say
12911 occurrences across the corpus
The Babylonian Talmud
And Rava said, If two [witnesses] come and say that they witnessed a murder on Sunday, and two [other witnesses] come and say that you [the first group] were with us on Sunday, but the murder did happen on Monday, and even if they [the second group of witnesses] say that the murder occurred on [the previous] Friday, they [the first group of witnesses] are executed [as zomemim] because at the time that they testified, the man [the accused] was not yet found guilty of death.
He [Rava] needs to say it for its ending which talks about [after the] verdict having a different rule If two [witnesses] come and say that they witnessed the court issue a guilty verdict [for the death penalty] on Sunday, and two [other witnesses] come and say that you [the first group] were with us on Sunday, but the verdict was given on [the previous] Friday, and even if they [the second group of witnesses] say, the verdict occurred on Monday, they [the first group of witnesses] are not executed [as zomemim] because at the time that they testified, the man [the accused] was already found guilty of death.
He [Rava] needs to say it for its ending which talks about [after the] verdict having a different rule If two [witnesses] come and say that they witnessed the court issue a guilty verdict [for the death penalty] on Sunday, and two [other witnesses] come and say that you [the first group] were with us on Sunday, but the verdict was given on [the previous] Friday, and even if they [the second group of witnesses] say, the verdict occurred on Monday, they [the first group of witnesses] are not executed [as zomemim] because at the time that they testified, the man [the accused] was already found guilty of death.
He [Rava] needs to say it for its ending which talks about [after the] verdict having a different rule If two [witnesses] come and say that they witnessed the court issue a guilty verdict [for the death penalty] on Sunday, and two [other witnesses] come and say that you [the first group] were with us on Sunday, but the verdict was given on [the previous] Friday, and even if they [the second group of witnesses] say, the verdict occurred on Monday, they [the first group of witnesses] are not executed [as zomemim] because at the time that they testified, the man [the accused] was already found guilty of death.
He [Rava] needs to say it for its ending which talks about [after the] verdict having a different rule If two [witnesses] come and say that they witnessed the court issue a guilty verdict [for the death penalty] on Sunday, and two [other witnesses] come and say that you [the first group] were with us on Sunday, but the verdict was given on [the previous] Friday, and even if they [the second group of witnesses] say, the verdict occurred on Monday, they [the first group of witnesses] are not executed [as zomemim] because at the time that they testified, the man [the accused] was already found guilty of death.
And [we find a] similar [rule] with regard to paying a fine. If two [witnesses] come and say that a person stole [an animal], and slaughtered or sold it on Sunday, and two [other witnesses] come and say that you [the first group] were with us on Sunday, but the person did steal the animal and slaughter or sell it on Monday,
And [we find a] similar [rule] with regard to paying a fine. If two [witnesses] come and say that a person stole [an animal], and slaughtered or sold it on Sunday, and two [other witnesses] come and say that you [the first group] were with us on Sunday, but the person did steal the animal and slaughter or sell it on Monday,
and even if they [the second group of witnesses] say that the person stole [the animal] and slaughtered or sold it on [the previous] Friday, they [the first group of witnesses] are found liable to pay [the intended fine as zomemim] because at the time that they testified, the man [the accused] was not yet found liable to the fine.
If two [witnesses] come and say, A person stole [an animal], slaughtered or sold it, and had a [guilty] verdict on Sunday, and two [other witnesses] come and say that you [the first group] were with us on Sunday, but the person did steal the animal, slaughter or sell it, and receive a [guilty] verdict on [the previous] Friday, and even if they [the second group of witnesses] say that the person stole [the animal], slaughtered or sold it, and received a [guilty] verdict on Monday, they [the first group of witnesses] are not found liable to pay [the intended fine as zomemim] because at the time that they testified, the man [the accused] was already found liable to the fine.
If two [witnesses] come and say, A person stole [an animal], slaughtered or sold it, and had a [guilty] verdict on Sunday, and two [other witnesses] come and say that you [the first group] were with us on Sunday, but the person did steal the animal, slaughter or sell it, and receive a [guilty] verdict on [the previous] Friday, and even if they [the second group of witnesses] say that the person stole [the animal], slaughtered or sold it, and received a [guilty] verdict on Monday, they [the first group of witnesses] are not found liable to pay [the intended fine as zomemim] because at the time that they testified, the man [the accused] was already found liable to the fine.
