acted
310 occurrences across the corpus
The Jerusalem Talmud
“Even though the House of Shammai and the House of Hillel disagreed about co-wives, and sisters, and an old bill of divorce, and a woman doubtfully married, and one who gives qiddushin in the value of a peruṭa, i. e., he who divorces his wife and spends the night with her in a hostelry, and that a woman receives qiddushin for at least a denar or the value of a denar, the House of Shammai did not refrain from marrying women from the House of Hillel or the House of Hillel from the House of Shammai but they behave truthfully and in peace, as it is said: ‘Love truth and peace.’ ” Bastardy is between them and you say so? How is that? If a first man gives her qiddushin for a peruṭa and a second for a denar, in the opinion of the House of Shammai she is betrothed to the second and the child of the first is a bastard. In the opinion of the House of Hillel she is betrothed to the first and the child of the second is a bastard. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The House of Shammai concede to the House of Hillel as a restriction. In that case, the House of Shammai should marry women from the House of Hillel since they concede to them. But the House of Hillel should not marry women from the House of Shammai since they do not concede to them. Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: They all followed the same practice. If they followed the same practice, in this case we stated: “The House of Shammai sent and diminished it, since the House of Shammai says unless most of it is missing?” Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, the House of Shammai acted before the question came before the House of Hillel. After a question came before the House of Hillel, the House of Shammai were not touching it. Rebbi Abba Mari said, that is correct. Did we not state: “They declared impure all purities from before”, but not in the future. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, Rav and Samuel, one said both acted according to valid practice; the other said, each party followed its own practice. Bastardy is between them and you say so? The Omnipresent watched and no case ever happened.
There, we have stated: “If a brother gave qiddushin to the sister of a woman waiting for the levir, they said in the name of Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra: One says to him, wait until your brother has acted. If [one of the] brothers performed ḥalîṣah or married her, he may marry his wife. If the sister-in-law died, he may marry his wife. If the levir died, he has to send away his wife by a bill of divorce and his brother’s widow by ḥalîṣah.” It says only: If the sister-in-law died, his wife is permitted to him. But if his wife died, his sister-in-law is forbidden to him. Rebbi Joḥanan said, these are the words of Rebbi Eliezer. But the Sages say, if his sister-in-law died, his wife is permitted to him, if his wife died, his sister-in-law is permitted to him. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the Sages hold that for anything induced by a cause, if the cause is removed the prohibition is removed. But for Rebbi Eliezer, if the cause is removed the prohibition remains.
A Mishnah disagrees with Samuel: “If somebody performs ḥalîṣah with his sister-in-law, her relatives are forbidden to him and his relatives are forbidden to her.” There is a difference here, since he already is available to free himself from her. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “If somebody performs ḥalîṣah with his sister-in-law, then his brother marries her sister and dies, she performs ḥalîṣah but cannot have levirate.” This supports him who says that ḥalîṣah is freeing. But according to him who says, ḥalîṣah is acquisiton, is there anybody who wants to acquire two sisters together? Explain it, after her death. Is there no levirate after death? Explain it following Rebbi Eleazar, since Rebbi Eleazar said, if the cause is removed the prohibition remains. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “Three brothers, two of them are married to two sisters and the third is free. One of the sisters’ husbands died, the free [brother] “bespoke” her, then the second brother died. The House of Shammai say, his wife is with him and the other one should leave as the wife’s sister. The House of Hillel say, he divorces his wife with a bill of divorce (and ḥalîṣah), and his wife’s sister with ḥalîṣah. This supports him who says that ḥalîṣah is (acquisiton) [freeing]. But according to him who says, ḥalîṣah is acquisiton, is there anybody who wants to acquire two sisters together? Explain it, after her death. Is there no levirate after death? Explain it following Rebbi Eleazar, since Rebbi Eleazar said, if the cause is removed the prohibition remains. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “If a brother gives qiddushin to the sister of a woman waiting for the levir, they said in the name of Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra: One says to him, wait until your brother has acted. If one of the brothers performed ḥalîṣah or married her, he may marry his wife. If the sister-in-law died, he may marry his wife. If the levir died, he has to remove his wife by a bill of divorce and his brother’s widow by ḥalîṣah.”. This supports him who says that ḥalîṣah is freeing. But according to him who says, ḥalîṣah is acquisiton, is there anybody who wants to acquire two sisters together? Explain it following Rebbi Eleazar, since Rebbi Eleazar said, if the cause is removed the prohibition remains. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “If a brother of the High Priest dies, he performs ḥalîṣah but not levirate.” This supports him who says that ḥalîṣah is freeing. But according to him who says, ḥalîṣah is acquisiton, does one say to him, transgress the words of the Torah? Rebbi Ḥama, the colleague of the rabbis, objected: Does not a Mishnah disagree with Rav? “Three brothers, two of them married to two sisters or a woman and her daughter or a woman and her daughter’s or her son’s daughter. These perform ḥalîṣah but not levirate.” There is a difference since the prohibition of a woman and her daughter applies both when she is alive as also after her death. These last two disagree with Rav and one cannot explain them away.
MISHNAH: If a brother gave qiddushin to the sister of a woman waiting for the levir, they said in the name of Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra: One says to him wait until your older brother has acted. If [one of the] brothers performed ḥalîṣah or married her, he may marry his wife. If the sister-in-law died, he may marry. If the levir died, he has to remove himself from his wife by a bill of divorce and his brother’s widow by ḥalîṣah.
Did we not state: “Just as the water checks her out so it checks him out”? Just as she is forbidden to her husband, so she is forbidden to her paramour. Just as she is forbidden to her husband’s brother, so she is forbidden to her paramour’s brother. Just as the water checks her out for every single intercourse for which she receives her husband after [intercourse with] her paramour, so it checks him out. Since she in general becomes forbidden, whether by him or by another [man], she is checked out. But when he makes [her] drink, he is checked out. If it checked him out but not her, I would say that merit suspends for her. That is according to him who says that merit suspends and it is not recognizable. But following him who says that merit suspends and it is recognizable? Look, she was not recognized! But I could say that she drank uncovered water and it swelled. They should not have her checked out in this way but correctly! But I could say that he was in secret with other women. Did we not think to say, when he makes [her] drink, he is checked out? Explain it that he had criminal intent but she acted in error; then the water checked him out but not her. [ If the water checked her out but not him,] I would say that merit suspends for (her) [him]. That is according to him who says that merit suspends and it is not recognizable. But following him who says that merit suspends and it is recognizable? Look, she was not recognized! But I could say that she drank uncovered water and her belly swelled. They should not have her checked out in this way but correctly! But I could say that she was in secret with other men. Then if he divorced her, she would be permitted to him. Explain it that he acted in error but she had criminal intent; then the water checked her out but not him. If he had criminal intent but she acted in error, then it is obvious that she is permitted to her house. If he divorced her, would she be permitted to him? Is it possible to say that he had criminal intent and you say so? If he acted in error but she had criminal intent, it is obvious that she is forbidden to her house. If he divorced her, would she be permitted to him? Is it possible to say that she left because of him and you say so? From where do we know that all depends on her? Simeon bar Abba in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Is is written: “Do not ejaculate semen into your neighbor’s wife to be impure through her.” It depends on her; if she had criminal intent, she is forbidden, acted in error she is permitted.
Did we not state: “Just as the water checks her out so it checks him out”? Just as she is forbidden to her husband, so she is forbidden to her paramour. Just as she is forbidden to her husband’s brother, so she is forbidden to her paramour’s brother. Just as the water checks her out for every single intercourse for which she receives her husband after [intercourse with] her paramour, so it checks him out. Since she in general becomes forbidden, whether by him or by another [man], she is checked out. But when he makes [her] drink, he is checked out. If it checked him out but not her, I would say that merit suspends for her. That is according to him who says that merit suspends and it is not recognizable. But following him who says that merit suspends and it is recognizable? Look, she was not recognized! But I could say that she drank uncovered water and it swelled. They should not have her checked out in this way but correctly! But I could say that he was in secret with other women. Did we not think to say, when he makes [her] drink, he is checked out? Explain it that he had criminal intent but she acted in error; then the water checked him out but not her. [ If the water checked her out but not him,] I would say that merit suspends for (her) [him]. That is according to him who says that merit suspends and it is not recognizable. But following him who says that merit suspends and it is recognizable? Look, she was not recognized! But I could say that she drank uncovered water and her belly swelled. They should not have her checked out in this way but correctly! But I could say that she was in secret with other men. Then if he divorced her, she would be permitted to him. Explain it that he acted in error but she had criminal intent; then the water checked her out but not him. If he had criminal intent but she acted in error, then it is obvious that she is permitted to her house. If he divorced her, would she be permitted to him? Is it possible to say that he had criminal intent and you say so? If he acted in error but she had criminal intent, it is obvious that she is forbidden to her house. If he divorced her, would she be permitted to him? Is it possible to say that she left because of him and you say so? From where do we know that all depends on her? Simeon bar Abba in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Is is written: “Do not ejaculate semen into your neighbor’s wife to be impure through her.” It depends on her; if she had criminal intent, she is forbidden, acted in error she is permitted.
