latter
705 occurrences across the corpus
The Jerusalem Talmud
Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira had a different version: Rebbi Eleazar asked Rebbi Joḥanan, what is the rule about a dough widow? He said to him, she is qualified. What about her daughter? He said to him, the one who declares her to be qualified, declares her daughter to be qualified. They wanted to say, according to Rebbi Eleazar, a child of unknown paternity is disqualified; according to Rebbi Joḥanan, a child of unknown paternity is qualified. Rebbi Joḥanan also holds that in some cases a child of unknown paternity is disqualified; he answered [Rebbi Eleazar] following the latter’s reasoning: Since you reason that the child is simply of unknown paternity, we find that a child of unknown paternity can be High Priest! How is this possible? A group of Cohanim was passing by, one of them came and had sexual relations; it turns out that the child of unknown paternity can be High Priest.
Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rav Ḥuna, in the name of Rav: One witness and someone from the market place cannot together certify the signature of the second witness. How is that? If one identified his own signature and that of his colleague, but that second witness’s signature was not known to anybody except his colleague, may that colleague together with somebody from the market place testify on that signature? That is what Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rav Ḥuna, said in the name of Rav: One witness and someone from the market cannot together certify the signature of the second witness. Another case where there are no two persons: The signature of one is known by everybody, but that second witness’s signature is not known to anybody except his colleague. Can that colleague testify on his signature as if he were someone from the market place? If you say so, the entire testimony is confirmed by one witness. Rebbi Yudan said, that is correct. If two people come from a town that is mostly Gentile, like Hippos. One is known by everybody as a Jew, but the other is not known by anybody except his companion. Can the latter be considered one from the market place to testify about him? If you say so, the entire testimony would be confirmed by one witness! And in the prior case, the entire testimony would be confirmed by one witness.
There, we have stated: “The only difference between the Sabbath and the Day of Atonement is that intentional infraction of the former is punished by the hands of man, but intentional infraction of the latter is punished by extirpation.” Therefore, for payment both follow the same rules. This is by Rebbi Neḥoniah ben Haqanah since “Rebbi Neḥoniah ben Haqanah says, the Day of Atonement follows the rules of Sabbath for payment. But Rebbi Simeon ben Menassiah says those subject to extirpation equal those subject to capital punishment.” What is between them? Rebbi Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Avina said, a menstruating adolescent girl is between them. Rebbi Mana said, also his wife’s sister is between them. In the opinion of Rebbi Neḥoniah ben Haqanah, just as the Sabbath does not become permitted after its prohibition started; so theDay of Atonement does not become permitted after its prohibition started. However, these may become permitted after their prohibition started, he has to pay. But Rebbi Simeon ben Menassiah said, extirpation applies to the Sabbath and the day of Atonement; extirpation does not apply to these, he has to pay.
MISHNAH: If a proselyte woman converted together with her daughter and the latter committed adultery, she is [executed] by strangling; she has neither a door of her father’s house nor 100 tetradrachmas. If she was conceived not in holiness but born in holiness, she is [executed] by stoning; she has neither a door to her father’s house nor 100 tetradrachmas. If she was conceived and born in holiness, she is a Jewish woman in all respects. If she has a father but no door to her father’s house, or a door to her father’s house but no father, she is stoned since the door to her father’s house was mentioned only as a commandment.
Rebbi Abba bar Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: “How much are you giving to your son? Such and such. How much are you giving to your daughter? Such and such. When he preliminarily married her, the daughter acquired among the daughters and the son among the sons,” but only if it is a first marriage. This follows what Rebbi Ḥanania said: If somebody definitively married off his son in a house, the latter acquired the house, but only if it is a first marriage. Rebbi Hoshaia said, she acquired movables but did not acquire the house. Do they disagree? Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of Rebbi Abbahu: Explain it that his father used it for storage. Rebbi Ḥizqiah in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: It is needed in case what was stored was borrowed from the market. Rebbi Abbahu said, if he said it is loaned, he did not acquire it. There came a case before Rebbi Jacob ben Rebbi Abun and he instructed following Rebbi Abbahu. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, essentialy this has no basis but the rabbis build and add to it!
Rebbi Jeremiah asked: If somebody dedicated his slave’s earnings and the latter was a hunter, what are the rules? Let us hear from the following: If somebody dedicates his slave, that one is dedicated but his earnings are profane. His [slave’s] earnings, he is profane and his earnings are dedicated. Rebbi Joḥanan said, if somebody cuts off the hands of another person’s slave, that one’s owner collects the payments for his injuries, his pain, his shame, and impairment but he shall go out and subsist on alms. Did we not state: If somebody dedicates his slave, that one takes out his provisions but the remainder is dedicated. Rebbi Abba bar Mamal said, nobody thinks that he should die. [ ] more than for slaves. Did not Rebbi Joḥanan say, if somebody cuts off the hands of another person’s slave, that one’s owner collects the payments for his damages, his pain, his shame, and impairment but he shall go out and subsist on alms. The rabbis of Caesarea in the name of Rebbi Aḥa: Jews are obligated to care for amputees, even slaves. Rebbi Joḥanan gave to his slave from everything he himself ate and quoted for this: “Did not his Maker make me in the belly and formed me likewise in a womb?”
”If they died, others should inherit.” Did not Rebbi Abbahu say in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: A person can transfer property rights in any language except with an expression of inheritance? One does not have here “they shall inherit” but “they shall take”. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Mana: Do they not differ here in matters of a gift? If somebody signed over all his property to two persons at the same time; to one he wrote in the language of gift but to the other in the language of inheritance. Rebbi Eleazar said, since the one acquired in the language of gift, the other one acquired in the language of inheritance. Rebbi Joḥanan said, it seems that one did acquire in the language of gift but the other did not acquire in the language of inheritance Rebbi Phineas said, there came a case before Rebbi Jeremiah: Practice follows Rebbi Eleazar since Rebbi Eleazar stated a docrine but Rebbi Joḥanan said only “it seems”. Rebbi Samuel said, but did not Rebbi Meïr say that and it does not seem reasonable; is that nothing? Did not Rebbi Joḥanan say in the name of Rebbi Assi: Carded firstling wool becomes insignificant in a plurality. Rebbi Ḥiyya the Sepphorean brought before Rebbi Ammi a pound in eight but the latter refused to rule since had not Rebbi Assi said, is that not a Mishnah? “If somebody weaves the length of a sîṭ of firstling’s wool in a cloth, the cloth must be burned, of hair of a nazir or firstling donkey in sackcloth, the sackcloth must be burned”? The following Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If he wrote any expression of gift either at the start, or in the middle, or at the end, his instructions are valid.” There, to one person in an expression of gift and to one an expression of inheritance. But here to each one both in the language of gift and the language of inheritance Rebbi Ḥaggai asked before Rebbi Yose: But does he not prejudice the rights of others? He said to him, if there are no brothers. But does he not prejudice the rights of his paternal uncles? Rebbi Ḥanania the son of Rebbi Hillel: A person prefers the good of his house over his relatives.
It was stated: “Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel said, I met an old man, smitten with boils, from Sepphoris. He told me, there are 24 kinds of boils; the worst one, and the one for which a woman is bad, is flowing boils. Rebbi Samuel bar Naḥman in the name of Rebbi Jonathan: With the latter kind, the evil Pharao was smitten; that is what is written: “The Eternal smote Pharao and his house with great plagues,” etc. Rebbi Berekhia said: Because he dared to touch the matron’s body. There are 24 kinds of cedar, and from all of them the verse mentioned only seven. That is what is written: “I shall give in the desert cedar, acacia, myrtle, and oil wood; I put in the prairie beroš, tidhar, and teaššur together. Beroš is cypress; tidhar is idra;teasššur is the box-tree. They added to them ’allonim, ‘armonim, and ’almogim. ’Allonim are oaks, ‘armonim plane trees, ’almuggim aloës.
