case
3217 occurrences across the corpus
The Babylonian Talmud
Rav Pappa asked Abayi, Now that we've established that they [the witnesses] do not combine [in the case of] one [witness] from this window and one [witness] from this window where this [witness] observed the entire action and this [witness] observed the entire action, Do we need to say [the case of] one [witness] after the other [from the same window] where they each only observed half of the action? He answered him, We only need it for [the case of witnesses to] a cohabitation.
Rav Pappa asked Abayi, Now that we've established that they [the witnesses] do not combine [in the case of] one [witness] from this window and one [witness] from this window where this [witness] observed the entire action and this [witness] observed the entire action, Do we need to say [the case of] one [witness] after the other [from the same window] where they each only observed half of the action? He answered him, We only need it for [the case of witnesses to] a cohabitation.
Rav Pappa asked Abayi, Now that we've established that they [the witnesses] do not combine [in the case of] one [witness] from this window and one [witness] from this window where this [witness] observed the entire action and this [witness] observed the entire action, Do we need to say [the case of] one [witness] after the other [from the same window] where they each only observed half of the action? He answered him, We only need it for [the case of witnesses to] a cohabitation.
Another interpretation of, by the mouth of two witnesses is that the court cannot hear a case through an interpreter. etc.: There was these foreigners that came before Rava; Rava appointed an interpreter between them. But how was he able to this? We learned in a mishna, That the court cannot hear a case through the mouth of an interpreter? Rava knew what they were saying, but he did not know how to answer back.
Another interpretation of, by the mouth of two witnesses is that the court cannot hear a case through an interpreter. etc.: There was these foreigners that came before Rava; Rava appointed an interpreter between them. But how was he able to this? We learned in a mishna, That the court cannot hear a case through the mouth of an interpreter? Rava knew what they were saying, but he did not know how to answer back.
MISHNA: One has had a verdict and then flees and comes before a different court, we do not retry his case. Any circumstance where two witnesses get up and say that they testify about a certain man that he had his verdict in this-and-this court and so-and-so and so-and-so were his witnesses, that person gets executed.
GEMARA: Only before the same court is when his case is not retried, but brute a different court his case is retried. But the latter part of the mishna teaches, "Any circumstance where two witnesses get up and say that they testify about a certain man that he had his verdict in this-and-this court and so-and-so and so-and-so were his witnesses, that person gets executed."?
GEMARA: Only before the same court is when his case is not retried, but brute a different court his case is retried. But the latter part of the mishna teaches, "Any circumstance where two witnesses get up and say that they testify about a certain man that he had his verdict in this-and-this court and so-and-so and so-and-so were his witnesses, that person gets executed."?
Abaye answered, It isn't a contradiction. Here [where we retry the case] is in Israel; here [where we do not retry the case] is in Diaspora.
Abaye answered, It isn't a contradiction. Here [where we retry the case] is in Israel; here [where we do not retry the case] is in Diaspora.
Like we learned in a beraisa, Rebbi Yehuda ben Dostai says in the name of Rebbi Shimon ben Shetach, If he ran from Israel to Diaspora, we do not retry his case; if he ran from Diaspora to Israel, we do retry his case due the merit of Israel.
Like we learned in a beraisa, Rebbi Yehuda ben Dostai says in the name of Rebbi Shimon ben Shetach, If he ran from Israel to Diaspora, we do not retry his case; if he ran from Diaspora to Israel, we do retry his case due the merit of Israel.
By a cohabitation related crime what would they do? Abaye and Rava said together, Did you see [the equivalent] of a brush being out into a tube? And what would the Rabbis do [to execute in such a case]? They would go like Shmuel, that Shmuel says, They are sinners when they act in a manner like sinners.
Our Rabbis taught [in a baraita]: “If he came upon him suddenly” (Numbers 35:22) this excludes a [case when someone turns quickly] around a corner. “Without hatred” (Numbers 35:22) excludes the one who hates [their victim]. “He pushed him” (Numbers 35:22) [means] when he pushed his body. “Or hurled upon him” (Numbers 35:22) includes downward motion that is for a need of upward motion. “Without lying in wait (tz’diyah)” (Numbers 35:22) excludes the one who intends [to throw something] to one side (tzad) and it goes to the other side. “And if one does not lie in wait (tzadah)” (Exodus 21:13) excludes the one who intends to throw [something] two cubits and he threw [it] four cubits.