Did we not state: “Just as the water checks her out so it checks him out”? Just as she is forbidden to her husband, so she is forbidden to her paramour. Just as she is forbidden to her husband’s brother, so she is forbidden to her paramour’s brother. Just as the water checks her out for every single intercourse for which she receives her husband after [intercourse with] her paramour, so it checks him out. Since she in general becomes forbidden, whether by him or by another [man], she is checked out. But when he makes [her] drink, he is checked out. If it checked him out but not her, I would say that merit suspends for her. That is according to him who says that merit suspends and it is not recognizable. But following him who says that merit suspends and it is recognizable? Look, she was not recognized! But I could say that she drank uncovered water and it swelled. They should not have her checked out in this way but correctly! But I could say that he was in secret with other women. Did we not think to say, when he makes [her] drink, he is checked out? Explain it that he had criminal intent but she acted in error; then the water checked him out but not her. [ If the water checked her out but not him,] I would say that merit suspends for (her) [him]. That is according to him who says that merit suspends and it is not recognizable. But following him who says that merit suspends and it is recognizable? Look, she was not recognized! But I could say that she drank uncovered water and her belly swelled. They should not have her checked out in this way but correctly! But I could say that she was in secret with other men. Then if he divorced her, she would be permitted to him. Explain it that he acted in error but she had criminal intent; then the water checked her out but not him. If he had criminal intent but she acted in error, then it is obvious that she is permitted to her house. If he divorced her, would she be permitted to him? Is it possible to say that he had criminal intent and you say so? If he acted in error but she had criminal intent, it is obvious that she is forbidden to her house. If he divorced her, would she be permitted to him? Is it possible to say that she left because of him and you say so? From where do we know that all depends on her? Simeon bar Abba in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Is is written: “Do not ejaculate semen into your neighbor’s wife to be impure through her.” It depends on her; if she had criminal intent, she is forbidden, acted in error she is permitted.
Did we not state: “Just as the water checks her out so it checks him out”? Just as she is forbidden to her husband, so she is forbidden to her paramour. Just as she is forbidden to her husband’s brother, so she is forbidden to her paramour’s brother. Just as the water checks her out for every single intercourse for which she receives her husband after [intercourse with] her paramour, so it checks him out. Since she in general becomes forbidden, whether by him or by another [man], she is checked out. But when he makes [her] drink, he is checked out. If it checked him out but not her, I would say that merit suspends for her. That is according to him who says that merit suspends and it is not recognizable. But following him who says that merit suspends and it is recognizable? Look, she was not recognized! But I could say that she drank uncovered water and it swelled. They should not have her checked out in this way but correctly! But I could say that he was in secret with other women. Did we not think to say, when he makes [her] drink, he is checked out? Explain it that he had criminal intent but she acted in error; then the water checked him out but not her. [ If the water checked her out but not him,] I would say that merit suspends for (her) [him]. That is according to him who says that merit suspends and it is not recognizable. But following him who says that merit suspends and it is recognizable? Look, she was not recognized! But I could say that she drank uncovered water and her belly swelled. They should not have her checked out in this way but correctly! But I could say that she was in secret with other men. Then if he divorced her, she would be permitted to him. Explain it that he acted in error but she had criminal intent; then the water checked her out but not him. If he had criminal intent but she acted in error, then it is obvious that she is permitted to her house. If he divorced her, would she be permitted to him? Is it possible to say that he had criminal intent and you say so? If he acted in error but she had criminal intent, it is obvious that she is forbidden to her house. If he divorced her, would she be permitted to him? Is it possible to say that she left because of him and you say so? From where do we know that all depends on her? Simeon bar Abba in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Is is written: “Do not ejaculate semen into your neighbor’s wife to be impure through her.” It depends on her; if she had criminal intent, she is forbidden, acted in error she is permitted.
Did we not state: “Just as the water checks her out so it checks him out”? Just as she is forbidden to her husband, so she is forbidden to her paramour. Just as she is forbidden to her husband’s brother, so she is forbidden to her paramour’s brother. Just as the water checks her out for every single intercourse for which she receives her husband after [intercourse with] her paramour, so it checks him out. Since she in general becomes forbidden, whether by him or by another [man], she is checked out. But when he makes [her] drink, he is checked out. If it checked him out but not her, I would say that merit suspends for her. That is according to him who says that merit suspends and it is not recognizable. But following him who says that merit suspends and it is recognizable? Look, she was not recognized! But I could say that she drank uncovered water and it swelled. They should not have her checked out in this way but correctly! But I could say that he was in secret with other women. Did we not think to say, when he makes [her] drink, he is checked out? Explain it that he had criminal intent but she acted in error; then the water checked him out but not her. [ If the water checked her out but not him,] I would say that merit suspends for (her) [him]. That is according to him who says that merit suspends and it is not recognizable. But following him who says that merit suspends and it is recognizable? Look, she was not recognized! But I could say that she drank uncovered water and her belly swelled. They should not have her checked out in this way but correctly! But I could say that she was in secret with other men. Then if he divorced her, she would be permitted to him. Explain it that he acted in error but she had criminal intent; then the water checked her out but not him. If he had criminal intent but she acted in error, then it is obvious that she is permitted to her house. If he divorced her, would she be permitted to him? Is it possible to say that he had criminal intent and you say so? If he acted in error but she had criminal intent, it is obvious that she is forbidden to her house. If he divorced her, would she be permitted to him? Is it possible to say that she left because of him and you say so? From where do we know that all depends on her? Simeon bar Abba in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Is is written: “Do not ejaculate semen into your neighbor’s wife to be impure through her.” It depends on her; if she had criminal intent, she is forbidden, acted in error she is permitted.
If he performed the preliminary marriage in the bridal chamber, these strictures do not apply. They said that Rebbi Mattaniah acted thus for his daughter. In the opinion of Rebbi Eleazar, could she be married any day at a place where courts are in session every day? And at a place where there are no courts (every day) could she never be married? One does not want to abolish the time of Wednesday. Why does one not want to abolish the time of Wednesday? Because he also accepts what Bar Qappara stated. Bar Qappara said, because a blessing is written there. Could she not be married on Sunday, that he might quickly go to court on Monday? Some want to say, not to abolish the time of Wednesday; some want to say, because of what Bar Qappara stated, for Bar Qappara said, because a blessing is written there.
Ḥananiah bar Šelemiah in the name of Rav: A case came before Rebbi, who wanted to act following the rabbis. Rebbi Eleazar ben Proteus, the grandson of Rebbi Eleazar ben Proteus, said to him: Did you not teach us in your old man’s name, “except if they offered public tender”? He accepted it; Rebbi changed his mind and acted following Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel.
Rebbi Ḥanania in the name of Rebbi Abin bar Ḥiyya, [this is Rebbi’s opinion.] Rebbi Joḥanan said, and it was stated so: “All conditions invalidate a bill of divorce, the words of Rebbi. But the Sages say, what invalidates orally invalidates in writing, and what does not invalidate orally does not invalidate in writing.” “You are permitted to marry anybody except Mr. X,” because this invalidates orally it invalidates in writing. “This is your bill of divorce on condition that you give me 200 zuz”; because this does not invalidate orally it does not invalidate in writing. Rebbi Yudan said, when do they disagree? If he rescinded his condition. But if he did nor rescind his condition, even Rebbi agrees. Otherwise, we would have to say that all conditions which were stated for bills of divorce do not follow Rebbi. Rebbi Ḥinena said, there when he writes “on condition,” here if he gives “on condition.” Rebbi Ezra asked before Rebbi Mana: Does this imply that Rebbi does not recognize formulaic texts? He answered him, about whom do you ask? About Rebbi! He follows Rebbi Jehudah, for Rebbi Jehudah invalidates formulaic texts. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, everybody agrees that all conditions invalidate a bill of divorce. There came a case before Rebbi Jeremiah and he acted following Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. Rebbi Yose said to him, does one neglect Rebbi Joḥanan and act following Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? He answered him, is Rebbi Joḥanan’s instruction an instruction but Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish’s instruction not an instruction? Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, it is not that Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan, but he understood a baraita and acted accordingly. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, not that Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish fights against Rebbi Joḥanan when he disagrees with him only to extract a ruling from him. If he finds a baraita, he depends on it; if he does not find a baraita, he retracts his opinion before Rebbi Joḥanan’s opinion.
