252 occurrences across the corpus

The Jerusalem Talmud

Jerusalem Talmud Chagigah 3:12

Rebbi Joḥanan said, it is from Rebbi Aqiba’s testimony. As we have stated there, “Rebbi Aqiba added that fine flour, and incense, frankincense, and coals, part of which were touched by a Tevul Yom are all disqualified.” Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, they knew that vessels of Servive do combine. About what comes he to testify? About the leftovers of flour-offerings that they do combine together. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Zamina in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Why did they say, leftovers of flour-offerings do combine together? Because they need their vessel. Rebbi Aḥa, Rebbi Ila in the name of Rebbi Yasa: they knew that vessels of Service do combine. About what comes he to testify? About fine flour, and incense, and frankincense, and coals. One understands fine flour, and incense, and frankincense. Coals? Rebbi Abun bar Cahana said, explain it about coals on the Day of Atonement which he has to carry inside in the vessel which he used to scoop up. But [not] about every day’s coals. As we have stated there, “If a qab of coals were dispersed, one sweeps them into the water canal, but on the Sabbath one covers it with a wine-cooler. Rebbi Mattania said, do fine flour, and incense, frankincense, and coals, need a minimum volume in this respect? Not because they have to be in their vessel? Here also because they have to be in their vessel.

Jerusalem Talmud Chagigah 3:13

Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya asked: may a fistful be offered from two vessels? Rebbi Ḥanin objected, did we not state, “the vessel combines”? If you would say that a fistful can be offered from two vessels, for which purpose did we state “the vessel combines”? Rebbi Eleazar the Southerner said, did not Rebbi Yose bar Zamina say in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, why did they say, leftovers of flour-offerings do combine together? Because they need their vessel. Here also because they have to be in their vessel. Rebbi Mattaniah said, are not fine flour, and incense, and frankincense, and coals offered in many vessels? Nevertheless you are saying, “the vessel combines”; and here “the vessel combines”. Cahana asked the rabbis there, a flour-offering split in the mixing bowl, if one became impure did the other become impure? They said to him, if one became impure the other became impure. Did impurity jump? They said to him, impurity did jump. Even if another {vessel} was in between? They said to him, even if another {vessel} was in between. Taking a fistful from one on the other? They said to him, we did not hear any tradition, we studied a Mishnah, as what we did state there, “if two flour offerings from which no fistfuls were taken were combined together, if he is able to take a fistful from one separately and from the other separately they are qualified, otherwise disqualified.” Do not the remainders of one interrupt between one and the other? There came Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa, Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If a fistful was taken from one for the other, if one became impure he other became impure. Anything in-between did not become impure. Was it not stated, “one cup? Which makes its contents one.” Rebbi Ḥinena said, a vessel combines only what is tied to it.

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 6:9

Rebbi Samuel bar Sosarti asked: Then one who eats a limb from a kosher living animal should be guilty on two counts, because of “you shall not eat any carcass meat;” and because of “you shall not eat of life with the flesh.” Does one argue from kosher abour non-kosher animals? But did not Rebbi Eleazar argue from kosher about non-kosher animals? Then one who eats a limb from a non-kosher living animal should be guilty on three counts, because of “you shall not eat any carcass meat;” and because of “you shall not eat of life with the flesh”; and because of “you shall not eat from their flesh.” Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: If somebody ate five ants together, in one forgetting, he is guilty for each one separately because of “creature”. If he fragmented and ate them, he is guilty only once, if together they amount to the volume of an olive. If he ate of the fragments in the volume of an olive, he is guilty; if he ate of the fragments in the volume of an olive and an ant, he is guilty twice. If this is correct, then if he ate of the fragments less than the volume of an olive and an ant completed the volume of an olive, is he guilty twice? If this is correct, if the ate an ant the size of an olive, is he guilty twice? The same rule applies to combinations of a nazir. If he ate of the combinations in the volume of an olive, he is guilty. If he ate of the combinations in the volume of an olive and a grape berry, is he guilty twice? If this is correct, then if he ate a grape berry for the volume ofan olive, is he guilty twice? Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: All [food] prohibitions combine together to be whipped for the volume of an olive, but for an ant one is guilty twice. Then if he ate prohibited food and an ant completed the volume of an olive, he is guilty twice. Then if he ate an ant the volume of an olive, he is guilty twice.