Rebbi Jehudah said, they argued before Rabban Gamliel: Because preliminarily married she is his wife and definitively married she is his wife; just as the sale by the latter is void, the sale by the former also should be void. He said to them, we are ashamed of the new ones, now you want to roll the new on over the old ones! The new ones, after the definitive marriage; the old ones before the definitive marriage, when she was married in the second ceremony.
HALAKHAH: “If a widow’s ketubah was 200,” etc. We understand worth a mina for 200 or worth 200 for a mina. In any case, she made the orphans lose a mina. [If it was worth] a mina [and she sold it] for 200, would the sale not be invalidated as erroneous buy? Explain it that the property increased in value. Rebbi Abin said, this supports Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, since Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, real estate buys are never under the laws of overcharging. Rebbi Joḥanan said, if the transaction was excessive, it comes under the law of overcharging. The Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “The following do not fall under the laws of overcharging: Slaves, securities, real estate, and redemptions.” He explains it, unless it was excessive. If he redeemed what was worth a mina by 200, Rebbi Joḥanan said, it is not redeemed, but Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, it is redeemed. A baralta disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: If he said, this toga instead of this donkey, the latter becomes profane. And its end disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: It is necessary to compute the value. Rebbi Yose said, the baraita itself implies that it is necessary to compute the value. Where do they disagree? To bring [a sacrifice to atone for] larceny. Rebbi Joḥanan said, he has to bring a sacrifice for larceny; Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, he does not have to bring a sacrifice for larceny.
If she dies she is not with him. If she was divorced she is not with him. If he took her back? One says, this was stated for the ketubah but not for the stipulations; one says, both for the ketubah and the stipulations, which opinion is valid? “The intelligent ones did write: On condition that I support your daughter for five years the entire time you are with me;” on that it was stated: Only for the first marriage. This parallels what Rebbi Ḥanina said, if somebody marries off his son in a house, the latter acquires the house, but only for a first marriage.
Rebbi Naḥman in the name of Rebbi Mana: Miracles happened that day. It was Sabbath eve and all the surrounding towns came together to eulogize him. They made him [Rebbi] rest in eighteen synagogues until they brought him to his resting place but the day extended for them until each one had time to get to his house, fill an amphora of water, and light the candles. When the sun set, the rooster crowed. They were anxious and said, maybe we did desecrate the Sabbath? There came a voice and said to them, every one who was not lazy for the eulogies of Rebbi shall be announced for the life of the Future World, except the fuller. When the latter heard this, he climbed on the roof, threw himself down, and died. There came a voice and said, including the fuller.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody went overseas,” etc. Rebbi Abba bar Mamal asked: If somebody pays off somebody else’s debt without the latter’s knowledge, is that the disagreement of Ḥanan and the High Priests’ sons? Rebbi Yose said, there the reason of the High Priest’s sons is that he would not expect his wife to starve. But here, [the debtor could say:] “I could negotiate with him and he would forgive some.” Think of it, if [the loan] was on a pledge! “I could negotiate with him and he would return my pledge.” So far about a creditor who does not push [for repayment]. Even for a creditor who pushes, we can hear from the following: “He may give his šeqel.” If somebody does not pay his šeqel, does one not take a pledge from him? This says, even for a creditor who pushes. You should know that this is so, as we have stated: “He can bring for him nests for males or females suffering from genital discharges, nests for childbirth, purification and reparation offerings” since nothing of these comes to [the other person’s] hand. And here also, that nothing should come into his hand.
HALAKHAH: “If one is under a vow [not to have] usufruct from another,” etc. Rebbi Abba bar Mamal asked: If somebody pays off somebody else’s debt without the latter’s knowledge, is that the disagreement of Ḥanan and the High Priests’ sons? Rebbi Yose said, there the reason of the High Priest’s sons is that nobody expects his wife to die from hunger. But here, [the debtor could say:] “I could negotiate with him and he would forgive some.” Think of it, if [the loan] was on a pledge! “I could negotiate with him and he would return my pledge.” So far about a creditor who does not push [for repayment]. Even for a creditor who pushes, we can hear from the following: “He may give his šeqel. If somebody does not pay his šeqel, does one not take a pledge from him? This says, even for a creditor who pushes. You should know that this is so, as we have stated: “He can bring for him nests for males or females suffering from genital discharges, nests for childbirth, purification and reparation offerings” since nothing of these comes to [the other person’s] hand. And here also, that nothing should come into his hand.
HALAKHAH: “Also he can separate his heave” etc. If somebody fixes the harvest of another person without the latter’s knowledge, who receives the goodwill from the tithes? Rebbi Abbahu says, the one who does the fixing. Rebbi Ze‘ira says, the owner of the produce. Rebbi Ze‘ira is consistent since Rebbi Ze‘ira said in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, if somebody gave the sacrifice of a nazir or of a [healed] person afflicted with skin disease, the person purged makes (heave). The Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: “Also he can separate his heave and tithes with his knowledge.” Explain it, that [it was stipulated] that the other should not get the goodwill.
May one appoint Elders for a fixed time? Let us hear from the following: Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba went to Rebbi Eleazar and asked him to intervene with the Patriarch Rebbi Jehudah, that the latter should write him a letter of recommendation for seeking a livelihood in a foreign country. He intervened, and [the Patriarch] wrote for him: Here we are sending you as our representative a great personality with all our powers until he shall return to us. Rebbi Ḥizqiah, Rebbi Dositheus, Rebbi Abba bar Zamina in the name of the old Rebbi Dositheus: He wrote him the following. Here we are sending you a great personality who will not be ashamed to say “1 did not learn this”.
May a Cohen defile himself for the Patriarch? When Rebbi Judah the Prince died, Rebbi Yannai proclaimed and said: “There is no priesthood today.” When Rebbi Judah the Prince, grandson of Rebbi Judah the Prince, died, Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba did push Rebbi Zeïra in the Gufna synagogue of Sepphoris and defiled him. When Yehudinai, the sister of Rebbi Judah the Prince, died, Rebbi Ḥanina sent for Rebbi Mana but the latter did not come. He said to him, if one does not defile himself for them during their lifetime, so much less in their death. Rebbi Nassa said, in their death they treated them like a corpse of obligation.
The following is obvious: If he became impure and then was manumitted, he brings a sacrifice of impurity. When is that, if his master forced him or if his master did not force him? If you say that he forced him, how can be bring a sacrifice of impurity? If you say he did not force him, should he not count for his master as long as he still is in the latter’s power? Rebbi Yose said, we are dealing with the case that his master forced him. You should not say that because he was manumitted, the nezirut in impurity was lifted from him. Therefore, it was necessary to say that he counts nezirut in impurity.
Rebbi Ḥiyya [bar] Abba said: If one sold a slave into Acco, the latter was set free. Rebbi Ismael, the father of Rebbi Yudan, asked: Even from Acco to Acco? This follows what Rebbi Aḥa bar Jacob said in the name of Rebbi Immi: From two actions of Rebbi we learn that Acco is partly of the Land of Israel and partly outside the Land. Rebbi was in Acco when he saw them eating clean bread; he asked them, how did you knead [the dough]? They said to him, a student came here and instructed us that egg water does not prepare. We are boiling eggs and use their water to knead. They thought he was talking about cooking water of eggs when he spoke only of the eggs themselves. Rebbi Jacob bar Idi said, at that moment they decreed that a student may not render decisions. Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Ḥuna: If a student gives instructions even according to practice, his instructions are no instructions.
