should
12262 occurrences across the corpus
The Babylonian Talmud
Nor on the work of Creation with two. How then is this shewn? Inasmuch as our Rabbis have taught, "For ask thou now of the days that are past" (Deut. iv. 32). It is one person who asks, not two who ask. One might have thought that it possibly means that a man should ask about things that were before the world was created. No, for the teaching says, "since the day that God created man upon the earth" (ibid.). One might have thought that it possibly means that a man should not ask about the six days of creation. No, for the teaching says, "of the days that are past, which were before thee" (ibid.). One might have thought that it possibly means that a man should ask about what is above and what is below, what is before and what is after. No, for the teaching says, "and from the one end of heaven unto the other" (ibid.). From the one end of heaven unto the other thou mayest ask, but thou mayest not ask about what is above, what is below, what is before, what is after.
Nor on the work of Creation with two. How then is this shewn? Inasmuch as our Rabbis have taught, "For ask thou now of the days that are past" (Deut. iv. 32). It is one person who asks, not two who ask. One might have thought that it possibly means that a man should ask about things that were before the world was created. No, for the teaching says, "since the day that God created man upon the earth" (ibid.). One might have thought that it possibly means that a man should not ask about the six days of creation. No, for the teaching says, "of the days that are past, which were before thee" (ibid.). One might have thought that it possibly means that a man should ask about what is above and what is below, what is before and what is after. No, for the teaching says, "and from the one end of heaven unto the other" (ibid.). From the one end of heaven unto the other thou mayest ask, but thou mayest not ask about what is above, what is below, what is before, what is after.
R. Ishmael questioned R. Akiba, when they were walking on the road. He said to him, Thou art one who hast served for twenty-two years Nachum, the man surnamed Gamzu, the man who expounded the meaning of all the particles eth which are in the Law. "Eth ha-shamayim v'eth ha-aretz"—what was his exposition of these? He said to him, If the words had been simply shamayim v'eretz, I should have said, shamayim is the name of the Holy One, blessed be He. But now that the words are eth ha-shamayim v'eth ha-aretz, shamayim means the literal heaven, and eretz the literal earth.
R. Jochanan said to R. El'azar, Come, I will fully instruct thee in the subject of the Chariot. He said to him, I am not old enough. When he was old enough, R. Jochanan's soul had passed away. R. Asi said to him, Come, and I will fully instruct thee in the subject of the Chariot. He said to him, If I had been worthy, I should have received full instruction from R. Jochanan thy teacher. R. Joseph was giving full instruction in the subject of the Chariot. The wise men of Pumbeditha were teaching the subject of Creation. They said to him, Would that our lord would instruct us fully in the subject of the Chariot. He said to them, Instruct me fully in the subject of Creation. After they had instructed him fully, they said to him, Would that our lord would instruct us fully in the subject of the Chariot. He said to them, There is a Baraitha with reference to these things which says, "Honey and milk are under thy tongue" (Cant. iv. 11). Let words sweeter than honey and milk be under thy tongue. R. Abohu said, It is drawn from this passage, viz., "things to be concealed under thy clothes" (Prov. xxvii. 26), that is to say, things which are the secrets of the world shall be under thy clothes. They said to him, We have worked in them as far as the words, "And he said unto me, Son of man" (Ezek. ii. 1). He said to them, But this is the subject of the Chariot. Some one puts a difficulty. How far does the subject of the Chariot reach? Rab says, It reaches to the last occurrence of the expression, "I saw" (Ezek. i. 27). R. Isaac says, It reaches to the Chashmal. We instruct fully to the words, "and I saw;" thenceforward we only impart the heads of the divisions. There are others who say, As far as, "and I saw," we impart the heads of the divisions; thenceforward, if the man be wise and of ready intelligence, Yes; if not, No. And how are we to expound in Chashmal? For there is the story of the child, who was studying in Chashmal, and there came out a fire and consumed him. The case of the child is different, for he had not reached the fitting age.
Our Rabbis have taught thus: There is a matter concerning Rabban Jochanan ben Zakkai, that he was riding upon his ass and was travelling on the road, and R. El'azar ben Arakh was behind him, as driver. [El'azar] said to him, Rabbi, teach me a section on the subject of the Chariot. [Jochanan] said to him, Have I not taught you thus, nor the Chariot with one, but if a man do so, he must be a wise man and one who has much knowledge of his own? [El'azar] said to him, Rabbi, allow me to say before thee one thing which thou hast taught me. [Jochanan] said to him, Say on. Immediately Rabban Jochanan ben Zakkai dismounted from the ass, and wrapped himself up and seated himself upon the stone under the olive tree. [El'azar] said to him, Rabbi, wherefore didst thou dismount from the ass? [Jochanan] said to him, Is it possible that thou shouldest investigate the subject of the Chariot and that the Shechinah is with us, and that the ministering angels accompany us, and that I should ride upon the ass? Immediately R. El'azar ben Arakh entered upon the subject of the Chariot and expounded, and there came down fire from heaven and encircled all the terebinth trees which were in the field. They all opened their mouths and uttered a song. What was the song which they uttered? "Praise the Lord from the earth, ye dragons and all deeps ... fruitful trees and all cedars ... praise ye the Lord" (Ps. cxlviii. 7, 9, 14). An angel answered from the fire and said, This is the subject of the Chariot. R. Jochanan ben Zakkai stood up and kissed him upon his head and said, Blessed be the Lord God of Israel, who hath given to Abraham our father a son who knoweth to do wisely and to search and expound in the subject of the Chariot. There is one who expoundeth well, but doth not perform well. There is one who performeth well, but doth not expound well. Thou dost expound well and dost perform well. Blessed art thou, Abraham our father, from whose loins hath come forth El'azar ben Arakh.
And R. Meir thus explained the Law from the mouth of Acher, viz., And behold Rabbah bar bar-Channah said that R. Jochanan said, What is the meaning of the passage, "For the priest's lips should keep knowledge, and they should seek the law at his mouth, when he is the messenger of the Lord of hosts" (Mal. ii. 7). It means, if the teacher be like the messenger of the Lord of hosts, let them seek the Law at his mouth, and if not, let them not seek the Law at his mouth.
And R. Meir thus explained the Law from the mouth of Acher, viz., And behold Rabbah bar bar-Channah said that R. Jochanan said, What is the meaning of the passage, "For the priest's lips should keep knowledge, and they should seek the law at his mouth, when he is the messenger of the Lord of hosts" (Mal. ii. 7). It means, if the teacher be like the messenger of the Lord of hosts, let them seek the Law at his mouth, and if not, let them not seek the Law at his mouth.
Our Rabbis have taught, In the three former pairs, which say that a man is not to lay, and in the two latter pairs which say that a man is to lay, the first were prince-presidents and the second vice-presidents. These are the words of R. Meir. But wise men say, Jehudah ben Tabbai was vice-president, and Simeon ben Shetach was prince-president. Who is the author of that teaching? For the converse would appear to be the case, because our Rabbis have taught thus, viz., that R. Jehudah ben Tabbai said, May I see the consolation of Israel, if I have not slain a false witness so as to oppose the Sadducees, when they say, False witnesses are not put to death, until the condemned person shall have been put to death. Simeon ben Shetach said to him, May I see the consolation of Israel, if thou hast not shed innocent blood; for behold, wise men have said, False witnesses are not to be put to death, until they are both proved to be false, and they are not beaten, until they are both proved to be false, and they do not have to refund money, until they are both proved to be false. Forthwith Jehudah ben Tabbai undertook that he would not teach doctrine (Halachah) except in the presence of Simeon ben Shetach. All the days of Jehudah ben Tabbai he used to stretch himself upon the grave of the slain man, and his voice was heard, so that the people wondered, saying that it was the voice of the slain man. He said to them, It is my voice; know ye that tomorrow he will be dead, and his voice will not be heard. R. Acha bar Rabba said to R. Ashi, But perhaps he prayed him earnestly to forgive him, or perhaps he called him before the judgment seat. Who is the authority for this view? If thou sayest, It is all right according to R. Meir, who said, Simeon ben Shetach was vice-president, and R. Jehudah ben Tabbai was prince-president, this accords with his teaching doctrine in the presence of Simeon ben Shetach, but if thou sayest, Our Rabbis are right, who say, Jehudah ben Tabbai was vice-president, Simeon ben Shetach was prince-president, how should the vice-president teach doctrine in the presence of the prince-president? No, what is the meaning of "he undertook?" He spoke in reference not to teaching but to combination, Even if men combine, yet will I not combine.