Rebbi Ḥanania in the name of Rebbi Abin bar Ḥiyya, [this is Rebbi’s opinion.] Rebbi Joḥanan said, and it was stated so: “All conditions invalidate a bill of divorce, the words of Rebbi. But the Sages say, what invalidates orally invalidates in writing, and what does not invalidate orally does not invalidate in writing.” “You are permitted to marry anybody except Mr. X,” because this invalidates orally it invalidates in writing. “This is your bill of divorce on condition that you give me 200 zuz”; because this does not invalidate orally it does not invalidate in writing. Rebbi Yudan said, when do they disagree? If he rescinded his condition. But if he did nor rescind his condition, even Rebbi agrees. Otherwise, we would have to say that all conditions which were stated for bills of divorce do not follow Rebbi. Rebbi Ḥinena said, there when he writes “on condition,” here if he gives “on condition.” Rebbi Ezra asked before Rebbi Mana: Does this imply that Rebbi does not recognize formulaic texts? He answered him, about whom do you ask? About Rebbi! He follows Rebbi Jehudah, for Rebbi Jehudah invalidates formulaic texts. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, everybody agrees that all conditions invalidate a bill of divorce. There came a case before Rebbi Jeremiah and he acted following Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. Rebbi Yose said to him, does one neglect Rebbi Joḥanan and act following Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? He answered him, is Rebbi Joḥanan’s instruction an instruction but Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish’s instruction not an instruction? Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, it is not that Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan, but he understood a baraita and acted accordingly. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, not that Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish fights against Rebbi Joḥanan when he disagrees with him only to extract a ruling from him. If he finds a baraita, he depends on it; if he does not find a baraita, he retracts his opinion before Rebbi Joḥanan’s opinion.
“If sometimes he is insane and sometimes healthy. When he is insane he is insane in all regards, when healthy he is normal in all regards.” A case came before Samuel who said, when he is of sound mind he should deliver the bill of divorce. Why? Samuel follows Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish; as Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, when he regains his sanity. It follows that Samuel acted according to Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish who said, only if he is of sound mind may he deliver the bill of divorce; (Is. 38:16) “make me healthy and let me live!”
Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The following is the contract text: “I, X son of Y, contract a preliminary marriage with you, Z, daughter of U, on condition that I shall give you property A anddefinitively marry you by day B. If that day should pass without me having taken you in, I shall have no claim on you.” If anything intervened beyond his control? Rebbi Joḥanan said, matters beyond his control are as if he were inactive. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, matters outside his control are as if he had acted. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, what would be necessary? “If that day should pass without you having taken me in, I shall have no claim on you.” When Rebbi Joḥanan was dying, he told his daughters to act following Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. He said, maybe in the future there might be a court which follows him; then his descendants might be in danger of bastardy.
HALAKHAH: “If he wrote a bill to divorce his wife and then changed his mind,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai: There is no problem because of the purity of the priestly line and the court will not denigrate her. There came a case before the Elder Rebbi Ḥiyya and he acted following the House of Hillel. Rav asked him, why did you bring yourself into this great doubt? He answered, Rebbi Ismael ben Rebbi Yose was with me. He quoted about them: “Two are better than one.”
Rav said: Judges may sign even if they cannot read, but no witnesses may sign unless they know how to read. He said, such should come over me if I ever acted thus. Rebbi Ḥaggai said before Rebbi Yose: Did no Greek document come before Rav that he could confirm it by its signatures? The Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “A bill of divorce written in Hebrew with its witnesses signing in Greek, written in Greek with its witnesses signing in Hebrew, or one witness signing in Hebrew and one in Greek, is valid.” He explains that they knew how to read but not how to sign; or if they knew both [languages], they could sign in either one of their choice.
“Even though the House of Shammai and the House of Hillel disagreed about co-wives, and sisters, and an old bill of divorce, and a woman doubtfully married, and someone who gives qiddushin in the value of a peruṭa, and someone who divorces his wife and spends the night with her in a hostelry, and a woman who receives qiddushin for at least a denar or the value of a denar, the House of Shammai did not refrain from marrying women from the House of Hillel or the House of Hillel from the House of Shammai but they behave truthfully and in peace, as it is said: ‘Love truth and peace.’ ” Bastardy is between them and you say so? How is that? If a first man gives her qiddushin for a peruṭa and a second [gives her afterwards)] for a denar, in the opinion of the House of Shammai she is betrothed to the second and her child by the first is a bastard. In the opinion of the House of Hillel she is betrothed to the first and her child by the second is a bastard. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The House of Shammai concede to the House of Hillel as a restriction. In that case, the House of Shammai should marry women from the House of Hillel since they concede to them. But the House of Hillel should not marry women from the House of Shammai since they do not concede to them. Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai: They all followed the same practice. If they followed the same practice, in this case we stated: “The House of Shammai sent and diminished it, since the House of Shammai say unless most of it is missing?” Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, the House of Shammai acted before the question came before the House of Hillel. After a question came before the House of Hillel, the House of Shammai were not touching it. Rebbi Abba Mari said, that is correct. Did we not state: “They declared impure all purities from before”, but not in the future. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, Rav and Samuel disagreed. One said both acted according to valid practice; the other said, each party followed their own practice. Bastardy is between them and you say so? The Omnipresent watched and no case ever happened.
“Even though the House of Shammai and the House of Hillel disagreed about co-wives, and sisters, and an old bill of divorce, and a woman doubtfully married, and someone who gives qiddushin in the value of a peruṭa, and someone who divorces his wife and spends the night with her in a hostelry, and a woman who receives qiddushin for at least a denar or the value of a denar, the House of Shammai did not refrain from marrying women from the House of Hillel or the House of Hillel from the House of Shammai but they behave truthfully and in peace, as it is said: ‘Love truth and peace.’ ” Bastardy is between them and you say so? How is that? If a first man gives her qiddushin for a peruṭa and a second [gives her afterwards)] for a denar, in the opinion of the House of Shammai she is betrothed to the second and her child by the first is a bastard. In the opinion of the House of Hillel she is betrothed to the first and her child by the second is a bastard. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The House of Shammai concede to the House of Hillel as a restriction. In that case, the House of Shammai should marry women from the House of Hillel since they concede to them. But the House of Hillel should not marry women from the House of Shammai since they do not concede to them. Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai: They all followed the same practice. If they followed the same practice, in this case we stated: “The House of Shammai sent and diminished it, since the House of Shammai say unless most of it is missing?” Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, the House of Shammai acted before the question came before the House of Hillel. After a question came before the House of Hillel, the House of Shammai were not touching it. Rebbi Abba Mari said, that is correct. Did we not state: “They declared impure all purities from before”, but not in the future. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, Rav and Samuel disagreed. One said both acted according to valid practice; the other said, each party followed their own practice. Bastardy is between them and you say so? The Omnipresent watched and no case ever happened.
This does not follow Rebbi Eliezer, for Rebbi Eliezer said that walking acquires, as it was stated: If one walked across a field in length and breadth, he acquired up to the place he walked to, the words of Rebbi Eliezer. But the Sages say that he did not acquire up to the moment he acted in possession. Everybody agrees that if somebody sells a path to another, when the latter went, he acquired. What is the reason? “Arise, walk in the Land in length and breadth, for I shall give it to you.”
This does not follow Rebbi Eliezer, for Rebbi Eliezer said that walking acquires. If one walked across a field in length and breadth, he acquired up to the place he walked, the words of Rebbi Eliezer. But the Sages say that he did not acquire up to the moment he acted in possession. Everybody agrees that if somebody sells a path to another, when the latter went, he acquired. What is the reason? “Arise, walk in the Land, etc.”
Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The following is the contract text: “I, X son of Y, contract a preliminary marriage with you, Z, daughter of U, on condition that I give you property A and definitively marry you by day B. If that day should pass without me having taken you in, I shall have no claim on you.” If anything intervened beyond his control? Rebbi Joḥanan said, matters beyond his control are as if he were inactive. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, matters outside his control are as if he had acted. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, what would be necessary? “If that day should pass without you having taken me in, I shall have no claim on you.” When Rebbi Joḥanan was dying, he told his daughters to act following Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. He said, sometime in the future there might be a court which follows him; then his descendants might be in danger of bastardy.
If he performed a preliminary marriage during the validity of the symphōn, this is unconditional preliminary marriage. If he divorced, the students of Rebbi Jonah said, divorce touched her; Rebbi Jonah said, divorce did not touch her. When Rebbi Jonah died, his students acted following him. They said, since after 30 [days] she would leave without a bill of divorce, how can you say that divorce touched her? But divorce did not touch her. If he died during the time stipulated in the symphōn, Rebbi Abbahu said, she is permitted to marry; Rebbi Abba said, she is not permitted to marry. Rebbi Mana asked the family of Rebbi Yose’s father: How did your master usually act? He said to him, when it was a long time, he said that she should go and marry immediately. If the time was short, he said, what is the hurt if she waits? If he sent things during the validity of the symphōn, Rebbi Mana said, [it follows the rules of] symphōn; Rebbi Abba said, [it follows the rules of] preliminary marriage. The rabbis take note of Rebbi Mana’s opinion.
Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba went to Tyre. When he came before Rebbi Joḥanan, he asked him, what case did you handle? He said to him, a proselyte who had been circumcised but had not immersed himself. He asked him, why did you not injure him? Rebbi Joshua ben Levi told him, leave him alone, he acted correctly not to injure him. The argument of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi seems inverted. There, Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa, Rebbi Simeon bar Abba, Rebbi Joshua ben Levi, in the name of Rebbi Gamliel ben Rebbi: The child is neither qualified nor disqualified but dirtied. And here, he says so? Did we not state: If a proselyte was circumcised but not immersed, immersed but not circumcised, everything depends on circumcision, the words of Rebbi Eliezer. Rebbi Joshua says, immersion also is necessary. But Rebbi Joshua ben Levi follows what Bar Qappara stated, as Bar Qappara stated: A proselyte who was circumcised but not immersed is qualified since there is no proselyte who did not immerse himself for his emission of semen. Is that not difficult? The cleansing from a minor impurity is counted for him for a major impurity? Rebbi Yose ben Abun said, since either one is for the holiness of Israel, it is counted for him.
Rav Huna said that in the days of Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah they tried to include them. Rebbi Abbahu inverts the wording: In the days of Rebbi Eleazar they said, who could purify the altar’s part? That implies that Joshua excluded them. He excluded them only as disqualified for marriage. If you would say, disqualified (because of sins) then the rapist of a Gibeonite girl should not have to pay the fine, but we have stated: The rapist of a Gibeonite girl has to pay the fine.” Rebbi Eleazar said, he cursed them as a snake, as it is said: “But now you are cursed.” And it is written: “The people of Israel said to the Ḥiwwite.” But were they Ḥiwwites? They acted like the snake which said, I know that the Holy One, praise to Him, did say “because on the day you eat from it, you will die a death.” I shall go and trick them so that they eat and will be punished and I shall inherit the earth for myself. So these people acted; they said, we know that the Holy One, praise to Him, said to Israel: “You shall certainly ban them, the Hittite, the Emorite, and the Perizite, as the Eternal, your God, has commanded you” And it is written: “You shall not conclude a covenant with them.” We shall go and trick them that they conclude a covenant with us. As you take it, if they kill us, they violate their oath. If they let us live, they violated the [divine] decision. In any case, they will be punished and we shall inherit the Land.
Rav Huna said that in the days of Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah they tried to include them. Rebbi Abbahu inverts the wording: In the days of Rebbi Eleazar they said, who could purify the altar’s part? That implies that Joshua excluded them. He excluded them only as disqualified for marriage. If you would say, disqualified (because of sins) then the rapist of a Gibeonite girl should not have to pay the fine, but we have stated: The rapist of a Gibeonite girl has to pay the fine.” Rebbi Eleazar said, he cursed them as a snake, as it is said: “But now you are cursed.” And it is written: “The people of Israel said to the Ḥiwwite.” But were they Ḥiwwites? They acted like the snake which said, I know that the Holy One, praise to Him, did say “because on the day you eat from it, you will die a death.” I shall go and trick them so that they eat and will be punished and I shall inherit the earth for myself. So these people acted; they said, we know that the Holy One, praise to Him, said to Israel: “You shall certainly ban them, the Hittite, the Emorite, and the Perizite, as the Eternal, your God, has commanded you” And it is written: “You shall not conclude a covenant with them.” We shall go and trick them that they conclude a covenant with us. As you take it, if they kill us, they violate their oath. If they let us live, they violated the [divine] decision. In any case, they will be punished and we shall inherit the Land.
HALAKHAH: “One who comes to marry a woman from a priestly family,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said, this is Rebbi Meïr’s, as we have stated: “What is qualified dough? Anyone about whom there is [no suspicion of descent from] a desecrated one, a bastard, or a Gibeonite. Rebbi Meïr says, the daughter of any woman not tainted with any of these is qualified for the priesthood. But about a family in which a disability had disappeared, Rebbi Meïr says he checks up to four mothers and marries, but the Sages say, he checks forever.” Rav said, these are the words of Rebbi Meïr, but the Sages say, he checks from which family one marries into the priesthood and marries. Through whom does he check? Rebbi Ḥaggai in the name of Rebbi Josia: He checks through his female relatives. To Rebbi Ḥama came an old man; he asked him: Does one marry into the priesthood from this family? He answered: yes, and he was making a match based on this information. Rav said to his son Ḥiyya: Descend a degree to marry a wife. Rebbi Idi said, the following is a frequent saying of the rabbis: “If the woman was not impure but she is pure.” If she was not impure, she is pure. Not like Pappos ben Jehudah who locks the door before his wife. One said to him, did your forefathers act like this? A Cohen came to Rebbi Joḥanan and said to him: I acted on the Mishnah when I married a woman from a priestly family and checked after her four mothers which are eight. He said to him, if the origin was defective, who would inform you?
New paragraph. “And a bachelor shall not be a school teacher; a woman shall not be a school teacher, etc.” It was stated: Rebbi Eliezer says, also a man with a wife and children shall not be a school teacher if they are not with him at that place. Rebbi Yudan ben Rebbi Ismael acted accordingly in the case of a Mishnah teacher.
Rebbi Yasa said, I heard something from Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac in this matter, but I do not remember what it was. Rebbi Ze‘ira told him, maybe it was the following: At the start the discussion refers to the tame animal. It added weregilt for the notorious. Then it added damages for both of them. I could think that as it added damages, it added the payment for the slave; the verse says “but the owner of the bull is free;” free from paying for a slave. Rebbi La said, everywhere you are more restrictive for a slave than anything else since even if he is scabbed one pays thirty tetradrachmas; I would have said also (for his father and his mother) the same; the verse says “but the owner of the bull is free;” free from paying for fetuses. Everywhere you are more restrictive for a notorious than for a tame one, would you be more restrictive here for a tame one than for a notorious? But it must be so: Men who act unintentionally are liable; bulls who act unintentionally are not liable. Does this mean that if they acted intentionally, they were liable? The verse says, “but the owner of the bull is free;” free from paying for a slave. Another Tanna stated: “But the owner of the bull is free;” free from paying for a slave. But is it not written: “If people quarrel”, people but not bulls. Rebbi Ḥaggai said, so is the baraita: Men who act unintentionally are liable; bulls who act unintentionally are not liable. Does this mean that if they acted intentionally, they were liable? The verse says, “but the owner of the bull is free;” free from paying for a slave. But is it not written: “When they quarrel,” “when they brawl”. Is not quarrel the same as brawl? Since there the act was intentional, so here the act was intentional; or since here the act was unintentional, so here the act was unintentional. What about this? As Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac said, at the start it treats the tame animal, etc.
