forbids

MISHNAH: When may one start giving away rights? The House of Shammai say, as long as it is daylight, but the House of Hillel say, when it gets dark. If somebody gave away his rights and then brought out, whether in error or intentionally, he forbids, the words of Rebbi Meïr. Rebbi Jehudah says, intentionally he forbids, in error he does not forbid.

“If somebody gave away his rights and then brought out.” So is the Mishnah: If somebody ceded his rights, “whether in error or intentionally, he forbids.” So is the Mishnah: He does not forbid.

Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav Jehudah: Two houses, one inside the other. If the inner one made an eruv, the outer one does not have to make an eruv. If the outer one made an eruv, the inner one must contribute to the eruv. Rebbi Phineas said, but in Egypt it was the other way. If he gave on the inner, the outer has to give. If he gave on the outer, the inner does not have to give. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa, Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: Even if the inner one did not make an eruv, the outer one does not have to make an eruv. Why? It is treated as a porter’s lodge. His statement implies that there is no porter’s lodge for a single dweller. Rav’s statement implies that there is a porter’s lodge for a single dweller, for Rebbi Abba bar Jehudah said in the name of Rav: This refers to a porter’s lodge of a single dweller. But for a porter’s lodge of multiple dwellers it is an eruv, and one who dwells there forbids him. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav Jehudah: If there are two people, one is entitled, the other one is not entitled. If the one entitled made an eruv, the one not entitled is permitted. If the one not entitled made an eruv, the one entitled is not permitted.

MISHNAH: Two courtyards, one inside the other. If for the inner one they made an eruv but not the outer one, the inner one is permitted and the outer one forbidden. If the outer one but not the inner one, both are forbidden. If both made separate eruvin, both are permitted separately; Rebbi Aqiba forbids the outer one since the right of access makes it forbidden but the Sages say the right of access does not make it forbidden.

Rav Ḥuna in the name of Rav: There is no rule of enclosure for a Gentile; there is no rule of stone partitions for a Gentile. There is no rule of enclosure for a Gentile; for if he dwelt on an upper floor you take him down to forbid. There is no rule of stone partitions for a Gentile for if he dwelt in the inner [courtyard] you would take him out to forbid. Rebbi La in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: There is a rule of enclosure for a Gentile, for if an Israel and a Gentile were dwelling in the inner [courtyard] he never forbids unless there be two Israel. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav Jehudah: He who has a stone partition inside his house ten hand-breadths high, if an Israel he does not forbid, if a Gentile he forbids. The argument of Rebbi Abba seems inverted. There Rebbi Abba said, Rav Jehudah in the name of Samuel: If a wall was surrounded by ladders on both sides one makes two eruvin but not one eruv. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, there because of the ladders they have the status of doors, but here from the upper floors one is used to descend, from the lower one is not used to ascend.

Rav Ḥuna in the name of Rav: There is no rule of enclosure for a Gentile; there is no rule of stone partitions for a Gentile. There is no rule of enclosure for a Gentile; for if he dwelt on an upper floor you take him down to forbid. There is no rule of stone partitions for a Gentile for if he dwelt in the inner [courtyard] you would take him out to forbid. Rebbi La in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: There is a rule of enclosure for a Gentile, for if an Israel and a Gentile were dwelling in the inner [courtyard] he never forbids unless there be two Israel. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav Jehudah: He who has a stone partition inside his house ten hand-breadths high, if an Israel he does not forbid, if a Gentile he forbids. The argument of Rebbi Abba seems inverted. There Rebbi Abba said, Rav Jehudah in the name of Samuel: If a wall was surrounded by ladders on both sides one makes two eruvin but not one eruv. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, there because of the ladders they have the status of doors, but here from the upper floors one is used to descend, from the lower one is not used to ascend.

Rebbi Isaac Ḥaqula in the name of Rebbu Jehudah the Prince: One forcibly makes an eruv for a person. It was stated thus: “The dwellers in an alley force one another to install lath or beam,” and it was stated: If they told him to make an eruv and he does not object. If he objects does one force him? Rebbi Yudan said, the baraita is Rebbi Meïr’s. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, one may explain it according to everybody if he is a Sadducee. But was it not stated: “If one forgot and did not make an eruv, whether in error or intentionally he forbids, the words of Rebbi Meïr. Rebbi Jehudah says intentionally he forbids, in error he does not forbid.” Intentionally he forbids; may one not make eruv for him forcibly? But it must be a fine. Then he should be forbidden but everybody else permitted. Since they could make an eruv and did not make it one fines him. But does Rebbi Meïr not hold that one may make something in favor of another person without his knowledge, only one may not impose a disadvantage on him? Rebbi Meïr holds that this is not a favor; a person does not want that a neighbor may come to his house except on his invitation.

Rebbi Isaac Ḥaqula in the name of Rebbu Jehudah the Prince: One forcibly makes an eruv for a person. It was stated thus: “The dwellers in an alley force one another to install lath or beam,” and it was stated: If they told him to make an eruv and he does not object. If he objects does one force him? Rebbi Yudan said, the baraita is Rebbi Meïr’s. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, one may explain it according to everybody if he is a Sadducee. But was it not stated: “If one forgot and did not make an eruv, whether in error or intentionally he forbids, the words of Rebbi Meïr. Rebbi Jehudah says intentionally he forbids, in error he does not forbid.” Intentionally he forbids; may one not make eruv for him forcibly? But it must be a fine. Then he should be forbidden but everybody else permitted. Since they could make an eruv and did not make it one fines him. But does Rebbi Meïr not hold that one may make something in favor of another person without his knowledge, only one may not impose a disadvantage on him? Rebbi Meïr holds that this is not a favor; a person does not want that a neighbor may come to his house except on his invitation.

Rebbi Isaac Ḥaqula in the name of Rebbu Jehudah the Prince: One forcibly makes an eruv for a person. It was stated thus: “The dwellers in an alley force one another to install lath or beam,” and it was stated: If they told him to make an eruv and he does not object. If he objects does one force him? Rebbi Yudan said, the baraita is Rebbi Meïr’s. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, one may explain it according to everybody if he is a Sadducee. But was it not stated: “If one forgot and did not make an eruv, whether in error or intentionally he forbids, the words of Rebbi Meïr. Rebbi Jehudah says intentionally he forbids, in error he does not forbid.” Intentionally he forbids; may one not make eruv for him forcibly? But it must be a fine. Then he should be forbidden but everybody else permitted. Since they could make an eruv and did not make it one fines him. But does Rebbi Meïr not hold that one may make something in favor of another person without his knowledge, only one may not impose a disadvantage on him? Rebbi Meïr holds that this is not a favor; a person does not want that a neighbor may come to his house except on his invitation.

HALAKHAH: New paragraph. Rebbi Jehudah in the name of Rav: This you only say referring to a porter’s lodge of a single family dwelling. But for the porter’s lodge of the many it is an eruv and he who dwells there forbids for you.