R' Abahu asked R' Yohanan a question: If a person was ascending a ladder and a rung broke under him and it fell and struck someone below and killed him, is this a situation of ascent [where he would be exempt] or descent [where he would be held liable]? He said to him: You've already touched on this [in an earlier baraita]—in a case of descending for the purpose of ascent [here, we mean that the rung is going downward for the purpose of the person ascending].
He challenged him "This is the general rule: anything that is within a downward movement, [that person] is sent to exile. Anything not in a downward movement [that person who initiated the act] is not exiled." And what does this "anything not in a downward movement include?" Does it not include this case?! [where the rung is downward and you are moving up, where, according to this general rule, that person would not be culpable for the rung falling]. But according to your reasoning, [the rule that] anything that is in the way of descent includes what?!
Does it not include a butcher? Here too, it also comes to include the case of the butcher— as it is taught in a baraita: a butcher who was cutting [meat]. One tanna teaches that [if he struck someone who was standing] before him, he would liable and [if the person was behind him], he would be exempt. Another tanna teaches that [if he struck someone behind him] he would be liable and if [he struck someone before him], he would be exempt. Another tanna teaches that whether the person was before him or behind him, he would liable. And another tanna teaches that whether he was before him or behind him, he would be exempt. This is not a difficulty.
[Now we return back to the debate between R' Abahu and R. Yohanan about the case of the fallen rung]. Let us say this same issue was the matter of a Tannaitic debate: One who is ascending a ladder and a rung falls. One tanna taught that he is liable and another taught that he is exempt. Was it not about this that they were disagreeing? One of them held that it was a case of descent [where he is liable] and one of them holds that he is ascending [where he is exempt].
[Now we return back to the debate between R' Abahu and R. Yohanan about the case of the fallen rung]. Let us say this same issue was the matter of a Tannaitic debate: One who is ascending a ladder and a rung falls. One tanna taught that he is liable and another taught that he is exempt. Was it not about this that they were disagreeing? One of them held that it was a case of descent [where he is liable] and one of them holds that he is ascending [where he is exempt].
No [that's wrong], everybody agrees that it is a case of ascent. And this is not a problem [they still have a disagreement]. Here [one is talking about the issue of] damages [where he would be obligated to pay the compensation for damages caused] and the other [is talking about the issue of] exile [from which he would be exempted].
Rav Pappa said: One who threw a clod of dirt at a palm tree, and [the clod of dirt] knocked dates, and the dates fell and killed someone—[in this case] we have arrived at the disagreement between Rebi and the Sages! But this is obvious! Since you might have said that [the death in this instance is] like a case of secondary force, therefore this teaches you that this is not the case [and that this is a case where the death is a result of primary force, and therefore this case is parallel to the Mishnah].
Rav Pappa said: One who threw a clod of dirt at a palm tree, and [the clod of dirt] knocked dates, and the dates fell and killed someone—[in this case] we have arrived at the disagreement between Rebi and the Sages! But this is obvious! Since you might have said that [the death in this instance is] like a case of secondary force, therefore this teaches you that this is not the case [and that this is a case where the death is a result of primary force, and therefore this case is parallel to the Mishnah].
Rav Pappa said: One who threw a clod of dirt at a palm tree, and [the clod of dirt] knocked dates, and the dates fell and killed someone—[in this case] we have arrived at the disagreement between Rebi and the Sages! But this is obvious! Since you might have said that [the death in this instance is] like a case of secondary force, therefore this teaches you that this is not the case [and that this is a case where the death is a result of primary force, and therefore this case is parallel to the Mishnah].
Rav Pappa said: One who threw a clod of dirt at a palm tree, and [the clod of dirt] knocked dates, and the dates fell and killed someone—[in this case] we have arrived at the disagreement between Rebi and the Sages! But this is obvious! Since you might have said that [the death in this instance is] like a case of secondary force, therefore this teaches you that this is not the case [and that this is a case where the death is a result of primary force, and therefore this case is parallel to the Mishnah].
Rav Pappa said: One who threw a clod of dirt at a palm tree, and [the clod of dirt] knocked dates, and the dates fell and killed someone—[in this case] we have arrived at the disagreement between Rebi and the Sages! But this is obvious! Since you might have said that [the death in this instance is] like a case of secondary force, therefore this teaches you that this is not the case [and that this is a case where the death is a result of primary force, and therefore this case is parallel to the Mishnah].