If two [witnesses] come and say, A person stole [an animal], slaughtered or sold it, and had a [guilty] verdict on Sunday, and two [other witnesses] come and say that you [the first group] were with us on Sunday, but the person did steal the animal, slaughter or sell it, and receive a [guilty] verdict on [the previous] Friday, and even if they [the second group of witnesses] say that the person stole [the animal], slaughtered or sold it, and received a [guilty] verdict on Monday, they [the first group of witnesses] are not found liable to pay [the intended fine as zomemim] because at the time that they testified, the man [the accused] was already found liable to the fine.
At a different time they [Reish Lakash and Rebbi Elazar] were sitting before Rebbi Yochanon and this story came before them. Reish Lakash said, She has been established [as someone who brings in false witnesses]. Rebbi Yochanon responded, does the fact that she has been established [as bringing in false witnesses] cause all of Israel to be established [as being false witnesses]!? He [Reish Lakash] then proceeded to look at Rebbi Elazar crossly. He said [to Rebbi Elazar], You heard this from the blacksmith's son [Rebbi Yochanon], and you didn't say it over in his name?!
Let's say that Reish Lakash [the woman is established to bring in false witnesses] holds like Rebbi Yehudah [It's a plotting group] and Rebbi Yochanon [not all of Israel has been established] holds like the Rabbis [all the witnesses are executed].
Reish Lakash would say to you, I can even say like the Rabbis, that the Rabbis only said [that we trust the witnesses] over there because there wasn't anyone seeking them out. But here there is one [the woman] seeking out the witnesses.
Reish Lakash would say to you, I can even say like the Rabbis, that the Rabbis only said [that we trust the witnesses] over there because there wasn't anyone seeking them out. But here there is one [the woman] seeking out the witnesses.
And Rebbi Yochanon would say to you, I can even say like Rebbi Yehudah that Rebbi Yehudah only said [that we don't believe the witnesses] over there, because we can't expect the whole world to have been by them [the same two witnesses]. But over here [by this woman], these [witnesses] knew their testimony, and these [witnesses] did not know their testimony.
And Rebbi Yochanon would say to you, I can even say like Rebbi Yehudah that Rebbi Yehudah only said [that we don't believe the witnesses] over there, because we can't expect the whole world to have been by them [the same two witnesses]. But over here [by this woman], these [witnesses] knew their testimony, and these [witnesses] did not know their testimony.
The Sages said to them, But the Torah already says (Deuteronomy 19, 19), "And you should do to them [the zomemim] as they had plotted to do to their brother", which would imply that their brother [the victim] is still alive. If so then why does [the Torah] say, "a soul for a soul"? You might think that they [the zomemim] would be liable to be killed from the time that their testimony was accepted, Therefore the Torah says "a soul for a soul" to teach us that they [zomemim] aren't executed until they succeeded in having a verdict [for their victim].
We learned in a beraisa: Rebbi Yehudah ben Tavai said I will not seek comfort until I execute a zommeim witness, to go against the Tzudukim, who say zommemim witnesses aren't executed unless they succeeded in having their victim executed.
Shimon ben Shatach said to him, I will not seek comfort if you continue to spill innocent blood. That the sages say, zommemim witnesses aren't executed until they both become zommemim, and they also don't receive lashes until they both become zomemim.
Rebbi Yosi says, in what were these words said? etc. what should two brothers do? etc.: What do we say to the witnesses?
Rava answered, this is what we say to them, Did you come to see or did you come to testify? If they respond that they came to testify, then if one of them is found to be a relative or a disqualified [witness], the whole [group of] testimony is dismissed. But if they respond that they came to see, [then they can't disqualify the whole group because otherwise] what should two brothers do who together witnessed a murder?
Rav Pappa asked Abayi, Now that we've established that they [the witnesses] do not combine [in the case of] one [witness] from this window and one [witness] from this window where this [witness] observed the entire action and this [witness] observed the entire action, Do we need to say [the case of] one [witness] after the other [from the same window] where they each only observed half of the action? He answered him, We only need it for [the case of witnesses to] a cohabitation.
Illah and Tuvia were relatives of the guarantor. Rav Papa had thought to say, [They should be valid witnesses because] regarding the creditor and the borrower they are unrelated. Rab Huna brei dRav Yehushua said to Rav Papa, If the borrower doesn't have [the funds] won't the creditor go to the guarantor?