MISHNAH: If somebody leaves his house to stay in an other town for the Sabbath, whether he be Gentile of Jewish, he forbids, the words of Rebbi Meïr. Rebbi Jehudah says, a Gentile forbids but a Jew does not forbid since it is not Jewish to come on the Sabbath. Rebbi Simeon says, even if he left his house and went to keep the Sabbath at his daughter’s in the same town he does not forbid since already he does not think of it any more.

MISHNAH: If somebody leaves his house to stay in an other town for the Sabbath, whether he be Gentile of Jewish, he forbids, the words of Rebbi Meïr. Rebbi Jehudah says, a Gentile forbids but a Jew does not forbid since it is not Jewish to come on the Sabbath. Rebbi Simeon says, even if he left his house and went to keep the Sabbath at his daughter’s in the same town he does not forbid since already he does not think of it any more.

HALAKHAH: Paragraph. This is Rebbi Meïr’s, since Rebbi Meïr says, a locked house forbids. Could he not come by an eruv, or transgress and come? Mar Uqban in the name of Rav: Practice follows Rebbi (Simeon) [Meïr].

HALAKHAH: Paragraph. They estimated (the place of) what a person uses is two se’ah and four cubits absorb two se’ah. If the sump sprung a hole, there are Tannaïm who state that one does not have to plug; there are Tannaïm who state that one has to plug. If the sump was full, there are Tannaïm who state that one has to empty, there are Tannaïm who state that one does not have to. Rebbi Mana said, it is one Tanna. He who says that one has to plug forbids to pour out, he who says that one does not have to plug permits to pour out. Rehhi Ḥiyya bar Marius said to Rebbi Mana: So said your father Rebbi Jonah, thinking about it: If it is sloping inside, even more than ten is permitted; outside even less than ten is permitted. What we are dealing with if it is level.

MISHNAH: If a bolt is topped by a lock, Rebbi Eleazar forbids and Rebbi Yose permits. Rebbi Eleazar said, it happened at the synagogue of Tiberias that they used to permit it until Rabban Gamliel and the Elders came and forbade it to them. Rebbi Yose says, they used to consider it forbidden when Rabban Gamliel and the Elders came and permitted it to them. With a dragged bolt one locks at the Temple but not in the countryside, but the one left alone is forbidden here and there. Rebbi Jehudah says, the one left alone in the Temple and the dragged one in the countryside.

HALAKHAH: Paragraph: Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi [ ] said: He who permits makes the bolt an accessory to the lock; he who forbids makes the lock an accessory of the bolt.

MISHNAH: One adds flour neither to haroset nor to mustard. If one did add, he has to eat it immediately, but Rebbi Meïr forbids. One may not cook the Passover sacrifice either in fluid or in fruit juice, but one may rub it or immerse it in them. Water used by a baker has to be poured out because it causes leavening.

HALAKHAH: It was stated: “One adds flour neither to haroset nor to mustard; it one did add, he has to eat it immediately, on condition that he not tarry. Rebbi Meïr forbids since he tarries.”

Leather which was tanned for an amulet. It is permitted to write a mezuza on it; Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel forbids. Rebbi Yose said, we were of the opinion that where they disagree is about a private person; therefore not for Heaven. Since it was stated, holy stones have to be quarried in holiness, in holiness they have to be quarried. Holy garments have to be woven in holiness, in holiness they have to be woven. And Rebbi Ḥaninah said in the name of Rebbi Yasa, this is as the disagreement. This implies that they disagree even for Heaven, as it was stated: If somebody makes a vessel for Heaven, as long as it was not used for Heaven, a lay person may use it; after it was used for Heaven, a lay person may not use it. But was it not stated, If somebody makes a vessel for Heaven, a lay person may not use it? Rebbi Ḥananiah in the name of Rebbi Yasa, as the disagreement. [As it was stated:] If somebody makes a vessel for a lay person, as long as it was not used for a lay person, Heaven may use it; after it was used for a lay person Heaven may not use it. But was it not stated, If somebody makes a vessel for a lay person, Heaven may not use it? Rebbi Ḥuna in the name of the rabbis there: Explain it that it was paid for by the Temple tax and you cannot infer anything.

MISHNAH: One may use planks as roofing, the words of Rebbi Jehudah, but Rebbi Meïr forbids. If he put there a plank four hand-breadths wide it is qualified on condition that he not sleep under it.

HALAKHAH: There, we have stated: “Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah forbids unless he raises or lowers by three {hand-breadths} or puts it on a rock.” One may give two explanations. If he had a small amount{of manure} in his house from before the Sabbatical and he wants to transport it to his field during the Sabbatical, he may continuously add to it after the sinning sinners stopped. Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah forbids it. What is the reason of Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah? Maybe there will be no more manure and it turns out that he fertilizes that place. It turns out that Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah parallels Rebbi Yose. Just as Rebbi Yose says, manure is not easily found, so Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah says, manure is not easily found. One may give another explanation: If he had a small amount{of manure} in his house from before the Sabbatical and he wants to transport it to his field during the Sabbatical, he may continuously add to it after the sinning sinners stopped. Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah forbids it. What is the reason of Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah? Maybe there will be no more manure and it turns out that he fertilizes that place. Is it not already fertilized from before the Sabbatical? Rebbi Jeremiah, Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Abba bar Mamal: because of the bad impression, unless he transports ten boxes together. Do the rabbis not care about bad impressions? Rebbi Idi said his stick, his basket, and his shovel prove that he intends to make a dungheap. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun applied these traditions from here, as we have stated: “Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah says, one does not make new water canals on the holiday or in the Sabbatical year.” Rebbi Jeremiah said, because he would prepare its banks to be sown. Rebbi Jeremiah, Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Abba bar Mamal: because of the bad impression. They wanted to say, the one who says there “because of the bad impression” also here “because of the bad impression”. The one who says there “because he would prepare its banks to be sown”, what would you have here? The only answer would be, “maybe there will be no more manure and it turns out that he fertilizes that place.” What is the difference between them? If he dug a water canal for a building. They wanted to say that the one who said there “because of the bad impression” also here “because of the bad impression”. The one who says here “because he would prepare its banks to be sown”, clearly here its banks will not be prepared to be sown. Everybody agrees that if he assembled there stones, pebbles, lime, or cement it is permitted.