It was stated: A student who gave instructions about practice in front of his teacher has committed a deadly sin. It was stated in the name of Rebbi Eliezer: Nadab and Abihu died only because they determined practice in the presence of their teacher Moses. It happened that a student gave instructions about practice in front of his teacher Rebbi Eliezer. The latter said to his wife Imma Shalom: That one will not live out his week. The week was not completed when he died. His students said to him: Rebbi, you are a prophet. He said to them (Amos 7:14) “I am neither a prophet nor the disciple of a prophet” but I have received a tradition that any student who gives instructions about practice in front of his teacher has committed a deadly sin. It was stated: A student is forbidden to give instructions about practice during the lifetime of his teacher unless he be at a distance of at least 12 mil from him, [the breadth of] the camp of Israel. What is the reason? (Num. 33:49) “They encamped along the Jordan from Bet Hayyešimot to Abel Haššiṭṭim in the plains of Moab”; how far is this? Twelve mil. Like this: Rebbi Tanḥum ben Jeremiah was in Ḥefer; they asked him and he gave instructions about practice. They said to him, did the Rabbi not teach us that a student may not give instructions about practice during the lifetime of his teacher unless he be at a distance of at least 12 mil from him, [the breadth of] the camp of Israel; and your teacher Rebbi Ḥana sits at Sepphoris! He said to them, so it should come over me that I did not know! From that moment on he did no longer give instructions.
HALAKHAH: If one says, “give this bill of divorce to my wife,” etc. Elsewhere you say that “give” means “bring”, but here you say that “give” means “acquire”! So is the Mishnah: “Acquire this bill of divorce for my wife; acquire this document of manumission for my slave.” The formulation of the Mishnah says so: “Because one may bestow benefit on a person in his absence but put a detriment on a person only in his presence.” Rebbi Meïr says, it is a detriment for either of them, but the Sages say it is a benefit for the slave but a detriment for the wife. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said, Rebbi Joḥanan asked: Think of it, if he was the slave of a rich person, would it not be a detriment for the slave? The colleagues said, Rebbi Joḥanan asked: Think of it, if she was the wife of a man suffering from boils, would it not be a benefit for the woman? You have only the following: If one sells his slave without the latter’s knowledge, is the sale of the slave not valid? If one divorces his wife without her knowledge, is the divorce valid because she was acquired by him? Rebbi Abin said, he is his property but he disqualifies him for heave.
“If somebody says, give this mina to X because I owe it to him, bring this mina to X for the pledge which he has from me, if he wants to change his mind he cannot do so but he himself is responsible until X receives his due.” Rebbi Ila said, a gift is like a debt. “Give this mina to X, bring this mina to X, give this gift document to X, if he wants to change his mind he can(not) do so. If he went and found that X had died, he should return it to the sender, and if that one had died he should give it to the latter’s heirs.” “Acquire this mina for X, accept this mina for X, acquire this gift document for X, accept this gift document for X, if he wants to change his mind he cannot do so. If he went and found that X had died, he should deliver it to his heirs. But if he acquired after [X’s] death he should return it to the sender since nobody can acquire documents after his death.” “If somebody says, this mina is for X, take this mina for X, this mina shall be in your hand for X, if he wants to change his mind he cannot do so” because if somebody acquires for another person it cannot be changed.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody sent a bill of divorce to his wife,” etc. This disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan, since Rebbi Joḥanan said that a person invalidates the agent appointed by him by a declaration. He explains it by the stringency of the rules of incest. If he appointed an agent to deliver the bill of divorce, the latter has to deliver it in the presence of two [witnesses]; the agent is not counted as one of the two. If another agent went to invalidate the bill of divorce, he has to invalidate it in the presence of two [witnesses] and the agent is counted as one of the two. If he met him on the road and asked him, what about the bill of divorce I gave you? He answered, I delivered it to her. While they were talking there, he dropped it. He said, did you not tell me that you delivered it to her? He explained, I delivered it to her and she said, keep it for me. What? Can he be believed since it is in his power to divorce, or can he not be believed because it is in his hand? If the agent fell sick, how do you treat this? By the rules of divorces or the rules of preliminary marriages? By the rules of divorces one can divorce through the agency of anybody. By the rules of preliminary marriages one cannot preliminarily marry through the agency of anybody.
Who frees? Rav says, either his first or his second master. Rebbi Joḥanan says, only his first master alone is able to free. Rebbi Ḥaggai objected before Rebbi Yose: Does not a baraita disagree with Rav? If a Jew gave a loan to a Gentile on the latter’s leavened matter, it is permitted after Passover. If you say that the Jew has property rights in it, it would be forbidden. What does Rav do with this? Rebbi Yudan said, manumission is made easy, as it was stated: If somebody gives his slave as mortgage, if he sold him, he is not sold; if he freed him, he is freed. The strength of Rebbi Joḥanan is from the following: Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, only the manumittor writes. If somebody mortgaged his field to another, then went and sold it, can the creditor not come and foreclose? Rebbi Abbahu said, in this matter Rebbi Joḥanan opened for us a door to illuminate. We do not find that a slave can again be enslaved after having been freed. If that is so, he should not have to write a bond for his value! Rebbi Ila said, it is better that a person say to him, give me the 200 zuz which you owe me than say to him, you are my slave! The rabbis of Caesarea say in Rebbi Nasa’s name: Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel follows Rebbi Meïr. Just as Rebbi Meїr imposes a fine for words, so Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel imposes a fine for words. As it was stated: With a bond documenting both principal and interest one can collect neither principal nor interest, the words of Rebbi Meїr. But the Sages say, one collects the principal but not the interest.
MISHNAH: One does not collect from encumbered property as long as there is free property, even if the latter is of lowest quality. One may collect from orphans’ property only from the lowest quality.
MISHNAH: A woman who said, accept my bill of divorce for me, needs two groups of witnesses; two who say that she appointed in their presence and two who say that in their presence he received it and tore it up, even if the first ones are the latter ones, or one of the first together with one of the latter and a third person is associated with them. A preliminarily married adolescent girl, or her father, can accept her bill of divorce. Rebbi Jehudah says, no two hands can acquire together; only her father alone can accept her bill of divorce. Any female who cannot take care of her bill of divorce cannot be divorced. If an underage girl said, accept the bill of divorce for me, it is no valid bill until the bill of divorce reaches her hand. Therefore, if the husband wants to retract he can retract since an underage person cannot appoint an agent. But if her father said to [an agent]: Go and receive my daughter’s bill of divorce, if [the husband] wants to retract he cannot retract.
MISHNAH: A woman who said, accept my bill of divorce for me, needs two groups of witnesses; two who say that she appointed in their presence and two who say that in their presence he received it and tore it up, even if the first ones are the latter ones, or one of the first together with one of the latter and a third person is associated with them. A preliminarily married adolescent girl, or her father, can accept her bill of divorce. Rebbi Jehudah says, no two hands can acquire together; only her father alone can accept her bill of divorce. Any female who cannot take care of her bill of divorce cannot be divorced. If an underage girl said, accept the bill of divorce for me, it is no valid bill until the bill of divorce reaches her hand. Therefore, if the husband wants to retract he can retract since an underage person cannot appoint an agent. But if her father said to [an agent]: Go and receive my daughter’s bill of divorce, if [the husband] wants to retract he cannot retract.
After Rebbi Eliezer’s death, four Elders assembled to object to Rebbi Eliezer’s words: Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah, Rebbi Yose the Galilean, Rebbi Tarphon, and Rebbi Aqiba. Rebbi Joshua told them, one does not contradict the lion after his death. Rebbi Tarphon objected: If he said to her, you are permitted to any man except Mr. X; she went and married [the latter’s brother who] died childless; how can she contract the levirate marriage? Does it not turn out that he stipulated against what is written in the Torah, and anybody’s condition contradicting what is written in the Torah is invalid. Then nobody should be permitted to marry his brother’s daughter, lest he come to stipulate against what is written in the Torah. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, one understands the reason. There, the Torah forbade her to him. But here, he forbids to him! Rebbi Ḥananiah objected in the name of Rebbi Phineas: Should one not state “sixteen women” following Rebbi Eliezer? Rebbi Mana said, the reason was already explained: there, the Torah forbade her to him. But here, he forbids to him! Rebbi Jeremiah asked: If he said to her, you are permitted to any man except Mr. X; she went and married the latter’s brother who died childless, how can the latter permit what the first forbade? His words imply that death and divorce permit what the first [husband] prohibited. Rebbi Jeremiah said, he said only death and divorce; therefore, not marriage.