MISHNA: One has had a verdict and then flees and comes before a different court, we do not retry his case. Any circumstance where two witnesses get up and say that they testify about a certain man that he had his verdict in this-and-this court and so-and-so and so-and-so were his witnesses, that person gets executed.
We establish courts both in Israel and in Diaspora. A court that executes once in seven years is called a "killing [court]" Rebbi Eliezer ben Azarya says, Once in seventy years. Rebbi Tarfon and Rebbi Akiva say, If we were in court no one would ever get executed. Raban Shimon ben Gamlial responded, Then you would be increasing murder in Israel.
GEMARA: Only before the same court is when his case is not retried, but brute a different court his case is retried. But the latter part of the mishna teaches, "Any circumstance where two witnesses get up and say that they testify about a certain man that he had his verdict in this-and-this court and so-and-so and so-and-so were his witnesses, that person gets executed."?
If so then why does the Torah say (Deuteronomy 17,8) "In your gates"? In your gates [Isreal] you should set up courts in each and every district and in each and every city, but in the Diaspora you should set up [courts] in each and every district but you should not set up [courts] in each and every city.
Rav Ashi says, If it came out that they said that they saw that the victim was viable [prior to being killed, they would say that] maybe in the place that the sword entered there was a hole.
Acting willfully is obvious! He is liable for death!? (Rather) Rava said: Say [instead: “Through error”] excludes the one who says it is permitted [to do a prohibited action]. Abaye said to him: If he is one who says it is permitted, [then he falls into the category of] one who had no choice. [Rava] said to him: It is because I say that the one who said it is permitted [falls into the category of] one who was grossly negligent.
Acting willfully is obvious! He is liable for death!? (Rather) Rava said: Say [instead: “Through error”] excludes the one who says it is permitted [to do a prohibited action]. Abaye said to him: If he is one who says it is permitted, [then he falls into the category of] one who had no choice. [Rava] said to him: It is because I say that the one who said it is permitted [falls into the category of] one who was grossly negligent.
[Now we return back to the debate between R' Abahu and R. Yohanan about the case of the fallen rung]. Let us say this same issue was the matter of a Tannaitic debate: One who is ascending a ladder and a rung falls. One tanna taught that he is liable and another taught that he is exempt. Was it not about this that they were disagreeing? One of them held that it was a case of descent [where he is liable] and one of them holds that he is ascending [where he is exempt].
If you want, say that both cases are talking about exile and there is [still] not a difficulty. They are disagreeing about it being rotten. Here, [where he would be obligated for exile] is when (the rung) is rotten. Here [where he would be exempt from exile] is when it is not rotten.
And if you want, say that they both agree that the wood was not rotten and it is [still] not a difficulty: Here [where he would be exempt from exile] is when the rung has been fastened. Here, [where he would be liable] is when he did not fasten it.
Mishnah: If the iron axe head slipped from its handle and it killed someone, Rebi says he isn't exiled, and the Sages say that he is exiled. If [a wood chip] from the tree broke off [and that wood chip killed someone], Rebi says he is exiled, and the Sages say that he isn't exiled.
Mishnah: If the iron axe head slipped from its handle and it killed someone, Rebi says he isn't exiled, and the Sages say that he is exiled. If [a wood chip] from the tree broke off [and that wood chip killed someone], Rebi says he is exiled, and the Sages say that he isn't exiled.
Gemar: It was taught: Rebi said to the Sages: Does it say, "and the iron [flies off] from ITS wood?" Does it not only say "from the wood?" And furthermore, the word "wood" is said below and the word "wood" is said above. Just as the word "wood" is said above [and refers to wood that comes] from the tree being chopped, so too the word "wood" is said below [and refers to wood that comes] from the tree being chopped.
Gemar: It was taught: Rebi said to the Sages: Does it say, "and the iron [flies off] from ITS wood?" Does it not only say "from the wood?" And furthermore, the word "wood" is said below and the word "wood" is said above. Just as the word "wood" is said above [and refers to wood that comes] from the tree being chopped, so too the word "wood" is said below [and refers to wood that comes] from the tree being chopped.
Is that to say that “found” [means that the person] was already there from the outset? And pit them against each other [this baraita and the baraita that follows]: “And he found” (Leviticus 25:26) [This verse describes a case in which someone has a third party redeem a field because they do not have funds. If that person is trying to subvert the system and already has the money to redeem, he is not permitted to go through this process of including a third party] excludes [what was already] found, because he may not sell a far [field] and redeem it with [a field that is] close, [nor a field that is] bad and redeem it for a good [quality field].
