exempt

What might you have thought? There [in the mishnah] he is not liable when he errs in connection with a mitzvah, because he performs a mitzvah, but here where he erred in connection with a mitzvah but he does not perform another mitzvah, I might have said that he is liable, therefore he informs us [that even here he is exempt].

GEMARA. It was taught, It was the place called Kolonia. Then why does our Tanna call it Moza? Since it was exempt from the king’s tax, he calls it Moza

Hezekiah further stated in the name of R. Yirmiyah who said it in the name of R. Shimon b. Yohai: I am able to exempt the whole world from judgement from the day that I was born until now, and Eliezer, my son, were to be with me [we could exempt it] from the day of the creation of the world to the present time, and were Yotam the son of Uzziah with us, [we could exempt it] from the creation of the world to its final end.

Hezekiah further stated in the name of R. Yirmiyah who said it in the name of R. Shimon b. Yohai: I am able to exempt the whole world from judgement from the day that I was born until now, and Eliezer, my son, were to be with me [we could exempt it] from the day of the creation of the world to the present time, and were Yotam the son of Uzziah with us, [we could exempt it] from the creation of the world to its final end.

Hezekiah further stated in the name of R. Yirmiyah who said it in the name of R. Shimon b. Yohai: I am able to exempt the whole world from judgement from the day that I was born until now, and Eliezer, my son, were to be with me [we could exempt it] from the day of the creation of the world to the present time, and were Yotam the son of Uzziah with us, [we could exempt it] from the creation of the world to its final end.

Whose view does the Mishnah follow? That of R. Nehunia b. HaKaneh, as it has been taught: R. Nehunia b. HaKaneh used to make Yom Kippur the same as Shabbat in respect of compensation: just as [one who deliberately breaks] Shabbat forfeits his life but is exempt from compensation, so too [one who deliberately breaks] Yom Kippur forfeits his life but is exempt from compensation.

Whose view does the Mishnah follow? That of R. Nehunia b. HaKaneh, as it has been taught: R. Nehunia b. HaKaneh used to make Yom Kippur the same as Shabbat in respect of compensation: just as [one who deliberately breaks] Shabbat forfeits his life but is exempt from compensation, so too [one who deliberately breaks] Yom Kippur forfeits his life but is exempt from compensation.

We have learned elsewhere: If any who has incurred the penalty of karet is flogged — they are exempt from karet, as it says, “Lest your brother should be dishonored in your eyes” (Deuteronomy 25:3) once he has been flogged, he is like thy brother, the words of R. Hananiah b. Gamaliel. R. Yohanan said: R. Hananiah b. Gamaliel’s colleagues disagreed with him on this point.

What is the expression all to include? It is to include him who is half a slave and half free. But according to Rabena, who says, He who is half a slave and half free is exempt from the holocaust, what is the expression all to include? It is to include him who is lame on the first day and well on the second day. This agrees with him who says, All of them are transferable from one day to another; but according to him who says, All of them are transferable as from the first day only, what is the expression all to include? It is to include the blind in one eye. But this is not in accordance with the following Baraitha. For Jochanan ben Dahăbai, saying it in the name of Rabbi Jehudah, taught, He who is blind in one eye is exempt from the holocaust, as it is said, "He shall be seen," or "He shall see" (Ex. xxiii. 17, Deut. xvi. 16). As he went to see, so he went to be seen; as to see with both his eyes, so to be seen with both His eyes.

What is the expression all to include? It is to include him who is half a slave and half free. But according to Rabena, who says, He who is half a slave and half free is exempt from the holocaust, what is the expression all to include? It is to include him who is lame on the first day and well on the second day. This agrees with him who says, All of them are transferable from one day to another; but according to him who says, All of them are transferable as from the first day only, what is the expression all to include? It is to include the blind in one eye. But this is not in accordance with the following Baraitha. For Jochanan ben Dahăbai, saying it in the name of Rabbi Jehudah, taught, He who is blind in one eye is exempt from the holocaust, as it is said, "He shall be seen," or "He shall see" (Ex. xxiii. 17, Deut. xvi. 16). As he went to see, so he went to be seen; as to see with both his eyes, so to be seen with both His eyes.