HALAKHAH: There, we have stated: “Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah forbids unless he raises or lowers by three {hand-breadths} or puts it on a rock.” One may give two explanations. If he had a small amount{of manure} in his house from before the Sabbatical and he wants to transport it to his field during the Sabbatical, he may continuously add to it after the sinning sinners stopped. Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah forbids it. What is the reason of Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah? Maybe there will be no more manure and it turns out that he fertilizes that place. It turns out that Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah parallels Rebbi Yose. Just as Rebbi Yose says, manure is not easily found, so Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah says, manure is not easily found. One may give another explanation: If he had a small amount{of manure} in his house from before the Sabbatical and he wants to transport it to his field during the Sabbatical, he may continuously add to it after the sinning sinners stopped. Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah forbids it. What is the reason of Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah? Maybe there will be no more manure and it turns out that he fertilizes that place. Is it not already fertilized from before the Sabbatical? Rebbi Jeremiah, Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Abba bar Mamal: because of the bad impression, unless he transports ten boxes together. Do the rabbis not care about bad impressions? Rebbi Idi said his stick, his basket, and his shovel prove that he intends to make a dungheap. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun applied these traditions from here, as we have stated: “Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah says, one does not make new water canals on the holiday or in the Sabbatical year.” Rebbi Jeremiah said, because he would prepare its banks to be sown. Rebbi Jeremiah, Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Abba bar Mamal: because of the bad impression. They wanted to say, the one who says there “because of the bad impression” also here “because of the bad impression”. The one who says there “because he would prepare its banks to be sown”, what would you have here? The only answer would be, “maybe there will be no more manure and it turns out that he fertilizes that place.” What is the difference between them? If he dug a water canal for a building. They wanted to say that the one who said there “because of the bad impression” also here “because of the bad impression”. The one who says here “because he would prepare its banks to be sown”, clearly here its banks will not be prepared to be sown. Everybody agrees that if he assembled there stones, pebbles, lime, or cement it is permitted.

HALAKHAH: There, we have stated: “Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah forbids unless he raises or lowers by three {hand-breadths} or puts it on a rock.” One may give two explanations. If he had a small amount{of manure} in his house from before the Sabbatical and he wants to transport it to his field during the Sabbatical, he may continuously add to it after the sinning sinners stopped. Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah forbids it. What is the reason of Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah? Maybe there will be no more manure and it turns out that he fertilizes that place. It turns out that Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah parallels Rebbi Yose. Just as Rebbi Yose says, manure is not easily found, so Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah says, manure is not easily found. One may give another explanation: If he had a small amount{of manure} in his house from before the Sabbatical and he wants to transport it to his field during the Sabbatical, he may continuously add to it after the sinning sinners stopped. Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah forbids it. What is the reason of Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah? Maybe there will be no more manure and it turns out that he fertilizes that place. Is it not already fertilized from before the Sabbatical? Rebbi Jeremiah, Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Abba bar Mamal: because of the bad impression, unless he transports ten boxes together. Do the rabbis not care about bad impressions? Rebbi Idi said his stick, his basket, and his shovel prove that he intends to make a dungheap. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun applied these traditions from here, as we have stated: “Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah says, one does not make new water canals on the holiday or in the Sabbatical year.” Rebbi Jeremiah said, because he would prepare its banks to be sown. Rebbi Jeremiah, Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Abba bar Mamal: because of the bad impression. They wanted to say, the one who says there “because of the bad impression” also here “because of the bad impression”. The one who says there “because he would prepare its banks to be sown”, what would you have here? The only answer would be, “maybe there will be no more manure and it turns out that he fertilizes that place.” What is the difference between them? If he dug a water canal for a building. They wanted to say that the one who said there “because of the bad impression” also here “because of the bad impression”. The one who says here “because he would prepare its banks to be sown”, clearly here its banks will not be prepared to be sown. Everybody agrees that if he assembled there stones, pebbles, lime, or cement it is permitted.

HALAKHAH: Rebbi Mana said it anonymously, Rebbi Abun in the name of Samuel. They disagree anonymously. Where are we holding? If they are widely spaced everybody agrees that it is forbidden. If they are tightly planted everybody agrees that it is permitted. But we deal with the case that they are planted ten to a bet seah. Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob treats it as widely spaced, the rabbis treat it as tightly planted. So the rabbis said, if widely spaced it is forbidden to irrigate; may one continue? Let us learn the opinion of the rabbis from that of Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob. Just as Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob says, it is forbidden to irrigate but permitted to continue, so the rabbis say that it is forbidden to irrigate but permitted to continue. Did we not think that according to everybody if they are widely spaced it is forbidden; but is white dust not as if widely spaced? But here it is the Sabbatical, there the holiday. What is the difference between Sabbatical and holiday? In the Sabbatical when work is permitted they permitted both activities requiring effort and activities not requiring effort. On a holiday when work is forbidden they only permitted to avoid loss and only activities not requiring effort. Some want to understand it from the following: In the Sabbatical which is extended they permitted, on a holiday which is short they forbade. Then these last seven days should be compared to the seven days of a holiday and be forbidden. It was found stated: “One may sprinkle with water on white dust during the Sabbatical year but not during the holiday, <the words of Rebbi Simeon. Rebbi Eliezer Ben Jacob forbids.>”

MISHNAH: One does not dig niches and graves on the holiday but one may ready them for use. One makes a temporary grave and a coffin for the deceased in the courtyard; Rebbi Jehudah forbids unless he has boards ready.

Levi bar Sisi asked before Rebbi: Should we not state “sixteen women”? One’s mother who was raped by his father married to his paternal halfbrother. He said to him, it is evident that this person has no brain in his head. And why? He said to him, because of Rebbi Jehudah, because Rebbi Jehudah forbids the one who was raped or seduced by his father. Does Rebbi Jehudah not agree that if [the halfbrother] gave her qiddushin, the preliminary marriage is legally recognized? But because we have stated: “Six incest prohibitions more severe than these; because they are married to others their co-wives are free.” And Rebbi Ḥiyya stated thereupon: “If they may marry his brother without sin their co-wives are freed from ḥalîṣah and levirate.” And among all of them there is only his mother who was raped by his father married to his paternal halfbrother. Why did we not state this? Because Rebbi Ḥiyya stated it, should we not state it? Certainly we should state it! But because we have stated: “Her sister who also is her sister-in-law either takes ḥalîṣah or accepts the levirate.” We find in all cases that her sister who also is her sister-in-law accepts the levirate except for his mother who was raped by his father married to his paternal halfbrother.

Rebbi Ḥilqiah, Rebbi Simon in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: One did state this only for an Israel with an injured testicle, but not a Cohen with an injured testicle. There, we have stated: “All those forbidden to marry into the congregation may marry one another; Rebbi Jehudah forbids.” Rebbi Jeremiah said, as a matter of principle, an Israel with an injured testicle may marry a female bastard. Rebbi Yose said, it applies only to family blemishes, not to bodily defects. The strength of Rebbi Yose comes from the statement of Rebbi Ḥilqiah, Rebbi Simon in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: One did state this only for an Israel with an injured testicle, but not a Cohen, since, as you say there, if he is certainly a Cohen it is disabling if he married a convert; here also, he is certainly an Israel and forbidden to marry a female bastard.

There, we have stated: “A forced bill of divorce is valid in Israel; it is invalid from Gentiles.” Samuel said, it is invalid and disqualifies for the priesthood. And Samuel said, publicize in your towns: It is invalid and disqualifies for the priesthood. Samuel said, one does not force, only disqualify. Samuel said, one does not force except for example a widow married to a High Priest, a divorcee or one freed by ḥalîṣah for a simple priest. But did we not state: “Secondarily forbidden”? Did he not say “for example”? But did we not state: “A person who by a vow forbids his wife to have any usufruct from him, up to 30 days he shall appoint a caretaker; after 30 days he shall divorce her and pay Ketubah”! We heard that he shall divorce; did we hear that one forces him?

