case
3217 occurrences across the corpus
The Babylonian Talmud
Both statements are required. For if it had been stated only about the latter, [I might have thought that] in this case R. Yitzchak required [three scrolls], but in the other case he followed the view of Rav who said that the portion of Shekalim is “My sacrifice, my food,” and therefore two would be enough. Therefore we are told that this is not so.
There is no conflict [between these two statements]; the one refers to a case where Rosh Hodesh Nisan falls on Shabbat, and the other where it falls in the middle of the week.
I. (1) All are bound in the case of a holocaust except a deaf man, a fool, and a child, and one of doubtful sex, and one of double sex, and women, and slaves who are not manumitted, the lame man, and the blind man, and the sick man, and the old man, and him who is not able to go up on his feet. What is the definition of a child? Every one who is not able to ride upon his father's shoulders, and to go up from Jerusalem to the mountain of the House. These are the words of the house of Shammai. But the house of Hillel say, Every one who is not able to take hold of his father's hand, and to go up from Jerusalem to the mountain of the House, as it is said, "three footgoing times" (Ex. xxiii. 14).
he is bound as regards the rejoicing; but as for him who does not hear and does not speak and as for a fool and a child, they are exempt also from the rejoicing, inasmuch as these are exempt from all the commandments which are contained in the Law. What is the difference in the nature of holocaust, that they are exempt, and in the nature of rejoicing, that they are bound? As regards the nature of holocaust we are taught by the recurrence of the word from the passage intitled "Assemble," as it is written, "Assemble the people, the men and the women and the little ones" (Deut. xxxi. 12), and it is written, "when all Israel is come to appear" (Deut. xxxi. 11). And that point, whence do we get it? Because it is written, "that they may hear and that they may learn" (Deut. xxxi. 12). And there is a Baraitha as follows, "That they may hear," this expression excludes him who speaks and does not hear; "and that they may learn," this expression excludes him who hears and does not speak. Is this to say, that he who cannot talk cannot learn? No; for this suggests the case of the two dumb men who were in the neighbourhood of Rabbi, viz., the sons of R. Jochanan ben Gudgodah's daughter; and the sons of R. Jochanan's sister say concerning it, that every time that Rabbi went up to the College, they went up and sat before him, and shook their heads, and moved their lips, and Rabbi asked for mercy for them, and they were examined, and it was ascertained that they were perfect in knowledge of Halachah and Siphra and Siphre and all the Talmud. Mar Zot'ra said, The reading there is, "in order that they may teach." R. Ashi said, Assuredly it is, "in order that they may teach"; for, if you imagine that it is, "in order that they may learn," then, since he who does not talk does not learn, and since he who does not hear does not learn, this sense of learn comes out of the words, "in order that they may hear," but assuredly it is here, "in order that they may teach."
Our Rabbis have taught, Who is it who is a fool? He who goes out alone at night, and he who passes the night in a cemetery, and he who tears his clothes. It has been reported that R. Hunna said, So long as they all take place at one time. R. Jochanan said, Even in the case of one of them taking place. Explain this. If he have done them in the way of folly, even though he confined himself to one, yet he is guilty; but if he have not done them in the way of folly, even though he have done them all, yet he is not guilty. Granting fully that he has done them in the way of folly, then as for him who passes the night in a cemetery, it may be said, He does it that there may rest upon him a spirit of uncleanness; and as for him who goes out alone at night it may be said that the Gandrippus has seized him; and as for him who tears his clothes it may be said that he is lost in thought. But in case men have done them all,
Our Rabbis have taught, Who is it who is a fool? He who goes out alone at night, and he who passes the night in a cemetery, and he who tears his clothes. It has been reported that R. Hunna said, So long as they all take place at one time. R. Jochanan said, Even in the case of one of them taking place. Explain this. If he have done them in the way of folly, even though he confined himself to one, yet he is guilty; but if he have not done them in the way of folly, even though he have done them all, yet he is not guilty. Granting fully that he has done them in the way of folly, then as for him who passes the night in a cemetery, it may be said, He does it that there may rest upon him a spirit of uncleanness; and as for him who goes out alone at night it may be said that the Gandrippus has seized him; and as for him who tears his clothes it may be said that he is lost in thought. But in case men have done them all,
they are like the ox that has gored an ox, an ass, and a camel, and has been made a precedent of warning for all men. R. Papa said, If R. Hunna had heard that this is the Baraitha, viz., Who is a fool? it is he who destroys all that is given to him, he would have recalled his words. It is a question as regards his recalling of his words, whether he would have recalled his words only in the case of the man who tears his clothes, in consideration of the Baraitha which is like it, or whether he would have recalled them in the case of all three. The matter was left undecided.
they are like the ox that has gored an ox, an ass, and a camel, and has been made a precedent of warning for all men. R. Papa said, If R. Hunna had heard that this is the Baraitha, viz., Who is a fool? it is he who destroys all that is given to him, he would have recalled his words. It is a question as regards his recalling of his words, whether he would have recalled his words only in the case of the man who tears his clothes, in consideration of the Baraitha which is like it, or whether he would have recalled them in the case of all three. The matter was left undecided.
And one of doubtful sex and one of double sex etc. Our Rabbis have taught, The use of the word, "male," is to exclude the women; "thy males" to exclude the one of doubtful and the one of double sex; "all thy males" to include the children (Ex. xxiii. 17, Deut. xvi. 16). The Mishnah teacher said, Male is to exclude the women. But why do I need a verse as above, to teach me this? Inasmuch as it is a case of a positive precept in which the time determines. And from all positive precepts in which the time determines, women are exempt. Nay, but it is needed. You might have thought, We learn of a twofold appearing before the Lord from the section, "Assemble." As in the one case women are bound, so in the other case women are bound. We learn it from this.
And one of doubtful sex and one of double sex etc. Our Rabbis have taught, The use of the word, "male," is to exclude the women; "thy males" to exclude the one of doubtful and the one of double sex; "all thy males" to include the children (Ex. xxiii. 17, Deut. xvi. 16). The Mishnah teacher said, Male is to exclude the women. But why do I need a verse as above, to teach me this? Inasmuch as it is a case of a positive precept in which the time determines. And from all positive precepts in which the time determines, women are exempt. Nay, but it is needed. You might have thought, We learn of a twofold appearing before the Lord from the section, "Assemble." As in the one case women are bound, so in the other case women are bound. We learn it from this.
And one of doubtful sex and one of double sex etc. Our Rabbis have taught, The use of the word, "male," is to exclude the women; "thy males" to exclude the one of doubtful and the one of double sex; "all thy males" to include the children (Ex. xxiii. 17, Deut. xvi. 16). The Mishnah teacher said, Male is to exclude the women. But why do I need a verse as above, to teach me this? Inasmuch as it is a case of a positive precept in which the time determines. And from all positive precepts in which the time determines, women are exempt. Nay, but it is needed. You might have thought, We learn of a twofold appearing before the Lord from the section, "Assemble." As in the one case women are bound, so in the other case women are bound. We learn it from this.
The Mishnah teacher said, The expression "thy males" is to exclude the one of doubtful and the one of double sex. It is all right as regards the latter. This was necessary. You might have imagined that, since he has a shred of virility, he is bound. We learn from this that his case is one sui generis. But as for the former, this was a dubious case. How was a verse necessary to remove the doubt? Abai said, Si eius ovaria externa sunt.
The Mishnah teacher said, The expression "thy males" is to exclude the one of doubtful and the one of double sex. It is all right as regards the latter. This was necessary. You might have imagined that, since he has a shred of virility, he is bound. We learn from this that his case is one sui generis. But as for the former, this was a dubious case. How was a verse necessary to remove the doubt? Abai said, Si eius ovaria externa sunt.
The Mishnah teacher said, The expression "all thy males" is to include the children. But there is a canonical Mishnah, Except a deaf man, a fool and a child (Chag. 2a, i. 1). Abai said, There is no difficulty. The one case has to do with a child who has reached the age for initiation in the law, the other with a child who has not reached the age for initiation. A child who has reached the age for initiation—this is Rabbinical only. Even so, and the expression is a mere supporting peg. But why does the expression come? To correspond with what the others said. For we have a Baraitha, Others say, the cordwainer and the smelter in bronze and the tanner are exempt from the holocaust, because it is said "all thy males" (Ex. xxiii. 17, Deut. xvi. 16), i.e., he who is able to go up with all thy males. They are exempt, who are not fit to go up with all thy males.
Women and slaves who are not manumitted etc. This is all right as regards women, as we have said, but slaves—how do we get them here? R. Hunna says, The scripture says "before the LORD God" (Ex. xxiii. 17, Deut. xvi. 16). This expression can only apply to him who has but one Lord. He is excluded who has another lord. But why do I need a verse for it? Surely by every precept by which a woman is bound a slave is bound, and by every precept by which a woman is not bound a slave is not bound. The teacher learns it from the case of a woman through the double occurrence of the words "unto her." Rabena said, It is only needed for one who is half a slave and half free. This is precisely too what the teaching of the Mishnah is, women and slaves who are not manumitted. What is the meaning of the addition, who are not manumitted? If I should say that it means, who are not manumitted at all, then the words ought to be simply, slaves, but do you not think that it means, those who are not completely manumitted? and who are such? He who is half a slave and half free. Learn from this the meaning.
R. Jochanan, when he came upon this passage, wept, "Behold, he putteth no trust in his holy ones" (Job xv. 15). If He putteth not trust in His holy ones, in whom will He put trust? One day he was walking in the way. He saw a certain man, who was gathering figs. He was leaving what were ripe, and gathering what were not ripe. He said to him, Dost thou not think that those are much better? He said to him, As regards their use, they are for a journey. The one will keep and the other will not keep. He said, This is what is written, "Behold, he putteth no trust in his holy ones." Is it so? and yet there is the case of that disciple, who was in the neighbourhood of R. Alcasnadri, and died while yet young, and he said, If this one of our Rabbis had wished, he would have been alive now; or perhaps he was one of those who are referred to in the passage "he putteth no trust in his holy ones"; but no, for he was one who kicked against his teachers.
R. Jochanan, when he came upon this passage, wept, "And it shall come to pass, when many evils and troubles are come upon them" (Deut. xxxi. 21). A slave, whose master brings upon him evils and troubles—is there any help for him? What is the meaning of "evils and troubles"? Rab said, Evils which become troubles counterbalancing one another, as in the case of the wasp and the scorpion. But Samuel said, This refers to him who bestows money upon the poor man in the hour of his extreme distress. Rabba said, This agrees with the proverb, Money for corn standing in the field is not found, for corn hanging up it is found.
R. Ela was mounting a ladder in the house of Rabbah bar Shela; he heard a child who was reading, "For, lo, he that formeth the mountains and createth the wind, and declareth unto man what is his thought" (Amos iv. 13). Ela said, A slave, whose master declareth to him what is his thought, is there any help for him? What is the meaning of the expression, What is his thought? Rab said, Even the superfluous talk between a husband and his wife is told a man in the day of his death. Is it so? and yet Rab Kohăna hid himself under the nuptial couch of Rab and heard him talk and laugh and do as he had a mind. He said, The mouth of Rab is like that of one who has not tasted broth. He said to him, Kohăna, get out, these are not good manners. There is no difficulty. In the one case it was needful to procure her favour, in the other it was not needful to procure her favour.
R. Jochanan went into the College and expounded thus, "Yet they seek me daily, and delight to know my ways" (Is. lviii. 2). And while they seek Him by day, do they not seek Him by night also? Yes, but it is to inform thee that every one who studieth in the Law even one day in the year, the Scripture reckoneth it to him, as if he studied all the year; and so in the case of punishments, as it is written, "After the number of the days that ye spied out the land" (Numb. xiv. 34). And was it that they sinned forty years? Was it not forty days that they sinned? but it was to inform thee, that every one who committeth a transgression even one day in the year, the Scripture reckoneth it to him, as if he had transgressed all the year.
R. Simeon asked, What of a child that is lame, according to the words of the house of Shammai, or one that is blind, according to the words of both of them? Explain this. If we are to speak of the case of a lame person, who cannot stretch out his limb, or a blind person, who cannot open his eye, see now, an adult is free, why should we ask about a child? It is not necessary to discuss such a case. But in the case of a lame person, who can stretch out his limb, or a blind person who can open his eye, what of this case? Abai said, Wherever the adult is bound according to the Law, we educate the child in it also according to our Rabbis, and wherever the adult is free according to the Law, the child also is free according to the Rabbis.
R. Simeon asked, What of a child that is lame, according to the words of the house of Shammai, or one that is blind, according to the words of both of them? Explain this. If we are to speak of the case of a lame person, who cannot stretch out his limb, or a blind person, who cannot open his eye, see now, an adult is free, why should we ask about a child? It is not necessary to discuss such a case. But in the case of a lame person, who can stretch out his limb, or a blind person who can open his eye, what of this case? Abai said, Wherever the adult is bound according to the Law, we educate the child in it also according to our Rabbis, and wherever the adult is free according to the Law, the child also is free according to the Rabbis.
R. Simeon asked, What of a child that is lame, according to the words of the house of Shammai, or one that is blind, according to the words of both of them? Explain this. If we are to speak of the case of a lame person, who cannot stretch out his limb, or a blind person, who cannot open his eye, see now, an adult is free, why should we ask about a child? It is not necessary to discuss such a case. But in the case of a lame person, who can stretch out his limb, or a blind person who can open his eye, what of this case? Abai said, Wherever the adult is bound according to the Law, we educate the child in it also according to our Rabbis, and wherever the adult is free according to the Law, the child also is free according to the Rabbis.
