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16891 occurrences across the corpus
The Babylonian Talmud
GEMARA: From where is this known [that lashes can not be divided]? Abaye says, The word "rasha" (wicked person) is said by the laws of lashes (Deuteronomy 25, 2) and the word "rasha" is said by the laws of the death penalty (Numbers 35, 31). Just as there is no half of a death penalty, so too there is no half of lashes.
Rava says, We need to fulfill the requirement of (Deuteronomy 19, 19) "as he plotted to do his brother" and we can not. [He plotted to make his fellow liable a full forty lashes.] If so, than money should also [not be able to be divided]. Money combines, while lashes do not combine.
The Sages said to them, But the Torah already says (Deuteronomy 19, 19), "And you should do to them [the zomemim] as they had plotted to do to their brother", which would imply that their brother [the victim] is still alive. If so then why does [the Torah] say, "a soul for a soul"? You might think that they [the zomemim] would be liable to be killed from the time that their testimony was accepted, Therefore the Torah says "a soul for a soul" to teach us that they [zomemim] aren't executed until they succeeded in having a verdict [for their victim].
MISHNA: (Deuteronomy 17,6) "By the mouth [the testimony] of two witnesses or three witnesses the [perpetrator] shall surely be put to death." If the testimony can be established with two [witnesses], why does the Torah specify three? Rather, the Torah is juxtaposing (three to two). Just as three [witnesses] can make two [witnesses] into zomemim, so too two [witnesses] can make three [witnesses] into zomemim. And from where do we know [that two witnesses can] even [make] one hundred [witnesses into zomemim]? The Torah teaches us this with the word "Witnesses".
Rebbi Shimon says, Just as two [witnesses] aren't executed unless they are both zomemim, so too three [witnesses] aren't executed unless all three of them are zomemim. And from where do we know even one hundred [witnesses all must be zomemim for any to be executed]? The Torah teaches us this with the word "Witnesses".
And if this is how the Torah punishes to one who facilitated the doing of a transgression like the ones transgressing, how much more so will the Torah grant reward to those who facilitate the doing of a mitzvah like the ones doing the mitzva.
And just as by two [witnesses] if one is found to be relative or disqualified, the whole testimony gets dismissed, so too by three [witnesses] if one is found to be relative or disqualified, the whole testimony gets dismissed. And from where do we know that even [the testimony of] one hundred [witnesses can be dismissed if one is found to be relative or disqualified]? The Torah teaches us this with the word "Witnesses".
Rav Zutra asked a question, But now let us ave him ny capital cases as well [which we are more lenient by]. So why do we learn in a Mishna, He and they are executed? It's a question.
MISHNA: One has had a verdict and then flees and comes before a different court, we do not retry his case. Any circumstance where two witnesses get up and say that they testify about a certain man that he had his verdict in this-and-this court and so-and-so and so-and-so were his witnesses, that person gets executed.
MISHNA: One has had a verdict and then flees and comes before a different court, we do not retry his case. Any circumstance where two witnesses get up and say that they testify about a certain man that he had his verdict in this-and-this court and so-and-so and so-and-so were his witnesses, that person gets executed.
MISHNA: One has had a verdict and then flees and comes before a different court, we do not retry his case. Any circumstance where two witnesses get up and say that they testify about a certain man that he had his verdict in this-and-this court and so-and-so and so-and-so were his witnesses, that person gets executed.
MISHNA: One has had a verdict and then flees and comes before a different court, we do not retry his case. Any circumstance where two witnesses get up and say that they testify about a certain man that he had his verdict in this-and-this court and so-and-so and so-and-so were his witnesses, that person gets executed.
GEMARA: Only before the same court is when his case is not retried, but brute a different court his case is retried. But the latter part of the mishna teaches, "Any circumstance where two witnesses get up and say that they testify about a certain man that he had his verdict in this-and-this court and so-and-so and so-and-so were his witnesses, that person gets executed."?
GEMARA: Only before the same court is when his case is not retried, but brute a different court his case is retried. But the latter part of the mishna teaches, "Any circumstance where two witnesses get up and say that they testify about a certain man that he had his verdict in this-and-this court and so-and-so and so-and-so were his witnesses, that person gets executed."?
GEMARA: Only before the same court is when his case is not retried, but brute a different court his case is retried. But the latter part of the mishna teaches, "Any circumstance where two witnesses get up and say that they testify about a certain man that he had his verdict in this-and-this court and so-and-so and so-and-so were his witnesses, that person gets executed."?
GEMARA: Only before the same court is when his case is not retried, but brute a different court his case is retried. But the latter part of the mishna teaches, "Any circumstance where two witnesses get up and say that they testify about a certain man that he had his verdict in this-and-this court and so-and-so and so-and-so were his witnesses, that person gets executed."?