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 6:12

Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: One does not whip for anything imparting taste except imparting taste for the nazir. [Rebbi Ze‘ira said, one does not whip for anything imparting taste until he tasted the forbidden thing itself] except the nazir even if he did not taste the forbidden thing itself. Rebbi Abba bar Mamal said, for food imparting taste what is forbidden and what is permitted is not combined, but for the nazir forbidden and permitted do combine. A baraita supports one and a baraita supports the other. A baraita supports Rebbi Ze‘ira: If wine in the volume of an olive fell into a dish and he ate from it, he cannot be prosecuted unless he ate the entire dish. In the opinion of Rebbi Abba bar Mamal, if he ate the volume of an olive from it he is guilty. A baraita supports Rebbi Abba bar Mamal: “What do we understand when it is said (Num. 6:3): ‘Anything in which grapes were soaked he shall not eat, and fresh or dried grape berries he shall not eat’? What did the verse leave out that was not said? But since it was said (Num. 6:4): ‘anything made from the wine-vine, from grape skins to seeds he should not eat;’ (Num. 6:3) ‘from wine and liquor he shall abstain.’ Why does the verse say ‘anything in which grapes were soaked he should not eat’? It means that if he soaked grapes and then soaked his bread in that, if it adds up to the volume of an olive, he is guilty. From here you argue about all prohibitions of the Torah. Since for all that comes from the vine, whose prohibition is neither permanent, nor a prohibition of usufruct, and whose prohibition can be lifted, He made taste like the thing itself; it is logical that for every prohibition of the Torah which is permanent, is a prohibition of usufruct, whose prohibition cannot be lifted, taste is treated like the thing itself. From here, the Sages inferred that everything imparting taste is forbidden.” This is difficult for Rebbi Ze‘ira: you say everywhere “unless he tasted”, and here you say, “even if he did not taste.”

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 6:14

“Rebbi Aqiba says, even if he dipped his bread in wine for a total volume of an olive, he is guilty.” Rebbi Ḥanania said, only if he dipped in an olive-sized volume of wine. Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: For a mixed cup one whips because of soaking. That is, if they did (not) warn because of soaking. But if they warned because of soaking, this does not apply. It is written: “He shall not drink anything soaked in grapes.” Not only soaking grapes, from where soaking grape skins? The verse says “soaked, anything soaked,” that all kinds of soaking are counted. Mixed wine combines with pure wine. Soaking water of grapes combines with grapes. Do soaked grapes and wine combine? If one ate half an olive’s volume of wine and half an olive’s volume of soaking water, is he not guilty. Separately, he is not prosecutable. Because he combined, he is guilty. If he ate (sic!) an olive’s volume of wine and an olive’s volume of soaking water, he is guilty only once. Separately, he is guilty twice. Because he combined, he should be guilty only once.

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 6:52

How is this? One says, all sources of flavor by one in 100; the other says, all sources of flavor by one in 60. For him who says all sources of taste by one in 100, you take the foreleg as one in 100 of the ram. For him who says all sources of taste by one in 60, you take the foreleg as one in 60 of the ram. For him who says one in 100, you remove the bones from the foreleg. But if you remove the bones from the foreleg, remove them from the ram! This you cannot do, as it was stated: “The waste of heave does not combine with heave to forbid the profane, but the waste of profane combines with the profane to lift the heave.” Rebbi Vivian asked: Does the waste of heave combine with profane to lift the heave? Since Rav Ḥuna said, the husks of what is forbidden combine to permit; that means waste of heave combines with profane to lift the heave.