There is a canonical Mishnah, In the case of the day of Pentecost which falls upon the eve of a Sabbath, the house of Shammai say, The day for sacrificing is after the Sabbath, but the house of Hillel say, There is no day for sacrificing (Chag. 17a, i. 6). Do you not think that it means that there is no day at all for sacrificing? No; it cannot mean that a day for sacrificing is not necessary. What then does it mean? We learn from this that we are to bring the sacrifice on its own day? But how can this be? for they have discussed this point once already, for we have a canonical Mishnah, viz., The house of Shammai say, Men bring peace-offerings on a festival and do not lay their hands on them, but not burnt offerings; but the house of Hillel say, Men bring both peace-offerings and burnt-offerings and lay their hands on them (Chag. 17a, i. 3). I reply, No; there is no superfluity. For the passage is necessary. For, if he had let me hear only the second paragraph, I should not have doubted through hearing it only, that the house of Shammai insist that men are not to sacrifice on the day of Pentecost, because it is possible to do so on the morrow, but, unless I had a distinct paragraph to the contrary, I should have said thus, They agree as regards the possibility of doing it on the morrow with the house of Hillel; and if he had let me hear only the first paragraph, I should not have doubted through hearing it only, that the house of Hillel say that men may sacrifice because it is impossible to do so on the morrow, but according to this I should have said, They agree as regards the impossibility of doing it on the morrow, with the house of Shammai. Hence the second paragraph was necessary.
There is a canonical Mishnah, In the case of the day of Pentecost which falls upon the eve of a Sabbath, the house of Shammai say, The day for sacrificing is after the Sabbath, but the house of Hillel say, There is no day for sacrificing (Chag. 17a, i. 6). Do you not think that it means that there is no day at all for sacrificing? No; it cannot mean that a day for sacrificing is not necessary. What then does it mean? We learn from this that we are to bring the sacrifice on its own day? But how can this be? for they have discussed this point once already, for we have a canonical Mishnah, viz., The house of Shammai say, Men bring peace-offerings on a festival and do not lay their hands on them, but not burnt offerings; but the house of Hillel say, Men bring both peace-offerings and burnt-offerings and lay their hands on them (Chag. 17a, i. 3). I reply, No; there is no superfluity. For the passage is necessary. For, if he had let me hear only the second paragraph, I should not have doubted through hearing it only, that the house of Shammai insist that men are not to sacrifice on the day of Pentecost, because it is possible to do so on the morrow, but, unless I had a distinct paragraph to the contrary, I should have said thus, They agree as regards the possibility of doing it on the morrow with the house of Hillel; and if he had let me hear only the first paragraph, I should not have doubted through hearing it only, that the house of Hillel say that men may sacrifice because it is impossible to do so on the morrow, but according to this I should have said, They agree as regards the impossibility of doing it on the morrow, with the house of Shammai. Hence the second paragraph was necessary.
There is a canonical Mishnah, In the case of the day of Pentecost which falls upon the eve of a Sabbath, the house of Shammai say, The day for sacrificing is after the Sabbath, but the house of Hillel say, There is no day for sacrificing (Chag. 17a, i. 6). Do you not think that it means that there is no day at all for sacrificing? No; it cannot mean that a day for sacrificing is not necessary. What then does it mean? We learn from this that we are to bring the sacrifice on its own day? But how can this be? for they have discussed this point once already, for we have a canonical Mishnah, viz., The house of Shammai say, Men bring peace-offerings on a festival and do not lay their hands on them, but not burnt offerings; but the house of Hillel say, Men bring both peace-offerings and burnt-offerings and lay their hands on them (Chag. 17a, i. 3). I reply, No; there is no superfluity. For the passage is necessary. For, if he had let me hear only the second paragraph, I should not have doubted through hearing it only, that the house of Shammai insist that men are not to sacrifice on the day of Pentecost, because it is possible to do so on the morrow, but, unless I had a distinct paragraph to the contrary, I should have said thus, They agree as regards the possibility of doing it on the morrow with the house of Hillel; and if he had let me hear only the first paragraph, I should not have doubted through hearing it only, that the house of Hillel say that men may sacrifice because it is impossible to do so on the morrow, but according to this I should have said, They agree as regards the impossibility of doing it on the morrow, with the house of Shammai. Hence the second paragraph was necessary.
There is a canonical Mishnah, In the case of the day of Pentecost which falls upon the eve of a Sabbath, the house of Shammai say, The day for sacrificing is after the Sabbath, but the house of Hillel say, There is no day for sacrificing (Chag. 17a, i. 6). Do you not think that it means that there is no day at all for sacrificing? No; it cannot mean that a day for sacrificing is not necessary. What then does it mean? We learn from this that we are to bring the sacrifice on its own day? But how can this be? for they have discussed this point once already, for we have a canonical Mishnah, viz., The house of Shammai say, Men bring peace-offerings on a festival and do not lay their hands on them, but not burnt offerings; but the house of Hillel say, Men bring both peace-offerings and burnt-offerings and lay their hands on them (Chag. 17a, i. 3). I reply, No; there is no superfluity. For the passage is necessary. For, if he had let me hear only the second paragraph, I should not have doubted through hearing it only, that the house of Shammai insist that men are not to sacrifice on the day of Pentecost, because it is possible to do so on the morrow, but, unless I had a distinct paragraph to the contrary, I should have said thus, They agree as regards the possibility of doing it on the morrow with the house of Hillel; and if he had let me hear only the first paragraph, I should not have doubted through hearing it only, that the house of Hillel say that men may sacrifice because it is impossible to do so on the morrow, but according to this I should have said, They agree as regards the impossibility of doing it on the morrow, with the house of Shammai. Hence the second paragraph was necessary.
But it may be objected, He who has not kept the Feast for the seven days of the Passover, and the eight days of the Feast of Tabernacles, and the first high holiday of Pentecost, he cannot afterwards keep the Feast. Do you not think, then, that the high holiday of Pentecost is not the day of sacrificing? But, if so, do we gather from it that there is but one day of sacrificing? I should rather say, days of sacrificing. But it may be objected, Rabba bar Samuel taught, The Torah says, Number the days and sanctify the month, Number the days and sanctify the Pentecost. As the first day of the month is established by counting, so the Pentecost is established by counting. Do you not think that he has settled the matter from the analogy of the first day of the month? As the first day of the month is one day, so the Pentecost must be one day. Rabba said, Nay, consider that thou mayest be in error. Perhaps in the case of the Pentecost men number days and do not number weeks. But yet Abai said, There is a command to number days, for it is written, "Ye shall number fifty days" (Lev. xxiii. 16), and there is a command to number weeks, for it is written, "Seven weeks shalt thou number unto thee" (Deut. xvi. 9), and again the expression Feast of Weeks is found.
A member of the house of R. Eliezer ben Jacob taught thus, Holy Writ says, "And ye shall make proclamation," "and when ye reap" (Lev. xxiii. 21, 22). What is this Feast in which thou makest proclamation and reapest? Thou must reply, This is the Feast of Pentecost. When is it? If I am to say, On the high holiday, how is reaping lawful on a high holiday? But dost thou not think that it means as well on the subsequent days? And although this has been said already by R. El'azar quoting R. Oshaia, nevertheless what R. Eliezer ben Jacob said was necessary. If I had only the words of R. El'azar quoting R. Oshaia, I should say, As on the subsequent days of the Feast of Unleavened Bread the doing of work is prohibited, so on the subsequent days of the Feast of Pentecost also the doing of work is prohibited.
I should not have known how many days were meant. We learn the truth about this from R. El'azar quoting R. Oshaia.