If so then why does the Torah say (Deuteronomy 17,8) "In your gates"? In your gates [Isreal] you should set up courts in each and every district and in each and every city, but in the Diaspora you should set up [courts] in each and every district but you should not set up [courts] in each and every city.
“When a person comes upon his friend in a forest” (Deuteronomy 19:5) Just as in a forest it is permitted for the perpetrator and the victim to enter there [because it is public space], so too [the same rules apply in] any [place where it is] permitted for the perpetrator and the victim to enter there.
Gemar: It was taught: Rebi said to the Sages: Does it say, "and the iron [flies off] from ITS wood?" Does it not only say "from the wood?" And furthermore, the word "wood" is said below and the word "wood" is said above. Just as the word "wood" is said above [and refers to wood that comes] from the tree being chopped, so too the word "wood" is said below [and refers to wood that comes] from the tree being chopped.
The one who threw a stone into his courtyard and he killed [someone], if there was permission for the victim to enter there, [the thrower] is exiled. And if [the victim does] not [have permission], he is not exiled. As it was said: “When a person comes upon his friend in a forest” (Deuteronomy 19:5). Just as in a forest it is permitted for the perpetrator and the victim to enter there [because it is public space], so too [the same rules apply in] any [place where it is] permitted for the perpetrator and the victim to enter there, except the courtyard [in which] the owner has not given permission to the victim (or the perpetrator) to enter there.
Abba Shaul says: Just as cutting wood is optional [for someone and therefore he should not be punished], so too, anything that is optional [should not receive punishment] except the father who strikes his son, the teacher who rebukes his student [through beating], and the messenger of the court [who gives punishments through lashings].
Rava said: here, the verse [in the second baraita] is according to its context, and there, the verse [in the first baraita] is according to its context. There, according to the context of the verse, “he found” is the same as “he obtained it in his hand” (Leviticus 25:26). Just as he obtained it in his hand from now [meaning already in the past] so too, he also found from now [meaning already in the past]. Here, according to the context of the verse, “he found” is the same as the forest. Just as the forest something was there from the outset, so too, also [in the case of] “he found” something was there from the outset.
Rava said: here, the verse [in the second baraita] is according to its context, and there, the verse [in the first baraita] is according to its context. There, according to the context of the verse, “he found” is the same as “he obtained it in his hand” (Leviticus 25:26). Just as he obtained it in his hand from now [meaning already in the past] so too, he also found from now [meaning already in the past]. Here, according to the context of the verse, “he found” is the same as the forest. Just as the forest something was there from the outset, so too, also [in the case of] “he found” something was there from the outset.
Rabbi Yishmael says (his response because he sees the verse as referring to Shabbat): Just as plowing is optional (not a Mitzvah) so too reaping is optional (i.e. these acts are only forbidden on Shabbat if they are done voluntarily as opposed to for Mitzvah reasons). It excludes the reaping for the omer (offering) as it is a Mitzvah.
Ravina challenged Rava (all the cases to follow are where the person is in pursuit of a Mitzvah so they would not be punished with exile): This excludes the case of a father who strikes his son (and kills him inadvertently), and the teacher who rebukes his student (and inadvertently kills him) and the court agent (who inadvertently killed). So, why (is this a mitzvah to hit one's son, etc?). Let us say that since he was already learned (the son), it's not actually a Mitzvah to strike him (again) so here too, it is also not a Mitzvah. (Rava:) There, despite the fact that he's already learned, it is still a Mitzvah to hit him, as it is stated, "rebuke your son and he will bring you rest."
Ravina challenged Rava (all the cases to follow are where the person is in pursuit of a Mitzvah so they would not be punished with exile): This excludes the case of a father who strikes his son (and kills him inadvertently), and the teacher who rebukes his student (and inadvertently kills him) and the court agent (who inadvertently killed). So, why (is this a mitzvah to hit one's son, etc?). Let us say that since he was already learned (the son), it's not actually a Mitzvah to strike him (again) so here too, it is also not a Mitzvah. (Rava:) There, despite the fact that he's already learned, it is still a Mitzvah to hit him, as it is stated, "rebuke your son and he will bring you rest."
Ravina challenged Rava (all the cases to follow are where the person is in pursuit of a Mitzvah so they would not be punished with exile): This excludes the case of a father who strikes his son (and kills him inadvertently), and the teacher who rebukes his student (and inadvertently kills him) and the court agent (who inadvertently killed). So, why (is this a mitzvah to hit one's son, etc?). Let us say that since he was already learned (the son), it's not actually a Mitzvah to strike him (again) so here too, it is also not a Mitzvah. (Rava:) There, despite the fact that he's already learned, it is still a Mitzvah to hit him, as it is stated, "rebuke your son and he will bring you rest."
