does
8640 occurrences across the corpus
The Babylonian Talmud
It was taught: R. Shimon b. Yohai said: Come and see how beloved are Israel to God—... every place to which they were exiled the Shekhinah (God’s Divine Presence) went with them. They were exiled to Egypt and the Shekhinah was with them, as it says, “Did I reveal myself to the house of your father when they were in Egypt” (II Samuel 2:27). They were exiled to Babylon, and the Shekhinah was with them, as it says, “For your sake I was sent to Babylon” (Isaiah 43:14). And when they will be redeemed in the future, the Shekhinah will be with them, as it says, “Then the Lord your God will return [with] your captivity” (Deuteronomy 30:3). It does not say here veheshiv [and He shall bring back] but veshav [and he shall return]. This teaches us that the Holy One, blessed be He, will return with them from the places of exile.
It should not be used as a short cut [kapandria]. What is kapandria? Rava said: Kapandaria is as its name implies.... What does its name imply? As if one were to say, Instead of going round the building [makifna adare], I will enter here.
Our Rabbis taught: One does not act disrespectfully in a cemetery: We do not graze cattle in them, nor do we run a water channel through them, nor do we gather grass in them, and if he did gather grass they must be burned on the spot, out of respect for the dead.
To what do these last words apply? Shall I say, to the last clause? Since he burns them on the spot, what respect does this show for the dead? Rather it refers to the preceding clauses.
With whose view does this accord? Not with that of R. Shimon b. Gamaliel. For if it were R. Shimon b. Gamaliel, he said [only] two weeks, as it has been taught: They ask about the laws of Passover from thirty days before Passover; R. Shimon b. Gamaliel. who says we only begin talking about Pesah two weeks before.
It makes sense to the one who says that “When you count” should be read, because he thus makes a difference between this Rosh Hodesh and other cases of Rosh Hodesh. But the one who says that “Command the children of Israel” should be read, what difference does he make?
He does make a difference, because on other cases of Rosh Hodesh six read in the portion of the day and one that of Rosh Hodesh, whereas in this case all read in that of Rosh Hodesh.
This works for the one who holds that “When you count” is read because [the regular portion containing this passage] falls about that time. But according to the one who says that “Command…My sacrifice” does [the portion containing that passage] fall about that time?
Yitzchak Nafha could say to you: And does it go so well with Abaye? It makes sense with the Shabbat before it, but does it make sense with the Shabbat after it?
Yitzchak Nafha could say to you: And does it go so well with Abaye? It makes sense with the Shabbat before it, but does it make sense with the Shabbat after it?
It was taught: If it falls during the week, they move it [Parshat Shekalim] up to the previous Shabbat, and they stop [the order of special Shabbatot] for the following Shabbat. Does not this rule apply even where it falls on Friday? No; only if it falls actually in the middle part of the week.
On Monday and Thursday and on Shabbat at minhah they read according to the regular order and this does not count as part of the reading [for the succeeding Shabbat]. As it says,
Zera said: The halakhah is that the place where they leave off in the morning service on Shabbat is the place where they begin at Minhah, on Monday, on Thursday and on the next Shabbat. Why does he not say, “the halakhah follows Rabbi Judah”?
You have settled it well for his master, but you have not settled it well for himself. Does he wish to marry a slave woman? he is not able; a free woman? he is not able; to abstain from marriage? but was not the world created only that men might be fruitful and multiply? as it is said, "he created it not in vain; he formed it to be inhabited" (Is. xlv. 18). But for the sake of the maintenance of the world they force his master and make him a free man, and he writes for him a bill on half his property, and the house of Hillel comes round to teach according to the words of the house of Shammai.
Except a deaf man, a fool, and a child etc. There is a Baraitha, A deaf man is like a fool and a child. As a fool and a child are not responsible for their actions, so a deaf man is not responsible for his actions. And we learn, as we are taught by a canonical Mishnah, A deaf man, as wise men have everywhere said, is one who does not hear and does not speak (Niddah, 13b, ii. 17). Lo, you will say then, He who speaks and does not hear, or he who hears and does not speak, is bound. Yes, for there is a Baraitha for this. For our Rabbis have taught, He who speaks and does not hear is deaf, he who hears and does not speak is dumb. Both one and the other are to be treated as capable persons in all that relates to them. And whence do you infer that he who speaks and does not hear is deaf, and that he who hears and does not speak is dumb? Since it is written, "But I as a deaf man hear not; and I am as a dumb man, who openeth not his mouth" (Ps. xxxviii. 14). And, if you like, I will say, according to the proverbial saying, A man stumbling in his words. He who speaks and does not hear, or he who hears and does not speak, is bound. But, lo, there is a Baraitha, viz., He who speaks and does not hear, or he who hears and does not speak, is exempt. Rabena, or it may have been Rabba, said, There is a hiatus here. And there is a Baraitha to this effect, All are bound as regards the holocaust, and as regards the rejoicing, except a deaf man. He who speaks and does not hear, or he who hears and does not speak, is exempt from the holocaust. But although he is exempt from the holocaust, he is bound as regards the rejoicing; but as for him who does not hear and does not speak, and as for a fool and a child, he is exempt also from the rejoicing, inasmuch as these are exempt from all the commandments which are contained in the Law.
Except a deaf man, a fool, and a child etc. There is a Baraitha, A deaf man is like a fool and a child. As a fool and a child are not responsible for their actions, so a deaf man is not responsible for his actions. And we learn, as we are taught by a canonical Mishnah, A deaf man, as wise men have everywhere said, is one who does not hear and does not speak (Niddah, 13b, ii. 17). Lo, you will say then, He who speaks and does not hear, or he who hears and does not speak, is bound. Yes, for there is a Baraitha for this. For our Rabbis have taught, He who speaks and does not hear is deaf, he who hears and does not speak is dumb. Both one and the other are to be treated as capable persons in all that relates to them. And whence do you infer that he who speaks and does not hear is deaf, and that he who hears and does not speak is dumb? Since it is written, "But I as a deaf man hear not; and I am as a dumb man, who openeth not his mouth" (Ps. xxxviii. 14). And, if you like, I will say, according to the proverbial saying, A man stumbling in his words. He who speaks and does not hear, or he who hears and does not speak, is bound. But, lo, there is a Baraitha, viz., He who speaks and does not hear, or he who hears and does not speak, is exempt. Rabena, or it may have been Rabba, said, There is a hiatus here. And there is a Baraitha to this effect, All are bound as regards the holocaust, and as regards the rejoicing, except a deaf man. He who speaks and does not hear, or he who hears and does not speak, is exempt from the holocaust. But although he is exempt from the holocaust, he is bound as regards the rejoicing; but as for him who does not hear and does not speak, and as for a fool and a child, he is exempt also from the rejoicing, inasmuch as these are exempt from all the commandments which are contained in the Law.
Except a deaf man, a fool, and a child etc. There is a Baraitha, A deaf man is like a fool and a child. As a fool and a child are not responsible for their actions, so a deaf man is not responsible for his actions. And we learn, as we are taught by a canonical Mishnah, A deaf man, as wise men have everywhere said, is one who does not hear and does not speak (Niddah, 13b, ii. 17). Lo, you will say then, He who speaks and does not hear, or he who hears and does not speak, is bound. Yes, for there is a Baraitha for this. For our Rabbis have taught, He who speaks and does not hear is deaf, he who hears and does not speak is dumb. Both one and the other are to be treated as capable persons in all that relates to them. And whence do you infer that he who speaks and does not hear is deaf, and that he who hears and does not speak is dumb? Since it is written, "But I as a deaf man hear not; and I am as a dumb man, who openeth not his mouth" (Ps. xxxviii. 14). And, if you like, I will say, according to the proverbial saying, A man stumbling in his words. He who speaks and does not hear, or he who hears and does not speak, is bound. But, lo, there is a Baraitha, viz., He who speaks and does not hear, or he who hears and does not speak, is exempt. Rabena, or it may have been Rabba, said, There is a hiatus here. And there is a Baraitha to this effect, All are bound as regards the holocaust, and as regards the rejoicing, except a deaf man. He who speaks and does not hear, or he who hears and does not speak, is exempt from the holocaust. But although he is exempt from the holocaust, he is bound as regards the rejoicing; but as for him who does not hear and does not speak, and as for a fool and a child, he is exempt also from the rejoicing, inasmuch as these are exempt from all the commandments which are contained in the Law.
Except a deaf man, a fool, and a child etc. There is a Baraitha, A deaf man is like a fool and a child. As a fool and a child are not responsible for their actions, so a deaf man is not responsible for his actions. And we learn, as we are taught by a canonical Mishnah, A deaf man, as wise men have everywhere said, is one who does not hear and does not speak (Niddah, 13b, ii. 17). Lo, you will say then, He who speaks and does not hear, or he who hears and does not speak, is bound. Yes, for there is a Baraitha for this. For our Rabbis have taught, He who speaks and does not hear is deaf, he who hears and does not speak is dumb. Both one and the other are to be treated as capable persons in all that relates to them. And whence do you infer that he who speaks and does not hear is deaf, and that he who hears and does not speak is dumb? Since it is written, "But I as a deaf man hear not; and I am as a dumb man, who openeth not his mouth" (Ps. xxxviii. 14). And, if you like, I will say, according to the proverbial saying, A man stumbling in his words. He who speaks and does not hear, or he who hears and does not speak, is bound. But, lo, there is a Baraitha, viz., He who speaks and does not hear, or he who hears and does not speak, is exempt. Rabena, or it may have been Rabba, said, There is a hiatus here. And there is a Baraitha to this effect, All are bound as regards the holocaust, and as regards the rejoicing, except a deaf man. He who speaks and does not hear, or he who hears and does not speak, is exempt from the holocaust. But although he is exempt from the holocaust, he is bound as regards the rejoicing; but as for him who does not hear and does not speak, and as for a fool and a child, he is exempt also from the rejoicing, inasmuch as these are exempt from all the commandments which are contained in the Law.
Except a deaf man, a fool, and a child etc. There is a Baraitha, A deaf man is like a fool and a child. As a fool and a child are not responsible for their actions, so a deaf man is not responsible for his actions. And we learn, as we are taught by a canonical Mishnah, A deaf man, as wise men have everywhere said, is one who does not hear and does not speak (Niddah, 13b, ii. 17). Lo, you will say then, He who speaks and does not hear, or he who hears and does not speak, is bound. Yes, for there is a Baraitha for this. For our Rabbis have taught, He who speaks and does not hear is deaf, he who hears and does not speak is dumb. Both one and the other are to be treated as capable persons in all that relates to them. And whence do you infer that he who speaks and does not hear is deaf, and that he who hears and does not speak is dumb? Since it is written, "But I as a deaf man hear not; and I am as a dumb man, who openeth not his mouth" (Ps. xxxviii. 14). And, if you like, I will say, according to the proverbial saying, A man stumbling in his words. He who speaks and does not hear, or he who hears and does not speak, is bound. But, lo, there is a Baraitha, viz., He who speaks and does not hear, or he who hears and does not speak, is exempt. Rabena, or it may have been Rabba, said, There is a hiatus here. And there is a Baraitha to this effect, All are bound as regards the holocaust, and as regards the rejoicing, except a deaf man. He who speaks and does not hear, or he who hears and does not speak, is exempt from the holocaust. But although he is exempt from the holocaust, he is bound as regards the rejoicing; but as for him who does not hear and does not speak, and as for a fool and a child, he is exempt also from the rejoicing, inasmuch as these are exempt from all the commandments which are contained in the Law.
Except a deaf man, a fool, and a child etc. There is a Baraitha, A deaf man is like a fool and a child. As a fool and a child are not responsible for their actions, so a deaf man is not responsible for his actions. And we learn, as we are taught by a canonical Mishnah, A deaf man, as wise men have everywhere said, is one who does not hear and does not speak (Niddah, 13b, ii. 17). Lo, you will say then, He who speaks and does not hear, or he who hears and does not speak, is bound. Yes, for there is a Baraitha for this. For our Rabbis have taught, He who speaks and does not hear is deaf, he who hears and does not speak is dumb. Both one and the other are to be treated as capable persons in all that relates to them. And whence do you infer that he who speaks and does not hear is deaf, and that he who hears and does not speak is dumb? Since it is written, "But I as a deaf man hear not; and I am as a dumb man, who openeth not his mouth" (Ps. xxxviii. 14). And, if you like, I will say, according to the proverbial saying, A man stumbling in his words. He who speaks and does not hear, or he who hears and does not speak, is bound. But, lo, there is a Baraitha, viz., He who speaks and does not hear, or he who hears and does not speak, is exempt. Rabena, or it may have been Rabba, said, There is a hiatus here. And there is a Baraitha to this effect, All are bound as regards the holocaust, and as regards the rejoicing, except a deaf man. He who speaks and does not hear, or he who hears and does not speak, is exempt from the holocaust. But although he is exempt from the holocaust, he is bound as regards the rejoicing; but as for him who does not hear and does not speak, and as for a fool and a child, he is exempt also from the rejoicing, inasmuch as these are exempt from all the commandments which are contained in the Law.