Ravina challenges this to Rava: [this case] excludes the father who strikes his son, the teacher who rebukes his student, and the messenger of the court, lets say, that since [the child is already] learned, it is not a mitzvah [to strike his son], also now [regarding cutting wood] is not a mitzvah [and therefore not required]. There, even though he is learned, it is a mitzvah [to strike him], as it is written: ... “correct your son and he will please you. He will give delight to your soul.” (Proverbs 29:17).
"But he [i.e. you, Rava] needs this [verse] for [a case like] this baraita?!: 'He will be impure' (Numbers 19:13)—to include a day immerser (one who is impure and has immersed but needs to wait until nightfall to be pure). 'His impurity is in him' (Numbers 19:13)—to include one waiting for atonement." He said to him: "I say [that I derive my position] from 'more (od)' (Numbers 19:13)."
Ravina challenged Rava (all the cases to follow are where the person is in pursuit of a Mitzvah so they would not be punished with exile): This excludes the case of a father who strikes his son (and kills him inadvertently), and the teacher who rebukes his student (and inadvertently kills him) and the court agent (who inadvertently killed). So, why (is this a mitzvah to hit one's son, etc?). Let us say that since he was already learned (the son), it's not actually a Mitzvah to strike him (again) so here too, it is also not a Mitzvah. (Rava:) There, despite the fact that he's already learned, it is still a Mitzvah to hit him, as it is stated, "rebuke your son and he will bring you rest."
Gemara: "The father is exiled for his son." But didn't you say (in an earlier Mishnah) that a father who strikes his son is not exiled? But he was learned (which is why he would be exiled, since it was not a hit of a Mitzvah). But you said, even when he is learned, it actually is a Mitzvah that he is doing [so he would not be exiled]. [Here, we're talking about when the father is a carpenter and his son] is a carpenter's apprentice [so he is just teaching him a trade—and he would not be exiled].
For the Rabbis who say beheading is more severe than strangulation: one who inadvertently kills his father, this is inadvertent sin [that would be punished, if done intentionally, with] beheading, so such an inadvertent sin would be given atonement [through exile—so this is the opinion of our Mishnah].
This works out well if a slave or Samaritan is exiled by way of an Israelite or lashed. [He is exiled in a case where] he killed him [accidentally] and lashed [in a case where] he cursed him. But an Israelite who is exiled or lashed by way of Samaritan?! It works well with exile [in a case where] he killed him [accidentally]. But lashing, why? [If you say] because he cursed him, "the chieftain of your people do not curse" (Exodus 22:27)! [I.e. a Samaritan is not on of your people and thus this prohibition for which the punishment is lashes should not apply in this case]
Some say that they contrasted the two verses together. It's written: "For the children of Israel, and for the foreign resident in your midst there shall be six cities" (Numbers 35:15). And it is written: "There shall be for you all cities of refuge" (Numbers 35:12)—for you—not for the resident foreigners! Rav Kahanah said: This is not a difficulty. Here [in the second verse] is where a resident foreigner killed an Israelite, and here [in the second verse] is where a resident foreigner killed a resident foreigner.
Rather, Rava said: [This is an instance where the resident foreigner] said that it was permitted. Abaye said to him: Someone who said that it was permitted is [a case of] a freak accident?! He said to him: I say that someone who said that it was permitted is [a case of] gross negligence.
Mishnah: "The blind person is not exiled—words of Rabbi Yehudah. Rabbi Meir says: He is exiled. The hater is not exiled. Rabbi Yose says: "The hater is put to death because he is like a forewarned [ox]". Rabbi Shimon says: "There are haters which are exiled and haters which are not. This is the rule: Anyone for whom it is possible to say that they knew they were killing is not exiled; that they didn't know they were killing, behold they are exiled."
And if you want to say [another solution]: What [does Rabbi Yohanan mean when he says the words of Torah] are effective at providing refuge? [Refuge] from the angel of death. For when Rav Hisda was sitting and studying in the yeshiva, the messenger, the angel of death, was not able to come near him since his mouth was never quiet from his learning. He climbed and sat on the cedar tree of the yeshiva. The cedar broke and he was silent, and [then] the [angel of death] was able [to take him].