He returned and said: That which I said before is not a thing (I could have given a better answer). Reaping is similar to plowing. Just as with plowing, if one found already plowed material, he does not have to plow another, so too with reaping, if he found it reaped, he does not have to reap again. And if you should think (that reaping, as brought by the verse) is a Mitzvah, if he found grain, (would he) not have to still reap? (Rather), it is a Mitzvah to reap and bring (new grain).
Gemara: "The father is exiled for his son." But didn't you say (in an earlier Mishnah) that a father who strikes his son is not exiled? But he was learned (which is why he would be exiled, since it was not a hit of a Mitzvah). But you said, even when he is learned, it actually is a Mitzvah that he is doing [so he would not be exiled]. [Here, we're talking about when the father is a carpenter and his son] is a carpenter's apprentice [so he is just teaching him a trade—and he would not be exiled].
Gemara: "The father is exiled for his son." But didn't you say (in an earlier Mishnah) that a father who strikes his son is not exiled? But he was learned (which is why he would be exiled, since it was not a hit of a Mitzvah). But you said, even when he is learned, it actually is a Mitzvah that he is doing [so he would not be exiled]. [Here, we're talking about when the father is a carpenter and his son] is a carpenter's apprentice [so he is just teaching him a trade—and he would not be exiled].
Learning [to be] a carpenter's apprentice is a livelihood that he is teaching him! [Actually] he is teaching him another trade [that is not his livelihood—so striking and killing him inadvertently will result in exile).
According to Rabbi Shimon who says strangulation is more severe than decapitation [in the realm of punishment]. So, for the unwitting sin [in which, if he committed it intentionally, he would be punished with] beheading, he is given atonement [through exile]. But, an unwitting sin [which, if were done intentionally, would be punished with] strangulation, is not given atonement [through exile].
For the Rabbis who say beheading is more severe than strangulation: one who inadvertently kills his father, this is inadvertent sin [that would be punished, if done intentionally, with] beheading, so such an inadvertent sin would be given atonement [through exile—so this is the opinion of our Mishnah].
For the Rabbis who say beheading is more severe than strangulation: one who inadvertently kills his father, this is inadvertent sin [that would be punished, if done intentionally, with] beheading, so such an inadvertent sin would be given atonement [through exile—so this is the opinion of our Mishnah].
Rava says:... [This case of non-exile for a son] is when he just hits [wounds] his father inadvertently. Since, you may have thought that if he would have killed him intentionally, he would be executed, then let him also be so in a case of inadvertent striking, this comes to teach us [that no, in fact, exile is specifically in cases of inadvertent killing and not striking/wounding].
Rather, Rav Aha son of Yaakov said: It's a case where he [the Israelite] testified against him [the Samaritan that he would be liable for lashing] and he was found guilty of falsely testifying [so whatever punishment he tried to give the Samaritan, he would suffer]. Similarly regarding a slave who testified against [an Israelite that would be punished with lashes] and was found to be a false witness—can a slave even give testimony?! [Therefore, this solution must be wrong because this half of the baraita doesn't make sense]. Rather, Rav Aha son of Rav Ika said: Here is what we are dealing with [where slave and Samaritan are lashed because of Israelite]: a case where he struck him with a wound
They raised a contradiction [from a baraita]: Therefore, a resident foreigner and a idol worshiper who killed are put to death. This teaches that a resident foreigner is comparable to an idol worshiper! Just as in the case of an idol worshiper, there is no difference if he killed one of his own kind or if he killed one who was not his own kind—he is put to death; so too [in the case] of a resident foreigner, there is no difference if he killed one of his own kind or if he killed one who was not his own kind, he is put to death!
[Rava:] But according to your reasoning, [regarding the verse about Joseph speaking of adultery says] "I sinned against God,"—against God and not against people! Rather, his judgment has been handed over to people. So too here, his judgment has been handed over to people.
Gemara: Our rabbis taught [in a baraita]: Moses set aside three cities across the Jordan. And opposite them, Joshua set aside [three cities] in the land of Canaan. They were arranged such that they resembled two rows in a vineyard: Hebron in Judah opposite Betzer in the wilderness; Shkhem on the mountain of Efraim opposite Ramot in Gilead; Kedesh on the mountain of Naftali opposite Golan in Bashan. And they divided [the length] into thirds so that they should be thirds: from the south to Hebron was like Hebron to Shkhem; from Hebron to Shkhem was like Shkhem to Kedesh; from Shkhem to Kedesh was like Kedesh to the north.