Except a deaf man, a fool, and a child etc. There is a Baraitha, A deaf man is like a fool and a child. As a fool and a child are not responsible for their actions, so a deaf man is not responsible for his actions. And we learn, as we are taught by a canonical Mishnah, A deaf man, as wise men have everywhere said, is one who does not hear and does not speak (Niddah, 13b, ii. 17). Lo, you will say then, He who speaks and does not hear, or he who hears and does not speak, is bound. Yes, for there is a Baraitha for this. For our Rabbis have taught, He who speaks and does not hear is deaf, he who hears and does not speak is dumb. Both one and the other are to be treated as capable persons in all that relates to them. And whence do you infer that he who speaks and does not hear is deaf, and that he who hears and does not speak is dumb? Since it is written, "But I as a deaf man hear not; and I am as a dumb man, who openeth not his mouth" (Ps. xxxviii. 14). And, if you like, I will say, according to the proverbial saying, A man stumbling in his words. He who speaks and does not hear, or he who hears and does not speak, is bound. But, lo, there is a Baraitha, viz., He who speaks and does not hear, or he who hears and does not speak, is exempt. Rabena, or it may have been Rabba, said, There is a hiatus here. And there is a Baraitha to this effect, All are bound as regards the holocaust, and as regards the rejoicing, except a deaf man. He who speaks and does not hear, or he who hears and does not speak, is exempt from the holocaust. But although he is exempt from the holocaust, he is bound as regards the rejoicing; but as for him who does not hear and does not speak, and as for a fool and a child, he is exempt also from the rejoicing, inasmuch as these are exempt from all the commandments which are contained in the Law.
Except a deaf man, a fool, and a child etc. There is a Baraitha, A deaf man is like a fool and a child. As a fool and a child are not responsible for their actions, so a deaf man is not responsible for his actions. And we learn, as we are taught by a canonical Mishnah, A deaf man, as wise men have everywhere said, is one who does not hear and does not speak (Niddah, 13b, ii. 17). Lo, you will say then, He who speaks and does not hear, or he who hears and does not speak, is bound. Yes, for there is a Baraitha for this. For our Rabbis have taught, He who speaks and does not hear is deaf, he who hears and does not speak is dumb. Both one and the other are to be treated as capable persons in all that relates to them. And whence do you infer that he who speaks and does not hear is deaf, and that he who hears and does not speak is dumb? Since it is written, "But I as a deaf man hear not; and I am as a dumb man, who openeth not his mouth" (Ps. xxxviii. 14). And, if you like, I will say, according to the proverbial saying, A man stumbling in his words. He who speaks and does not hear, or he who hears and does not speak, is bound. But, lo, there is a Baraitha, viz., He who speaks and does not hear, or he who hears and does not speak, is exempt. Rabena, or it may have been Rabba, said, There is a hiatus here. And there is a Baraitha to this effect, All are bound as regards the holocaust, and as regards the rejoicing, except a deaf man. He who speaks and does not hear, or he who hears and does not speak, is exempt from the holocaust. But although he is exempt from the holocaust, he is bound as regards the rejoicing; but as for him who does not hear and does not speak, and as for a fool and a child, he is exempt also from the rejoicing, inasmuch as these are exempt from all the commandments which are contained in the Law.
Except a deaf man, a fool, and a child etc. There is a Baraitha, A deaf man is like a fool and a child. As a fool and a child are not responsible for their actions, so a deaf man is not responsible for his actions. And we learn, as we are taught by a canonical Mishnah, A deaf man, as wise men have everywhere said, is one who does not hear and does not speak (Niddah, 13b, ii. 17). Lo, you will say then, He who speaks and does not hear, or he who hears and does not speak, is bound. Yes, for there is a Baraitha for this. For our Rabbis have taught, He who speaks and does not hear is deaf, he who hears and does not speak is dumb. Both one and the other are to be treated as capable persons in all that relates to them. And whence do you infer that he who speaks and does not hear is deaf, and that he who hears and does not speak is dumb? Since it is written, "But I as a deaf man hear not; and I am as a dumb man, who openeth not his mouth" (Ps. xxxviii. 14). And, if you like, I will say, according to the proverbial saying, A man stumbling in his words. He who speaks and does not hear, or he who hears and does not speak, is bound. But, lo, there is a Baraitha, viz., He who speaks and does not hear, or he who hears and does not speak, is exempt. Rabena, or it may have been Rabba, said, There is a hiatus here. And there is a Baraitha to this effect, All are bound as regards the holocaust, and as regards the rejoicing, except a deaf man. He who speaks and does not hear, or he who hears and does not speak, is exempt from the holocaust. But although he is exempt from the holocaust, he is bound as regards the rejoicing; but as for him who does not hear and does not speak, and as for a fool and a child, he is exempt also from the rejoicing, inasmuch as these are exempt from all the commandments which are contained in the Law.
Except a deaf man, a fool, and a child etc. There is a Baraitha, A deaf man is like a fool and a child. As a fool and a child are not responsible for their actions, so a deaf man is not responsible for his actions. And we learn, as we are taught by a canonical Mishnah, A deaf man, as wise men have everywhere said, is one who does not hear and does not speak (Niddah, 13b, ii. 17). Lo, you will say then, He who speaks and does not hear, or he who hears and does not speak, is bound. Yes, for there is a Baraitha for this. For our Rabbis have taught, He who speaks and does not hear is deaf, he who hears and does not speak is dumb. Both one and the other are to be treated as capable persons in all that relates to them. And whence do you infer that he who speaks and does not hear is deaf, and that he who hears and does not speak is dumb? Since it is written, "But I as a deaf man hear not; and I am as a dumb man, who openeth not his mouth" (Ps. xxxviii. 14). And, if you like, I will say, according to the proverbial saying, A man stumbling in his words. He who speaks and does not hear, or he who hears and does not speak, is bound. But, lo, there is a Baraitha, viz., He who speaks and does not hear, or he who hears and does not speak, is exempt. Rabena, or it may have been Rabba, said, There is a hiatus here. And there is a Baraitha to this effect, All are bound as regards the holocaust, and as regards the rejoicing, except a deaf man. He who speaks and does not hear, or he who hears and does not speak, is exempt from the holocaust. But although he is exempt from the holocaust, he is bound as regards the rejoicing; but as for him who does not hear and does not speak, and as for a fool and a child, he is exempt also from the rejoicing, inasmuch as these are exempt from all the commandments which are contained in the Law.
Except a deaf man, a fool, and a child etc. There is a Baraitha, A deaf man is like a fool and a child. As a fool and a child are not responsible for their actions, so a deaf man is not responsible for his actions. And we learn, as we are taught by a canonical Mishnah, A deaf man, as wise men have everywhere said, is one who does not hear and does not speak (Niddah, 13b, ii. 17). Lo, you will say then, He who speaks and does not hear, or he who hears and does not speak, is bound. Yes, for there is a Baraitha for this. For our Rabbis have taught, He who speaks and does not hear is deaf, he who hears and does not speak is dumb. Both one and the other are to be treated as capable persons in all that relates to them. And whence do you infer that he who speaks and does not hear is deaf, and that he who hears and does not speak is dumb? Since it is written, "But I as a deaf man hear not; and I am as a dumb man, who openeth not his mouth" (Ps. xxxviii. 14). And, if you like, I will say, according to the proverbial saying, A man stumbling in his words. He who speaks and does not hear, or he who hears and does not speak, is bound. But, lo, there is a Baraitha, viz., He who speaks and does not hear, or he who hears and does not speak, is exempt. Rabena, or it may have been Rabba, said, There is a hiatus here. And there is a Baraitha to this effect, All are bound as regards the holocaust, and as regards the rejoicing, except a deaf man. He who speaks and does not hear, or he who hears and does not speak, is exempt from the holocaust. But although he is exempt from the holocaust, he is bound as regards the rejoicing; but as for him who does not hear and does not speak, and as for a fool and a child, he is exempt also from the rejoicing, inasmuch as these are exempt from all the commandments which are contained in the Law.
Except a deaf man, a fool, and a child etc. There is a Baraitha, A deaf man is like a fool and a child. As a fool and a child are not responsible for their actions, so a deaf man is not responsible for his actions. And we learn, as we are taught by a canonical Mishnah, A deaf man, as wise men have everywhere said, is one who does not hear and does not speak (Niddah, 13b, ii. 17). Lo, you will say then, He who speaks and does not hear, or he who hears and does not speak, is bound. Yes, for there is a Baraitha for this. For our Rabbis have taught, He who speaks and does not hear is deaf, he who hears and does not speak is dumb. Both one and the other are to be treated as capable persons in all that relates to them. And whence do you infer that he who speaks and does not hear is deaf, and that he who hears and does not speak is dumb? Since it is written, "But I as a deaf man hear not; and I am as a dumb man, who openeth not his mouth" (Ps. xxxviii. 14). And, if you like, I will say, according to the proverbial saying, A man stumbling in his words. He who speaks and does not hear, or he who hears and does not speak, is bound. But, lo, there is a Baraitha, viz., He who speaks and does not hear, or he who hears and does not speak, is exempt. Rabena, or it may have been Rabba, said, There is a hiatus here. And there is a Baraitha to this effect, All are bound as regards the holocaust, and as regards the rejoicing, except a deaf man. He who speaks and does not hear, or he who hears and does not speak, is exempt from the holocaust. But although he is exempt from the holocaust, he is bound as regards the rejoicing; but as for him who does not hear and does not speak, and as for a fool and a child, he is exempt also from the rejoicing, inasmuch as these are exempt from all the commandments which are contained in the Law.
Except a deaf man, a fool, and a child etc. There is a Baraitha, A deaf man is like a fool and a child. As a fool and a child are not responsible for their actions, so a deaf man is not responsible for his actions. And we learn, as we are taught by a canonical Mishnah, A deaf man, as wise men have everywhere said, is one who does not hear and does not speak (Niddah, 13b, ii. 17). Lo, you will say then, He who speaks and does not hear, or he who hears and does not speak, is bound. Yes, for there is a Baraitha for this. For our Rabbis have taught, He who speaks and does not hear is deaf, he who hears and does not speak is dumb. Both one and the other are to be treated as capable persons in all that relates to them. And whence do you infer that he who speaks and does not hear is deaf, and that he who hears and does not speak is dumb? Since it is written, "But I as a deaf man hear not; and I am as a dumb man, who openeth not his mouth" (Ps. xxxviii. 14). And, if you like, I will say, according to the proverbial saying, A man stumbling in his words. He who speaks and does not hear, or he who hears and does not speak, is bound. But, lo, there is a Baraitha, viz., He who speaks and does not hear, or he who hears and does not speak, is exempt. Rabena, or it may have been Rabba, said, There is a hiatus here. And there is a Baraitha to this effect, All are bound as regards the holocaust, and as regards the rejoicing, except a deaf man. He who speaks and does not hear, or he who hears and does not speak, is exempt from the holocaust. But although he is exempt from the holocaust, he is bound as regards the rejoicing; but as for him who does not hear and does not speak, and as for a fool and a child, he is exempt also from the rejoicing, inasmuch as these are exempt from all the commandments which are contained in the Law.