R. Simeon asked, What of a child that is lame, according to the words of the house of Shammai, or one that is blind, according to the words of both of them? Explain this. If we are to speak of the case of a lame person, who cannot stretch out his limb, or a blind person, who cannot open his eye, see now, an adult is free, why should we ask about a child? It is not necessary to discuss such a case. But in the case of a lame person, who can stretch out his limb, or a blind person who can open his eye, what of this case? Abai said, Wherever the adult is bound according to the Law, we educate the child in it also according to our Rabbis, and wherever the adult is free according to the Law, the child also is free according to the Rabbis.
The house of Shammai say, The holocaust involves two pieces of silver etc. Our Rabbis have taught thus, The house of Shammai say, The holocaust involves two pieces of silver, and the Chagigah a meah of silver; for the holocaust is all a burnt-offering to the Most High, which is not the case with the Chagigah; and besides we find that at the Feast of Weeks the Scripture enjoins more burnt-offerings than peace-offerings. But the house of Hillel say, The holocaust involves a meah of silver and the Chagigah two pieces of silver, for the Chagigah is older than the Decalogue, which is not the case with the holocaust; and besides we find in the case of "the princes" (Numb. vii. 15, 17, etc.) that the Scripture enjoins more peace-offerings than burnt-offerings. What then is the reason that the house of Hillel do not agree with the house of Shammai? Inasmuch as thou sayest that a holocaust is better, for it is all a burnt-offering to the Most High, on the contrary a Chagigah is better, for there are in it two feastings; and in that thou sayest, Let us learn from the Feast of Weeks, I reply that we are to judge an individual gift by comparison with an individual gift, and we are not to judge an individual gift by comparison with the gift of a congregation. What then is the reason that the house of Shammai do not agree with the house of Hillel? In that thou sayest that a Chagigah is superior, because it is older than the Decalogue, a holocaust also is older than the Decalogue; and in that thou sayest, Let us learn from "the princes," we are to judge a thing that lasts for ever by comparison with a thing that lasts for ever, and we are not to judge a thing which lasts for ever by comparison with a thing which does not last for ever. And how does the house of Hillel come to teach that the Chagigah is older than the Decalogue, but the holocaust not? Because it is written, "and they sacrificed sacrifices of peace-offerings" (Exod. xxiv. 5). There must have been a holocaust also. Lo, it is written, "and they offered burnt-offerings." The house of Hillel consider that the burnt-offering which Israel offered in the wilderness was the "continual burnt-offering" (Exod. xxix. 42), but the house of Shammai consider that the burnt-offering which Israel offered in the wilderness was a holocaust. Abai said, The house of Shammai and R. El'azar and R. Ishmael all consider that the burnt-offering which Israel offered in the wilderness was a holocaust. And the house of Hillel and R. Akiba and R. Jose the Galilaean all consider that the offering which Israel offered in the wilderness was the "continual burnt-offering." The house of Shammai hold this view according to what we have said. R. Ishmael agrees, for there is a Baraitha, viz., R. Ishmael says, The general directions only were given to Moses on Sinai,
The house of Shammai say, The holocaust involves two pieces of silver etc. Our Rabbis have taught thus, The house of Shammai say, The holocaust involves two pieces of silver, and the Chagigah a meah of silver; for the holocaust is all a burnt-offering to the Most High, which is not the case with the Chagigah; and besides we find that at the Feast of Weeks the Scripture enjoins more burnt-offerings than peace-offerings. But the house of Hillel say, The holocaust involves a meah of silver and the Chagigah two pieces of silver, for the Chagigah is older than the Decalogue, which is not the case with the holocaust; and besides we find in the case of "the princes" (Numb. vii. 15, 17, etc.) that the Scripture enjoins more peace-offerings than burnt-offerings. What then is the reason that the house of Hillel do not agree with the house of Shammai? Inasmuch as thou sayest that a holocaust is better, for it is all a burnt-offering to the Most High, on the contrary a Chagigah is better, for there are in it two feastings; and in that thou sayest, Let us learn from the Feast of Weeks, I reply that we are to judge an individual gift by comparison with an individual gift, and we are not to judge an individual gift by comparison with the gift of a congregation. What then is the reason that the house of Shammai do not agree with the house of Hillel? In that thou sayest that a Chagigah is superior, because it is older than the Decalogue, a holocaust also is older than the Decalogue; and in that thou sayest, Let us learn from "the princes," we are to judge a thing that lasts for ever by comparison with a thing that lasts for ever, and we are not to judge a thing which lasts for ever by comparison with a thing which does not last for ever. And how does the house of Hillel come to teach that the Chagigah is older than the Decalogue, but the holocaust not? Because it is written, "and they sacrificed sacrifices of peace-offerings" (Exod. xxiv. 5). There must have been a holocaust also. Lo, it is written, "and they offered burnt-offerings." The house of Hillel consider that the burnt-offering which Israel offered in the wilderness was the "continual burnt-offering" (Exod. xxix. 42), but the house of Shammai consider that the burnt-offering which Israel offered in the wilderness was a holocaust. Abai said, The house of Shammai and R. El'azar and R. Ishmael all consider that the burnt-offering which Israel offered in the wilderness was a holocaust. And the house of Hillel and R. Akiba and R. Jose the Galilaean all consider that the offering which Israel offered in the wilderness was the "continual burnt-offering." The house of Shammai hold this view according to what we have said. R. Ishmael agrees, for there is a Baraitha, viz., R. Ishmael says, The general directions only were given to Moses on Sinai,
The house of Shammai say, The holocaust involves two pieces of silver etc. Our Rabbis have taught thus, The house of Shammai say, The holocaust involves two pieces of silver, and the Chagigah a meah of silver; for the holocaust is all a burnt-offering to the Most High, which is not the case with the Chagigah; and besides we find that at the Feast of Weeks the Scripture enjoins more burnt-offerings than peace-offerings. But the house of Hillel say, The holocaust involves a meah of silver and the Chagigah two pieces of silver, for the Chagigah is older than the Decalogue, which is not the case with the holocaust; and besides we find in the case of "the princes" (Numb. vii. 15, 17, etc.) that the Scripture enjoins more peace-offerings than burnt-offerings. What then is the reason that the house of Hillel do not agree with the house of Shammai? Inasmuch as thou sayest that a holocaust is better, for it is all a burnt-offering to the Most High, on the contrary a Chagigah is better, for there are in it two feastings; and in that thou sayest, Let us learn from the Feast of Weeks, I reply that we are to judge an individual gift by comparison with an individual gift, and we are not to judge an individual gift by comparison with the gift of a congregation. What then is the reason that the house of Shammai do not agree with the house of Hillel? In that thou sayest that a Chagigah is superior, because it is older than the Decalogue, a holocaust also is older than the Decalogue; and in that thou sayest, Let us learn from "the princes," we are to judge a thing that lasts for ever by comparison with a thing that lasts for ever, and we are not to judge a thing which lasts for ever by comparison with a thing which does not last for ever. And how does the house of Hillel come to teach that the Chagigah is older than the Decalogue, but the holocaust not? Because it is written, "and they sacrificed sacrifices of peace-offerings" (Exod. xxiv. 5). There must have been a holocaust also. Lo, it is written, "and they offered burnt-offerings." The house of Hillel consider that the burnt-offering which Israel offered in the wilderness was the "continual burnt-offering" (Exod. xxix. 42), but the house of Shammai consider that the burnt-offering which Israel offered in the wilderness was a holocaust. Abai said, The house of Shammai and R. El'azar and R. Ishmael all consider that the burnt-offering which Israel offered in the wilderness was a holocaust. And the house of Hillel and R. Akiba and R. Jose the Galilaean all consider that the offering which Israel offered in the wilderness was the "continual burnt-offering." The house of Shammai hold this view according to what we have said. R. Ishmael agrees, for there is a Baraitha, viz., R. Ishmael says, The general directions only were given to Moses on Sinai,
The house of Hillel hold the view which we have mentioned. R. Akiba also holds the view which we have mentioned. R. Jose the Galilaean agrees with them, for there is a Baraitha, viz., R. Jose the Galilaean says, Three commands have been put upon Israel when they go up to a feast, viz., the holocaust, and the Chagigah, and the rejoicing. There is in the holocaust what there is not in the other two, and there is in the Chagigah what there is not in the other two, and there is in the rejoicing what there is not in the other two. There is in the holocaust what there is not in the other two, for the holocaust is a whole burnt-offering to the Most High, which is not the case in the other two. There is in the Chagigah what there is not in the other two, for the Chagigah is older than the Decalogue, which is not the case in the other two. There is in the rejoicing what there is not in the other two, for the rejoicing has to do with women as well as men, which is not the case in the other two.
The house of Hillel hold the view which we have mentioned. R. Akiba also holds the view which we have mentioned. R. Jose the Galilaean agrees with them, for there is a Baraitha, viz., R. Jose the Galilaean says, Three commands have been put upon Israel when they go up to a feast, viz., the holocaust, and the Chagigah, and the rejoicing. There is in the holocaust what there is not in the other two, and there is in the Chagigah what there is not in the other two, and there is in the rejoicing what there is not in the other two. There is in the holocaust what there is not in the other two, for the holocaust is a whole burnt-offering to the Most High, which is not the case in the other two. There is in the Chagigah what there is not in the other two, for the Chagigah is older than the Decalogue, which is not the case in the other two. There is in the rejoicing what there is not in the other two, for the rejoicing has to do with women as well as men, which is not the case in the other two.
The house of Hillel hold the view which we have mentioned. R. Akiba also holds the view which we have mentioned. R. Jose the Galilaean agrees with them, for there is a Baraitha, viz., R. Jose the Galilaean says, Three commands have been put upon Israel when they go up to a feast, viz., the holocaust, and the Chagigah, and the rejoicing. There is in the holocaust what there is not in the other two, and there is in the Chagigah what there is not in the other two, and there is in the rejoicing what there is not in the other two. There is in the holocaust what there is not in the other two, for the holocaust is a whole burnt-offering to the Most High, which is not the case in the other two. There is in the Chagigah what there is not in the other two, for the Chagigah is older than the Decalogue, which is not the case in the other two. There is in the rejoicing what there is not in the other two, for the rejoicing has to do with women as well as men, which is not the case in the other two.
the corner of a field, and the first-fruits and the appearing before the Lord, and the conferring of kindnesses and the teaching contained in the Law. R. Jochanan said, We were of opinion that the appearing before the Lord had no superior limit but had an inferior limit, until R. Oshaia, in the name of a great teacher, came and taught that appearing before the Lord has no limit either superior or inferior. But wise men say, that the holocaust involves a meah of silver, but the Chagigah two pieces of silver. What does the appearing mean? R. Jochanan said, The presenting of oneself in the Court, but Resh Lakish said, The presenting of oneself with an offering. All the world is agreed that on the first day it means, the presenting of oneself with an offering, but men differ as regards the remainder of the days of the Feast. Every time that a man comes and brings an offering, all the world agrees that we are to receive it from him, but men differ in the case of one who comes and does not bring; for R. Jochanan considers that the presenting of oneself in the Court is sufficient, because it is not necessary, every time that he comes, to bring an offering; but Resh Lakish says, The presenting oneself with an offering is the meaning, for it is necessary, every time that he comes, to bring an offering. Resh Lakish put this difficulty to R. Jochanan, "None shall appear before me empty" (Exod. xxiii. 15). He said to him, Yes, but only on the first day of the Feast. He put this further difficulty to him. The passage "None shall appear before me empty" refers to coming with sacrifices. If thou sayest, With sacrifices? perhaps not, but with birds and meal-offerings; then here is an argument against thee. The Chagigah is assigned to a private person, but the appearing is assigned to the Most High. As the Chagigah, which is assigned to a private person, involves sacrifices, so must the appearing, which is assigned to the Most High, involve sacrifices. And what are these sacrifices? They are burnt-offerings. If thou sayest, Burnt-offerings? perhaps not, but peace-offerings; then here is an argument against thee. The Chagigah is assigned to a private person, and the appearing is assigned to the Most High. As the Chagigah, which is assigned to a private person, is suited to him, so must the appearing, which is assigned to the Most High, be suited to Him. And so it is fitting that thy table should not be full and the table of thy Master empty. He said to him, Yes, but only on the first day of the Feast. R. Jose, in the name of R. Jehudah, put this difficulty to him, saying, Three times in the year Israel was commanded to go up to a Feast, viz., at the Feast of the Passover, and at the Feast of Weeks, and at the Feast of Tabernacles, and they must not appear by halves, inasmuch as it is said, "all thy males" (Exod. xxiii. 17; Deut. xvi. 16), and they must not appear empty, inasmuch as it is said, "none shall appear before me empty" (Exod. xxiii. 15). He said to him, Yes, but only on the first day of the Feast.
