10 occurrences across the corpus

The Jerusalem Talmud

Jerusalem Talmud Bikkurim 3:40

HALAKHAH: Rebbi Yose said: Everybody agrees that one adorns First Fruits with produce of the Land since nobody errs to think that one may bring First Fruits from outside the Land. They differ about this, about Ammon and Moab. For him who says, one adorns First Fruits [with anything] except from the Seven Kinds, one may adorn First Fruits with produce from Ammon and Moab. For him who says, one adorns First Fruits only with the Seven Kinds, one may not adorn First Fruits with produce from Ammon and Moab. Rebbi Mana said: Everybody agrees that one may not adorn First Fruits with produce of Ammon and Moab since people err to think that one may bring First Fruits from Ammon and Moab. About what do they differ? About outside the Land. For him who says, one adorns First Fruits [with anything] except from the Seven Kinds, one may adorn First Fruits with produce from outside the Land. For him who says, one adorns First Fruits only with the Seven Kinds, one may not adorn First Fruits with produce from outside the Land..

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 9:15

HALAKHAH: “If somebody died and left a wife,” etc. Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, the weakest in his claim. For example, one lent before witnesses, the other lent on a mortgage document; it should be given to the one who lent before witnesses. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the weakest in his body. Think about it, if he is rich, like those of the family Andreas. Rebbi Aḥa said, the weakest in his body and poor. As the following: They gave to a relative of Rebbi Samuel bar Abba as the weakest. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish brought slaves of Rebbi Jehuda the Prince and took it away from her. Rebbi Joḥanan was leaning on Rebbi Simeon bar Abba and said, what was done with that poor woman? He said to him, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish brought slaves of Rebbi Jehuda the Prince and took it away from her. Was he justified in doing this? Rebbi Jeremiah asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: Should we say that Rebbi Joḥanan follows his doctrine and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish his own? Since they disagree: Everybody agrees that if they err in arguments, one does not reverse. In the words of the Torah, one reverses. Where do they disagree? If one errs in a Mishnah, for Rebbi Joḥanan says, an error in Mishnah is like an error in arguments, but Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish says, an error in Mishnah is like an error in words of the Torah. What is said of the Mishnah is also said of words of the Elders.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:2

HALAKHAH: “There are two kinds of oaths which are four kinds,” etc. One understands “that I shall eat, or that I shall not eat.” “That I ate, or that I did not eat”? Where do we stand? If it is known that he ate and he swore that he did not eat, it is a false oath. But if he was of the opinion that he ate and swore that he did not eat? Rebbi Abba, Rav Jehudah in the name of Rav: If he is inadvertent for its sacrifice or intentional for its sacrifice. But “I was of the opinion that this is not an oath” is permitted. But it must be that he was intentional in the deed but in error about the sacrifice. Did not Rebbi Abbahu say in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Intentional about fat and in error about the sacrifice, one warns him, he is flogged and has to bring a sacrifice. This is impossible, as Rebbi La said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: So did Rebbi Ismael answer Rebbi Aqiba: Do we find a situation where one is liable if intentional because of a false oath and in oblivion because of blurting? Should not Rebbi Aqiba retort, we find a situation where one is liable if intentional because of a false oath and he brings a sacrifice? But we deal here with the case that he was sure that he ate, and he swore, and it turned out that he had not eaten. Not about him who said that this is not an oath? There, if he says this is not an oath; but here if he knows that this is an oath but he errs because of something else.

Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 1:7

“And a single person went and acted inadvertently following their pronouncement.” Is there an intentional inadvertent action concerning an instruction by the Court? Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Our Mishnah, for example, if Simeon ben Azzai was sitting before them. Where do we hold? If he knows the entire Torah but does not know this detail, he is not Simeon ben Azzai. If he knows this particular subject but not the entire Torah, he is Simeon ben Azzai for this particular subject. But we must hold that he knows the entire Torah and knows the particular subject, but he errs to believe that the Torah said, after them, after them. If he errs to believe that the Torah said, after them, after them, he is not Simeon ben Azzai. As we have stated, I could think that if they tell you about right that it is left, and about left that it is right, you should listen to them? The verse says, “to go to the right or to the left;” that they should tell you about the right that it is right, and about the left that it is left. What about it? Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Hila: Because everywhere for an inadvertent sin one is not liable but for an intentional one is liable, and here even intentionally he is not liable.

Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 1:7

“And a single person went and acted inadvertently following their pronouncement.” Is there an intentional inadvertent action concerning an instruction by the Court? Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Our Mishnah, for example, if Simeon ben Azzai was sitting before them. Where do we hold? If he knows the entire Torah but does not know this detail, he is not Simeon ben Azzai. If he knows this particular subject but not the entire Torah, he is Simeon ben Azzai for this particular subject. But we must hold that he knows the entire Torah and knows the particular subject, but he errs to believe that the Torah said, after them, after them. If he errs to believe that the Torah said, after them, after them, he is not Simeon ben Azzai. As we have stated, I could think that if they tell you about right that it is left, and about left that it is right, you should listen to them? The verse says, “to go to the right or to the left;” that they should tell you about the right that it is right, and about the left that it is left. What about it? Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Hila: Because everywhere for an inadvertent sin one is not liable but for an intentional one is liable, and here even intentionally he is not liable.

The Babylonian Talmud

Babylonian Talmud Berakhot 4:110

Why did they not discharge him ? For lo, Rab Judah said in the name of Rab : If [the Precentor] errs in all the [eighteen] benedictions we do not discharge him ; but [if he errs] in the benediction relating to the Minim we do discharge him, for fear that he is a Min !

Babylonian Talmud Berakhot 4:110

Why did they not discharge him ? For lo, Rab Judah said in the name of Rab : If [the Precentor] errs in all the [eighteen] benedictions we do not discharge him ; but [if he errs] in the benediction relating to the Minim we do discharge him, for fear that he is a Min !

Babylonian Talmud Berakhot 5:226

MISHNAH If one errs while saying the Tefillah, it is a bad omen for him; and should he be the messenger of the congregation, it is a bad omen for those who deputed him, since a man's deputy is similar to himself. They declared concerning R. Hannina b. Dosa that when praying on behalf of the sick, he would say, "This one will live, that one will die." They asked him, "How knowest thou?" He replied, "If my prayer is fluent in my mouth, I know that he is accepted; but if not, I know that he is rejected."

Babylonian Talmud Sukkah 3:291

R. Huna said: R. Yose used to say: A bird [offered as] a burnt-offering that was found among other fowls and [the priest] thought that it was a bird sin-offering, and ate it, he is exempt. What does he teach us by this ruling? That one who errs in connection with a mitzvah is exempt? But this is the same [as the Mishnah]?

Babylonian Talmud Sukkah 3:292

What might you have thought? There [in the mishnah] he is not liable when he errs in connection with a mitzvah, because he performs a mitzvah, but here where he erred in connection with a mitzvah but he does not perform another mitzvah, I might have said that he is liable, therefore he informs us [that even here he is exempt].