Rebbi Yasa said, I heard something from Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac in this matter, but I do not remember what it was. Rebbi Ze‘ira told him, maybe it was the following: At the start the discussion refers to the tame animal. It added weregilt for the notorious. Then it added damages for both of them. I could think that as it added damages, it added the payment for the slave; the verse says “but the owner of the bull is free;” free from paying for a slave. Rebbi La said, everywhere you are more restrictive for a slave than anything else since even if he is scabbed one pays thirty tetradrachmas; I would have said also (for his father and his mother) the same; the verse says “but the owner of the bull is free;” free from paying for fetuses. Everywhere you are more restrictive for a notorious than for a tame one, would you be more restrictive here for a tame one than for a notorious? But it must be so: Men who act unintentionally are liable; bulls who act unintentionally are not liable. Does this mean that if they acted intentionally, they were liable? The verse says, “but the owner of the bull is free;” free from paying for a slave. Another Tanna stated: “But the owner of the bull is free;” free from paying for a slave. But is it not written: “If people quarrel”, people but not bulls. Rebbi Ḥaggai said, so is the baraita: Men who act unintentionally are liable; bulls who act unintentionally are not liable. Does this mean that if they acted intentionally, they were liable? The verse says, “but the owner of the bull is free;” free from paying for a slave. But is it not written: “When they quarrel,” “when they brawl”. Is not quarrel the same as brawl? Since there the act was intentional, so here the act was intentional; or since here the act was unintentional, so here the act was unintentional. What about this? As Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac said, at the start it treats the tame animal, etc.
HALAKHAH: “If a spark is coming from under a hammer,” etc. “Rebbi Jehudah stated: In case of a Ḥanukkah light he is not liable because he acted with permission. But the Sages say, in any case he is liable, as, e. g., those who build huts in front of their stores on Tabernacles because it is permitted; but if somebody else is hurt by them, he is liable.”
Rebbi Samuel bar Sosarṭai went to Rome. The queen had lost her דילניה but he found it. A herold went through the city: One who will return it within 30 days will receive such and such; after 30 days his head will be lifted from him. He did not return it within 30 days. After 30 days he returned it. She asked him, had you not been in the city? He answered, yes. She asked him, had you not heard the voice of the herold? He answered, yes. She asked him, what did he say? He answered, one who will return it within 30 days will receive such and such; after 30 days his head will be lifted from him. She asked him, why did you not return it within 30 days? He answered, one should not say that I acted out of fear of you, but out of fear of the Merciful. She said to him, praised be the God of the Jews.
MISHNAH: One may increase rental fees but not sale price. How is this? He leased a courtyard saying to him, if [you pay] now it is yours for ten tetradrachmas a year but if paid monthly it is a tetradrachma per month; this is permitted. He sold his field and said to him, if [you pay] now it is yours for 1’000 zuz, but if after the threshing floor it is twelve mina; this is forbidden. If one sold his field, [the buyer] made a partial payment and [the seller] said, anytime you wish bring the remainder and take yours; this is forbidden. If one lent money on a field and said, if you do not repay me in three years from now, it will be mine, it is his; Boethos ben Zenon acted thus following the Sages.
Samuel said, if two men acted as judges, their judgment stands, but they are called an insolent court. Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both are instructing: Even if two men acted as judges, their judgment is no judgment. There, we have stated: “If he rendered judgment, acquitted the guilty and condemned the innocent, declared the pure impure or the impure pure, what he did is done but he has to pay from his own pocket.” Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Abbahu: if they told him, we accept you as if you were two. What are we dealing with? If his error was that he judged them on his discretion, then what he did is done. If his error was that he judged them by Torah law, why should he pay from his own pocket? Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Abbahu: if they told him, we accept you as if you were three on condition that you judge us by Torah law. He erred and judged them on his discretion. What he did is done, but since he erred and judged them on his discretion, he has to pay from his own pocket because he was presumptuous to judge alone by Torah law, as we have stated: “Do not judge sitting alone, for only One judges sitting alone.”
Samuel said, if two men acted as judges, their judgment stands, but they are called an insolent court. Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both are instructing: Even if two men acted as judges, their judgment is no judgment. There, we have stated: “If he rendered judgment, acquitted the guilty and condemned the innocent, declared the pure impure or the impure pure, what he did is done but he has to pay from his own pocket.” Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Abbahu: if they told him, we accept you as if you were two. What are we dealing with? If his error was that he judged them on his discretion, then what he did is done. If his error was that he judged them by Torah law, why should he pay from his own pocket? Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Abbahu: if they told him, we accept you as if you were three on condition that you judge us by Torah law. He erred and judged them on his discretion. What he did is done, but since he erred and judged them on his discretion, he has to pay from his own pocket because he was presumptuous to judge alone by Torah law, as we have stated: “Do not judge sitting alone, for only One judges sitting alone.”
It was stated: One does not make public tender for slaves, securities, and movables. [What is public tender?] Rebbi Jehudah ben Pazi said, announcement. Ulla bar Ismael said, slaves lest they flee, securities and movables lest they be stolen. Rebbi Abba bar Cohen asked before Rebbi Yose: Does this not imply that a slave be redeemed in front of three people? He answered him, yes. But did we not state: “Real estate nine and a Cohen. The same holds for humans”? He answered him, but the human here is a free person. Ḥanania bar Šelemiah in the name of Rav: A case came before Rebbi who wanted to act following the rabbis. Rebbi Eleazar ben Proteus, the grandson of Rebbi Eleazar ben Proteus, said to him: Rebbi, did you not teach us in your grandfather’s name, “except if he offered public tender”? He answered, yes, changed his mind, and acted following Rabban Gamliel.
How was he removed? When Aḥitophel saw that his counsel was not taken, he saddled his donkey, etc. Three things did Aḥitophel command his sons: Do not rebel against the dynasty of David, since we find that the Holy One, praise to Him, shows them favor even when they acted brazenly. Do not have dealings with anybody who has a lucky streak. And if Pentecost was clear, sow wheat of the best quality. But we do not know whether clear from dew or clear from šarav.
Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Jehudah. One said, they were exiles only when they were uncircumcised. The other said, they were exiled only when they were bastards. He who says uncircumcised, for circumcision and commandments. But he who says bastards, from their fathers. Rebbi Joḥanan said, Israel was exiled only after they formed 24 heretical sects. What is the reason? Son of man, I am sending you to the Children of Israel, to rebellious peoples who rebelled against Me. It is not written “to a rebellious people” but to rebellious peoples who rebelled against Me; they and their fathers have acted criminally against Me up to this day. Rebbi Berekhia and Rebbi Ḥelbo in the name of Rebbi Samuel bar Naḥman. Israel was exiled to three diasporas: one inside the river Sanbation, one to Daphne of Antiochia, and one on whom the Cloud descended and covered them. Just as they were exiled to three diasporas, so the tribes of Reuben, Gad, and half the tribe of Manasse were exiled into three diasporas. What is the reason? You went in the way of your sister and I gave her cup into your hand. So when they return, they will return from three diasporas. What is the reason? To tell the prisoners, leave, those who were exiled inside the river Sanbation; those in darkness, become visible, those upon whom the Cloud descended and covered them; on the roads they are grazing and on all plains is their pasturage, those who were exiled to Daphne of Antiochia.
A rebellious Elder who instructed to act and acted is punishable. If he instructed but did not act, he is not prosecutable. If he instructed not for application, he is not prosecutable. If he instructed for application, even if he himself did not act, he is punishable. Rebbi Hila said, Rebbi Ismael stated thus: Who would act, even in he did not act himself. Rav Huna said, if he was instructing for practice and later a case came up, one acts on his instruction. If he taught it on the occasion of a case, one acts on it for others but not for himself.
Rebbi Joḥanan said: In any case of doubt in the public domain, the doubt has to be resolved as pure, but one does not allow to act. But did we not state: “Any case of doubt which was declared pure for heave is pure for sprinkling water, and in any case where it remains unresolved for heave the sprinkling water is poured out.” There is nothing unresolved for the sprinkling water; either it is genuinely pure or genuinely impure. Rebbi Ze`ira said, the Mishnah deals with a situation not caused by a sacrifice; what Rebbi Joḥanan said refers to a situation caused by a sacrifice. Everybody agrees that if the person transgresses and acted, it is pure. The arguments of Rebbi Joḥanan are inverted. There, he says, if he transgresses and acted, it is impure. But here he said, if he transgresses and acted, it is pure. There in a private domain, here in the public domain. But you could even say, there and here in the public domain. The arguments of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish are inverted, the arguments of Rebbi Joḥanan are inverted, since they disagreed: A nazir became impure by a grave in the abyss, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, the nazir does not shave, but Rebbi Joḥanan said, the nazir has to shave. That is since Rebbi Joḥanan said, a doubt of awareness is awareness, even if the first was because of a crawling animal and the second by a corpse. The first before he converted and the second after he converted. The first before he grew two pubic hairs, the second after he grew them.