R. Jochanan put this difficulty to Resh Lakish; "he shall be seen," "He shall see" (Exod. xxiii. 17; Deut. xvi. 16). As I am seen freely, so shall ye see me freely. But every one who comes and does not bring an offering, all the world agrees that he goes up and allows himself to be seen and goes away. But they differ in the case of one who comes and brings an offering. R. Jochanan says, The simple presenting of oneself in the Court is the real presenting of oneself, and so has no limit of times prescribed, while on the contrary the presenting of oneself for an offering has a limit of times prescribed. But Resh Lakish said, The presenting of oneself with an offering is alone the real presenting of oneself, for if it be the case of an offering also, there is no limit. He put this difficulty to him, "Let thy foot be seldom in thy neighbour's house" (Prov. xxv. 17). But here it has to do with sin-offerings and trespass-offerings. So is the opinion of R. Levi. For R. Levi adduces the passage, "Let thy foot be seldom in thy neighbour's house," and the passage, "I will come into thy house with burnt-offerings" (Ps. lxvi. 12). There is no difficulty. In the one case it has to do with sin-offerings and trespass-offerings, in the other with burnt-offerings and peace-offerings. There is a Baraitha also to this effect, viz., "Let thy foot be seldom in thy neighbour's house:" the passage speaks of sin-offerings and trespass-offerings; if thou sayest, Of sin-offerings and trespass-offerings? perhaps not, but of burnt-offerings and peace-offerings, as he says, "I will come into thy house with burnt-offerings, I will pay thee my vows" (Ps. lxvi. 12), for see, they actually speak there of burnt-offerings and peace-offerings; Nay, but look thou how I explain, "Let thy foot be seldom in thy neighbour's house," viz., that the passage is speaking of sin-offerings and trespass-offerings.
R. Jochanan put this difficulty to Resh Lakish; "he shall be seen," "He shall see" (Exod. xxiii. 17; Deut. xvi. 16). As I am seen freely, so shall ye see me freely. But every one who comes and does not bring an offering, all the world agrees that he goes up and allows himself to be seen and goes away. But they differ in the case of one who comes and brings an offering. R. Jochanan says, The simple presenting of oneself in the Court is the real presenting of oneself, and so has no limit of times prescribed, while on the contrary the presenting of oneself for an offering has a limit of times prescribed. But Resh Lakish said, The presenting of oneself with an offering is alone the real presenting of oneself, for if it be the case of an offering also, there is no limit. He put this difficulty to him, "Let thy foot be seldom in thy neighbour's house" (Prov. xxv. 17). But here it has to do with sin-offerings and trespass-offerings. So is the opinion of R. Levi. For R. Levi adduces the passage, "Let thy foot be seldom in thy neighbour's house," and the passage, "I will come into thy house with burnt-offerings" (Ps. lxvi. 12). There is no difficulty. In the one case it has to do with sin-offerings and trespass-offerings, in the other with burnt-offerings and peace-offerings. There is a Baraitha also to this effect, viz., "Let thy foot be seldom in thy neighbour's house:" the passage speaks of sin-offerings and trespass-offerings; if thou sayest, Of sin-offerings and trespass-offerings? perhaps not, but of burnt-offerings and peace-offerings, as he says, "I will come into thy house with burnt-offerings, I will pay thee my vows" (Ps. lxvi. 12), for see, they actually speak there of burnt-offerings and peace-offerings; Nay, but look thou how I explain, "Let thy foot be seldom in thy neighbour's house," viz., that the passage is speaking of sin-offerings and trespass-offerings.
R. Jochanan put this difficulty to Resh Lakish; "he shall be seen," "He shall see" (Exod. xxiii. 17; Deut. xvi. 16). As I am seen freely, so shall ye see me freely. But every one who comes and does not bring an offering, all the world agrees that he goes up and allows himself to be seen and goes away. But they differ in the case of one who comes and brings an offering. R. Jochanan says, The simple presenting of oneself in the Court is the real presenting of oneself, and so has no limit of times prescribed, while on the contrary the presenting of oneself for an offering has a limit of times prescribed. But Resh Lakish said, The presenting of oneself with an offering is alone the real presenting of oneself, for if it be the case of an offering also, there is no limit. He put this difficulty to him, "Let thy foot be seldom in thy neighbour's house" (Prov. xxv. 17). But here it has to do with sin-offerings and trespass-offerings. So is the opinion of R. Levi. For R. Levi adduces the passage, "Let thy foot be seldom in thy neighbour's house," and the passage, "I will come into thy house with burnt-offerings" (Ps. lxvi. 12). There is no difficulty. In the one case it has to do with sin-offerings and trespass-offerings, in the other with burnt-offerings and peace-offerings. There is a Baraitha also to this effect, viz., "Let thy foot be seldom in thy neighbour's house:" the passage speaks of sin-offerings and trespass-offerings; if thou sayest, Of sin-offerings and trespass-offerings? perhaps not, but of burnt-offerings and peace-offerings, as he says, "I will come into thy house with burnt-offerings, I will pay thee my vows" (Ps. lxvi. 12), for see, they actually speak there of burnt-offerings and peace-offerings; Nay, but look thou how I explain, "Let thy foot be seldom in thy neighbour's house," viz., that the passage is speaking of sin-offerings and trespass-offerings.
consequently he must from the beginning have had the opinion that the Chagigah of the fourteenth day is not an enactment of the Law. The Mishnah teacher said, The house of Hillel say, From the tithe. But why? For surely it is obligatory, and everything which is obligatory comes only from that which is not previously consecrated. Ola said, This is so in the case of one making a supplementary offering. Hezekiah said, Men may supplement beast with beast, but they may not supplement money with money. But R. Jochanan said, Men may supplement money with money, but they may not supplement beast with beast. A Baraitha supports R. Hezekiah, and a Baraitha supports R. Jochanan. A Baraitha supports R. Jochanan, viz., The word "tribute" (Deut. xvi. 10) teaches that a man is to bring his duty offering from things not previously consecrated; and whence have we got it that if he wishes to mix things, he may mix? The teaching says, "According as the Lord thy God shall bless thee" (Deut. xvi. 10). A Baraitha supports R. Hezekiah, viz., The word "tribute" teaches that a man is to bring his duty offering from things not previously consecrated. The house of Shammai say, The first day from things not previously consecrated, thenceforward from the tithe, but the house of Hillel say, Only the first meal from things not previously consecrated, thenceforward from the tithe. And all the rest of the days of the Passover a man is to fulfil his duty with the tithe of a beast. On a high holiday what is the reason that he should not do the same? R. Ashi said, Lest perhaps, if this were allowed, he might go to tithe upon a high holiday, for it is impossible to tithe upon a high holiday on account of the red chalk. What passage is there to shew that "tribute" is a word that denotes things not previously consecrated? The passage, "And king Ahasuerus laid tribute upon the land" (Esth. x. 1).
I. (5) He who has many to eat with him and few possessions, brings many peace-offerings and few burnt-offerings. He who has many possessions and few to eat with him, brings many burnt-offerings, and few peace-offerings. If a man have little of both, to his case applies the saying about the meah of silver and the two pieces of silver. If he have much of both, to his case apply the words, "every man shall give as he is able, according to the blessing of the LORD thy God, which he hath given thee" (Deut. xvi. 17).
I. (5) He who has many to eat with him and few possessions, brings many peace-offerings and few burnt-offerings. He who has many possessions and few to eat with him, brings many burnt-offerings, and few peace-offerings. If a man have little of both, to his case applies the saying about the meah of silver and the two pieces of silver. If he have much of both, to his case apply the words, "every man shall give as he is able, according to the blessing of the LORD thy God, which he hath given thee" (Deut. xvi. 17).
Ola said that Resh Lakish said, If a man set apart ten beasts for his Chagigah, he may bring five on the first high holiday, and may again bring five on the second high holiday. R. Jochanan said, When he has finished, he cannot bring again. R. Abba said, But they do not really differ. The one is the case where he keeps silence, the other where he declares his intention. This expression, When he keeps silence—explain it. Perhaps there was not time in the day to bring them. In that case they are not brought, because there was not time in the day. But perhaps he has none to eat with him. In that case they are not brought, because he has none to eat with him. No; this is not such a case; and so far as this goes, it is necessary that he should bring them. For there is time in the day, and he has people to eat with him. Inasmuch as he did not bring them at the earlier time, learn from this that he left them behind intentionally; and this also is the purport of the story, how when Rabbin came, R. Jochanan said, If a man set apart ten beasts for his Chagigah, he may bring five on the first high holiday, and may again bring five on the second high holiday. They are in appearance difficult to reconcile, but in reality not. For learn from this that the one is the case when he keeps silence, the other when he declares his intention. Learn from this that the point has been also distinctly settled. R. Shemen bar Abba said that R. Jochanan said,
Ola said that Resh Lakish said, If a man set apart ten beasts for his Chagigah, he may bring five on the first high holiday, and may again bring five on the second high holiday. R. Jochanan said, When he has finished, he cannot bring again. R. Abba said, But they do not really differ. The one is the case where he keeps silence, the other where he declares his intention. This expression, When he keeps silence—explain it. Perhaps there was not time in the day to bring them. In that case they are not brought, because there was not time in the day. But perhaps he has none to eat with him. In that case they are not brought, because he has none to eat with him. No; this is not such a case; and so far as this goes, it is necessary that he should bring them. For there is time in the day, and he has people to eat with him. Inasmuch as he did not bring them at the earlier time, learn from this that he left them behind intentionally; and this also is the purport of the story, how when Rabbin came, R. Jochanan said, If a man set apart ten beasts for his Chagigah, he may bring five on the first high holiday, and may again bring five on the second high holiday. They are in appearance difficult to reconcile, but in reality not. For learn from this that the one is the case when he keeps silence, the other when he declares his intention. Learn from this that the point has been also distinctly settled. R. Shemen bar Abba said that R. Jochanan said,
Ola said that Resh Lakish said, If a man set apart ten beasts for his Chagigah, he may bring five on the first high holiday, and may again bring five on the second high holiday. R. Jochanan said, When he has finished, he cannot bring again. R. Abba said, But they do not really differ. The one is the case where he keeps silence, the other where he declares his intention. This expression, When he keeps silence—explain it. Perhaps there was not time in the day to bring them. In that case they are not brought, because there was not time in the day. But perhaps he has none to eat with him. In that case they are not brought, because he has none to eat with him. No; this is not such a case; and so far as this goes, it is necessary that he should bring them. For there is time in the day, and he has people to eat with him. Inasmuch as he did not bring them at the earlier time, learn from this that he left them behind intentionally; and this also is the purport of the story, how when Rabbin came, R. Jochanan said, If a man set apart ten beasts for his Chagigah, he may bring five on the first high holiday, and may again bring five on the second high holiday. They are in appearance difficult to reconcile, but in reality not. For learn from this that the one is the case when he keeps silence, the other when he declares his intention. Learn from this that the point has been also distinctly settled. R. Shemen bar Abba said that R. Jochanan said,
Ola said that Resh Lakish said, If a man set apart ten beasts for his Chagigah, he may bring five on the first high holiday, and may again bring five on the second high holiday. R. Jochanan said, When he has finished, he cannot bring again. R. Abba said, But they do not really differ. The one is the case where he keeps silence, the other where he declares his intention. This expression, When he keeps silence—explain it. Perhaps there was not time in the day to bring them. In that case they are not brought, because there was not time in the day. But perhaps he has none to eat with him. In that case they are not brought, because he has none to eat with him. No; this is not such a case; and so far as this goes, it is necessary that he should bring them. For there is time in the day, and he has people to eat with him. Inasmuch as he did not bring them at the earlier time, learn from this that he left them behind intentionally; and this also is the purport of the story, how when Rabbin came, R. Jochanan said, If a man set apart ten beasts for his Chagigah, he may bring five on the first high holiday, and may again bring five on the second high holiday. They are in appearance difficult to reconcile, but in reality not. For learn from this that the one is the case when he keeps silence, the other when he declares his intention. Learn from this that the point has been also distinctly settled. R. Shemen bar Abba said that R. Jochanan said,
Ola said that Resh Lakish said, If a man set apart ten beasts for his Chagigah, he may bring five on the first high holiday, and may again bring five on the second high holiday. R. Jochanan said, When he has finished, he cannot bring again. R. Abba said, But they do not really differ. The one is the case where he keeps silence, the other where he declares his intention. This expression, When he keeps silence—explain it. Perhaps there was not time in the day to bring them. In that case they are not brought, because there was not time in the day. But perhaps he has none to eat with him. In that case they are not brought, because he has none to eat with him. No; this is not such a case; and so far as this goes, it is necessary that he should bring them. For there is time in the day, and he has people to eat with him. Inasmuch as he did not bring them at the earlier time, learn from this that he left them behind intentionally; and this also is the purport of the story, how when Rabbin came, R. Jochanan said, If a man set apart ten beasts for his Chagigah, he may bring five on the first high holiday, and may again bring five on the second high holiday. They are in appearance difficult to reconcile, but in reality not. For learn from this that the one is the case when he keeps silence, the other when he declares his intention. Learn from this that the point has been also distinctly settled. R. Shemen bar Abba said that R. Jochanan said,
But how could R. Jochanan have said this? For surely Hezekiah said, A Nazirite, if again polluted on the eighth day, must bring an additional offering, but if in the previous night, he need not bring it; but R. Jochanan said, Nay, in the latter case also he must bring it. R. Jeremiah said, A case of defilement is a different matter, for payments postponed from it are made at a second Passover. R. Papa objects to this and says, It will be all right according to him who says,
But how could R. Jochanan have said this? For surely Hezekiah said, A Nazirite, if again polluted on the eighth day, must bring an additional offering, but if in the previous night, he need not bring it; but R. Jochanan said, Nay, in the latter case also he must bring it. R. Jeremiah said, A case of defilement is a different matter, for payments postponed from it are made at a second Passover. R. Papa objects to this and says, It will be all right according to him who says,
R. Simeon ben Manassea says, What sort of person is this, that is crooked and that cannot be made straight? This is he who forms an incestuous connexion and begets therefrom a bastard child, etc. If he beget, yes; if he do not beget, no. And lo, there is a Baraitha. R. Simeon ben Manassea says, In case of a thief it is possible that he may restore that which he has stolen, and so it may be made good; in case of a robber, it is possible that he may restore his plunder, and so it may be made good; but he that approaches a man's wife, and so makes her unfit for her husband, is cut off from the world, and goes to his own place.