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 6:52

How is this? One says, all sources of flavor by one in 100; the other says, all sources of flavor by one in 60. For him who says all sources of taste by one in 100, you take the foreleg as one in 100 of the ram. For him who says all sources of taste by one in 60, you take the foreleg as one in 60 of the ram. For him who says one in 100, you remove the bones from the foreleg. But if you remove the bones from the foreleg, remove them from the ram! This you cannot do, as it was stated: “The waste of heave does not combine with heave to forbid the profane, but the waste of profane combines with the profane to lift the heave.” Rebbi Vivian asked: Does the waste of heave combine with profane to lift the heave? Since Rav Ḥuna said, the husks of what is forbidden combine to permit; that means waste of heave combines with profane to lift the heave.

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 6:52

How is this? One says, all sources of flavor by one in 100; the other says, all sources of flavor by one in 60. For him who says all sources of taste by one in 100, you take the foreleg as one in 100 of the ram. For him who says all sources of taste by one in 60, you take the foreleg as one in 60 of the ram. For him who says one in 100, you remove the bones from the foreleg. But if you remove the bones from the foreleg, remove them from the ram! This you cannot do, as it was stated: “The waste of heave does not combine with heave to forbid the profane, but the waste of profane combines with the profane to lift the heave.” Rebbi Vivian asked: Does the waste of heave combine with profane to lift the heave? Since Rav Ḥuna said, the husks of what is forbidden combine to permit; that means waste of heave combines with profane to lift the heave.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 7:22

But Rebbi Joḥanan himself had a problem: from where does one prove it? Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia: Two prohibitions and one extirpation, the prohibitions split the extirpation. For example, it should not be used to be rubbed on anybody’s skin and in its proportions you shall not imitate it, and it is written, a person who would compound similarly, or who would put it on a stranger, will be extirpated from his people, that is two prohibitions and one extirpation. The prohibitions split the extirpation. Also from the following: Samuel bar Abba asked before Rebbi Ze`ura, should not well-being sacrifices, being treated separately, split all sancta regarding impurity? He told him, it was necessary that they be treated separately, to eliminate sancta destined for the upkeep of the Temple [regarding larceny], lest one be liable for them because of mushiness, leftovers, and impurity. But is that not a Mishnah? “All sancta destined for the altar combine with one another with respect to liability for mushiness, leftovers, and impurity,” in contrast to sancta destined for the upkeep of the Temple. Since they do not combine, they do (not) split. Rebbi Ḥanina said, what he really questioned, should they not split but combine ?

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 7:22

But Rebbi Joḥanan himself had a problem: from where does one prove it? Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia: Two prohibitions and one extirpation, the prohibitions split the extirpation. For example, it should not be used to be rubbed on anybody’s skin and in its proportions you shall not imitate it, and it is written, a person who would compound similarly, or who would put it on a stranger, will be extirpated from his people, that is two prohibitions and one extirpation. The prohibitions split the extirpation. Also from the following: Samuel bar Abba asked before Rebbi Ze`ura, should not well-being sacrifices, being treated separately, split all sancta regarding impurity? He told him, it was necessary that they be treated separately, to eliminate sancta destined for the upkeep of the Temple [regarding larceny], lest one be liable for them because of mushiness, leftovers, and impurity. But is that not a Mishnah? “All sancta destined for the altar combine with one another with respect to liability for mushiness, leftovers, and impurity,” in contrast to sancta destined for the upkeep of the Temple. Since they do not combine, they do (not) split. Rebbi Ḥanina said, what he really questioned, should they not split but combine ?

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 7:22

But Rebbi Joḥanan himself had a problem: from where does one prove it? Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia: Two prohibitions and one extirpation, the prohibitions split the extirpation. For example, it should not be used to be rubbed on anybody’s skin and in its proportions you shall not imitate it, and it is written, a person who would compound similarly, or who would put it on a stranger, will be extirpated from his people, that is two prohibitions and one extirpation. The prohibitions split the extirpation. Also from the following: Samuel bar Abba asked before Rebbi Ze`ura, should not well-being sacrifices, being treated separately, split all sancta regarding impurity? He told him, it was necessary that they be treated separately, to eliminate sancta destined for the upkeep of the Temple [regarding larceny], lest one be liable for them because of mushiness, leftovers, and impurity. But is that not a Mishnah? “All sancta destined for the altar combine with one another with respect to liability for mushiness, leftovers, and impurity,” in contrast to sancta destined for the upkeep of the Temple. Since they do not combine, they do (not) split. Rebbi Ḥanina said, what he really questioned, should they not split but combine ?