However, where can we find a case where Rebi [would exempt someone from exile] in an instance of secondary force? This is like [a case where] someone threw a clod of dirt and it struck a twig and the twig then went and hit a cluster of dates and the dates then fell and killed.
However, where can we find a case where Rebi [would exempt someone from exile] in an instance of secondary force? This is like [a case where] someone threw a clod of dirt and it struck a twig and the twig then went and hit a cluster of dates and the dates then fell and killed.
Gemara: [The one who throws a stone] into the public domain is an intentional [sinner]! Rav Shmuel bar Yitzchak said: [Rather this is in a case when] he is taking down his wall. He should have been paying attention! [Rather this is in a case when] he is taking down his wall at night. At night also, he should have been paying attention!
Gemara: [The one who throws a stone] into the public domain is an intentional [sinner]! Rav Shmuel bar Yitzchak said: [Rather this is in a case when] he is taking down his wall. He should have been paying attention! [Rather this is in a case when] he is taking down his wall at night. At night also, he should have been paying attention!
[Rather this is in a case when] he is taking down his wall towards the garbage heap. This garbage heap, what is the case? If it is common for many [people] to be in it [the garbage heap], he is [considered] a criminal. If it is not common for many [people] to be in it, it is [considered a situation of] one who had no choice [meaning that it was a freak accident or totally unexpected].
[Rather this is in a case when] he is taking down his wall towards the garbage heap. This garbage heap, what is the case? If it is common for many [people] to be in it [the garbage heap], he is [considered] a criminal. If it is not common for many [people] to be in it, it is [considered a situation of] one who had no choice [meaning that it was a freak accident or totally unexpected].
Rav Papa said: This is only necessary to teach [a case of] a garbage heap that is regularly used [as a bathroom] at night, and not one that is regularly used during the day, because it is possible that someone will be sitting there, [therefore] he is not a [considered] a criminal. [In a case] that it is not regularly used during the day, it is also not [considered] totally unexpected, because it is possible that someone will be sitting there.
Rav Papa said: This is only necessary to teach [a case of] a garbage heap that is regularly used [as a bathroom] at night, and not one that is regularly used during the day, because it is possible that someone will be sitting there, [therefore] he is not a [considered] a criminal. [In a case] that it is not regularly used during the day, it is also not [considered] totally unexpected, because it is possible that someone will be sitting there.
Is that to say that “found” [means that the person] was already there from the outset? And pit them against each other [this baraita and the baraita that follows]: “And he found” (Leviticus 25:26) [This verse describes a case in which someone has a third party redeem a field because they do not have funds. If that person is trying to subvert the system and already has the money to redeem, he is not permitted to go through this process of including a third party] excludes [what was already] found, because he may not sell a far [field] and redeem it with [a field that is] close, [nor a field that is] bad and redeem it for a good [quality field].
Rava said: here, the verse [in the second baraita] is according to its context, and there, the verse [in the first baraita] is according to its context. There, according to the context of the verse, “he found” is the same as “he obtained it in his hand” (Leviticus 25:26). Just as he obtained it in his hand from now [meaning already in the past] so too, he also found from now [meaning already in the past]. Here, according to the context of the verse, “he found” is the same as the forest. Just as the forest something was there from the outset, so too, also [in the case of] “he found” something was there from the outset.
The one who throws the stone, etc. One of the rabbis said to Rava: From what [basis are we stating the case] that he is cutting wood because it is optional? Perhaps he is cutting wood because [it is for a] sukkah or cutting wood [for the altar] (which would be a requirement and not an option), and even this, Scripture said, he should be exiled [for doing something required]?! He (Rava) said to him: since he found it cut and he does not cut [it himself], it is not a mitzvah, also now [regarding cutting wood] is not a mitzvah.
Ravina challenges this to Rava: [this case] excludes the father who strikes his son, the teacher who rebukes his student, and the messenger of the court, lets say, that since [the child is already] learned, it is not a mitzvah [to strike his son], also now [regarding cutting wood] is not a mitzvah [and therefore not required]. There, even though he is learned, it is a mitzvah [to strike him], as it is written: ... “correct your son and he will please you. He will give delight to your soul.” (Proverbs 29:17).