R. Simeon ben Manassea says, What sort of person is this, that is crooked and that cannot be made straight? This is he who forms an incestuous connexion and begets therefrom a bastard child, etc. If he beget, yes; if he do not beget, no. And lo, there is a Baraitha. R. Simeon ben Manassea says, In case of a thief it is possible that he may restore that which he has stolen, and so it may be made good; in case of a robber, it is possible that he may restore his plunder, and so it may be made good; but he that approaches a man's wife, and so makes her unfit for her husband, is cut off from the world, and goes to his own place.
R. Simeon ben Jochai says, One does not say, Investigate a camel, investigate a pig, but investigate a lamb. And what kind of person is this? This is the pupil of a wise man, who has separated himself from the Law. R. Jehudah ben Lakish said, Every pupil of a wise man, who has separated himself from the Law, to him does the passage refer, which says, "As a bird that wandereth from her nest, so is a man that wandereth from his place" (Prov. xxvii. 8), and that which says, "What unrighteousness have your fathers found in me, that they are gone far from me?" (Jer. ii. 5) There is no difficulty. The one case has to do with his unmarried sister, the other with another man's wife. And, if you like, I will say that both of them have to do with another man's wife, and yet there is no difficulty. The one is
the case of a man who has to use violence, the other of one whose approaches are admitted. And, if you like, I will say that both are cases of one who has to use violence, and yet there is no difficulty. The one is the case of the wife of a priest, the other that of the wife of an ordinary Israelite.
the case of a man who has to use violence, the other of one whose approaches are admitted. And, if you like, I will say that both are cases of one who has to use violence, and yet there is no difficulty. The one is the case of the wife of a priest, the other that of the wife of an ordinary Israelite.
Trespasses. But there is much in Holy Writ concerning them. Ramai bar Chama said, It was only necessary in order to agree with the following Mishnah, If the messenger has done his commission, it is the master of the house who has trespassed; if the messenger has not done his commission, the messenger has trespassed (Kiddushin, 42b, ii. 12, N'darim, 54a, ii. 7, M'ila, 20a, ii. 13, K'thuboth, 28b, ii. 16). But if he has done his commission, how has the master trespassed? And is it possible that the one should be guilty and the other liable to the punishment? This is as mountains suspended by a hair. Rabba said, But what is the difficulty? Perhaps a trespass is different. But one learns the law on this subject from the analogy of the two words, viz., "sin" in the present case, and "sin" used of the heave-offering. As in the one case, the man's messenger represents him, so in the other the man's messenger represents him. But Rabba said, It was only necessary in order to agree with the Baraitha, The master of the house remembered and the messenger did not remember. The messenger has trespassed. What then has the poor messenger done? This is as mountains suspended by a hair. Rab Ashi said, What is the difficulty? Perhaps it is more difficult than in the case of one who takes sacred money for ordinary uses. But Rab Ashi said, It was only necessary in order to agree with the canonical Mishnah, If a man have taken a stone or a beam of the sanctuary, behold, he has not trespassed. If he have given it to his neighbour, he has trespassed, but his neighbour has not trespassed (M'ilah, 9b, ii. 16, Baba Kamma, 20b, ii. 24, Baba M'tsia', 99b, ii. 3). But most assuredly he has appropriated it. What is it to me whether it be the man himself or his neighbour? This is as mountains suspended by a hair. And what is the difficulty? Perhaps it is in accordance with the words of Samuel. For Samuel said, It is thus in the case
Trespasses. But there is much in Holy Writ concerning them. Ramai bar Chama said, It was only necessary in order to agree with the following Mishnah, If the messenger has done his commission, it is the master of the house who has trespassed; if the messenger has not done his commission, the messenger has trespassed (Kiddushin, 42b, ii. 12, N'darim, 54a, ii. 7, M'ila, 20a, ii. 13, K'thuboth, 28b, ii. 16). But if he has done his commission, how has the master trespassed? And is it possible that the one should be guilty and the other liable to the punishment? This is as mountains suspended by a hair. Rabba said, But what is the difficulty? Perhaps a trespass is different. But one learns the law on this subject from the analogy of the two words, viz., "sin" in the present case, and "sin" used of the heave-offering. As in the one case, the man's messenger represents him, so in the other the man's messenger represents him. But Rabba said, It was only necessary in order to agree with the Baraitha, The master of the house remembered and the messenger did not remember. The messenger has trespassed. What then has the poor messenger done? This is as mountains suspended by a hair. Rab Ashi said, What is the difficulty? Perhaps it is more difficult than in the case of one who takes sacred money for ordinary uses. But Rab Ashi said, It was only necessary in order to agree with the canonical Mishnah, If a man have taken a stone or a beam of the sanctuary, behold, he has not trespassed. If he have given it to his neighbour, he has trespassed, but his neighbour has not trespassed (M'ilah, 9b, ii. 16, Baba Kamma, 20b, ii. 24, Baba M'tsia', 99b, ii. 3). But most assuredly he has appropriated it. What is it to me whether it be the man himself or his neighbour? This is as mountains suspended by a hair. And what is the difficulty? Perhaps it is in accordance with the words of Samuel. For Samuel said, It is thus in the case
Trespasses. But there is much in Holy Writ concerning them. Ramai bar Chama said, It was only necessary in order to agree with the following Mishnah, If the messenger has done his commission, it is the master of the house who has trespassed; if the messenger has not done his commission, the messenger has trespassed (Kiddushin, 42b, ii. 12, N'darim, 54a, ii. 7, M'ila, 20a, ii. 13, K'thuboth, 28b, ii. 16). But if he has done his commission, how has the master trespassed? And is it possible that the one should be guilty and the other liable to the punishment? This is as mountains suspended by a hair. Rabba said, But what is the difficulty? Perhaps a trespass is different. But one learns the law on this subject from the analogy of the two words, viz., "sin" in the present case, and "sin" used of the heave-offering. As in the one case, the man's messenger represents him, so in the other the man's messenger represents him. But Rabba said, It was only necessary in order to agree with the Baraitha, The master of the house remembered and the messenger did not remember. The messenger has trespassed. What then has the poor messenger done? This is as mountains suspended by a hair. Rab Ashi said, What is the difficulty? Perhaps it is more difficult than in the case of one who takes sacred money for ordinary uses. But Rab Ashi said, It was only necessary in order to agree with the canonical Mishnah, If a man have taken a stone or a beam of the sanctuary, behold, he has not trespassed. If he have given it to his neighbour, he has trespassed, but his neighbour has not trespassed (M'ilah, 9b, ii. 16, Baba Kamma, 20b, ii. 24, Baba M'tsia', 99b, ii. 3). But most assuredly he has appropriated it. What is it to me whether it be the man himself or his neighbour? This is as mountains suspended by a hair. And what is the difficulty? Perhaps it is in accordance with the words of Samuel. For Samuel said, It is thus in the case
Trespasses. But there is much in Holy Writ concerning them. Ramai bar Chama said, It was only necessary in order to agree with the following Mishnah, If the messenger has done his commission, it is the master of the house who has trespassed; if the messenger has not done his commission, the messenger has trespassed (Kiddushin, 42b, ii. 12, N'darim, 54a, ii. 7, M'ila, 20a, ii. 13, K'thuboth, 28b, ii. 16). But if he has done his commission, how has the master trespassed? And is it possible that the one should be guilty and the other liable to the punishment? This is as mountains suspended by a hair. Rabba said, But what is the difficulty? Perhaps a trespass is different. But one learns the law on this subject from the analogy of the two words, viz., "sin" in the present case, and "sin" used of the heave-offering. As in the one case, the man's messenger represents him, so in the other the man's messenger represents him. But Rabba said, It was only necessary in order to agree with the Baraitha, The master of the house remembered and the messenger did not remember. The messenger has trespassed. What then has the poor messenger done? This is as mountains suspended by a hair. Rab Ashi said, What is the difficulty? Perhaps it is more difficult than in the case of one who takes sacred money for ordinary uses. But Rab Ashi said, It was only necessary in order to agree with the canonical Mishnah, If a man have taken a stone or a beam of the sanctuary, behold, he has not trespassed. If he have given it to his neighbour, he has trespassed, but his neighbour has not trespassed (M'ilah, 9b, ii. 16, Baba Kamma, 20b, ii. 24, Baba M'tsia', 99b, ii. 3). But most assuredly he has appropriated it. What is it to me whether it be the man himself or his neighbour? This is as mountains suspended by a hair. And what is the difficulty? Perhaps it is in accordance with the words of Samuel. For Samuel said, It is thus in the case
of a treasurer. We give in charge to him the stones of a building, so that all which is thus placed, is placed at his disposition. But at the end he has built some of it into his house. Behold, he has not trespassed, until he has dwelt under it to the worth of a farthing. But most assuredly he has altered the stone. What is it to me whether he has dwelt in it or not? This is as mountains suspended by a hair. And what is the difficulty? Perhaps it is in accordance with the words of Rab; for Rab said, For example, if a man have placed it upon the opening of a roof-window, then, if he have dwelt in it, yes; if he have not dwelt in it, no. But granting fully that it is as Rabba said, yet thou findest more difficulty here than in the case of him who drew sacred money for common uses; in that case he knows well that they are coins belonging to the sanctuary. It was a matter for him to watch what he was doing. But in this case how should he know? This is as mountains suspended by a hair.
of a treasurer. We give in charge to him the stones of a building, so that all which is thus placed, is placed at his disposition. But at the end he has built some of it into his house. Behold, he has not trespassed, until he has dwelt under it to the worth of a farthing. But most assuredly he has altered the stone. What is it to me whether he has dwelt in it or not? This is as mountains suspended by a hair. And what is the difficulty? Perhaps it is in accordance with the words of Rab; for Rab said, For example, if a man have placed it upon the opening of a roof-window, then, if he have dwelt in it, yes; if he have not dwelt in it, no. But granting fully that it is as Rabba said, yet thou findest more difficulty here than in the case of him who drew sacred money for common uses; in that case he knows well that they are coins belonging to the sanctuary. It was a matter for him to watch what he was doing. But in this case how should he know? This is as mountains suspended by a hair.
of a treasurer. We give in charge to him the stones of a building, so that all which is thus placed, is placed at his disposition. But at the end he has built some of it into his house. Behold, he has not trespassed, until he has dwelt under it to the worth of a farthing. But most assuredly he has altered the stone. What is it to me whether he has dwelt in it or not? This is as mountains suspended by a hair. And what is the difficulty? Perhaps it is in accordance with the words of Rab; for Rab said, For example, if a man have placed it upon the opening of a roof-window, then, if he have dwelt in it, yes; if he have not dwelt in it, no. But granting fully that it is as Rabba said, yet thou findest more difficulty here than in the case of him who drew sacred money for common uses; in that case he knows well that they are coins belonging to the sanctuary. It was a matter for him to watch what he was doing. But in this case how should he know? This is as mountains suspended by a hair.
Things unclean. But there is much in Holy Writ concerning them. It was only necessary in order to determine that a creeping thing should be the size of a lentil; for this is not determined in Holy Writ. For there is a Baraitha, "In them" (Lev. xi. 26, 43). One might have thought it meant among them all, but that the teaching says, "of them" (Lev. xi. 32, 33). One might have thought it meant from a portion of them, but that the teaching says, "among them." But how is this? It is to include the case of a man's touching the extremity of it, for this is equivalent to the whole of it. Wise men calculated that a lentil should be the minimum for comparison. For a snail at first is about the size of a lentil. R. Jose in the name of R. Jehudah says, As the tail of a lizard.
Unlawful unions. But there is much in Holy Writ concerning them. Nay, it was necessary to meet the case of
Thou saidst at first, Nor the Chariot with one, and again thou saidst, But if a man do so, he must be a wise man, and one who has much knowledge of his own. This is its meaning. Men are not to expound unlawful unions to three others, nor the work of Creation to two others, nor the Chariot to one other, but if they do, he must be a wise man, and one who has much knowledge of his own. Men are not to expound unlawful unions with three. What is the reason? Shall we say, It is on account of the passage, "each man to any that is near of kin" (Lev. xviii. 6)? "Each man" is equivalent to two, "that is near of kin" is equivalent to one; and the Merciful One said, "Ye shall not approach etc." But regard it thus; as it is written, "each man that curseth his God" (Lev. xxiv. 15), "each man that giveth of his seed unto Molech" (Lev. xx. 2), so it is with this passage also; but as these last must mean to include the strangers, who are cautioned for cursing the Lord, and for idolatry, like Israel, so that first quoted also must mean to include the strangers who are cautioned for unlawful unions, like Israel. But do we get it from the passage, "therefore shall ye keep my charge?" (Lev. xviii. 30) "Therefore shall ye keep" implies two, "my charge" one; for the Merciful One in this passage was forbidding the practice of "abominable customs" (ibid.). But as it is written, Ye therefore shall keep the Sabbath (Exod. xxxi. 14), "and ye shall keep the Unleavened Bread" (Exod. xii. 17), "and ye shall keep the charge of the sanctuary" (Numb. xviii. 5), so it is with this passage also. But R. Ashi said, How are we to explain, Men are not to expound unlawful unions with three? It means that they are not to expound the details of the subject with three others. What is the reason? The probability is that when two sit before their Rabbi one is wholly occupied with his Rabbi, and the other inclines his ear to instruction, but if there are three, one is wholly occupied with his Rabbi, but the other two are wholly occupied with each other, and know not what their Rabbi is saying, and they go forth from his lecture to allow things that are prohibited in the matter of unlawful unions. But if this be so, the whole Law should also by parity of reason come under this rule. No, for unlawful unions are different from other subjects. For the Mishnah teacher said, As for robbery and unlawful unions, a man's soul coveteth and lusteth for them. But if it be so, robbery also should come under the rule. No, for in the case of unlawful unions, whether the temptation is visible or not visible, the man's propensity is strong, but in the case of robbery, when the temptation is visible, his propensity is strong; when it is not visible, the propensity is not strong.