The elder Rebbi Hoshaia said, the baraita is about someone who takes back his divorcee after she had been married to another. Why after she had been married, not also after she had been betrothed? Because of Rebbi Yose ben Kipper, since Rebbi Yose ben Kipper said, she is permitted after betrothal. Rebbi Eleazar said, the baraita is about a sister-in-law who became eligible before two levirs, when one of them “bespoke” her and then the other copulated with her. Why when one of them “bespoke” her, even if he had not “bespoken” her! Why if he copulated with her, even if he did not copulate with her! Because of the House of Shammai, because of Rebbi Simeon. As it was stated, Rebbi Simeon said, the House of Shammai and the House of Hillel did not disagree that one who copulates with his wife’s sister disables his wife. Where did they disagree? If he copulates with his mother-in-law; where the House of Shammai say, he disabled her, but the House of Hillel say, he did not disable her. The House of Hillel were arguing: A man is permitted all women, a woman is permitted all men. When he becomes betrothed to her, he forbids her and she forbids him. The prohibition through which he forbids her is greater than the prohibition through which she forbids him, since he forbids her to go to marry any other man but she forbids him only her relatives. And is that not an argument de minore ad majus? If she, whose prohibition is greater, transgressed the prohibition in error, is not forbidden even to the one permitted to her, he, whose prohibition is less, if he transgressed the prohibition in error, is it not logical that he should not be forbidden even to the one permitted to him? That works for an error. From where if intentional: The verse says “with her;” her sleeping prohibits her, the sleeping of another woman does not prohibit her.

The elder Rebbi Hoshaia said, the baraita is about someone who takes back his divorcee after she had been married to another. Why after she had been married, not also after she had been betrothed? Because of Rebbi Yose ben Kipper, since Rebbi Yose ben Kipper said, she is permitted after betrothal. Rebbi Eleazar said, the baraita is about a sister-in-law who became eligible before two levirs, when one of them “bespoke” her and then the other copulated with her. Why when one of them “bespoke” her, even if he had not “bespoken” her! Why if he copulated with her, even if he did not copulate with her! Because of the House of Shammai, because of Rebbi Simeon. As it was stated, Rebbi Simeon said, the House of Shammai and the House of Hillel did not disagree that one who copulates with his wife’s sister disables his wife. Where did they disagree? If he copulates with his mother-in-law; where the House of Shammai say, he disabled her, but the House of Hillel say, he did not disable her. The House of Hillel were arguing: A man is permitted all women, a woman is permitted all men. When he becomes betrothed to her, he forbids her and she forbids him. The prohibition through which he forbids her is greater than the prohibition through which she forbids him, since he forbids her to go to marry any other man but she forbids him only her relatives. And is that not an argument de minore ad majus? If she, whose prohibition is greater, transgressed the prohibition in error, is not forbidden even to the one permitted to her, he, whose prohibition is less, if he transgressed the prohibition in error, is it not logical that he should not be forbidden even to the one permitted to him? That works for an error. From where if intentional: The verse says “with her;” her sleeping prohibits her, the sleeping of another woman does not prohibit her.

The elder Rebbi Hoshaia said, the baraita is about someone who takes back his divorcee after she had been married to another. Why after she had been married, not also after she had been betrothed? Because of Rebbi Yose ben Kipper, since Rebbi Yose ben Kipper said, she is permitted after betrothal. Rebbi Eleazar said, the baraita is about a sister-in-law who became eligible before two levirs, when one of them “bespoke” her and then the other copulated with her. Why when one of them “bespoke” her, even if he had not “bespoken” her! Why if he copulated with her, even if he did not copulate with her! Because of the House of Shammai, because of Rebbi Simeon. As it was stated, Rebbi Simeon said, the House of Shammai and the House of Hillel did not disagree that one who copulates with his wife’s sister disables his wife. Where did they disagree? If he copulates with his mother-in-law; where the House of Shammai say, he disabled her, but the House of Hillel say, he did not disable her. The House of Hillel were arguing: A man is permitted all women, a woman is permitted all men. When he becomes betrothed to her, he forbids her and she forbids him. The prohibition through which he forbids her is greater than the prohibition through which she forbids him, since he forbids her to go to marry any other man but she forbids him only her relatives. And is that not an argument de minore ad majus? If she, whose prohibition is greater, transgressed the prohibition in error, is not forbidden even to the one permitted to her, he, whose prohibition is less, if he transgressed the prohibition in error, is it not logical that he should not be forbidden even to the one permitted to him? That works for an error. From where if intentional: The verse says “with her;” her sleeping prohibits her, the sleeping of another woman does not prohibit her.

The elder Rebbi Hoshaia said, the baraita is about someone who takes back his divorcee after she had been married to another. Why after she had been married, not also after she had been betrothed? Because of Rebbi Yose ben Kipper, since Rebbi Yose ben Kipper said, she is permitted after betrothal. Rebbi Eleazar said, the baraita is about a sister-in-law who became eligible before two levirs, when one of them “bespoke” her and then the other copulated with her. Why when one of them “bespoke” her, even if he had not “bespoken” her! Why if he copulated with her, even if he did not copulate with her! Because of the House of Shammai, because of Rebbi Simeon. As it was stated, Rebbi Simeon said, the House of Shammai and the House of Hillel did not disagree that one who copulates with his wife’s sister disables his wife. Where did they disagree? If he copulates with his mother-in-law; where the House of Shammai say, he disabled her, but the House of Hillel say, he did not disable her. The House of Hillel were arguing: A man is permitted all women, a woman is permitted all men. When he becomes betrothed to her, he forbids her and she forbids him. The prohibition through which he forbids her is greater than the prohibition through which she forbids him, since he forbids her to go to marry any other man but she forbids him only her relatives. And is that not an argument de minore ad majus? If she, whose prohibition is greater, transgressed the prohibition in error, is not forbidden even to the one permitted to her, he, whose prohibition is less, if he transgressed the prohibition in error, is it not logical that he should not be forbidden even to the one permitted to him? That works for an error. From where if intentional: The verse says “with her;” her sleeping prohibits her, the sleeping of another woman does not prohibit her.

The elder Rebbi Hoshaia said, the baraita is about someone who takes back his divorcee after she had been married to another. Why after she had been married, not also after she had been betrothed? Because of Rebbi Yose ben Kipper, since Rebbi Yose ben Kipper said, she is permitted after betrothal. Rebbi Eleazar said, the baraita is about a sister-in-law who became eligible before two levirs, when one of them “bespoke” her and then the other copulated with her. Why when one of them “bespoke” her, even if he had not “bespoken” her! Why if he copulated with her, even if he did not copulate with her! Because of the House of Shammai, because of Rebbi Simeon. As it was stated, Rebbi Simeon said, the House of Shammai and the House of Hillel did not disagree that one who copulates with his wife’s sister disables his wife. Where did they disagree? If he copulates with his mother-in-law; where the House of Shammai say, he disabled her, but the House of Hillel say, he did not disable her. The House of Hillel were arguing: A man is permitted all women, a woman is permitted all men. When he becomes betrothed to her, he forbids her and she forbids him. The prohibition through which he forbids her is greater than the prohibition through which she forbids him, since he forbids her to go to marry any other man but she forbids him only her relatives. And is that not an argument de minore ad majus? If she, whose prohibition is greater, transgressed the prohibition in error, is not forbidden even to the one permitted to her, he, whose prohibition is less, if he transgressed the prohibition in error, is it not logical that he should not be forbidden even to the one permitted to him? That works for an error. From where if intentional: The verse says “with her;” her sleeping prohibits her, the sleeping of another woman does not prohibit her.