Rav Ada bar Ahavah said to Rava: "Is every case where it's written 'when (asher)' an optional action? From this [reasoning], 'When (asher) anyone has become impure fails to purify himself [they will be cut off from their people]' (Numbers 19:20)—if he wants to [touch a corpse], he can be impure, and if he doesn't want to he isn't impure; and a mitzvah corpse (of an unknown stranger) where it is not possible that [the finder] would become impure—would he be exempt [from the penalty of entering the Sanctuary while impure]?"
'He shall be impure' (Numbers 19:13)—[i.e.] in any case." [Hence in the case of the corpse impurity it is not optional like the chopping wood case].
'He shall be impure' (Numbers 19:13)—[i.e.] in any case." [Hence in the case of the corpse impurity it is not optional like the chopping wood case].
'He shall be impure' (Numbers 19:13)—[i.e.] in any case." [Hence in the case of the corpse impurity it is not optional like the chopping wood case].
"But he [i.e. you, Rava] needs this [verse] for [a case like] this baraita?!: 'He will be impure' (Numbers 19:13)—to include a day immerser (one who is impure and has immersed but needs to wait until nightfall to be pure). 'His impurity is in him' (Numbers 19:13)—to include one waiting for atonement." He said to him: "I say [that I derive my position] from 'more (od)' (Numbers 19:13)."
A certain Rabbi asked Rava: From where do you know (really R. Yishmael) that this plowing is voluntary? Maybe it is plowing for the Mitzvah of the Omer and even in this case, God said, "you shall desist." He said to him: If he were to find the (field) already plowed, then he would not have to plow again.(Therefore), plowing is not a Mitzvah.
Ravina challenged Rava (all the cases to follow are where the person is in pursuit of a Mitzvah so they would not be punished with exile): This excludes the case of a father who strikes his son (and kills him inadvertently), and the teacher who rebukes his student (and inadvertently kills him) and the court agent (who inadvertently killed). So, why (is this a mitzvah to hit one's son, etc?). Let us say that since he was already learned (the son), it's not actually a Mitzvah to strike him (again) so here too, it is also not a Mitzvah. (Rava:) There, despite the fact that he's already learned, it is still a Mitzvah to hit him, as it is stated, "rebuke your son and he will bring you rest."
Rava says:... [This case of non-exile for a son] is when he just hits [wounds] his father inadvertently. Since, you may have thought that if he would have killed him intentionally, he would be executed, then let him also be so in a case of inadvertent striking, this comes to teach us [that no, in fact, exile is specifically in cases of inadvertent killing and not striking/wounding].
Rava says:... [This case of non-exile for a son] is when he just hits [wounds] his father inadvertently. Since, you may have thought that if he would have killed him intentionally, he would be executed, then let him also be so in a case of inadvertent striking, this comes to teach us [that no, in fact, exile is specifically in cases of inadvertent killing and not striking/wounding].
This works out well if a slave or Samaritan is exiled by way of an Israelite or lashed. [He is exiled in a case where] he killed him [accidentally] and lashed [in a case where] he cursed him. But an Israelite who is exiled or lashed by way of Samaritan?! It works well with exile [in a case where] he killed him [accidentally]. But lashing, why? [If you say] because he cursed him, "the chieftain of your people do not curse" (Exodus 22:27)! [I.e. a Samaritan is not on of your people and thus this prohibition for which the punishment is lashes should not apply in this case]
This works out well if a slave or Samaritan is exiled by way of an Israelite or lashed. [He is exiled in a case where] he killed him [accidentally] and lashed [in a case where] he cursed him. But an Israelite who is exiled or lashed by way of Samaritan?! It works well with exile [in a case where] he killed him [accidentally]. But lashing, why? [If you say] because he cursed him, "the chieftain of your people do not curse" (Exodus 22:27)! [I.e. a Samaritan is not on of your people and thus this prohibition for which the punishment is lashes should not apply in this case]
This works out well if a slave or Samaritan is exiled by way of an Israelite or lashed. [He is exiled in a case where] he killed him [accidentally] and lashed [in a case where] he cursed him. But an Israelite who is exiled or lashed by way of Samaritan?! It works well with exile [in a case where] he killed him [accidentally]. But lashing, why? [If you say] because he cursed him, "the chieftain of your people do not curse" (Exodus 22:27)! [I.e. a Samaritan is not on of your people and thus this prohibition for which the punishment is lashes should not apply in this case]
