renders
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The Works of Flavius Josephus
The high priest's mitre was the same that we described before, and was wrought like that of all the other priests; above which there was another, with swathes of blue embroidered, and round it was a golden crown polished, of three rows, one above another; out of which arose a cup of gold, which resembled the herb which we call Saccharus; but those Greeks that are skillful in botany call it Hyoscyamus. Now, lest any one that has seen this herb, but has not been taught its name, and is unacquainted with its nature, or, having known its name, knows not the herb when he sees it, I shall give such as these are a description of it. This herb is oftentimes in tallness above three spans, but its root is like that of a turnip [for he that should compare it thereto would not be mistaken]; but its leaves are like the leaves of mint. Out of its branches it sends out a calyx, cleaving to the branch; and a coat encompasses it, which it naturally puts off when it is changing, in order to produce its fruit. This calyx is of the bigness of the bone of the little finger, but in the compass of its aperture is like a cup. This I will further describe, for the use of those that are unacquainted with it. Suppose a sphere be divided into two parts, round at the bottom, but having another segment that grows up to a circumference from that bottom; suppose it become narrower by degrees, and that the cavity of that part grow decently smaller, and then gradually grow wider again at the brim, such as we see in the navel of a pomegranate, with its notches. And indeed such a coat grows over this plant as renders it a hemisphere, and that, as one may say, turned accurately in a lathe, and having its notches extant above it, which, as I said, grow like a pomegranate, only that they are sharp, and end in nothing but prickles. Now the fruit is preserved by this coat of the calyx, which fruit is like the seed of the herb Sideritis: it sends out a flower that may seem to resemble that of poppy. Of this was a crown made, as far from the hinder part of the head to each of the temples; but this Ephielis, for so this calyx may be called, did not cover the forehead, but it was covered with a golden plate, which had inscribed upon it the name of God in sacred characters. And such were the ornaments of the high priest.
As to those young men that despise their parents, and do not pay them honor, but offer them affronts, either because they are ashamed of them or think themselves wiser than they,—in the first place, let their parents admonish them in words, [for they are by nature of authority sufficient for becoming their judges,] and let them say thus to them:—That they cohabited together, not for the sake of pleasure, nor for the augmentation of their riches, by joining both their stocks together, but that they might have children to take care of them in their old age, and might by them have what they then should want. And say further to him, "That when thou wast born, we took thee up with gladness, and gave God the greatest thanks for thee, and brought time up with great care, and spared for nothing that appeared useful for thy preservation, and for thy instruction in what was most excellent. And now, since it is reasonable to forgive the sins of those that are young, let it suffice thee to have given so many indications Of thy contempt of us; reform thyself, and act more wisely for the time to come; considering that God is displeased with those that are insolent towards their parents, because he is himself the Father of the whole race of mankind, and seems to bear part of that dishonor which falls upon those that have the same name, when they do not meet with dire returns from their children. And on such the law inflicts inexorable punishment; of which punishment mayst thou never have the experience." Now if the insolence of young men be thus cured, let them escape the reproach which their former errors deserved; for by this means the lawgiver will appear to be good, and parents happy, while they never behold either a son or a daughter brought to punishment. But if it happen that these words and instructions, conveyed by them in order to reclaim the man, appear to be useless, then the offender renders the laws implacable enemies to the insolence he has offered his parents; let him therefore be brought forth by these very parents out of the city, with a multitude following him, and there let him be stoned; and when he has continued there for one whole day, that all the people may see him, let him be buried in the night. And thus it is that we bury all whom the laws condemn to die, upon any account whatsoever. Let our enemies that fall in battle be also buried; nor let any one dead body lie above the ground, or suffer a punishment beyond what justice requires.
. And now perhaps it may not seem unreasonable to some, that such an inveterate hatred might increase so much [on both sides], as to proceed further, and overcome nature; but it may justly deserve consideration, whether it be to be laid to the charge of the young men, that they gave such an occasion to their father's anger, and led him to do what he did, and by going on long in the same way put things past remedy, and brought him to use them so unmercifully; or whether it be to be laid to the father's charge, that he was so hard-hearted, and so very tender in the desire of government, and of other things that would tend to his glory, that tae would take no one into a partnership with him, that so whatsoever he would have done himself might continue immovable; or, indeed, whether fortune have not greater power than all prudent reasonings; whence we are persuaded that human actions are thereby determined beforehand by an inevitable necessity, and we call her Fate, because there is nothing which is not done by her; wherefore I suppose it will be sufficient to compare this notion with that other, which attribute somewhat to ourselves, and renders men not unaccountable for the different conducts of their lives, which notion is no other than the philosophical determination of our ancient law. Accordingly, of the two other causes of this sad event, any body may lay the blame on the young men, who acted by youthful vanity, and pride of their royal birth, that they should bear to hear the calumnies that were raised against their father, while certainly they were not equitable judges of the actions of his life, but ill-natured in suspecting, and intemperate in speaking of it, and on both accounts easily caught by those that observed them, and revealed them to gain favor; yet cannot their father be thought worthy excuse, as to that horrid impiety which he was guilty of about them, while he ventured, without any certain evidence of their treacherous designs against him, and without any proofs that they had made preparations for such attempt, to kill his own sons, who were of very comely bodies, and the great darlings of other men, and no way deficient in their conduct, whether it were in hunting, or in warlike exercises, or in speaking upon occasional topics of discourse; for in all these they were skillful, and especially Alexander, who was the eldest; for certainly it had been sufficient, even though he had condemned them, to have kept them alive in bonds, or to let them live at a distance from his dominions in banishment, while he was surrounded by the Roman forces, which were a strong security to him, whose help would prevent his suffering any thing by a sudden onset, or by open force; but for him to kill them on the sudden, in order to gratify a passion that governed him, was a demonstration of insufferable impiety. He also was guilty of so great a crime in his older age; nor will the delays that he made, and the length of time in which the thing was done, plead at all for his excuse; for when a man is on a sudden amazed, and in commotion of mind, and then commits a wicked action, although this be a heavy crime, yet is it a thing that frequently happens; but to do it upon deliberation, and after frequent attempts, and as frequent puttings-off, to undertake it at last, and accomplish it, was the action of a murderous mind, and such as was not easily moved from that which is evil. And this temper he showed in what he did afterward, when he did not spare those that seemed to be the best beloved of his friends that were left, wherein, though the justice of the punishment caused those that perished to be the less pitied, yet was the barbarity of the man here equal, in that he did not abstain from their slaughter also. But of those persons we shall have occasion to discourse more hereafter.
And truly any one would be surprised at Judas upon this occasion. He was of the sect of the Essens, and had never failed or deceived men in his predictions before. Now this man saw Antigonus as he was passing along by the temple, and cried out to his acquaintance, [they were not a few who attended upon him as his scholars,] "O strange!" said he, "it is good for me to die now, since truth is dead before me, and somewhat that I have foretold hath proved false; for this Antigonus is this day alive, who ought to have died this day; and the place where he ought to be slain, according to that fatal decree, was Strato's Tower, which is at the distance of six hundred furlongs from this place; and yet four hours of this day are over already; which point of time renders the prediction impossible to be fill filled." And when the old man had said this, he was dejected in his mind, and so continued. But in a little time news came that Antigonus was slain in a subterraneous place, which was itself also called Strato's Tower, by the same name with that Cesarea which lay by the sea-side; and this ambiguity it was which caused the prophet's disorder.
Now Joppa is not naturally a haven, for it ends in a rough shore, where all the rest of it is straight, but the two ends bend towards each other, where there are deep precipices, and great stones that jut out into the sea, and where the chains wherewith Andromeda was bound have left their footsteps, which attest to the antiquity of that fable. But the north wind opposes and beats upon the shore, and dashes mighty waves against the rocks which receive them, and renders the haven more dangerous than the country they had deserted. Now as those people of Joppa were floating about in this sea, in the morning there fell a violent wind upon them; it is called by those that sail there "the black north wind," and there dashed their ships one against another, and dashed some of them against the rocks, and carried many of them by force, while they strove against the opposite waves, into the main sea; for the shore was so rocky, and had so many of the enemy upon it, that they were afraid to come to land; nay, the waves rose so very high, that they drowned them; nor was there any place whither they could fly, nor any way to save themselves; while they were thrust out of the sea, by the violence of the wind, if they staid where they were, and out of the city by the violence of the Romans. And much lamentation there was when the ships were dashed against one another, and a terrible noise when they were broken to pieces; and some of the multitude that were in them were covered with waves, and so perished, and a great many were embarrassed with shipwrecks. But some of them thought that to die by their own swords was lighter than by the sea, and so they killed themselves before they were drowned; although the greatest part of them were carried by the waves, and dashed to pieces against the abrupt parts of the rocks, insomuch that the sea was bloody a long way, and the maritime parts were full of dead bodies; for the Romans came upon those that were carried to the shore, and destroyed them; and the number of the bodies that were thus thrown out of the sea was four thousand and two hundred. The Romans also took the city without opposition, and utterly demolished it.
Now as for ourselves, I venture to say that no one can tell of so many; nay, not of more than one or two that have betrayed our laws, no, not out of fear of death itself; I do not mean such an easy death as happens in battles, but that which comes with bodily torments, and seems to be the severest kind of death of all others. Now I think those that have conquered us have put us to such deaths, not out of their hatred to us when they had subdued us, but rather out of their desire of seeing a surprising sight, which is this, whether there be such men in the world who believe that no evil is to them so great as to be compelled to do or to speak any thing contrary to their own laws. Nor ought men to wonder at us, if we are more courageous in dying for our laws than all other men are; for other men do not easily submit to the easier things in which we are instituted; I mean working with our hands, and eating but little, and being contented to eat and drink, not at random, or at every one's pleasure, or being under inviolable rules in lying with our wives, in magnificent furniture, and again in the observation of our times of rest; while those that can use their swords in war, and can put their enemies to flight when they attack them, cannot bear to submit to such laws about their way of living: whereas our being accustomed willingly to submit to laws in these instances, renders us fit to show our fortitude upon other occasions also.