The elder Rebbi Hoshaia said, the baraita is about someone who takes back his divorcee after she had been married to another. Why after she had been married, not also after she had been betrothed? Because of Rebbi Yose ben Kipper, since Rebbi Yose ben Kipper said, she is permitted after betrothal. Rebbi Eleazar said, the baraita is about a sister-in-law who became eligible before two levirs, when one of them “bespoke” her and then the other copulated with her. Why when one of them “bespoke” her, even if he had not “bespoken” her! Why if he copulated with her, even if he did not copulate with her! Because of the House of Shammai, because of Rebbi Simeon. As it was stated, Rebbi Simeon said, the House of Shammai and the House of Hillel did not disagree that one who copulates with his wife’s sister disables his wife. Where did they disagree? If he copulates with his mother-in-law; where the House of Shammai say, he disabled her, but the House of Hillel say, he did not disable her. The House of Hillel were arguing: A man is permitted all women, a woman is permitted all men. When he becomes betrothed to her, he forbids her and she forbids him. The prohibition through which he forbids her is greater than the prohibition through which she forbids him, since he forbids her to go to marry any other man but she forbids him only her relatives. And is that not an argument de minore ad majus? If she, whose prohibition is greater, transgressed the prohibition in error, is not forbidden even to the one permitted to her, he, whose prohibition is less, if he transgressed the prohibition in error, is it not logical that he should not be forbidden even to the one permitted to him? That works for an error. From where if intentional: The verse says “with her;” her sleeping prohibits her, the sleeping of another woman does not prohibit her.

MISHNAH: If somebody divorced his wife and later took her back, she is permitted to the levir but Rebbi Eliezer forbids her. Similarly, if somebody divorced an orphan girl and took her back, she is permitted to the levir but Rebbi Eliezer forbids her. If an underage girl who was married off by her father was divorced, she is like an orphan during her father’s lifetime. If she was taken back, she is prohibited to the levir. The Sages agree with Rebbi Eliezer in case he divorced her as a minor and took her back as a minor, since her divorce is a total divorce but her return was not complete. But if he divorced her as a minor and took her back as an adult or she became an adult while married to him, she is permitted to the levir.

MISHNAH: If somebody divorced his wife and later took her back, she is permitted to the levir but Rebbi Eliezer forbids her. Similarly, if somebody divorced an orphan girl and took her back, she is permitted to the levir but Rebbi Eliezer forbids her. If an underage girl who was married off by her father was divorced, she is like an orphan during her father’s lifetime. If she was taken back, she is prohibited to the levir. The Sages agree with Rebbi Eliezer in case he divorced her as a minor and took her back as a minor, since her divorce is a total divorce but her return was not complete. But if he divorced her as a minor and took her back as an adult or she became an adult while married to him, she is permitted to the levir.

What is the status of her co-wife? Rav said, her co-wife is forbidden. Rebbi Joḥanan said, her co-wife is forbidden. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, her co-wife is permitted. Rebbi Eleazar said, I looked around at the rabbis here and at the rabbis there and did not find anybody agreeing with me except Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish who says, her co-wife is permitted.Rav Hamnuna was sitting before Rav Ada bar Ahava and said, what is the status of her co-wife? He said to him, she is permitted. He asked, divorce? He answered, forbidden. He said, go around. Rebbi Abba bar Mamal said, it is reasonable following him who said that her co-wife is permitted. But following him who said, her co-wife is forbidden, as you take it: The aspect he acquired in her makes the corresponding aspect forbidden in her co-wife, the aspect he did not acquire in her makes the corresponding aspect permitted in her co-wife! Rebbi Shammai said, does one admit that kind of argument in matters of incest prohibitions? What about it? For any sister-in-law who is not totally outside [the family], the acquired aspect of her belongs to an incest prohibition and an incest prohibition forbids the co-wife.

MISHNAH: It would have been logical: Since the first testimony, which does not forbid her permanently, is not confirmed if not from two [witnesses], the last testimony, which forbids her permanently, should reasonably only be confirmed by [witnesses]. The verse says: “There is no witness about her”, any kind of testimony about her. There would now be an argument de minore ad majus for the first testimony! Since the last testimony, which forbids her permanently, is confirmed from a single witness, the first testimony, which does not forbid her permanently, should logically be confirmed from a single witness. The verse says, “for he found out about her a matter of sexual misbehavior,” and further, it says, “by the mouth of two witnesses a matter should be confirmed.”

MISHNAH: It would have been logical: Since the first testimony, which does not forbid her permanently, is not confirmed if not from two [witnesses], the last testimony, which forbids her permanently, should reasonably only be confirmed by [witnesses]. The verse says: “There is no witness about her”, any kind of testimony about her. There would now be an argument de minore ad majus for the first testimony! Since the last testimony, which forbids her permanently, is confirmed from a single witness, the first testimony, which does not forbid her permanently, should logically be confirmed from a single witness. The verse says, “for he found out about her a matter of sexual misbehavior,” and further, it says, “by the mouth of two witnesses a matter should be confirmed.”

MISHNAH: These are the kinds of work a woman does for her husband: She grinds flour, bakes, launders, nurses her baby, makes his bed, and spins wool. If she brought a slave girl with her, she does not have to grind flour, bake, and launder. Two, she does not have to nurse her baby. Three, she does not have to make his bed or spin wool. Four, she sits in a chair. Rebbi Eliezer says, even if she brought him a hundred slave girls, he forces her to spin wool because indolence causes immorality. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, also a man who by a vow forbids his wife to work must divorce her and pay her ketubah since idleness induces mental illness.

There, we have stated: “A forced bill of divorce is valid in Israel; it is invalid from Gentiles.” Samuel said, it is invalid and disqualifies for the priesthood. Samuel said, one does not force, only disqualify. Samuel said, one does not force except for example a widow married to a High Priest, a divorcee or one freed by ḥalîṣah for a simple priest. But did we not state: “Secondarily forbidden”? Did he not say “for example”? But did we not state: “A person who by a vow forbids his wife to have any usufruct from him, up to 30 days he shall appoint a caretaker; after 30 days he shall divorce her and pay ketubah”! We heard that he shall divorce; did we hear that one forces him?

MISHNAH: If somebody says sacrifice, elevation offering, or flour offering, purification offering, or well-being offering, that I will not eat with you, he is forbidden; Rebbi Jehudah permits. The sacrifice, like a sacrifice, sacrifice if I would eat with you, he is forbidden. It is for sacrifice what I will not eat with you, Rebbi Meїr forbids. If somebody says to another person, a qônām that my mouth speaks with you, that my hand works with you, that my foot goes with you, he is forbidden.