After Rebbi Eliezer’s death, four Elders assembled to object to Rebbi Eliezer’s words: Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah, Rebbi Yose the Galilean, Rebbi Tarphon, and Rebbi Aqiba. Rebbi Joshua told them, one does not contradict the lion after his death. Rebbi Tarphon objected: If he said to her, you are permitted to any man except Mr. X; she went and married [the latter’s brother who] died childless; how can she contract the levirate marriage? Does it not turn out that he stipulated against what is written in the Torah, and anybody’s condition contradicting what is written in the Torah is invalid. Then nobody should be permitted to marry his brother’s daughter, lest he come to stipulate against what is written in the Torah. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, one understands the reason. There, the Torah forbade her to him. But here, he forbids to him! Rebbi Ḥananiah objected in the name of Rebbi Phineas: Should one not state “sixteen women” following Rebbi Eliezer? Rebbi Mana said, the reason was already explained: there, the Torah forbade her to him. But here, he forbids to him! Rebbi Jeremiah asked: If he said to her, you are permitted to any man except Mr. X; she went and married the latter’s brother who died childless, how can the latter permit what the first forbade? His words imply that death and divorce permit what the first [husband] prohibited. Rebbi Jeremiah said, he said only death and divorce; therefore, not marriage.
After Rebbi Eliezer’s death, four Elders assembled to object to Rebbi Eliezer’s words: Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah, Rebbi Yose the Galilean, Rebbi Tarphon, and Rebbi Aqiba. Rebbi Joshua told them, one does not contradict the lion after his death. Rebbi Tarphon objected: If he said to her, you are permitted to any man except Mr. X; she went and married [the latter’s brother who] died childless; how can she contract the levirate marriage? Does it not turn out that he stipulated against what is written in the Torah, and anybody’s condition contradicting what is written in the Torah is invalid. Then nobody should be permitted to marry his brother’s daughter, lest he come to stipulate against what is written in the Torah. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, one understands the reason. There, the Torah forbade her to him. But here, he forbids to him! Rebbi Ḥananiah objected in the name of Rebbi Phineas: Should one not state “sixteen women” following Rebbi Eliezer? Rebbi Mana said, the reason was already explained: there, the Torah forbade her to him. But here, he forbids to him! Rebbi Jeremiah asked: If he said to her, you are permitted to any man except Mr. X; she went and married the latter’s brother who died childless, how can the latter permit what the first forbade? His words imply that death and divorce permit what the first [husband] prohibited. Rebbi Jeremiah said, he said only death and divorce; therefore, not marriage.
The word of the elder Rebbi Ḥiyya implies that Gentiles have no divorce, as Rebbi Ḥiyya stated in this matter: A Gentile who divorced his wife, who herself then went and married another, when the latter divorced her and then both of them converted, I do not read for them: “Her first husband who had divorced her cannot return to marry her.” It was stated in this matter: A case came before Rebbi and he approved.
“She regains her autonomy by a bill of divorce,” as it is written: “He shall write her a bill of divorce.” “Or the husband’s death,” as it is written: “Or if the latter husband dies.” So far, if the latter one dies, [what about] the death of the former? Since the latter’s death releases her, even though his death does not cause a complete release, it is only logical that the former’s death should release her since his death will cause a complete release. Rebbi Ḥuna said, the verse implies that death releases, as it is written: “If brothers live together and one of them dies childless, etc.” Therefore, if he had a child, death releases. Rebbi Yose bar Abun said, if you would say that death does not release, how could we find a widow for a High priest, a divorcee or one who has received ḥalîṣah for a common priest? Rebbi Joḥanan bar Marius said, explain it for a sister-in-law.
“She regains her autonomy by a bill of divorce,” as it is written: “He shall write her a bill of divorce.” “Or the husband’s death,” as it is written: “Or if the latter husband dies.” So far, if the latter one dies, [what about] the death of the former? Since the latter’s death releases her, even though his death does not cause a complete release, it is only logical that the former’s death should release her since his death will cause a complete release. Rebbi Ḥuna said, the verse implies that death releases, as it is written: “If brothers live together and one of them dies childless, etc.” Therefore, if he had a child, death releases. Rebbi Yose bar Abun said, if you would say that death does not release, how could we find a widow for a High priest, a divorcee or one who has received ḥalîṣah for a common priest? Rebbi Joḥanan bar Marius said, explain it for a sister-in-law.
“She regains her autonomy by a bill of divorce,” as it is written: “He shall write her a bill of divorce.” “Or the husband’s death,” as it is written: “Or if the latter husband dies.” So far, if the latter one dies, [what about] the death of the former? Since the latter’s death releases her, even though his death does not cause a complete release, it is only logical that the former’s death should release her since his death will cause a complete release. Rebbi Ḥuna said, the verse implies that death releases, as it is written: “If brothers live together and one of them dies childless, etc.” Therefore, if he had a child, death releases. Rebbi Yose bar Abun said, if you would say that death does not release, how could we find a widow for a High priest, a divorcee or one who has received ḥalîṣah for a common priest? Rebbi Joḥanan bar Marius said, explain it for a sister-in-law.
Samuel bar Abba asked before Rebbi Yose: There it is written “he computes” and here it is written “he computes”. Here you compute months and years so he may leave, there you do not compute months and years so he may leave. He said to him, the difference is that the Torah compared him to the hireling. Since the latter computes months and years and leaves, so this one computes months and years and leaves.
“If he allots her to his son;” with [the girl’s] agreement. Rebbi Joḥanan said, there is no agreement here. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said so, the statement follows Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah. Rebbi Samuel bar Eudaimon said, even if you say the statement follows Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah, is he not a minor? “If he allots her to his son;” with [the latter’s] agreement. Rebbi Joḥanan said, he allots her to his minor or adult son, with or without the latter’s agreement. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, he allots her only to his adult son with the latter’s agreement.
“If he allots her to his son;” with [the girl’s] agreement. Rebbi Joḥanan said, there is no agreement here. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said so, the statement follows Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah. Rebbi Samuel bar Eudaimon said, even if you say the statement follows Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah, is he not a minor? “If he allots her to his son;” with [the latter’s] agreement. Rebbi Joḥanan said, he allots her to his minor or adult son, with or without the latter’s agreement. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, he allots her only to his adult son with the latter’s agreement.
“If he allots her to his son;” with [the girl’s] agreement. Rebbi Joḥanan said, there is no agreement here. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said so, the statement follows Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah. Rebbi Samuel bar Eudaimon said, even if you say the statement follows Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah, is he not a minor? “If he allots her to his son;” with [the latter’s] agreement. Rebbi Joḥanan said, he allots her to his minor or adult son, with or without the latter’s agreement. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, he allots her only to his adult son with the latter’s agreement.