Thou saidst at first, Nor the Chariot with one, and again thou saidst, But if a man do so, he must be a wise man, and one who has much knowledge of his own. This is its meaning. Men are not to expound unlawful unions to three others, nor the work of Creation to two others, nor the Chariot to one other, but if they do, he must be a wise man, and one who has much knowledge of his own. Men are not to expound unlawful unions with three. What is the reason? Shall we say, It is on account of the passage, "each man to any that is near of kin" (Lev. xviii. 6)? "Each man" is equivalent to two, "that is near of kin" is equivalent to one; and the Merciful One said, "Ye shall not approach etc." But regard it thus; as it is written, "each man that curseth his God" (Lev. xxiv. 15), "each man that giveth of his seed unto Molech" (Lev. xx. 2), so it is with this passage also; but as these last must mean to include the strangers, who are cautioned for cursing the Lord, and for idolatry, like Israel, so that first quoted also must mean to include the strangers who are cautioned for unlawful unions, like Israel. But do we get it from the passage, "therefore shall ye keep my charge?" (Lev. xviii. 30) "Therefore shall ye keep" implies two, "my charge" one; for the Merciful One in this passage was forbidding the practice of "abominable customs" (ibid.). But as it is written, Ye therefore shall keep the Sabbath (Exod. xxxi. 14), "and ye shall keep the Unleavened Bread" (Exod. xii. 17), "and ye shall keep the charge of the sanctuary" (Numb. xviii. 5), so it is with this passage also. But R. Ashi said, How are we to explain, Men are not to expound unlawful unions with three? It means that they are not to expound the details of the subject with three others. What is the reason? The probability is that when two sit before their Rabbi one is wholly occupied with his Rabbi, and the other inclines his ear to instruction, but if there are three, one is wholly occupied with his Rabbi, but the other two are wholly occupied with each other, and know not what their Rabbi is saying, and they go forth from his lecture to allow things that are prohibited in the matter of unlawful unions. But if this be so, the whole Law should also by parity of reason come under this rule. No, for unlawful unions are different from other subjects. For the Mishnah teacher said, As for robbery and unlawful unions, a man's soul coveteth and lusteth for them. But if it be so, robbery also should come under the rule. No, for in the case of unlawful unions, whether the temptation is visible or not visible, the man's propensity is strong, but in the case of robbery, when the temptation is visible, his propensity is strong; when it is not visible, the propensity is not strong.
R. Jochanan said to R. El'azar, Come, I will fully instruct thee in the subject of the Chariot. He said to him, I am not old enough. When he was old enough, R. Jochanan's soul had passed away. R. Asi said to him, Come, and I will fully instruct thee in the subject of the Chariot. He said to him, If I had been worthy, I should have received full instruction from R. Jochanan thy teacher. R. Joseph was giving full instruction in the subject of the Chariot. The wise men of Pumbeditha were teaching the subject of Creation. They said to him, Would that our lord would instruct us fully in the subject of the Chariot. He said to them, Instruct me fully in the subject of Creation. After they had instructed him fully, they said to him, Would that our lord would instruct us fully in the subject of the Chariot. He said to them, There is a Baraitha with reference to these things which says, "Honey and milk are under thy tongue" (Cant. iv. 11). Let words sweeter than honey and milk be under thy tongue. R. Abohu said, It is drawn from this passage, viz., "things to be concealed under thy clothes" (Prov. xxvii. 26), that is to say, things which are the secrets of the world shall be under thy clothes. They said to him, We have worked in them as far as the words, "And he said unto me, Son of man" (Ezek. ii. 1). He said to them, But this is the subject of the Chariot. Some one puts a difficulty. How far does the subject of the Chariot reach? Rab says, It reaches to the last occurrence of the expression, "I saw" (Ezek. i. 27). R. Isaac says, It reaches to the Chashmal. We instruct fully to the words, "and I saw;" thenceforward we only impart the heads of the divisions. There are others who say, As far as, "and I saw," we impart the heads of the divisions; thenceforward, if the man be wise and of ready intelligence, Yes; if not, No. And how are we to expound in Chashmal? For there is the story of the child, who was studying in Chashmal, and there came out a fire and consumed him. The case of the child is different, for he had not reached the fitting age.
There is a passage which says, "each one had six wings" (Is. vi. 2), and there is a passage which says, "And every one had four faces, and every one of them had four wings" (Ezek. i. 6). There is no difficulty. The one case was at the time when the Holy House was standing, the other at the time when the Holy House was not standing. As if it were possible to say which two of the wings of the living creatures were taken away. Which of them were taken away? R. Chănaneel said, that Rab said, Those with which they utter their song. It is written thus, "And with twain he did fly. And one cried to another and said," (Is. vi. 2, 3) and it is written, "Wilt thou set thine eyes upon it? But it is gone" (Prov. xxiii. 5). But our Rabbis say, Those with which they cover their feet, as it is said, "And their feet were as a straight foot" (Ezek. i. 7). And if none had been taken away, how would he have known? Perhaps it was uncovered, and he saw it. But if thou sayest, Not so, then I may argue thus: "And as for the likeness of their faces, they had the face of a man," and I may argue that in this case also they were taken away. But when you reply that in this case it was uncovered and he saw it, then I rejoin that in this case also it was uncovered and he saw it. But no, for in this case, even granting that the face is customarily uncovered before one's teacher, the legs are not customarily uncovered before one's teacher.
There is a passage which says, "each one had six wings" (Is. vi. 2), and there is a passage which says, "And every one had four faces, and every one of them had four wings" (Ezek. i. 6). There is no difficulty. The one case was at the time when the Holy House was standing, the other at the time when the Holy House was not standing. As if it were possible to say which two of the wings of the living creatures were taken away. Which of them were taken away? R. Chănaneel said, that Rab said, Those with which they utter their song. It is written thus, "And with twain he did fly. And one cried to another and said," (Is. vi. 2, 3) and it is written, "Wilt thou set thine eyes upon it? But it is gone" (Prov. xxiii. 5). But our Rabbis say, Those with which they cover their feet, as it is said, "And their feet were as a straight foot" (Ezek. i. 7). And if none had been taken away, how would he have known? Perhaps it was uncovered, and he saw it. But if thou sayest, Not so, then I may argue thus: "And as for the likeness of their faces, they had the face of a man," and I may argue that in this case also they were taken away. But when you reply that in this case it was uncovered and he saw it, then I rejoin that in this case also it was uncovered and he saw it. But no, for in this case, even granting that the face is customarily uncovered before one's teacher, the legs are not customarily uncovered before one's teacher.
There is a passage which says, "each one had six wings" (Is. vi. 2), and there is a passage which says, "And every one had four faces, and every one of them had four wings" (Ezek. i. 6). There is no difficulty. The one case was at the time when the Holy House was standing, the other at the time when the Holy House was not standing. As if it were possible to say which two of the wings of the living creatures were taken away. Which of them were taken away? R. Chănaneel said, that Rab said, Those with which they utter their song. It is written thus, "And with twain he did fly. And one cried to another and said," (Is. vi. 2, 3) and it is written, "Wilt thou set thine eyes upon it? But it is gone" (Prov. xxiii. 5). But our Rabbis say, Those with which they cover their feet, as it is said, "And their feet were as a straight foot" (Ezek. i. 7). And if none had been taken away, how would he have known? Perhaps it was uncovered, and he saw it. But if thou sayest, Not so, then I may argue thus: "And as for the likeness of their faces, they had the face of a man," and I may argue that in this case also they were taken away. But when you reply that in this case it was uncovered and he saw it, then I rejoin that in this case also it was uncovered and he saw it. But no, for in this case, even granting that the face is customarily uncovered before one's teacher, the legs are not customarily uncovered before one's teacher.
There is a passage which says, "each one had six wings" (Is. vi. 2), and there is a passage which says, "And every one had four faces, and every one of them had four wings" (Ezek. i. 6). There is no difficulty. The one case was at the time when the Holy House was standing, the other at the time when the Holy House was not standing. As if it were possible to say which two of the wings of the living creatures were taken away. Which of them were taken away? R. Chănaneel said, that Rab said, Those with which they utter their song. It is written thus, "And with twain he did fly. And one cried to another and said," (Is. vi. 2, 3) and it is written, "Wilt thou set thine eyes upon it? But it is gone" (Prov. xxiii. 5). But our Rabbis say, Those with which they cover their feet, as it is said, "And their feet were as a straight foot" (Ezek. i. 7). And if none had been taken away, how would he have known? Perhaps it was uncovered, and he saw it. But if thou sayest, Not so, then I may argue thus: "And as for the likeness of their faces, they had the face of a man," and I may argue that in this case also they were taken away. But when you reply that in this case it was uncovered and he saw it, then I rejoin that in this case also it was uncovered and he saw it. But no, for in this case, even granting that the face is customarily uncovered before one's teacher, the legs are not customarily uncovered before one's teacher.
There is a passage which says, "each one had six wings" (Is. vi. 2), and there is a passage which says, "And every one had four faces, and every one of them had four wings" (Ezek. i. 6). There is no difficulty. The one case was at the time when the Holy House was standing, the other at the time when the Holy House was not standing. As if it were possible to say which two of the wings of the living creatures were taken away. Which of them were taken away? R. Chănaneel said, that Rab said, Those with which they utter their song. It is written thus, "And with twain he did fly. And one cried to another and said," (Is. vi. 2, 3) and it is written, "Wilt thou set thine eyes upon it? But it is gone" (Prov. xxiii. 5). But our Rabbis say, Those with which they cover their feet, as it is said, "And their feet were as a straight foot" (Ezek. i. 7). And if none had been taken away, how would he have known? Perhaps it was uncovered, and he saw it. But if thou sayest, Not so, then I may argue thus: "And as for the likeness of their faces, they had the face of a man," and I may argue that in this case also they were taken away. But when you reply that in this case it was uncovered and he saw it, then I rejoin that in this case also it was uncovered and he saw it. But no, for in this case, even granting that the face is customarily uncovered before one's teacher, the legs are not customarily uncovered before one's teacher.
There is a passage which says, "His raiment was white as snow, and the hair of his head like pure wool" (Dan. vii. 9), and yet it is written, "His locks are curling and black as a raven" (Cant. v. 11). There is no difficulty. The one is the case where He is engaged in session, the other where He is engaged in war. For the Mishnah teacher said, No one, look you, is nobler in session than an old man, and no one, look you, is nobler in war than a youth. One passage says, "His throne was fiery flames," but another says, "till thrones were placed, and one that was ancient of days did sit" (Dan. vii. 9). There is no difficulty, One throne is for Him and one for David. As says a Baraitha, viz., One for him and one for David. These are the words of R. Akiba. R. Jose the Galilaean said to him, Akiba, how long dost thou shew irreverence to the Shechinah? Nay, but one is for judgment and one for grace. Was he convinced by him, or was he not? Come and hear. One is for judgment and one for grace. These are the words of R. Akiba. R. El'azar ben Azariah said to him, Akiba, what hast thou to do with Haggadah? Be off. Thy sayings have to do with stripes and bitters. But the real meaning is that one is for a throne and one for a footstool; a throne that He may sit upon it, and a footstool as the resting-place for His feet, as it is said, "The heaven is my throne and the earth is the resting-place of my feet" (Is. lxvi. 1).
Is it so? And yet there is a Baraitha to this effect. R. Jose in the name of R. Jehudah says, These are the three consecutive expositions. R. Joshua explained things before his master R. Jochanan ben Zakkai; R. Akiba explained things before his master R. Joshua; Chănaniah ben Chăkhinai explained before his master R. Akiba. But behold, R. El'azar ben Arakh was not thought worthy of a place with the three. No, for the principle is, He who teaches and before whom others teach is considered worthy, while he who teaches and before whom others do not teach is not considered worthy. But what do you say then to the case of Chănaniah ben Chăkhinai? For others did not teach before him, and yet he was considered worthy. Yes, for he taught at least in the presence of one who taught others.