MISHNAH: If they were walking on the road and he had nothing to eat, the other gives something to a third person as a gift, and this one is permitted it. If nobody is with them, he puts it on a rock or a fence and says, this is ownerless for everyone to take and this one can come and eat, but Rebbi Yose forbids.

“This one can come and eat, but Rebbi Yose forbids.” What is Rebbi Yose’s reason? Because his vow preceded his abandonment. Therefore, not if his abandonment preceded his vow. They asked before Rebbi Yose: What is the difference if his vow preceded his abandonment? He said to them, it did not occur to him to forbid what he abandoned. Rebbi Jonah said, so they asked before him: That means, not if it applies to a single person? But did we not state: “This one can come and eat, but Rebbi Yose forbids”? He said to them, it did not occur to him to forbid what he abandoned. Rebbi Jonah, Rebbi Abba, Rebbi Ḥiyya, in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Joṣadaq: If somebody abandons his field to ten persons he cannot retract. Rebbi Yose said, that follows Rebbi Meïr. Rebbi Mana asked: When you said, “to three,” [did you not mean] “in the presence of three”? Instead of asking about Rebbi Meïr, ask about Rebbi Yose! When you said, “to ten,” [did you not mean] “in the presence of ten”? He said to him, if he abandoned it before two persons, he can retract and it remains subject to tithes. If he abandoned it before three persons, he cannot retract and it is free from tithes.

“This one can come and eat, but Rebbi Yose forbids.” What is Rebbi Yose’s reason? Because his vow preceded his abandonment. Therefore, not if his abandonment preceded his vow. They asked before Rebbi Yose: What is the difference if his vow preceded his abandonment? He said to them, it did not occur to him to forbid what he abandoned. Rebbi Jonah said, so they asked before him: That means, not if it applies to a single person? But did we not state: “This one can come and eat, but Rebbi Yose forbids”? He said to them, it did not occur to him to forbid what he abandoned. Rebbi Jonah, Rebbi Abba, Rebbi Ḥiyya, in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Joṣadaq: If somebody abandons his field to ten persons he cannot retract. Rebbi Yose said, that follows Rebbi Meïr. Rebbi Mana asked: When you said, “to three,” [did you not mean] “in the presence of three”? Instead of asking about Rebbi Meïr, ask about Rebbi Yose! When you said, “to ten,” [did you not mean] “in the presence of ten”? He said to him, if he abandoned it before two persons, he can retract and it remains subject to tithes. If he abandoned it before three persons, he cannot retract and it is free from tithes.

[One who forbids himself] “anything going into the pot, is forbidden what goes into the frying pan. From anything going into the frying pan is permitted what goes into the pot.” For there are things going into the frying pan which do not go into the pot. What do you have? For example, greasy fish. “One who makes a vow to forbid to himself what is baked in the oven, is forbidden only bread. From what is prepared in the oven, anything is forbiddden that may be made in an oven”.

MISHNAH: If somebody vows not to drink milk, he is permitted curd but Rebbi Yose forbids. But from curd, he is permitted milk. Abba Shaul says, if he vows not to have cheese, it is forbidden to him whether salted or unsalted.

MISHNAH: If somebody vows not to eat meat, he is permitted clear bouillon and coagulated fibers, but Rebbi Jehudah forbids. Rebbi Jehudah said, it happened that Rebbi Ṭarphon forbade to me eggs that were cooked in it. They said to him, that is correct; when? If he would say, that piece of meat [is forbidden] to me. In truth, if somebody forbids himself something by a vow and it became mixed with something else, if it can be tasted it is forbidden If somebody vows not to drink wine he is permitted a dish prepared with wine. If he said, a qônām that I shall not taste this wine, if it fell into a dish and it can be tasted, that is forbidden.

MISHNAH: If somebody vows not to eat meat, he is permitted clear bouillon and coagulated fibers, but Rebbi Jehudah forbids. Rebbi Jehudah said, it happened that Rebbi Ṭarphon forbade to me eggs that were cooked in it. They said to him, that is correct; when? If he would say, that piece of meat [is forbidden] to me. In truth, if somebody forbids himself something by a vow and it became mixed with something else, if it can be tasted it is forbidden If somebody vows not to drink wine he is permitted a dish prepared with wine. If he said, a qônām that I shall not taste this wine, if it fell into a dish and it can be tasted, that is forbidden.

MISHNAH: One who makes a vow to abstain from vegetables is permitted squash, but Rebbi Aqiba forbids it. They said to Rebbi Aqiba, does it not happen that a person says to his agent, buy vegetables for us, and he says, I found only squash? He said to them, that is true. Would he ever say, I found only legumes? But squash is contained in the notion of “vegetable”. He is forbidden fresh Egyptian beans and permitted dried ones.

HALAKHAH: Does Rebbi Aqiba think “I found, I did not find”? Then one who forbids meat to himself should be forbidden fish and grasshopper meat since, if a man says to another, buy meat for us, he will return and say, I found only fish! But Rebbi Aqiba must think that squash are vegetables, but the rabbis think that squash are not vegetables. That applies to legal situations. “The vegetables of this garden are sold;” if squash were there, they would be sold in the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba, not sold in the opinion of the rabbis. The same applies to declarations of abandonment or dedications.

They asked before Rebbi Zeїra: a Cohen to an Israel, Rebbi forbids. What does Rebbi Yose say? Rebbi Ḥizqiah in the name of Rebbi Aḥa said, so he responded to them: In the opinion of Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Ḥanina, why is a Cohen to an Israel forbidden, not because it looks badly? Also Rebbi Joḥanan holds that from an Israel to an Israel it is forbidden because it looks badly. In addition, because of the following, as it was stated: “Cohanim and Levites who help at the threshing floor have no right either to heave or to tithe, and if the farmer gave, it is desecrated, as it is said (Lev. 22:15): ‘They should not desecrate the sanctified things of the Children of Israel,’ but they desecrate them! In addition, they said that their heave is no heave, their tithes are no tithes, their dedications are no dedications, and about them the verse says (Micha 3:11): ‘Their heads judge for bribes, [their priests are for hire].’ The Omnipresent brings over them three catastrophies; that is what is written (Micha 3:12): ‘Therefore, because of you Zion will be ploughed over as a field, Jerusalem will be desolate, and the Temple Mount a wooded hill.’

“Rebbi Aqiba said, he has to dissolve.” Rebbi Abba said, if she forbids the yields of her work, [vowing] not to work, he can force her up to the weight of five tetradrachmas. More than that he cannot force, for he has to be afraid that she may work more and it turns out that she profits from what is forbidden. Therefore, Rebbi Aqiba says, he has to dissolve his part. Rebbi Hila said, it is impossible for her to make exactly the weight of five tetradrachmas. He could force her up to the weight of five tetradrachmas; more that that he cannot force. He has to be afraid that she might be over the limit by a minute amount; then he would profit from what is forbidden. Therefore ….