Rebbi Joḥanan said: In any case of doubt in the public domain, the doubt has to be resolved as pure, but one does not allow to act. But did we not state: “Any case of doubt which was declared pure for heave is pure for sprinkling water, and in any case where it remains unresolved for heave the sprinkling water is poured out.” There is nothing unresolved for the sprinkling water; either it is genuinely pure or genuinely impure. Rebbi Ze`ira said, the Mishnah deals with a situation not caused by a sacrifice; what Rebbi Joḥanan said refers to a situation caused by a sacrifice. Everybody agrees that if the person transgresses and acted, it is pure. The arguments of Rebbi Joḥanan are inverted. There, he says, if he transgresses and acted, it is impure. But here he said, if he transgresses and acted, it is pure. There in a private domain, here in the public domain. But you could even say, there and here in the public domain. The arguments of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish are inverted, the arguments of Rebbi Joḥanan are inverted, since they disagreed: A nazir became impure by a grave in the abyss, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, the nazir does not shave, but Rebbi Joḥanan said, the nazir has to shave. That is since Rebbi Joḥanan said, a doubt of awareness is awareness, even if the first was because of a crawling animal and the second by a corpse. The first before he converted and the second after he converted. The first before he grew two pubic hairs, the second after he grew them.
Rebbi Joḥanan said: In any case of doubt in the public domain, the doubt has to be resolved as pure, but one does not allow to act. But did we not state: “Any case of doubt which was declared pure for heave is pure for sprinkling water, and in any case where it remains unresolved for heave the sprinkling water is poured out.” There is nothing unresolved for the sprinkling water; either it is genuinely pure or genuinely impure. Rebbi Ze`ira said, the Mishnah deals with a situation not caused by a sacrifice; what Rebbi Joḥanan said refers to a situation caused by a sacrifice. Everybody agrees that if the person transgresses and acted, it is pure. The arguments of Rebbi Joḥanan are inverted. There, he says, if he transgresses and acted, it is impure. But here he said, if he transgresses and acted, it is pure. There in a private domain, here in the public domain. But you could even say, there and here in the public domain. The arguments of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish are inverted, the arguments of Rebbi Joḥanan are inverted, since they disagreed: A nazir became impure by a grave in the abyss, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, the nazir does not shave, but Rebbi Joḥanan said, the nazir has to shave. That is since Rebbi Joḥanan said, a doubt of awareness is awareness, even if the first was because of a crawling animal and the second by a corpse. The first before he converted and the second after he converted. The first before he grew two pubic hairs, the second after he grew them.
MISHNAH: If the Court ruled to violate one of the commandments spelled out in the Torah and a single person went and acted inadvertently following their pronouncement, whether they acted and he acted simultaneously with them, or they acted and he followed their example, or they did not act but he did, he is not liable since he depended on the Court. If the Court ruled but one of them knew that they erred, or a student worthy of ordination went and acted following their pronouncement, whether they acted and he acted simultaneously with them, or they acted and he followed their example, or they did not act but he did, he is liable since he did not depend on the Court. This is the principle: The person depending on himself is liable, but one depending on the Court is not liable.
MISHNAH: If the Court ruled to violate one of the commandments spelled out in the Torah and a single person went and acted inadvertently following their pronouncement, whether they acted and he acted simultaneously with them, or they acted and he followed their example, or they did not act but he did, he is not liable since he depended on the Court. If the Court ruled but one of them knew that they erred, or a student worthy of ordination went and acted following their pronouncement, whether they acted and he acted simultaneously with them, or they acted and he followed their example, or they did not act but he did, he is liable since he did not depend on the Court. This is the principle: The person depending on himself is liable, but one depending on the Court is not liable.
MISHNAH: If the Court ruled to violate one of the commandments spelled out in the Torah and a single person went and acted inadvertently following their pronouncement, whether they acted and he acted simultaneously with them, or they acted and he followed their example, or they did not act but he did, he is not liable since he depended on the Court. If the Court ruled but one of them knew that they erred, or a student worthy of ordination went and acted following their pronouncement, whether they acted and he acted simultaneously with them, or they acted and he followed their example, or they did not act but he did, he is liable since he did not depend on the Court. This is the principle: The person depending on himself is liable, but one depending on the Court is not liable.
MISHNAH: If the Court ruled to violate one of the commandments spelled out in the Torah and a single person went and acted inadvertently following their pronouncement, whether they acted and he acted simultaneously with them, or they acted and he followed their example, or they did not act but he did, he is not liable since he depended on the Court. If the Court ruled but one of them knew that they erred, or a student worthy of ordination went and acted following their pronouncement, whether they acted and he acted simultaneously with them, or they acted and he followed their example, or they did not act but he did, he is liable since he did not depend on the Court. This is the principle: The person depending on himself is liable, but one depending on the Court is not liable.
MISHNAH: If the Court ruled to violate one of the commandments spelled out in the Torah and a single person went and acted inadvertently following their pronouncement, whether they acted and he acted simultaneously with them, or they acted and he followed their example, or they did not act but he did, he is not liable since he depended on the Court. If the Court ruled but one of them knew that they erred, or a student worthy of ordination went and acted following their pronouncement, whether they acted and he acted simultaneously with them, or they acted and he followed their example, or they did not act but he did, he is liable since he did not depend on the Court. This is the principle: The person depending on himself is liable, but one depending on the Court is not liable.
MISHNAH: If the Court ruled to violate one of the commandments spelled out in the Torah and a single person went and acted inadvertently following their pronouncement, whether they acted and he acted simultaneously with them, or they acted and he followed their example, or they did not act but he did, he is not liable since he depended on the Court. If the Court ruled but one of them knew that they erred, or a student worthy of ordination went and acted following their pronouncement, whether they acted and he acted simultaneously with them, or they acted and he followed their example, or they did not act but he did, he is liable since he did not depend on the Court. This is the principle: The person depending on himself is liable, but one depending on the Court is not liable.
MISHNAH: If the Court ruled to violate one of the commandments spelled out in the Torah and a single person went and acted inadvertently following their pronouncement, whether they acted and he acted simultaneously with them, or they acted and he followed their example, or they did not act but he did, he is not liable since he depended on the Court. If the Court ruled but one of them knew that they erred, or a student worthy of ordination went and acted following their pronouncement, whether they acted and he acted simultaneously with them, or they acted and he followed their example, or they did not act but he did, he is liable since he did not depend on the Court. This is the principle: The person depending on himself is liable, but one depending on the Court is not liable.
MISHNAH: If the Court ruled to violate one of the commandments spelled out in the Torah and a single person went and acted inadvertently following their pronouncement, whether they acted and he acted simultaneously with them, or they acted and he followed their example, or they did not act but he did, he is not liable since he depended on the Court. If the Court ruled but one of them knew that they erred, or a student worthy of ordination went and acted following their pronouncement, whether they acted and he acted simultaneously with them, or they acted and he followed their example, or they did not act but he did, he is liable since he did not depend on the Court. This is the principle: The person depending on himself is liable, but one depending on the Court is not liable.
“And a single person went and acted inadvertently following their pronouncement.” Is there an intentional inadvertent action concerning an instruction by the Court? Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Our Mishnah, for example, if Simeon ben Azzai was sitting before them. Where do we hold? If he knows the entire Torah but does not know this detail, he is not Simeon ben Azzai. If he knows this particular subject but not the entire Torah, he is Simeon ben Azzai for this particular subject. But we must hold that he knows the entire Torah and knows the particular subject, but he errs to believe that the Torah said, after them, after them. If he errs to believe that the Torah said, after them, after them, he is not Simeon ben Azzai. As we have stated, I could think that if they tell you about right that it is left, and about left that it is right, you should listen to them? The verse says, “to go to the right or to the left;” that they should tell you about the right that it is right, and about the left that it is left. What about it? Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Hila: Because everywhere for an inadvertent sin one is not liable but for an intentional one is liable, and here even intentionally he is not liable.