Except a deaf man, a fool, and a child etc. There is a Baraitha, A deaf man is like a fool and a child. As a fool and a child are not responsible for their actions, so a deaf man is not responsible for his actions. And we learn, as we are taught by a canonical Mishnah, A deaf man, as wise men have everywhere said, is one who does not hear and does not speak (Niddah, 13b, ii. 17). Lo, you will say then, He who speaks and does not hear, or he who hears and does not speak, is bound. Yes, for there is a Baraitha for this. For our Rabbis have taught, He who speaks and does not hear is deaf, he who hears and does not speak is dumb. Both one and the other are to be treated as capable persons in all that relates to them. And whence do you infer that he who speaks and does not hear is deaf, and that he who hears and does not speak is dumb? Since it is written, "But I as a deaf man hear not; and I am as a dumb man, who openeth not his mouth" (Ps. xxxviii. 14). And, if you like, I will say, according to the proverbial saying, A man stumbling in his words. He who speaks and does not hear, or he who hears and does not speak, is bound. But, lo, there is a Baraitha, viz., He who speaks and does not hear, or he who hears and does not speak, is exempt. Rabena, or it may have been Rabba, said, There is a hiatus here. And there is a Baraitha to this effect, All are bound as regards the holocaust, and as regards the rejoicing, except a deaf man. He who speaks and does not hear, or he who hears and does not speak, is exempt from the holocaust. But although he is exempt from the holocaust, he is bound as regards the rejoicing; but as for him who does not hear and does not speak, and as for a fool and a child, he is exempt also from the rejoicing, inasmuch as these are exempt from all the commandments which are contained in the Law.
Except a deaf man, a fool, and a child etc. There is a Baraitha, A deaf man is like a fool and a child. As a fool and a child are not responsible for their actions, so a deaf man is not responsible for his actions. And we learn, as we are taught by a canonical Mishnah, A deaf man, as wise men have everywhere said, is one who does not hear and does not speak (Niddah, 13b, ii. 17). Lo, you will say then, He who speaks and does not hear, or he who hears and does not speak, is bound. Yes, for there is a Baraitha for this. For our Rabbis have taught, He who speaks and does not hear is deaf, he who hears and does not speak is dumb. Both one and the other are to be treated as capable persons in all that relates to them. And whence do you infer that he who speaks and does not hear is deaf, and that he who hears and does not speak is dumb? Since it is written, "But I as a deaf man hear not; and I am as a dumb man, who openeth not his mouth" (Ps. xxxviii. 14). And, if you like, I will say, according to the proverbial saying, A man stumbling in his words. He who speaks and does not hear, or he who hears and does not speak, is bound. But, lo, there is a Baraitha, viz., He who speaks and does not hear, or he who hears and does not speak, is exempt. Rabena, or it may have been Rabba, said, There is a hiatus here. And there is a Baraitha to this effect, All are bound as regards the holocaust, and as regards the rejoicing, except a deaf man. He who speaks and does not hear, or he who hears and does not speak, is exempt from the holocaust. But although he is exempt from the holocaust, he is bound as regards the rejoicing; but as for him who does not hear and does not speak, and as for a fool and a child, he is exempt also from the rejoicing, inasmuch as these are exempt from all the commandments which are contained in the Law.
Except a deaf man, a fool, and a child etc. There is a Baraitha, A deaf man is like a fool and a child. As a fool and a child are not responsible for their actions, so a deaf man is not responsible for his actions. And we learn, as we are taught by a canonical Mishnah, A deaf man, as wise men have everywhere said, is one who does not hear and does not speak (Niddah, 13b, ii. 17). Lo, you will say then, He who speaks and does not hear, or he who hears and does not speak, is bound. Yes, for there is a Baraitha for this. For our Rabbis have taught, He who speaks and does not hear is deaf, he who hears and does not speak is dumb. Both one and the other are to be treated as capable persons in all that relates to them. And whence do you infer that he who speaks and does not hear is deaf, and that he who hears and does not speak is dumb? Since it is written, "But I as a deaf man hear not; and I am as a dumb man, who openeth not his mouth" (Ps. xxxviii. 14). And, if you like, I will say, according to the proverbial saying, A man stumbling in his words. He who speaks and does not hear, or he who hears and does not speak, is bound. But, lo, there is a Baraitha, viz., He who speaks and does not hear, or he who hears and does not speak, is exempt. Rabena, or it may have been Rabba, said, There is a hiatus here. And there is a Baraitha to this effect, All are bound as regards the holocaust, and as regards the rejoicing, except a deaf man. He who speaks and does not hear, or he who hears and does not speak, is exempt from the holocaust. But although he is exempt from the holocaust, he is bound as regards the rejoicing; but as for him who does not hear and does not speak, and as for a fool and a child, he is exempt also from the rejoicing, inasmuch as these are exempt from all the commandments which are contained in the Law.
There is also a Baraitha to this effect, All are bound as regards the holocaust and the rejoicing except a deaf man. He who speaks and does not hear, and he who hears and does not speak, are exempt from the holocaust. But although he is exempt from the holocaust,
There is also a Baraitha to this effect, All are bound as regards the holocaust and the rejoicing except a deaf man. He who speaks and does not hear, and he who hears and does not speak, are exempt from the holocaust. But although he is exempt from the holocaust,
he is bound as regards the rejoicing; but as for him who does not hear and does not speak and as for a fool and a child, they are exempt also from the rejoicing, inasmuch as these are exempt from all the commandments which are contained in the Law. What is the difference in the nature of holocaust, that they are exempt, and in the nature of rejoicing, that they are bound? As regards the nature of holocaust we are taught by the recurrence of the word from the passage intitled "Assemble," as it is written, "Assemble the people, the men and the women and the little ones" (Deut. xxxi. 12), and it is written, "when all Israel is come to appear" (Deut. xxxi. 11). And that point, whence do we get it? Because it is written, "that they may hear and that they may learn" (Deut. xxxi. 12). And there is a Baraitha as follows, "That they may hear," this expression excludes him who speaks and does not hear; "and that they may learn," this expression excludes him who hears and does not speak. Is this to say, that he who cannot talk cannot learn? No; for this suggests the case of the two dumb men who were in the neighbourhood of Rabbi, viz., the sons of R. Jochanan ben Gudgodah's daughter; and the sons of R. Jochanan's sister say concerning it, that every time that Rabbi went up to the College, they went up and sat before him, and shook their heads, and moved their lips, and Rabbi asked for mercy for them, and they were examined, and it was ascertained that they were perfect in knowledge of Halachah and Siphra and Siphre and all the Talmud. Mar Zot'ra said, The reading there is, "in order that they may teach." R. Ashi said, Assuredly it is, "in order that they may teach"; for, if you imagine that it is, "in order that they may learn," then, since he who does not talk does not learn, and since he who does not hear does not learn, this sense of learn comes out of the words, "in order that they may hear," but assuredly it is here, "in order that they may teach."
he is bound as regards the rejoicing; but as for him who does not hear and does not speak and as for a fool and a child, they are exempt also from the rejoicing, inasmuch as these are exempt from all the commandments which are contained in the Law. What is the difference in the nature of holocaust, that they are exempt, and in the nature of rejoicing, that they are bound? As regards the nature of holocaust we are taught by the recurrence of the word from the passage intitled "Assemble," as it is written, "Assemble the people, the men and the women and the little ones" (Deut. xxxi. 12), and it is written, "when all Israel is come to appear" (Deut. xxxi. 11). And that point, whence do we get it? Because it is written, "that they may hear and that they may learn" (Deut. xxxi. 12). And there is a Baraitha as follows, "That they may hear," this expression excludes him who speaks and does not hear; "and that they may learn," this expression excludes him who hears and does not speak. Is this to say, that he who cannot talk cannot learn? No; for this suggests the case of the two dumb men who were in the neighbourhood of Rabbi, viz., the sons of R. Jochanan ben Gudgodah's daughter; and the sons of R. Jochanan's sister say concerning it, that every time that Rabbi went up to the College, they went up and sat before him, and shook their heads, and moved their lips, and Rabbi asked for mercy for them, and they were examined, and it was ascertained that they were perfect in knowledge of Halachah and Siphra and Siphre and all the Talmud. Mar Zot'ra said, The reading there is, "in order that they may teach." R. Ashi said, Assuredly it is, "in order that they may teach"; for, if you imagine that it is, "in order that they may learn," then, since he who does not talk does not learn, and since he who does not hear does not learn, this sense of learn comes out of the words, "in order that they may hear," but assuredly it is here, "in order that they may teach."
he is bound as regards the rejoicing; but as for him who does not hear and does not speak and as for a fool and a child, they are exempt also from the rejoicing, inasmuch as these are exempt from all the commandments which are contained in the Law. What is the difference in the nature of holocaust, that they are exempt, and in the nature of rejoicing, that they are bound? As regards the nature of holocaust we are taught by the recurrence of the word from the passage intitled "Assemble," as it is written, "Assemble the people, the men and the women and the little ones" (Deut. xxxi. 12), and it is written, "when all Israel is come to appear" (Deut. xxxi. 11). And that point, whence do we get it? Because it is written, "that they may hear and that they may learn" (Deut. xxxi. 12). And there is a Baraitha as follows, "That they may hear," this expression excludes him who speaks and does not hear; "and that they may learn," this expression excludes him who hears and does not speak. Is this to say, that he who cannot talk cannot learn? No; for this suggests the case of the two dumb men who were in the neighbourhood of Rabbi, viz., the sons of R. Jochanan ben Gudgodah's daughter; and the sons of R. Jochanan's sister say concerning it, that every time that Rabbi went up to the College, they went up and sat before him, and shook their heads, and moved their lips, and Rabbi asked for mercy for them, and they were examined, and it was ascertained that they were perfect in knowledge of Halachah and Siphra and Siphre and all the Talmud. Mar Zot'ra said, The reading there is, "in order that they may teach." R. Ashi said, Assuredly it is, "in order that they may teach"; for, if you imagine that it is, "in order that they may learn," then, since he who does not talk does not learn, and since he who does not hear does not learn, this sense of learn comes out of the words, "in order that they may hear," but assuredly it is here, "in order that they may teach."
he is bound as regards the rejoicing; but as for him who does not hear and does not speak and as for a fool and a child, they are exempt also from the rejoicing, inasmuch as these are exempt from all the commandments which are contained in the Law. What is the difference in the nature of holocaust, that they are exempt, and in the nature of rejoicing, that they are bound? As regards the nature of holocaust we are taught by the recurrence of the word from the passage intitled "Assemble," as it is written, "Assemble the people, the men and the women and the little ones" (Deut. xxxi. 12), and it is written, "when all Israel is come to appear" (Deut. xxxi. 11). And that point, whence do we get it? Because it is written, "that they may hear and that they may learn" (Deut. xxxi. 12). And there is a Baraitha as follows, "That they may hear," this expression excludes him who speaks and does not hear; "and that they may learn," this expression excludes him who hears and does not speak. Is this to say, that he who cannot talk cannot learn? No; for this suggests the case of the two dumb men who were in the neighbourhood of Rabbi, viz., the sons of R. Jochanan ben Gudgodah's daughter; and the sons of R. Jochanan's sister say concerning it, that every time that Rabbi went up to the College, they went up and sat before him, and shook their heads, and moved their lips, and Rabbi asked for mercy for them, and they were examined, and it was ascertained that they were perfect in knowledge of Halachah and Siphra and Siphre and all the Talmud. Mar Zot'ra said, The reading there is, "in order that they may teach." R. Ashi said, Assuredly it is, "in order that they may teach"; for, if you imagine that it is, "in order that they may learn," then, since he who does not talk does not learn, and since he who does not hear does not learn, this sense of learn comes out of the words, "in order that they may hear," but assuredly it is here, "in order that they may teach."
he is bound as regards the rejoicing; but as for him who does not hear and does not speak and as for a fool and a child, they are exempt also from the rejoicing, inasmuch as these are exempt from all the commandments which are contained in the Law. What is the difference in the nature of holocaust, that they are exempt, and in the nature of rejoicing, that they are bound? As regards the nature of holocaust we are taught by the recurrence of the word from the passage intitled "Assemble," as it is written, "Assemble the people, the men and the women and the little ones" (Deut. xxxi. 12), and it is written, "when all Israel is come to appear" (Deut. xxxi. 11). And that point, whence do we get it? Because it is written, "that they may hear and that they may learn" (Deut. xxxi. 12). And there is a Baraitha as follows, "That they may hear," this expression excludes him who speaks and does not hear; "and that they may learn," this expression excludes him who hears and does not speak. Is this to say, that he who cannot talk cannot learn? No; for this suggests the case of the two dumb men who were in the neighbourhood of Rabbi, viz., the sons of R. Jochanan ben Gudgodah's daughter; and the sons of R. Jochanan's sister say concerning it, that every time that Rabbi went up to the College, they went up and sat before him, and shook their heads, and moved their lips, and Rabbi asked for mercy for them, and they were examined, and it was ascertained that they were perfect in knowledge of Halachah and Siphra and Siphre and all the Talmud. Mar Zot'ra said, The reading there is, "in order that they may teach." R. Ashi said, Assuredly it is, "in order that they may teach"; for, if you imagine that it is, "in order that they may learn," then, since he who does not talk does not learn, and since he who does not hear does not learn, this sense of learn comes out of the words, "in order that they may hear," but assuredly it is here, "in order that they may teach."