Quoties velim, coire sine sanguine possum. Or perhaps it may be said, This case of Samuel is not a usual thing. He (Ben Zoma) said to them, This case of Samuel is not a usual thing. But we take into consideration the possibility eam in balneo gravidam factam esse. But against this view Samuel said, Omne semen coitus quod non velut sagitta emittitur, non generat. But this may only mean quod primo velut sagitta emissum est. Our Rabbis have taught thus, There is a story about R. Joshua ben Chănaniah, that he was standing upon a high ridge of the Temple mountain, and Ben Zoma saw him and did not stand up before him. He said to him, Whence and whither tend thy thoughts, Ben Zoma? He said to him, I was considering the interval between the upper and the lower waters, and there is only between the two a bare three fingers' breadth, as it is said, "And the spirit of God was brooding upon the face of the waters" (Gen. i. 2), like a dove which broods over her young without touching them. R. Joshua said to his disciples, Ben Zoma is certainly still out of his mind. "And the spirit of God was brooding upon the face of the waters." When was it doing so? On the first day? But the division between the upper and lower waters was on the second day, for this is what is written, "and let it divide the waters from the waters" (Gen. i. 6). And about what is the interval? R. Acha bar Jacob said, About the thickness of a hair. And our Rabbis say, The interstices between closely fitting planks of a bridge. Mar Zot'ra, or, if you like, I will say Rab Asi, said, Like two cloaks that are spread out together, and there are some who say with regard to it, Like two inverted cups that are pressed together.
Quoties velim, coire sine sanguine possum. Or perhaps it may be said, This case of Samuel is not a usual thing. He (Ben Zoma) said to them, This case of Samuel is not a usual thing. But we take into consideration the possibility eam in balneo gravidam factam esse. But against this view Samuel said, Omne semen coitus quod non velut sagitta emittitur, non generat. But this may only mean quod primo velut sagitta emissum est. Our Rabbis have taught thus, There is a story about R. Joshua ben Chănaniah, that he was standing upon a high ridge of the Temple mountain, and Ben Zoma saw him and did not stand up before him. He said to him, Whence and whither tend thy thoughts, Ben Zoma? He said to him, I was considering the interval between the upper and the lower waters, and there is only between the two a bare three fingers' breadth, as it is said, "And the spirit of God was brooding upon the face of the waters" (Gen. i. 2), like a dove which broods over her young without touching them. R. Joshua said to his disciples, Ben Zoma is certainly still out of his mind. "And the spirit of God was brooding upon the face of the waters." When was it doing so? On the first day? But the division between the upper and lower waters was on the second day, for this is what is written, "and let it divide the waters from the waters" (Gen. i. 6). And about what is the interval? R. Acha bar Jacob said, About the thickness of a hair. And our Rabbis say, The interstices between closely fitting planks of a bridge. Mar Zot'ra, or, if you like, I will say Rab Asi, said, Like two cloaks that are spread out together, and there are some who say with regard to it, Like two inverted cups that are pressed together.
Resh Lakish said, R. Meir was reading the Scriptures. He came upon this passage and expounded thus, "Incline thine ear, and hear the words of the wise, and apply thine heart unto my knowledge" (Prov. xxii. 17). It is not said, unto their knowledge, but "unto my knowledge." R. Chănina said, From this passage we learn it, "Hearken, O daughter, and consider, and incline thine ear; forget also thine own people and thy father's house, etc." (Ps. xlv. 10) It would appear that the passages are difficult to reconcile. But no, there is no difficulty. The one is the case of an adult, the other of a young person.
Everyone, who does not respect the glory of his Maker, it would have been a mercy for him that he had not come into the world. What is the case here meant? R. Abba said, This is the man who gazes into the rainbow. R. Joseph said, This is the man who commits a transgression secretly. In support of the explanation that it means the man who gazes into the rainbow, it is written, "As the appearance of the bow that is in the cloud in the day of rain, so was the appearance of the brightness round about" (Ezek. i. 28). This is the appearance of the likeness of the glory of the LORD. R. Joseph said, The explanation that this is the man who commits a transgression secretly, agrees with the view of R. Isaac, for R. Isaac said, Every one who committeth a transgression secretly is as though he jarred the feet of the Shechinah, as it is said, "Thus saith the LORD, the heaven is my throne, and the earth is my footstool" (Is. lxvi. 1). Is it so? and yet R. El'a the elder said, If a man sees that his evil nature is mastering him, let him go to a place where they do not know him, and let him put on black garments, and cover himself with black, and do what his heart desireth, but let him not profane the name of God openly. There is no difficulty. The one is the case of a man who has found a means of checking his evil nature, the other of a man who has not found a means of checking his evil nature.
Everyone, who does not respect the glory of his Maker, it would have been a mercy for him that he had not come into the world. What is the case here meant? R. Abba said, This is the man who gazes into the rainbow. R. Joseph said, This is the man who commits a transgression secretly. In support of the explanation that it means the man who gazes into the rainbow, it is written, "As the appearance of the bow that is in the cloud in the day of rain, so was the appearance of the brightness round about" (Ezek. i. 28). This is the appearance of the likeness of the glory of the LORD. R. Joseph said, The explanation that this is the man who commits a transgression secretly, agrees with the view of R. Isaac, for R. Isaac said, Every one who committeth a transgression secretly is as though he jarred the feet of the Shechinah, as it is said, "Thus saith the LORD, the heaven is my throne, and the earth is my footstool" (Is. lxvi. 1). Is it so? and yet R. El'a the elder said, If a man sees that his evil nature is mastering him, let him go to a place where they do not know him, and let him put on black garments, and cover himself with black, and do what his heart desireth, but let him not profane the name of God openly. There is no difficulty. The one is the case of a man who has found a means of checking his evil nature, the other of a man who has not found a means of checking his evil nature.
Our Rabbis have taught, In the three former pairs, which say that a man is not to lay, and in the two latter pairs which say that a man is to lay, the first were prince-presidents and the second vice-presidents. These are the words of R. Meir. But wise men say, Jehudah ben Tabbai was vice-president, and Simeon ben Shetach was prince-president. Who is the author of that teaching? For the converse would appear to be the case, because our Rabbis have taught thus, viz., that R. Jehudah ben Tabbai said, May I see the consolation of Israel, if I have not slain a false witness so as to oppose the Sadducees, when they say, False witnesses are not put to death, until the condemned person shall have been put to death. Simeon ben Shetach said to him, May I see the consolation of Israel, if thou hast not shed innocent blood; for behold, wise men have said, False witnesses are not to be put to death, until they are both proved to be false, and they are not beaten, until they are both proved to be false, and they do not have to refund money, until they are both proved to be false. Forthwith Jehudah ben Tabbai undertook that he would not teach doctrine (Halachah) except in the presence of Simeon ben Shetach. All the days of Jehudah ben Tabbai he used to stretch himself upon the grave of the slain man, and his voice was heard, so that the people wondered, saying that it was the voice of the slain man. He said to them, It is my voice; know ye that tomorrow he will be dead, and his voice will not be heard. R. Acha bar Rabba said to R. Ashi, But perhaps he prayed him earnestly to forgive him, or perhaps he called him before the judgment seat. Who is the authority for this view? If thou sayest, It is all right according to R. Meir, who said, Simeon ben Shetach was vice-president, and R. Jehudah ben Tabbai was prince-president, this accords with his teaching doctrine in the presence of Simeon ben Shetach, but if thou sayest, Our Rabbis are right, who say, Jehudah ben Tabbai was vice-president, Simeon ben Shetach was prince-president, how should the vice-president teach doctrine in the presence of the prince-president? No, what is the meaning of "he undertook?" He spoke in reference not to teaching but to combination, Even if men combine, yet will I not combine.
Menahem went out, Shammai entered in, etc. Whither did he go out? Abai said, He went out to destruction. Rabba said, He went out for the service of the king. There is also a Baraitha to this effect, that Menahem went out for the service of the king, and there went out with him eighty pairs of disciples clothed in Syrian robes. R. Shemen bar Abba said that R. Jochanan said, Let the sabbath rest be by no means a light thing in thine eyes; for lo, the laying on of the hands is only prohibited on account of the Sabbath rest, and the great men of the nation were divided upon the matter. That is self-evident. But as this is a case of a Sabbath rest which clashes with a positive command, there was need of it. But this also is self-evident. It was to meet the objection of the person who says, In the matter of the laying on of the hands itself men are divided. We learn from this that it is in the matter of Sabbath rest that they are divided. Ramai bar Chama said, Learn hence that we require the laying on to be done with all one's strength, for if thou dost imagine that we do not require it to be done with all one's strength, how is the idea of work involved in the laying on of the hands? Some people adduce the passage, "Speak unto the sons of Israel ... and he shall lay his hand" (Lev. i. 2, 4). The sons of Israel lay on their hands, but the daughters of Israel do not lay on their hands. R. Jose and R. Ishmael say, Daughters of Israel lay on their hands by permission. R. Jose said, Abba El'azar related to me the following story: Once we had a calf belonging to the sacrifices of peace-offerings, and we brought it to the court of the women, and the women laid their hands upon it, not because the laying on of the hands belongs to women, but so as to gratify the women. And if thou dost imagine we require the laying on of the hands to be done with all one's strength, dost thou mean to say that in order to gratify women we introduced work into holy things? But do we not learn hence that we do not require it to be done with all one's strength? Nay, by all means I will grant you that we require it to be done with all one's strength. He said to them, Rest your hand upon it. If so, it was not because the laying on of the hands belongs to women that it was done. Thou mayest conclude that it has nothing at all to do with the nature of the laying on of the hand. R. Ami says, He is establishing two things; one that it has nothing at all to do with the nature of the laying on of the hands, and the other that it was done in order to gratify the women. Rab Papa said, Learn hence, Sides, and not the head only, are forbidden; for if thou dost imagine that sides are allowed, might they not lay hands on the sides? But no; learn hence that sides are forbidden.
(4) In the case of the day of Pentecost which falls upon the eve of a Sabbath, the house of Shammai say, The day for sacrificing is after the Sabbath, but the house of Hillel say, There is no day for sacrificing after the Sabbath; but they both admit that, if it fall upon a Sabbath, the day for sacrificing is the day after the Sabbath. A high priest is not to clothe himself in his costly garments, but it is allowed in case of a mourning or of a fast, but this is not to confirm the words of those who say, Pentecost is after the Sabbath.
(4) In the case of the day of Pentecost which falls upon the eve of a Sabbath, the house of Shammai say, The day for sacrificing is after the Sabbath, but the house of Hillel say, There is no day for sacrificing after the Sabbath; but they both admit that, if it fall upon a Sabbath, the day for sacrificing is the day after the Sabbath. A high priest is not to clothe himself in his costly garments, but it is allowed in case of a mourning or of a fast, but this is not to confirm the words of those who say, Pentecost is after the Sabbath.
But as for the case of transferable offerings, they are transferable as from the first day. For there is a canonical Mishnah, viz., He who has not kept the Feast on the first high holiday of the festival, nevertheless keeps all the festival, even up to the last high holiday (Chag. 9a, i. 5, Beytsah 20b, i. 23, Rosh ha-Shanah 4b, ii. 13). If thou layest hold on much, thou dost not hold it, if thou layest hold on a little, thou holdest it. But with a view to what teaching has the All-merciful One written the Feast of Tabernacles? It is in order to compare it with the Feast of Unleavened Bread. As the Feast of Unleavened Bread requires remaining over night, so the Feast of Tabernacles requires remaining over night. And whence do we get that?
There is a canonical Mishnah, In the case of the day of Pentecost which falls upon the eve of a Sabbath, the house of Shammai say, The day for sacrificing is after the Sabbath, but the house of Hillel say, There is no day for sacrificing (Chag. 17a, i. 6). Do you not think that it means that there is no day at all for sacrificing? No; it cannot mean that a day for sacrificing is not necessary. What then does it mean? We learn from this that we are to bring the sacrifice on its own day? But how can this be? for they have discussed this point once already, for we have a canonical Mishnah, viz., The house of Shammai say, Men bring peace-offerings on a festival and do not lay their hands on them, but not burnt offerings; but the house of Hillel say, Men bring both peace-offerings and burnt-offerings and lay their hands on them (Chag. 17a, i. 3). I reply, No; there is no superfluity. For the passage is necessary. For, if he had let me hear only the second paragraph, I should not have doubted through hearing it only, that the house of Shammai insist that men are not to sacrifice on the day of Pentecost, because it is possible to do so on the morrow, but, unless I had a distinct paragraph to the contrary, I should have said thus, They agree as regards the possibility of doing it on the morrow with the house of Hillel; and if he had let me hear only the first paragraph, I should not have doubted through hearing it only, that the house of Hillel say that men may sacrifice because it is impossible to do so on the morrow, but according to this I should have said, They agree as regards the impossibility of doing it on the morrow, with the house of Shammai. Hence the second paragraph was necessary.
But it may be objected, He who has not kept the Feast for the seven days of the Passover, and the eight days of the Feast of Tabernacles, and the first high holiday of Pentecost, he cannot afterwards keep the Feast. Do you not think, then, that the high holiday of Pentecost is not the day of sacrificing? But, if so, do we gather from it that there is but one day of sacrificing? I should rather say, days of sacrificing. But it may be objected, Rabba bar Samuel taught, The Torah says, Number the days and sanctify the month, Number the days and sanctify the Pentecost. As the first day of the month is established by counting, so the Pentecost is established by counting. Do you not think that he has settled the matter from the analogy of the first day of the month? As the first day of the month is one day, so the Pentecost must be one day. Rabba said, Nay, consider that thou mayest be in error. Perhaps in the case of the Pentecost men number days and do not number weeks. But yet Abai said, There is a command to number days, for it is written, "Ye shall number fifty days" (Lev. xxiii. 16), and there is a command to number weeks, for it is written, "Seven weeks shalt thou number unto thee" (Deut. xvi. 9), and again the expression Feast of Weeks is found.