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 2:12

Rebbi Yose asked: If one ate half the volume of an olive being aware of the Sanctuary but oblivious of impurity and about half the volume of an olive being aware of impurity but oblivious of the Sanctuary; do the oblivions combine?

Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 1:15

Are consequences of a ruling like the ruling? Do ruling within ruling combine? How is that? If the public ate forbidden fat and designated their sacrifices. If you say that consequences of a ruling are like the ruling, the Court is liable. If you say that consequences of a ruling are not like the ruling, the Court is not liable. The following should be obvious to you: the consequences of a ruling are like the ruling. Do ruling within ruling combine with each other? How is that? If the Court ruled that the fat in the right side kidney was permitted but that of the left side and its cover was forbidden; then they reversed themselves and said the opposite. Most ate the first time, and most the second time. If you say that they combine, they are liable for one. But if you say that they do not combine, they are liable for two. Do two instructions about one kind of work combine? How is that? If a majority ate and a majority slaughtered. In Rebbi Meïr’s opinion they are once liable; in Rebbi Simeon’s opinion they are twice liable. If a minority ate the first time and a minority the second time. In Rebbi Meïr’s opinion they are liable; in Rebbi Simeon’s opinion they are not liable.

Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 1:15

Are consequences of a ruling like the ruling? Do ruling within ruling combine? How is that? If the public ate forbidden fat and designated their sacrifices. If you say that consequences of a ruling are like the ruling, the Court is liable. If you say that consequences of a ruling are not like the ruling, the Court is not liable. The following should be obvious to you: the consequences of a ruling are like the ruling. Do ruling within ruling combine with each other? How is that? If the Court ruled that the fat in the right side kidney was permitted but that of the left side and its cover was forbidden; then they reversed themselves and said the opposite. Most ate the first time, and most the second time. If you say that they combine, they are liable for one. But if you say that they do not combine, they are liable for two. Do two instructions about one kind of work combine? How is that? If a majority ate and a majority slaughtered. In Rebbi Meïr’s opinion they are once liable; in Rebbi Simeon’s opinion they are twice liable. If a minority ate the first time and a minority the second time. In Rebbi Meïr’s opinion they are liable; in Rebbi Simeon’s opinion they are not liable.

Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 1:15

Are consequences of a ruling like the ruling? Do ruling within ruling combine? How is that? If the public ate forbidden fat and designated their sacrifices. If you say that consequences of a ruling are like the ruling, the Court is liable. If you say that consequences of a ruling are not like the ruling, the Court is not liable. The following should be obvious to you: the consequences of a ruling are like the ruling. Do ruling within ruling combine with each other? How is that? If the Court ruled that the fat in the right side kidney was permitted but that of the left side and its cover was forbidden; then they reversed themselves and said the opposite. Most ate the first time, and most the second time. If you say that they combine, they are liable for one. But if you say that they do not combine, they are liable for two. Do two instructions about one kind of work combine? How is that? If a majority ate and a majority slaughtered. In Rebbi Meïr’s opinion they are once liable; in Rebbi Simeon’s opinion they are twice liable. If a minority ate the first time and a minority the second time. In Rebbi Meïr’s opinion they are liable; in Rebbi Simeon’s opinion they are not liable.

Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 1:15

Are consequences of a ruling like the ruling? Do ruling within ruling combine? How is that? If the public ate forbidden fat and designated their sacrifices. If you say that consequences of a ruling are like the ruling, the Court is liable. If you say that consequences of a ruling are not like the ruling, the Court is not liable. The following should be obvious to you: the consequences of a ruling are like the ruling. Do ruling within ruling combine with each other? How is that? If the Court ruled that the fat in the right side kidney was permitted but that of the left side and its cover was forbidden; then they reversed themselves and said the opposite. Most ate the first time, and most the second time. If you say that they combine, they are liable for one. But if you say that they do not combine, they are liable for two. Do two instructions about one kind of work combine? How is that? If a majority ate and a majority slaughtered. In Rebbi Meïr’s opinion they are once liable; in Rebbi Simeon’s opinion they are twice liable. If a minority ate the first time and a minority the second time. In Rebbi Meïr’s opinion they are liable; in Rebbi Simeon’s opinion they are not liable.

Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 1:15

Are consequences of a ruling like the ruling? Do ruling within ruling combine? How is that? If the public ate forbidden fat and designated their sacrifices. If you say that consequences of a ruling are like the ruling, the Court is liable. If you say that consequences of a ruling are not like the ruling, the Court is not liable. The following should be obvious to you: the consequences of a ruling are like the ruling. Do ruling within ruling combine with each other? How is that? If the Court ruled that the fat in the right side kidney was permitted but that of the left side and its cover was forbidden; then they reversed themselves and said the opposite. Most ate the first time, and most the second time. If you say that they combine, they are liable for one. But if you say that they do not combine, they are liable for two. Do two instructions about one kind of work combine? How is that? If a majority ate and a majority slaughtered. In Rebbi Meïr’s opinion they are once liable; in Rebbi Simeon’s opinion they are twice liable. If a minority ate the first time and a minority the second time. In Rebbi Meïr’s opinion they are liable; in Rebbi Simeon’s opinion they are not liable.

Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 3:13

If one ate half the volume of an olive before he was appointed, half the volume of an olive after he was appointed, half the volume of an olive after he was removed from office. Since [no] obligation of a sacrifice came in between, do they combine? Let us hear from the following: Before him were three [olive sized pieces]. He ate the first but did not realize it; the second (and the third) while he was oblivious of the first. He was informed of the first but was not informed of the second. [He ate] the third while oblivious of the second. Afterwards he was informed about all of them. Rebbi Joḥanan said, he is liable for the first and the second but not liable for the third. Rebbi Yose said, the second depends on his intention. If he wishes, he atones for it with the first; if he wishes, he atones for it with the third. The colleagues compare it to four half-olives. If he was intelligent, he brings one sacrifice; otherwise, he brings two sacrifices. How is that? He brings one for the first and the second together; one for the third and fourth together. (Rebbi Yose compares it to full olive sizes. If he was intelligent, he brings two sacrifices; otherwise, he brings three sacrifices. How is that? He brings one for the first and the second together, and one for the third and fourth together.) If he brought for the middle ones, he is not liable for the first and the fourth. Rebbi Yose compares it to full olive sizes. If he was intelligent, he brings two sacrifices; otherwise, he brings three sacrifices. How is that? He brings one for the first and the second together, and one for the third and fourth together. If he brought for the middle ones, he is liable for the first separately and for the fourth separately.

The Babylonian Talmud

Babylonian Talmud Berakhot 9:52

Rab Judah said in the name of Rab : Besalel knew how to combine the letters with which the heavens and earth had been created ; for it is written here, "And He hath filled him with the spirit of God, in wisdom and in understanding and in knowledge" (Exod. 35:31), and it is written elsewhere, "The Lord by wisdom founded the earth; by understanding He established the heavens" (Proverbs 3:19) and "By His knowledge the depths were broken up" (Proverbs 3:20).

Babylonian Talmud Sukkah 1:358

Come and hear: Two sheets combine,

Babylonian Talmud Sukkah 1:359

two boards do not combine. R. Meir says: Boards also are like sheets.

Babylonian Talmud Sukkah 1:360

It is well according to Samuel who says that the dispute is where there are not four [handbreadths], but where there are four handbreadths all agree that it is invalid, [since it may be explained;] What does ‘combine’ mean? That they combine to make four [handbreadths].

Babylonian Talmud Sukkah 1:360

It is well according to Samuel who says that the dispute is where there are not four [handbreadths], but where there are four handbreadths all agree that it is invalid, [since it may be explained;] What does ‘combine’ mean? That they combine to make four [handbreadths].