he is bound as regards the rejoicing; but as for him who does not hear and does not speak and as for a fool and a child, they are exempt also from the rejoicing, inasmuch as these are exempt from all the commandments which are contained in the Law. What is the difference in the nature of holocaust, that they are exempt, and in the nature of rejoicing, that they are bound? As regards the nature of holocaust we are taught by the recurrence of the word from the passage intitled "Assemble," as it is written, "Assemble the people, the men and the women and the little ones" (Deut. xxxi. 12), and it is written, "when all Israel is come to appear" (Deut. xxxi. 11). And that point, whence do we get it? Because it is written, "that they may hear and that they may learn" (Deut. xxxi. 12). And there is a Baraitha as follows, "That they may hear," this expression excludes him who speaks and does not hear; "and that they may learn," this expression excludes him who hears and does not speak. Is this to say, that he who cannot talk cannot learn? No; for this suggests the case of the two dumb men who were in the neighbourhood of Rabbi, viz., the sons of R. Jochanan ben Gudgodah's daughter; and the sons of R. Jochanan's sister say concerning it, that every time that Rabbi went up to the College, they went up and sat before him, and shook their heads, and moved their lips, and Rabbi asked for mercy for them, and they were examined, and it was ascertained that they were perfect in knowledge of Halachah and Siphra and Siphre and all the Talmud. Mar Zot'ra said, The reading there is, "in order that they may teach." R. Ashi said, Assuredly it is, "in order that they may teach"; for, if you imagine that it is, "in order that they may learn," then, since he who does not talk does not learn, and since he who does not hear does not learn, this sense of learn comes out of the words, "in order that they may hear," but assuredly it is here, "in order that they may teach."
he is bound as regards the rejoicing; but as for him who does not hear and does not speak and as for a fool and a child, they are exempt also from the rejoicing, inasmuch as these are exempt from all the commandments which are contained in the Law. What is the difference in the nature of holocaust, that they are exempt, and in the nature of rejoicing, that they are bound? As regards the nature of holocaust we are taught by the recurrence of the word from the passage intitled "Assemble," as it is written, "Assemble the people, the men and the women and the little ones" (Deut. xxxi. 12), and it is written, "when all Israel is come to appear" (Deut. xxxi. 11). And that point, whence do we get it? Because it is written, "that they may hear and that they may learn" (Deut. xxxi. 12). And there is a Baraitha as follows, "That they may hear," this expression excludes him who speaks and does not hear; "and that they may learn," this expression excludes him who hears and does not speak. Is this to say, that he who cannot talk cannot learn? No; for this suggests the case of the two dumb men who were in the neighbourhood of Rabbi, viz., the sons of R. Jochanan ben Gudgodah's daughter; and the sons of R. Jochanan's sister say concerning it, that every time that Rabbi went up to the College, they went up and sat before him, and shook their heads, and moved their lips, and Rabbi asked for mercy for them, and they were examined, and it was ascertained that they were perfect in knowledge of Halachah and Siphra and Siphre and all the Talmud. Mar Zot'ra said, The reading there is, "in order that they may teach." R. Ashi said, Assuredly it is, "in order that they may teach"; for, if you imagine that it is, "in order that they may learn," then, since he who does not talk does not learn, and since he who does not hear does not learn, this sense of learn comes out of the words, "in order that they may hear," but assuredly it is here, "in order that they may teach."
he is bound as regards the rejoicing; but as for him who does not hear and does not speak and as for a fool and a child, they are exempt also from the rejoicing, inasmuch as these are exempt from all the commandments which are contained in the Law. What is the difference in the nature of holocaust, that they are exempt, and in the nature of rejoicing, that they are bound? As regards the nature of holocaust we are taught by the recurrence of the word from the passage intitled "Assemble," as it is written, "Assemble the people, the men and the women and the little ones" (Deut. xxxi. 12), and it is written, "when all Israel is come to appear" (Deut. xxxi. 11). And that point, whence do we get it? Because it is written, "that they may hear and that they may learn" (Deut. xxxi. 12). And there is a Baraitha as follows, "That they may hear," this expression excludes him who speaks and does not hear; "and that they may learn," this expression excludes him who hears and does not speak. Is this to say, that he who cannot talk cannot learn? No; for this suggests the case of the two dumb men who were in the neighbourhood of Rabbi, viz., the sons of R. Jochanan ben Gudgodah's daughter; and the sons of R. Jochanan's sister say concerning it, that every time that Rabbi went up to the College, they went up and sat before him, and shook their heads, and moved their lips, and Rabbi asked for mercy for them, and they were examined, and it was ascertained that they were perfect in knowledge of Halachah and Siphra and Siphre and all the Talmud. Mar Zot'ra said, The reading there is, "in order that they may teach." R. Ashi said, Assuredly it is, "in order that they may teach"; for, if you imagine that it is, "in order that they may learn," then, since he who does not talk does not learn, and since he who does not hear does not learn, this sense of learn comes out of the words, "in order that they may hear," but assuredly it is here, "in order that they may teach."
And he also opened his mouth and expounded the passage, "The words of the wise are as goads, and as nails planted are the words of the masters of assemblies, which are given from one shepherd" (Eccles. xii. 11). Wherefore are the words of the Law likened to goads? It is to tell thee, that as a goad is what keeps the heifer in her furrows, so as to produce sustenance for the world, so the words of the Law keep the learners of them from the ways of death for the ways of life. If you say, that as a goad is what moves, so the words of the Law will move; no, for the teaching says "nails." If you say, that as a nail is a thing which diminishes and does not add, so the words of the Law diminish and do not add; no, for the teaching says "planted." As planting is a thing which is fruitful and multiplies, so too the words of the Law are fruitful and multiply. "Masters of assemblies." These are the disciples of wise men, who sit by companies and study in the Law, some declaring unclean and others declaring clean, some binding and others loosing, some disqualifying and others pronouncing ceremonially pure. Perhaps a man may say, How under those circumstances am I to learn the Law? The teaching says, All of them "are given from one shepherd." One God gave them, one pastor uttered them from the mouth of the Lord of all that is made, blessed be He, for it is written, "and God spake all these words" (Ex. xx. 1). Also do thou make thine ear as the upper millstone, and procure for thyself an understanding heart to hear the words of those who declare unclean and the words of those who declare clean, the words of those who bind and the words of those who loose, the words of those who disqualify and the words of those who pronounce ceremonially pure. On the same occasion he said to them, It is not an orphan generation in the midst of which El'azar ben Azariah lives. And why did they not tell him without hesitation? It was on account of the matter that occurred. For there is a Baraitha, A matter occurred with regard to R. Jose, son of a Damascene woman, viz., that he went to visit R. El'azar in Lod. He said to him, What was there new in the College to day?
Our Rabbis have taught, Who is it who is a fool? He who goes out alone at night, and he who passes the night in a cemetery, and he who tears his clothes. It has been reported that R. Hunna said, So long as they all take place at one time. R. Jochanan said, Even in the case of one of them taking place. Explain this. If he have done them in the way of folly, even though he confined himself to one, yet he is guilty; but if he have not done them in the way of folly, even though he have done them all, yet he is not guilty. Granting fully that he has done them in the way of folly, then as for him who passes the night in a cemetery, it may be said, He does it that there may rest upon him a spirit of uncleanness; and as for him who goes out alone at night it may be said that the Gandrippus has seized him; and as for him who tears his clothes it may be said that he is lost in thought. But in case men have done them all,
The Mishnah teacher said, The expression "all thy males" is to include the children. But there is a canonical Mishnah, Except a deaf man, a fool and a child (Chag. 2a, i. 1). Abai said, There is no difficulty. The one case has to do with a child who has reached the age for initiation in the law, the other with a child who has not reached the age for initiation. A child who has reached the age for initiation—this is Rabbinical only. Even so, and the expression is a mere supporting peg. But why does the expression come? To correspond with what the others said. For we have a Baraitha, Others say, the cordwainer and the smelter in bronze and the tanner are exempt from the holocaust, because it is said "all thy males" (Ex. xxiii. 17, Deut. xvi. 16), i.e., he who is able to go up with all thy males. They are exempt, who are not fit to go up with all thy males.
There is a Baraitha, The uncircumcised person and the unclean person are exempt from appearing. This is all right as regards an unclean person, for it is written, "And thither thou shalt come: and thither ye shall bring" (Deut. xii. 5, 6). Every one who belongs to the category of coming belongs to the category of bringing, and every one who does not belong to the category of coming does not belong to the category of bringing. But "the uncircumcised person," whence do we get it? Behold, this comes not from a text but from R. Akiba, who includes an uncircumcised person as unclean. For there is a Baraitha, viz., R. Akiba says, The expression "each man" (Lev. xxii. 4) is to include the uncircumcised person. Our Rabbis have taught, The unclean person is exempt from appearing, for it is written, "And thither thou shalt come: and thither ye shall bring" (Deut. xii. 5, 6). Every one who belongs to the category of coming belongs to the category of bringing, and every one who does not belong to the category of coming does not belong to the category of bringing.
There is a Baraitha, The uncircumcised person and the unclean person are exempt from appearing. This is all right as regards an unclean person, for it is written, "And thither thou shalt come: and thither ye shall bring" (Deut. xii. 5, 6). Every one who belongs to the category of coming belongs to the category of bringing, and every one who does not belong to the category of coming does not belong to the category of bringing. But "the uncircumcised person," whence do we get it? Behold, this comes not from a text but from R. Akiba, who includes an uncircumcised person as unclean. For there is a Baraitha, viz., R. Akiba says, The expression "each man" (Lev. xxii. 4) is to include the uncircumcised person. Our Rabbis have taught, The unclean person is exempt from appearing, for it is written, "And thither thou shalt come: and thither ye shall bring" (Deut. xii. 5, 6). Every one who belongs to the category of coming belongs to the category of bringing, and every one who does not belong to the category of coming does not belong to the category of bringing.
There is a Baraitha, The uncircumcised person and the unclean person are exempt from appearing. This is all right as regards an unclean person, for it is written, "And thither thou shalt come: and thither ye shall bring" (Deut. xii. 5, 6). Every one who belongs to the category of coming belongs to the category of bringing, and every one who does not belong to the category of coming does not belong to the category of bringing. But "the uncircumcised person," whence do we get it? Behold, this comes not from a text but from R. Akiba, who includes an uncircumcised person as unclean. For there is a Baraitha, viz., R. Akiba says, The expression "each man" (Lev. xxii. 4) is to include the uncircumcised person. Our Rabbis have taught, The unclean person is exempt from appearing, for it is written, "And thither thou shalt come: and thither ye shall bring" (Deut. xii. 5, 6). Every one who belongs to the category of coming belongs to the category of bringing, and every one who does not belong to the category of coming does not belong to the category of bringing.
There is a Baraitha, The uncircumcised person and the unclean person are exempt from appearing. This is all right as regards an unclean person, for it is written, "And thither thou shalt come: and thither ye shall bring" (Deut. xii. 5, 6). Every one who belongs to the category of coming belongs to the category of bringing, and every one who does not belong to the category of coming does not belong to the category of bringing. But "the uncircumcised person," whence do we get it? Behold, this comes not from a text but from R. Akiba, who includes an uncircumcised person as unclean. For there is a Baraitha, viz., R. Akiba says, The expression "each man" (Lev. xxii. 4) is to include the uncircumcised person. Our Rabbis have taught, The unclean person is exempt from appearing, for it is written, "And thither thou shalt come: and thither ye shall bring" (Deut. xii. 5, 6). Every one who belongs to the category of coming belongs to the category of bringing, and every one who does not belong to the category of coming does not belong to the category of bringing.
and clearing out the stove. She took it and put it upon her foot and was burned, and her evil star was in the ascendant, and I have brought her. R. Baybi bar Abai said to him, Have ye permission to do thus? He said to him, And is it not written, "There is that is destroyed without judgment" (Prov. xiii. 23)? R. Baybi said to him, There is also the passage, "One generation goeth, and another generation cometh" (Eccles. i. 4). The Angel said, I shepherd them, till they have fulfilled the generation, and again I hand them over to Dumah. He said to him, But in the final result what hast thou done with the years? He said, If there is a mighty Rabbi, who does not fulfil his threats, I add them to him, and so there is compensation.