The Writings of Origen
But it will not appear absurd if we employ another similitude to make the matter clearer. Our eyes frequently cannot look upon the nature of the light itself—that is, upon the substance of the sun; but when we behold his splendour or his rays pouring in, perhaps, through windows or some small openings to admit the light, we can reflect how great is the supply and source of the light of the body. So, in like manner, the works of Divine Providence and the plan of this whole world are a sort of rays, as it were, of the nature of God, in comparison with His real substance and being. As, therefore, our understanding is unable of itself to behold God Himself as He is, it knows the Father of the world from the beauty of His works and the comeliness of His creatures. God, therefore, is not to be thought of as being either a body or as existing in a body, but as an uncompounded intellectual nature, admitting within Himself no addition of any kind; so that He cannot be believed to have within Him a greater and a less, but is such that He is in all parts Μονάς, and, so to speak, Ἑνάς, and is the mind and source from which all intellectual nature or mind takes its beginning. But mind, for its movements or operations, needs no physical space, nor sensible magnitude, nor bodily shape, nor colour, nor any other of those adjuncts which are the properties of body or matter. Wherefore that simple and wholly intellectual nature can admit of no delay or hesitation in its movements or operations, lest the simplicity of the divine nature should appear to be circumscribed or in some degree hampered by such adjuncts, and lest that which is the beginning of all things should be found composite and differing, and that which ought to be free from all bodily intermixture, in virtue of being the one sole species of Deity, so to speak, should prove, instead of being one, to consist of many things. That mind, moreover, does not require space in order to carry on its movements agreeably to its nature, is certain from observation of our own mind. For if the mind abide within its own limits, and sustain no injury from any cause, it will never, from diversity of situation, be retarded in the discharge of its functions; nor, on the other hand, does it gain any addition or increase of mobility from the nature of particular places. And here, if any one were to object, for example, that among those who are at sea, and tossed by its waves, the mind is considerably less vigorous than it is wont to be on land, we are to believe that it is in this state, not from diversity of situation, but from the commotion or disturbance of the body to which the mind is joined or attached. For it seems to be contrary to nature, as it were, for a human body to live at sea; and for that reason it appears, by a sort of inequality of its own, to enter upon its mental operations in a slovenly and irregular manner, and to perform the acts of the intellect with a duller sense, in as great degree as those who on land are prostrated with fever; with respect to whom it is certain, that if the mind do not discharge its functions as well as before, in consequence of the attack of disease, the blame is to be laid not upon the place, but upon the bodily malady, by which the body, being disturbed and disordered, renders to the mind its customary services under by no means the well-known and natural conditions: for we human beings are animals composed of a union of body and soul, and in this way [only] was it possible for us to live upon the earth. But God, who is the beginning of all things, is not to be regarded as a composite being, lest perchance there should be found to exist elements prior to the beginning itself, out of which everything is composed, whatever that be which is called composite. Neither does the mind require bodily magnitude in order to perform any act or movement; as when the eye by gazing upon bodies of larger size is dilated, but is compressed and contracted in order to see smaller objects. The mind, indeed, requires magnitude of an intellectual kind, because it grows, not after the fashion of a body, but after that of intelligence. For the mind is not enlarged, together with the body, by means of corporal additions, up to the twentieth or thirtieth year of life; but the intellect is sharpened by exercises of learning, and the powers implanted within it for intelligent purposes are called forth; and it is rendered capable of greater intellectual efforts, not being increased by bodily additions, but carefully polished by learned exercises. But these it cannot receive immediately from boyhood, or from birth, because the framework of limbs which the mind employs as organs for exercising itself is weak and feeble; and it is unable to bear the weight of its own operations, or to exhibit a capacity for receiving training.
But since we quoted the language of Paul regarding Christ, where he says of Him that He is “the brightness of the glory of God, and the express figure of his person,” let us see what idea we are to form of this. According to John, “God is light.” The only-begotten Son, therefore, is the glory of this light, proceeding inseparably from [God] Himself, as brightness does from light, and illuminating the whole of creation. For, agreeably to what we have already explained as to the manner in which He is the Way, and conducts to the Father; and in which He is the Word, interpreting the secrets of wisdom, and the mysteries of knowledge, making them known to the rational creation; and is also the Truth, and the Life, and the Resurrection,—in the same way ought we to understand also the meaning of His being the brightness: for it is by its splendour that we understand and feel what light itself is. And this splendour, presenting itself gently and softly to the frail and weak eyes of mortals, and gradually training, as it were, and accustoming them to bear the brightness of the light, when it has put away from them every hindrance and obstruction to vision, according to the Lord’s own precept, “Cast forth the beam out of thine eye,” renders them capable of enduring the splendour of the light, being made in this respect also a sort of mediator between men and the light.
That the working of the Father and the Son operates both in saints and in sinners, is manifest from this, that all who are rational beings are partakers of the word, i.e. of reason, and by this means bear certain seeds, implanted within them, of wisdom and justice, which is Christ. Now, in Him who truly exists, and who said by Moses, “I am what I am,” all things, whatever they are, participate; which participation in God the Father is shared both by just men and sinners, by rational and irrational beings, and by all things universally which exist. The Apostle Paul also shows truly that all have a share in Christ, when he says, “Say not in thine heart, Who shall ascend into heaven? (i.e. to bring Christ down from above;) or who shall descend into the deep? (that is, to bring up Christ again from the dead.) But what saith the Scripture? The word is nigh thee, even in thy mouth, and in thy heart.” By which he means that Christ is in the heart of all, in respect of His being the word or reason, by participating in which they are rational beings. That declaration also in the Gospel, “If I had not come and spoken unto them, they had not had sin; but now they have no excuse for their sin,” renders it manifest and patent to all who have a rational knowledge of how long a time man is without sin, and from what period he is liable to it, how, by participating in the word or reason, men are said to have sinned, viz. from the time they are made capable of understanding and knowledge, when the reason implanted within has suggested to them the difference between good and evil; and after they have already begun to know what evil is, they are made liable to sin, if they commit it. And this is the meaning of the expression, that “men have no excuse for their sin,” viz. that, from the time the divine word or reason has begun to show them internally the difference between good and evil, they ought to avoid and guard against that which is wicked: “For to him who knoweth to do good, and doeth it not, to him it is sin.” Moreover, that all men are not without communion with God, is taught in the Gospel thus, by the Saviour’s words: “The kingdom of God cometh not with observation; neither shall they say, Lo here! or, lo there! but the kingdom of God is within you.” But here we must see whether this does not bear the same meaning with the expression in Genesis: “And He breathed into his face the breath of life, and man became a living soul.” For if this be understood as applying generally to all men, then all men have a share in God.
Having made these declarations regarding the unity of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit, let us return to the order in which we began the discussion. God the Father bestows upon all, existence; and participation in Christ, in respect of His being the word of reason, renders them rational beings. From which it follows that they are deserving either of praise or blame, because capable of virtue and vice. On this account, therefore, is the grace of the Holy Ghost present, that those beings which are not holy in their essence may be rendered holy by participating in it. Seeing, then, that firstly, they derive their existence from God the Father; secondly, their rational nature from the Word; thirdly, their holiness from the Holy Spirit,—those who have been previously sanctified by the Holy Spirit are again made capable of receiving Christ, in respect that He is the righteousness of God; and those who have earned advancement to this grade by the sanctification of the Holy Spirit, will nevertheless obtain the gift of wisdom according to the power and working of the Spirit of God. And this I consider is Paul’s meaning, when he says that to “some is given the word of wisdom, to others the word of knowledge, according to the same Spirit.” And while pointing out the individual distinction of gifts, he refers the whole of them to the source of all things in the words, “There are diversities of operations, but one God who worketh all in all.” Whence also the working of the Father, which confers existence upon all things, is found to be more glorious and magnificent, while each one, by participation in Christ, as being wisdom, and knowledge, and sanctification, makes progress, and advances to higher degrees of perfection; and seeing it is by partaking of the Holy Spirit that any one is made purer and holier, he obtains, when he is made worthy, the grace of wisdom and knowledge, in order that, after all stains of pollution and ignorance are cleansed and taken away, he may make so great an advance in holiness and purity, that the nature which he received from God may become such as is worthy of Him who gave it to be pure and perfect, so that the being which exists may be as worthy as He who called it into existence. For, in this way, he who is such as his Creator wished him to be, will receive from God power always to exist, and to abide for ever. That this may be the case, and that those whom He has created may be unceasingly and inseparably present with Him, who IS, it is the business of wisdom to instruct and train them, and to bring them to perfection by confirmation of His Holy Spirit and unceasing sanctification, by which alone are they capable of receiving God. In this way, then, by the renewal of the ceaseless working of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit in us, in its various stages of progress, shall we be able at some future time perhaps, although with difficulty, to behold the holy and the blessed life, in which (as it is only after many struggles that we are able to reach it) we ought so to continue, that no satiety of that blessedness should ever seize us; but the more we perceive its blessedness, the more should be increased and intensified within us the longing for the same, while we ever more eagerly and freely receive and hold fast the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit. But if satiety should ever take hold of any one of those who stand on the highest and perfect summit of attainment, I do not think that such an one would suddenly be deposed from his position and fall away, but that he must decline gradually and little by little, so that it may sometimes happen that if a brief lapsus take place, and the individual quickly repent and return to himself, he may not utterly fall away, but may retrace his steps, and return to his former place, and again make good that which had been lost by his negligence.