Rabbi Smalai expounded: "What is that which it was written, 'Then Moses separated three cities across the Jordan in the east (mizraha shamesh)' (Deuteronomy 4:41)? The Holy Blessed One said to Moses: 'The sun will rise (hizrah shemesh) on the murderers.'" There are those who say: "[God] said to [Moses]: "You caused the sun to rise (hazrahta shemesh) on the murderers."
And the Rabbis (and some say Rabbah bar Mari) say: "Who loves wealth, that is his reward? Anyone who loves to teach in public—that is his reward." The rabbis put their eyes on Rava son of Rabbah.
And the Rabbis (and some say Rabbah bar Mari) say: "Who loves wealth, that is his reward? Anyone who loves to teach in public—that is his reward." The rabbis put their eyes on Rava son of Rabbah.
"Anyone who loves to learn in public, that is his reward." And this is [similar to] what Rabbi Yose bar Rabbi Hanina said: "What is that which is written, 'The sword on the sorcerers (badim), that they be made fools of!' (Jeremiah 50:36)? A sword on the necks of those who hate the students of the Sages who sit and busy themselves with Torah alone (bad ve-bad). And that is not all, for they are foolish! It is written here 'that they be made fools of' (Jeremiah 50:36), and it is written there 'that we have done foolishly' (Numbers 12:11). And that is not all, for they are sinners! As it says, 'and that we have sinned' (Numbers 12:11)." And if you want to say from [that they are sinners] from here: "Princes of Zoan have become fools" (Isaiah 19:13).
Rabbah bar Rav Huna said (and some say Rav Huna said that Rabbi Elazar said): "From the Torah, from the Prophets, and from the Writings [we can learn that] on the road the a person wants to travel on [to the cities of refuge], they permit him to go.
They challenged [from a baraita]: "'And for him there is no death penalty' (Deuteronomy 19:6)—about the murderer the verse speaks. You say it's about the murderer or perhaps it's actually about the blood avenger? When it says, 'And he didn't hate him recently' (Deuteronomy 19:4)—thus [you would] say that the verse is speaking about the murderer." [Just as the earlier phrase "he didn't hate him" is clearly referring to the murderer, so too when the phrase appears in verse 6 it is also referring to the murderer. Thus the rest of the verse should also be read as referring to the murderer].
They challenged [from a baraita]: "'And for him there is no death penalty' (Deuteronomy 19:6)—about the murderer the verse speaks. You say it's about the murderer or perhaps it's actually about the blood avenger? When it says, 'And he didn't hate him recently' (Deuteronomy 19:4)—thus [you would] say that the verse is speaking about the murderer." [Just as the earlier phrase "he didn't hate him" is clearly referring to the murderer, so too when the phrase appears in verse 6 it is also referring to the murderer. Thus the rest of the verse should also be read as referring to the murderer].
He [Rav Huna] said according to this tanna, as it is taught [in a baraita]: "'And for him there is no death penalty' (Deuteronomy 19:6)—about the blood avenger the verse speaks. You say it's about the blood avenger or maybe the verse is actually speaking about the murderer? When it says, 'Since he didn't hate him recently' (Deuteronomy 19:6)—this is speaking about the murderer, [but then] how can I uphold 'and for him there is no death penalty'? [This should have been obvious because it has already been established by the fact that he's a manslayer!]. [Therefore], the verse speaks about the blood avenger."
Does this mean to say that all occurrences of the word "דבר" (speak) connotate a harsh tone? Yes, as the Torah writes (Genesis 42, 30) "The matter if the land spoke (דבר) to us harshly". But we learned [otherwise] in a baraisa, (Malachi 3,16) "They spoke (דבר)" there is no use of "They spoke (דבר)" except to connote a gentle tone. And so too it is said (Psalms 47, 4) "He will subdue people under us". דבר connotes one thing. ידבר connotes another thing.
It is understandable according to the opinion that it was the eight verses, as that would be why it says "in the Torah scroll of God". However according to the opinion that it was the cities of refuge, why does it say "in the Torah scroll of God"? This is what it was saying, And Yehoshua wrote in his book these matters that were written in the Torah scroll of God.
And [what is] Rebbi Yehudah['s reason]? The Torah says elsewhere (Numbers 35, 32) "to dwell in the dwellings of the land until the death of the priest etc.". And [what does] the other opinion [do with this verse]? From the fact that it doesn't say "high", it must be referring to one of [the three already mentioned].