R. Joshua ben Chănania was in the house of Caesar. That infidel shewed him a people whose Lord had turned His face from them. He shewed him in return His hand stretched out over us. Caesar said to Rabbi Joshua, What did he shew thee? He replied, A people, whose Lord has turned away His face from them, and I shewed him His hand stretched out over us. They said to that heretic, What didst thou shew him? He replied, I shewed him a people, whose Lord had turned away His face from them. They said to him, And what did he shew thee? He said, I know not. They said to him, A man, who does not know what he is shewn by a sign, shall he interpret before a king? They cast him out and slew him.
Our Rabbis have taught, There are three persons, over whom the Holy One, blessed be He, weepeth every day, viz., over him who can study in the Law and does not study it, and over him who cannot properly study the Law, and yet does study it, and over a president who deals arrogantly with the congregation.
Our Rabbis have taught, There are three persons, over whom the Holy One, blessed be He, weepeth every day, viz., over him who can study in the Law and does not study it, and over him who cannot properly study the Law, and yet does study it, and over a president who deals arrogantly with the congregation.
The house of Shammai say, The holocaust involves two pieces of silver etc. Our Rabbis have taught thus, The house of Shammai say, The holocaust involves two pieces of silver, and the Chagigah a meah of silver; for the holocaust is all a burnt-offering to the Most High, which is not the case with the Chagigah; and besides we find that at the Feast of Weeks the Scripture enjoins more burnt-offerings than peace-offerings. But the house of Hillel say, The holocaust involves a meah of silver and the Chagigah two pieces of silver, for the Chagigah is older than the Decalogue, which is not the case with the holocaust; and besides we find in the case of "the princes" (Numb. vii. 15, 17, etc.) that the Scripture enjoins more peace-offerings than burnt-offerings. What then is the reason that the house of Hillel do not agree with the house of Shammai? Inasmuch as thou sayest that a holocaust is better, for it is all a burnt-offering to the Most High, on the contrary a Chagigah is better, for there are in it two feastings; and in that thou sayest, Let us learn from the Feast of Weeks, I reply that we are to judge an individual gift by comparison with an individual gift, and we are not to judge an individual gift by comparison with the gift of a congregation. What then is the reason that the house of Shammai do not agree with the house of Hillel? In that thou sayest that a Chagigah is superior, because it is older than the Decalogue, a holocaust also is older than the Decalogue; and in that thou sayest, Let us learn from "the princes," we are to judge a thing that lasts for ever by comparison with a thing that lasts for ever, and we are not to judge a thing which lasts for ever by comparison with a thing which does not last for ever. And how does the house of Hillel come to teach that the Chagigah is older than the Decalogue, but the holocaust not? Because it is written, "and they sacrificed sacrifices of peace-offerings" (Exod. xxiv. 5). There must have been a holocaust also. Lo, it is written, "and they offered burnt-offerings." The house of Hillel consider that the burnt-offering which Israel offered in the wilderness was the "continual burnt-offering" (Exod. xxix. 42), but the house of Shammai consider that the burnt-offering which Israel offered in the wilderness was a holocaust. Abai said, The house of Shammai and R. El'azar and R. Ishmael all consider that the burnt-offering which Israel offered in the wilderness was a holocaust. And the house of Hillel and R. Akiba and R. Jose the Galilaean all consider that the offering which Israel offered in the wilderness was the "continual burnt-offering." The house of Shammai hold this view according to what we have said. R. Ishmael agrees, for there is a Baraitha, viz., R. Ishmael says, The general directions only were given to Moses on Sinai,
The house of Shammai say, The holocaust involves two pieces of silver etc. Our Rabbis have taught thus, The house of Shammai say, The holocaust involves two pieces of silver, and the Chagigah a meah of silver; for the holocaust is all a burnt-offering to the Most High, which is not the case with the Chagigah; and besides we find that at the Feast of Weeks the Scripture enjoins more burnt-offerings than peace-offerings. But the house of Hillel say, The holocaust involves a meah of silver and the Chagigah two pieces of silver, for the Chagigah is older than the Decalogue, which is not the case with the holocaust; and besides we find in the case of "the princes" (Numb. vii. 15, 17, etc.) that the Scripture enjoins more peace-offerings than burnt-offerings. What then is the reason that the house of Hillel do not agree with the house of Shammai? Inasmuch as thou sayest that a holocaust is better, for it is all a burnt-offering to the Most High, on the contrary a Chagigah is better, for there are in it two feastings; and in that thou sayest, Let us learn from the Feast of Weeks, I reply that we are to judge an individual gift by comparison with an individual gift, and we are not to judge an individual gift by comparison with the gift of a congregation. What then is the reason that the house of Shammai do not agree with the house of Hillel? In that thou sayest that a Chagigah is superior, because it is older than the Decalogue, a holocaust also is older than the Decalogue; and in that thou sayest, Let us learn from "the princes," we are to judge a thing that lasts for ever by comparison with a thing that lasts for ever, and we are not to judge a thing which lasts for ever by comparison with a thing which does not last for ever. And how does the house of Hillel come to teach that the Chagigah is older than the Decalogue, but the holocaust not? Because it is written, "and they sacrificed sacrifices of peace-offerings" (Exod. xxiv. 5). There must have been a holocaust also. Lo, it is written, "and they offered burnt-offerings." The house of Hillel consider that the burnt-offering which Israel offered in the wilderness was the "continual burnt-offering" (Exod. xxix. 42), but the house of Shammai consider that the burnt-offering which Israel offered in the wilderness was a holocaust. Abai said, The house of Shammai and R. El'azar and R. Ishmael all consider that the burnt-offering which Israel offered in the wilderness was a holocaust. And the house of Hillel and R. Akiba and R. Jose the Galilaean all consider that the offering which Israel offered in the wilderness was the "continual burnt-offering." The house of Shammai hold this view according to what we have said. R. Ishmael agrees, for there is a Baraitha, viz., R. Ishmael says, The general directions only were given to Moses on Sinai,
the corner of a field, and the first-fruits and the appearing before the Lord, and the conferring of kindnesses and the teaching contained in the Law. R. Jochanan said, We were of opinion that the appearing before the Lord had no superior limit but had an inferior limit, until R. Oshaia, in the name of a great teacher, came and taught that appearing before the Lord has no limit either superior or inferior. But wise men say, that the holocaust involves a meah of silver, but the Chagigah two pieces of silver. What does the appearing mean? R. Jochanan said, The presenting of oneself in the Court, but Resh Lakish said, The presenting of oneself with an offering. All the world is agreed that on the first day it means, the presenting of oneself with an offering, but men differ as regards the remainder of the days of the Feast. Every time that a man comes and brings an offering, all the world agrees that we are to receive it from him, but men differ in the case of one who comes and does not bring; for R. Jochanan considers that the presenting of oneself in the Court is sufficient, because it is not necessary, every time that he comes, to bring an offering; but Resh Lakish says, The presenting oneself with an offering is the meaning, for it is necessary, every time that he comes, to bring an offering. Resh Lakish put this difficulty to R. Jochanan, "None shall appear before me empty" (Exod. xxiii. 15). He said to him, Yes, but only on the first day of the Feast. He put this further difficulty to him. The passage "None shall appear before me empty" refers to coming with sacrifices. If thou sayest, With sacrifices? perhaps not, but with birds and meal-offerings; then here is an argument against thee. The Chagigah is assigned to a private person, but the appearing is assigned to the Most High. As the Chagigah, which is assigned to a private person, involves sacrifices, so must the appearing, which is assigned to the Most High, involve sacrifices. And what are these sacrifices? They are burnt-offerings. If thou sayest, Burnt-offerings? perhaps not, but peace-offerings; then here is an argument against thee. The Chagigah is assigned to a private person, and the appearing is assigned to the Most High. As the Chagigah, which is assigned to a private person, is suited to him, so must the appearing, which is assigned to the Most High, be suited to Him. And so it is fitting that thy table should not be full and the table of thy Master empty. He said to him, Yes, but only on the first day of the Feast. R. Jose, in the name of R. Jehudah, put this difficulty to him, saying, Three times in the year Israel was commanded to go up to a Feast, viz., at the Feast of the Passover, and at the Feast of Weeks, and at the Feast of Tabernacles, and they must not appear by halves, inasmuch as it is said, "all thy males" (Exod. xxiii. 17; Deut. xvi. 16), and they must not appear empty, inasmuch as it is said, "none shall appear before me empty" (Exod. xxiii. 15). He said to him, Yes, but only on the first day of the Feast.
the corner of a field, and the first-fruits and the appearing before the Lord, and the conferring of kindnesses and the teaching contained in the Law. R. Jochanan said, We were of opinion that the appearing before the Lord had no superior limit but had an inferior limit, until R. Oshaia, in the name of a great teacher, came and taught that appearing before the Lord has no limit either superior or inferior. But wise men say, that the holocaust involves a meah of silver, but the Chagigah two pieces of silver. What does the appearing mean? R. Jochanan said, The presenting of oneself in the Court, but Resh Lakish said, The presenting of oneself with an offering. All the world is agreed that on the first day it means, the presenting of oneself with an offering, but men differ as regards the remainder of the days of the Feast. Every time that a man comes and brings an offering, all the world agrees that we are to receive it from him, but men differ in the case of one who comes and does not bring; for R. Jochanan considers that the presenting of oneself in the Court is sufficient, because it is not necessary, every time that he comes, to bring an offering; but Resh Lakish says, The presenting oneself with an offering is the meaning, for it is necessary, every time that he comes, to bring an offering. Resh Lakish put this difficulty to R. Jochanan, "None shall appear before me empty" (Exod. xxiii. 15). He said to him, Yes, but only on the first day of the Feast. He put this further difficulty to him. The passage "None shall appear before me empty" refers to coming with sacrifices. If thou sayest, With sacrifices? perhaps not, but with birds and meal-offerings; then here is an argument against thee. The Chagigah is assigned to a private person, but the appearing is assigned to the Most High. As the Chagigah, which is assigned to a private person, involves sacrifices, so must the appearing, which is assigned to the Most High, involve sacrifices. And what are these sacrifices? They are burnt-offerings. If thou sayest, Burnt-offerings? perhaps not, but peace-offerings; then here is an argument against thee. The Chagigah is assigned to a private person, and the appearing is assigned to the Most High. As the Chagigah, which is assigned to a private person, is suited to him, so must the appearing, which is assigned to the Most High, be suited to Him. And so it is fitting that thy table should not be full and the table of thy Master empty. He said to him, Yes, but only on the first day of the Feast. R. Jose, in the name of R. Jehudah, put this difficulty to him, saying, Three times in the year Israel was commanded to go up to a Feast, viz., at the Feast of the Passover, and at the Feast of Weeks, and at the Feast of Tabernacles, and they must not appear by halves, inasmuch as it is said, "all thy males" (Exod. xxiii. 17; Deut. xvi. 16), and they must not appear empty, inasmuch as it is said, "none shall appear before me empty" (Exod. xxiii. 15). He said to him, Yes, but only on the first day of the Feast.
R. Jochanan put this difficulty to Resh Lakish; "he shall be seen," "He shall see" (Exod. xxiii. 17; Deut. xvi. 16). As I am seen freely, so shall ye see me freely. But every one who comes and does not bring an offering, all the world agrees that he goes up and allows himself to be seen and goes away. But they differ in the case of one who comes and brings an offering. R. Jochanan says, The simple presenting of oneself in the Court is the real presenting of oneself, and so has no limit of times prescribed, while on the contrary the presenting of oneself for an offering has a limit of times prescribed. But Resh Lakish said, The presenting of oneself with an offering is alone the real presenting of oneself, for if it be the case of an offering also, there is no limit. He put this difficulty to him, "Let thy foot be seldom in thy neighbour's house" (Prov. xxv. 17). But here it has to do with sin-offerings and trespass-offerings. So is the opinion of R. Levi. For R. Levi adduces the passage, "Let thy foot be seldom in thy neighbour's house," and the passage, "I will come into thy house with burnt-offerings" (Ps. lxvi. 12). There is no difficulty. In the one case it has to do with sin-offerings and trespass-offerings, in the other with burnt-offerings and peace-offerings. There is a Baraitha also to this effect, viz., "Let thy foot be seldom in thy neighbour's house:" the passage speaks of sin-offerings and trespass-offerings; if thou sayest, Of sin-offerings and trespass-offerings? perhaps not, but of burnt-offerings and peace-offerings, as he says, "I will come into thy house with burnt-offerings, I will pay thee my vows" (Ps. lxvi. 12), for see, they actually speak there of burnt-offerings and peace-offerings; Nay, but look thou how I explain, "Let thy foot be seldom in thy neighbour's house," viz., that the passage is speaking of sin-offerings and trespass-offerings.