Now, of these opinions, let us first discuss that which is maintained by some, that there is in us a good and heavenly soul, and another earthly and inferior; and that the better soul is implanted within us from heaven, such as was that which, while Jacob was still in the womb, gave him the prize of victory in supplanting his brother Esau, and which in the case of Jeremiah was sanctified from his birth, and in that of John was filled by the Holy Spirit from the womb. Now, that which they term the inferior soul is produced, they allege, along with the body itself out of the seed of the body, whence they say it cannot live or subsist beyond the body, on which account also they say it is frequently termed flesh. For the expression, “The flesh lusteth against the spirit,” they take to be applicable not to the flesh, but to this soul, which is properly the soul of the flesh. From these words, moreover, they endeavour notwithstanding to make good the declaration in Leviticus: “The life of all flesh is the blood thereof.” For, from the circumstance that it is the diffusion of the blood throughout the whole flesh which produces life in the flesh, they assert that this soul, which is said to be the life of all flesh, is contained in the blood. This statement, moreover, that the flesh struggles against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh; and the further statement, that “the life of all flesh is the blood thereof,” is, according to these writers, simply calling the wisdom of the flesh by another name, because it is a kind of material spirit, which is not subject to the law of God, nor can be so, because it has earthly wishes and bodily desires. And it is with respect to this that they think the apostle uttered the words: “I see another law in my members, warring against the law of my mind, and bringing me into captivity to the law of sin which is in my members.” And if one were to object to them that these words were spoken of the nature of the body, which indeed, agreeably to the peculiarity of its nature, is dead, but is said to have sensibility, or wisdom, which is hostile to God, or which struggles against the spirit; or if one were to say that, in a certain degree, the flesh itself was possessed of a voice, which should cry out against the endurance of hunger, or thirst, or cold, or of any discomfort arising either from abundance or poverty,—they would endeavour to weaken and impair the force of such [arguments], by showing that there were many other mental perturbations which derive their origin in no respect from the flesh, and yet against which the spirit struggles, such as ambition, avarice, emulation, envy, pride, and others like these; and seeing that with these the human mind or spirit wages a kind of contest, they lay down as the cause of all these evils, nothing else than this corporal soul, as it were, of which we have spoken above, and which is generated from the seed by a process of traducianism. They are accustomed also to adduce, in support of their assertion, the declaration of the apostle, “Now the works of the flesh are manifest, which are these, fornication, uncleanness, lasciviousness, idolatry, poisonings, hatred, contentions, emulations, wrath, quarrelling, dissensions, heresies, sects, envyings, drunkenness, revellings, and the like;” asserting that all these do not derive their origin from the habits or pleasures of the flesh, so that all such movements are to be regarded as inherent in that substance which has not a soul, i.e. the flesh. The declaration, moreover, “For ye see your calling, brethren, how that not many wise men among you according to the flesh are called,” would seem to require to be understood as if there were one kind of wisdom, carnal and material, and another according to the spirit, the former of which cannot indeed be called wisdom, unless there be a soul of the flesh, which is wise in respect of what is called carnal wisdom. And in addition to these passages they adduce the following: “Since the flesh lusteth against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh, so that we cannot do the things that we would.” What are these things now respecting which he says, “that we cannot do the things that we would?” It is certain, they reply, that the spirit cannot be intended; for the will of the spirit suffers no hindrance. But neither can the flesh be meant, because if it has not a soul of its own, neither can it assuredly possess a will. It remains, then, that the will of this soul be intended which is capable of having a will of its own, and which certainly is opposed to the will of the spirit. And if this be the case, it is established that the will of the soul is something intermediate between the flesh and the spirit, undoubtedly obeying and serving that one of the two which it has elected to obey. And if it yield itself up to the pleasures of the flesh, it renders men carnal; but when it unites itself with the spirit, it produces men of the spirit, and who on that account are termed spiritual. And this seems to be the meaning of the apostle in the words, “But ye are not in the flesh, but in the spirit.” We have accordingly to ascertain what is this very will [intermediate] between flesh and spirit, besides that will which is said to belong to the flesh or the spirit. For it is held as certain, that everything which is said to be a work of the spirit is [a product of] the will of the spirit, and everything that is called a work of the flesh [proceeds from] the will of the flesh. What else then, besides these, is that will of the soul which receives a separate name, and which will, the apostle being opposed to our executing, says: “Ye cannot do the things that ye would?” By this it would seem to be intended, that it ought to adhere to neither of these two, i.e. to neither flesh nor spirit. But some one will say, that as it is better for the soul to execute its own will than that of the flesh; so, on the other hand, it is better to do the will of the spirit than its own will. How, then, does the apostle say, “that ye cannot do the things that ye would?” Because in that contest which is waged between flesh and spirit, the spirit is by no means certain of victory, it being manifest that in very many individuals the flesh has the mastery. But since the subject of discussion on which we have entered is one of great profundity, which it is necessary to consider in all its bearings, let us see whether some such point as this may not be determined: that as it is better for the soul to follow the spirit when the latter has overcome the flesh, so also, if it seem to be a worse course for the former to follow the flesh in its struggles against the spirit, when the latter would recall the soul to its influence, it may nevertheless appear a more advantageous procedure for the soul to be under the mastery of the flesh than to remain under the power of its own will. For, since it is said to be neither hot nor cold, but to continue in a sort of tepid condition, it will find conversion a slow and somewhat difficult undertaking. If indeed it clung to the flesh, then, satiated at length, and filled with those very evils which it suffers from the vices of the flesh, and wearied as it were by the heavy burdens of luxury and lust, it may sometimes be converted with greater ease and rapidity from the filthiness of matter to a desire for heavenly things, and [to a taste for] spiritual graces. And the apostle must be supposed to have said, that “the spirit contends against the flesh, and the flesh against the spirit, so that we cannot do the things that we would” (those things, undoubtedly, which are designated as being beyond the will of the spirit, and the will of the flesh), meaning (as if we were to express it in other words) that it is better for a man to be either in a state of virtue or in one of wickedness, than in neither of these; but that the soul, before its conversion to the spirit, and its union with it, appears during its adherence to the body, and its meditation of carnal things, to be neither in a good condition nor in a manifestly bad one, but resembles, so to speak, an animal. It is better, however, for it, if possible, to be rendered spiritual through adherence to the spirit; but if that cannot be done, it is more expedient for it to follow even the wickedness of the flesh, than, placed under the influence of its own will, to retain the position of an irrational animal. These points we have now discussed, in our desire to consider each individual opinion, at greater length than we intended, that those views might not be supposed to have escaped our notice which are generally brought forward by those who inquire whether there is within us any other soul than this heavenly and rational one, which is naturally opposed to the latter, and is called either the flesh, or the wisdom of the flesh, or the soul of the flesh.
But let us see further what the things are which he proposes to teach us, if indeed we can comprehend them, since he speaks of us as being “utterly wedded to the flesh;” although if we live well, and in accordance with the teaching of Jesus, we hear this said of us: “Ye are not in the flesh, but in the Spirit, if the Spirit of God dwelleth in you.” He says also that we look upon nothing that is pure, although our endeavour is to keep even our thoughts free from all defilement of sin, and although in prayer we say, “Create in me a clean heart, O God, and renew a right spirit within me,” so that we may behold Him with that “pure heart” to which alone is granted the privilege of seeing Him. This, then, is what he proposes for our instruction: “Things are either intelligible, which we call substance—being; or visible, which we call becoming: with the former is truth; from the latter arises error. Truth is the object of knowledge; truth and error form opinion. Intelligible objects are known by the reason, visible objects by the eyes; the action of the reason is called intelligent perception, that of the eyes vision. As, then, among visible things the sun is neither the eye nor vision, but that which enables the eye to see, and renders vision possible, and in consequence of it visible things are seen, all sensible things exist, and itself is rendered visible; so among things intelligible, that which is neither reason, nor intelligent perception, nor knowledge, is yet the cause which enables the reason to know, which renders intelligent perception possible; and in consequence of it knowledge arises, all things intelligible, truth itself and substance have their existence; and itself, which is above all these things, becomes in some ineffable way intelligible. These things are offered to the consideration of the intelligent; and if even you can understand any of them, it is well. And if you think that a Divine Spirit has descended from God to announce divine things to men, it is doubtless this same Spirit that reveals these truths, and it was under the same influence that men of old made known many important truths. But if you cannot comprehend these things, then keep silence; do not expose your own ignorance, and do not accuse of blindness those who see, or of lameness those who run, while you yourselves are utterly lamed and mutilated in mind, and lead a merely animal life—the life of the body, which is the dead part of our nature.”
But let us see further what the things are which he proposes to teach us, if indeed we can comprehend them, since he speaks of us as being “utterly wedded to the flesh;” although if we live well, and in accordance with the teaching of Jesus, we hear this said of us: “Ye are not in the flesh, but in the Spirit, if the Spirit of God dwelleth in you.” He says also that we look upon nothing that is pure, although our endeavour is to keep even our thoughts free from all defilement of sin, and although in prayer we say, “Create in me a clean heart, O God, and renew a right spirit within me,” so that we may behold Him with that “pure heart” to which alone is granted the privilege of seeing Him. This, then, is what he proposes for our instruction: “Things are either intelligible, which we call substance—being; or visible, which we call becoming: with the former is truth; from the latter arises error. Truth is the object of knowledge; truth and error form opinion. Intelligible objects are known by the reason, visible objects by the eyes; the action of the reason is called intelligent perception, that of the eyes vision. As, then, among visible things the sun is neither the eye nor vision, but that which enables the eye to see, and renders vision possible, and in consequence of it visible things are seen, all sensible things exist, and itself is rendered visible; so among things intelligible, that which is neither reason, nor intelligent perception, nor knowledge, is yet the cause which enables the reason to know, which renders intelligent perception possible; and in consequence of it knowledge arises, all things intelligible, truth itself and substance have their existence; and itself, which is above all these things, becomes in some ineffable way intelligible. These things are offered to the consideration of the intelligent; and if even you can understand any of them, it is well. And if you think that a Divine Spirit has descended from God to announce divine things to men, it is doubtless this same Spirit that reveals these truths, and it was under the same influence that men of old made known many important truths. But if you cannot comprehend these things, then keep silence; do not expose your own ignorance, and do not accuse of blindness those who see, or of lameness those who run, while you yourselves are utterly lamed and mutilated in mind, and lead a merely animal life—the life of the body, which is the dead part of our nature.”