And there are others whom teach it [differently], "In order that they [the murderers] would pray that their children would not die". The reason [that the high priests don't die] is that they pray for them. This implies that if they wouldn't pray for them then they would die. But what should [the high priest] have done?! Here [in Babylonia] we say, "Tuvia sinned and Zigud gets lashes?!"
There [in Isreal] they say, "Schem gets married and Mavgui must get circumcised?!"
Abaye says, we have a tradition, If one's judgment is finished and then dies [before reaching the city of refuge], we bring his bones there as the Torah says (Numbers 35, 32), "to dwell in the dwelling of the land until the death of the priest". And what type of dwelling is "in" the land? You must say this is [referring to] burial. It was taught, if he dies before the high priest dies, then we bring his bones to his ancestral graves [after the high priest subsequently dies] as the Torah says (Numbers 35,28), "the murderer should return to the land of his possession". What type of dwelling is "in the land of his possession? You must say this is [referring to] burial.
Abaye says, we have a tradition, If one's judgment is finished and then dies [before reaching the city of refuge], we bring his bones there as the Torah says (Numbers 35, 32), "to dwell in the dwelling of the land until the death of the priest". And what type of dwelling is "in" the land? You must say this is [referring to] burial. It was taught, if he dies before the high priest dies, then we bring his bones to his ancestral graves [after the high priest subsequently dies] as the Torah says (Numbers 35,28), "the murderer should return to the land of his possession". What type of dwelling is "in the land of his possession? You must say this is [referring to] burial.
Let us say that they are arguing the same dispute as Rebbi Eliezer and Rebbi Yehoshua. That we learned in a mishna, If he [the priest] was standing and sacrificing upon the alter, acc it became known that he was the son of a divorcee or the son of a woman who received chalitzah, Rebbi Eliezer says, All of the sacrifices that he ever brought are [retroactively] disqualified. And Rebbi Yehoshua validates then.
[Let's say that] the one who says [it's like] he dies [holds] like Rebbi Yehoshua, and the one who says [it's like] he got disqualified [holds] like Rebbi Eliezer.
Rebbi Abahu says, Cities of refuge were not given for burial, as the Torah says (Numbers 35, 3) "And their open lands should be for their cattle, their flocks, and all of their livelihoods" For "life" they were given and not for burial. They inquired, "Their" (Numbers 35,25) implies that their should be his living there should be his death and there should be his burial. [so how can we say that cities of refuge aren't fit for burial]? A murderer is different because the Torah exiled him.
Just like the city protects... etc.: And a contradiction, (Numbers 35, 25) "And he shall dwell there" "there" implies not in the boundary [so how can we say that the boundary also protects]? Abaye says, It is not a difficulty. Here [by our Mishna] it's referring to [receiving] protection. Here [by the verse in Numbers] it's referring to [not being permitted to] dwell.
What is the reason of Rebbi Yossi Hagalili? [He would say,] does [the Torah] write, "If" he kills? And Rebbi Akiva? [He would say,] Does [the Torah] write, he "shall" kill?
What is the reason of Rebbi Yossi Hagalili? [He would say,] does [the Torah] write, "If" he kills? And Rebbi Akiva? [He would say,] Does [the Torah] write, he "shall" kill?
One baraisa teaches, A father that killed, his son can become his Goel HaDam, and another baraisa teaches, His son cannot become his Goel HaDam. Let us say that this [baraisa that says the son can become a Goel Hadam] is [like the opinion of] Rebbe Yossi HaGalili and this [baraisa that says the son cannot become a Goel Hadam] is [like the opinion of] Rebbi Akiva.
Say that you heard [this view ascribed] to Rebbi Yehuda regarding maiser [shenei when it would result in a] stringency. If the trunk is outside and the branches inside, just as on the branches one may not redeem [the maiser shenei], so too on the trunk one may not eat redeem [the maiser shenei], If the trunk is inside and the branches outside, just as on the branches one may not eat [the maiser shenei] without redeeming it, so too on the trunk one may not eat [the maiser shenei] without redeeming it.
But with regards to cities of refuge [going after the branches doesn't always result in a stringency], it is understandable if the trunk is outside and the branches inside, just as on the branches [the Goel Hadam] may not kill him [the murderer], so too on the trunk he may not kill him. But if the trunk is inside and the branches outside [then it won't result in a stringency to say that] just as on the branches [the Goel Hadam] may kill him, so too on the trunk he may kill him, Because he is inside [the boundary]!?