Rabbi Yohanan: "The teacher that is exiled—they exile his yeshiva with him." Is this so?! But Rabbi Yohan said: "From where [do we learn] that the words of Torah are effective at providing refuge? As it is said: 'Betzer in the wilderness...' (Deuteronomy 4:43), (and afterwards it is written) 'And this Torah' (Deuteronomy 4:44)"?! [I.e., why is a teacher being exiled at all? Why don't the words of Torah protect him?].
Rav Hama var Hanina began a sermon on this section from here: "'The Eternal is good and upright. Therefore, He shows the paths to sinners' (Psalms 25:8). If He shows [the paths] to sinners, all the more so to the righteous!"
They challenged [from a baraita]: "'And for him there is no death penalty' (Deuteronomy 19:6)—about the murderer the verse speaks. You say it's about the murderer or perhaps it's actually about the blood avenger? When it says, 'And he didn't hate him recently' (Deuteronomy 19:4)—thus [you would] say that the verse is speaking about the murderer." [Just as the earlier phrase "he didn't hate him" is clearly referring to the murderer, so too when the phrase appears in verse 6 it is also referring to the murderer. Thus the rest of the verse should also be read as referring to the murderer].
It was taught [in a Mishnah]: "They handed him [the manslayer] over to two students of the Sages lest he [the blood avenger] kill him on the road, and they will speak to him." Is it not so that they are warning him that if he kills [the manslayer] he would be liable for the death penalty?
Does this mean to say that all occurrences of the word "דבר" (speak) connotate a harsh tone? Yes, as the Torah writes (Genesis 42, 30) "The matter if the land spoke (דבר) to us harshly". But we learned [otherwise] in a baraisa, (Malachi 3,16) "They spoke (דבר)" there is no use of "They spoke (דבר)" except to connote a gentle tone. And so too it is said (Psalms 47, 4) "He will subdue people under us". דבר connotes one thing. ידבר connotes another thing.
According to the opinion that it is invalid [the reason is] that the Torah says (Exodus 13, 9) "In order that the Torah of God should be in your mouth" which compares the whole Torah to Tefillin. Just as Tefillin is a law from Moshe at [Mt.] Sinai to tie them with sinews, so too the whole [Torah] has to be tied with sinews. And the other [opinion holds], in what aspect was it compared? That it must be [from an animal] permitted to the mouth. For the rest of it's laws, it wasn't compared.
Therefore the mothers of the high priests etc.: The reason [that their mother's would distribute food] is so that they [the murderers] would not pray [for the high priests deaths]. This implies that if they would prey, they would die. But the Torah says, (Proverbs 26, 2) "Like a wondering sparrow, like a flying swallow, so too a curse in vain will not come"? An old man replied, From the lectures of Rava I heared that the reason was that he should have beseeched [God] for mercy on his generation and he didn't beseech [God].
Therefore the mothers of the high priests etc.: The reason [that their mother's would distribute food] is so that they [the murderers] would not pray [for the high priests deaths]. This implies that if they would prey, they would die. But the Torah says, (Proverbs 26, 2) "Like a wondering sparrow, like a flying swallow, so too a curse in vain will not come"? An old man replied, From the lectures of Rava I heared that the reason was that he should have beseeched [God] for mercy on his generation and he didn't beseech [God].
Achitofel reasoned to himself with a fortiori. He said to himself, If in regards to making peace between a man and his wife the Torah says, "My name that was written with holiness should be erased in water", then [in order to make peace] for the entire world is it not even more so? [Achitofel] said to [Dovid], It is permissible. [Dovid] wrote [God's] name on a shard and threw it into the deeps. [The water] calmed and remained in its place.
And even so, still it is written (Samuel 2 17,23), "and Achitofel saw that his counsel was not accepted, he saddled his donkey, he got up and went to his house and to his city, he gave order to his household, and he strangled himself etc."
Rebbi Abahu says, The curse of a sage, even on an [unfulfilled] condition will be fulfilled. From where [is this derived]? From Eli. That Eli said to Shmuel (Samuel 1 3, 17) "So will God do to you and so will he add on if you withhold from me anything". And even though it is written (Samuel 1 3, 18) "And Shmuel related to him all of the matter and did not withhold from him", it is still written (Samuel 1 8, 3) " And his sons did not follow in his ways etc.".
Rebbi Abahu says, The curse of a sage, even on an [unfulfilled] condition will be fulfilled. From where [is this derived]? From Eli. That Eli said to Shmuel (Samuel 1 3, 17) "So will God do to you and so will he add on if you withhold from me anything". And even though it is written (Samuel 1 3, 18) "And Shmuel related to him all of the matter and did not withhold from him", it is still written (Samuel 1 8, 3) " And his sons did not follow in his ways etc.".