And Resh Lakish said, "And the feast of the harvest" (Exod. xxiii. 16),—what is this Feast on which thou feastest and reapest? Thou must reply, This is the Pentecost. When is it? If I am to say, On the high holiday, how is reaping lawful on a high holiday? But dost thou not think that it means as well on the subsequent days? R. Jochanan said, But regard it thus. The Feast of Ingathering—what is this Feast in which there is an ingathering? Thou must say, This is the Feast of Tabernacles. When is it? If I am to say, On the high holiday, how is work lawful on a high holiday? But if I am to say, On one of the ordinary middle holidays, how is work lawful on one of the ordinary middle holidays? But it means the Feast which comes at the season of ingathering; and so in this case also the Feast which comes at the season of harvest. Consequently both are of opinion that on the ordinary middle holidays the doing of work is forbidden. Whence do we obtain these statements? Because our Rabbis have taught, "The feast of unleavened bread shalt thou keep seven days" (Exod. xxiii. 15). This teaches us that on the middle holidays it is forbidden to do work. These are the words of R. Jeshaiah. R. Jonathan says, The above proof is not necessary. I can prove it by an argument a fortiori. For if on the first and seventh days of the Feast which have not got a holiday before them and after them, the doing of work is prohibited, then on ordinary middle holidays, which have a holiday before them and after them, is it not just that the doing of work should be prohibited? But, it is replied, Let the six days of Creation bear witness against this interpretation, which have a holiday before them and after them, and yet the doing of work is permitted. Nay, it is rejoined, how are the six days of Creation a parallel case? For they have no additional sacrifice as the middle holidays have. Thou mayest say in reply, In the case of an ordinary middle holiday, as it has an additional sacrifice, let the first day of the month bear testimony, for on it there is an additional sacrifice, yet the doing of work is permitted. Nay, it is rejoined, how is the first day of the month a parallel case? For it is not called a holy convocation. Thou mayest say in conclusion, In the case of an ordinary middle holiday which is called a holy convocation, seeing that it is called a holy convocation, it is only just that the doing of work should be prohibited. There is another Baraitha, "Ye shall do no servile work" (Lev. xxiii. 8), that is to say, that on an ordinary middle holiday the doing of work is forbidden. The following are the words of R. Jose the Galilaean. R. Akiba says, It was not necessary, for lo, He says, "These are the set feasts of the Lord, etc." (Lev. xxiii. 4) With reference to what is the Scripture speaking? If to the first day, Behold, it has been already called a sabbath-day; if to the seventh day, Behold, it has been already called a sabbath-day; behold, the Scripture can be speaking only of an ordinary middle holiday, to teach thee that the doing of work is forbidden thereon.
And Resh Lakish said, "And the feast of the harvest" (Exod. xxiii. 16),—what is this Feast on which thou feastest and reapest? Thou must reply, This is the Pentecost. When is it? If I am to say, On the high holiday, how is reaping lawful on a high holiday? But dost thou not think that it means as well on the subsequent days? R. Jochanan said, But regard it thus. The Feast of Ingathering—what is this Feast in which there is an ingathering? Thou must say, This is the Feast of Tabernacles. When is it? If I am to say, On the high holiday, how is work lawful on a high holiday? But if I am to say, On one of the ordinary middle holidays, how is work lawful on one of the ordinary middle holidays? But it means the Feast which comes at the season of ingathering; and so in this case also the Feast which comes at the season of harvest. Consequently both are of opinion that on the ordinary middle holidays the doing of work is forbidden. Whence do we obtain these statements? Because our Rabbis have taught, "The feast of unleavened bread shalt thou keep seven days" (Exod. xxiii. 15). This teaches us that on the middle holidays it is forbidden to do work. These are the words of R. Jeshaiah. R. Jonathan says, The above proof is not necessary. I can prove it by an argument a fortiori. For if on the first and seventh days of the Feast which have not got a holiday before them and after them, the doing of work is prohibited, then on ordinary middle holidays, which have a holiday before them and after them, is it not just that the doing of work should be prohibited? But, it is replied, Let the six days of Creation bear witness against this interpretation, which have a holiday before them and after them, and yet the doing of work is permitted. Nay, it is rejoined, how are the six days of Creation a parallel case? For they have no additional sacrifice as the middle holidays have. Thou mayest say in reply, In the case of an ordinary middle holiday, as it has an additional sacrifice, let the first day of the month bear testimony, for on it there is an additional sacrifice, yet the doing of work is permitted. Nay, it is rejoined, how is the first day of the month a parallel case? For it is not called a holy convocation. Thou mayest say in conclusion, In the case of an ordinary middle holiday which is called a holy convocation, seeing that it is called a holy convocation, it is only just that the doing of work should be prohibited. There is another Baraitha, "Ye shall do no servile work" (Lev. xxiii. 8), that is to say, that on an ordinary middle holiday the doing of work is forbidden. The following are the words of R. Jose the Galilaean. R. Akiba says, It was not necessary, for lo, He says, "These are the set feasts of the Lord, etc." (Lev. xxiii. 4) With reference to what is the Scripture speaking? If to the first day, Behold, it has been already called a sabbath-day; if to the seventh day, Behold, it has been already called a sabbath-day; behold, the Scripture can be speaking only of an ordinary middle holiday, to teach thee that the doing of work is forbidden thereon.
There is another Baraitha, viz., "Six days thou shalt eat blistered cakes, and on the seventh day there shall be a prohibition of work to the Lord" (Deut. xvi. 8). As on the seventh day work is prohibited, so on the six days work is prohibited. I should have thought perhaps, as on the seventh day there is a prohibition from all work, so on the six days there is a prohibition from all work. But no; for the teaching says, And on the seventh day there is a prohibition, thus indicating that on the seventh day there is a prohibition from all work, and that on the six days there is not a prohibition from all work. Behold, Holy Writ has communicated it only to wise men, to tell thee which is a forbidden day and which is a lawful day, which is forbidden work and which is lawful work.
And what is your authority for saying that common food does not want intention? Because there is a canonical Mishnah, If a wave of water, which is let loose and contains forty seahs, falls upon a man or upon vessels, they are clean (Chullin 31b, i. 1). For it teaches that a man is like vessels. As vessels have no intention, so a man has no intention. But whence do you gather that he has no intention? Perhaps we are dealing with the case of a man sitting and watching when the wave shall be let loose. And vessels are like a man. As a man utters his intention, so in the case of vessels persons exercise intention for them. And when thou sayest, It is the case of a man sitting and watching, what is the good of the story, for in that case he has an intention? Thou mightest have thought, It is to set a limit. Perhaps otherwise he would have gone to dip himself in a collection of stagnant rain-water. Thus also we limit it to the first fall, on account of the second being unlawful. We learn from this that we are not to limit it. And what is your authority for saying that men do not dip in the second fall? Because there is a Baraitha, viz., Men dip in the first, but do not dip in the second, that they may not dip in the air. But we also learn it hence, for there is a canonical Mishnah, If fruits have fallen into the midst of a reservoir of water, and if one whose hands are unclean should reach out and lay hold of them, his hands are clean, and the fruits are clean. But if he did this that he might wash his hands, his hands are clean, but the fruits are unclean (Makhshirin, iv. 7).
And yet there is a Baraitha, viz., Behold, a man's muleteers and his workmen are laden with clean things; although he is distant from them more than a mile, his clean things are still clean; but if he say to them, Go and I will come after you, then when they are out of his sight, his clean things become unclean. How is the inconsistency in this Baraitha to be explained? R. Isaac Naphcha said, The earlier part means, when he cleanses his muleteers and his workmen. Therefore, if so, the latter part should also refer to the same. No; for a common person is not careful as regards touching his neighbour. But, if so, this would hold good for the beginning also. Perhaps it may mean, when he comes to them by some by-way. But, if so, this would hold good for the latter part also. Nay; but the true explanation is, When he said to them, Go and I will come after you, their minds were set completely at rest.