And Resh Lakish said, "And the feast of the harvest" (Exod. xxiii. 16),—what is this Feast on which thou feastest and reapest? Thou must reply, This is the Pentecost. When is it? If I am to say, On the high holiday, how is reaping lawful on a high holiday? But dost thou not think that it means as well on the subsequent days? R. Jochanan said, But regard it thus. The Feast of Ingathering—what is this Feast in which there is an ingathering? Thou must say, This is the Feast of Tabernacles. When is it? If I am to say, On the high holiday, how is work lawful on a high holiday? But if I am to say, On one of the ordinary middle holidays, how is work lawful on one of the ordinary middle holidays? But it means the Feast which comes at the season of ingathering; and so in this case also the Feast which comes at the season of harvest. Consequently both are of opinion that on the ordinary middle holidays the doing of work is forbidden. Whence do we obtain these statements? Because our Rabbis have taught, "The feast of unleavened bread shalt thou keep seven days" (Exod. xxiii. 15). This teaches us that on the middle holidays it is forbidden to do work. These are the words of R. Jeshaiah. R. Jonathan says, The above proof is not necessary. I can prove it by an argument a fortiori. For if on the first and seventh days of the Feast which have not got a holiday before them and after them, the doing of work is prohibited, then on ordinary middle holidays, which have a holiday before them and after them, is it not just that the doing of work should be prohibited? But, it is replied, Let the six days of Creation bear witness against this interpretation, which have a holiday before them and after them, and yet the doing of work is permitted. Nay, it is rejoined, how are the six days of Creation a parallel case? For they have no additional sacrifice as the middle holidays have. Thou mayest say in reply, In the case of an ordinary middle holiday, as it has an additional sacrifice, let the first day of the month bear testimony, for on it there is an additional sacrifice, yet the doing of work is permitted. Nay, it is rejoined, how is the first day of the month a parallel case? For it is not called a holy convocation. Thou mayest say in conclusion, In the case of an ordinary middle holiday which is called a holy convocation, seeing that it is called a holy convocation, it is only just that the doing of work should be prohibited. There is another Baraitha, "Ye shall do no servile work" (Lev. xxiii. 8), that is to say, that on an ordinary middle holiday the doing of work is forbidden. The following are the words of R. Jose the Galilaean. R. Akiba says, It was not necessary, for lo, He says, "These are the set feasts of the Lord, etc." (Lev. xxiii. 4) With reference to what is the Scripture speaking? If to the first day, Behold, it has been already called a sabbath-day; if to the seventh day, Behold, it has been already called a sabbath-day; behold, the Scripture can be speaking only of an ordinary middle holiday, to teach thee that the doing of work is forbidden thereon.
And Resh Lakish said, "And the feast of the harvest" (Exod. xxiii. 16),—what is this Feast on which thou feastest and reapest? Thou must reply, This is the Pentecost. When is it? If I am to say, On the high holiday, how is reaping lawful on a high holiday? But dost thou not think that it means as well on the subsequent days? R. Jochanan said, But regard it thus. The Feast of Ingathering—what is this Feast in which there is an ingathering? Thou must say, This is the Feast of Tabernacles. When is it? If I am to say, On the high holiday, how is work lawful on a high holiday? But if I am to say, On one of the ordinary middle holidays, how is work lawful on one of the ordinary middle holidays? But it means the Feast which comes at the season of ingathering; and so in this case also the Feast which comes at the season of harvest. Consequently both are of opinion that on the ordinary middle holidays the doing of work is forbidden. Whence do we obtain these statements? Because our Rabbis have taught, "The feast of unleavened bread shalt thou keep seven days" (Exod. xxiii. 15). This teaches us that on the middle holidays it is forbidden to do work. These are the words of R. Jeshaiah. R. Jonathan says, The above proof is not necessary. I can prove it by an argument a fortiori. For if on the first and seventh days of the Feast which have not got a holiday before them and after them, the doing of work is prohibited, then on ordinary middle holidays, which have a holiday before them and after them, is it not just that the doing of work should be prohibited? But, it is replied, Let the six days of Creation bear witness against this interpretation, which have a holiday before them and after them, and yet the doing of work is permitted. Nay, it is rejoined, how are the six days of Creation a parallel case? For they have no additional sacrifice as the middle holidays have. Thou mayest say in reply, In the case of an ordinary middle holiday, as it has an additional sacrifice, let the first day of the month bear testimony, for on it there is an additional sacrifice, yet the doing of work is permitted. Nay, it is rejoined, how is the first day of the month a parallel case? For it is not called a holy convocation. Thou mayest say in conclusion, In the case of an ordinary middle holiday which is called a holy convocation, seeing that it is called a holy convocation, it is only just that the doing of work should be prohibited. There is another Baraitha, "Ye shall do no servile work" (Lev. xxiii. 8), that is to say, that on an ordinary middle holiday the doing of work is forbidden. The following are the words of R. Jose the Galilaean. R. Akiba says, It was not necessary, for lo, He says, "These are the set feasts of the Lord, etc." (Lev. xxiii. 4) With reference to what is the Scripture speaking? If to the first day, Behold, it has been already called a sabbath-day; if to the seventh day, Behold, it has been already called a sabbath-day; behold, the Scripture can be speaking only of an ordinary middle holiday, to teach thee that the doing of work is forbidden thereon.
And Resh Lakish said, "And the feast of the harvest" (Exod. xxiii. 16),—what is this Feast on which thou feastest and reapest? Thou must reply, This is the Pentecost. When is it? If I am to say, On the high holiday, how is reaping lawful on a high holiday? But dost thou not think that it means as well on the subsequent days? R. Jochanan said, But regard it thus. The Feast of Ingathering—what is this Feast in which there is an ingathering? Thou must say, This is the Feast of Tabernacles. When is it? If I am to say, On the high holiday, how is work lawful on a high holiday? But if I am to say, On one of the ordinary middle holidays, how is work lawful on one of the ordinary middle holidays? But it means the Feast which comes at the season of ingathering; and so in this case also the Feast which comes at the season of harvest. Consequently both are of opinion that on the ordinary middle holidays the doing of work is forbidden. Whence do we obtain these statements? Because our Rabbis have taught, "The feast of unleavened bread shalt thou keep seven days" (Exod. xxiii. 15). This teaches us that on the middle holidays it is forbidden to do work. These are the words of R. Jeshaiah. R. Jonathan says, The above proof is not necessary. I can prove it by an argument a fortiori. For if on the first and seventh days of the Feast which have not got a holiday before them and after them, the doing of work is prohibited, then on ordinary middle holidays, which have a holiday before them and after them, is it not just that the doing of work should be prohibited? But, it is replied, Let the six days of Creation bear witness against this interpretation, which have a holiday before them and after them, and yet the doing of work is permitted. Nay, it is rejoined, how are the six days of Creation a parallel case? For they have no additional sacrifice as the middle holidays have. Thou mayest say in reply, In the case of an ordinary middle holiday, as it has an additional sacrifice, let the first day of the month bear testimony, for on it there is an additional sacrifice, yet the doing of work is permitted. Nay, it is rejoined, how is the first day of the month a parallel case? For it is not called a holy convocation. Thou mayest say in conclusion, In the case of an ordinary middle holiday which is called a holy convocation, seeing that it is called a holy convocation, it is only just that the doing of work should be prohibited. There is another Baraitha, "Ye shall do no servile work" (Lev. xxiii. 8), that is to say, that on an ordinary middle holiday the doing of work is forbidden. The following are the words of R. Jose the Galilaean. R. Akiba says, It was not necessary, for lo, He says, "These are the set feasts of the Lord, etc." (Lev. xxiii. 4) With reference to what is the Scripture speaking? If to the first day, Behold, it has been already called a sabbath-day; if to the seventh day, Behold, it has been already called a sabbath-day; behold, the Scripture can be speaking only of an ordinary middle holiday, to teach thee that the doing of work is forbidden thereon.
And Resh Lakish said, "And the feast of the harvest" (Exod. xxiii. 16),—what is this Feast on which thou feastest and reapest? Thou must reply, This is the Pentecost. When is it? If I am to say, On the high holiday, how is reaping lawful on a high holiday? But dost thou not think that it means as well on the subsequent days? R. Jochanan said, But regard it thus. The Feast of Ingathering—what is this Feast in which there is an ingathering? Thou must say, This is the Feast of Tabernacles. When is it? If I am to say, On the high holiday, how is work lawful on a high holiday? But if I am to say, On one of the ordinary middle holidays, how is work lawful on one of the ordinary middle holidays? But it means the Feast which comes at the season of ingathering; and so in this case also the Feast which comes at the season of harvest. Consequently both are of opinion that on the ordinary middle holidays the doing of work is forbidden. Whence do we obtain these statements? Because our Rabbis have taught, "The feast of unleavened bread shalt thou keep seven days" (Exod. xxiii. 15). This teaches us that on the middle holidays it is forbidden to do work. These are the words of R. Jeshaiah. R. Jonathan says, The above proof is not necessary. I can prove it by an argument a fortiori. For if on the first and seventh days of the Feast which have not got a holiday before them and after them, the doing of work is prohibited, then on ordinary middle holidays, which have a holiday before them and after them, is it not just that the doing of work should be prohibited? But, it is replied, Let the six days of Creation bear witness against this interpretation, which have a holiday before them and after them, and yet the doing of work is permitted. Nay, it is rejoined, how are the six days of Creation a parallel case? For they have no additional sacrifice as the middle holidays have. Thou mayest say in reply, In the case of an ordinary middle holiday, as it has an additional sacrifice, let the first day of the month bear testimony, for on it there is an additional sacrifice, yet the doing of work is permitted. Nay, it is rejoined, how is the first day of the month a parallel case? For it is not called a holy convocation. Thou mayest say in conclusion, In the case of an ordinary middle holiday which is called a holy convocation, seeing that it is called a holy convocation, it is only just that the doing of work should be prohibited. There is another Baraitha, "Ye shall do no servile work" (Lev. xxiii. 8), that is to say, that on an ordinary middle holiday the doing of work is forbidden. The following are the words of R. Jose the Galilaean. R. Akiba says, It was not necessary, for lo, He says, "These are the set feasts of the Lord, etc." (Lev. xxiii. 4) With reference to what is the Scripture speaking? If to the first day, Behold, it has been already called a sabbath-day; if to the seventh day, Behold, it has been already called a sabbath-day; behold, the Scripture can be speaking only of an ordinary middle holiday, to teach thee that the doing of work is forbidden thereon.
And Resh Lakish said, "And the feast of the harvest" (Exod. xxiii. 16),—what is this Feast on which thou feastest and reapest? Thou must reply, This is the Pentecost. When is it? If I am to say, On the high holiday, how is reaping lawful on a high holiday? But dost thou not think that it means as well on the subsequent days? R. Jochanan said, But regard it thus. The Feast of Ingathering—what is this Feast in which there is an ingathering? Thou must say, This is the Feast of Tabernacles. When is it? If I am to say, On the high holiday, how is work lawful on a high holiday? But if I am to say, On one of the ordinary middle holidays, how is work lawful on one of the ordinary middle holidays? But it means the Feast which comes at the season of ingathering; and so in this case also the Feast which comes at the season of harvest. Consequently both are of opinion that on the ordinary middle holidays the doing of work is forbidden. Whence do we obtain these statements? Because our Rabbis have taught, "The feast of unleavened bread shalt thou keep seven days" (Exod. xxiii. 15). This teaches us that on the middle holidays it is forbidden to do work. These are the words of R. Jeshaiah. R. Jonathan says, The above proof is not necessary. I can prove it by an argument a fortiori. For if on the first and seventh days of the Feast which have not got a holiday before them and after them, the doing of work is prohibited, then on ordinary middle holidays, which have a holiday before them and after them, is it not just that the doing of work should be prohibited? But, it is replied, Let the six days of Creation bear witness against this interpretation, which have a holiday before them and after them, and yet the doing of work is permitted. Nay, it is rejoined, how are the six days of Creation a parallel case? For they have no additional sacrifice as the middle holidays have. Thou mayest say in reply, In the case of an ordinary middle holiday, as it has an additional sacrifice, let the first day of the month bear testimony, for on it there is an additional sacrifice, yet the doing of work is permitted. Nay, it is rejoined, how is the first day of the month a parallel case? For it is not called a holy convocation. Thou mayest say in conclusion, In the case of an ordinary middle holiday which is called a holy convocation, seeing that it is called a holy convocation, it is only just that the doing of work should be prohibited. There is another Baraitha, "Ye shall do no servile work" (Lev. xxiii. 8), that is to say, that on an ordinary middle holiday the doing of work is forbidden. The following are the words of R. Jose the Galilaean. R. Akiba says, It was not necessary, for lo, He says, "These are the set feasts of the Lord, etc." (Lev. xxiii. 4) With reference to what is the Scripture speaking? If to the first day, Behold, it has been already called a sabbath-day; if to the seventh day, Behold, it has been already called a sabbath-day; behold, the Scripture can be speaking only of an ordinary middle holiday, to teach thee that the doing of work is forbidden thereon.
But it is allowed in case of a mourning or of a fast, but this is not to confirm the words of those who say, Pentecost is after the Sabbath. And here there is a matter told as follows: And Alexis died in Lod, and all Israel assembled to mourn him, and R. Tarphon forbad them because it was the high holiday of Pentecost. "High holiday". Thou mightest have thought, If it was a high holiday, how could the people have come? But I will tell you. It was because it was the day of sacrificing. There is no difficulty. The one case was that in which the holiday had fallen upon the first day of the week, the other case is that in which the holiday has fallen on the Sabbath.