“As a slave girl.” Only as a slave girl: this teaches that he may sell her on condition that he not have the right of allotment over her, the words of Rebbi Meïr. But the Sages say, he did not do anything, for he stipulated against what is written in the Torah, “and the stipulation of anybody who stipulates against what is written in the Torah is invalid.” But does Rebbi Meïr not agree that “the stipulation of anybody who stipulates against what is written in the Torah is invalid”? He accepts it if it is impossible to keep the stipulation in the end, but here it is possible to keep the stipulation in the end. Do the rabbis not agree about a stipulation which it is possible to keep in the end? They agree to it in money matters, but this is a personal matter. But did we not state: A person may marry a woman and stipulate with her that she have no claim on him for food, clothing, or marital relations? One understands food and clothing. But are marital relations not a personal matter? Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Ada said, explain it for an underage girl. How can that Tanna explain “as a slave girl”? He may sell her as a widow to the High Priest, as a divorcee or one who received ḥălîṣah to a common priest. How can that Tanna explain “as a servant”? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, explain it by a widow from preliminary marriage. But was it not stated: A person may sell his daugher into marriage and repeat, into servitude and repeat, into marriage after servitude, but not into servitude after marriage? Rebbi Joḥanan said, these are different Tannaïm. He who states “a widow to the High Priest” agrees to servitude after marriage; he who does not state “a widow to the High Priest” does not agree to servitude after marriage. How does the latter Tanna explain “as a servant”? Rebbi Mattaniah said, explain it if [the master] was married to her sister.
This does not follow Rebbi Eliezer, for Rebbi Eliezer said that walking acquires, as it was stated: If one walked across a field in length and breadth, he acquired up to the place he walked to, the words of Rebbi Eliezer. But the Sages say that he did not acquire up to the moment he acted in possession. Everybody agrees that if somebody sells a path to another, when the latter went, he acquired. What is the reason? “Arise, walk in the Land in length and breadth, for I shall give it to you.”
This does not follow Rebbi Eliezer, for Rebbi Eliezer said that walking acquires. If one walked across a field in length and breadth, he acquired up to the place he walked, the words of Rebbi Eliezer. But the Sages say that he did not acquire up to the moment he acted in possession. Everybody agrees that if somebody sells a path to another, when the latter went, he acquired. What is the reason? “Arise, walk in the Land, etc.”
HALAKHAH: “Any commandment the father has to fulfill towards his son,” etc. “To circumcise him, to redeem him, to teach him Torah, to teach him a trade, and to marry him to a wife. Rebbi Aqiba says, also to teach him to swim in water.” To circumcise him, “on the eighth day, he shall circumcise the flesh of his foreskin.” “To redeem him,” as is written: “Any firstborn human among your sons you shall redeem.” To teach him Torah, “you shall teach them to your sons.” To teach him a trade, Rebbi Ismael stated: “Choose life,” that is a trade. To marry him to a wife, “make it known to your children and grandchildren.” When do you have children and grandchildren: if you marry off your sons when young. Rebbi Aqiba says, also to swim in water. “That you shall live together with your descendants.” How is this? Is it a commandment or is it obligatory? Let us hear from the following: Bar Tarima came to Rebbi Immi and said to him, talk to my father that he should marry me to a woman. He talked to [the father], but the latter refused. That means it is a commandment, for if it were obligatory, he should have forced him. From where that if his father did not do these things for him, he is required to do them himself? The verse says a human you shall redeem”, “you shall circumcise” them, “you shall study them”, “you shall know” yourself, “that you shall live.”
HALAKHAH: “A man may contract a premininary marriage either in person or through an agent,” etc. From where that a person’s agent may act in his stead? Rebbi Eleazar said: “The entirety of the assembly of the congregation of Israel shall slaughter it in the evening.” But do all of them slaughter? Does not one slaughter for the many? From here [it follows that] a person’s agent may act in his stead. And that would be the same as: “Everybody should take for himself a sheep for the family, a sheep to a house.” Did everyone take? Did not one take for the many? From here [it follows that] a person’s agent may act in his stead. Rebbi Yose said, there is a difference, for a person may slaughter the Passover sacrifice of another without the latter’s knowledge. If you wanted to say that a person may separate the Passover sacrifice for another without the latter’s knowledge, you cannot say so, for Rebbi Ze‘ira said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar that a person may slaughter the Passover sacrifice of another without the latter’s knowledge, but nobody may separate the Passover sacrifice for another without the latter’s knowledge.
HALAKHAH: “A man may contract a premininary marriage either in person or through an agent,” etc. From where that a person’s agent may act in his stead? Rebbi Eleazar said: “The entirety of the assembly of the congregation of Israel shall slaughter it in the evening.” But do all of them slaughter? Does not one slaughter for the many? From here [it follows that] a person’s agent may act in his stead. And that would be the same as: “Everybody should take for himself a sheep for the family, a sheep to a house.” Did everyone take? Did not one take for the many? From here [it follows that] a person’s agent may act in his stead. Rebbi Yose said, there is a difference, for a person may slaughter the Passover sacrifice of another without the latter’s knowledge. If you wanted to say that a person may separate the Passover sacrifice for another without the latter’s knowledge, you cannot say so, for Rebbi Ze‘ira said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar that a person may slaughter the Passover sacrifice of another without the latter’s knowledge, but nobody may separate the Passover sacrifice for another without the latter’s knowledge.
HALAKHAH: “A man may contract a premininary marriage either in person or through an agent,” etc. From where that a person’s agent may act in his stead? Rebbi Eleazar said: “The entirety of the assembly of the congregation of Israel shall slaughter it in the evening.” But do all of them slaughter? Does not one slaughter for the many? From here [it follows that] a person’s agent may act in his stead. And that would be the same as: “Everybody should take for himself a sheep for the family, a sheep to a house.” Did everyone take? Did not one take for the many? From here [it follows that] a person’s agent may act in his stead. Rebbi Yose said, there is a difference, for a person may slaughter the Passover sacrifice of another without the latter’s knowledge. If you wanted to say that a person may separate the Passover sacrifice for another without the latter’s knowledge, you cannot say so, for Rebbi Ze‘ira said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar that a person may slaughter the Passover sacrifice of another without the latter’s knowledge, but nobody may separate the Passover sacrifice for another without the latter’s knowledge.
HALAKHAH: “A man may contract a premininary marriage either in person or through an agent,” etc. From where that a person’s agent may act in his stead? Rebbi Eleazar said: “The entirety of the assembly of the congregation of Israel shall slaughter it in the evening.” But do all of them slaughter? Does not one slaughter for the many? From here [it follows that] a person’s agent may act in his stead. And that would be the same as: “Everybody should take for himself a sheep for the family, a sheep to a house.” Did everyone take? Did not one take for the many? From here [it follows that] a person’s agent may act in his stead. Rebbi Yose said, there is a difference, for a person may slaughter the Passover sacrifice of another without the latter’s knowledge. If you wanted to say that a person may separate the Passover sacrifice for another without the latter’s knowledge, you cannot say so, for Rebbi Ze‘ira said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar that a person may slaughter the Passover sacrifice of another without the latter’s knowledge, but nobody may separate the Passover sacrifice for another without the latter’s knowledge.
The House of Shammai say, an agent may not testify as witness. But the House of Hillel say, an agent may testify as witness. How is that? If he sent two, in the opinion of the House of Shammai there is an agent and two witnesses. In the opinion of the House of Hillel, all three can be agents and all three can be witnesses. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya said, the matter is reasonable if the preliminary marriage was executed by document. But if he executed the preliminary marriage by money, he became an interested party in his testimony. Rebbi Yose said, since the Torah made him trustworthy, even if he executed the preliminary marriage by money, he did not become an interested party in his testimony. Rebbi Abba said, there came a case before Rav who admitted the agent as witness. A person deposited his amphoras in another’s corral; [the latter] reneged. The case came before Rebbi Jeremiah who admitted the agent as witness and made him swear [by the testimony of] the porter.
Some baraita implies that the agent of a person acts in his stead, and some baraita implies that the agent of a person does not act in his stead. “If he definitively will substitute, if he himself will dissolve.” We may hold that a person’s agent cannot act in his stead because Scripture excluded him. “He shall lean his hand,” not the hand of his son nor the hand of his slave nor the hand of his agent. We may hold that a person’s agent can act in his stead but [in this case] Scripture excluded him. “His master shall pierce his ear with an awl;” “his master” but not the latter’s son, “his master” but not the latter’s agent. We may hold that a person’s agent can act in his stead but Scripture excluded him. Some Tannaïm state: “He shall pierce”, to include the agent. This follows Rebbi Aqiba. Following Rebbi Ismael? “His master”, anybody acting on his master’s authority.