Except a deaf man, a fool, and a child etc. There is a Baraitha, A deaf man is like a fool and a child. As a fool and a child are not responsible for their actions, so a deaf man is not responsible for his actions. And we learn, as we are taught by a canonical Mishnah, A deaf man, as wise men have everywhere said, is one who does not hear and does not speak (Niddah, 13b, ii. 17). Lo, you will say then, He who speaks and does not hear, or he who hears and does not speak, is bound. Yes, for there is a Baraitha for this. For our Rabbis have taught, He who speaks and does not hear is deaf, he who hears and does not speak is dumb. Both one and the other are to be treated as capable persons in all that relates to them. And whence do you infer that he who speaks and does not hear is deaf, and that he who hears and does not speak is dumb? Since it is written, "But I as a deaf man hear not; and I am as a dumb man, who openeth not his mouth" (Ps. xxxviii. 14). And, if you like, I will say, according to the proverbial saying, A man stumbling in his words. He who speaks and does not hear, or he who hears and does not speak, is bound. But, lo, there is a Baraitha, viz., He who speaks and does not hear, or he who hears and does not speak, is exempt. Rabena, or it may have been Rabba, said, There is a hiatus here. And there is a Baraitha to this effect, All are bound as regards the holocaust, and as regards the rejoicing, except a deaf man. He who speaks and does not hear, or he who hears and does not speak, is exempt from the holocaust. But although he is exempt from the holocaust, he is bound as regards the rejoicing; but as for him who does not hear and does not speak, and as for a fool and a child, he is exempt also from the rejoicing, inasmuch as these are exempt from all the commandments which are contained in the Law.

Except a deaf man, a fool, and a child etc. There is a Baraitha, A deaf man is like a fool and a child. As a fool and a child are not responsible for their actions, so a deaf man is not responsible for his actions. And we learn, as we are taught by a canonical Mishnah, A deaf man, as wise men have everywhere said, is one who does not hear and does not speak (Niddah, 13b, ii. 17). Lo, you will say then, He who speaks and does not hear, or he who hears and does not speak, is bound. Yes, for there is a Baraitha for this. For our Rabbis have taught, He who speaks and does not hear is deaf, he who hears and does not speak is dumb. Both one and the other are to be treated as capable persons in all that relates to them. And whence do you infer that he who speaks and does not hear is deaf, and that he who hears and does not speak is dumb? Since it is written, "But I as a deaf man hear not; and I am as a dumb man, who openeth not his mouth" (Ps. xxxviii. 14). And, if you like, I will say, according to the proverbial saying, A man stumbling in his words. He who speaks and does not hear, or he who hears and does not speak, is bound. But, lo, there is a Baraitha, viz., He who speaks and does not hear, or he who hears and does not speak, is exempt. Rabena, or it may have been Rabba, said, There is a hiatus here. And there is a Baraitha to this effect, All are bound as regards the holocaust, and as regards the rejoicing, except a deaf man. He who speaks and does not hear, or he who hears and does not speak, is exempt from the holocaust. But although he is exempt from the holocaust, he is bound as regards the rejoicing; but as for him who does not hear and does not speak, and as for a fool and a child, he is exempt also from the rejoicing, inasmuch as these are exempt from all the commandments which are contained in the Law.

Except a deaf man, a fool, and a child etc. There is a Baraitha, A deaf man is like a fool and a child. As a fool and a child are not responsible for their actions, so a deaf man is not responsible for his actions. And we learn, as we are taught by a canonical Mishnah, A deaf man, as wise men have everywhere said, is one who does not hear and does not speak (Niddah, 13b, ii. 17). Lo, you will say then, He who speaks and does not hear, or he who hears and does not speak, is bound. Yes, for there is a Baraitha for this. For our Rabbis have taught, He who speaks and does not hear is deaf, he who hears and does not speak is dumb. Both one and the other are to be treated as capable persons in all that relates to them. And whence do you infer that he who speaks and does not hear is deaf, and that he who hears and does not speak is dumb? Since it is written, "But I as a deaf man hear not; and I am as a dumb man, who openeth not his mouth" (Ps. xxxviii. 14). And, if you like, I will say, according to the proverbial saying, A man stumbling in his words. He who speaks and does not hear, or he who hears and does not speak, is bound. But, lo, there is a Baraitha, viz., He who speaks and does not hear, or he who hears and does not speak, is exempt. Rabena, or it may have been Rabba, said, There is a hiatus here. And there is a Baraitha to this effect, All are bound as regards the holocaust, and as regards the rejoicing, except a deaf man. He who speaks and does not hear, or he who hears and does not speak, is exempt from the holocaust. But although he is exempt from the holocaust, he is bound as regards the rejoicing; but as for him who does not hear and does not speak, and as for a fool and a child, he is exempt also from the rejoicing, inasmuch as these are exempt from all the commandments which are contained in the Law.

