pieces of flesh; or if [a woman] miscarries something with the shape of fish or locusts or reptiles, or creeping things, or if she discharges on the fortieth day [of conception], [the infant] which follows after [these discharges] is a firstborn both [in respect] of inheritance and for redemption from a priest.
The Jerusalem Talmud
HALAKHAH: Why “the wife of his brother who did not live in his world”? “Together”, this excludes the wife of his brother who did not live in his world. Because if it were not so, what would we say? If he died childless, his widow would be forbidden to remarry, for maybe his father would have another son and his widow would then be a candidate for the levirate! Even if [the deceased’s] mother had died, his widow would be forbidden to remarry, [because] maybe the father would go and marry a new wife who could have a son and the widow would then be a candidate for the levirate! Then the verse would have to read: “He has neither father nor son”! One would compare this to the case that he left his widow pregnant; does she not have to wait to know whether the child is viable or not? Here also, should she not have to wait to know whether the child is viable or not? Therefore it was necessary to say “together”; this excludes the wife of his brother who did not live in his world.
HALAKHAH: Why “the wife of his brother who did not live in his world”? “Together”, this excludes the wife of his brother who did not live in his world. Because if it were not so, what would we say? If he died childless, his widow would be forbidden to remarry, for maybe his father would have another son and his widow would then be a candidate for the levirate! Even if [the deceased’s] mother had died, his widow would be forbidden to remarry, [because] maybe the father would go and marry a new wife who could have a son and the widow would then be a candidate for the levirate! Then the verse would have to read: “He has neither father nor son”! One would compare this to the case that he left his widow pregnant; does she not have to wait to know whether the child is viable or not? Here also, should she not have to wait to know whether the child is viable or not? Therefore it was necessary to say “together”; this excludes the wife of his brother who did not live in his world.
MISHNAH: If his wife had a miscarriage, he is not a nazir. Rebbi Simeon says, he should say: If it was a viable child, I am a nazir as an obligation, if not, I am a nazir voluntarily. If afterwards she had a child, he is a nazir. Rebbi Simeon says, he should say: If the earlier one was a viable child, I earlier was a nazir as an obligation, and now I am a nazir voluntarily; otherwise, I earlier was a nazir voluntarily, and now I am a nazir as an obligation.
MISHNAH: If his wife had a miscarriage, he is not a nazir. Rebbi Simeon says, he should say: If it was a viable child, I am a nazir as an obligation, if not, I am a nazir voluntarily. If afterwards she had a child, he is a nazir. Rebbi Simeon says, he should say: If the earlier one was a viable child, I earlier was a nazir as an obligation, and now I am a nazir voluntarily; otherwise, I earlier was a nazir voluntarily, and now I am a nazir as an obligation.
HALAKHAH: “If his wife had a miscarriage,” etc. Should one not be afraid that he might have been viable? Rebbi Joḥanan said, [the Mishnah] is Rebbi Jehudah’s, since Rebbi Jehudah said, any doubt of nezirut is permitted. It was said to him that Rebbi Jehudah said so only for the end; but for the start even Rebbi Jehudah will agree. What is beginning and what is end? Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac said, everybody agrees that “I do not know whether I made a vow of nazir or not,” is at the beginning, “whether it was for 30 or 50 days”, is at the end. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbu Abun said: Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba and Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac disagreed: Everybody agrees that “I do not know whether I made a vow of nazir or not,” is at the beginning, “whether it was for 30 or 50 days”, is at the end. Where do they disagree? If it was once or twice. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba considered it the end, Rebbi Samuel considered it the beginning. Rebbi Mana: The problem for Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac about one or two times is whether it is the beginning or the end.
HALAKHAH: “A bull which gored a human,” etc. It was stated: “But the owner of the bull is free,” free from half the weregilt, the words of Rebbi Eliezer. Rebbi Aqiba said to him, Rabbi, is he not destined for the severity of the stoning place? He answered him, I said this only for one which intended to kill an animal but killed a human, etc. Before he objects to Rebbi Eliezer, should he not object to himself? Rebbi Miasha said, explain it if he transgressed and slaughtered it. But some want to say, from what we learn from Rebbi Eliezer who said, I said this only for one which intended to kill an animal but killed a human, a Gentile but killed an Israel, still birth but killed a viable [child], he is not liable. How does Rebbi Aqiba explain “the owner of the bull is free”’? Free from paying for a slave. Does not Rebbi Eliezer agree that he is free from paying for a slave? “If weregilt is imposed on him,” the verse speaks of the notorious. Does not Rebbi Aqiba agree that he is free from half the weregilt? It is said here, “the bull shall be stoned,” and it says there, “the bull shall be stoned.” Since about “the bull” mentioned there, the verse speaks of the notorious, so also about “the bull shall be stoned” mentioned here, the verse speaks of the notorious. But is it not written: “The bull by stoning shall be stoned”? It is better that “the bull shall be stoned” shall be interpreted following “the bull shall be stoned” rather than that “the bull shall be stoned” should be interpreted following “the bull by stoning shall be stoned”.
MISHNAH: A bull which was rubbing itself against a wall which then fell on a human, [or which] intended to kill an animal but killed a human, a Gentile but killed a Jew, stillbirth but killed a viable child, is free from prosecution.
MISHNAH: If one intended to kill an animal but he killed a human, a Non-Jew but he killed a Jew, a stillborn but he killed a viable baby, he is not criminally liable. If one intended to hit someone on his hips where it would not have been enough to kill but it went on his heart where it was enough to kill and he died, he cannot be prosecuted. If one intended to hit someone on his heart where it would have been enough to kill but it went on his hips where it was not enough to kill but he died, he cannot be prosecuted. If one intended to hit someone big whom it would not have been enough to kill but it went on somebody small whom it was enough to kill and he died, he cannot be prosecuted. If one intended to hit someone small whom it would have been enough to kill but it went on somebody big whom it was not enough to kill but he died, he cannot be prosecuted. If one intended to hit someone on his hips where it was enough to kill but it went on his heart and he died; [or] if one intended to hit someone big and it was enough to kill but it went on somebody small and he died; he is [criminally] liable. Rebbi Simeon says, even if he intended to kill one person but killed another, he is not criminally liable.
The Babylonian Talmud
Rebbi Tarfon and Rebbi Akiva said, If we were part of court...etc.: What would they have done? Rebbi Yochanon and Rebbi Elezer said together, [they would ask the witnesses,] did you see if the victim was a Terefah or viable?
Rav Ashi says, If it came out that they said that they saw that the victim was viable [prior to being killed, they would say that] maybe in the place that the sword entered there was a hole.
“Without awareness” (Deuteronomy 19:4) excludes intentionality. Intentionality is obvious! He is liable for death!? Rabbah said: This excludes [when] he intends to kill an animal and kills a person, [when he intends to kill] a Cutite and kills a Jew, [when he intends to kill] a stillbirth and kills a viable infant.