Some baraita implies that the agent of a person acts in his stead, and some baraita implies that the agent of a person does not act in his stead. “If he definitively will substitute, if he himself will dissolve.” We may hold that a person’s agent cannot act in his stead because Scripture excluded him. “He shall lean his hand,” not the hand of his son nor the hand of his slave nor the hand of his agent. We may hold that a person’s agent can act in his stead but [in this case] Scripture excluded him. “His master shall pierce his ear with an awl;” “his master” but not the latter’s son, “his master” but not the latter’s agent. We may hold that a person’s agent can act in his stead but Scripture excluded him. Some Tannaïm state: “He shall pierce”, to include the agent. This follows Rebbi Aqiba. Following Rebbi Ismael? “His master”, anybody acting on his master’s authority.
HALAKHAH: “Similarly, if a woman empowered her agent,” etc. Does this not disagree with Rebbi Joḥanan, since Rebbi Joḥanan said that a person invalidates agency by a declaration? He explains it by the stringency of the rules of adultery and incest. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun understood this from the latter part: “Similarly, if a woman empowered her agent to contract preliminary marriage for her and then went and contracted for herself.” Does this not disagree with Rebbi Joḥanan, since Rebbi Joḥanan said that a person invalidates agency by a declaration? He explains it by the stringency of the rules of adultery and incest.
MISHNAH: One man should not be alone with two women but one woman may be alone with two men. Rebbi Simeon says, he may be alone with two women as long as his wife is with him; he can sleep with them in a hostelry because his wife will watch over him. A man can be alone with his mother or his daughter and sleep with them with their skins touching; once they grew up each one sleeps in his garment. And a bachelor shall not be a school teacher; a woman shall not be a school teacher. Rebbi Eliezer says, also a man without a wife shall not be a school teacher. Rebbi Jehudah says, a bachelor shall not be a shepherd and two bachelors shall not sleep under one cover, but the Sages permit. Anybody whose occupation is with women should never be alone with women. And a man should not teach his son a craft for women. Rebbi Meïr says that a man should try to teach his son a clean and easy trade and pray to Him to Whom riches and properties belong since there is no trade in which poverty and riches are not found, for neither poverty nor riches come from the trade. Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar says, did you ever see a wild animal or a bird which had a trade? And they sustain themselves without pain. But they were created only to serve me and sustain themselves without pain, and I was created to serve my Maker, it should be logical that I should be able to sustain myself without pain; only I worsened my deeds and destroyed my sustenance. Abba Gorion from Sidon says in the name of Abba Shaul: A man should not teach his son to be a donkey driver, a camel driver, a hairdresser, a sailor, a potter, a shepherd, or a grocer, since their occupations are those of robbers. Rebbi Jehudah says in the latter’s name: Most donkey drivers are wicked, most camel drivers are in order, most sailors are pious; the best of physicians goes to hell, the qualified among the butchers is an associate of Amaleq.
“If I partially set up for damage claims” “as if I had set up for any claims.” This is the pit, as it was stated: If somebody dug a pit ten handbreadths deep and another came and deepened it another handbreadth, the latter is responsible. Rebbi says, one goes after the latter in case of death and after the former for damages. Rebbi Isaac says: So is the baraita: After the latter in case of death and after both of them for damages. If he dug [a pit] ten handbreadths deep and another person came, whitewashed and lined it, both of them are liable. Is he liable because he whitewashed and lined it? When he told him, whitewash this (house) [pit] and acquire it, for Rebbi Immi said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar, the prevention of damages follows the rules of guarding an acquisition. Rebbi Simon said, explain it when he was digging in the dunes. And it was stated: If each of them dug ten, or each one twenty, or each one a hundred, they are all liable. How deep does it have to be? To be deadly, ten handbreadths. To do damage, anything. Symmachos says, three in depth and four in width. Rebbi Eleazar the caper grower says, the length of the animal which falls in. What means the length of the animal which falls in? Whether chicken or camel.
“If I partially set up for damage claims” “as if I had set up for any claims.” This is the pit, as it was stated: If somebody dug a pit ten handbreadths deep and another came and deepened it another handbreadth, the latter is responsible. Rebbi says, one goes after the latter in case of death and after the former for damages. Rebbi Isaac says: So is the baraita: After the latter in case of death and after both of them for damages. If he dug [a pit] ten handbreadths deep and another person came, whitewashed and lined it, both of them are liable. Is he liable because he whitewashed and lined it? When he told him, whitewash this (house) [pit] and acquire it, for Rebbi Immi said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar, the prevention of damages follows the rules of guarding an acquisition. Rebbi Simon said, explain it when he was digging in the dunes. And it was stated: If each of them dug ten, or each one twenty, or each one a hundred, they are all liable. How deep does it have to be? To be deadly, ten handbreadths. To do damage, anything. Symmachos says, three in depth and four in width. Rebbi Eleazar the caper grower says, the length of the animal which falls in. What means the length of the animal which falls in? Whether chicken or camel.
“If I partially set up for damage claims” “as if I had set up for any claims.” This is the pit, as it was stated: If somebody dug a pit ten handbreadths deep and another came and deepened it another handbreadth, the latter is responsible. Rebbi says, one goes after the latter in case of death and after the former for damages. Rebbi Isaac says: So is the baraita: After the latter in case of death and after both of them for damages. If he dug [a pit] ten handbreadths deep and another person came, whitewashed and lined it, both of them are liable. Is he liable because he whitewashed and lined it? When he told him, whitewash this (house) [pit] and acquire it, for Rebbi Immi said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar, the prevention of damages follows the rules of guarding an acquisition. Rebbi Simon said, explain it when he was digging in the dunes. And it was stated: If each of them dug ten, or each one twenty, or each one a hundred, they are all liable. How deep does it have to be? To be deadly, ten handbreadths. To do damage, anything. Symmachos says, three in depth and four in width. Rebbi Eleazar the caper grower says, the length of the animal which falls in. What means the length of the animal which falls in? Whether chicken or camel.
If it was filling the entire public domain, if he took it from here and put it down there he would create a “pit”. But could he take a stick and break it or step over it and if it broke, it broke? Let us hear from the following: If a bull mounted another and the [latter’s] owner came to draw away his own, or [the bull] slipped away, and [the attacker] fell down and died, he is free from payment. If he pushed [the attacker] which then fell down and died, he must pay. Could he not tell him, if you had not interferred, I would have paid your damages? But he could have answered, If I had not interferred, you would have paid me half the damage! Think of it, if it was notorious? It is not in your power to drag me through the courts.
Somebody put down an amphora in the public domain and then another person came and put another one close to the first. If the first person comes to take his own and would move [the second] and put it down at another place, he would create a “pit”. But could he take a stick and break it or step over it and if it broke, it broke? Let us hear from the following: If a bull came to mount another and the [latter’s] owner came to draw away his own, if he drew him away before it could mount, and [the attacker] fell down and died, he is free from payment. If he pushed [the attacker] which then fell down and died, he must pay. Rebbi Yose said, we can hear from this that if one saw a flood threatening in his irrigation canal, before the flood reached his field he is permitted to divert the water to another place; after the flood reached his field he is not permitted to divert it to another place. If the chrysargyros was imposed, before [the collector of] chrysargyros arrived, one is permitted to say, X is following my profession, Y is following my professon. Once the [the collector of] chrysarguros arrived, it is forbidden. It is permitted to bribe the quartermaster before the Roman [soldiers] arrive; after the Roman [soldiers] arrive it is forbidden.