Just as the city protects, so to it's boundary protects. A killer who went outside of the boundrary [of the city of refuge] and the goel hadam found him. Rebbi Yosi haGalili says, It's a mitzvah in the hands of the goel hadam [to kill him], and permitted for everyone else. Rebbi Akiva says, It's permitted in the hands of the goel hadam [to kill him], and everyone else is liable for [killing] him.
Rebbi Abahu says, Cities of refuge were not given for burial, as the Torah says (Numbers 35, 3) "And their open lands should be for their cattle, their flocks, and all of their livelihoods" For "life" they were given and not for burial. They inquired, "Their" (Numbers 35,25) implies that their should be his living there should be his death and there should be his burial. [so how can we say that cities of refuge aren't fit for burial]? A murderer is different because the Torah exiled him.
Just like the city protects... etc.: And a contradiction, (Numbers 35, 25) "And he shall dwell there" "there" implies not in the boundary [so how can we say that the boundary also protects]? Abaye says, It is not a difficulty. Here [by our Mishna] it's referring to [receiving] protection. Here [by the verse in Numbers] it's referring to [not being permitted to] dwell.
Abaye says, It is logical according to the opinion that the Torah speaks in the vernacular, so that his end should not be more stringent then his beginning. Just like in the beginning [when he murdered] if it was intentional he is executed and if it was inadvertent he is exiled, so too his end [when he leaves the city of refuge] if it was intentional he should be executed and if it was inadvertent he should be [re-]exiled.
Abaye says, It is logical according to the opinion that the Torah speaks in the vernacular, so that his end should not be more stringent then his beginning. Just like in the beginning [when he murdered] if it was intentional he is executed and if it was inadvertent he is exiled, so too his end [when he leaves the city of refuge] if it was intentional he should be executed and if it was inadvertent he should be [re-]exiled.
But I'd this logical?! Whether [one holds like] the opinion that it is a mitzvah [for the Goel HaDam to kill the murderer] or whether [one holds like] the opinion that it is permissible, is it permitted [for a son to kill his father]? But Rabba bar Rav Huna said, and so too was taught in a baraisa of the academy of Rebbi Yishmael, For everything a son may not be made into an agent [of the court] against his father to hit him or curse him, except in the case of one who instigates [idolatry] upon which the Torah says (Deuteronomy 13,9) "do not spare him and do not conceal him".
Say that you heard [this view ascribed] to Rebbi Yehuda regarding maiser [shenei when it would result in a] stringency. If the trunk is outside and the branches inside, just as on the branches one may not redeem [the maiser shenei], so too on the trunk one may not eat redeem [the maiser shenei], If the trunk is inside and the branches outside, just as on the branches one may not eat [the maiser shenei] without redeeming it, so too on the trunk one may not eat [the maiser shenei] without redeeming it.
Say that you heard [this view ascribed] to Rebbi Yehuda regarding maiser [shenei when it would result in a] stringency. If the trunk is outside and the branches inside, just as on the branches one may not redeem [the maiser shenei], so too on the trunk one may not eat redeem [the maiser shenei], If the trunk is inside and the branches outside, just as on the branches one may not eat [the maiser shenei] without redeeming it, so too on the trunk one may not eat [the maiser shenei] without redeeming it.
But with regards to cities of refuge [going after the branches doesn't always result in a stringency], it is understandable if the trunk is outside and the branches inside, just as on the branches [the Goel Hadam] may not kill him [the murderer], so too on the trunk he may not kill him. But if the trunk is inside and the branches outside [then it won't result in a stringency to say that] just as on the branches [the Goel Hadam] may kill him, so too on the trunk he may kill him, Because he is inside [the boundary]!?
But with regards to cities of refuge [going after the branches doesn't always result in a stringency], it is understandable if the trunk is outside and the branches inside, just as on the branches [the Goel Hadam] may not kill him [the murderer], so too on the trunk he may not kill him. But if the trunk is inside and the branches outside [then it won't result in a stringency to say that] just as on the branches [the Goel Hadam] may kill him, so too on the trunk he may kill him, Because he is inside [the boundary]!?
MISHNA: Similarly, if a murderer that was exiled to a city of refuge and the people of the city wish to honor him, he must say to them "I am a murderer". If they tell him "even so" he may except [honor] from them, as the Torah says, (Deuteronomy 19, 4) "and this is the word of the murderer"
Rava said to him [Rav Kahana], "For you" most definitively implies for all of your needs. Rather Rava says, The dispute concerns the forty two [additional cities of refuge], that one opinion [Rebbi Yehuda] holds (Numbers 35, 6) "and besides then you should designate" [implies] that they should be like those [the six primary cities only] with regards to protection. And the other opinion [Rebbi Meir] holds "and besides then you should designate" [implies] that they should be like those [the six primary cities]. Just as those [the six] are for all of your needs, so too these [the forty two] are for all of your needs. But with regards to the six [primary cities], everyone agrees that [the murderers] would not pay rent.