But it is allowed in case of a mourning or of a fast, but this is not to confirm the words of those who say, Pentecost is after the Sabbath. And here there is a matter told as follows: And Alexis died in Lod, and all Israel assembled to mourn him, and R. Tarphon forbad them because it was the high holiday of Pentecost. "High holiday". Thou mightest have thought, If it was a high holiday, how could the people have come? But I will tell you. It was because it was the day of sacrificing. There is no difficulty. The one case was that in which the holiday had fallen upon the first day of the week, the other case is that in which the holiday has fallen on the Sabbath.
But it is allowed in case of a mourning or of a fast, but this is not to confirm the words of those who say, Pentecost is after the Sabbath. And here there is a matter told as follows: And Alexis died in Lod, and all Israel assembled to mourn him, and R. Tarphon forbad them because it was the high holiday of Pentecost. "High holiday". Thou mightest have thought, If it was a high holiday, how could the people have come? But I will tell you. It was because it was the day of sacrificing. There is no difficulty. The one case was that in which the holiday had fallen upon the first day of the week, the other case is that in which the holiday has fallen on the Sabbath.
For common food and tithe how can washing of hands be needed? For I can adduce against this Mishnah the following, viz., The heave offering and the firstfruits involve to one who transgresses with respect to them death and compensation to the amount of one fifth part beyond the price, and it is forbidden to strangers to share in them, and these are the property of the priest and are mixed with one hundred and one things, and they are subject to the washing of hands and waiting till the going down of the sun (Bikkurim, ii. 1, and elsewhere). Lo, this is the case with heave-offering and firstfruits, but it is not the case with tithe, much less with common food. There is a difficulty when we place tithe against tithe, and there is a difficulty when we place common food against common food. It is all right in the case of tithe against tithe. It does not present a difficulty. The one opinion is that of R. Meir, and the other that of our Rabbis. For there is a canonical Mishnah, Everything which is subject to the duty of going to the water, as far as the scribes have taught, defiles hallowed things, but only disqualifies heave-offering and leaves common food and tithe unaffected. These are the words of R. Meir, but wise men consider tithe affected (Chullin 33b, i. 1, Sota 30a, ii. 4).
For common food and tithe how can washing of hands be needed? For I can adduce against this Mishnah the following, viz., The heave offering and the firstfruits involve to one who transgresses with respect to them death and compensation to the amount of one fifth part beyond the price, and it is forbidden to strangers to share in them, and these are the property of the priest and are mixed with one hundred and one things, and they are subject to the washing of hands and waiting till the going down of the sun (Bikkurim, ii. 1, and elsewhere). Lo, this is the case with heave-offering and firstfruits, but it is not the case with tithe, much less with common food. There is a difficulty when we place tithe against tithe, and there is a difficulty when we place common food against common food. It is all right in the case of tithe against tithe. It does not present a difficulty. The one opinion is that of R. Meir, and the other that of our Rabbis. For there is a canonical Mishnah, Everything which is subject to the duty of going to the water, as far as the scribes have taught, defiles hallowed things, but only disqualifies heave-offering and leaves common food and tithe unaffected. These are the words of R. Meir, but wise men consider tithe affected (Chullin 33b, i. 1, Sota 30a, ii. 4).
For common food and tithe how can washing of hands be needed? For I can adduce against this Mishnah the following, viz., The heave offering and the firstfruits involve to one who transgresses with respect to them death and compensation to the amount of one fifth part beyond the price, and it is forbidden to strangers to share in them, and these are the property of the priest and are mixed with one hundred and one things, and they are subject to the washing of hands and waiting till the going down of the sun (Bikkurim, ii. 1, and elsewhere). Lo, this is the case with heave-offering and firstfruits, but it is not the case with tithe, much less with common food. There is a difficulty when we place tithe against tithe, and there is a difficulty when we place common food against common food. It is all right in the case of tithe against tithe. It does not present a difficulty. The one opinion is that of R. Meir, and the other that of our Rabbis. For there is a canonical Mishnah, Everything which is subject to the duty of going to the water, as far as the scribes have taught, defiles hallowed things, but only disqualifies heave-offering and leaves common food and tithe unaffected. These are the words of R. Meir, but wise men consider tithe affected (Chullin 33b, i. 1, Sota 30a, ii. 4).
But, you may say, there is a difficulty, where we place common food against common food. There is no difficulty. The one case has to do with eating, the other with touching.
And what is your authority for saying that common food does not want intention? Because there is a canonical Mishnah, If a wave of water, which is let loose and contains forty seahs, falls upon a man or upon vessels, they are clean (Chullin 31b, i. 1). For it teaches that a man is like vessels. As vessels have no intention, so a man has no intention. But whence do you gather that he has no intention? Perhaps we are dealing with the case of a man sitting and watching when the wave shall be let loose. And vessels are like a man. As a man utters his intention, so in the case of vessels persons exercise intention for them. And when thou sayest, It is the case of a man sitting and watching, what is the good of the story, for in that case he has an intention? Thou mightest have thought, It is to set a limit. Perhaps otherwise he would have gone to dip himself in a collection of stagnant rain-water. Thus also we limit it to the first fall, on account of the second being unlawful. We learn from this that we are not to limit it. And what is your authority for saying that men do not dip in the second fall? Because there is a Baraitha, viz., Men dip in the first, but do not dip in the second, that they may not dip in the air. But we also learn it hence, for there is a canonical Mishnah, If fruits have fallen into the midst of a reservoir of water, and if one whose hands are unclean should reach out and lay hold of them, his hands are clean, and the fruits are clean. But if he did this that he might wash his hands, his hands are clean, but the fruits are unclean (Makhshirin, iv. 7).
And what is your authority for saying that common food does not want intention? Because there is a canonical Mishnah, If a wave of water, which is let loose and contains forty seahs, falls upon a man or upon vessels, they are clean (Chullin 31b, i. 1). For it teaches that a man is like vessels. As vessels have no intention, so a man has no intention. But whence do you gather that he has no intention? Perhaps we are dealing with the case of a man sitting and watching when the wave shall be let loose. And vessels are like a man. As a man utters his intention, so in the case of vessels persons exercise intention for them. And when thou sayest, It is the case of a man sitting and watching, what is the good of the story, for in that case he has an intention? Thou mightest have thought, It is to set a limit. Perhaps otherwise he would have gone to dip himself in a collection of stagnant rain-water. Thus also we limit it to the first fall, on account of the second being unlawful. We learn from this that we are not to limit it. And what is your authority for saying that men do not dip in the second fall? Because there is a Baraitha, viz., Men dip in the first, but do not dip in the second, that they may not dip in the air. But we also learn it hence, for there is a canonical Mishnah, If fruits have fallen into the midst of a reservoir of water, and if one whose hands are unclean should reach out and lay hold of them, his hands are clean, and the fruits are clean. But if he did this that he might wash his hands, his hands are clean, but the fruits are unclean (Makhshirin, iv. 7).
And what is your authority for saying that common food does not want intention? Because there is a canonical Mishnah, If a wave of water, which is let loose and contains forty seahs, falls upon a man or upon vessels, they are clean (Chullin 31b, i. 1). For it teaches that a man is like vessels. As vessels have no intention, so a man has no intention. But whence do you gather that he has no intention? Perhaps we are dealing with the case of a man sitting and watching when the wave shall be let loose. And vessels are like a man. As a man utters his intention, so in the case of vessels persons exercise intention for them. And when thou sayest, It is the case of a man sitting and watching, what is the good of the story, for in that case he has an intention? Thou mightest have thought, It is to set a limit. Perhaps otherwise he would have gone to dip himself in a collection of stagnant rain-water. Thus also we limit it to the first fall, on account of the second being unlawful. We learn from this that we are not to limit it. And what is your authority for saying that men do not dip in the second fall? Because there is a Baraitha, viz., Men dip in the first, but do not dip in the second, that they may not dip in the air. But we also learn it hence, for there is a canonical Mishnah, If fruits have fallen into the midst of a reservoir of water, and if one whose hands are unclean should reach out and lay hold of them, his hands are clean, and the fruits are clean. But if he did this that he might wash his hands, his hands are clean, but the fruits are unclean (Makhshirin, iv. 7).
And what is your authority for saying that common food does not want intention? Because there is a canonical Mishnah, If a wave of water, which is let loose and contains forty seahs, falls upon a man or upon vessels, they are clean (Chullin 31b, i. 1). For it teaches that a man is like vessels. As vessels have no intention, so a man has no intention. But whence do you gather that he has no intention? Perhaps we are dealing with the case of a man sitting and watching when the wave shall be let loose. And vessels are like a man. As a man utters his intention, so in the case of vessels persons exercise intention for them. And when thou sayest, It is the case of a man sitting and watching, what is the good of the story, for in that case he has an intention? Thou mightest have thought, It is to set a limit. Perhaps otherwise he would have gone to dip himself in a collection of stagnant rain-water. Thus also we limit it to the first fall, on account of the second being unlawful. We learn from this that we are not to limit it. And what is your authority for saying that men do not dip in the second fall? Because there is a Baraitha, viz., Men dip in the first, but do not dip in the second, that they may not dip in the air. But we also learn it hence, for there is a canonical Mishnah, If fruits have fallen into the midst of a reservoir of water, and if one whose hands are unclean should reach out and lay hold of them, his hands are clean, and the fruits are clean. But if he did this that he might wash his hands, his hands are clean, but the fruits are unclean (Makhshirin, iv. 7).
Rabbah put this question to R. Nachman, Thou saidst, He who dips for common food and has credit for common food, is forbidden tithe. If he claims credit, he has it; if he does not claim credit, he has it not. Nay, but it means, Although he has credit for common food, he is forbidden tithe. He put this further question to him, There is a Mishnah as follows, If he have dipped and have not got credit for it, it is as though he had not dipped. Do you think it means, that it is as though he had not dipped? Certainly not, but it means that it is, as though he had not dipped for tithe. But the case supposed is that of one who has dipped for common food. He considered and brought this refutation.
He went out and speculated and found that there is a Baraitha, viz., If a man have dipped and have not credit, he is forbidden tithe, but is free for common food. R. Eliezer said, If he have dipped and gone up, he may hold himself fit for any thing that he desires. But they reply, If, while he had still one foot in the water, he considered himself fit for a smaller thing, he may consider himself fit for a greater thing; if he had gone up, he may not any more consider himself fit. Don't you think that this means, that he may not consider himself fit for any thing at all? No; while he had still one foot in the water, although he considered himself fit for a smaller thing only, he may consider himself fit for a greater thing; if he have gone up, then, if he did not think of himself as fit for any particular thing, he may consider himself as fit, but if he did think of himself as fit for a smaller thing, he may not consider himself as fit for a greater thing. Who is the Mishnah teacher who says, While he had still one foot in the water? R. P'dath says, It is R. Jehudah, for there is a canonical Mishnah, If a collection of water is measured, and there are in it exactly forty seahs, and two men go down and dip one after the other, the first is clean, and the second is unclean. R. Jehudah said, If the feet of the first are still in contact with the water, the second also is clean (Mikvaoth, vi. 6). R. Nachman said that Rabbah bar Abuah said, There is a disagreement on the point among the weighty sayings of our Rabbis, but, if it is a case of passing from uncleanness to cleanness, all agree that the second also is unclean, and this is the opinion of R. P'dath. There are some who say that R. Nachman said, that Rabbah bar Abuah said, There is a disagreement as regards passing from uncleanness to cleanness, but among the weighty sayings of our Rabbis all agree that the second also is clean. And here there is a divergence from R. P'dath. Ola said,
They asked this question of R. Jochanan, According to R. Jehudah how is it as regards dipping needles and forks on the head of the first? Is there the case of draw and go down according to R. Jehudah? and is there not the case of draw and go up according to him? or perhaps there is also the case of draw and go up according to him. He said to him, This is an old story. There are, suppose, three depressions in the bed of a stream, the upper and the lower and the middle one. The upper and the lower are each of the size of twenty seahs, and the middle one of forty seahs, and a collection of stagnant rain-water stretches between them? R. Jehudah said, Meir used to say, A man may dip in the upper one. And yet there is a Baraitha, viz., R. Jehudah says,
They asked this question of R. Jochanan, According to R. Jehudah how is it as regards dipping needles and forks on the head of the first? Is there the case of draw and go down according to R. Jehudah? and is there not the case of draw and go up according to him? or perhaps there is also the case of draw and go up according to him. He said to him, This is an old story. There are, suppose, three depressions in the bed of a stream, the upper and the lower and the middle one. The upper and the lower are each of the size of twenty seahs, and the middle one of forty seahs, and a collection of stagnant rain-water stretches between them? R. Jehudah said, Meir used to say, A man may dip in the upper one. And yet there is a Baraitha, viz., R. Jehudah says,
They asked this question of R. Jochanan, According to R. Jehudah how is it as regards dipping needles and forks on the head of the first? Is there the case of draw and go down according to R. Jehudah? and is there not the case of draw and go up according to him? or perhaps there is also the case of draw and go up according to him. He said to him, This is an old story. There are, suppose, three depressions in the bed of a stream, the upper and the lower and the middle one. The upper and the lower are each of the size of twenty seahs, and the middle one of forty seahs, and a collection of stagnant rain-water stretches between them? R. Jehudah said, Meir used to say, A man may dip in the upper one. And yet there is a Baraitha, viz., R. Jehudah says,