MISHNAH: If a bull intended [to hurt] another bull but hit a woman who then had a miscarriage, he is not liable. But if a man intended [to hurt] a neighbor but hit a woman who then had a miscarriage, he pays for the children. How does he pay for the children? One estimates the worth of the woman before and after she gave birth. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel said, but the value of a woman increses after giving birth! But one estimates how much the children would have been worth and gives [the value] to the husband; if she does not have a husband, to the latter’s heirs. If she was a freedwoman or a proselyte, he is not liable.
MISHNAH: One who robbed from a proselyte, swore to him, and [the proselyte] died, has to pay the capital and the fifth to the priests and the reparation offering to the altar as it is said: “If the man has no heirs to give the reparation to, the reparation etc.” If he was bringing the money and the reparation offering when he died, the money should be given to his sons and the reparation offering shall graze until it becomes disqualified, then be sold, and the amount be given for voluntary offerings. If he had given the money to the men of the watch when he died, the heirs cannot ask it back from them since it is said: “What a man give to a Cohen shall be the latter’s.”
HALAKHAH: “Somebody had robbed a field from another person,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said, but did they not say that “real estate cannot be robbed”? Why did they say, “he has to give him a field”? It is a fine by which they fined him. If the discharged veterans took it from the robber because of the robbed, could he tell him, in any case give me what is mine and let any claimant come and deal with me? Rebbi Johua ben Levi said, nobody is held responsible for his neighbor and the latter has to repay him except annona and head-tax. Rav said, he can tell him, you redeemed your pledge with my money.
MISHNAH: The tailor who had enough thread left to sew with it, and cloth three by three finger breadths, has to return if to its owners. What the woodworker takes off with a small plane is his, with a large one belongs to the consignor; if he works at the latter’s place even the chips are the consignor’s.
HALAKHAH: “The find of his small son or daughter,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said, only if they are not dependent on their father. But if they are dependent on their father, their finds belong to the latter. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish says, a person cannot acquire a find for another. Rebbi [Hila] said: Not that Rebbi Simeon had formulated thus, but he had a problem with what Rebbi Hoshaiah stated: If a person hires a worker for any work, the latter’s finds belong to the employer. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, should the finds of a person who can resign at any moment belong to his employer?
HALAKHAH: “The find of his small son or daughter,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said, only if they are not dependent on their father. But if they are dependent on their father, their finds belong to the latter. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish says, a person cannot acquire a find for another. Rebbi [Hila] said: Not that Rebbi Simeon had formulated thus, but he had a problem with what Rebbi Hoshaiah stated: If a person hires a worker for any work, the latter’s finds belong to the employer. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, should the finds of a person who can resign at any moment belong to his employer?
MISHNAH: If somebody deposits produce with another person, the latter returns it deducting losses, for wheat and rice 9/2 qab per kor, for barley and millet nine qab per kor, for spelt and linseed three se‘ah per kor; everything proportional to quantity and time elapsed. Rebbi Joḥanan ben Nuri said, do the rats care, do they not eat from much as from little? But he only deducts what corresponds to one kor. Rebbi Jehudah says, if it was a large quantity, he does not deduct because of the surplus. He deducts one sixth of wine; Rebbi Jehudah says a fifth. He deducts three log of oil per hundred, a log and a half lees, a log and a half absorption. If it was refined oil, he does not deduct lees; if the vessels were old, he does not deduct absorption. Rebbi Jehudah says, also if somebody sells refined oil during the entire year, [the buyer] accepts a log and a half lees per hundred.
MISHNAH: One who hires workers and tells them to start early and work late, at a place where it is not customary to start early or work late cannot force them to do so. At a place where it is customary to feed them, he has to feed them; to supply a snack, he has to supply it, always following local custom. It happened that Rebbi Joḥanan ben Matthew said to his son, go and hire workers for us. He awarded them food, but when he returned to his father, the latter told him, even if you serve them Solomon’s meal in his time you did not fulfill your pledge since they are descendants of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. But before they start work go and tell them: On condition that your only claim be for bread and legumes. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel said, that was unnecessary; one always follows local custom.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody borrowed a cow,” etc. Rebbi Ila said, from the meaning of what is said, “certainly he shall pay”; would we not have known that if its owner was with it he does not pay? Why does the verse say, “if its owner was not with it, certainly he shall pay”? But since he borrowed the cow and did not ask its owner at the same time, even if the latter was ploughing with it when it died, he is liable.
“But if he borrowed the cow and afterwards asked or paid its owner [to work with him] and it died he is liable.” Rebbi La said, from the meaning of what is said, “if its owner was not with it, certainly he shall pay,” would I not have known that if its owner was not with it, certainly he shall pay? Why does the verse say, “if its owner was with it he does not pay”? But since he borrowed the cow and did ask its owner at the same time, even if the latter was ploughing at another place when it died, he is not liable.
MISHNAH: Somebody’s [property] surrounded another’s on three sides. If he fenced in the first, and the second, and the third sides, one does not hold [the other] liable. Rebbi Yose said, if the latter then fenced in the fourth side, one rolls everything over to him. If the wall of a courtyard collapsed, one obligates him to rebuild up to four cubits. There is a presumption that he gave, unless he brings proof that he did not give. Higher than four cubits one does not obligate him, but if he built an adjacent wall, even though he did not put on roofing, one rolls everything over to him. There is a presumption that he did not give, unless he brings proof that he gave.
“Rebbi Yose said, if the latter then fenced in the fourth side, one rolls everything over to him.” Rav Ḥuna said, one rolls over the length of the wall to him.
Rebbi Ḥanina said, if somebody definitively married off his son in a house, the latter acquired it. Rebbi Hoshaia stated, the house but not the movables. Rebbi La divided the dining hall between himself and his son. Rebbi Ḥaggai asked Rebbi Yose: If the ceremony was in the bedroom but the wedding party was in the dining room, what is the rule? He told him, one does not see him leaving.
Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav Jeremiah: The signatures of the witnesses must be two blank lines away from the text. Rebbi Idi in the name of Rav Jeremiah: On a knotted document the witnesses sign lengthwise; on a simple document the witnesses sign across. The first one on the outside, the latter one on the inside. Rebbi Mana said, [ ]. How do the witnesses sign on a knotted document? Rav Huna said, between two knots. Rebbi Idi said, but between witnesses’ signatures and the document there may not be space for two lines.
MISHNAH: Similarly did Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel say that if a person was guarantor for a woman’s ketubah and her husband divorced her, the latter has to make a vow not to have any usufruct from her so they could not plan a partnership against that person’s property and then he would take back his wife.
One verse says five, the other verse says seven. The latter includes the two clerks of court.
They asked before Rebbi Abbahu: If [a man] copulated with a woman, she had a daughter, and after that he came and copulated with the latter. Is he [criminally] liable about her because of a woman and her daughter, her daughter’s daughter, and her son’s daughter? He said to them, they are relatives, it is taboo, all because of taboo.
But what did Aḥaz do? He built a throne in the Temple Court. That is what is written: “The throne-hall which they built in the Temple,” etc. Rebbi Onias in the name of Rebbi Eleazar. Why is he called “the grabber”? For he grabbed synagogues and houses of study. To what may Aḥaz be compared? To a king who had a son whom he entrusted to his pedagogue. The latter wanted to kill him. He said, if I kill him, I will be put to death. But I shall draw his wet-nurse away from him and he will die of himself. So Aḥaz said, if there are no kid goats there are no he-goats. If there are no he-goats there are no goats. If there are no goats there is no shepherd. If there is no shepherd there is no world; if it were thinkable that there be no world. So Aḥaz was thinking, if there are no children there are no adults. If there are no adults, there are no Sages. If there are no Sages, there are no prophets. If there are no prophets, there is no Holy Spirit. If there is no Holy Spirit, there are no synagogues and no houses of study. If it were thinkable, the Holy One, praise to Him, will not let His Presence rest over Israel. Rebbi Jacob bar Abbai in the name of Rebbi Aḥa brings it from the following I shall wait for the Eternal, Who hid His Face from the House of Jacob, and put my hope in Him. There was no worse moment in the world than when the Holy One, praise to Him, said to Moses: I shall certainly hide My Face at that time. From that moment on, I put my hope in Him, Who said at Sinai, for it shall not be forgotten by his descendants. What would its use be? Behold, I and the children which the Eternal has given me. Were they his children? Were they not his students? But this teaches he loved them as if they were his sons and called them “my sons”.