MISHNAH: “The vow of a widow or a divorcee, anything she forbids to herself shall be confirmed.” How is that? If she said, I shall be a nazir after thirty days, even if she married within these thirty days he cannot dissolve. If she made the vow under her husband’s authority and he dissolved it, if she had said, I shall be a nazir after thirty days, even if she should become a widow or a divorcee within the next 30 days, it remains dissolved. If she made a vow, was on the same day divorced, and taken back, he cannot dissolve. This is the principle: He cannot dissolve for any one who was on her own for one moment.

MISHNAH: “I am a nazir on condition that I may drink wine or become impure for the dead,” he is a nazir and forbidden everything. “I knew that there are nezirim but I did not know that wine is forbidden to the nazir”; wine is forbidden to him, but Rebbi Simeon permits. “I knew that wine was forbidden to the nazir but I thought that the Sages would permit me because I cannot live without wine, or because I am an undertaker;” he is permitted but Rebbi Simeon forbids.

Does the Mishnah follow Rebbi Simeon? For “Rebbi Simeon declares him free, because his offering was not according to the way of offerers.” And Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said, there is a difference because he reserved shaving. Rebbi Jeremiah asked: If it is because he reserved shaving, does not the following state “it is forbidden to him, but Rebbi Simeon permits.” Did he not reserve shaving [and] impurity but Rebbi Simeon frees him? There is a difference, because of an opening for the vow. If it was because of an opening for the vow, does not the following state “he is permitted but Rebbi Simeon forbids”? Rebbi Simeon does not recognize it as an opening for the vow but the rabbis recognize it as an opening for the vow. Why? Because he connects his vow with his life. One understands, to drink wine. The defile oneself for the dead? It is his profession to bury the dead.

MISHNAH: “Bring my bill of divorce”, she may eat heave until the bill is delivered to her. “Receive my bill of divorce,” she is immediately forbidden to eat heave. “Receive my bill of divorce at place X,” she may eat heave until the bill arrives at that place; Rebbi Eleazar forbids immediately.

After Rebbi Eliezer’s death, four Elders assembled to object to Rebbi Eliezer’s words: Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah, Rebbi Yose the Galilean, Rebbi Tarphon, and Rebbi Aqiba. Rebbi Joshua told them, one does not contradict the lion after his death. Rebbi Tarphon objected: If he said to her, you are permitted to any man except Mr. X; she went and married [the latter’s brother who] died childless; how can she contract the levirate marriage? Does it not turn out that he stipulated against what is written in the Torah, and anybody’s condition contradicting what is written in the Torah is invalid. Then nobody should be permitted to marry his brother’s daughter, lest he come to stipulate against what is written in the Torah. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, one understands the reason. There, the Torah forbade her to him. But here, he forbids to him! Rebbi Ḥananiah objected in the name of Rebbi Phineas: Should one not state “sixteen women” following Rebbi Eliezer? Rebbi Mana said, the reason was already explained: there, the Torah forbade her to him. But here, he forbids to him! Rebbi Jeremiah asked: If he said to her, you are permitted to any man except Mr. X; she went and married the latter’s brother who died childless, how can the latter permit what the first forbade? His words imply that death and divorce permit what the first [husband] prohibited. Rebbi Jeremiah said, he said only death and divorce; therefore, not marriage.

After Rebbi Eliezer’s death, four Elders assembled to object to Rebbi Eliezer’s words: Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah, Rebbi Yose the Galilean, Rebbi Tarphon, and Rebbi Aqiba. Rebbi Joshua told them, one does not contradict the lion after his death. Rebbi Tarphon objected: If he said to her, you are permitted to any man except Mr. X; she went and married [the latter’s brother who] died childless; how can she contract the levirate marriage? Does it not turn out that he stipulated against what is written in the Torah, and anybody’s condition contradicting what is written in the Torah is invalid. Then nobody should be permitted to marry his brother’s daughter, lest he come to stipulate against what is written in the Torah. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, one understands the reason. There, the Torah forbade her to him. But here, he forbids to him! Rebbi Ḥananiah objected in the name of Rebbi Phineas: Should one not state “sixteen women” following Rebbi Eliezer? Rebbi Mana said, the reason was already explained: there, the Torah forbade her to him. But here, he forbids to him! Rebbi Jeremiah asked: If he said to her, you are permitted to any man except Mr. X; she went and married the latter’s brother who died childless, how can the latter permit what the first forbade? His words imply that death and divorce permit what the first [husband] prohibited. Rebbi Jeremiah said, he said only death and divorce; therefore, not marriage.

HALAKHAH: “That is how the punctilious in Jerusalem used to write. A forced bill of divorce among Jews is valid, from Gentiles it is invalid”. Samuel said, it is invalid and disqualifies from the priesthood. Samuel said, one does not force, only disqualify. Samuel said, one does not force except for example a widow married to a High Priest, a divorcee or one freed by ḥalȋṣah in the case of a simple priest. But did we not state: “Secondarily forbidden”? Did he not say “for example”? But did we not state: “A person who by a vow forbids his wife to have any usufruct from him for up to 30 days shall appoint a caretaker; after 30 days he shall divorce her and pay ketubah”! We heard that he shall divorce; did we hear that one forces him?

They asked before Rebbi Zeïra: a Cohen to an Israel, Rebbi forbids. What does Rebbi Yose say? He did not respond. Rebbi Ḥizqiah in the name of Rebbi Aḥa said, so he said to them: In the opinion of Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Ḥanina, why is a Cohen to an Israel forbidden, not because it looks badly? Also Rebbi Joḥanan holds that from an Israel to an Israel it is forbidden because it looks badly. In addition, because of the following, as it was stated: “Cohanim and Levites who help at the threshing floor have no right either to heave or to tithe, and if the farmer gave, it is desecrated, as it is said (Lev. 22:15): ‘They should not desecrate the sanctified things of the Children of Israel,’ but they do desecrate them! In addition, they said that their heave is no heave, their tithes are no tithes, their dedications are no dedications, and about them the verse says (Micha 3:11): ‘Their heads judge for bribes, their priests instruct for hire, etc.’ The Omnipresent brings over them three catastrophes; that is what is written (Micha 3:12): ‘Therefore, because of you Zion will be ploughed over as a field, Jerusalem will be desolate, and the Temple Mount a wooded hill.’

MISHNAH: Any who are forbidden to marry in the congregation are permitted to marry one another but Rebbi Jehudah forbids. Rebbi Eliezer says, certain with certain are permitted, certain with questionable, questionable with certain, and questionable with questionable are forbidden. The following are questionable: the silenced one, the foundling, and the Samaritan.

MISHNAH: A person may not say to another, lend me a kor of wheat and I shall return it to you from the threshing-floor, but he may tell him, lend me until my son comes or until I find the key, but Hillel forbids. Similarly, Hillel said that a woman may not lend a loaf to another unless she fixed its price, for possibly wheat may rise in price and they would be entangled in problems of interest.