The colleagues in the name of Samuel. The Mishnah deals with an individual who complements the multitude. But any individual who acted on his own is not liable. Rebbi Joḥanan said, even any single individual who acted on his own brings a female sheep or goat. It is difficult. In Samuel’s opinion, would any single individual be atoned by two sacrifices? Rebbi Zeˋira in the name of Samuel: The individual is suspended. If a majority ate, the court brings. If a minority ate, each individual brings. For any ruling for which the court [bring] a bull, the individual does not bring a female sheep or goat. For any ruling for which the court bring a bull, the individual does not bring a female sheep; for any ruling for which the court does not bring a bull, the individual brings a female sheep or goat. Samuel explains the Mishnah by majority and minority. If a majority ate, since the court does not bring a bull, an individual brings a female sheep or goat.
The colleagues in the name of Samuel. The Mishnah deals with an individual who complements the multitude. But any individual who acted on his own is not liable. Rebbi Joḥanan said, even any single individual who acted on his own brings a female sheep or goat. It is difficult. In Samuel’s opinion, would any single individual be atoned by two sacrifices? Rebbi Zeˋira in the name of Samuel: The individual is suspended. If a majority ate, the court brings. If a minority ate, each individual brings. For any ruling for which the court [bring] a bull, the individual does not bring a female sheep or goat. For any ruling for which the court bring a bull, the individual does not bring a female sheep; for any ruling for which the court does not bring a bull, the individual brings a female sheep or goat. Samuel explains the Mishnah by majority and minority. If a majority ate, since the court does not bring a bull, an individual brings a female sheep or goat.
Samuel spoke about the Mishnah: “I still am saying, if a minority acted they are liable because the Court will not bring a bull for them. The verse says, [from] the people of the Land. Even [all of them] (part of them), even most of them.” Rebbi Joḥanan explains the Mishnah: I still am saying, if a minority acted without ruling they are liable because with instruction the Court will not bring a bull. Samuel said, but they bring a female sheep or goat. Rebbi Joḥanan said, they do not bring a female sheep or goat. According to Samuel, who infers liability from liability, it is understandable. According to Rebbi Joḥanan, who infers liability from exemption? The statement of a baraita disagrees with Samuel. Or his transgression in which he sinned was made known to him; this excludes the apostate. A baraita disagrees with Samuel, “A person who would transgress; one would transgress; acting he would transgress; these are restrictions: the person depending on himself is liable, but one dependent on the Court is not liable.” This disagrees with Samuel and cannot be confirmed.
Samuel spoke about the Mishnah: “I still am saying, if a minority acted they are liable because the Court will not bring a bull for them. The verse says, [from] the people of the Land. Even [all of them] (part of them), even most of them.” Rebbi Joḥanan explains the Mishnah: I still am saying, if a minority acted without ruling they are liable because with instruction the Court will not bring a bull. Samuel said, but they bring a female sheep or goat. Rebbi Joḥanan said, they do not bring a female sheep or goat. According to Samuel, who infers liability from liability, it is understandable. According to Rebbi Joḥanan, who infers liability from exemption? The statement of a baraita disagrees with Samuel. Or his transgression in which he sinned was made known to him; this excludes the apostate. A baraita disagrees with Samuel, “A person who would transgress; one would transgress; acting he would transgress; these are restrictions: the person depending on himself is liable, but one dependent on the Court is not liable.” This disagrees with Samuel and cannot be confirmed.
MISHNAH: If the Court gave an instruction; then they realized that they erred and reversed themselves; whether they brought their atonement or they did not bring their atonement, another person went and acted on their instructions, Rebbi Simeon declares him not liable, but Rebbi Eliezer says, it is in doubt. What is the doubt? If he remained at home, he is liable; if he went overseas he is not liable. Rebbi Aqiba said, I agree in this case that he is closer to not being liable than being liable. Ben Azzai asked him, what is the difference between him and the one staying at home? For one who stays at home might be informed but the other one could not be informed.
MISHNAH: If the Court ruled in error and the public acted in error, they have to bring a bull; intentionally but they acted in error, they bring a female sheep or goat; in error but they acted intentionally, they are not liable.
MISHNAH: If the Court ruled in error and the public acted in error, they have to bring a bull; intentionally but they acted in error, they bring a female sheep or goat; in error but they acted intentionally, they are not liable.
MISHNAH: If the Court ruled in error and the public acted in error, they have to bring a bull; intentionally but they acted in error, they bring a female sheep or goat; in error but they acted intentionally, they are not liable.
HALAKHAH: “If the Court ruled in error,” etc. Does this not disagree with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? Since Rebbi Immi said in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Our Mishnah, for example, if Simeon ben Azzai was sitting before them. “Intentionally but they acted in error.” Is there intentional misdeed or error with respect of an instruction by the Court? The colleagues in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: If not most of the public accepted it. Rebbi Zeˋira in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, if they rebelled against their instruction. What is the difference between them? If they first accepted and then rebelled. In the opinions of the colleagues, since they rebelled, they are not liable. In the opinion of Rebbi Zeˋira, since at the first moment they accepted it, those are liable.
MISHNAH: If the Court ruled and all the public or a majority acted on their instruction, they bring a bull; or in a matter of idolatry a bull and a goat, the words of Rebbi Meïr. Rebbi Jehudah says, the Twelve Tribes bring twelve bulls and in a matter of idolatry the Twelve Tribes bring twelve bulls and twelve goats. Rebbi Simeon says, thirteen oxen, and in a matter of idolatry thirteen bulls and thirteen goats; a bull and a goat for each tribe; a bull and a goat for the Court.
HALAKHAH: “If the Court ruled and all the public acted,” etc. Who stated “a majority”? Rebbi Meïr, as it was stated: Either half of the tribes or half of each tribe, if only it be a majority. Rebbi Jehudah says, half of each tribe, but only a majority of entire tribes. One tribe drags all tribes. Rebbi Meïr says, all tribes are called “the public”. Rebbi Jehudah says, each single tribe is called “public”. And Rebbi Simeon follows Rebbi Jehudah. Just as Rebbi Jehudah said, each single tribe is called “public”, so Rebbi Simeon says, each single tribe is called “public”. What is between them? Dragging. Rebbi Jehudah says, one tribe drags all tribes. Rebbi Simeon says, one tribe does not drag all tribes. [Even though Rebbi Jehudah says, one tribe drags all tribes,] he agrees that only if the ruling came from the ashlar hall. Rebbi Yose said, the reason of that Tanna: From this place which the Eternal will choose. Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Bejamin ben Levi: The verse supports him who said that each tribe is called “public”, as it is written: A people and a public of peoples will come from you, and Benjamin was not yet born. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said, just as they differ here, so they differ about impurity, as we have stated: If the public was half pure and half impure; pure [people] celebrate the first [Passover] and impure the second. Rebbi Jehudah said, the pure ones celebrate for themselves, and the impure ones celebrate for themselves. They told him, there is no split Passover; either all celebrate in impurity or all celebrate in purity. Who is “they told him”? Following Rebbi Jehudah? As it was stated: “If one of the loaves or one of the (leftovers) [orders] became impure, Rebbi Jehudah said, both have to be brought to be burned for a public offering cannot be split. But the Sages say, the impure in its impurity, and the pure shall be eaten.” Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, who is “they told him”? The Sages who argue like Rebbi Jehudah.
MISHNAH: If the Court ruled and seven tribes or a majority acted on their saying they bring a bull and for idolatry they bring a bull and a goat, the words of Rebbi Meïr. Rebbi Jehudah says, the seven tribes who sinned bring seven bulls, and the remaining tribes who did not sin bring because of them a bull each, for also those who did not sin each bring a bull because of the sinners. Rebbi Simeon says eight bulls, and for idolatry eight oxen and eight goats, a bull and a goat for each tribe and a bull and a goat for the Court.
HALAKHAH: “If the Court ruled and seven tribes acted,” etc. It was stated: Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar says in his name, if six sinned and they are a majority. Therefore seven even though they do not form a majority are liable. Rebbi Eleazar said, he only said “six and they are a majority”. Therefore for five, even though they are a majority, they are not liable. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, a baraita said so: Half of the tribes on condition that they be most of the population. And similarly, half of the population on condition that they be most of the tribes. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, the question of the Anointed Priest, is it as from the High Court or a lower court?
MISHNAH: If the Court of one of the tribes ruled and that tribe acted on their pronouncement, that tribe is liable but any other tribes are not liable, the words of Rebbi Jehudah. But the Sages say, they are only liable for a ruling by the High Court, as it is said, if the entire congregation of Israel be in error, and something was hidden from the eyes of the congregation, not the congregation of that tribe.