MISHNAH: An oath about a deposit applies to men and women, unrelated persons and relatives, qualified and disqualified persons, before a court or out of court, from his own mouth. From the mouth of another he is liable only if he denies in court, the words of Rebbi Meїr. But the Sages say, whether by his own mouth or the mouth of others, from the moment that he denies, he is liable. He is liable for intent about the oath, or error about it with intent about the deposit, but he is not liable for error about the latter. What is he liable for in case of intentional violation? A reparation offering in the value of two Šeqalim.
“And the acknowledgment of one peruṭah.” Rebbi Joḥanan said, if somebody claims that another had stolen, the latter is not liable unless he partially admit. But all his colleagues differ from him. How do the colleagues uphold for this is it? If he claims money from him. If he claims money from him, is that double he shall pay to his neighbor? But this is a mixture of paragraphs.
Somebody tears up another’s documents without the latter’s agreement. Rebbi Ḥanania and Rebbi Mana, one said, he is liable; the other said, he is not liable. The one who said he is liable, as a fine. The one who said he is not liable: he is like one who obstructs the depositions of witnesses. A widow who grabs documents is like a person who ties up the mouths of witnesses.
MISHNAH: The Elders were asked in Rome, if He does not approve of idol worship, why does He not eliminate it? They answered, if they would worship something which the world does not need, He would eliminate it. But they worship sun and moon, stars and planets, mountains and hills. Should He destroy His world because of the stupid? They told them, if it is so, He should eliminate things which are not needed in the world, and keep things necessary for the world. They answered, then we would strengthen the worshippers of the latter who would say, you should know that these are divinities since those were eliminated and these were not eliminated.
If an amnion’s shape was spoiled, what is the rule? Rebbi Joḥanan said, it is a child; Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, it is not a child. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish objected before Rebbi Joḥanan: What is the difference between this and a rotting corpse without a spine? He said to him, in the latter case it would have been correct that he should be pure even with his spine intact; why did they say, he is impure? That he should be treated with honor. But in our case it is a birth.
The Babylonian Talmud
Perhaps the former signifies the setting of its light, and the latter the man shall be clean !
In the West, this explanation of Rabbah b. Rab Shela had not been heard by them, and they raised the question: The phrase "When the sun is down" means the [complete] setting of the sun, and the phrase "It is clean" means the day is clean ; but perhaps the former signifies the setting of its light, and the latter the man shall be clean !
The latter part of this passage is certainly at variance with our Mishnah ; but is it to be said that the first part is also at variance with it ?
What is the meaning of this latter verse?
Or if thou wilt, I can say the latter teaching refers to when the plague affects a hidden part of the body and the other to the case where an exposed part is affected. Is not childlessness to be considered [chastenings of love] ?
What is meant [by childlessness] ? Is it to be supposed to refer to a man who had children but they died ? Lo, R. Johanan himself said, "This is the bone of my tenth son!" Nay, the latter teaching refers to one who never had children, the other to one who has been bereft of his children.
We set these verses one against the other and conclude there is no contradiction ; because the former passage refers to those children who continue in their fathers' ways, and the latter to those who do not continue in their fathers' ways.
There is no contradiction ; the former referring to the pupil who submits to his master, the latter to him who does not.
Rab Joseph said : There is no contradiction ; the statement of the Mishnah being the view of R. Eleazar b. 'Azariah, the other the view of R. 'Akiba. For there is a teaching : "And they shall eat the flesh in that night" (Exod. xii. 8). R. Eleazar b. 'Azariah said, "Here it is stated, 'in that night' and the same phrase occurs in 'For I will go through the land of Egypt in that night' (ibid. 5:12) ; as in the latter passage it means 'until midnight', so also in the former it means 'until midnight'."
Why, then, is the Psalm concerning Absalom (Ps. iii) next to the Psalm concerning Gog and Magog (Ps. ii)? So that should anybody ask thee, "Is there a slave that rebels against his master?" do thou ask him, "Is there a son who rebels against his father?" The latter has happened, and similarly will the former happen.
[No, there is a difference]; the former is troubled by the anxiety of a religious duty; but as for the latter, his anxiety is caused by some voluntary affair.
The Rabbis have taught : Bet Hillel say : When standing they may read [the Shema'], when sitting they may read, when reclining they may read, when walking by the way they may read, when doing work they may read. It once happened that R. Ishmael and R. Eleazar b. 'Azariah were dining in a certain place, the former reclining and the latter sitting upright. When the time for reading the Shema' arrived, R. Eleazar reclined and R. Ishmael sat up. R. Eleazar b. 'Azariah said to R. Ishmael, "[Ishmael] My brother, I will narrate a parable for thee. To what is this like? To one who is told 'Thy beard is well grown' and he answers, 'Then it shall be taken in hand by the barbers. ' So art thou ; all the time that I was sitting up thou wert reclining, but now that I have reclined thou hast sat up !"
Come and hear : From the latter clause [of the quoted Baraita] "The general rule in this matter is that it depends upon the conclusion of the benediction" — what does "the general rule in this matter" intend to include? Is it not to include what we have mentioned?
Rabbah b. Hinnana the Elder also said in the name of Rab : During the whole year, one should in the Tefillah use the phrases "The holy God" and "King Who lovest righteousness and judgment" ; except during the ten days from the New Year until the Day of Atonement, when he should substitute "The holy King" for the former and "King of judgment" for the latter.
R. Joshua b. Karhah said: Why does the section "Hear, O Israel" precede "And it shall come to pass if ye shall hearken"? So that a man shall first receive upon himself the yoke of the kingdom of heaven, and afterwards receive upon himself the yoke of the commandments. And why does "And it shall came to pass if ye shall hearken" precede "And the Lord spake" ? Because the former applies both during the day and night, but the latter during the day only.
R. Abbahu said in the name of R. Johanan: He must repeat the word "true." Rabbah said : He does not repeat it. Somebody descended in the presence of Rabbah ; and when the latter heard him say emit "true" twice, He [Rabbah] exclaimed, "Every emet has seized hold of this fellow !"
There is a teaching : R. Simeon b. Johai says : It is right that precedence should be given to "Hear O Israel" over "And it shall come to pass," because the former speaks of learning, the latter of teaching; and to "It shall come to pass" over "And the Lord spake," because the former speaks of teaching and the latter of performing.
There is a teaching : R. Simeon b. Johai says : It is right that precedence should be given to "Hear O Israel" over "And it shall come to pass," because the former speaks of learning, the latter of teaching; and to "It shall come to pass" over "And the Lord spake," because the former speaks of teaching and the latter of performing.
Here is a self-contradiction ! The first clause declares such a man to be exempt from the obligation, and the latter imposes the obligation upon him !
There is no contradiction : the latter clause referring to where there are two, the former to one.
It is certainly in agreement with R. Judah, even though it be ab initio ; and there is no contradiction. The latter is his own opinion, the other the opinion of his teacher. For there is a teaching : R. Judah says in the name of R. Eleazar b. 'Azariah : When one reads the Shema' he must make it audible to his ear ; as it is said, "Hear, O Israel, the Lord our God, the Lord is one" (Deut. vi. 4). R. Meir said to him : Behold the Scriptures state, "And these words which I command thee this day shall be upon thy heart" (ibid. v. 6), i.e. the words depend on the Kawwanah of the heart. Since thou hast reached so far, thou mayest even suppose that