If so then not performing a positive commandment should also [be liable to malkus, something which we know isn't true]? "If you do not guard yourself (תשמור)" was written, and [Rav Yitzchak holds] like what Rebbi Avin said in the name of Rebbi Illui, that Rebbi Avin said in the name of Rebbi Illui any place where the Torah uses the words, "השמר", "פן", or "אל", it's referring to a negative commandment.
If so then a prohibition not involving an action should also [be liable to malkus, something which we know isn't true]? (Deuteronomy 28, 58), "to perform" is written.
and according to Rebbi Akiva if so [that kdei reshaso prevents malkus by court execution] then liabilites of kares should also [not be subject to malkus]? What is his answer of if he repents, now, however,he hasn't [repented]?
Rebbi Abahu answers, the Torah explicitly compared liabilities of kares to malkus that we learn out [through a gezaria shava] (Leviticus 20,17) "לעיני" from (Deuteronomy 25,3) "לעיניך". Rebbi Abba bar Mamal inquired, If so [that we can learn out to kares from a gezaria shava], then liabilities of court execution should also be [subject to malkus, as we should] learn out [through a gezaria shava] (Numbers 15,24) "מעיני" from (Deuteronomy 25,3) "לעיניך"?
And according Rebbi Akiva, if so then by liabilites of kares also, [we also should] say that a a prohibition that has a scriptural warning for kares [cannot also be liable to malkus]. Rav Mordechai said to Rav Ashi that this is what Avimi from Hagronia had said in the name of Rava, liabilities of kares do not need a scriptual warning [to obligate one with kares, thus freeing the warning to teach malkus], for the Pesach offering and circumcision are punished [with kares for not performing them] even though they have no scriptural warning.
There [by Pesach and circumcision] that isn't the reason [why one doesn't bring a sacrifice], rather it's because the whole Torah is compared to [the prohibition of] idolatry. Just as idolatry is a "sit and don't do" [a passive prohibition] so to all [times that one is obligated to bring a conciliatory sacrifice] is by a "sit and don't do", which excludes these [Peasch and circumcision] which are each a "get up and do" [an active commandment]
And let the Rabbis also derive it from here. Yes this is so[, everyone actually does derive the principle of separation from here]. So rather then why do the Rabbis need the verse of kares b'achoso for [if they aren't learning the principle of separation]? To make one liable [to three korban chatoses if he inadvertently cohabited in the same of lapse of unawareness] with his sister, his father's sister, and his mother's sister.
And let the Rabbis also derive it from here. Yes this is so[, everyone actually does derive the principle of separation from here]. So rather then why do the Rabbis need the verse of kares b'achoso for [if they aren't learning the principle of separation]? To make one liable [to three korban chatoses if he inadvertently cohabited in the same of lapse of unawareness] with his sister, his father's sister, and his mother's sister.
They responded, This [case] we have not heard, but we have not heard, but we have heard that one who cohabits with five woman who are niddahs in one lapse of unawareness is liable [a separate offering] for each and every one, and it would appear that these [two] cases form a kal v'chomer, and just if [by the case of five] niddah[s] which is one prohibition, one is liable for each and every one, then here [by re'shia bar re'shia] where there are three separate prohibitions is it not more so?
[that we derive it from the gezaira shava of] טומאתו טומאתו. It says here [by entering the temple impure] (Leviticus 7,20) "and his impureness (טומאתו) is upon him and he will be cut off" and it says there [by touching sacfical meats while impure] (Numbers 19,13) "Impure he shall be; his impureness (טומאתו) is still upon him". Just as there [by entering the temple impure] there is both punishment and scriptural warning, so too here [by touching sacfical meats while impure] there is both punishment and scriptual warning.
A baraisa was taught in accordance with [the view of] Reish Lakash, "B'chol kodesh lo sigah" is a scriptural warning for eating [sacrificial foods while one is impure]. You say that it is a warning for eating? Or maybe it's only a warning for touching? The Torah therefore says, "In all sanctity he shall not touch and into the Temple etc." The Torah juxtaposes sacrificial foods with the Temple. Just as the Temple is a thing that involve the loss of life [one who enters while impure is subject to kares], so too the whole [verse] most involve the loss of life. And does touching [sacrificial foods, which is punishable with malkus] involve any loss of life? Rather you must say that the "b'chol kodesh lo sigah" refers to eating [sacrificial foods].