Except a deaf man, a fool, and a child etc. There is a Baraitha, A deaf man is like a fool and a child. As a fool and a child are not responsible for their actions, so a deaf man is not responsible for his actions. And we learn, as we are taught by a canonical Mishnah, A deaf man, as wise men have everywhere said, is one who does not hear and does not speak (Niddah, 13b, ii. 17). Lo, you will say then, He who speaks and does not hear, or he who hears and does not speak, is bound. Yes, for there is a Baraitha for this. For our Rabbis have taught, He who speaks and does not hear is deaf, he who hears and does not speak is dumb. Both one and the other are to be treated as capable persons in all that relates to them. And whence do you infer that he who speaks and does not hear is deaf, and that he who hears and does not speak is dumb? Since it is written, "But I as a deaf man hear not; and I am as a dumb man, who openeth not his mouth" (Ps. xxxviii. 14). And, if you like, I will say, according to the proverbial saying, A man stumbling in his words. He who speaks and does not hear, or he who hears and does not speak, is bound. But, lo, there is a Baraitha, viz., He who speaks and does not hear, or he who hears and does not speak, is exempt. Rabena, or it may have been Rabba, said, There is a hiatus here. And there is a Baraitha to this effect, All are bound as regards the holocaust, and as regards the rejoicing, except a deaf man. He who speaks and does not hear, or he who hears and does not speak, is exempt from the holocaust. But although he is exempt from the holocaust, he is bound as regards the rejoicing; but as for him who does not hear and does not speak, and as for a fool and a child, he is exempt also from the rejoicing, inasmuch as these are exempt from all the commandments which are contained in the Law.

Except a deaf man, a fool, and a child etc. There is a Baraitha, A deaf man is like a fool and a child. As a fool and a child are not responsible for their actions, so a deaf man is not responsible for his actions. And we learn, as we are taught by a canonical Mishnah, A deaf man, as wise men have everywhere said, is one who does not hear and does not speak (Niddah, 13b, ii. 17). Lo, you will say then, He who speaks and does not hear, or he who hears and does not speak, is bound. Yes, for there is a Baraitha for this. For our Rabbis have taught, He who speaks and does not hear is deaf, he who hears and does not speak is dumb. Both one and the other are to be treated as capable persons in all that relates to them. And whence do you infer that he who speaks and does not hear is deaf, and that he who hears and does not speak is dumb? Since it is written, "But I as a deaf man hear not; and I am as a dumb man, who openeth not his mouth" (Ps. xxxviii. 14). And, if you like, I will say, according to the proverbial saying, A man stumbling in his words. He who speaks and does not hear, or he who hears and does not speak, is bound. But, lo, there is a Baraitha, viz., He who speaks and does not hear, or he who hears and does not speak, is exempt. Rabena, or it may have been Rabba, said, There is a hiatus here. And there is a Baraitha to this effect, All are bound as regards the holocaust, and as regards the rejoicing, except a deaf man. He who speaks and does not hear, or he who hears and does not speak, is exempt from the holocaust. But although he is exempt from the holocaust, he is bound as regards the rejoicing; but as for him who does not hear and does not speak, and as for a fool and a child, he is exempt also from the rejoicing, inasmuch as these are exempt from all the commandments which are contained in the Law.

There is also a Baraitha to this effect, All are bound as regards the holocaust and the rejoicing except a deaf man. He who speaks and does not hear, and he who hears and does not speak, are exempt from the holocaust. But although he is exempt from the holocaust,

There is also a Baraitha to this effect, All are bound as regards the holocaust and the rejoicing except a deaf man. He who speaks and does not hear, and he who hears and does not speak, are exempt from the holocaust. But although he is exempt from the holocaust,

he is bound as regards the rejoicing; but as for him who does not hear and does not speak and as for a fool and a child, they are exempt also from the rejoicing, inasmuch as these are exempt from all the commandments which are contained in the Law. What is the difference in the nature of holocaust, that they are exempt, and in the nature of rejoicing, that they are bound? As regards the nature of holocaust we are taught by the recurrence of the word from the passage intitled "Assemble," as it is written, "Assemble the people, the men and the women and the little ones" (Deut. xxxi. 12), and it is written, "when all Israel is come to appear" (Deut. xxxi. 11). And that point, whence do we get it? Because it is written, "that they may hear and that they may learn" (Deut. xxxi. 12). And there is a Baraitha as follows, "That they may hear," this expression excludes him who speaks and does not hear; "and that they may learn," this expression excludes him who hears and does not speak. Is this to say, that he who cannot talk cannot learn? No; for this suggests the case of the two dumb men who were in the neighbourhood of Rabbi, viz., the sons of R. Jochanan ben Gudgodah's daughter; and the sons of R. Jochanan's sister say concerning it, that every time that Rabbi went up to the College, they went up and sat before him, and shook their heads, and moved their lips, and Rabbi asked for mercy for them, and they were examined, and it was ascertained that they were perfect in knowledge of Halachah and Siphra and Siphre and all the Talmud. Mar Zot'ra said, The reading there is, "in order that they may teach." R. Ashi said, Assuredly it is, "in order that they may teach"; for, if you imagine that it is, "in order that they may learn," then, since he who does not talk does not learn, and since he who does not hear does not learn, this sense of learn comes out of the words, "in order that they may hear," but assuredly it is here, "in order that they may teach."