Babylonian Talmud Sukkah 1:361

But according to Rav, who says that their dispute is where there are four [handbreadths], but where there are not four handbreadths all agree that it is valid, how is it to be explained? If there are four [handbreadths] why do they need to combine; if there are not, why [is it invalid]? Are they not mere sticks?

Babylonian Talmud Sukkah 1:362

Indeed [it is a case] where there are four handbreadths, and what [is meant by] "combine" they combine to form four cubits at the side

Babylonian Talmud Sukkah 1:362

Indeed [it is a case] where there are four handbreadths, and what [is meant by] "combine" they combine to form four cubits at the side

Babylonian Talmud Sukkah 1:363

Another version: goes well according to Shmuel, who says that the dispute is where there are not four [handbreadths], but where there are four, all agree that it is invalid. What is meant by ‘combine’? That they combine to form four cubits at the side.

Babylonian Talmud Sukkah 1:363

Another version: goes well according to Shmuel, who says that the dispute is where there are not four [handbreadths], but where there are four, all agree that it is invalid. What is meant by ‘combine’? That they combine to form four cubits at the side.

Babylonian Talmud Sukkah 1:364

But according to Rav it goes well according to R. Meir, since what is meant by ‘combine’ may be that they combine to form four cubits at the side, but according to R. Judah, who says that even if there are four [handbreadths] the Sukkah is valid, what could be the meaning of ‘they do not combine’? Are they not like mere sticks? Since R. Meir said ‘they do combine’, R. Judah said ‘they do not combine’.

Babylonian Talmud Sukkah 1:364

But according to Rav it goes well according to R. Meir, since what is meant by ‘combine’ may be that they combine to form four cubits at the side, but according to R. Judah, who says that even if there are four [handbreadths] the Sukkah is valid, what could be the meaning of ‘they do not combine’? Are they not like mere sticks? Since R. Meir said ‘they do combine’, R. Judah said ‘they do not combine’.

Babylonian Talmud Sukkah 1:364

But according to Rav it goes well according to R. Meir, since what is meant by ‘combine’ may be that they combine to form four cubits at the side, but according to R. Judah, who says that even if there are four [handbreadths] the Sukkah is valid, what could be the meaning of ‘they do not combine’? Are they not like mere sticks? Since R. Meir said ‘they do combine’, R. Judah said ‘they do not combine’.

Babylonian Talmud Sukkah 1:364

But according to Rav it goes well according to R. Meir, since what is meant by ‘combine’ may be that they combine to form four cubits at the side, but according to R. Judah, who says that even if there are four [handbreadths] the Sukkah is valid, what could be the meaning of ‘they do not combine’? Are they not like mere sticks? Since R. Meir said ‘they do combine’, R. Judah said ‘they do not combine’.

Babylonian Talmud Sukkah 1:364

But according to Rav it goes well according to R. Meir, since what is meant by ‘combine’ may be that they combine to form four cubits at the side, but according to R. Judah, who says that even if there are four [handbreadths] the Sukkah is valid, what could be the meaning of ‘they do not combine’? Are they not like mere sticks? Since R. Meir said ‘they do combine’, R. Judah said ‘they do not combine’.

Babylonian Talmud Sukkah 1:429

because [in this case the validity of the sukkah depends on] whether there is the standard size or not, and there is not the standard size, for since their standard sizes are unequal, they do not combine;

Babylonian Talmud Sukkah 1:430

because [in this case the validity of the sukkah depends on] whether there is the standard size or not, and there is not the standard size, for since their standard sizes are unequal, they do not combine;

Babylonian Talmud Sukkah 1:434

And it has been taught concerning this: garments and sacking, sacking and leather, leather and matting combine with one another?

Babylonian Talmud Sukkah 1:439

Come and hear: two sheets combine, two boards do not combine. R. Meir says, boards are like sheets.

Babylonian Talmud Sukkah 1:439

Come and hear: two sheets combine, two boards do not combine. R. Meir says, boards are like sheets.