In a passage previously quoted Celsus asks us why we do not worship demons, and to his remarks on demons we gave such an answer as seemed to us in accordance with the divine word. After having put this question for the purpose of leading us to the worship of demons, he represents us as answering that it is impossible to serve many masters. “This,” he goes on to say, “is the language of sedition, and is only used by those who separate themselves and stand aloof from all human society. Those who speak in this way ascribe,” as he supposes, “their own feelings and passions to God. It does hold true among men, that he who is in the service of one master cannot well serve another, because the service which he renders to the one interferes with that which he owes to the other; and no one, therefore, who has already engaged himself to the service of one, must accept that of another. And, in like manner, it is impossible to serve at the same time heroes or demons of different natures. But in regard to God, who is subject to no suffering or loss, it is,” he thinks, “absurd to be on our guard against serving more gods, as though we had to do with demi-gods, or other spirits of that sort.” He says also, “He who serves many gods does that which is pleasing to the Most High, because he honours that which belongs to Him.” And he adds, “It is indeed wrong to give honour to any to whom God has not given honour.” “Wherefore,” he says, “in honouring and worshipping all belonging to God, we will not displease Him to whom they all belong.”
The Mishnah
One who is about to die who assigns his property in writing [to another]: If he retains any land [for himself] however small, he renders his gift valid. But if he retains no land whatsoever, his gift is not valid. One who assigns in writing his property to his children, and he assigns to his wife in writing any plot of land, however small, she lost her ketubah. Rabbi Yose says: if she accepted [such an assignment] even though he did not assign it to her in writing she lost her ketubah.
One who plants a vegetable or leaves it to remain in a vineyard, he renders prohibited [as kilayim] forty-five vines. When is this so? When they were planted with either four or five [cubits between rows]. If they were planted with either six or seven [cubits between rows] he renders prohibited as kilayim [the vines within an area of] sixteen cubits in every direction, in the form of a circle, not of a square.
One who plants a vegetable or leaves it to remain in a vineyard, he renders prohibited [as kilayim] forty-five vines. When is this so? When they were planted with either four or five [cubits between rows]. If they were planted with either six or seven [cubits between rows] he renders prohibited as kilayim [the vines within an area of] sixteen cubits in every direction, in the form of a circle, not of a square.
Mules of uncertain parentage are forbidden [one with another,] And a ramakh is permitted. Wild man-like creatures are [in the category of] hayyah. Rabbi Yose says: they cause impurity in a tent like a human being. The hedgehog and the bush-mole are [in the category of] hayyah. The bush-mole: Rabbi Yose says in the name of Bet Shammai: an olive's size [of its carcass] renders a person carrying it unclean, and a lentil’s size [of its carcass] renders a person touching it unclean.
Mules of uncertain parentage are forbidden [one with another,] And a ramakh is permitted. Wild man-like creatures are [in the category of] hayyah. Rabbi Yose says: they cause impurity in a tent like a human being. The hedgehog and the bush-mole are [in the category of] hayyah. The bush-mole: Rabbi Yose says in the name of Bet Shammai: an olive's size [of its carcass] renders a person carrying it unclean, and a lentil’s size [of its carcass] renders a person touching it unclean.
If a new rose has been preserved in old oil, the rose may be taken out. But if an old rose was preserved in new oil, it is subject to the law of removal. New carobs preserved in old wine, or old carobs in new wine, are subject to the law of removal. This is the general principle: Any thing that imparts taste, he must remove it if it is one kind mixed with a different kind. But if it is mixed with the identical kind, then [the whole is subject to removal] even if only the smallest quantity exists. Sabbatical year produce renders similar kinds prohibited even [if it exists] in the smallest quantity. But if of different species only when it imparts taste.
They may not give terumah from oil for crushed olives nor may [they give terumah from] wine for trodden grapes. If he did so, his terumah is terumah, but he must give terumah again. The first terumah renders on its own [produce into which it falls] “doubtful terumah” and is subject to the added fifth, but not the second.
Terumah given by a non-Jew or a Samaritan is terumah and their tithes are tithes and their dedications [to the Temple] are dedications. Rabbi Judah says: the law of the vineyard in the fourth year is not applicable to a non-Jew. But the sages say: it is. The terumah of a non-Jew renders [produce into which it falls] medumma and [one who eats it unwittingly] is obligated [to pay back an extra] fifth. But Rabbi Shimon exempts it.
Rabbi Eliezer says: terumah can be taken out [if it falls into] a hundred and one parts. Rabbi Joshua says: in a hundred and more, and this “more” has no definite measure. Rabbi Yose ben Meshullam says: this ‘more’ must be a kav to a hundred seahs, a sixth [of the seah] which renders the whole as medumma.
A seah of terumah that fell into a hundred [of hullin], and he lifted it out and fell into [hullin] elsewhere: Rabbi Eliezer says: it renders medumma as though it were certainly terumah. But the sages say: it is rendered medumma only according to proportion.
A seah of terumah which fell into less than a hundred [of hullin], and rendered the whole medumma, and part of this mixture fell afterwards into another place: Rabbi Eliezer says: it renders again medumma as if certain terumah [had fallen in]. But the sages say: the [first] mixture renders medumma only according to the proportion. [Similarly], that which is leavened [with terumah] renders other dough leavened [as with terumah] only according to the proportion. And drawn water disqualifies a ritual bath also only according to the proportion.
A seah of terumah which fell into less than a hundred [of hullin], and rendered the whole medumma, and part of this mixture fell afterwards into another place: Rabbi Eliezer says: it renders again medumma as if certain terumah [had fallen in]. But the sages say: the [first] mixture renders medumma only according to the proportion. [Similarly], that which is leavened [with terumah] renders other dough leavened [as with terumah] only according to the proportion. And drawn water disqualifies a ritual bath also only according to the proportion.
A seah of terumah which fell into less than a hundred [of hullin], and rendered the whole medumma, and part of this mixture fell afterwards into another place: Rabbi Eliezer says: it renders again medumma as if certain terumah [had fallen in]. But the sages say: the [first] mixture renders medumma only according to the proportion. [Similarly], that which is leavened [with terumah] renders other dough leavened [as with terumah] only according to the proportion. And drawn water disqualifies a ritual bath also only according to the proportion.
Rabbi Yose says: Anything stewed with [terumah] beets becomes forbidden, because they impart a flavor. Rabbi Shimon says: cabbage from a field artificially irrigated [that is stewed] with [terumah] cabbage from a field watered by rain, is forbidden because it absorbs. Rabbi Akiba says: all things cooked together are permitted, except those with meat. Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri says: liver renders other things forbidden, but does not become forbidden, because it gives off [flavor] but does not absorb.
Roofs do not render [produce] liable, even though they belong to a courtyard which renders it liable. A gate house, portico, or balcony, are like the courtyard [to which it belongs]; if [the courtyard] makes the [produce] liable [for tithes] so do they, and if it does not, they do not.
Cone-shaped huts, watchtowers, and sheds in the field do not render [produce] liable. A sukkah-hut like those used in Ginnosar, even though it contains millstones and poultry, does not render [produce] liable. As for the potter’s sukkah-hut, the inner part renders [produce] liable and the outer part does not. Rabbi Yose says: anything which is not both a sunny season and rainy season dwelling does not render [produce] liable [to tithes]. A sukkah used on the Festival [of Sukkot]: Rabbi Judah says: this renders [produce] liable [for tithes] But the sages exempt.
Cone-shaped huts, watchtowers, and sheds in the field do not render [produce] liable. A sukkah-hut like those used in Ginnosar, even though it contains millstones and poultry, does not render [produce] liable. As for the potter’s sukkah-hut, the inner part renders [produce] liable and the outer part does not. Rabbi Yose says: anything which is not both a sunny season and rainy season dwelling does not render [produce] liable [to tithes]. A sukkah used on the Festival [of Sukkot]: Rabbi Judah says: this renders [produce] liable [for tithes] But the sages exempt.
One who takes leaven from a dough of wheat [flour] and puts [it] into dough of rice [flour], [then] if it has the taste of grain, it is subject to hallah, [but] if not, it is exempt. If so, why did they say: “Untithed produce of any amount renders food prohibited”? That is [with regard to a mixture of] a species with its own species, but [with regard to a mixture of a species] not with its own species, only when it imparts taste.
Whatever causes something to ferment, or seasons, or makes medumma with terumah, with orlah or with ‘mixed-seeds’ of the vineyard, is prohibited. Bet Shammai says: it also renders unclean. But Bet Hillel says: it never renders unclean unless it has the volume of an egg.
Whatever causes something to ferment, or seasons, or makes medumma with terumah, with orlah or with ‘mixed-seeds’ of the vineyard, is prohibited. Bet Shammai says: it also renders unclean. But Bet Hillel says: it never renders unclean unless it has the volume of an egg.