In hallowed things. What is the reason of the prohibition? R. Ela said, Because the weight of the vessel interposes. But seeing that in a later case it is on account of the interposition, the first case cannot be on account of an interposition. For we are taught in the later case, And the manner of the heave-offering is not as the manner of the hallowed things. For in the case of hallowed things one looses a knot and wipes and cleanses and afterwards ties up again, but in the case of a heave-offering he ties up and afterwards cleanses. Nay, but both the earlier and later cases are because of interposition, and it was necessary that they should be separately mentioned, for if he had taught us the first only, I should say, This is the reason for the prohibition with reference to the hallowed things, viz., because of the vessel's weight, which actually exists. But in the latter case, where the vessel's weight is not an element, I should say, In regard to hallowed things also there is in this case no disqualifying interposition. And if he had taught us the latter only, I should say, This is the reason for the prohibition with reference to hallowed things, because
In hallowed things. What is the reason of the prohibition? R. Ela said, Because the weight of the vessel interposes. But seeing that in a later case it is on account of the interposition, the first case cannot be on account of an interposition. For we are taught in the later case, And the manner of the heave-offering is not as the manner of the hallowed things. For in the case of hallowed things one looses a knot and wipes and cleanses and afterwards ties up again, but in the case of a heave-offering he ties up and afterwards cleanses. Nay, but both the earlier and later cases are because of interposition, and it was necessary that they should be separately mentioned, for if he had taught us the first only, I should say, This is the reason for the prohibition with reference to the hallowed things, viz., because of the vessel's weight, which actually exists. But in the latter case, where the vessel's weight is not an element, I should say, In regard to hallowed things also there is in this case no disqualifying interposition. And if he had taught us the latter only, I should say, This is the reason for the prohibition with reference to hallowed things, because
In hallowed things. What is the reason of the prohibition? R. Ela said, Because the weight of the vessel interposes. But seeing that in a later case it is on account of the interposition, the first case cannot be on account of an interposition. For we are taught in the later case, And the manner of the heave-offering is not as the manner of the hallowed things. For in the case of hallowed things one looses a knot and wipes and cleanses and afterwards ties up again, but in the case of a heave-offering he ties up and afterwards cleanses. Nay, but both the earlier and later cases are because of interposition, and it was necessary that they should be separately mentioned, for if he had taught us the first only, I should say, This is the reason for the prohibition with reference to the hallowed things, viz., because of the vessel's weight, which actually exists. But in the latter case, where the vessel's weight is not an element, I should say, In regard to hallowed things also there is in this case no disqualifying interposition. And if he had taught us the latter only, I should say, This is the reason for the prohibition with reference to hallowed things, because
In hallowed things. What is the reason of the prohibition? R. Ela said, Because the weight of the vessel interposes. But seeing that in a later case it is on account of the interposition, the first case cannot be on account of an interposition. For we are taught in the later case, And the manner of the heave-offering is not as the manner of the hallowed things. For in the case of hallowed things one looses a knot and wipes and cleanses and afterwards ties up again, but in the case of a heave-offering he ties up and afterwards cleanses. Nay, but both the earlier and later cases are because of interposition, and it was necessary that they should be separately mentioned, for if he had taught us the first only, I should say, This is the reason for the prohibition with reference to the hallowed things, viz., because of the vessel's weight, which actually exists. But in the latter case, where the vessel's weight is not an element, I should say, In regard to hallowed things also there is in this case no disqualifying interposition. And if he had taught us the latter only, I should say, This is the reason for the prohibition with reference to hallowed things, because
a knot in water is drawn tighter, while in the former case the water makes the vessel to swim, and so there is no interposition. Thus it was necessary that they should be separately mentioned. Rabbi Ela is consistent with himself. For R. Ela said that R. Chănina bar Papa said, Ten degrees of superior excellence are taught here. The first five refer alike to hallowed things, and to ordinary things which are treated with observance of the laws of purification belonging to hallowed things; the later refer to hallowed things, but not to ordinary things, which are treated with observance of the laws of purification belonging to hallowed things. What is the reason? Because the former five involve an essential impurity arising out of the Law, our Rabbis have decided that they apply as well to hallowed things, as to ordinary things which are treated with observance of the laws of purification belonging to hallowed things. Because the later ones involve no essential impurity arising out of the Law, our Rabbis have decided that they apply to hallowed things; but to ordinary things which are treated with observance of the laws of purification belonging to hallowed things our Rabbis have decided that they do not apply.
Raba said, Since the later portion of the Mishnah is on account of interposition, the former is not on account of interposition. But in the former one this is the reason. It is a precaution, in order that needles and pipes should not be dipped in a vessel, the mouth of which is not of the size of the pipe of a wine-skin bottle. For there is a canonical Mishnah, viz., The communication between religious baths must be as the pipe of a wine-skin as regards its thickness,
What real difference is there between what Raba and what R. Ela says? There is this difference between them. In the case of a basket and a wine-strainer which are filled with vessels and cleansed, according to the one who says, The prohibition is because of interposition, there is an interposition; but according to the one who says, The prohibition is for a precaution, lest haply needles and pipes should be dipped in a vessel, the mouth of which is not of the size of the pipe of a wine-skin, the answer is, there is no basket or wine-strainer the mouth of which is not of the size of the pipe of a wine-skin. And Raba has acted consistently with himself; for Raba said, In the case of a basket and wine-strainer, which are filled with vessels and dipped, all are clean; but in the case of a bath, which is divided by a basket or wine-strainer, he who seeks to cleanse there—the cleansing avails him nought, for lo, all the earth is trembling, and we require that there should be forty seahs of water in one place. And these words refer to a clean vessel, but in the case of an unclean vessel, seeing that the cleansing has gone up over the whole surface of the vessel, it has gone up also over the vessels which are in it. For there is a canonical Mishnah, viz., Vessels which are filled with vessels and are dipped, lo, these are clean, and if they are not dipped, the mingled waters must reach that amount of mingling which takes place by means of a communication as large as the pipe of a wine-skin (Mikvaoth, vi. 2). How is it that it says, And if they are not dipped? This is the meaning, viz., And if it is not necessary to dip them, still the mingled waters must reach that amount of mingling which takes place by means of a communication as large as the pipe of a wine-skin. And lo, as regards the sayings of Raba and R. Ela, they are the subject of a Baraitha. For there is a Baraitha, A basket and a wine-strainer which are filled with vessels and are dipped are clean as well for hallowed things as for a heave-offering. Abba Saul says, For a heave-offering, but not for hallowed things. If so, then is not a heave-offering also invalid? No, for to whom are we speaking? Is it not to teachers? teachers who are possessed of knowledge? But if so, the same rule will apply to hallowed things also. No, for a common person sees him and goes and dips. Then in the case of heave-offering also, a common person sees him and goes and dips. We need not receive it from him. Hallowed things also we need not receive from him. He would be angry. In the case of heave-offering also he would be angry.
What real difference is there between what Raba and what R. Ela says? There is this difference between them. In the case of a basket and a wine-strainer which are filled with vessels and cleansed, according to the one who says, The prohibition is because of interposition, there is an interposition; but according to the one who says, The prohibition is for a precaution, lest haply needles and pipes should be dipped in a vessel, the mouth of which is not of the size of the pipe of a wine-skin, the answer is, there is no basket or wine-strainer the mouth of which is not of the size of the pipe of a wine-skin. And Raba has acted consistently with himself; for Raba said, In the case of a basket and wine-strainer, which are filled with vessels and dipped, all are clean; but in the case of a bath, which is divided by a basket or wine-strainer, he who seeks to cleanse there—the cleansing avails him nought, for lo, all the earth is trembling, and we require that there should be forty seahs of water in one place. And these words refer to a clean vessel, but in the case of an unclean vessel, seeing that the cleansing has gone up over the whole surface of the vessel, it has gone up also over the vessels which are in it. For there is a canonical Mishnah, viz., Vessels which are filled with vessels and are dipped, lo, these are clean, and if they are not dipped, the mingled waters must reach that amount of mingling which takes place by means of a communication as large as the pipe of a wine-skin (Mikvaoth, vi. 2). How is it that it says, And if they are not dipped? This is the meaning, viz., And if it is not necessary to dip them, still the mingled waters must reach that amount of mingling which takes place by means of a communication as large as the pipe of a wine-skin. And lo, as regards the sayings of Raba and R. Ela, they are the subject of a Baraitha. For there is a Baraitha, A basket and a wine-strainer which are filled with vessels and are dipped are clean as well for hallowed things as for a heave-offering. Abba Saul says, For a heave-offering, but not for hallowed things. If so, then is not a heave-offering also invalid? No, for to whom are we speaking? Is it not to teachers? teachers who are possessed of knowledge? But if so, the same rule will apply to hallowed things also. No, for a common person sees him and goes and dips. Then in the case of heave-offering also, a common person sees him and goes and dips. We need not receive it from him. Hallowed things also we need not receive from him. He would be angry. In the case of heave-offering also he would be angry.