MISHNA: Similarly, if a murderer that was exiled to a city of refuge and the people of the city wish to honor him, he must say to them "I am a murderer". If they tell him "even so" he may except [honor] from them, as the Torah says, (Deuteronomy 19, 4) "and this is the word of the murderer"
How much must one eat from tevel to be liable? Rebbi Shimon says any amount, and the sages say one k'zais. Rebbi Shimon said to them [the sages], Will you not agree with me that one who eats an ant of any size is liable? They responded, That is because it is in the form that it was created. He [Rebbi Shimon] said back to them, Also a kernel of wheat is in the form that it was created.
What is the reason of Rebbi Yishmael? The Torah says (Deuteronomy 28, 58), "If you do not guard yourself to perform all of these laws" and (Deuteronomy 28, 59) "And G-d make wondrous (הפלאה) your plagues" I do not know what this word "הפלאה" means. But when the Torah elsewhere says (Deuteronomy 25, 2) "And the judge should cast him down and hit him before his face", then I must say that this word "הפלאה" means malkus. And the Torah said over there (Deuteronomy 28, 58), "If you do not guard yourself to perform all etc.". [showing that all prohibitions are punishable with malkus.]
And according Rebbi Akiva, if so then by liabilites of kares also, [we also should] say that a a prohibition that has a scriptural warning for kares [cannot also be liable to malkus]. Rav Mordechai said to Rav Ashi that this is what Avimi from Hagronia had said in the name of Rava, liabilities of kares do not need a scriptual warning [to obligate one with kares, thus freeing the warning to teach malkus], for the Pesach offering and circumcision are punished [with kares for not performing them] even though they have no scriptural warning.
And [the rabbis, who learn re'shia bar re'shia from kares b'achoso] would say that it is a flawed kal v'chomer, because what comparison can you make to niddah which involves separte bodies?
And [as for where Rebbi Yitzchak derives the principle against deriving punishments] you can either say that he derives [the principle against deriving] punishment from [the principle against deriving] scriptural warnings, or you can say that he learns it out from
And [as for where Rebbi Yitzchak derives the principle against deriving punishments] you can either say that he derives [the principle against deriving] punishment from [the principle against deriving] scriptural warnings, or you can say that he learns it out from
Or if you prefer you can say, that he does not hold like Rebbi Elezar, [rather] he derives it from (Leviticus 20, 18) "And if a man shall lie with a woman sick".
It is understandable why Reish Lakash does not hold like Rebbi Yochanon, [as he can say that] he does not learn that gezaira shava. But what is the reason that Rebbi Yochanon does not say like Reish Lakash? [Rebbi Yochanon] would say to you, [b'chol kodesh lo sigah] is giving a scriptual warning for [consuming] Terumah [while impure],
It is understandable why Reish Lakash does not hold like Rebbi Yochanon, [as he can say that] he does not learn that gezaira shava. But what is the reason that Rebbi Yochanon does not say like Reish Lakash? [Rebbi Yochanon] would say to you, [b'chol kodesh lo sigah] is giving a scriptual warning for [consuming] Terumah [while impure],
It is understandable why Reish Lakash does not hold like Rebbi Yochanon, [as he can say that] he does not learn that gezaira shava. But what is the reason that Rebbi Yochanon does not say like Reish Lakash? [Rebbi Yochanon] would say to you, [b'chol kodesh lo sigah] is giving a scriptual warning for [consuming] Terumah [while impure],
And then where does Reish Lakash derive a scriptual warning for Terumah [if he uses b'chol kodesh lo sigah to teach against eating sacrificial meats]? He derives it from (Leviticus 22,4) "Any man from the seed of Ahron, who is a lepor or zav". What is fit [only] for the seed of Ahron? You must say that this is referring to Terumah. And what does Rebbi Yochanon use that verse for [if he learns Terumah from elsewhere]? That verse is for consuming [Terumah while one is impure] and this verse [b'chol kodesh lo sigah] is for touching [Terumah while one is impure].
A baraisa was taught in accordance with [the view of] Reish Lakash, "B'chol kodesh lo sigah" is a scriptural warning for eating [sacrificial foods while one is impure]. You say that it is a warning for eating? Or maybe it's only a warning for touching? The Torah therefore says, "In all sanctity he shall not touch and into the Temple etc." The Torah juxtaposes sacrificial foods with the Temple. Just as the Temple is a thing that involve the loss of life [one who enters while impure is subject to kares], so too the whole [verse] most involve the loss of life. And does touching [sacrificial foods, which is punishable with malkus] involve any loss of life? Rather you must say that the "b'chol kodesh lo sigah" refers to eating [sacrificial foods].