Abai said to him, Of course. For otherwise the question would arise, Which of them wilt thou cause to be sinners, and which of them wilt thou cause to be obedient? But wherefore then does the passage come? It is to correspond to the saying of others. For there is a Baraitha, viz., Others say, The cordwainer, and the smelter in bronze and the tanner, are exempt from the holocaust, for it is said, "all thy males" (Exod. xxiii. 17, Deut. xvi. 16), i.e., he who can go up with all thy males. These are excluded, for they cannot go up with all thy males.
things only from which the Chagigah may come. These are excluded, for the Chagigah does not come from them. R. Ashi said, This comes out of the expression "and thou shalt rejoice." These are excluded, for there is no joy in them. And R. Ashi said, Pray, for what purpose does the expression "in thy feast" occur? It is to serve the same purpose as it served with R. Daniel bar Kattinah. For R. Daniel bar Kattinah said that Rab said, How is it that men do not take them wives on a middle holiday? Because it is said, "and thou shalt rejoice in thy feast," and not in thy wife.
things only from which the Chagigah may come. These are excluded, for the Chagigah does not come from them. R. Ashi said, This comes out of the expression "and thou shalt rejoice." These are excluded, for there is no joy in them. And R. Ashi said, Pray, for what purpose does the expression "in thy feast" occur? It is to serve the same purpose as it served with R. Daniel bar Kattinah. For R. Daniel bar Kattinah said that Rab said, How is it that men do not take them wives on a middle holiday? Because it is said, "and thou shalt rejoice in thy feast," and not in thy wife.
Many peace-offerings—whence does he bring them? For behold, he has them not. R. Chasda said, He supplements, and brings a large bullock. R. Shesheth said to him, Behold, they say, Men supplement beast with beast. What did he mean? If you say, He meant this, viz., Behold, they say, Men supplement beast with beast, but not money with money, then he ought to have said to him, Men do not supplement money with money. But this is what he meant, viz., Behold, they say, Men also supplement beast with beast. To whose teaching is this to be attached? For it does not accord with Hezekiah, and it does not accord with R. Jochanan. And if you say, It is Gemaric teachers who are at variance, but the Mishnic teachers are not at variance, I reply that there is a teaching which says, The first meal shall come from things not previously consecrated. In what sense is the expression "the first meal" used here? It means, The money equivalent of the first meal shall come from things not previously consecrated.
Many peace-offerings—whence does he bring them? For behold, he has them not. R. Chasda said, He supplements, and brings a large bullock. R. Shesheth said to him, Behold, they say, Men supplement beast with beast. What did he mean? If you say, He meant this, viz., Behold, they say, Men supplement beast with beast, but not money with money, then he ought to have said to him, Men do not supplement money with money. But this is what he meant, viz., Behold, they say, Men also supplement beast with beast. To whose teaching is this to be attached? For it does not accord with Hezekiah, and it does not accord with R. Jochanan. And if you say, It is Gemaric teachers who are at variance, but the Mishnic teachers are not at variance, I reply that there is a teaching which says, The first meal shall come from things not previously consecrated. In what sense is the expression "the first meal" used here? It means, The money equivalent of the first meal shall come from things not previously consecrated.
Many peace-offerings—whence does he bring them? For behold, he has them not. R. Chasda said, He supplements, and brings a large bullock. R. Shesheth said to him, Behold, they say, Men supplement beast with beast. What did he mean? If you say, He meant this, viz., Behold, they say, Men supplement beast with beast, but not money with money, then he ought to have said to him, Men do not supplement money with money. But this is what he meant, viz., Behold, they say, Men also supplement beast with beast. To whose teaching is this to be attached? For it does not accord with Hezekiah, and it does not accord with R. Jochanan. And if you say, It is Gemaric teachers who are at variance, but the Mishnic teachers are not at variance, I reply that there is a teaching which says, The first meal shall come from things not previously consecrated. In what sense is the expression "the first meal" used here? It means, The money equivalent of the first meal shall come from things not previously consecrated.
Whence do you gather this? R. Jochanan said in the name of R. Ishmael, The same word, Restraint, is used of the seventh day of Passover, and of the eighth day of the Feast of Tabernacles. What is true of the former as regards postponement of payments, the same is true of the latter. The word is used in an unrestricted way. For if it were not used in an unrestricted way, the force of the argument drawn from it might have been broken by saying, Whereas the seventh day of Passover is not separated from those that precede it, you may say that the eighth day of the Feast of Tabernacles is separated from those that precede it. Assuredly, it is used in a wholly unrestricted sense. What does restraint really mean? That one is restrained from acts of work. But we have the passage, "Thou shalt do no work" (Deut. xvi. 8). Why then has the Merciful One written me Restraint? But learn from it that it was to give the unrestricted sense of the word. And a Baraitha brings out the same thing thus. For there is a Baraitha, "And ye shall keep it a feast unto the Lord seven days" (Lev. xxiii. 41). One might have thought from this passage that one was to go on sacrificing all seven days. No, for the teaching says "it." Thou art to sacrifice "it," and thou art not to sacrifice all seven days. If so, why have we seven stated as the number of the days of the Feast? For postponements of payments; and whence do you gather that if a man has not observed the Feast on the first high holiday of the Feast, he is to go and sacrifice during any part of its extent, even including the last high holiday? Because the teaching says, "Ye shall keep it in the seventh month" (Lev. xxiii. 41). If it had merely said, In the seventh month, one might have thought that one was to go and sacrifice the whole month. No; for the teaching says "it." Thou art to sacrifice "it" and thou art not to sacrifice further.
R. Simeon ben Jochai says, One does not say, Investigate a camel, investigate a pig, but investigate a lamb. And what kind of person is this? This is the pupil of a wise man, who has separated himself from the Law. R. Jehudah ben Lakish said, Every pupil of a wise man, who has separated himself from the Law, to him does the passage refer, which says, "As a bird that wandereth from her nest, so is a man that wandereth from his place" (Prov. xxvii. 8), and that which says, "What unrighteousness have your fathers found in me, that they are gone far from me?" (Jer. ii. 5) There is no difficulty. The one case has to do with his unmarried sister, the other with another man's wife. And, if you like, I will say that both of them have to do with another man's wife, and yet there is no difficulty. The one is
R. Simeon ben Jochai says, One does not say, Investigate a camel, investigate a pig, but investigate a lamb. And what kind of person is this? This is the pupil of a wise man, who has separated himself from the Law. R. Jehudah ben Lakish said, Every pupil of a wise man, who has separated himself from the Law, to him does the passage refer, which says, "As a bird that wandereth from her nest, so is a man that wandereth from his place" (Prov. xxvii. 8), and that which says, "What unrighteousness have your fathers found in me, that they are gone far from me?" (Jer. ii. 5) There is no difficulty. The one case has to do with his unmarried sister, the other with another man's wife. And, if you like, I will say that both of them have to do with another man's wife, and yet there is no difficulty. The one is
Halachoth concerning Sabbath. But there is much in Holy Writ concerning it. Nay, but it was necessary, so as to agree with the words of R. Abba, for R. Abba said, He who digs a hole on the Sabbath, when it is only needed for the sake of the earth from it, is permitted to do so. According to whom is this teaching? According to R. Simeon, who said, A work which is not necessary for its own sake is permitted. If thou sayest, According to R. Jehudah, his teaching is that there are two cases to be distinguished, and that in the one the man does something which effects good, in the other harm. What is the meaning of the expression, as mountains suspended by a hair? It refers to the fact that
Chagigoth. But there is much in Holy Writ concerning them. Nay, but it was necessary, so as to agree with what R. Papa said to Abai, viz., Whence is it that the passage, "and ye shall keep it a feast to the Lord" (Exod. xii. 14, Lev. xxiii. 41) involves sacrifice? Perhaps the Merciful One meant merely, Celebrate a Feast without sacrifice. But that sacrifices are meant we learn from this passage, "That they may hold a feast unto me in the wilderness" (Exod. v. 1). But, it may be replied, here also it only means, Hold a Feast. But if thou sayest, Here also it only means, Hold a Feast, yet there is the passage, "And Moses said, Thou must also give into our hands sacrifices and burnt-offerings" (Exod. x. 25). But the objector may say, Perhaps here the Merciful One meant merely, Eat and drink and keep the Feast before Me. Thou art not to think so, for it is written, "neither shall the fat of my feast remain all night until the morning" (Exod. xxiii. 18). And if thou dost imagine that this is a mere Feast, Does fat belong to a mere Feast? But perhaps you will object, the Merciful One meant only this, viz., that the fat which comes at the time of a Feast shall not remain. But that such is not the meaning we learn from this consideration, viz., The fat which comes at the time of a Feast shall not remain. Shall then all that which comes all the rest of the year remain? "All night unto the morning" (Lev. vi. 2, E.V. 9) is what is written. Perhaps, if the argument were drawn from that passage only, I might have said, The Merciful One wrote the one as an affirmative, and the other as a negative commandment (Lev. vi. 2. Exod. xxiii. 18). But, it is replied, the Scripture has other negative commandments to the same effect, e.g., "Neither shall any of the flesh, which thou sacrificest the first day at even, remain all night until the morning" (Deut. xvi. 4). But perhaps it was to impose upon him two negative commandments and one positive. But there comes in two passages the word "wilderness," "wilderness." It is written in the one, "That they may hold a feast unto me in the wilderness" (Exod. v. 1), and it is written in the other, "Did ye bring unto me sacrifices and offerings in the wilderness?" (Amos v. 25) As in the latter there are sacrifices mentioned, so in the former there are sacrifices meant. And what is the meaning of the expression, as mountains suspended by a hair? Nay, but we do not learn the words of the Law from the words of tradition.
II. (1) Men are not to expound unlawful unions with a company of three, nor the work of Creation with two, nor the Chariot with one; but if a man do so, he must be a wise man, and one who has much knowledge of his own. Everyone who meddles with these four things that follow, it were better for him that he had not come into the world, viz., what is above and what is beneath, what is before and what is after. And every one who does not revere the glory of his Maker, it were better for him that he had not come into the world.
And why do I find the expression, v'eth ha-aretz? To shew that the heaven preceded the earth. "And the earth was chaos and desolation" (Gen. i. 2). Assuredly He began with heaven at first. What reason then was there for His considering the affairs of the earth? The house of R. Ishmael teaches thus, He is like a king of flesh and blood, who saith to his servants, Rise up early and come to my door. He himself rises early, and finds women and men. Whom does he praise? Him who was under no obligation to rise early, yet did rise early.
There is a Baraitha of R. Jose, which says, Woe to the creatures which see and know not what they see, which stand and know not upon what they stand. Upon what does the earth stand? Upon the pillars, as it is said, "Who shaketh the earth out of her place, and the pillars thereof tremble" (Job ix. 6). The pillars stand upon the waters, as it is said, "To him that spread forth the earth upon the waters;" (Ps. cxxxvi. 6) the waters upon the mountains, as it is said, "the waters stood above the mountains" (Ps. civ. 6); the mountains upon the wind, as it is said, "For lo he that formeth the mountains and createth wind;" (Amos iv. 13) the wind upon the storm, as it is said, "Storm making the substance of the wind;" (Ps. cxlviii. 8) the storm is suspended upon the arm of the Holy One, blessed be He, as it is said, "underneath are the everlasting arms" (Deut. xxxiii. 27). And wise men say, It stands upon twelve pillars, as it is said, "He set the bounds of the peoples according to the number of the children of Israel" (Deut. xxxii. 8). And there are some who say, Seven pillars, as it is said, "she hath hewn out her seven pillars" (Prov. ix. 1). R. El'azar ben Shammua' says, Upon one pillar, and its name is The Righteous, as it is said, "but the righteous is the foundation of the world" (Prov. x. 25).