This works out well if a slave or Samaritan is exiled by way of an Israelite or lashed. [He is exiled in a case where] he killed him [accidentally] and lashed [in a case where] he cursed him. But an Israelite who is exiled or lashed by way of Samaritan?! It works well with exile [in a case where] he killed him [accidentally]. But lashing, why? [If you say] because he cursed him, "the chieftain of your people do not curse" (Exodus 22:27)! [I.e. a Samaritan is not on of your people and thus this prohibition for which the punishment is lashes should not apply in this case]
Rather, Rav Aha son of Yaakov said: It's a case where he [the Israelite] testified against him [the Samaritan that he would be liable for lashing] and he was found guilty of falsely testifying [so whatever punishment he tried to give the Samaritan, he would suffer]. Similarly regarding a slave who testified against [an Israelite that would be punished with lashes] and was found to be a false witness—can a slave even give testimony?! [Therefore, this solution must be wrong because this half of the baraita doesn't make sense]. Rather, Rav Aha son of Rav Ika said: Here is what we are dealing with [where slave and Samaritan are lashed because of Israelite]: a case where he struck him with a wound
Rather, Rav Aha son of Yaakov said: It's a case where he [the Israelite] testified against him [the Samaritan that he would be liable for lashing] and he was found guilty of falsely testifying [so whatever punishment he tried to give the Samaritan, he would suffer]. Similarly regarding a slave who testified against [an Israelite that would be punished with lashes] and was found to be a false witness—can a slave even give testimony?! [Therefore, this solution must be wrong because this half of the baraita doesn't make sense]. Rather, Rav Aha son of Rav Ika said: Here is what we are dealing with [where slave and Samaritan are lashed because of Israelite]: a case where he struck him with a wound
They raised a contradiction [from a baraita]: Therefore, a resident foreigner and a idol worshiper who killed are put to death. This teaches that a resident foreigner is comparable to an idol worshiper! Just as in the case of an idol worshiper, there is no difference if he killed one of his own kind or if he killed one who was not his own kind—he is put to death; so too [in the case] of a resident foreigner, there is no difference if he killed one of his own kind or if he killed one who was not his own kind, he is put to death!
They raised a contradiction [from a baraita]: Therefore, a resident foreigner and a idol worshiper who killed are put to death. This teaches that a resident foreigner is comparable to an idol worshiper! Just as in the case of an idol worshiper, there is no difference if he killed one of his own kind or if he killed one who was not his own kind—he is put to death; so too [in the case] of a resident foreigner, there is no difference if he killed one of his own kind or if he killed one who was not his own kind, he is put to death!
Rav Hisda said: This is not a difficulty! Here [where he is exiled] is where he killed in a downward motion, and here [where he is not exiled] is where he killed in an upward motion. [I.e:] If [he killed him] in a downward motion, [in which case] an Israelite would be exiled, then exile should be enough for the [resident foreigner] as well. If [he killed him] in an upward motion, [in which case] an Israelite is exempt, then the resident foreigner is put to death.
Rav Hisda said: This is not a difficulty! Here [where he is exiled] is where he killed in a downward motion, and here [where he is not exiled] is where he killed in an upward motion. [I.e:] If [he killed him] in a downward motion, [in which case] an Israelite would be exiled, then exile should be enough for the [resident foreigner] as well. If [he killed him] in an upward motion, [in which case] an Israelite is exempt, then the resident foreigner is put to death.
Rava said to him: And is it not a kal vahomer (logical inference from a light to serious case)!? [This kal vahomer will show that your argument doesn't work]. Just as [in the case of] a downward motion an Israelite would be exiled, exile should be enough for a resident foreigner too; then [in the case of] an upward motion, an Israelite is an exempt, should [the resident foreigner really] be killed?!
Rava said to him: And is it not a kal vahomer (logical inference from a light to serious case)!? [This kal vahomer will show that your argument doesn't work]. Just as [in the case of] a downward motion an Israelite would be exiled, exile should be enough for a resident foreigner too; then [in the case of] an upward motion, an Israelite is an exempt, should [the resident foreigner really] be killed?!
