slaughtered

HALAKHAH: “Rebbi Jehudah said, Rebbi Ismael asked Rebbi Joshua,” etc. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa, Rebbi Simeon bar Abba in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: Because [most] calves there are slaughtered in the name of pagan worship. Rebbi Joḥanan heard this and said, my teacher taught us well, since if one slaughters for pagan worship even its excrement is forbidden. Rebbi Joḥanan asked, if one found a ring in it? Rebbi Yose said, a ring is recognizable; excrement is part of its body.

Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa, Rebbi Simeon bar Abba in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: Because most calves there are slaughtered in the name of pagan worship. Rebbi Joḥanan heard this and said, my teacher taught us well, since if one slaughters an animal for pagan worship even its excrement is forbidden. Rebbi Joḥanan asked, if one found a ring in it? Rebbi Yose said, a ring is recognizable; excrement is part of its body.

MISHNAH: The following are forbidden and they forbid in the most minute amount: Libation wine, idols, heart-removed skins, and an ox which was stoned, and the calf whose neck was broken, and the birds of the sufferer from skin disease, and the nazir’s hair, and the firstborn donkey, and meat in milk, and profane animals slaughtered in the Temple precinct. These are forbidden and they forbid in the most minute amount.

And the birds of the sufferer from skin disease. Any pure bird you may eat, this is the living bird. But the following you may not eat of them, that is the slaughtered one. Or the other way around? Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Ismael: The Torah has no prohibition of usufruct which applies to any living thing.

And profane animals slaughtered in the Temple precinct. Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Ismael: The Torah said, slaughter what is Mine in My place and what is yours in yours. Since Mine in yours is forbidden, also yours in Mine. Is it punished by extirpation? Does not Rebbi Ismael say, one infers by an argument de minore ad majus but one does not punish by an argument de minore ad majus?

HALAKHAH: “Plotting witnesses cannot be”. Rebbi Zeˋira said, this implies that a plotting witness is not disqualified by the court but is disqualified by himself. Explain it by warning, as it was stated: “Rebbi Yose said, when has this been said? For two testimonies with two warnings. But for one testimony and one warning any testimony which is partially disqualified is totally disqualified.” What does it mean, “if it is partially disqualified it is totally disqualified”? If they were standing and testifying against him on the tenth of Nisan that he had stolen an ox on the first of Nisan, and slaughtered or sold it on the fifth of Nisan. They were shown to be plotting on the eleventh of Nisan. Any testimony which they delivered between the second and the fifth of Nisan is retroactively disqualified. Rebbi Abba bar Mamal said, explain it if they deliver their testimony in one group and you cannot infer anything, as we have stated: “They were the first and they were the later [witnesses]. If they were shown to be plotting at first, there is nothing. At the second time, there is one testimony. At the third time, there are two testimonies. How? If they testify on one occasion, you could not infer anything. It only comes based on multiple testimonies. Rebbi Zeˋira said, this implies that a plotting witness is not disqualified by the court but is disqualified by himself.

Rebbi Ḥaggai asked the colleagues: From where that he who eats with permission be not liable? What is the difference between him who thought that it was profane but it turned out to be heave, who is liable, and him who thought that he was a Cohen but it turned out that he was an Israel, who is not liable? They said to him, by the instruction of the court. He said to them, still I am having a problem. What is the difference between him who thought that it was weekday but it turned out that it was Sabbath, who is liable, and him who thought that it was a Passover sacrifice but it turned out to be a well-being offering, who is not liable. They said to him, because he slaughtered with permission. He said to them, still I am having a problem. What is the difference between him who thought that it was permitted but it turned out to be forbidden, who is liable, and him who thought that it was forbidden fat and it turned out to be permitted fat, who is not liable. They did not answer at all. He told them, let me tell you from myself: Or his transgression in which he sinned was made known to him; he has to bring. Rebbi Yossi came to visit them; they told him, that problem is hard for us. He asked them, why did you not answer him, or his transgression in which hesinned was made known to him; he has to bring? They told him, Ḥaggai asked the question, Ḥaggai gave the answer.

Are consequences of a ruling like the ruling? Do ruling within ruling combine? How is that? If the public ate forbidden fat and designated their sacrifices. If you say that consequences of a ruling are like the ruling, the Court is liable. If you say that consequences of a ruling are not like the ruling, the Court is not liable. The following should be obvious to you: the consequences of a ruling are like the ruling. Do ruling within ruling combine with each other? How is that? If the Court ruled that the fat in the right side kidney was permitted but that of the left side and its cover was forbidden; then they reversed themselves and said the opposite. Most ate the first time, and most the second time. If you say that they combine, they are liable for one. But if you say that they do not combine, they are liable for two. Do two instructions about one kind of work combine? How is that? If a majority ate and a majority slaughtered. In Rebbi Meïr’s opinion they are once liable; in Rebbi Simeon’s opinion they are twice liable. If a minority ate the first time and a minority the second time. In Rebbi Meïr’s opinion they are liable; in Rebbi Simeon’s opinion they are not liable.