R. Jochanan said to R. El'azar, Come, I will fully instruct thee in the subject of the Chariot. He said to him, I am not old enough. When he was old enough, R. Jochanan's soul had passed away. R. Asi said to him, Come, and I will fully instruct thee in the subject of the Chariot. He said to him, If I had been worthy, I should have received full instruction from R. Jochanan thy teacher. R. Joseph was giving full instruction in the subject of the Chariot. The wise men of Pumbeditha were teaching the subject of Creation. They said to him, Would that our lord would instruct us fully in the subject of the Chariot. He said to them, Instruct me fully in the subject of Creation. After they had instructed him fully, they said to him, Would that our lord would instruct us fully in the subject of the Chariot. He said to them, There is a Baraitha with reference to these things which says, "Honey and milk are under thy tongue" (Cant. iv. 11). Let words sweeter than honey and milk be under thy tongue. R. Abohu said, It is drawn from this passage, viz., "things to be concealed under thy clothes" (Prov. xxvii. 26), that is to say, things which are the secrets of the world shall be under thy clothes. They said to him, We have worked in them as far as the words, "And he said unto me, Son of man" (Ezek. ii. 1). He said to them, But this is the subject of the Chariot. Some one puts a difficulty. How far does the subject of the Chariot reach? Rab says, It reaches to the last occurrence of the expression, "I saw" (Ezek. i. 27). R. Isaac says, It reaches to the Chashmal. We instruct fully to the words, "and I saw;" thenceforward we only impart the heads of the divisions. There are others who say, As far as, "and I saw," we impart the heads of the divisions; thenceforward, if the man be wise and of ready intelligence, Yes; if not, No. And how are we to expound in Chashmal? For there is the story of the child, who was studying in Chashmal, and there came out a fire and consumed him. The case of the child is different, for he had not reached the fitting age.
There is a certain passage which says, "Thousand thousands ministered unto him, and ten thousand times ten thousand stood before him" (Dan. vii. 10), and there is a certain passage which says, "Is there any number of his armies?" (Job xxv. 3) There is no difficulty. The one was at the time when the Holy House was standing, and the other was at the time when the Holy House was not standing. As though it were possible to say that the family of the Most High was diminished. There is a Baraitha, Rabbi says in the name of Abba Jose ben Dosai, "Thousand thousands ministered unto him," this is the number of one troop, but of His troops there is no number. And R. Jeremiah bar Abba said, Thousand thousands ministered unto him at the fiery stream, as it is said, "A fiery stream issued and came forth from before him: thousand thousands ministered unto him, and ten thousand times ten thousand stood before him" (Dan. vii. 10). Whence does it come forth? From the perspiration of the living creatures. And upon what is it poured? R. Zot'ra bar Tobiah said that Rab said, Upon the heads of wicked men in Gehenna, as it is said, "Behold the tempest of the LORD, even his fury, is gone forth, yea, a whirling tempest; it shall burst upon the head of the wicked" (Jer. xxiii. 19). And R. Acha bar Jacob said, Upon those who were held back, as it is said, "Who were held back before their time, whose foundation was poured out as a stream" (Job xxii. 16). There is a Baraitha to the effect that R. Simeon the Holy said, These are nine hundred and seventy-four generations, which were held back from being created
Nimus the weaver asked R. Meir this question, Does all wool which goes down to the dyeing vat come up with the right colour? He said to him, All which was clean while on its mother's back does so come up: all which was not clean while on its mother's back does not so come up.
Nimus the weaver asked R. Meir this question, Does all wool which goes down to the dyeing vat come up with the right colour? He said to him, All which was clean while on its mother's back does so come up: all which was not clean while on its mother's back does not so come up.
Nimus the weaver asked R. Meir this question, Does all wool which goes down to the dyeing vat come up with the right colour? He said to him, All which was clean while on its mother's back does so come up: all which was not clean while on its mother's back does not so come up.
Everyone, who does not respect the glory of his Maker, it would have been a mercy for him that he had not come into the world. What is the case here meant? R. Abba said, This is the man who gazes into the rainbow. R. Joseph said, This is the man who commits a transgression secretly. In support of the explanation that it means the man who gazes into the rainbow, it is written, "As the appearance of the bow that is in the cloud in the day of rain, so was the appearance of the brightness round about" (Ezek. i. 28). This is the appearance of the likeness of the glory of the LORD. R. Joseph said, The explanation that this is the man who commits a transgression secretly, agrees with the view of R. Isaac, for R. Isaac said, Every one who committeth a transgression secretly is as though he jarred the feet of the Shechinah, as it is said, "Thus saith the LORD, the heaven is my throne, and the earth is my footstool" (Is. lxvi. 1). Is it so? and yet R. El'a the elder said, If a man sees that his evil nature is mastering him, let him go to a place where they do not know him, and let him put on black garments, and cover himself with black, and do what his heart desireth, but let him not profane the name of God openly. There is no difficulty. The one is the case of a man who has found a means of checking his evil nature, the other of a man who has not found a means of checking his evil nature.
There is a canonical Mishnah, In the case of the day of Pentecost which falls upon the eve of a Sabbath, the house of Shammai say, The day for sacrificing is after the Sabbath, but the house of Hillel say, There is no day for sacrificing (Chag. 17a, i. 6). Do you not think that it means that there is no day at all for sacrificing? No; it cannot mean that a day for sacrificing is not necessary. What then does it mean? We learn from this that we are to bring the sacrifice on its own day? But how can this be? for they have discussed this point once already, for we have a canonical Mishnah, viz., The house of Shammai say, Men bring peace-offerings on a festival and do not lay their hands on them, but not burnt offerings; but the house of Hillel say, Men bring both peace-offerings and burnt-offerings and lay their hands on them (Chag. 17a, i. 3). I reply, No; there is no superfluity. For the passage is necessary. For, if he had let me hear only the second paragraph, I should not have doubted through hearing it only, that the house of Shammai insist that men are not to sacrifice on the day of Pentecost, because it is possible to do so on the morrow, but, unless I had a distinct paragraph to the contrary, I should have said thus, They agree as regards the possibility of doing it on the morrow with the house of Hillel; and if he had let me hear only the first paragraph, I should not have doubted through hearing it only, that the house of Hillel say that men may sacrifice because it is impossible to do so on the morrow, but according to this I should have said, They agree as regards the impossibility of doing it on the morrow, with the house of Shammai. Hence the second paragraph was necessary.
For common food and tithe how can washing of hands be needed? For I can adduce against this Mishnah the following, viz., The heave offering and the firstfruits involve to one who transgresses with respect to them death and compensation to the amount of one fifth part beyond the price, and it is forbidden to strangers to share in them, and these are the property of the priest and are mixed with one hundred and one things, and they are subject to the washing of hands and waiting till the going down of the sun (Bikkurim, ii. 1, and elsewhere). Lo, this is the case with heave-offering and firstfruits, but it is not the case with tithe, much less with common food. There is a difficulty when we place tithe against tithe, and there is a difficulty when we place common food against common food. It is all right in the case of tithe against tithe. It does not present a difficulty. The one opinion is that of R. Meir, and the other that of our Rabbis. For there is a canonical Mishnah, Everything which is subject to the duty of going to the water, as far as the scribes have taught, defiles hallowed things, but only disqualifies heave-offering and leaves common food and tithe unaffected. These are the words of R. Meir, but wise men consider tithe affected (Chullin 33b, i. 1, Sota 30a, ii. 4).
Our Rabbis have taught thus, He that washes his hands—if he does it with intention, his hands are clean; if he does it without intention, his hands are unclean. And so he that dips his hands—if he does it with intention, his hands are clean; if he does it without intention, his hands are unclean. And yet there is a Baraitha, Whether he does it with intention or not, his hands are clean. R. Nachman said, There is no difficulty. The one has to do with common food,
Our Rabbis have taught thus, He that washes his hands—if he does it with intention, his hands are clean; if he does it without intention, his hands are unclean. And so he that dips his hands—if he does it with intention, his hands are clean; if he does it without intention, his hands are unclean. And yet there is a Baraitha, Whether he does it with intention or not, his hands are clean. R. Nachman said, There is no difficulty. The one has to do with common food,
Our Rabbis have taught thus, He that washes his hands—if he does it with intention, his hands are clean; if he does it without intention, his hands are unclean. And so he that dips his hands—if he does it with intention, his hands are clean; if he does it without intention, his hands are unclean. And yet there is a Baraitha, Whether he does it with intention or not, his hands are clean. R. Nachman said, There is no difficulty. The one has to do with common food,
Our Rabbis have taught thus, He that washes his hands—if he does it with intention, his hands are clean; if he does it without intention, his hands are unclean. And so he that dips his hands—if he does it with intention, his hands are clean; if he does it without intention, his hands are unclean. And yet there is a Baraitha, Whether he does it with intention or not, his hands are clean. R. Nachman said, There is no difficulty. The one has to do with common food,
Our Rabbis have taught thus, He that washes his hands—if he does it with intention, his hands are clean; if he does it without intention, his hands are unclean. And so he that dips his hands—if he does it with intention, his hands are clean; if he does it without intention, his hands are unclean. And yet there is a Baraitha, Whether he does it with intention or not, his hands are clean. R. Nachman said, There is no difficulty. The one has to do with common food,
And what is your authority for saying that common food does not want intention? Because there is a canonical Mishnah, If a wave of water, which is let loose and contains forty seahs, falls upon a man or upon vessels, they are clean (Chullin 31b, i. 1). For it teaches that a man is like vessels. As vessels have no intention, so a man has no intention. But whence do you gather that he has no intention? Perhaps we are dealing with the case of a man sitting and watching when the wave shall be let loose. And vessels are like a man. As a man utters his intention, so in the case of vessels persons exercise intention for them. And when thou sayest, It is the case of a man sitting and watching, what is the good of the story, for in that case he has an intention? Thou mightest have thought, It is to set a limit. Perhaps otherwise he would have gone to dip himself in a collection of stagnant rain-water. Thus also we limit it to the first fall, on account of the second being unlawful. We learn from this that we are not to limit it. And what is your authority for saying that men do not dip in the second fall? Because there is a Baraitha, viz., Men dip in the first, but do not dip in the second, that they may not dip in the air. But we also learn it hence, for there is a canonical Mishnah, If fruits have fallen into the midst of a reservoir of water, and if one whose hands are unclean should reach out and lay hold of them, his hands are clean, and the fruits are clean. But if he did this that he might wash his hands, his hands are clean, but the fruits are unclean (Makhshirin, iv. 7).
Rabbah put this question to R. Nachman, Thou saidst, He who dips for common food and has credit for common food, is forbidden tithe. If he claims credit, he has it; if he does not claim credit, he has it not. Nay, but it means, Although he has credit for common food, he is forbidden tithe. He put this further question to him, There is a Mishnah as follows, If he have dipped and have not got credit for it, it is as though he had not dipped. Do you think it means, that it is as though he had not dipped? Certainly not, but it means that it is, as though he had not dipped for tithe. But the case supposed is that of one who has dipped for common food. He considered and brought this refutation.
He that dips for common food and has credit for common food, etc. According to whom does our Mishnah run? It is a saying of our Rabbis, for they make a distinction between common food and tithes. But against this view let me quote the latter part of the Mishnah, The garments of a common person are defiled by pressure for Pharisees; the garments of Pharisees are defiled by pressure for those that eat heave-offering. This is in accordance with R. Meir, who says, Common food and tithe are exactly the same. Then is our conclusion to be that the former part is the teaching of our Rabbis, and the latter part that of R. Meir? Yes, the former part is the teaching of our Rabbis, and the latter part that of R. Meir. Rab Acha bar Ada teaches in the latter part five orders, and establishes it all according to our Rabbis.
because he does not include it among the orders? No; for perhaps this is the reason that he does not include it among the orders, that, if it were likened to heave-offering, behold, we have been already taught about heave-offering, and if it were likened to common food, behold, we have been already taught about common food, for there is a Baraitha, viz., common food which is treated with observance of the laws of purification belonging to hallowed things, behold, it is nevertheless as common food. R. El'azar in the name of R. Zadok says, Behold it is as heave-offering.
because he does not include it among the orders? No; for perhaps this is the reason that he does not include it among the orders, that, if it were likened to heave-offering, behold, we have been already taught about heave-offering, and if it were likened to common food, behold, we have been already taught about common food, for there is a Baraitha, viz., common food which is treated with observance of the laws of purification belonging to hallowed things, behold, it is nevertheless as common food. R. El'azar in the name of R. Zadok says, Behold it is as heave-offering.