He does not care, for he goes and gives it to a priest, a common person, his friend. And what is the Baraitha to the effect that we should pay regard to the fear of such anger? It is a saying of R. Jose. For there is a Baraitha, R. Jose said, Wherefore are all believed as to the purity of wine and oil all the days of the year? It is in order that every individual may not go and build a high place for himself, and burn a red heifer for himself.
it was for himself that we declared them clean, but should we declare clean the vessel whose purity is a matter which relates both to thee and to him (Kelim, x. 1)? There is a Baraitha, viz., R. Joshua said, I am ashamed of your words, ye house of Shammai. Is it possible that if a woman be kneading in a trough, and the woman become for any reason unclean, the woman and the trough are unclean for seven days, but the dough is clean? Or suppose that a bowl is full of drinkables. If for any reason the bowl becomes unclean for seven days, yet are the drinkables clean? A certain disciple, one of the disciples of the house of Shammai, joined himself to him and said to him, Shall I tell thee the reason of the house of Shammai? He said to him, Tell me. He said to him, Does an unclean vessel bar, or does it not bar? He said to him, It does not bar. Are the vessels of a common person unclean or clean? He said to him, Unclean. But if thou sayest to him, It is unclean, will he care for thee at all? And not only so, but if thou sayest to him, It is unclean, he will say to thee, Mine is clean, but thine is unclean; and this is the reason of the house of Shammai. Immediately R. Joshua went and threw himself down at the graves of the house of Shammai, and said, I humble myself before you, O bones of the house of Shammai, and when your mysteries are so wonderful, how much more are your explicit teachings? They say that all his days his teeth were black by reason of his fasts.
Vessels finished in purity, etc. Finished by whom? If a learned and observant man has finished them, why should they be dipped? but if a common person has finished them, how is it that the Mishnah calls them "finished in purity?" Rabbah bar Shela said that R. Mothnah said that Samuel said, By all means, in case that a learned and observant man has finished them; yet because of a drop of spittle of a common person which may have fallen upon it, it is treated as unclean. "May have fallen upon it," when? If we should say, before it is completed, but lo, it is not yet a vessel; or, after it is completed, but then he takes good care of it. By all means in the case of the vessel before it is completed; yet perhaps at the moment that it was made, it was still liquid. It is a case for dipping, but not for the going down of the sun. This Mishnic teaching does not agree with R. Eliezer. For there is a canonical Mishnah, When one has cut out a pipe for the ashes of purification for sin, R. Eliezer says, Let him forthwith dip. R. Joshua says, Let him be rendered unclean and afterwards let him dip (Parah, v. 4). And we discuss the question, Who is it that is cutting it out? Perhaps it is a learned and observant man, who has cut it out. But then, why should I dip? Or, a common person has cut it out. But then would R. Joshua have said, He shall be made unclean and shall be dipped? Nay, for he is already unclean and continues so. And Rabbah bar Shela said that Rab Mothnah said that Samuel said, By all means let it be the case that a learned and observant man has cut it out, yet because of a drop of spittle of a common person which may have fallen upon it—When? If we should say, before he cut it out, but lo, it is not yet a vessel; or after he cut it out, but then he takes good care of it. By all means it is so before he cut it out; yet perhaps at the moment that he cut it out, it was still liquid. It is all right as to what R. Joshua says, This is by way of a test for Sadducees. For we have a canonical Mishnah, They used to make unclean the priest who burns the heifer, in order to protest against the view of the Sadducees (Parah, iii. 7); for they used to say, This act is included among the sunset ones. But thou art in accord with the teaching of R. Eliezer, if thou sayest, It is all right to say that in every case we require the sunset rule, for this is a protest against the Sadducees. But if thou sayest, In every case we do not require the sunset rule, how is it a protest against the Sadducees? Rab said,
Vessels finished in purity, etc. Finished by whom? If a learned and observant man has finished them, why should they be dipped? but if a common person has finished them, how is it that the Mishnah calls them "finished in purity?" Rabbah bar Shela said that R. Mothnah said that Samuel said, By all means, in case that a learned and observant man has finished them; yet because of a drop of spittle of a common person which may have fallen upon it, it is treated as unclean. "May have fallen upon it," when? If we should say, before it is completed, but lo, it is not yet a vessel; or, after it is completed, but then he takes good care of it. By all means in the case of the vessel before it is completed; yet perhaps at the moment that it was made, it was still liquid. It is a case for dipping, but not for the going down of the sun. This Mishnic teaching does not agree with R. Eliezer. For there is a canonical Mishnah, When one has cut out a pipe for the ashes of purification for sin, R. Eliezer says, Let him forthwith dip. R. Joshua says, Let him be rendered unclean and afterwards let him dip (Parah, v. 4). And we discuss the question, Who is it that is cutting it out? Perhaps it is a learned and observant man, who has cut it out. But then, why should I dip? Or, a common person has cut it out. But then would R. Joshua have said, He shall be made unclean and shall be dipped? Nay, for he is already unclean and continues so. And Rabbah bar Shela said that Rab Mothnah said that Samuel said, By all means let it be the case that a learned and observant man has cut it out, yet because of a drop of spittle of a common person which may have fallen upon it—When? If we should say, before he cut it out, but lo, it is not yet a vessel; or after he cut it out, but then he takes good care of it. By all means it is so before he cut it out; yet perhaps at the moment that he cut it out, it was still liquid. It is all right as to what R. Joshua says, This is by way of a test for Sadducees. For we have a canonical Mishnah, They used to make unclean the priest who burns the heifer, in order to protest against the view of the Sadducees (Parah, iii. 7); for they used to say, This act is included among the sunset ones. But thou art in accord with the teaching of R. Eliezer, if thou sayest, It is all right to say that in every case we require the sunset rule, for this is a protest against the Sadducees. But if thou sayest, In every case we do not require the sunset rule, how is it a protest against the Sadducees? Rab said,
Vessels finished in purity, etc. Finished by whom? If a learned and observant man has finished them, why should they be dipped? but if a common person has finished them, how is it that the Mishnah calls them "finished in purity?" Rabbah bar Shela said that R. Mothnah said that Samuel said, By all means, in case that a learned and observant man has finished them; yet because of a drop of spittle of a common person which may have fallen upon it, it is treated as unclean. "May have fallen upon it," when? If we should say, before it is completed, but lo, it is not yet a vessel; or, after it is completed, but then he takes good care of it. By all means in the case of the vessel before it is completed; yet perhaps at the moment that it was made, it was still liquid. It is a case for dipping, but not for the going down of the sun. This Mishnic teaching does not agree with R. Eliezer. For there is a canonical Mishnah, When one has cut out a pipe for the ashes of purification for sin, R. Eliezer says, Let him forthwith dip. R. Joshua says, Let him be rendered unclean and afterwards let him dip (Parah, v. 4). And we discuss the question, Who is it that is cutting it out? Perhaps it is a learned and observant man, who has cut it out. But then, why should I dip? Or, a common person has cut it out. But then would R. Joshua have said, He shall be made unclean and shall be dipped? Nay, for he is already unclean and continues so. And Rabbah bar Shela said that Rab Mothnah said that Samuel said, By all means let it be the case that a learned and observant man has cut it out, yet because of a drop of spittle of a common person which may have fallen upon it—When? If we should say, before he cut it out, but lo, it is not yet a vessel; or after he cut it out, but then he takes good care of it. By all means it is so before he cut it out; yet perhaps at the moment that he cut it out, it was still liquid. It is all right as to what R. Joshua says, This is by way of a test for Sadducees. For we have a canonical Mishnah, They used to make unclean the priest who burns the heifer, in order to protest against the view of the Sadducees (Parah, iii. 7); for they used to say, This act is included among the sunset ones. But thou art in accord with the teaching of R. Eliezer, if thou sayest, It is all right to say that in every case we require the sunset rule, for this is a protest against the Sadducees. But if thou sayest, In every case we do not require the sunset rule, how is it a protest against the Sadducees? Rab said,