Rebbi Ḥaggai said in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina: A colleague of the rabbis objected to the position of Rebbi Meïr: If she miscarried the likeness of a raven and he stands on the top of a tree, can one say to him, come and give ḥalîṣah or marry in levirate? Rebbi Mana told him, instead of objecting to Rebbi Meïr, object to the rabbis! Since Rebbi Yasa said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, if his entire body is human and only his face is animal, he is not counted as a child. If his entire body is animal and only his face is human, he is counted as a child. If his entire body is human and only his face is animal, when he is standing reading the Torah one may tell him, come to be slaughtered. If his entire body is animal and only his face is human, when he is ploughing the field one may tell him, come and give ḥalîṣah or marry in levirate!

R. Johanan said : R. Meir, on concluding the reading of the Book of Job, used to say: It is the fate of man to die and of cattle to be slaughtered, and all are destined to die. Happy is he who has grown in Torah and whose labour has been in Torah ; who has caused tranquillity of spirit to his Creator, advanced in good repute, and departed from the world with a good name. Of him said Solomon, "A good name is better than precious oil, and the day of death than the day of one's birth " (Eccles. vii. 1).

It was taught in agreement with R. Yohanan: Both the produce of the Sabbatical Year and of Second Tithe may be redeemed with cattle, beast or fowl, whether live or slaughtered, the words of R. Meir. But the sages say: With slaughtered [animals and birds] they may be redeemed, but not with live ones, lest one rear flocks from them.

It was taught in agreement with R. Yohanan: Both the produce of the Sabbatical Year and of Second Tithe may be redeemed with cattle, beast or fowl, whether live or slaughtered, the words of R. Meir. But the sages say: With slaughtered [animals and birds] they may be redeemed, but not with live ones, lest one rear flocks from them.

applies only to male [animals and birds], but with regard to female ones, all agree that they may be redeemed with slaughtered animals, but not with live ones, lest one rear flocks with them.

If he knows how to slaughter [animals ritually] we may eat from [the meat of animals] which he has slaughtered. R. Huna explained: This applies only where an adult was standing by his side [when he slaughtered the animal].

If he knows how to slaughter [animals ritually] we may eat from [the meat of animals] which he has slaughtered. R. Huna explained: This applies only where an adult was standing by his side [when he slaughtered the animal].

Rava said: Is there anyone who can maintain that Rakat is not Tiberias. But when a person dies here [in Babylonia] they mourn for him there [in Tiberias] as follows: “Great was he in Sheshach and he has a name in Rakat”, and when the coffin is taken there they mourn for him thus: “You lovers of the remnants, dwellers in Rakat, go forth and receive the slaughtered of the depths.”

And [we find a] similar [rule] with regard to paying a fine. If two [witnesses] come and say that a person stole [an animal], and slaughtered or sold it on Sunday, and two [other witnesses] come and say that you [the first group] were with us on Sunday, but the person did steal the animal and slaughter or sell it on Monday,

and even if they [the second group of witnesses] say that the person stole [the animal] and slaughtered or sold it on [the previous] Friday, they [the first group of witnesses] are found liable to pay [the intended fine as zomemim] because at the time that they testified, the man [the accused] was not yet found liable to the fine.

If two [witnesses] come and say, A person stole [an animal], slaughtered or sold it, and had a [guilty] verdict on Sunday, and two [other witnesses] come and say that you [the first group] were with us on Sunday, but the person did steal the animal, slaughter or sell it, and receive a [guilty] verdict on [the previous] Friday, and even if they [the second group of witnesses] say that the person stole [the animal], slaughtered or sold it, and received a [guilty] verdict on Monday, they [the first group of witnesses] are not found liable to pay [the intended fine as zomemim] because at the time that they testified, the man [the accused] was already found liable to the fine.

If two [witnesses] come and say, A person stole [an animal], slaughtered or sold it, and had a [guilty] verdict on Sunday, and two [other witnesses] come and say that you [the first group] were with us on Sunday, but the person did steal the animal, slaughter or sell it, and receive a [guilty] verdict on [the previous] Friday, and even if they [the second group of witnesses] say that the person stole [the animal], slaughtered or sold it, and received a [guilty] verdict on Monday, they [the first group of witnesses] are not found liable to pay [the intended fine as zomemim] because at the time that they testified, the man [the accused] was already found liable to the fine.

Or one who slaughtered and brought up an animal outside [the Temple]. One who ate chometz on Pesach, one who ate or did work on Yom Kippur, One who replicated the anointing oil, one who replicated the ketoras, one who anointed himself with the anointing oil, one who ate carcasses, treif animals, insects, or reptiles.