Dostai of Kefar Yitmah was one of the disciples of Bet Shammai, and he said, “I received a tradition from Shammai the elder who said: “It never renders unclean unless it contains the volume of an egg.”
Concerning what did they say: “Anything that causes fermentation or seasons or which renders medumma we rule stringently”? [In the case of] a species [mixed] with its [like] species. [When did they say] “we rule [sometimes] leniently and [sometimes] stringently”? [In the case of] a species [mixed] with a different kind of species. How so? If leaven of wheat fell into dough of wheat and there is enough to cause fermentation, [then] whether there is enough to become neutralized in one-hundred-and-one, or there is not enough to become neutralized in one-hundred-and-one, it is prohibited. If there is not enough to become neutralized in one-hundred-and-one, [then] whether there is enough to cause fermentation, or there is not enough to cause fermentation, it is prohibited.
There are [laws] which apply to [second tithe] and bikkurim but not to terumah: That [second] tithe and bikkurim must to be brought to [the appointed] place; They require confession; They are forbidden to an onen. But Rabbi Shimon permits [bikkurim to an onen]; They are subject to [the law of] removal. But Rabbi Shimon exempts [bikkurim from removal]. And in Jerusalem the slightest mixture of them [with hullin of the same species] renders it forbidden to be consumed [as common food outside of Jerusalem.] And what grows from them in Jerusalem is forbidden to be consumed [outside of Jerusalem], Even by non-priests or by cattle; But Rabbi Shimon permits. These are [the laws] which apply to [second] tithe and bikkurim, but not to terumah.
The terumah of tithe is like bikkurim in two ways, and like terumah in two other ways: It may be taken from pure produce for impure produce; And from such produce that is not in close proximity, like bikkurim. And it renders the contents of the threshing-floor forbidden, And it has a prescribed amount like terumah.
The blood of those who walk on two [legs] is like the blood of beasts in that it renders seeds susceptible [to impurity]. And it is like the blood of a sheretz, in that one is not liable for eating it.
If one says, “Behold, I am a nazirite,” and becomes impure on the thirtieth day, he renders void the whole period. Rabbi Eliezer says: only seven days are void. [If one says,] “Behold, I am a nazirite for thirty days”, and becomes impure on the thirtieth day, then he renders void the whole period.
If one says, “Behold, I am a nazirite,” and becomes impure on the thirtieth day, he renders void the whole period. Rabbi Eliezer says: only seven days are void. [If one says,] “Behold, I am a nazirite for thirty days”, and becomes impure on the thirtieth day, then he renders void the whole period.
[If he says,] “Behold, I am a nazirite for one hundred days,” and becomes impure on the hundredth day, he renders void the whole period. Rabbi Eliezer says: only thirty days are void. If he becomes impure on the hundred and first day, thirty days are void. Rabbi Eliezer says: only seven days are void.
If orphans relied on a householder or if their father appointed a guardian for them, he must tithe their produce. A guardian who was appointed by the father of the orphans is required to take an oath. [A guardian who was] appointed by the court does not need to take an oath. Abba Shaul says that the rule is the reverse. One who renders impure [someone else’s pure food] or mixes terumah [with someone else’s non-terumah produce] or makes a libation [with someone else’s wine], if he does so inadvertently, he is exempt, but if intentionally he is liable. Priests who intentionally made someone else’s sacrifice piggul in the Temple are liable.
If one hired a donkey to carry wheat and he used it to carry [a like weight] of barley, he is liable [if the donkey was injured]. [If he hired it to carry] grain and he used it to carry [a like weight of] chopped straw he is liable, since the greater bulk is more difficult to carry. [If he hired it to carry] a letech of wheat and it carried a letech of barley he is not liable. But if he increased the weight, he is liable. What increase in weight renders him liable? Symmachos says in the name of Rabbi Meir: “One seah for a camel and three kavs for a donkey.”
Hillel says: “A hin full of drawn water renders the mikweh unfit.” (However, man must speak in the language of his teacher.) And Shammai says: “Nine kavs.” But the Sages say: “Neither according to the opinion of this one nor according to the opinion of this one;” But when two weavers from the dung-gate which is in Jerusalem came and testified in the name of Shemaiah and Avtalion, “Three logs of drawn water render the mikweh unfit,” the Sages confirmed their statement.
The following are permitted to be eaten [by an israelite]:milk which a non-Jew milked with a Jew watching him; honey, grape-clusters even though these secrete moisture the law which renders food susceptible to defilement by a liquid does not apply to them preserves into which they are not accustomed to put wine or vinegar, pickled herring which has not been minced, brine containing fish, a leaf of asafoetida, and rolled olive-cakes. Rabbi Yose says: those olives having pits ready to drop out are prohibited. Locusts which come out of [a shopkeeper’s] basket are prohibited, but if from storage they are permitted. The same rule applies to terumah.
Yen nesekh is prohibited and renders [other wine] prohibited by the smallest quantity. Wine [mixed] with wine and water with water [prohibits] by the smallest quantity. Wine [mixed] with water and water with wine [disqualifies when the prohibited element] imparts a flavor. This is the general rule: with the same type [the mixture is disqualified] by the smallest quantity, but with a different type [it is disqualified when the prohibited element] imparts a flavor.
He who slaughters and offers up outside [the Temple courtyard] is liable in respect of slaughtering and in respect of offering. Rabbi Yose the Galilean says: if he slaughtered inside and offered up outside, [he is liable]; if he slaughtered outside and offered up outside, he is not liable [for offering up], because he offered up only that which was unfit. They said to him: even when one slaughters inside and offers up outside, since he carries it out, he renders it unfit.
Two minhahs from which the handfuls had not yet been taken out were mixed together: If it is still possible to take the handful from each separately, they are valid; If not, they are invalid. If the handful [of a minhah] was mixed with a minhah from which the handful had not yet been taken, he must not burn it. If he did burn it, then the minhah from which the handful had been taken fulfills the owner's obligation while the other from which the handful had not been taken does not fulfill the owner's obligation. If the handful was mixed with the remainder of the minhah or with the remainder of another minhah, it must not be burned; If he did burn it does fulfill the owner's obligation. If the handful had become unclean and yet he offered it, the head plate renders it acceptable, But if it went out [of the Temple Court] and was afterwards he offered it, the headplate does not render it acceptable. For the headplate renders acceptable only an offering which was unclean but not that which was taken out.
Two minhahs from which the handfuls had not yet been taken out were mixed together: If it is still possible to take the handful from each separately, they are valid; If not, they are invalid. If the handful [of a minhah] was mixed with a minhah from which the handful had not yet been taken, he must not burn it. If he did burn it, then the minhah from which the handful had been taken fulfills the owner's obligation while the other from which the handful had not been taken does not fulfill the owner's obligation. If the handful was mixed with the remainder of the minhah or with the remainder of another minhah, it must not be burned; If he did burn it does fulfill the owner's obligation. If the handful had become unclean and yet he offered it, the head plate renders it acceptable, But if it went out [of the Temple Court] and was afterwards he offered it, the headplate does not render it acceptable. For the headplate renders acceptable only an offering which was unclean but not that which was taken out.
The [absence of the] bull, or the rams, or the lambs or the goat does not invalidate the bread, neither does the [absence of the] bread invalidate them. The [absence of the] bread invalidates the lambs, but the [absence of the] lambs does not invalidate the bread, the words of Rabbi Akiva. Rabbi Shimon b. Nanas said: it is not so, but rather the [absence of the] lambs invalidates the bread, while the [absence of the] bread does not invalidate the lambs; for so we find that when the Israelites were in the wilderness for forty years they offered the lambs without the bread, therefore now too they may offer the lambs without the bread. Rabbi Shimon said: the halakhah is according to the words of Ben Nanas but not for the reason he stated; for every offering stated in the Book of Numbers was offered in the wilderness, but not every offering stated in the book of Leviticus was offered in the wilderness; however, when they came into the land of Israel they offered both kinds. Why then do I say that the lambs may be offered without the bread? Because the lambs render themselves permissible without the bread, whereas bread without lambs, there is nothing that renders it permissible.
[The method of killing] which renders the red cow valid renders the heifer invalid, and the method which renders the heifer valid renders the red cow invalid. [The disability] which does not disqualify priests disqualifies Levites, and [the disability] which does not disqualify Levites disqualifies priests. That which cannot be rendered unclean in earthenware vessels can be rendered unclean in all other vessels, and that which cannot be rendered unclean in all other vessels can be rendered unclean in earthenware vessels. That which cannot be rendered unclean in wooden things can be rendered unclean in metal things, and that which cannot be rendered unclean in metal things can be rendered unclean in wooden things. When bitter almonds are subject to tithing sweet almonds are exempt, and when sweet almonds are subject to tithing bitter almonds are exempt.
[The method of killing] which renders the red cow valid renders the heifer invalid, and the method which renders the heifer valid renders the red cow invalid. [The disability] which does not disqualify priests disqualifies Levites, and [the disability] which does not disqualify Levites disqualifies priests. That which cannot be rendered unclean in earthenware vessels can be rendered unclean in all other vessels, and that which cannot be rendered unclean in all other vessels can be rendered unclean in earthenware vessels. That which cannot be rendered unclean in wooden things can be rendered unclean in metal things, and that which cannot be rendered unclean in metal things can be rendered unclean in wooden things. When bitter almonds are subject to tithing sweet almonds are exempt, and when sweet almonds are subject to tithing bitter almonds are exempt.