Vessels finished in purity, etc. Finished by whom? If a learned and observant man has finished them, why should they be dipped? but if a common person has finished them, how is it that the Mishnah calls them "finished in purity?" Rabbah bar Shela said that R. Mothnah said that Samuel said, By all means, in case that a learned and observant man has finished them; yet because of a drop of spittle of a common person which may have fallen upon it, it is treated as unclean. "May have fallen upon it," when? If we should say, before it is completed, but lo, it is not yet a vessel; or, after it is completed, but then he takes good care of it. By all means in the case of the vessel before it is completed; yet perhaps at the moment that it was made, it was still liquid. It is a case for dipping, but not for the going down of the sun. This Mishnic teaching does not agree with R. Eliezer. For there is a canonical Mishnah, When one has cut out a pipe for the ashes of purification for sin, R. Eliezer says, Let him forthwith dip. R. Joshua says, Let him be rendered unclean and afterwards let him dip (Parah, v. 4). And we discuss the question, Who is it that is cutting it out? Perhaps it is a learned and observant man, who has cut it out. But then, why should I dip? Or, a common person has cut it out. But then would R. Joshua have said, He shall be made unclean and shall be dipped? Nay, for he is already unclean and continues so. And Rabbah bar Shela said that Rab Mothnah said that Samuel said, By all means let it be the case that a learned and observant man has cut it out, yet because of a drop of spittle of a common person which may have fallen upon it—When? If we should say, before he cut it out, but lo, it is not yet a vessel; or after he cut it out, but then he takes good care of it. By all means it is so before he cut it out; yet perhaps at the moment that he cut it out, it was still liquid. It is all right as to what R. Joshua says, This is by way of a test for Sadducees. For we have a canonical Mishnah, They used to make unclean the priest who burns the heifer, in order to protest against the view of the Sadducees (Parah, iii. 7); for they used to say, This act is included among the sunset ones. But thou art in accord with the teaching of R. Eliezer, if thou sayest, It is all right to say that in every case we require the sunset rule, for this is a protest against the Sadducees. But if thou sayest, In every case we do not require the sunset rule, how is it a protest against the Sadducees? Rab said,
They made him as one unclean through touching a dead animal. But regard it thus. Such an unclean thing will not make a man unclean by touching him. Perhaps it will not, you will say. But then to what purpose is the Baraitha, viz., He that cuts it and dips it, needs dipping? Or was it that they made him as one who is unclean by touching a dead man? If so, this would require the purifications of the third and seventh days. To what purpose is the Baraitha, He that cuts it and dips it, needs dipping? Dipping, yes; but the purifications of the third and seventh days, no. But was it that they made him as one who is unclean by touching a dead man on his seventh day? But lo, there is a Baraitha, viz., They absolutely refrain from making any new ordinance in the case of the heifer. But Abai said, They do not say that a spade makes unclean when used as a seat, according to the teaching, "And he that sitteth upon the vessel" (Lev. xv. 6). I might have thought, If he were to turn a two gallon measure upside down, and sit upon it, or a peck measure, and sit upon it, he would be unclean. But no; I should have been wrong, for the teaching says, "And he that sitteth upon the vessel, upon which there sitteth—" (ibid.), shall be unclean. But it must mean, that which is intended for sitting, and the other is excepted, for if he sit upon it, he will be told, Stand up and let us do our work.
The unclean in the fourth degree in the case of hallowed things is disqualified. There is a Baraitha, viz., R. Jose said, How is it in the case of the unclean in the fourth degree that in the matter of the hallowed things he is disqualified? But this depends on a logical argument. For look you, He who has entered on the last stage of his atonement, while he is free as regards heave-offering, is disqualified as regards hallowed things. Is it not just, seeing that a man who is unclean in the third degree is disqualified as regards heave-offering, that he should become disqualified as regards hallowed things, if unclean in the fourth degree? But we have learned from the Law that he who is unclean in the third degree is disqualified as regards hallowed things. And that he who is unclean in the fourth degree is so, we have learned, as above, by an a fortiori argument. Whence do we learn from the Law that he who is unclean in the third degree is disqualified as regards hallowed things? Because it is written, "And the flesh that toucheth any unclean thing shall not be eaten" (Lev. vii. 19). Are we not here treating of the touching of a thing of secondary uncleanness? And the Merciful One says, It "shall not be eaten." That which is unclean in the fourth degree is proved to be disqualified by the a fortiori argument, as we have said.
Why am I told this again? Lo, it was taught in the preceding clauses of the same Mishnah. But do you not think that one should learn from it that it is for the purpose of bringing in the hand of his companion? And moreover so powerful was it that Resh Lakish changed his view about it, for R. Jonah said, that R. Ami said, that Resh Lakish said, Whether it be his own hand, or the hand of his companion, with that same hand he may disqualify but not render unclean.
Men may eat dry food with ceremonially unclean hands etc. There is a Baraitha, viz., R. Chănina ben Antigonus said, Does such a question as whether a thing be dry or wet exist as regards hallowed things? Nay, does not love for the hallowed things make men careful where they are concerned? Yea, every one will admit that it was not necessary to say this. But this is the case supposed, viz., that a man's companion put a piece of the hallowed things into his mouth, or he put it into his own mouth with a spindle or with a skewer, or attempted to eat along with these an onion or garlic taken from unconsecrated things. Our Rabbis decided that this should be the case for hallowed things; for the heave-offering our Rabbis decided that it should not be the case.
Men may eat dry food with ceremonially unclean hands etc. There is a Baraitha, viz., R. Chănina ben Antigonus said, Does such a question as whether a thing be dry or wet exist as regards hallowed things? Nay, does not love for the hallowed things make men careful where they are concerned? Yea, every one will admit that it was not necessary to say this. But this is the case supposed, viz., that a man's companion put a piece of the hallowed things into his mouth, or he put it into his own mouth with a spindle or with a skewer, or attempted to eat along with these an onion or garlic taken from unconsecrated things. Our Rabbis decided that this should be the case for hallowed things; for the heave-offering our Rabbis decided that it should not be the case.
We have a canonical Mishnah, viz., vessels of wine and vessels of oil which are mixed, why should they not be mixed as regards heave-offering? Those of the house of R. Chia say, Mixed as regards hallowed things. But how can there be a mixture as regards hallowed things. Those of the house of R. El'ai say, Yes, in the case of one who is in the act of purifying his untouched produce, to take out of it the libations.
The [false witnesses that succeed in] getting a person stoned to death are not stoned [after the miscarriage of justice is carried out], surely the [false witnesses] then that do not succeed should not be stoned. Rather we follow the first opinion [of R' Lakish]
R' Yochanan says A fortiori, if the one that intentionally acted is not exiled then the one that did not act [i.e. he spoke], even though he did it intentionally, should not be exiled.
That should be proof. The one that intentionally acted is not exiled because we do not give atonement. The accidental murderer we exile for the sake of atonement. Rather we follow R' Lakish
Rava said to him, Let the witnesses say if you had, would you be sold? So likewise we should not be sold. Rather R' Hamnuna meant to say If either the accused or the witnesses have, they are not sold, but if neither the accused nor the witnesses have, they are sold. Rava said to him, The Torah states, he is sold for his theft, meaning theft and not conspiring.
Witnesses testify this person should get forty lashes and are found to be false are lashed eighty times, for 'do not bear false witness' and for 'and you shall do unto him as he wished to do'. These are the words of R' Meir, and the Rabbis say they are only lashed forty times. GEMARA:
They use it to drive a scriptural warning for false witnesses. And from where does Rabbi Meir derive the scriptural warning for false witnesses? Rebbi Yermiah says, he derives it from the verse (Deuteronomy 19, 20) "The remaining ones should hear, fear, and do no more evil".
Rava says, We need to fulfill the requirement of (Deuteronomy 19, 19) "as he plotted to do his brother" and we can not. [He plotted to make his fellow liable a full forty lashes.] If so, than money should also [not be able to be divided]. Money combines, while lashes do not combine.
The Sages said to them, But the Torah already says (Deuteronomy 19, 19), "And you should do to them [the zomemim] as they had plotted to do to their brother", which would imply that their brother [the victim] is still alive. If so then why does [the Torah] say, "a soul for a soul"? You might think that they [the zomemim] would be liable to be killed from the time that their testimony was accepted, Therefore the Torah says "a soul for a soul" to teach us that they [zomemim] aren't executed until they succeeded in having a verdict [for their victim].
He answered him, You taught us, our rebbi, that one cannot derive a punishment from a fortiori. We see this in a beraisa [From what the Torah says,] (Leviticus 20, 17) "If a man should take his sister, the daughter of his father, or the daughter of his mother", I can only derive [that a person is forbidden from] the daughter of his father who isn't the daughter of his mother [half-sister from the father] and the daughter of his mother who isn't the daughter of his father [half-sister from the mother]. From where can I derive [the prohibition for] the daughter of his father and the daughter of his mother [his full sister]? The Torah teaches us this with the words ערות אחותו גילה.
Let the murderer and the sodomizer save them selves? He was silent. When he came before Rava, [Rava] told him, (Deuteronomy 19, 15) "The matter should be established" implies that the Torah is exclusively referring to those who establish the matter.