Rava said to him: And is it not a kal vahomer (logical inference from a light to serious case)!? [This kal vahomer will show that your argument doesn't work]. Just as [in the case of] a downward motion an Israelite would be exiled, exile should be enough for a resident foreigner too; then [in the case of] an upward motion, an Israelite is an exempt, should [the resident foreigner really] be killed?!
Rather, Rava said: [This is an instance where the resident foreigner] said that it was permitted. Abaye said to him: Someone who said that it was permitted is [a case of] a freak accident?! He said to him: I say that someone who said that it was permitted is [a case of] gross negligence.
Rather, Rava said: [This is an instance where the resident foreigner] said that it was permitted. Abaye said to him: Someone who said that it was permitted is [a case of] a freak accident?! He said to him: I say that someone who said that it was permitted is [a case of] gross negligence.
And they [Rav Hisda and Rava] go according to their principles, as it was stated [in an Amoraic teaching]: He thought that it was an animal and [after he killed him] it was found to be a person, or if he thought it was a non-Jew and it was found to be a resident foreigner, Rava says: He is liable. One who says it was permitted is [a case of] gross negligence. Rav Hisda says: He is exempt. One who says it was permitted is [a case of] freak accident.
And they [Rav Hisda and Rava] go according to their principles, as it was stated [in an Amoraic teaching]: He thought that it was an animal and [after he killed him] it was found to be a person, or if he thought it was a non-Jew and it was found to be a resident foreigner, Rava says: He is liable. One who says it was permitted is [a case of] gross negligence. Rav Hisda says: He is exempt. One who says it was permitted is [a case of] freak accident.
But Kedesh is a city of refuge?! But it is written, "The fortified towns: Tzidim, Tzar and Hamat, Rakat and Khineret... and Kedesh, and Edrai and Ein Hatzor? (Joshua 19:35-37)" [which means that Kedesh is a fortified town]. And it is taught [in a baraita]: "Those cities [of refuge]—make them neither small villages nor large cities but medium-sized towns"?! [Which means that Kedesh cannot be a fortified town and still qualify as a city of refuge]. Rav Yoseif said: "There were two Kedesh's." Rav Ashi said: "Like Seleucia and the acropolis of Seleucia." [Kedesh had a separate, administrative section known as Kedesh as well as a distinct town called Kedesh, like the case we know of in Seleucia].
Not a difficulty. This one [the second statement] is [a case where] he is currently occupied with it [the Torah], and that one is [a case where] he is currently not occupied with it.
Not a difficulty. This one [the second statement] is [a case where] he is currently occupied with it [the Torah], and that one is [a case where] he is currently not occupied with it.
Come and learn [a proof from our mishna], If his verdict was concluded without a high priest, he never leaves [the city of refuge] for ever. And if it was true [that the death of any high priest would release him], let him return with [the death of] one of them. [The mishna was discussing a case were] there were no [other high priests].
If his judgment was finalized and subsequently the [high] priest was found to be the son of a divorcee or the son of a woman who received chalitzah, the matter is subject to a dispute between Rebbi Ami and Rebbi Yitzchak Nafkah. One says, [It is comparable to a case where] the priesthood died, and one says, [It is comparable to a case where] the priesthood got disqualified [retroactively].
If his judgment was finalized and subsequently the [high] priest was found to be the son of a divorcee or the son of a woman who received chalitzah, the matter is subject to a dispute between Rebbi Ami and Rebbi Yitzchak Nafkah. One says, [It is comparable to a case where] the priesthood died, and one says, [It is comparable to a case where] the priesthood got disqualified [retroactively].
But I'd this logical?! Whether [one holds like] the opinion that it is a mitzvah [for the Goel HaDam to kill the murderer] or whether [one holds like] the opinion that it is permissible, is it permitted [for a son to kill his father]? But Rabba bar Rav Huna said, and so too was taught in a baraisa of the academy of Rebbi Yishmael, For everything a son may not be made into an agent [of the court] against his father to hit him or curse him, except in the case of one who instigates [idolatry] upon which the Torah says (Deuteronomy 13,9) "do not spare him and do not conceal him".
This should be obvious!? They are separate bodies and they are separate prohibitions, [why do the Rabbis need a verse to teach us this?] Rather to make one liable [separate offerings for cohabiting with] his sister who is his father's sister, and who is [also] his mother's sister. And how can we find such a case, with a sinner the son of a sinner [re'shia bar re'shia. cf. Rashi].