he is bound as regards the rejoicing; but as for him who does not hear and does not speak and as for a fool and a child, they are exempt also from the rejoicing, inasmuch as these are exempt from all the commandments which are contained in the Law. What is the difference in the nature of holocaust, that they are exempt, and in the nature of rejoicing, that they are bound? As regards the nature of holocaust we are taught by the recurrence of the word from the passage intitled "Assemble," as it is written, "Assemble the people, the men and the women and the little ones" (Deut. xxxi. 12), and it is written, "when all Israel is come to appear" (Deut. xxxi. 11). And that point, whence do we get it? Because it is written, "that they may hear and that they may learn" (Deut. xxxi. 12). And there is a Baraitha as follows, "That they may hear," this expression excludes him who speaks and does not hear; "and that they may learn," this expression excludes him who hears and does not speak. Is this to say, that he who cannot talk cannot learn? No; for this suggests the case of the two dumb men who were in the neighbourhood of Rabbi, viz., the sons of R. Jochanan ben Gudgodah's daughter; and the sons of R. Jochanan's sister say concerning it, that every time that Rabbi went up to the College, they went up and sat before him, and shook their heads, and moved their lips, and Rabbi asked for mercy for them, and they were examined, and it was ascertained that they were perfect in knowledge of Halachah and Siphra and Siphre and all the Talmud. Mar Zot'ra said, The reading there is, "in order that they may teach." R. Ashi said, Assuredly it is, "in order that they may teach"; for, if you imagine that it is, "in order that they may learn," then, since he who does not talk does not learn, and since he who does not hear does not learn, this sense of learn comes out of the words, "in order that they may hear," but assuredly it is here, "in order that they may teach."

he is bound as regards the rejoicing; but as for him who does not hear and does not speak and as for a fool and a child, they are exempt also from the rejoicing, inasmuch as these are exempt from all the commandments which are contained in the Law. What is the difference in the nature of holocaust, that they are exempt, and in the nature of rejoicing, that they are bound? As regards the nature of holocaust we are taught by the recurrence of the word from the passage intitled "Assemble," as it is written, "Assemble the people, the men and the women and the little ones" (Deut. xxxi. 12), and it is written, "when all Israel is come to appear" (Deut. xxxi. 11). And that point, whence do we get it? Because it is written, "that they may hear and that they may learn" (Deut. xxxi. 12). And there is a Baraitha as follows, "That they may hear," this expression excludes him who speaks and does not hear; "and that they may learn," this expression excludes him who hears and does not speak. Is this to say, that he who cannot talk cannot learn? No; for this suggests the case of the two dumb men who were in the neighbourhood of Rabbi, viz., the sons of R. Jochanan ben Gudgodah's daughter; and the sons of R. Jochanan's sister say concerning it, that every time that Rabbi went up to the College, they went up and sat before him, and shook their heads, and moved their lips, and Rabbi asked for mercy for them, and they were examined, and it was ascertained that they were perfect in knowledge of Halachah and Siphra and Siphre and all the Talmud. Mar Zot'ra said, The reading there is, "in order that they may teach." R. Ashi said, Assuredly it is, "in order that they may teach"; for, if you imagine that it is, "in order that they may learn," then, since he who does not talk does not learn, and since he who does not hear does not learn, this sense of learn comes out of the words, "in order that they may hear," but assuredly it is here, "in order that they may teach."

R. Tanchum said, He that is deaf in one ear is exempt from the holocaust, as it is said, "in their ears" (Deut. xxxi. 11). And this expression "in their ears" must mean, in the ears of all Israel, for this comes out of the words "before all Israel." How "before all Israel"? I should say, that, although they could not all hear, the Merciful One wrote it in their ears, and the fact that they heard comes out of the expression "in order that they may hear."

R. Tanchum said, He that is lame in one foot is exempt from the holocaust, as it is said, "footgoing times." And this expression, "footgoing times," must mean to exempt men with wooden legs. This comes out of the expression "steps," for there is a Baraitha, viz., Steps are not steps but feet, and so He says, "The foot shall tread it down, the feet of the poor, the steps of the needy" (Is. xxvi. 6), and He says, "How beautiful are thy steps in shoes, O prince's daughter!" (Cant. vii. 1). Rabba expounds thus, What is the meaning of that which is written, "How beautiful are thy steps in shoes, O prince's daughter"? It means, How comely are the feet of Israel at the time when they go up to the feast! "Prince's daughter" means daughter of Abraham our father, who is called prince, as it is said, "The princes of the peoples are gathered together to be the people of the God of Abraham:" (Ps. xlvii. 9) "God of Abraham," and not God of Isaac and Jacob, but "God of Abraham"; for he was the first of the proselytes.