Babylonian Talmud Sukkah 1:440

It is well according to that version which says that Rav says that ‘whether in the middle or at the sides [it invalidates only] if it is four cubits wide;’ What does it mean by ‘combine'? They combine to make four cubits. But, according to the version which says that Rav says that, in the middle [even] four handbreadths [width of invalid skhakh] invalidates, what kind of boards are we to imagine? If they are each four handbreadths wide, why do they need to combine? And if they are each less than four handbreadths wide, they are mere sticks!

Babylonian Talmud Sukkah 1:440

It is well according to that version which says that Rav says that ‘whether in the middle or at the sides [it invalidates only] if it is four cubits wide;’ What does it mean by ‘combine'? They combine to make four cubits. But, according to the version which says that Rav says that, in the middle [even] four handbreadths [width of invalid skhakh] invalidates, what kind of boards are we to imagine? If they are each four handbreadths wide, why do they need to combine? And if they are each less than four handbreadths wide, they are mere sticks!

Babylonian Talmud Sukkah 1:440

It is well according to that version which says that Rav says that ‘whether in the middle or at the sides [it invalidates only] if it is four cubits wide;’ What does it mean by ‘combine'? They combine to make four cubits. But, according to the version which says that Rav says that, in the middle [even] four handbreadths [width of invalid skhakh] invalidates, what kind of boards are we to imagine? If they are each four handbreadths wide, why do they need to combine? And if they are each less than four handbreadths wide, they are mere sticks!

Babylonian Talmud Sukkah 1:441

This is indeed a case where they are each four handbreadths wide; and what does ‘combine’ mean? That they combine to make up four cubits at the side.

Babylonian Talmud Sukkah 1:441

This is indeed a case where they are each four handbreadths wide; and what does ‘combine’ mean? That they combine to make up four cubits at the side.

Babylonian Talmud Sukkah 1:477

R. Abba answered him, [The difference is that] in the former case it combines [with the rest of the Sukkah] and it is permitted to sleep under it; in the latter case it does not combine and it is forbidden to sleep under it.

Babylonian Talmud Chagigah 2:72

Our Rabbis have taught, In the three former pairs, which say that a man is not to lay, and in the two latter pairs which say that a man is to lay, the first were prince-presidents and the second vice-presidents. These are the words of R. Meir. But wise men say, Jehudah ben Tabbai was vice-president, and Simeon ben Shetach was prince-president. Who is the author of that teaching? For the converse would appear to be the case, because our Rabbis have taught thus, viz., that R. Jehudah ben Tabbai said, May I see the consolation of Israel, if I have not slain a false witness so as to oppose the Sadducees, when they say, False witnesses are not put to death, until the condemned person shall have been put to death. Simeon ben Shetach said to him, May I see the consolation of Israel, if thou hast not shed innocent blood; for behold, wise men have said, False witnesses are not to be put to death, until they are both proved to be false, and they are not beaten, until they are both proved to be false, and they do not have to refund money, until they are both proved to be false. Forthwith Jehudah ben Tabbai undertook that he would not teach doctrine (Halachah) except in the presence of Simeon ben Shetach. All the days of Jehudah ben Tabbai he used to stretch himself upon the grave of the slain man, and his voice was heard, so that the people wondered, saying that it was the voice of the slain man. He said to them, It is my voice; know ye that tomorrow he will be dead, and his voice will not be heard. R. Acha bar Rabba said to R. Ashi, But perhaps he prayed him earnestly to forgive him, or perhaps he called him before the judgment seat. Who is the authority for this view? If thou sayest, It is all right according to R. Meir, who said, Simeon ben Shetach was vice-president, and R. Jehudah ben Tabbai was prince-president, this accords with his teaching doctrine in the presence of Simeon ben Shetach, but if thou sayest, Our Rabbis are right, who say, Jehudah ben Tabbai was vice-president, Simeon ben Shetach was prince-president, how should the vice-president teach doctrine in the presence of the prince-president? No, what is the meaning of "he undertook?" He spoke in reference not to teaching but to combination, Even if men combine, yet will I not combine.