[The method of killing] which renders the red cow valid renders the heifer invalid, and the method which renders the heifer valid renders the red cow invalid. [The disability] which does not disqualify priests disqualifies Levites, and [the disability] which does not disqualify Levites disqualifies priests. That which cannot be rendered unclean in earthenware vessels can be rendered unclean in all other vessels, and that which cannot be rendered unclean in all other vessels can be rendered unclean in earthenware vessels. That which cannot be rendered unclean in wooden things can be rendered unclean in metal things, and that which cannot be rendered unclean in metal things can be rendered unclean in wooden things. When bitter almonds are subject to tithing sweet almonds are exempt, and when sweet almonds are subject to tithing bitter almonds are exempt.
[The method of killing] which renders the red cow valid renders the heifer invalid, and the method which renders the heifer valid renders the red cow invalid. [The disability] which does not disqualify priests disqualifies Levites, and [the disability] which does not disqualify Levites disqualifies priests. That which cannot be rendered unclean in earthenware vessels can be rendered unclean in all other vessels, and that which cannot be rendered unclean in all other vessels can be rendered unclean in earthenware vessels. That which cannot be rendered unclean in wooden things can be rendered unclean in metal things, and that which cannot be rendered unclean in metal things can be rendered unclean in wooden things. When bitter almonds are subject to tithing sweet almonds are exempt, and when sweet almonds are subject to tithing bitter almonds are exempt.
Temed: Before it has fermented it may not be bought with second tithe money and it renders a mikveh invalid; After it has fermented it may be bought with second tithe money and it does not render a mikveh invalid. Brothers who are partners [in their inheritance]: When they are liable to pay the kalbon, they are exempt from the cattle tithe, And when they are liable to the cattle tithe, they are exempt from the kalbon. Whenever there is [the power] to sell, there is no fine, and whenever there is a fine there is no power to sell. Whenever there is the right of refusal there can be no halizah, and whenever there can be halizah there is no longer the right of refusal. When the shofar is blown there is no havdalah, and when there is havdalah the shofar is not blown. [Thus], if a festival falls on the day before Shabbat the shofar is blown but there is no havdalah; If it falls on the day following Shabbat there is havdalah but the shofar is not blown. How do they recite havdalah [on a festival that follows Shabbat]? “Who distinguishes between holy and holy.” Rabbi Dosa says: “Who distinguishes between the more holy and less holy day.”
If an animal was having difficulty in labor and the fetus put forth its limb and a person immediately cut if off and then slaughtered the mother, the flesh [of the fetus] is clean. If he slaughtered the mother first and then cut if off, the flesh [of the fetus] is unclean like that which had touched nevelah, the words of Rabbi Meir. But the sages say, it is like that which had touched a slaughtered terefah, for just as we find that the slaughtering of a terefah animal renders it clean, so the slaughtering of the animal renders the limb clean. Rabbi Meir said to them: No, for when you say that the slaughtering of a terefah [animal] renders it clean you are concerned with [the animal] itself, but can you say that it will render clean the limb which is not part of [the animal] itself? From where do we learn that the slaughtering of a terefah animal renders it clean? [For we could have argued to the contrary:] An unclean animal may not be eaten, and a terefah also may not be eaten; just as slaughtering does not render an unclean animal clean so slaughtering should not render a terefah animal clean? No, if you said this of an unclean animal for at no time was it fit [for slaughtering]; can you also say this of a terefah animal which had a time when it was fit [for slaughtering]? Take away with this argument that you brought forth! For where would we know this of an animal that was born terefah from the womb? [Substitute therefore this argument]: No, if you said this of an unclean animal for none of its kind may be validly slaughtered; can you also state this of a terefah for whose kind there is valid slaughter? [Accordingly], the slaughtering of a live eight months birth does not render it clean, since there is no slaughtering of its kind.
If an animal was having difficulty in labor and the fetus put forth its limb and a person immediately cut if off and then slaughtered the mother, the flesh [of the fetus] is clean. If he slaughtered the mother first and then cut if off, the flesh [of the fetus] is unclean like that which had touched nevelah, the words of Rabbi Meir. But the sages say, it is like that which had touched a slaughtered terefah, for just as we find that the slaughtering of a terefah animal renders it clean, so the slaughtering of the animal renders the limb clean. Rabbi Meir said to them: No, for when you say that the slaughtering of a terefah [animal] renders it clean you are concerned with [the animal] itself, but can you say that it will render clean the limb which is not part of [the animal] itself? From where do we learn that the slaughtering of a terefah animal renders it clean? [For we could have argued to the contrary:] An unclean animal may not be eaten, and a terefah also may not be eaten; just as slaughtering does not render an unclean animal clean so slaughtering should not render a terefah animal clean? No, if you said this of an unclean animal for at no time was it fit [for slaughtering]; can you also say this of a terefah animal which had a time when it was fit [for slaughtering]? Take away with this argument that you brought forth! For where would we know this of an animal that was born terefah from the womb? [Substitute therefore this argument]: No, if you said this of an unclean animal for none of its kind may be validly slaughtered; can you also state this of a terefah for whose kind there is valid slaughter? [Accordingly], the slaughtering of a live eight months birth does not render it clean, since there is no slaughtering of its kind.
If an animal was having difficulty in labor and the fetus put forth its limb and a person immediately cut if off and then slaughtered the mother, the flesh [of the fetus] is clean. If he slaughtered the mother first and then cut if off, the flesh [of the fetus] is unclean like that which had touched nevelah, the words of Rabbi Meir. But the sages say, it is like that which had touched a slaughtered terefah, for just as we find that the slaughtering of a terefah animal renders it clean, so the slaughtering of the animal renders the limb clean. Rabbi Meir said to them: No, for when you say that the slaughtering of a terefah [animal] renders it clean you are concerned with [the animal] itself, but can you say that it will render clean the limb which is not part of [the animal] itself? From where do we learn that the slaughtering of a terefah animal renders it clean? [For we could have argued to the contrary:] An unclean animal may not be eaten, and a terefah also may not be eaten; just as slaughtering does not render an unclean animal clean so slaughtering should not render a terefah animal clean? No, if you said this of an unclean animal for at no time was it fit [for slaughtering]; can you also say this of a terefah animal which had a time when it was fit [for slaughtering]? Take away with this argument that you brought forth! For where would we know this of an animal that was born terefah from the womb? [Substitute therefore this argument]: No, if you said this of an unclean animal for none of its kind may be validly slaughtered; can you also state this of a terefah for whose kind there is valid slaughter? [Accordingly], the slaughtering of a live eight months birth does not render it clean, since there is no slaughtering of its kind.
If an animal was having difficulty in labor and the fetus put forth its limb and a person immediately cut if off and then slaughtered the mother, the flesh [of the fetus] is clean. If he slaughtered the mother first and then cut if off, the flesh [of the fetus] is unclean like that which had touched nevelah, the words of Rabbi Meir. But the sages say, it is like that which had touched a slaughtered terefah, for just as we find that the slaughtering of a terefah animal renders it clean, so the slaughtering of the animal renders the limb clean. Rabbi Meir said to them: No, for when you say that the slaughtering of a terefah [animal] renders it clean you are concerned with [the animal] itself, but can you say that it will render clean the limb which is not part of [the animal] itself? From where do we learn that the slaughtering of a terefah animal renders it clean? [For we could have argued to the contrary:] An unclean animal may not be eaten, and a terefah also may not be eaten; just as slaughtering does not render an unclean animal clean so slaughtering should not render a terefah animal clean? No, if you said this of an unclean animal for at no time was it fit [for slaughtering]; can you also say this of a terefah animal which had a time when it was fit [for slaughtering]? Take away with this argument that you brought forth! For where would we know this of an animal that was born terefah from the womb? [Substitute therefore this argument]: No, if you said this of an unclean animal for none of its kind may be validly slaughtered; can you also state this of a terefah for whose kind there is valid slaughter? [Accordingly], the slaughtering of a live eight months birth does not render it clean, since there is no slaughtering of its kind.
If one slaughtered an animal and found in it an eight months’ fetus, either living or dead, or a dead nine months’ fetus, he need only tear it open and take out the blood. If he found in it a living nine months’ fetus it must be slaughtered, and he would thereby [possibly] incur the penalty for “it and its young,” the words of Rabbi Meir. But the sages say: the slaughtering of its mother renders it permitted. Rabbi Shimon Shezuri says: even if it is eight years old and is plowing the field, the slaughtering of its mother renders it permitted. If he ripped open [the mother] and found in it a living nine months’ fetus, it must be slaughtered, since its mother has not been slaughtered.
If one slaughtered an animal and found in it an eight months’ fetus, either living or dead, or a dead nine months’ fetus, he need only tear it open and take out the blood. If he found in it a living nine months’ fetus it must be slaughtered, and he would thereby [possibly] incur the penalty for “it and its young,” the words of Rabbi Meir. But the sages say: the slaughtering of its mother renders it permitted. Rabbi Shimon Shezuri says: even if it is eight years old and is plowing the field, the slaughtering of its mother renders it permitted. If he ripped open [the mother] and found in it a living nine months’ fetus, it must be slaughtered, since its mother has not been slaughtered.
A hide which had an olive’s bulk of [unclean] flesh clinging to it, one who touches a shred hanging from it, or a hair that was opposite to it, he becomes unclean. If there were two pieces of flesh attached to it, each the size of half an olive, they convey uncleanness by carrying but not by contact, the words of Rabbi Ishmael. Rabbi Akiva says: neither by contact nor by carrying. Rabbi Akiva agrees that if there were two pieces of flesh, each the size of half of an olive, that he stuck on a twig and he waved them, he becomes unclean. Why then does Rabbi Akiva declare him clean in the [case where they cling to the] hide? Because the hide renders them negligible.
If a woman is liable to a bird hatat brought in a case of doubt and Yom Kippur intervenes, she is still bound to offer it after Yom Kippur, because it renders her fit to eat sacrifices. If a hatat of a bird was brought for a matter of doubt and, after the pinching of its neck it became known [that there was no need for it], it must be buried.