R. Jonathan ben Amram said, A man's Sabbath clothes have been exchanged for his common clothes, and he has put them on; they are unclean. R. El'azar bar Zadok said, There was the case of two women, companions, whose clothes were exchanged at the baths, and the matter came before R. Eliezer and he pronounced them unclean. R. Oshaia objects to him, But regard it thus. It follows that if a man stretch out his hand to a basket to take a piece of wheaten bread, and there come into his hand a piece of barley bread, in this case also he is made unclean. And if thou sayest, Yes, in this case also; but yet there is a Baraitha, viz., He that guards the cask, presuming that it is wine, and it is found to be a cask of oil—it is clean so far as not to cause uncleanness. But granting that, let me point out the last words. But it is forbidden to be eaten. Wherefore R. Jeremiah said, This is the case of one who says, I have guarded it as regards uncleanness, but not as regards separation. And what is the meaning of this securing in a half and half way? There is such a thing, and yet there is a Baraitha, If a man stretches out his hand into a basket, and the basket is upon his shoulder, and the scraper is inside the basket, and it is in his mind as regards the basket, but is not in his mind as regards the scraper, the basket is clean but the scraper is unclean. The basket is clean, you say. Does not the scraper make the basket unclean? No; for one vessel does not make another vessel unclean, but it may make unclean what is in the basket. Rabena said, This is the case of one who says, I have guarded it as regards its uncleanness, but not as regards its separation.
R. Jonathan ben Amram said, A man's Sabbath clothes have been exchanged for his common clothes, and he has put them on; they are unclean. R. El'azar bar Zadok said, There was the case of two women, companions, whose clothes were exchanged at the baths, and the matter came before R. Eliezer and he pronounced them unclean. R. Oshaia objects to him, But regard it thus. It follows that if a man stretch out his hand to a basket to take a piece of wheaten bread, and there come into his hand a piece of barley bread, in this case also he is made unclean. And if thou sayest, Yes, in this case also; but yet there is a Baraitha, viz., He that guards the cask, presuming that it is wine, and it is found to be a cask of oil—it is clean so far as not to cause uncleanness. But granting that, let me point out the last words. But it is forbidden to be eaten. Wherefore R. Jeremiah said, This is the case of one who says, I have guarded it as regards uncleanness, but not as regards separation. And what is the meaning of this securing in a half and half way? There is such a thing, and yet there is a Baraitha, If a man stretches out his hand into a basket, and the basket is upon his shoulder, and the scraper is inside the basket, and it is in his mind as regards the basket, but is not in his mind as regards the scraper, the basket is clean but the scraper is unclean. The basket is clean, you say. Does not the scraper make the basket unclean? No; for one vessel does not make another vessel unclean, but it may make unclean what is in the basket. Rabena said, This is the case of one who says, I have guarded it as regards its uncleanness, but not as regards its separation.
It is all right as regards R. El'azar son of R. Zadok. For we may observe that each woman says, My neighbour is wife of a common person, and she turns her attention from her. It is all right as regards R. Jonathan ben Amram also. For we may observe that inasmuch as a man pays great attention to his Sabbath clothes, he has taken his thoughts from the others. But as to R. Jonathan ben El'azar, we may observe that a man will pay attention to the hands of his neighbour. R. Jochanan said, It may be presumed that no man attends to what is in the hand of his neighbour? Does he not?
He does not care, for he goes and gives it to a priest, a common person, his friend. And what is the Baraitha to the effect that we should pay regard to the fear of such anger? It is a saying of R. Jose. For there is a Baraitha, R. Jose said, Wherefore are all believed as to the purity of wine and oil all the days of the year? It is in order that every individual may not go and build a high place for himself, and burn a red heifer for himself.
Rab Papa said, According to whom is it that we accept now-a-days the testimony of a common person? According to whom? It is according to R. Jose. But let us consider the question of borrowing. For there is a canonical Mishnah, viz., An earthen vessel protects everything from uncleanness. These are the words of the house of Hillel. The house of Shammai say, It only protects eatables and drinkables and every earthen vessel. The house of Hillel said to the house of Shammai, Wherefore? The house of Shammai said, Because it is unclean on account of the common people, and a vessel that is unclean does not bar. The house of Hillel said to them, But in accordance with the rule ye have just given do ye not declare clean the eatables and drinkables that are within it? The house of Shammai said to them, When we declared clean the eatables and drinkables which are within it,
it was for himself that we declared them clean, but should we declare clean the vessel whose purity is a matter which relates both to thee and to him (Kelim, x. 1)? There is a Baraitha, viz., R. Joshua said, I am ashamed of your words, ye house of Shammai. Is it possible that if a woman be kneading in a trough, and the woman become for any reason unclean, the woman and the trough are unclean for seven days, but the dough is clean? Or suppose that a bowl is full of drinkables. If for any reason the bowl becomes unclean for seven days, yet are the drinkables clean? A certain disciple, one of the disciples of the house of Shammai, joined himself to him and said to him, Shall I tell thee the reason of the house of Shammai? He said to him, Tell me. He said to him, Does an unclean vessel bar, or does it not bar? He said to him, It does not bar. Are the vessels of a common person unclean or clean? He said to him, Unclean. But if thou sayest to him, It is unclean, will he care for thee at all? And not only so, but if thou sayest to him, It is unclean, he will say to thee, Mine is clean, but thine is unclean; and this is the reason of the house of Shammai. Immediately R. Joshua went and threw himself down at the graves of the house of Shammai, and said, I humble myself before you, O bones of the house of Shammai, and when your mysteries are so wonderful, how much more are your explicit teachings? They say that all his days his teeth were black by reason of his fasts.
it was for himself that we declared them clean, but should we declare clean the vessel whose purity is a matter which relates both to thee and to him (Kelim, x. 1)? There is a Baraitha, viz., R. Joshua said, I am ashamed of your words, ye house of Shammai. Is it possible that if a woman be kneading in a trough, and the woman become for any reason unclean, the woman and the trough are unclean for seven days, but the dough is clean? Or suppose that a bowl is full of drinkables. If for any reason the bowl becomes unclean for seven days, yet are the drinkables clean? A certain disciple, one of the disciples of the house of Shammai, joined himself to him and said to him, Shall I tell thee the reason of the house of Shammai? He said to him, Tell me. He said to him, Does an unclean vessel bar, or does it not bar? He said to him, It does not bar. Are the vessels of a common person unclean or clean? He said to him, Unclean. But if thou sayest to him, It is unclean, will he care for thee at all? And not only so, but if thou sayest to him, It is unclean, he will say to thee, Mine is clean, but thine is unclean; and this is the reason of the house of Shammai. Immediately R. Joshua went and threw himself down at the graves of the house of Shammai, and said, I humble myself before you, O bones of the house of Shammai, and when your mysteries are so wonderful, how much more are your explicit teachings? They say that all his days his teeth were black by reason of his fasts.
it was for himself that we declared them clean, but should we declare clean the vessel whose purity is a matter which relates both to thee and to him (Kelim, x. 1)? There is a Baraitha, viz., R. Joshua said, I am ashamed of your words, ye house of Shammai. Is it possible that if a woman be kneading in a trough, and the woman become for any reason unclean, the woman and the trough are unclean for seven days, but the dough is clean? Or suppose that a bowl is full of drinkables. If for any reason the bowl becomes unclean for seven days, yet are the drinkables clean? A certain disciple, one of the disciples of the house of Shammai, joined himself to him and said to him, Shall I tell thee the reason of the house of Shammai? He said to him, Tell me. He said to him, Does an unclean vessel bar, or does it not bar? He said to him, It does not bar. Are the vessels of a common person unclean or clean? He said to him, Unclean. But if thou sayest to him, It is unclean, will he care for thee at all? And not only so, but if thou sayest to him, It is unclean, he will say to thee, Mine is clean, but thine is unclean; and this is the reason of the house of Shammai. Immediately R. Joshua went and threw himself down at the graves of the house of Shammai, and said, I humble myself before you, O bones of the house of Shammai, and when your mysteries are so wonderful, how much more are your explicit teachings? They say that all his days his teeth were black by reason of his fasts.
Vessels finished in purity, etc. Finished by whom? If a learned and observant man has finished them, why should they be dipped? but if a common person has finished them, how is it that the Mishnah calls them "finished in purity?" Rabbah bar Shela said that R. Mothnah said that Samuel said, By all means, in case that a learned and observant man has finished them; yet because of a drop of spittle of a common person which may have fallen upon it, it is treated as unclean. "May have fallen upon it," when? If we should say, before it is completed, but lo, it is not yet a vessel; or, after it is completed, but then he takes good care of it. By all means in the case of the vessel before it is completed; yet perhaps at the moment that it was made, it was still liquid. It is a case for dipping, but not for the going down of the sun. This Mishnic teaching does not agree with R. Eliezer. For there is a canonical Mishnah, When one has cut out a pipe for the ashes of purification for sin, R. Eliezer says, Let him forthwith dip. R. Joshua says, Let him be rendered unclean and afterwards let him dip (Parah, v. 4). And we discuss the question, Who is it that is cutting it out? Perhaps it is a learned and observant man, who has cut it out. But then, why should I dip? Or, a common person has cut it out. But then would R. Joshua have said, He shall be made unclean and shall be dipped? Nay, for he is already unclean and continues so. And Rabbah bar Shela said that Rab Mothnah said that Samuel said, By all means let it be the case that a learned and observant man has cut it out, yet because of a drop of spittle of a common person which may have fallen upon it—When? If we should say, before he cut it out, but lo, it is not yet a vessel; or after he cut it out, but then he takes good care of it. By all means it is so before he cut it out; yet perhaps at the moment that he cut it out, it was still liquid. It is all right as to what R. Joshua says, This is by way of a test for Sadducees. For we have a canonical Mishnah, They used to make unclean the priest who burns the heifer, in order to protest against the view of the Sadducees (Parah, iii. 7); for they used to say, This act is included among the sunset ones. But thou art in accord with the teaching of R. Eliezer, if thou sayest, It is all right to say that in every case we require the sunset rule, for this is a protest against the Sadducees. But if thou sayest, In every case we do not require the sunset rule, how is it a protest against the Sadducees? Rab said,
The addition was only necessary for the rest of the meat-offering. For the teaching of the Law is, What stands in need of a vessel, the vessel includes it; what does not stand in need of a vessel, the vessel does not include it. But our Rabbis went farther and ordained that although a thing do not necessarily belong to a vessel, the vessel includes it. This will be all right as regards flour, but what is to be said about incense and frankincense? R. Nachman said that Rabbah bar Abuah said, It is as though men heaped things up upon a large piece of leather. According to the Law if it have an inside, it includes them; if it have not an inside, it does not include them. But our Rabbis went farther and ordained that although it have no inside, it includes them. And the view of R. Chanin differs from that of R. Chia bar Abba. For R. Chia bar Abba says that R. Jochanan says, This Mishnah is taught from the testimony of R. Akiba.
The addition was only necessary for the rest of the meat-offering. For the teaching of the Law is, What stands in need of a vessel, the vessel includes it; what does not stand in need of a vessel, the vessel does not include it. But our Rabbis went farther and ordained that although a thing do not necessarily belong to a vessel, the vessel includes it. This will be all right as regards flour, but what is to be said about incense and frankincense? R. Nachman said that Rabbah bar Abuah said, It is as though men heaped things up upon a large piece of leather. According to the Law if it have an inside, it includes them; if it have not an inside, it does not include them. But our Rabbis went farther and ordained that although it have no inside, it includes them. And the view of R. Chanin differs from that of R. Chia bar Abba. For R. Chia bar Abba says that R. Jochanan says, This Mishnah is taught from the testimony of R. Akiba.
The addition was only necessary for the rest of the meat-offering. For the teaching of the Law is, What stands in need of a vessel, the vessel includes it; what does not stand in need of a vessel, the vessel does not include it. But our Rabbis went farther and ordained that although a thing do not necessarily belong to a vessel, the vessel includes it. This will be all right as regards flour, but what is to be said about incense and frankincense? R. Nachman said that Rabbah bar Abuah said, It is as though men heaped things up upon a large piece of leather. According to the Law if it have an inside, it includes them; if it have not an inside, it does not include them. But our Rabbis went farther and ordained that although it have no inside, it includes them. And the view of R. Chanin differs from that of R. Chia bar Abba. For R. Chia bar Abba says that R. Jochanan says, This Mishnah is taught from the testimony of R. Akiba.