R. Tanchum said, He that is lame in one foot is exempt from the holocaust, as it is said, "footgoing times." And this expression, "footgoing times," must mean to exempt men with wooden legs. This comes out of the expression "steps," for there is a Baraitha, viz., Steps are not steps but feet, and so He says, "The foot shall tread it down, the feet of the poor, the steps of the needy" (Is. xxvi. 6), and He says, "How beautiful are thy steps in shoes, O prince's daughter!" (Cant. vii. 1). Rabba expounds thus, What is the meaning of that which is written, "How beautiful are thy steps in shoes, O prince's daughter"? It means, How comely are the feet of Israel at the time when they go up to the feast! "Prince's daughter" means daughter of Abraham our father, who is called prince, as it is said, "The princes of the peoples are gathered together to be the people of the God of Abraham:" (Ps. xlvii. 9) "God of Abraham," and not God of Isaac and Jacob, but "God of Abraham"; for he was the first of the proselytes.

And one of doubtful sex and one of double sex etc. Our Rabbis have taught, The use of the word, "male," is to exclude the women; "thy males" to exclude the one of doubtful and the one of double sex; "all thy males" to include the children (Ex. xxiii. 17, Deut. xvi. 16). The Mishnah teacher said, Male is to exclude the women. But why do I need a verse as above, to teach me this? Inasmuch as it is a case of a positive precept in which the time determines. And from all positive precepts in which the time determines, women are exempt. Nay, but it is needed. You might have thought, We learn of a twofold appearing before the Lord from the section, "Assemble." As in the one case women are bound, so in the other case women are bound. We learn it from this.

The Mishnah teacher said, The expression "all thy males" is to include the children. But there is a canonical Mishnah, Except a deaf man, a fool and a child (Chag. 2a, i. 1). Abai said, There is no difficulty. The one case has to do with a child who has reached the age for initiation in the law, the other with a child who has not reached the age for initiation. A child who has reached the age for initiation—this is Rabbinical only. Even so, and the expression is a mere supporting peg. But why does the expression come? To correspond with what the others said. For we have a Baraitha, Others say, the cordwainer and the smelter in bronze and the tanner are exempt from the holocaust, because it is said "all thy males" (Ex. xxiii. 17, Deut. xvi. 16), i.e., he who is able to go up with all thy males. They are exempt, who are not fit to go up with all thy males.

The Mishnah teacher said, The expression "all thy males" is to include the children. But there is a canonical Mishnah, Except a deaf man, a fool and a child (Chag. 2a, i. 1). Abai said, There is no difficulty. The one case has to do with a child who has reached the age for initiation in the law, the other with a child who has not reached the age for initiation. A child who has reached the age for initiation—this is Rabbinical only. Even so, and the expression is a mere supporting peg. But why does the expression come? To correspond with what the others said. For we have a Baraitha, Others say, the cordwainer and the smelter in bronze and the tanner are exempt from the holocaust, because it is said "all thy males" (Ex. xxiii. 17, Deut. xvi. 16), i.e., he who is able to go up with all thy males. They are exempt, who are not fit to go up with all thy males.

There is a Baraitha, The uncircumcised person and the unclean person are exempt from appearing. This is all right as regards an unclean person, for it is written, "And thither thou shalt come: and thither ye shall bring" (Deut. xii. 5, 6). Every one who belongs to the category of coming belongs to the category of bringing, and every one who does not belong to the category of coming does not belong to the category of bringing. But "the uncircumcised person," whence do we get it? Behold, this comes not from a text but from R. Akiba, who includes an uncircumcised person as unclean. For there is a Baraitha, viz., R. Akiba says, The expression "each man" (Lev. xxii. 4) is to include the uncircumcised person. Our Rabbis have taught, The unclean person is exempt from appearing, for it is written, "And thither thou shalt come: and thither ye shall bring" (Deut. xii. 5, 6). Every one who belongs to the category of coming belongs to the category of bringing, and every one who does not belong to the category of coming does not belong to the category of bringing.

There is a Baraitha, The uncircumcised person and the unclean person are exempt from appearing. This is all right as regards an unclean person, for it is written, "And thither thou shalt come: and thither ye shall bring" (Deut. xii. 5, 6). Every one who belongs to the category of coming belongs to the category of bringing, and every one who does not belong to the category of coming does not belong to the category of bringing. But "the uncircumcised person," whence do we get it? Behold, this comes not from a text but from R. Akiba, who includes an uncircumcised person as unclean. For there is a Baraitha, viz., R. Akiba says, The expression "each man" (Lev. xxii. 4) is to include the uncircumcised person. Our Rabbis have taught, The unclean person is exempt from appearing, for it is written, "And thither thou shalt come: and thither ye shall bring" (Deut. xii. 5, 6). Every one who belongs to the category of coming belongs to the category of bringing, and every one who does not belong to the category of coming does not belong to the category of bringing.

R. Jochanan ben Dahăbai says in the name of R. Jehudah, A man blind in one eye is exempt from appearing, for it is said, "he shall be seen," "he shall see." As he comes to see, so he comes to be seen. As he comes to see with both his eyes, so he comes to be seen with both His eyes.