They responded, This [case] we have not heard, but we have not heard, but we have heard that one who cohabits with five woman who are niddahs in one lapse of unawareness is liable [a separate offering] for each and every one, and it would appear that these [two] cases form a kal v'chomer, and just if [by the case of five] niddah[s] which is one prohibition, one is liable for each and every one, then here [by re'shia bar re'shia] where there are three separate prohibitions is it not more so?
They responded, This [case] we have not heard, but we have not heard, but we have heard that one who cohabits with five woman who are niddahs in one lapse of unawareness is liable [a separate offering] for each and every one, and it would appear that these [two] cases form a kal v'chomer, and just if [by the case of five] niddah[s] which is one prohibition, one is liable for each and every one, then here [by re'shia bar re'shia] where there are three separate prohibitions is it not more so?
So rather, what is the reason that [Rebbi Yochanon] retracted [his veiw]? Because he found [his veiw point] problematic with the case of a rapist [Ohneis] For it was taught in a barasiah An Ohneis who divorced his wife [in violation of the Torah's commandment], If he is a Yisroel [i.e. a non-Kohen] he takes her back and does not receive malkus. If he is a Kohen, he receives malkus and doesn't take her back.
If he is a Yisroel he takes her back and doesn't receive malkus? Why? This is a case of a lo saseh sh'kadmu asseh, and [according to Rebbi Yochanon's original ruling] he should get malkus.
Ullah said [a possible resolution] [The Torah] need not have said "she should be to him for a wife" by Oneis, and it could have been derived from Motzei Shem Rah. And if by the case of Motzei Shem Rah where no action was performed, the Torah says (Deuteronomy 22,19) "She should be to him for a wife", then by Oneis [which does involve an action] is it not even more so?
But according to Reish Lakash, this certainly is also a case of a questionable warning. [Why then does he not make the diuk that Rebbi Yochanon made?]
But according to Rebbi Yochanon, this certainly is also a case of a prohibition without an action. [Why then does he not make the diuk that Reish Lakash made?]
According to Reish Lakash, there is no difficulty, it is a case of two differing opinion on what Rebbi Yehudah held. According to Rebbi Yochanon, there is no difficulty, one statement [of Rebbi Yehuda's] is his own and one is his rebbi's [Rebbi Yosi Haggilli.
It was taught in a mishna over there, One who takes a mother bird while with its young [in violation of the Torah's prohibition]. Rebbi Yehuda says that he receives malkus and need not send her away. And the Sages say that he must send away [the mother bird] and is not flogged. This is the general rule, any prohibition that has an active positive commandment one is not liable for. Rebbi Yochanon said, We do not have any examples of this [where one can receive malkus by nullifying a remedial positive commandment] besides for this case [of sending away the mother bird] and one other case.
It was taught in a mishna over there, One who takes a mother bird while with its young [in violation of the Torah's prohibition]. Rebbi Yehuda says that he receives malkus and need not send her away. And the Sages say that he must send away [the mother bird] and is not flogged. This is the general rule, any prohibition that has an active positive commandment one is not liable for. Rebbi Yochanon said, We do not have any examples of this [where one can receive malkus by nullifying a remedial positive commandment] besides for this case [of sending away the mother bird] and one other case.
Rebbi Ellazer asked him, Where is [the other case]? [Rebbi Yochanon] responded to him, when you look for it [you will find it]. He looked hard and found it. For it was taught in a baraisa An Oneiss who divorces his wife, if he is a Yisroel [a non-Kohen] he takes her back and does not recieve malkus. If he is a Kohen, however, [who is forbiden to marry a divorcee,] he is flogged and does not take her back.
This [case] harmonizes with the view that teaches Kimu v'lo Kimu.
But according to the one who teaches Bitlo v'lo Bitlo, then while [a way to nullify the remedial commandment] can be found regarding Shiloach Haken [i.e. sending away the mother bird, for example where he kills the mother bird], but with regards to Oneiss how can you find a case of Bitlo v'lo Bitlo?