A baraisa was taught in accordance with [the view of] Reish Lakash, "B'chol kodesh lo sigah" is a scriptural warning for eating [sacrificial foods while one is impure]. You say that it is a warning for eating? Or maybe it's only a warning for touching? The Torah therefore says, "In all sanctity he shall not touch and into the Temple etc." The Torah juxtaposes sacrificial foods with the Temple. Just as the Temple is a thing that involve the loss of life [one who enters while impure is subject to kares], so too the whole [verse] most involve the loss of life. And does touching [sacrificial foods, which is punishable with malkus] involve any loss of life? Rather you must say that the "b'chol kodesh lo sigah" refers to eating [sacrificial foods].
They asked him [Rebbi Yochanon] Did you say this? [that any prohibition preceded by a positive commandment is subject to flogging i.e. a lo saseah s'kedmu asseah]... He responded to them, No. [I retract what I said.] Rabbah said, By God! He said it. And it is backed by a posuk [verse] and a mishnah. It is written (Numbers 5,2) "And they shall send forth from the camp. etc. And they shall not defile their camps" [which is a lo saseah s'kedmu asseah] and it was taught in a mishna "One who enters the temple whilst impure [receives lashes].
But you can say, If it is not applicable before the Motzei Shem Rah [divorces his wife] apply it afterwards by itself [Motzei Shem Rah] that he does not recieve malkus for divorcing his wife [because he can remarry her].
If so [that an extra commandment shouldn't detract from it, then the same argument can be made by] a lav sh'nituk l'asseh also, say that just because the Torah writes by it an extra commandment, does that make it any less stringent?! Rava explained [the difference] to him, That one [by a lav sh'nituk l'asseh the commandment] is coming to remove the prohibition.
but according to the opinion of Kimu v'lo Kimu, what is there to say?
And they both go according to their reasoning, as it is said elsewhere, If one makes an oath that he will eat this loave today, and the day passes without him eating it, Rebbi Yochanon and Riesh Lakash both say that he is not flogged. Rebbi Yocahnon says that he is not flogged
It was taught in a mishna over there, One who takes a mother bird while with its young [in violation of the Torah's prohibition]. Rebbi Yehuda says that he receives malkus and need not send her away. And the Sages say that he must send away [the mother bird] and is not flogged. This is the general rule, any prohibition that has an active positive commandment one is not liable for. Rebbi Yochanon said, We do not have any examples of this [where one can receive malkus by nullifying a remedial positive commandment] besides for this case [of sending away the mother bird] and one other case.
Rather [when Rebbi Yochanon said] this and one other case, he was referring to [Pe'uh], but not oniess. Because where do we say that a vow made on public consent cannot be annulled? For an optional matter. But [a vow] related to performing a mitzvah is subject to annulment.
Rav Yosef says, It is subject to a tannaic dispute. Rebbi Meir says One need not designate by name maiser ani of demai [questionable produce bought from an ignoramus], but the sages say
[Regarding] one who takes a mother bird while on her young, Rebbi Yehuda says he incurs malkus, and need not send her away, but the sages say that he must send her away and does not receive malkus. This is the general rule, any prohibition that has an active positive commandment [to remedy it] does not make one liable to malkus.
GEMARA: Rabah bar bar Channa said in the name of Rebbi Yochanon, these are the words of Rebbi Akiva, the unnamed authority. The sages, however, say that regarding bikorim, their placement is essential to them, but the recital [or their verses] is not essential to them.
But lets say that these are the words of Rebbi Shimon, [and that he is] the unnamed authority, [which would be collaborated by a baraisa]? This is what he is saying, that Rebbi Akiva holds like Rebbi Shimon.
which means, that regarding any "holy" that got disqualified, the verse comes to add a prohibition against eating it. [Why doesn't Rava say he incurs malkus for that]. These words only apply in a case where they are fit [for consumption] before becoming disqualified, but here [by ollah] before being disqualified they are also not fit.
Rava asked, (Deuteronomy 14,6) "And any animal that has split hooves and has the hoof completely split into two and chews its cud,among the animals that you may eat". "That" you may eat, but a different animal you may not eat. And if it is as you say then why do I need (Deuteronomy 14,7) "This you may not eat"?