Abai said to him, Of course. For otherwise the question would arise, Which of them wilt thou cause to be sinners, and which of them wilt thou cause to be obedient? But wherefore then does the passage come? It is to correspond to the saying of others. For there is a Baraitha, viz., Others say, The cordwainer, and the smelter in bronze and the tanner, are exempt from the holocaust, for it is said, "all thy males" (Exod. xxiii. 17, Deut. xvi. 16), i.e., he who can go up with all thy males. These are excluded, for they cannot go up with all thy males.

R' Abahu asked R' Yohanan a question: If a person was ascending a ladder and a rung broke under him and it fell and struck someone below and killed him, is this a situation of ascent [where he would be exempt] or descent [where he would be held liable]? He said to him: You've already touched on this [in an earlier baraita]—in a case of descending for the purpose of ascent [here, we mean that the rung is going downward for the purpose of the person ascending].

Does it not include a butcher? Here too, it also comes to include the case of the butcher— as it is taught in a baraita: a butcher who was cutting [meat]. One tanna teaches that [if he struck someone who was standing] before him, he would liable and [if the person was behind him], he would be exempt. Another tanna teaches that [if he struck someone behind him] he would be liable and if [he struck someone before him], he would be exempt. Another tanna teaches that whether the person was before him or behind him, he would liable. And another tanna teaches that whether he was before him or behind him, he would be exempt. This is not a difficulty.

Does it not include a butcher? Here too, it also comes to include the case of the butcher— as it is taught in a baraita: a butcher who was cutting [meat]. One tanna teaches that [if he struck someone who was standing] before him, he would liable and [if the person was behind him], he would be exempt. Another tanna teaches that [if he struck someone behind him] he would be liable and if [he struck someone before him], he would be exempt. Another tanna teaches that whether the person was before him or behind him, he would liable. And another tanna teaches that whether he was before him or behind him, he would be exempt. This is not a difficulty.

Does it not include a butcher? Here too, it also comes to include the case of the butcher— as it is taught in a baraita: a butcher who was cutting [meat]. One tanna teaches that [if he struck someone who was standing] before him, he would liable and [if the person was behind him], he would be exempt. Another tanna teaches that [if he struck someone behind him] he would be liable and if [he struck someone before him], he would be exempt. Another tanna teaches that whether the person was before him or behind him, he would liable. And another tanna teaches that whether he was before him or behind him, he would be exempt. This is not a difficulty.

Here [where he would be liable for the person standing before him but exempt if he were behind him] is when the knife is descending in front of him and ascending behind him. Here [where he is he is exempt for the person standing before him but liable for the person standing behind him] is when the upward motion is in front of him but the downward motion is behind him.

Here [where he would be liable for the person standing before him but exempt if he were behind him] is when the knife is descending in front of him and ascending behind him. Here [where he is he is exempt for the person standing before him but liable for the person standing behind him] is when the upward motion is in front of him but the downward motion is behind him.

Here [where he is liable in both situations] is when the downward motion is both in front of him and behind him. And here [where he is exempt in all cases] is when the upward motion is both in front of him and behind him.

[Now we return back to the debate between R' Abahu and R. Yohanan about the case of the fallen rung]. Let us say this same issue was the matter of a Tannaitic debate: One who is ascending a ladder and a rung falls. One tanna taught that he is liable and another taught that he is exempt. Was it not about this that they were disagreeing? One of them held that it was a case of descent [where he is liable] and one of them holds that he is ascending [where he is exempt].

[Now we return back to the debate between R' Abahu and R. Yohanan about the case of the fallen rung]. Let us say this same issue was the matter of a Tannaitic debate: One who is ascending a ladder and a rung falls. One tanna taught that he is liable and another taught that he is exempt. Was it not about this that they were disagreeing? One of them held that it was a case of descent [where he is liable] and one of them holds that he is ascending [where he is exempt].

If you want, say that both cases are talking about exile and there is [still] not a difficulty. They are disagreeing about it being rotten. Here, [where he would be obligated for exile] is when (the rung) is rotten. Here [where he would be exempt from exile] is when it is not rotten.

And if you want, say that they both agree that the wood was not rotten and it is [still] not a difficulty: Here [where he would be exempt from exile] is when the rung has been fastened. Here, [where he would be liable] is when he did not fasten it.

However, where can we find a case where Rebi [would exempt someone from exile] in an instance of secondary force? This is like [a case where] someone threw a clod of dirt and it struck a twig and the twig then went and hit a cluster of dates and the dates then fell and killed.

Mishnah: The one who throws a stone into the public domain and killed [someone], behold, he is exiled. Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov says: If, from when the stone left his hand, another person stuck out their head and received [the stone and was killed], behold, he is exempt [from exile].

Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov says, etc. Our Rabbis taught [in a baraita]: And “and found [his neighbor]” (Deuteronomy 19:5) excludes the one who places himself [in danger]. From here [it follows that] Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov said: If, from when the stone left his hand, another person stuck out their head and received [the stone and was killed], he is exempt [from exile].