Rebbi Yosi says, in what were these words said? etc. what should two brothers do? etc.: What do we say to the witnesses?
Rava answered, this is what we say to them, Did you come to see or did you come to testify? If they respond that they came to testify, then if one of them is found to be a relative or a disqualified [witness], the whole [group of] testimony is dismissed. But if they respond that they came to see, [then they can't disqualify the whole group because otherwise] what should two brothers do who together witnessed a murder?
Illah and Tuvia were relatives of the guarantor. Rav Papa had thought to say, [They should be valid witnesses because] regarding the creditor and the borrower they are unrelated. Rab Huna brei dRav Yehushua said to Rav Papa, If the borrower doesn't have [the funds] won't the creditor go to the guarantor?
We establish courts...etc.: From where do we derive these words? That the rabbis thought in a beraisa, (Numbers 35,29) "And these should be for you as laws for your generations". This teaches us that courts are established both in Isreal and in Diaspora.
If so then why does the Torah say (Deuteronomy 17,8) "In your gates"? In your gates [Isreal] you should set up courts in each and every district and in each and every city, but in the Diaspora you should set up [courts] in each and every district but you should not set up [courts] in each and every city.
If so then why does the Torah say (Deuteronomy 17,8) "In your gates"? In your gates [Isreal] you should set up courts in each and every district and in each and every city, but in the Diaspora you should set up [courts] in each and every district but you should not set up [courts] in each and every city.
If so then why does the Torah say (Deuteronomy 17,8) "In your gates"? In your gates [Isreal] you should set up courts in each and every district and in each and every city, but in the Diaspora you should set up [courts] in each and every district but you should not set up [courts] in each and every city.
Rav Chiyah bar Ashi said in the name of Rav: Both [the Sages and Rebi] interpreted one verse. The iron breaks off from the wood [Ve'neshal]. Rebi holds that the transmission [how the written word appears in the text] is what matters, and 'Ve'Neyshal' it is written [the form of which implies that the phrase should be understood as meaning that the axe blade caused something else—i.e., a wood chip—to come loose], but the Sages hold that the pronunciation [how we actually read the word] is what matters and "nashal" we read [the form of which implies that the actual axe head flew off].
Abba Shaul says: Just as cutting wood is optional [for someone and therefore he should not be punished], so too, anything that is optional [should not receive punishment] except the father who strikes his son, the teacher who rebukes his student [through beating], and the messenger of the court [who gives punishments through lashings].
Abba Shaul says: Just as cutting wood is optional [for someone and therefore he should not be punished], so too, anything that is optional [should not receive punishment] except the father who strikes his son, the teacher who rebukes his student [through beating], and the messenger of the court [who gives punishments through lashings].
Gemara: [The one who throws a stone] into the public domain is an intentional [sinner]! Rav Shmuel bar Yitzchak said: [Rather this is in a case when] he is taking down his wall. He should have been paying attention! [Rather this is in a case when] he is taking down his wall at night. At night also, he should have been paying attention!
Gemara: [The one who throws a stone] into the public domain is an intentional [sinner]! Rav Shmuel bar Yitzchak said: [Rather this is in a case when] he is taking down his wall. He should have been paying attention! [Rather this is in a case when] he is taking down his wall at night. At night also, he should have been paying attention!
The one who throws the stone, etc. One of the rabbis said to Rava: From what [basis are we stating the case] that he is cutting wood because it is optional? Perhaps he is cutting wood because [it is for a] sukkah or cutting wood [for the altar] (which would be a requirement and not an option), and even this, Scripture said, he should be exiled [for doing something required]?! He (Rava) said to him: since he found it cut and he does not cut [it himself], it is not a mitzvah, also now [regarding cutting wood] is not a mitzvah.
Rava returned and said: "I said nothing! [This is what I should have said:] 'When he comes with his friend into a forest' (Deuteronomy 19:5). What [does it mean] 'forest'? If he goes or if he didn't go [i.e. it's an optional act]. And if you were to think it were a mitzvah, could he be sufficient [in meeting his obligation] if he didn't go?"
He returned and said: That which I said before is not a thing (I could have given a better answer). Reaping is similar to plowing. Just as with plowing, if one found already plowed material, he does not have to plow another, so too with reaping, if he found it reaped, he does not have to reap again. And if you should think (that reaping, as brought by the verse) is a Mitzvah, if he found grain, (would he) not have to still reap? (Rather), it is a Mitzvah to reap and bring (new grain).
This works out well if a slave or Samaritan is exiled by way of an Israelite or lashed. [He is exiled in a case where] he killed him [accidentally] and lashed [in a case where] he cursed him. But an Israelite who is exiled or lashed by way of Samaritan?! It works well with exile [in a case where] he killed him [accidentally]. But lashing, why? [If you say] because he cursed him, "the chieftain of your people do not curse" (Exodus 22:27)! [I.e. a Samaritan is not on of your people and thus this prohibition for which the punishment is lashes should not apply in this case]
Rav Hisda said: This is not a difficulty! Here [where he is exiled] is where he killed in a downward motion, and here [where he is not exiled] is where he killed in an upward motion. [I.e:] If [he killed him] in a downward motion, [in which case] an Israelite would be exiled, then exile should be enough for the [resident foreigner] as well. If [he killed him] in an upward motion, [in which case] an Israelite is exempt, then the resident foreigner is put to death.
Rava said to him: And is it not a kal vahomer (logical inference from a light to serious case)!? [This kal vahomer will show that your argument doesn't work]. Just as [in the case of] a downward motion an Israelite would be exiled, exile should be enough for a resident foreigner too; then [in the case of] an upward motion, an Israelite is an exempt, should [the resident foreigner really] be killed?!
Rava said to him: And is it not a kal vahomer (logical inference from a light to serious case)!? [This kal vahomer will show that your argument doesn't work]. Just as [in the case of] a downward motion an Israelite would be exiled, exile should be enough for a resident foreigner too; then [in the case of] an upward motion, an Israelite is an exempt, should [the resident foreigner really] be killed?!
Rava raised an objection to Rav Hisda [from the following verse]: "Behold, you should die because of the woman you have taken" (Genesis 20:3) [regarding Avimelekh and taking Sarah as his wife when he thought that she was Abraham's sister]. Does this not mean that he should die at the hands of people?
Rava raised an objection to Rav Hisda [from the following verse]: "Behold, you should die because of the woman you have taken" (Genesis 20:3) [regarding Avimelekh and taking Sarah as his wife when he thought that she was Abraham's sister]. Does this not mean that he should die at the hands of people?
Abaya raised an objection to Rava: "Will You slay people even thought innocent? (Genesis 20:4)" [Avimelekh was innocent totally; he should not be punished]. [Rava:] There (God) responded to him, "And now return the man's wife for he is a prophet" (Genesis 20:7)
Rather, it is like that which was said by Rabbi Shmuel bar Nahamni. For Rabbi Shmuel bar Nachamni said in the name of Rabbi Yonatan: This is what [God] said [to Avimelech] "But now return the man's wife"—in any instance. And regarding that which you said, "Will you slay people even though innocent" (Genesis 20:4)? Did he not tell me, "She is my sister!" [God]: He is a prophet, and from you one should learn, when a visitor comes to a city, regarding maters of food and drink you should ask him, but you should not ask him "is this your wife or your sister?"
Rather, it is like that which was said by Rabbi Shmuel bar Nahamni. For Rabbi Shmuel bar Nachamni said in the name of Rabbi Yonatan: This is what [God] said [to Avimelech] "But now return the man's wife"—in any instance. And regarding that which you said, "Will you slay people even though innocent" (Genesis 20:4)? Did he not tell me, "She is my sister!" [God]: He is a prophet, and from you one should learn, when a visitor comes to a city, regarding maters of food and drink you should ask him, but you should not ask him "is this your wife or your sister?"
Rather, it is like that which was said by Rabbi Shmuel bar Nahamni. For Rabbi Shmuel bar Nachamni said in the name of Rabbi Yonatan: This is what [God] said [to Avimelech] "But now return the man's wife"—in any instance. And regarding that which you said, "Will you slay people even though innocent" (Genesis 20:4)? Did he not tell me, "She is my sister!" [God]: He is a prophet, and from you one should learn, when a visitor comes to a city, regarding maters of food and drink you should ask him, but you should not ask him "is this your wife or your sister?"