The law of sacrilege applies to the handful [of a minhah], the frankincense, the incense, the minhah of a priest, the minhah of the anointed high priest and the minhah that is accompanied by a libation, from the moment of their dedication. Once they have become sacred by being put in the vessel, they become susceptible for unfitness through contact with a tevul yom or one who still requires atonement, or by remaining overnight, and they are subject to [the laws of] notar and defilement, but [the law of] piggul does not apply to them. This is the general rule: whatever has something else which renders it permissible [for the altar or for the use of the priests] is not subject to [the laws of] piggul, nothar and defilement until that act has been performed. And whatever does not have something else which renders it permissible becomes subject [to the laws of] notar and defilement as soon as it has become sacred by being put in the vessel, but piggul does not apply to it.
The law of sacrilege applies to the handful [of a minhah], the frankincense, the incense, the minhah of a priest, the minhah of the anointed high priest and the minhah that is accompanied by a libation, from the moment of their dedication. Once they have become sacred by being put in the vessel, they become susceptible for unfitness through contact with a tevul yom or one who still requires atonement, or by remaining overnight, and they are subject to [the laws of] notar and defilement, but [the law of] piggul does not apply to them. This is the general rule: whatever has something else which renders it permissible [for the altar or for the use of the priests] is not subject to [the laws of] piggul, nothar and defilement until that act has been performed. And whatever does not have something else which renders it permissible becomes subject [to the laws of] notar and defilement as soon as it has become sacred by being put in the vessel, but piggul does not apply to it.
The size of a hole that renders an earthen vessel clean: If the vessel was made for food, the hole must be big enough for olives [to fall through]. If it was used for liquids it suffices for the hole to be big enough for liquids [to go through it]. And if it was used for both, we apply the greater stringency, that olives must be able to fall through.
[A piece of cloth] three [handbreadths] square that was torn: if he put it on a chair, and his skin touches the chair, it is pure; And if not, it remains impure. [A piece of cloth] three [fingerbreadths] square one thread of which was worn away, or in which a knot was found, or in which two threads ran alongside each other, is pure. [A piece of cloth] three [fingerbreadths] square that was thrown on the rubbish heap becomes pure. If he brought it back, it it becomes susceptible to uncleanness. Throwing it away always renders it pure and taking it back renders it susceptible to uncleanness, except when it is of purple or fine crimson. Rabbi Eliezer says: a patch of new cloth is also subject to the same law. Rabbi Shimon says: all these materials become pure; they were mentioned only in connection with the return of lost property.
[A piece of cloth] three [handbreadths] square that was torn: if he put it on a chair, and his skin touches the chair, it is pure; And if not, it remains impure. [A piece of cloth] three [fingerbreadths] square one thread of which was worn away, or in which a knot was found, or in which two threads ran alongside each other, is pure. [A piece of cloth] three [fingerbreadths] square that was thrown on the rubbish heap becomes pure. If he brought it back, it it becomes susceptible to uncleanness. Throwing it away always renders it pure and taking it back renders it susceptible to uncleanness, except when it is of purple or fine crimson. Rabbi Eliezer says: a patch of new cloth is also subject to the same law. Rabbi Shimon says: all these materials become pure; they were mentioned only in connection with the return of lost property.
All who are occupied with the preparation of the [red] cow from the beginning until the end, defile their clothing, and they also render it invalid by [doing other] work. If some invalidity occurred while it was being slaughtered, it does not defile clothing. If it occurred while the blood was being sprinkled, for all who were occupied with it before the invalidity occurred, it defiles their clothing, but for those who were occupied with it after it had become invalid it does not defile their clothing unclean. Thus it follows that the stringency turns into a leniency. It is always subject to the rules of trespassing. Wood may be added to the fire. The service must be performed by day and by a priest. Work renders it invalid. [All of this is only] until it becomes ashes And work causes the water to be invalid until the ashes are put into it.
It is not permissible to collect the water in a trough set in the stone, nor is it permissible to prepare the mixture in it, nor may the sprinkling be done from it, nor does it require a tightly fitting cover, nor does it render a ritual bath invalid. If it was first a movable vessel and then was subsequently joined to the ground with lime, it is permissible to collect the water in it, to prepare the mixture in it and to sprinkle from it. And it needs a tightly fitting cover and renders a ritual bath invalid. If there was a hole in it below, and he stopped it up with a rag, the water in it is invalid since it is not wholly enclosed by the vessel. If the hole was in the side and it was stopped up with a rag, the water in it is valid since it is wholly enclosed by the vessel. If he made a rim of clay for the vessel and the water had risen to that spot, it is invalid; But if it was solid enough for the vessel to be moved with it, the water is valid.
The carrion of an unclean bird requires intention; and it must be rendered susceptible; It conveys food uncleanness if its minimum bulk is that of an egg; The consumption of half a loaf's bulk of it renders one's person unfit to eat terumah; There is no rule that an olive's worth defiles in the gullet; He who eats of it need not wait for sunset; No guilt is incurred on account of it for entering the sanctuary; But on account of it terumah must be burnt. He who eats a limb of it while it is alive is not subject to the penalty of forty stripes; Slaughtering it does not render it fit. The large feathers and the down contract uncleanness and convey uncleanness and combine with the flesh to constitute the prescribed minimum. The beak and the claws contract uncleanness and convey uncleanness and combine [with the flesh to make up the prescribed minimum].
The outlet of a bath-basin: if it is in the center, it renders [the bath] invalid [as a mikveh]; but if it is at the side, it does not render it invalid, because then it is like one mikveh adjoining another mikveh, the words of Rabbi Meir. But the sages say: if the bath-basin can contain a quarter-log of [water] before it reaches the outlet, it is valid; but if not, it is not valid. Rabbi Elazar bar Zadok says: if the outlet can contain any amount of [water], it is invalid.
If he rinsed in the mikveh baskets of olives or baskets of grapes and they changed its color, it remains valid. Rabbi Yose says: dye-water renders it invalid by a quantity of three logs, but not merely by changing its color. If wine or the sap of olives fell into it and changed its color, it becomes invalid. What should one do [to make it valid again]? One should wait until the rain falls and the color reverts to the color of water. If it contained forty seahs, water may be drawn and carried on the shoulder and put into it until the color reverts to that of water.
If one ate unclean foods or drank unclean liquids and then he immersed and then vomited them up, they are still unclean because they did not become clean in the body. If one drank unclean water and immersed and then vomited it up, it is clean because it became clean in the body. If one swallowed a clean ring and then went into the tent of a corpse, if he sprinkled himself once and twice and immersed himself and then vomited it up, behold, it remains as it was before. If one swallowed an unclean ring, he may immerse himself and eat terumah. If he vomited it up, it is unclean and it renders him unclean. If an arrow was stuck into a man, it blocks so long as it is visible. But if it is not visible, he may immerse himself and eat terumah.
If a boy the age of nine years and one day had relations with his yevamah, he acquires her thereby; But he cannot divorce her until he is of majority age. He contracts uncleanness through intercourse with a menstruant so that he in turn conveys uncleanness to a couch underneath as to a cover above. He disqualifies a woman from the priesthood. But he doesn't give her the right to eat terumah. He renders a beast invalid for the altar, and it is stoned on his account. If he had intercourse with any of the forbidden relations mentioned in the Torah, she is to be executed on his account, but he is exempt from punishment.
A woman's milk renders unclean whether [its flow is] desired or is not desired, but the milk of cattle renders unclean only if [its flow is] desired. Rabbi Akiva said: there is a kal vehomer argument here: if a woman's milk, which is specifically for infants, can render unclean whether [its flow is] desired or is not desired, all the more should the milk of cattle, which is for infants and adults, should render unclean both when [its flow is] desired and when it is not desired. They said to him: No; a woman's milk renders unclean when [its flow is] not desired, because the blood issuing from her wound is unclean; but how could the milk of cattle render unclean when [its flow is] not desired, seeing that the blood issuing from its wound is clean? He said to them: I am stricter in the case of milk than in the case of blood, for if one milks for healing, [the milk] is unclean, whereas if one lets blood for healing, [the blood] is clean. They said to him: let baskets of olives and grapes prove it; for liquids flowing from them are unclean only when [the flow is] desired, but when [the flow is] not desired they are clean. He said to them: No; if you say [thus] of baskets of olives and grapes which are at first a solid food and at the end become a liquid, could you say [the same] of milk which remains a liquid from beginning to end? Thus far was the argument. Rabbi Shimon said: from here on in we used to argue before him: let rain water prove it, for it remains a liquid from beginning to end, and renders unclean only when [its flow is] desired. But he said to us: No; if you say [thus] of rain water, it is because most of it is intended not for human usage but for the soil and for trees, whereas most milk is intended for human usage.
A woman's milk renders unclean whether [its flow is] desired or is not desired, but the milk of cattle renders unclean only if [its flow is] desired. Rabbi Akiva said: there is a kal vehomer argument here: if a woman's milk, which is specifically for infants, can render unclean whether [its flow is] desired or is not desired, all the more should the milk of cattle, which is for infants and adults, should render unclean both when [its flow is] desired and when it is not desired. They said to him: No; a woman's milk renders unclean when [its flow is] not desired, because the blood issuing from her wound is unclean; but how could the milk of cattle render unclean when [its flow is] not desired, seeing that the blood issuing from its wound is clean? He said to them: I am stricter in the case of milk than in the case of blood, for if one milks for healing, [the milk] is unclean, whereas if one lets blood for healing, [the blood] is clean. They said to him: let baskets of olives and grapes prove it; for liquids flowing from them are unclean only when [the flow is] desired, but when [the flow is] not desired they are clean. He said to them: No; if you say [thus] of baskets of olives and grapes which are at first a solid food and at the end become a liquid, could you say [the same] of milk which remains a liquid from beginning to end? Thus far was the argument. Rabbi Shimon said: from here on in we used to argue before him: let rain water prove it, for it remains a liquid from beginning to end, and renders unclean only when [its flow is] desired. But he said to us: No; if you say [thus] of rain water, it is because most of it is intended not for human usage but for the soil and for trees, whereas most milk is intended for human usage.