Rav Ada bar Ahavah said to Rava: "Is every case where it's written 'when (asher)' an optional action? From this [reasoning], 'When (asher) anyone has become impure fails to purify himself [they will be cut off from their people]' (Numbers 19:20)—if he wants to [touch a corpse], he can be impure, and if he doesn't want to he isn't impure; and a mitzvah corpse (of an unknown stranger) where it is not possible that [the finder] would become impure—would he be exempt [from the penalty of entering the Sanctuary while impure]?"

Rav Hisda said: This is not a difficulty! Here [where he is exiled] is where he killed in a downward motion, and here [where he is not exiled] is where he killed in an upward motion. [I.e:] If [he killed him] in a downward motion, [in which case] an Israelite would be exiled, then exile should be enough for the [resident foreigner] as well. If [he killed him] in an upward motion, [in which case] an Israelite is exempt, then the resident foreigner is put to death.

Rava said to him: And is it not a kal vahomer (logical inference from a light to serious case)!? [This kal vahomer will show that your argument doesn't work]. Just as [in the case of] a downward motion an Israelite would be exiled, exile should be enough for a resident foreigner too; then [in the case of] an upward motion, an Israelite is an exempt, should [the resident foreigner really] be killed?!

And they [Rav Hisda and Rava] go according to their principles, as it was stated [in an Amoraic teaching]: He thought that it was an animal and [after he killed him] it was found to be a person, or if he thought it was a non-Jew and it was found to be a resident foreigner, Rava says: He is liable. One who says it was permitted is [a case of] gross negligence. Rav Hisda says: He is exempt. One who says it was permitted is [a case of] freak accident.

Rabbi Yose bar Yehudah says: 'Originally, both unintentional and intentional [murderers] would rush to the cities of refuge, and the courts would send for them and bring them out of there [for judgement]. One who was liable for death by the court, they would put him to death; one who was not liable for death they would exempt him; one who was liable for exile, they would return him to his place, as it is said: "The congregation will return him to the city of his refuge" (Numbers 35:25).'"

Rav Huna said: "A murderer that is exiled to a city of refuge, and the blood avenger finds him and kills him—he is exempt." He [Rav Huna] thinks "And for him there is no death penalty" (Deuteronomy 19:6)—about the blood avenger it is written. [Pay close attention to this verse and you will see that it's actually ambiguous, though at first it seems obvious what it means].

Is [Rava and Ravin's] explanation coming to teach us anything but the reason of Rebbi Yochanon? Why Rebbi Yochanon is the one who told the teacher of baraisas to teach that he is liable for nullifying and exempt for not nullifying.

That a teacher of baraisas taught in the presence of Rebbi Yochanon, Any prohibition that includes a [remedial] positive commandment, if he fulfills the commandment he is exempt, if he nullifies the commandment is he is liable.

[Rebbi Yochanon] asked him, What are you saying? Either fulfilling will exempt it him and not fulfilling it will implicate him, or nullifying it will imp[licte him and not nullifying it will exempt him. Rather teach, Bitlo v'lo Bitlo [he nullified it and he did not nullify it]. And Rebbi Shimon ben Lakash said [to Teach] Kimu v'lo Kimu [he fulfilled it and he did not fulfill it].

[Rebbi Yochanon] asked him, What are you saying? Either fulfilling will exempt it him and not fulfilling it will implicate him, or nullifying it will imp[licte him and not nullifying it will exempt him. Rather teach, Bitlo v'lo Bitlo [he nullified it and he did not nullify it]. And Rebbi Shimon ben Lakash said [to Teach] Kimu v'lo Kimu [he fulfilled it and he did not fulfill it].

he holds like the other opinion of Rebbi Yehudah's views, that it was taught in a baraisa If one hit this [person who might have been his father] and then hit the other [person who might have been his father], or if he cursed this one and then that one, or if he hit them both simultaneously, or cursed them both simultaneously, Rebbi Yehudah says, If it was simultaneously he is liable, if not he is exempt [because it would be only an questionable warning.]

If he kills her [thus nullifying his ability to perform the remedy of remarrying her], the [he would be exempt based of the principle of] Kim Leih B'dirabah Me'neih [that anyone liable to the death penalty is exempt from all else.] Rav Shimi miChuznah proposed in a case where he accepted on her behalf Kidushin from another man. Rav asked If she had appointed him as her agent, then is he the one nullifying it? And if she had not appointed him as her agent then is anything even coming from his actions? They would be meaningless!

If he kills her [thus nullifying his ability to perform the remedy of remarrying her], the [he would be exempt based of the principle of] Kim Leih B'dirabah Me'neih [that anyone liable to the death penalty is exempt from all else.] Rav Shimi miChuznah proposed in a case where he accepted on her behalf Kidushin from another man. Rav asked If she had appointed him as her agent, then is he the one nullifying it? And if she had not appointed him as her agent then is anything even coming from his actions? They would be meaningless!