So rather, what is the reason that [Rebbi Yochanon] retracted [his veiw]? Because he found [his veiw point] problematic with the case of a rapist [Ohneis] For it was taught in a barasiah An Ohneis who divorced his wife [in violation of the Torah's commandment], If he is a Yisroel [i.e. a non-Kohen] he takes her back and does not receive malkus. If he is a Kohen, he receives malkus and doesn't take her back.
Ullah said [a possible resolution] [The Torah] need not have said "she should be to him for a wife" by Oneis, and it could have been derived from Motzei Shem Rah. And if by the case of Motzei Shem Rah where no action was performed, the Torah says (Deuteronomy 22,19) "She should be to him for a wife", then by Oneis [which does involve an action] is it not even more so?
So rather "she shall be to him for a wife" should not have been stated by Motzei Shem Rah, and it could have been derived from Oneis. If by Oneis which doesn't have [the double punishment] of malkus and monetary payment, the Torah says, "she shall be to him for a wife", then is not Motzei Shem Rah even more so? Why then is it repeated [by Motzei Shem Rah, if it can just be derived from Oneis]? If it is not needed to teach us anything by Motzei Shem Rah, then apply this commandment by Oneis. If it is not needed before [he divorces her], apply it afterwards.
So rather "she shall be to him for a wife" should not have been stated by Motzei Shem Rah, and it could have been derived from Oneis. If by Oneis which doesn't have [the double punishment] of malkus and monetary payment, the Torah says, "she shall be to him for a wife", then is not Motzei Shem Rah even more so? Why then is it repeated [by Motzei Shem Rah, if it can just be derived from Oneis]? If it is not needed to teach us anything by Motzei Shem Rah, then apply this commandment by Oneis. If it is not needed before [he divorces her], apply it afterwards.
So rather "she shall be to him for a wife" should not have been stated with regards to Motzei Shem Rah, because she is already his wife. Why then was it said? If it is not needed to teach us anything by Motzei Shem Rah, then apply this commandment by Oneis. If it is not needed before [he divorces her], apply it afterwards.
Yes this is indeed so, but Oneis comes and is derived from this. With what is it derived? Whether by a Kal V'chomer or by a Mah Matzhino, I can ask as I have previously asked, what comparison can be made to Motzei Shem Rah which [is less] as it involves no action?
Rav Pappa said to Rava But [a lo saseh sh'kedmu asseh] is not similar to the prohibition of muzzling, [so how can Rebbi Yochanon rule that one receives malkus]? Rava answered him, Just because the Torah writes by it an additional commandment, does that make it any less stringent?!
If so [that an extra commandment shouldn't detract from it, then the same argument can be made by] a lav sh'nituk l'asseh also, say that just because the Torah writes by it an extra commandment, does that make it any less stringent?! Rava explained [the difference] to him, That one [by a lav sh'nituk l'asseh the commandment] is coming to remove the prohibition.
That we learned in a baraisa, The mitzvah of pea'uh is to separate from the standing grain. If one did not separate from the standing grain, he should separate from the bundles. If he did not separate from the bundles, he should separate from the pile until he smooths it. Once he smoothes it, [making it subject to maiser] he should separate maiser and then give it [to the poor. Thus it is subject to nullification if he makes it into dough. So why is this not also a good example of a case where it's possible to nullify the remedial commandment?].
The Torah teaches us, (Deuteronomy 12, 17) "Do not proceed to eat within your gates etc." and then later on the Torah writes, (Deuteronomy 26, 12) "And they may eat it in their gates and be satisfied", just as over there the verse is refering to maiser ani, so to here the verse is refering to maiser ani, and the Torah here says about it "You shall not eat".
is it not that in this facet they are arguing, that one holds [produce is still] considered tevel [i.e. untithed, until maser ani is removed as well]. And the other one holds [maser ani] does not render the produce tevel. Abaye said to him. If so [that they argue about whether maser ani can render the produce tevel], then rather than arguing in a case of questionable produce [demai] they should argue in a case where it was known [that maser ani] was not separated.
How much must one eat from tevel to be liable? etc.: Rav Bibi said in the name of Rebbi Shimon ben Lakash, The dispute only concerns wheat kernels, but with regard to flour everyone agrees that the minimum is a k'zias [an olive's volume]. But Rebbi Yirmiya said in the name of Rebbi Shimon ben Lakash, just as there is a dispute by this [wheat], so is there a dispute by this [flour].
So then why should a mother give birth like Rebbi Shimon [if all of his points can be refuted]. That according to his explanation, he inverts the verse,and expounds on it.