HALAKHAH: “A person may not say to another,” etc. It was stated: “A person may not say to another, lend me a kor of wheat and I shall return it to you from the threshing-floor,” therefore for two or three weeks it is permitted; “but Hillel forbids.” Samuel said, practice follows Hillel.

HALAKHAH: “Fish sauce, cheese,” etc.“Wine in muries, Rebbi permits but Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon forbids.” Therefore, if somebody transgressed and put it in, Rebbi forbids it to laymen but Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon permits it to laymen.” Rebbi Mana bar Tanḥum asked: Following him who permits for laymen, why is muries of Gentiles forbidden? Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of Rebbi Ḥiyya ber Abba, it is forbidden as being cooked by Gentiles. But did not [Rebbi Yose] state: “From a professional it is permitted, from a non-professional it is forbidden.” From a professional it is permitted, is that not if it is not cooked? Similarly, from a non-professional it is forbidden even if cooked. What about it? If it is to remove contamination it is forbidden because of pagan worship. This implies that usufruct of pagan worship is forbidden, usufruct of heave is permitted. Rebbi Joḥanan bar Madia said, following him who said from a professional it is permitted, only if he knows him.

HALAKHAH: “Fish sauce, cheese,” etc.“Wine in muries, Rebbi permits but Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon forbids.” Therefore, if somebody transgressed and put it in, Rebbi forbids it to laymen but Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon permits it to laymen.” Rebbi Mana bar Tanḥum asked: Following him who permits for laymen, why is muries of Gentiles forbidden? Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of Rebbi Ḥiyya ber Abba, it is forbidden as being cooked by Gentiles. But did not [Rebbi Yose] state: “From a professional it is permitted, from a non-professional it is forbidden.” From a professional it is permitted, is that not if it is not cooked? Similarly, from a non-professional it is forbidden even if cooked. What about it? If it is to remove contamination it is forbidden because of pagan worship. This implies that usufruct of pagan worship is forbidden, usufruct of heave is permitted. Rebbi Joḥanan bar Madia said, following him who said from a professional it is permitted, only if he knows him.

What is the status of their lupines? Rebbi forbids, Ganiba permits. Rebbi said, I am an Elder and he is an Elder. It came to my mind to forbid; it was his opinion to permit. Rebbi Mana bar Tanḥum went to Tyre and permitted their lupines. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba went to Tyre and found that Rebbi Mana had permitted their lupines. He returned to Rebbi Joḥanan who asked him, what case came to your hands? He told him, I found that Rebbi Mana had permitted their lupines. He asked him, did you not hit him? He answered, he is an important personality and knows how to sweeten the waters of the Great Sea. He told him, no, my son. He knows how to compute the waters; when the waters come together to acclaim their Creator they sweeten themselves. Rebbi Isaac bar Eleazar said, he starts to speak his disgrace and tells his praise! Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, it is a difficult computation; Rebbi Zakkai of Alexandria knows it. He said, if you want, you may learn it from him.

The following is obvious: If the Jew holds the funnel and the Gentile pours, everybody agrees that is it forbidden. If the Gentile holds the funnel and the Jew pours, Rebbi Assi forbids and Rebbi Immi permits. If the Gentile holds the opening of the wineskin and the Jew pours, Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of Rebbi Ze`ira: this is the disagreement. Rebbi Mana asked before Rebbi Yose, which disagreement? He told him, the disasgreement between Rebbi Assi and Rebbi Immi. If the Jew holds the wineskin and the Gentile pours, they wanted to say that according to everybody it is permitted. Rebbi Samuel: In itself it implies that it is forbidden. For sometimes the Jew will loosen his grip and then the entire pouring is done by the Gentile. If somebody lets down a wineskin from top to bottom this is not pouring from vessel to vessel.

It is to be inferred that Rabban Simeon b. Gamaliel is concerned lest a charge of presumption [be brought against a bridegroom who reads the Shema' on the first night of his marriage and therefore forbids it], whereas the Rabbis have no such concern [and permit it]. But we understood just the opposite of them ! For there is a Mishnaic teaching : In a place where they are accustomed to work on the ninth of Ab, we may work ; but in a place where they are not accustomed to work, we may not. Disciples of the wise must cease work in every place. Rabban Simeon b. Gamaliel says : Everyone should regard himself as a disciple of the wise.

His opinion agrees with that of Rab Hamnuna who said : The Torah only forbids [the Shema' to be read] by fecal matter. He is also in agreement with

how is this? The latter verse refers to the major natural function, the former to the minor. Infer, then, that the Torah forbids [the Shema' to be read] near to urine only when it is by fecal matter ; but if it has fallen upon the ground, it is permitted [by the Torah], but the Rabbis have decreed against it. Have the Rabbis decreed against it ? When it is certain [that urine is there] ; but if there is a doubt, they do not decree against it.

Mishnah: They may make skhakh out of wooden planks, the words or Rabbi Judah. Rabbi Meir forbids. If one places on top of [the sukkah] a plank four handbreadths wide, it is valid provided that he does not sleep under it.

What [then] does [the Mishnah] teach us? That R. Meir holds that there is decree lest the sukkah look like ordinary roofing, while R. Judah holds that there is no such decree? But have they not already disputed this, as we have learned: Planks may be used for skhakh, the words of R. Judah; R. Meir forbids them.

It was reported: R. Ḥiyya b. 'Ashi said in the name of Rab, the law is in accordance with R. Jose, but Samuel said, it is in accordance with R. Meir. Did Samuel say so? Is it not stated in a Baraita: R. Simeon b. Gamaliel said: Why is the word behon (בהון = on them) used (in the Scroll of Fasts) twice in succession? In order to indicate that the prohibition applies only to the days specified, but not to the days immediately preceding or following them—to which Samuel remarked that the law is in accordance with R. Simeon b. Gamaliel! Answer: Originally Samuel was of the opinion that there was no authority as lenient in the matter as was R. Meir, and therefore he said that the law is in accordance with R. Meir, but when he heard of the view of R. Simeon b. Gamaliel, who is still more lenient, he said, the law is in accordance with R. Simeon b. Gamaliel. Bali, too, said in the name of R. Ḥiyya b. 'Abba, who had it from R. Johanan: The law is in accordance with R. Jose, whereupon R. Ḥiyya b. Abba said to Bali, I must inform you that when R. Johanan said the law is in accordance with R. Jose, he referred only to those days on which the Scroll of Fasts forbids fasting (but not mourning). Did R. Johanan say so? Did he not say, the law always follows the anonymous opinion of a Mishnah? Now, we read in an anonymous Mishnah: Although it has been decided that under certain circumstances the Megillah of Esther should be read several days before, instead of after, Purim,

[With regard to a synagogue which has been made] a gift, R. Aha and Ravina disagree, one forbids [it to be used for secular purposes] and one permits. The one who forbade—how is its sanctity removed? While the one who permitted if the giver [the giver] did not derive some benefit from the act he would not give it, so that in the end the gift is equivalent to a sale.

the traditional Law forbids work requiring thought, whereas Holy Writ makes no mention of work requiring thought.