Babylonian Talmud Chagigah 2:72

Our Rabbis have taught, In the three former pairs, which say that a man is not to lay, and in the two latter pairs which say that a man is to lay, the first were prince-presidents and the second vice-presidents. These are the words of R. Meir. But wise men say, Jehudah ben Tabbai was vice-president, and Simeon ben Shetach was prince-president. Who is the author of that teaching? For the converse would appear to be the case, because our Rabbis have taught thus, viz., that R. Jehudah ben Tabbai said, May I see the consolation of Israel, if I have not slain a false witness so as to oppose the Sadducees, when they say, False witnesses are not put to death, until the condemned person shall have been put to death. Simeon ben Shetach said to him, May I see the consolation of Israel, if thou hast not shed innocent blood; for behold, wise men have said, False witnesses are not to be put to death, until they are both proved to be false, and they are not beaten, until they are both proved to be false, and they do not have to refund money, until they are both proved to be false. Forthwith Jehudah ben Tabbai undertook that he would not teach doctrine (Halachah) except in the presence of Simeon ben Shetach. All the days of Jehudah ben Tabbai he used to stretch himself upon the grave of the slain man, and his voice was heard, so that the people wondered, saying that it was the voice of the slain man. He said to them, It is my voice; know ye that tomorrow he will be dead, and his voice will not be heard. R. Acha bar Rabba said to R. Ashi, But perhaps he prayed him earnestly to forgive him, or perhaps he called him before the judgment seat. Who is the authority for this view? If thou sayest, It is all right according to R. Meir, who said, Simeon ben Shetach was vice-president, and R. Jehudah ben Tabbai was prince-president, this accords with his teaching doctrine in the presence of Simeon ben Shetach, but if thou sayest, Our Rabbis are right, who say, Jehudah ben Tabbai was vice-president, Simeon ben Shetach was prince-president, how should the vice-president teach doctrine in the presence of the prince-president? No, what is the meaning of "he undertook?" He spoke in reference not to teaching but to combination, Even if men combine, yet will I not combine.

Babylonian Talmud Makkot 1:83

Rava says, We need to fulfill the requirement of (Deuteronomy 19, 19) "as he plotted to do his brother" and we can not. [He plotted to make his fellow liable a full forty lashes.] If so, than money should also [not be able to be divided]. Money combines, while lashes do not combine.

Babylonian Talmud Makkot 1:138

A beraisa taught this as well, "He shall not be executed by the mouth of one witness", this comes to include the case of two [witnesses] that witness [a murder], one from this window and one from this window without then seeing one another, that they do not combine. And not only that, but furthermore, [the case of] one [witness] after the other from the same window do not combine.

Babylonian Talmud Makkot 1:138

A beraisa taught this as well, "He shall not be executed by the mouth of one witness", this comes to include the case of two [witnesses] that witness [a murder], one from this window and one from this window without then seeing one another, that they do not combine. And not only that, but furthermore, [the case of] one [witness] after the other from the same window do not combine.

Babylonian Talmud Makkot 1:139

Rav Pappa asked Abayi, Now that we've established that they [the witnesses] do not combine [in the case of] one [witness] from this window and one [witness] from this window where this [witness] observed the entire action and this [witness] observed the entire action, Do we need to say [the case of] one [witness] after the other [from the same window] where they each only observed half of the action? He answered him, We only need it for [the case of witnesses to] a cohabitation.

Babylonian Talmud Makkot 1:140

Rava says, If they [the two witnesses] saw the warner or the warner saw them, they combine. Rava says, This warner that we mentions can even be himself, and can even be a demon.

Babylonian Talmud Makkot 3:108

Rava bar Rav Huna says, If one mashes up nine ants and brings in one live [ant] and they combine to form an olive's volume, he is liable to six sets of malkus [for eating it]. Five for the live ant and one for eating an olive's volume of a carcass. Rava said in the name of Rebbi Yochanon, [A person is liable to those six malkus] even if it was two [dead ants] and the one [live ant]. Rav Yosef said, Even if it is one [dead ant] and the one [live ant]. But they do not argue. This one is [talking about] larger [ants], while this one is [discussing] smaller [ants].