But let him also incur malkas according to the opinion of Rebbi Eliezer, that it was taught in a baraisa, Rebbi Eliezer says anything that is subject to being "entirely burnt" has an additional prohibition on its consumption. Yes this is so, but Rava was only talking about prohibitions derived from that one verse.
What is this opinion of Rebbi Yehuda? That it was taught it a baraisa, Rebbi Yehudah says, (Deuteronomy 26,10) "And he shall place" it this is a reference to the waving. You say that it is referring to the waving or maybe it is really referring to the actual placement? But when the Torah also says, (Deuteronomy 26,4) "And he shall place", the [requirement of] placement has already been stated. So how will I maintain (Deuteronomy 26,10) "And he shall place"? It [must be referring to] waving.
He makes [a gezariah shave] of "yad" "yad" (יד יד) from Shelamim, It is written here "And the kohen will take the basket from his hand (יד)", and it is written (Leviticus 7, 30) "His hands (יד) shall bring the fire-offerings of Hashem". Just as here it is referring to the Kohen, so too there it is referring to the Kohen, and just as there it is referring to the owner, so too here it is referring to the owner. How is this accomplished? The Kohen places his hands under where the owner places his hands and waves.
He makes [a gezariah shave] of "yad" "yad" (יד יד) from Shelamim, It is written here "And the kohen will take the basket from his hand (יד)", and it is written (Leviticus 7, 30) "His hands (יד) shall bring the fire-offerings of Hashem". Just as here it is referring to the Kohen, so too there it is referring to the Kohen, and just as there it is referring to the owner, so too here it is referring to the owner. How is this accomplished? The Kohen places his hands under where the owner places his hands and waves.
Who is this statement in accordance with? It is in accordance with the following Tanna, That it was taught in a baraisa, Rebbi Yosi said over three things from three elders. Rebbi Yishmael said, A person may ascend with his maaser sheni to Jerusalem and eat it nowadays. And this can be logically derived, A Bechor needs to be brought to "the place" and maaser sheni needs to be brought to "the place". Just as bechor is only possible in the time of the Temple, so is Maaser only possible in the time of the Temple.
Therefore the Torah teaches us with (Deuteronomy 16,7) "And you shall eat them before Hashem your God", juxtaposing maaser to bechor. Just as bechor is only possible in the time of the Temple, so too is Maaser only possible in the time of the Temple. And if this is was true [that the recital was essential for Bikorim] then we should have asked What comparison can be made to Bikorim which need both recital and placement?
Ravina says Actually he holds that the original sanctity of the Temple was for its time but not also all future time, but here we are dealing with a Bechor that the blood was sprinkled before the destruction of the Temple, and then the Temple was destroyed with the meat still extant. And we make a hekesh [juxtapose] from the meat to the blood. Just as the blood needs the alter, so does the meat need the alter. And we also make a hekesh from Maaser to Bechor.
If so then the Torah would have said "you may not proceed to eat it", why then does it say "שאת", carry it? [Rather, it must also mean to bring it.] So then let's say that it is exclusively coming to teach us this. If so then the Torah would have said "you may not proceed to bring it", why then does it say "שאת", carry it? Infer from this both rulings.
If so then the Torah would have said "you may not proceed to eat it", why then does it say "שאת", carry it? [Rather, it must also mean to bring it.] So then let's say that it is exclusively coming to teach us this. If so then the Torah would have said "you may not proceed to bring it", why then does it say "שאת", carry it? Infer from this both rulings.
If so then the Torah would have said "you may not proceed to eat it", why then does it say "שאת", carry it? [Rather, it must also mean to bring it.] So then let's say that it is exclusively coming to teach us this. If so then the Torah would have said "you may not proceed to bring it", why then does it say "שאת", carry it? Infer from this both rulings.
If so then what would be the need to say it? [It should have been obvious.] Here we are dealing with a case where he brought it into [Jerusalem] in an untithed state, and he is of the opinion that gifts that weren't yet given are considered as if they were given.
It says here "a bald spot" and it says there "a bald spot", just as there, one is liable for each and every bald spot and one is liable to the entire head as he is to between the eyes, so too here one is liable for each and every bald spot and one is liable to the entire head as he is to between the eyes. And just as there one is only liable [for making a bald spot] on a death, so too here [it must be] on a death.
It says here "a bald spot" and it says there "a bald spot", just as there, one is liable for each and every bald spot and one is liable to the entire head as he is to between the eyes, so too here one is liable for each and every bald spot and one is liable to the entire head as he is to between the eyes. And just as there one is only liable [for making a bald spot] on a death, so too here [it must be] on a death.