If he kills her [thus nullifying his ability to perform the remedy of remarrying her], the [he would be exempt based of the principle of] Kim Leih B'dirabah Me'neih [that anyone liable to the death penalty is exempt from all else.] Rav Shimi miChuznah proposed in a case where he accepted on her behalf Kidushin from another man. Rav asked If she had appointed him as her agent, then is he the one nullifying it? And if she had not appointed him as her agent then is anything even coming from his actions? They would be meaningless!
Rather Rav Shimi miNardeah proposed, in a case where he publicly made a vow [against marring her]. This is good according to the opinion that a vow made in public can not be annulled. But according to the opinion that [such a vow] can be annulled, what can be said? Where it was made with the consent of the public. That Ameimar said, The halacha is that a vow made publicly can be annulled, but a vow made with the consent of the public can not be annulled.
Rebbi Zeira asked, but there still is [the case someone who unlawfully took] the pledge of a proselyte, and then the proselyte died?
That we learned in a baraisa, The mitzvah of pea'uh is to separate from the standing grain. If one did not separate from the standing grain, he should separate from the bundles. If he did not separate from the bundles, he should separate from the pile until he smooths it. Once he smoothes it, [making it subject to maiser] he should separate maiser and then give it [to the poor. Thus it is subject to nullification if he makes it into dough. So why is this not also a good example of a case where it's possible to nullify the remedial commandment?].
[Because Rebbi Yochanon holds] according to Rebbi Yishmael who says, He may even separate pe'uh from the dough. But according to Rebbi Yishmael a way to nullify the commandment can also be found, in a case where he eats the dough?
Rather [when Rebbi Yochanon said] this and one other case, he was referring to [Pe'uh], but not oniess. Because where do we say that a vow made on public consent cannot be annulled? For an optional matter. But [a vow] related to performing a mitzvah is subject to annulment.
is it not that in this facet they are arguing, that one holds [produce is still] considered tevel [i.e. untithed, until maser ani is removed as well]. And the other one holds [maser ani] does not render the produce tevel. Abaye said to him. If so [that they argue about whether maser ani can render the produce tevel], then rather than arguing in a case of questionable produce [demai] they should argue in a case where it was known [that maser ani] was not separated.
is it not that in this facet they are arguing, that one holds [produce is still] considered tevel [i.e. untithed, until maser ani is removed as well]. And the other one holds [maser ani] does not render the produce tevel. Abaye said to him. If so [that they argue about whether maser ani can render the produce tevel], then rather than arguing in a case of questionable produce [demai] they should argue in a case where it was known [that maser ani] was not separated.
[We can bring a proof to Rav Bibi's understanding of the dispute to only concern wheat kernels from what] was taught in a mishna. Rebbe Shimon said to them [the sages], will you not [at least] agree with me [in the case of] where one consumes an ant of any size that he would be liable to malkus? The sages responded to him that is because [an ant] is in the form in which it was created. Rebbi Shimon said back to them, Even a single [kernel of] wheat is in the form that it was created. [This implies that Rebbi Shimon would hold only that by a] wheat [kernel] one is [liable for less then a k'zias], but not by flour.
The text is: Rava said a non-Kohen who eats from an ollah before the zerikah outside of the wall, according to Rebbi Shimon incurs five sets of malkus. But let him also incur malkus from (Exodus 29,33) "And a non-Kohen may not eat them for they are sanctified"? Those words only apply in a case where it is fit for Kohenim, but here it is also not fit for Kohenim.
But let him also incur malkus from (Exodus 22,30) "And torn meat in the field he shall not eat", that once the meat goes outside of it's bounds it is forbidden? Those words only apply in a case where it is fit when in it's bounds, but here it is also not fit in it's bounds.
which means, that regarding any "holy" that got disqualified, the verse comes to add a prohibition against eating it. [Why doesn't Rava say he incurs malkus for that]. These words only apply in a case where they are fit [for consumption] before becoming disqualified, but here [by ollah] before being disqualified they are also not fit.
This is a contradiction between [one case of] recitation and [another case of] recitation. This is a contradiction between [one case of] placement and [another case of] placement.
This is a contradiction between [one case of] recitation and [another case of] recitation. This is a contradiction between [one case of] placement and [another case of] placement.
This is a contradiction between [one case of] recitation and [another case of] recitation. This is a contradiction between [one case of] placement and [another case of] placement.
This is a contradiction between [one case of] recitation and [another case of] recitation. This is a contradiction between [one case of] placement and [another case of] placement.