From here we learn that a descendent of Noah is put to death, because he should have learnt, but he did not learn.
Gemara: Our rabbis taught [in a baraita]: Moses set aside three cities across the Jordan. And opposite them, Joshua set aside [three cities] in the land of Canaan. They were arranged such that they resembled two rows in a vineyard: Hebron in Judah opposite Betzer in the wilderness; Shkhem on the mountain of Efraim opposite Ramot in Gilead; Kedesh on the mountain of Naftali opposite Golan in Bashan. And they divided [the length] into thirds so that they should be thirds: from the south to Hebron was like Hebron to Shkhem; from Hebron to Shkhem was like Shkhem to Kedesh; from Shkhem to Kedesh was like Kedesh to the north.
'And don't sell in them [the cities] weapons or traps'—words of Rabbi Nehemyah; but the Sages permit [it]. But they agree that they don't spread in them traps and do not weave in them ropes in order that that leg of the blood avenger should not be found there [in the city]."
It was taught [by a tanna]: "A student that is exiled—they exile his teacher with him." As it is said, "and live" (Deuteronomy 4:42)? We make him [the manslayer] something that can be his livelihood [in the city of refuge]. Rabbi Z'eira said: "From here [we learn] that one should not teach a student that is not discerning."
Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said: "What is that which is written, 'Our legs were standing in your gates, Jerusalem' (Psalms 122:2)? Who causes our legs that they should stand in war at the gates of Jerusalem? Those who are occupied with Torah."
"'Refuge' was written at crossroads in order that the murderer would recognise it and turn to there [the cities]." Rav Kahana said: "What is [the meaning of] the verse: 'Prepare for yourself the road' (Deuteronomy 19:3)? Make for yourself preparations for the road." [The point is that "prepare"/"takhin" is a word that has multiple meanings. Rav Kahana is clarifying that it should be translated here as "prepare"].
They challenged [from a baraita]: "'And for him there is no death penalty' (Deuteronomy 19:6)—about the murderer the verse speaks. You say it's about the murderer or perhaps it's actually about the blood avenger? When it says, 'And he didn't hate him recently' (Deuteronomy 19:4)—thus [you would] say that the verse is speaking about the murderer." [Just as the earlier phrase "he didn't hate him" is clearly referring to the murderer, so too when the phrase appears in verse 6 it is also referring to the murderer. Thus the rest of the verse should also be read as referring to the murderer].
He [Rav Huna] said according to this tanna, as it is taught [in a baraita]: "'And for him there is no death penalty' (Deuteronomy 19:6)—about the blood avenger the verse speaks. You say it's about the blood avenger or maybe the verse is actually speaking about the murderer? When it says, 'Since he didn't hate him recently' (Deuteronomy 19:6)—this is speaking about the murderer, [but then] how can I uphold 'and for him there is no death penalty'? [This should have been obvious because it has already been established by the fact that he's a manslayer!]. [Therefore], the verse speaks about the blood avenger."
Rebbi Elezar says, a city that is mostly murderers does not provide protection as the Torah says (Joshua 20,4) "And he should speak his matter into the ears of the elders city" And not that his matter should be the same as theirs.
Rebbi Elezar says, a city that is mostly murderers does not provide protection as the Torah says (Joshua 20,4) "And he should speak his matter into the ears of the elders city" And not that his matter should be the same as theirs.
According to the opinion that it is invalid [the reason is] that the Torah says (Exodus 13, 9) "In order that the Torah of God should be in your mouth" which compares the whole Torah to Tefillin. Just as Tefillin is a law from Moshe at [Mt.] Sinai to tie them with sinews, so too the whole [Torah] has to be tied with sinews. And the other [opinion holds], in what aspect was it compared? That it must be [from an animal] permitted to the mouth. For the rest of it's laws, it wasn't compared.
Therefore the mothers of the [high] priests would prepare for the murderers food and clothing in order that they should not pray that their children would die.
Therefore the mothers of the high priests etc.: The reason [that their mother's would distribute food] is so that they [the murderers] would not pray [for the high priests deaths]. This implies that if they would prey, they would die. But the Torah says, (Proverbs 26, 2) "Like a wondering sparrow, like a flying swallow, so too a curse in vain will not come"? An old man replied, From the lectures of Rava I heared that the reason was that he should have beseeched [God] for mercy on his generation and he didn't beseech [God].
And there are others whom teach it [differently], "In order that they [the murderers] would pray that their children would not die". The reason [that the high priests don't die] is that they pray for them. This implies that if they wouldn't pray for them then they would die. But what should [the high priest] have done?! Here [in Babylonia] we say, "Tuvia sinned and Zigud gets lashes?!"
An old man replied, From the lectures of Rava I heared that the reason was that he should have beseeched [God] for mercy on his generation and he didn't beseech [God]. Like the incident of the person whom was devoured by a lion within three parsah's of Rebbi Yehoshua, and Eliyahu [haNavi] didn't visit him for three days.
Rav Yehuda says in the name of Rav, A curse of a sage even if in vain will be fulfilled. From where [is this derived]? From Achitofel. That at the time when Dovid was digging the foundation [for the beis hamikdash], the [water of the] deeps rose up and threatened to destroy the world. [Dovid] asked, Is it permissible to write [God's] name on a shard and throw it into the deeps in order that [the water] should remain in its place? There was no one who said anything to him. [Dovid] said, Whoever knows this matter and doesn't speak shall strangle by their throat.
Achitofel reasoned to himself with a fortiori. He said to himself, If in regards to making peace between a man and his wife the Torah says, "My name that was written with holiness should be erased in water", then [in order to make peace] for the entire world is it not even more so? [Achitofel] said to [Dovid], It is permissible. [Dovid] wrote [God's] name on a shard and threw it into the deeps. [The water] calmed and remained in its place.
His limbs returned to their sockets, but he could still not ascend to the hevenly academy. (Deuteronomy 33, 7) "And return him to his people". He was still didn't know how get involved in the discussions of the rabbis. (Deuteronomy 33, 7) "Let hands fight for him" He didn't know how to answer questions. (Deuteronomy 33, 7) "And you should aid him against his enemies."
GEMARA: What is the reason [that he doesn't go to exile if the high priest dies before he gets there]? Abaye says it's a fortiori, And just as someone who was already in exile goes out [with the death the high priest], then now, someone who never went to exile should certainly not be exiled. But maybe the one was exiled got an atonement, and the one who wasn't exiled didn't [get his atonement]? Is exile the thing that grants atonement? The death of the high priest is what grants atonement.
What should [this high priest] have done [he was appointed after the murder]? He should have beseeched [God] for mercy that his judgement should find a merit, and he didn't beseech.
What should [this high priest] have done [he was appointed after the murder]? He should have beseeched [God] for mercy that his judgement should find a merit, and he didn't beseech.
What should [this high priest] have done [he was appointed after the murder]? He should have beseeched [God] for mercy that his judgement should find a merit, and he didn't beseech.
Abaye says, we have a tradition, If one's judgment is finished and then dies [before reaching the city of refuge], we bring his bones there as the Torah says (Numbers 35, 32), "to dwell in the dwelling of the land until the death of the priest". And what type of dwelling is "in" the land? You must say this is [referring to] burial. It was taught, if he dies before the high priest dies, then we bring his bones to his ancestral graves [after the high priest subsequently dies] as the Torah says (Numbers 35,28), "the murderer should return to the land of his possession". What type of dwelling is "in the land of his possession? You must say this is [referring to] burial.
Rebbi Abahu says, Cities of refuge were not given for burial, as the Torah says (Numbers 35, 3) "And their open lands should be for their cattle, their flocks, and all of their livelihoods" For "life" they were given and not for burial. They inquired, "Their" (Numbers 35,25) implies that their should be his living there should be his death and there should be his burial. [so how can we say that cities of refuge aren't fit for burial]? A murderer is different because the Torah exiled him.
Rebbi Abahu says, Cities of refuge were not given for burial, as the Torah says (Numbers 35, 3) "And their open lands should be for their cattle, their flocks, and all of their livelihoods" For "life" they were given and not for burial. They inquired, "Their" (Numbers 35,25) implies that their should be his living there should be his death and there should be his burial. [so how can we say that cities of refuge aren't fit for burial]? A murderer is different because the Torah exiled him.