Rather if this was stated, this was how it was stated: Rav Gidal says in the name of Rav A non-Kohen who eats from a chatas or an asham before the zerikah is exempt. What is the reason? That the verse states (Exodus 29,33) "And they should eat it that which grants atonement" which implies that any place where we can apply "that which grants atonement" we can apply "and a non-Kohen shall not eat for it is holy", but any place where we cannot apply "that which grants atonement" we cannot apply "and a non-Kohen shall not eat for it is holy".

a Tanna who taught before Rabi Yochanan: [if one made an incision/gash] for the dead, whether it was by hand or by a tool, the person is culpable [for the punishment of lashes]. If the person did it for idolatry, by hand- the person is culpable, by a tool- the person is exempt (patoor) [from the punishment of lashes]. But isn't the opposite written (I Kings 18:28): "And they gashed themselves according to their practices, with knives and spears"? Rather, one should say: if it [the incision/gash] is done by hand, one is exempt [from the punishment] but if done with a tool one is culpable.

a Tanna who taught before Rabi Yochanan: [if one made an incision/gash] for the dead, whether it was by hand or by a tool, the person is culpable [for the punishment of lashes]. If the person did it for idolatry, by hand- the person is culpable, by a tool- the person is exempt (patoor) [from the punishment of lashes]. But isn't the opposite written (I Kings 18:28): "And they gashed themselves according to their practices, with knives and spears"? Rather, one should say: if it [the incision/gash] is done by hand, one is exempt [from the punishment] but if done with a tool one is culpable.

And if he dies under his hand, [the agent of court] is exonerated. If he added one additional lash and he died, then [the agent] is exiled on his account. If he soiled himself, whether with excrement or urine, he is exempt [from any further lashes]. Rebbi Yehuda says, A man [is exempt only with] excrement, but a woman with [is even exempt with] urine. GEMARA:

And if he dies under his hand, [the agent of court] is exonerated. If he added one additional lash and he died, then [the agent] is exiled on his account. If he soiled himself, whether with excrement or urine, he is exempt [from any further lashes]. Rebbi Yehuda says, A man [is exempt only with] excrement, but a woman with [is even exempt with] urine. GEMARA:

And if he dies under his hand, [the agent of court] is exonerated. If he added one additional lash and he died, then [the agent] is exiled on his account. If he soiled himself, whether with excrement or urine, he is exempt [from any further lashes]. Rebbi Yehuda says, A man [is exempt only with] excrement, but a woman with [is even exempt with] urine. GEMARA:

If he soiled himself. etc.: The Rabbis taught [in a baraisa], Both a man and a woman [are exempt] with excrement, but not urine, these are the words of Rebbi Meir. Rebbi Yehuda says, a man [is exempt] with excrement and a woman with urine. And the sages say, both a man and a woman [are exempt] with either excrement or urine.

If he soiled himself. etc.: The Rabbis taught [in a baraisa], Both a man and a woman [are exempt] with excrement, but not urine, these are the words of Rebbi Meir. Rebbi Yehuda says, a man [is exempt] with excrement and a woman with urine. And the sages say, both a man and a woman [are exempt] with either excrement or urine.

If he soiled himself. etc.: The Rabbis taught [in a baraisa], Both a man and a woman [are exempt] with excrement, but not urine, these are the words of Rebbi Meir. Rebbi Yehuda says, a man [is exempt] with excrement and a woman with urine. And the sages say, both a man and a woman [are exempt] with either excrement or urine.

But it was taught in a different baraisa, Rebbi Yehuda says, both a man and a woman [are exempt] with excrement? Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak answered,... [The second baraisa means that] both of them are equal with regards to excrement....

Shmuel said if they tied him [to the post] and then he fled from court, he is exempt. They challenged this [from the following baraisa], If he soiled himself whether after the first lash or after the second lash, he is exempt. If the strap broke, by the second lash, we exonerate him, by the first lash, however, we do not exonerate him. Why is this? Let him be like the one fled? There he fled [which is humiliation enough]. Here, however, he did not flee.

Shmuel said if they tied him [to the post] and then he fled from court, he is exempt. They challenged this [from the following baraisa], If he soiled himself whether after the first lash or after the second lash, he is exempt. If the strap broke, by the second lash, we exonerate him, by the first lash, however, we do not exonerate him. Why is this? Let him be like the one fled? There he fled [which is humiliation enough]. Here, however, he did not flee.

MISHNA: Anyone liable to kares who is flogged is exempt from their kares as the Torah says (Deuteronomy 25, 3)"And your brother should be flogged in your eyes" [this implies] when he gets flogged he is considered your brother. These are the words of Rebbi Channaia ben Gamliel.