A woman's milk renders unclean whether [its flow is] desired or is not desired, but the milk of cattle renders unclean only if [its flow is] desired. Rabbi Akiva said: there is a kal vehomer argument here: if a woman's milk, which is specifically for infants, can render unclean whether [its flow is] desired or is not desired, all the more should the milk of cattle, which is for infants and adults, should render unclean both when [its flow is] desired and when it is not desired. They said to him: No; a woman's milk renders unclean when [its flow is] not desired, because the blood issuing from her wound is unclean; but how could the milk of cattle render unclean when [its flow is] not desired, seeing that the blood issuing from its wound is clean? He said to them: I am stricter in the case of milk than in the case of blood, for if one milks for healing, [the milk] is unclean, whereas if one lets blood for healing, [the blood] is clean. They said to him: let baskets of olives and grapes prove it; for liquids flowing from them are unclean only when [the flow is] desired, but when [the flow is] not desired they are clean. He said to them: No; if you say [thus] of baskets of olives and grapes which are at first a solid food and at the end become a liquid, could you say [the same] of milk which remains a liquid from beginning to end? Thus far was the argument. Rabbi Shimon said: from here on in we used to argue before him: let rain water prove it, for it remains a liquid from beginning to end, and renders unclean only when [its flow is] desired. But he said to us: No; if you say [thus] of rain water, it is because most of it is intended not for human usage but for the soil and for trees, whereas most milk is intended for human usage.
A woman's milk renders unclean whether [its flow is] desired or is not desired, but the milk of cattle renders unclean only if [its flow is] desired. Rabbi Akiva said: there is a kal vehomer argument here: if a woman's milk, which is specifically for infants, can render unclean whether [its flow is] desired or is not desired, all the more should the milk of cattle, which is for infants and adults, should render unclean both when [its flow is] desired and when it is not desired. They said to him: No; a woman's milk renders unclean when [its flow is] not desired, because the blood issuing from her wound is unclean; but how could the milk of cattle render unclean when [its flow is] not desired, seeing that the blood issuing from its wound is clean? He said to them: I am stricter in the case of milk than in the case of blood, for if one milks for healing, [the milk] is unclean, whereas if one lets blood for healing, [the blood] is clean. They said to him: let baskets of olives and grapes prove it; for liquids flowing from them are unclean only when [the flow is] desired, but when [the flow is] not desired they are clean. He said to them: No; if you say [thus] of baskets of olives and grapes which are at first a solid food and at the end become a liquid, could you say [the same] of milk which remains a liquid from beginning to end? Thus far was the argument. Rabbi Shimon said: from here on in we used to argue before him: let rain water prove it, for it remains a liquid from beginning to end, and renders unclean only when [its flow is] desired. But he said to us: No; if you say [thus] of rain water, it is because most of it is intended not for human usage but for the soil and for trees, whereas most milk is intended for human usage.
He who touches a dead sheretz, or semen, or he that has suffered corpse uncleanness, or a metzora during his days of counting, or hatat waters of insufficient quantity with which to perform the sprinkling, or carrion, or an object ridden upon [by a zav], defiles at one [remove] and disqualifies [terumah] at one [more remove]. This is the general principle: anyone who touches anything that according to the Torah is a "father of uncleanness" defiles at one [remove] and disqualifies [terumah] at one [more remove], except [for the corpse] of a human. If he had become separated, he defiles at one [remove] and renders [terumah] unfit at one [more remove].
The Jerusalem Talmud
A slave may be a permanent sojourner. A sojourner is like a Gentile in every respect. Rebbi Samuel bar Ḥiyya bar Jehudah in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina: One keeps the sojourner for twelve months. If he changes his mind, that is fine; otherwise he is like a Gentile in all respects. Rebbi Samuel bar Ḥiyya bar Jehudah, Rebbi Ḥanina in the name of Rebbi: The sojourner has to accept on condition that he may eat cadaver meat. Rebbi Hila said, one would then say, the words are [interpreted] as they are written. What does it mean, the words are [interpreted] as they are written? Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, “You shall not eat any cadaver; to the sojourner in your midst you shall give it that he eat it.” Some Tannaim state: One does not receive a sojourner unless he accepts all commandments written in the Torah. Some Tannaim state: One does not receive a sojourner unless he renounces his idolatry. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Ashi: One does not receive a sojourner unless he renounces his idolatry as a Gentile. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, from their consensus: unless he renounces his idolatry as a Gentile. For if it were not so, what would we say? Since he is forbidden idolatry he cannot render profane. But are Gentiles not also forbidden idolatry and they do render profane? Rebbi Yose said, that you should not say, since he is equal to an Israel in three respects, do not oppress, do not cheat, and he is exiled like an Israel, that he has no power to render profane. Therefore, it was necessary to spell out that he renders idols profane like a Gentile. Who is the Tanna who includes “do not oppress”? He is Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah, as it was stated: The sojourner is protected by the prohibition, the words of Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah.
The Babylonian Talmud
Gemara. What do they argue about? One master holds the opinion that a hanging partition renders [the Sukkah] valid, and the other Master holds the opinion that a hanging partition does not render it valid.
If it was of clean terumah, he should not take it. R. Ammi and R. Assi disagree: One explains: Because he renders it susceptible [to ritual uncleanness], while the other explains because he diminishes it
What is the practical difference between them? For instance in a case where he called it terumah except for its outer peel. According to the one who explains: Because he renders it susceptible [to ritual uncleanness], the prohibition does apply. According to the one who explains, because he diminishes it, the prohibition does not apply.
If it was of second tithe in Jerusalem. According to him who explained: Because he renders it susceptible [to uncleanliness], behold he renders it susceptible [to uncleanliness]; according to him who explained because he diminishes it, behold he diminishes it
If it was of second tithe in Jerusalem. According to him who explained: Because he renders it susceptible [to uncleanliness], behold he renders it susceptible [to uncleanliness]; according to him who explained because he diminishes it, behold he diminishes it
And in the case of heave-offering, though one of his hands be unclean etc. R. Shezbi says, It is in case of contact that this teaching holds, but in case there is no contact, it does not hold. Abai replied to him, A wiped hand renders its fellow unclean, so far as to make unclean for hallowed things, but not for heave-offering. These are the words of Rab. R. Jose in the name of R. Jehudah says, This is the case so far as to disqualify, but not to render unclean. If thou sayest, No doubt this is so in cases of non-contact, then here comes in the importance of the word "wiped;" but if thou sayest, In case of contact, yes; in case of non-contact, no; then what is the importance of the "wiped" hand? It has been reported also that Resh Lakish said, The Mishnah refers only to his own hand
And to shew that there are things which can disqualify without rendering unclean, here is a teaching. For there is a canonical Mishnah, All that disqualifies for a heave-offering, renders the hands unclean, so as to be of secondary impurity. And a hand renders its fellow unclean. These are the words of R. Joshua. And other wise men say, The hands themselves are only of secondary uncleanness, and that which is secondary does not produce a second in the case of ordinary things (Yadaim, iii. 2). Do you think that it cannot make a second? Nay, you say, it makes a third. Or perhaps it makes neither a second nor a third. But moreover we have a Baraitha to quote on our side. For there is a Baraitha, A wiped hand renders its fellow unclean, so far as to render unclean for hallowed things, but not for heave-offering. These are the words of Rabbi. R. Jose in the name of R. Jehudah says, With that same hand he may disqualify, but not render unclean.
And to shew that there are things which can disqualify without rendering unclean, here is a teaching. For there is a canonical Mishnah, All that disqualifies for a heave-offering, renders the hands unclean, so as to be of secondary impurity. And a hand renders its fellow unclean. These are the words of R. Joshua. And other wise men say, The hands themselves are only of secondary uncleanness, and that which is secondary does not produce a second in the case of ordinary things (Yadaim, iii. 2). Do you think that it cannot make a second? Nay, you say, it makes a third. Or perhaps it makes neither a second nor a third. But moreover we have a Baraitha to quote on our side. For there is a Baraitha, A wiped hand renders its fellow unclean, so far as to render unclean for hallowed things, but not for heave-offering. These are the words of Rabbi. R. Jose in the name of R. Jehudah says, With that same hand he may disqualify, but not render unclean.
And to shew that there are things which can disqualify without rendering unclean, here is a teaching. For there is a canonical Mishnah, All that disqualifies for a heave-offering, renders the hands unclean, so as to be of secondary impurity. And a hand renders its fellow unclean. These are the words of R. Joshua. And other wise men say, The hands themselves are only of secondary uncleanness, and that which is secondary does not produce a second in the case of ordinary things (Yadaim, iii. 2). Do you think that it cannot make a second? Nay, you say, it makes a third. Or perhaps it makes neither a second nor a third. But moreover we have a Baraitha to quote on our side. For there is a Baraitha, A wiped hand renders its fellow unclean, so far as to render unclean for hallowed things, but not for heave-offering. These are the words of Rabbi. R. Jose in the name of R. Jehudah says, With that same hand he may disqualify, but not render unclean.
Rather, everyone holds that [failing to separate maser ani] renders produce tevel. But here it is in this that thay argue. One opinion holds the people of the land are not suspect regarding maser ani of demai, that since it is only a monetary matter, they will certainly separate it. But the sages hold that since the matter is a bother they do not separate.