Rebbi Zeˋira in the name of Rav Hamnuna: Following Rebbi Meïr. There, it was stated: If the Court ruled and the public acted. If a member of the Court died, they are not liable. If a member of the public died, they are liable. Rebbi Meïr told them, if he relieves others of their liability, not so much more for himself? They told him, he can relieve others from their liability since they have where to hang on; he cannot relieve himself of liability since he has nothing to hang on.
Rebbi Zeˋira in the name of Rav Ḥisdai. There, it was stated: “If the Court ruled, and they themselves acted, and they realized what they ruled about. If they erred in what they ruled, would they be liable? The verse says, if the sin became known, not that the sinners became known.” Anyway you take it, if about fat [ they ruled they are liable, if about Sabbath they ruled they are liable. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya said, this follows Rebbi Eliezer; it does not follow Rebbi Joshua. Rebbi Yose said, but] it follows Rebbi Joshua if they ruled and they did not know whether about idolatry or about any other commandment. If about idolatry by a bull, if about any other commandment a goat. Since it is in doubt whether a bull or [a bull and] a goat, it is a difference in sacrifice and he is not liable.
MISHNAH: If the Anointed Priest ruled for himself in error and acted in error, he brings a bull. If in error but he acted intentionally, or intentionally and he acted in error, he is not liable since the ruling of the Anointed Priest for himself is like the ruling of the Court for the public.
MISHNAH: If the Anointed Priest ruled for himself in error and acted in error, he brings a bull. If in error but he acted intentionally, or intentionally and he acted in error, he is not liable since the ruling of the Anointed Priest for himself is like the ruling of the Court for the public.
MISHNAH: If the Anointed Priest ruled for himself in error and acted in error, he brings a bull. If in error but he acted intentionally, or intentionally and he acted in error, he is not liable since the ruling of the Anointed Priest for himself is like the ruling of the Court for the public.
HALAKHAH: “If the Anointed Priest ruled,” etc. A person; if the Anointed Priest.” This makes the Anointed like a private person. Since the private person is not liable if he ate on the Court’s ruling, also neither is this one liable if he ate on the Court’s ruling. Since the private person is liable if he ate without a ruling, this one also should be liable if he ate without a ruling; the verse says, for the fault of the people. As the people are liable only if they issued a ruling, this one also is liable only if he issued a ruling. There are Tannaïm who state that the people are the Court. Since the people are liable if they instructed and others acted, this one also should be liable if he ruled and others acted. The verse says, as he sinned. He brings for what he sinned but he does not bring for what others sinned. There are Tannaïm who state that the people are the public. Since the people are liable if others ruled and they acted, this one also should be liable if others ruled and he acted. The verse says, as he sinned. He brings for what he sinned but he does not bring for what others sinned. Rebbi Jacob in the name of Rebbi Eleazar. Only if he is competent to argue about practice. Otherwise, would we say the incompetents give instructions? The anointed who ate following the Court’s prescript is not liable; following another Anointed’s prescript he is liable. Following the Court’s prescript he is not liable, since the prescript of others is nothing compared to their prescripts. Following another Anointed’s prescript he is liable, on condition that he instructed similarly.
HALAKHAH: “If the Anointed Priest ruled,” etc. A person; if the Anointed Priest.” This makes the Anointed like a private person. Since the private person is not liable if he ate on the Court’s ruling, also neither is this one liable if he ate on the Court’s ruling. Since the private person is liable if he ate without a ruling, this one also should be liable if he ate without a ruling; the verse says, for the fault of the people. As the people are liable only if they issued a ruling, this one also is liable only if he issued a ruling. There are Tannaïm who state that the people are the Court. Since the people are liable if they instructed and others acted, this one also should be liable if he ruled and others acted. The verse says, as he sinned. He brings for what he sinned but he does not bring for what others sinned. There are Tannaïm who state that the people are the public. Since the people are liable if others ruled and they acted, this one also should be liable if others ruled and he acted. The verse says, as he sinned. He brings for what he sinned but he does not bring for what others sinned. Rebbi Jacob in the name of Rebbi Eleazar. Only if he is competent to argue about practice. Otherwise, would we say the incompetents give instructions? The anointed who ate following the Court’s prescript is not liable; following another Anointed’s prescript he is liable. Following the Court’s prescript he is not liable, since the prescript of others is nothing compared to their prescripts. Following another Anointed’s prescript he is liable, on condition that he instructed similarly.
HALAKHAH: “If the Anointed Priest ruled,” etc. A person; if the Anointed Priest.” This makes the Anointed like a private person. Since the private person is not liable if he ate on the Court’s ruling, also neither is this one liable if he ate on the Court’s ruling. Since the private person is liable if he ate without a ruling, this one also should be liable if he ate without a ruling; the verse says, for the fault of the people. As the people are liable only if they issued a ruling, this one also is liable only if he issued a ruling. There are Tannaïm who state that the people are the Court. Since the people are liable if they instructed and others acted, this one also should be liable if he ruled and others acted. The verse says, as he sinned. He brings for what he sinned but he does not bring for what others sinned. There are Tannaïm who state that the people are the public. Since the people are liable if others ruled and they acted, this one also should be liable if others ruled and he acted. The verse says, as he sinned. He brings for what he sinned but he does not bring for what others sinned. Rebbi Jacob in the name of Rebbi Eleazar. Only if he is competent to argue about practice. Otherwise, would we say the incompetents give instructions? The anointed who ate following the Court’s prescript is not liable; following another Anointed’s prescript he is liable. Following the Court’s prescript he is not liable, since the prescript of others is nothing compared to their prescripts. Following another Anointed’s prescript he is liable, on condition that he instructed similarly.
HALAKHAH: “If the Anointed Priest ruled,” etc. A person; if the Anointed Priest.” This makes the Anointed like a private person. Since the private person is not liable if he ate on the Court’s ruling, also neither is this one liable if he ate on the Court’s ruling. Since the private person is liable if he ate without a ruling, this one also should be liable if he ate without a ruling; the verse says, for the fault of the people. As the people are liable only if they issued a ruling, this one also is liable only if he issued a ruling. There are Tannaïm who state that the people are the Court. Since the people are liable if they instructed and others acted, this one also should be liable if he ruled and others acted. The verse says, as he sinned. He brings for what he sinned but he does not bring for what others sinned. There are Tannaïm who state that the people are the public. Since the people are liable if others ruled and they acted, this one also should be liable if others ruled and he acted. The verse says, as he sinned. He brings for what he sinned but he does not bring for what others sinned. Rebbi Jacob in the name of Rebbi Eleazar. Only if he is competent to argue about practice. Otherwise, would we say the incompetents give instructions? The anointed who ate following the Court’s prescript is not liable; following another Anointed’s prescript he is liable. Following the Court’s prescript he is not liable, since the prescript of others is nothing compared to their prescripts. Following another Anointed’s prescript he is liable, on condition that he instructed similarly.
MISHNAH: If he ruled for himself and acted for himself, it is atoned for himself. If he ruled with the public and acted with the public, it is atoned for him with the public. As the Court is not liable unless they instruct to void part and confirm part, so is the Anointed. Also for idolatry they are not liable unless they instruct to void part and confirm part.
MISHNAH: If he ruled for himself and acted for himself, it is atoned for himself. If he ruled with the public and acted with the public, it is atoned for him with the public. As the Court is not liable unless they instruct to void part and confirm part, so is the Anointed. Also for idolatry they are not liable unless they instruct to void part and confirm part.
HALAKHAH: “If he ruled for himself,” etc. The Court ruled, he ruled following them, and then changed. It is obvious that for him it is the equivalent of uprooting the whole. But if he ruled first, the Court then ruled following him, and afterwards they reversed themselves. Nevertheless is it for him the equivalent of uprooting the whole, or because he ruled first, but his ruling was overturned by their ruling, for him it should not be the equivalent of uprooting the whole? If the Court ruled and he ruled following them, it is obvious that he is not liable if he ate according to the ruling of the Court. But after the Court reversed itself, he is liable. Rebbi Yose said, is that not the Mishnah? “If he ruled for himself [and acted for himself], it is atoned for himself.” Because he ruled for himself and acted for himself. “But if he ruled with the public and acted with the public, it is atoned for him with the public.” Because he ruled with the public and acted with the public, but “if he ruled for himself [and acted for himself], it is atoned for himself.”
HALAKHAH: “If he ruled for himself,” etc. The Court ruled, he ruled following them, and then changed. It is obvious that for him it is the equivalent of uprooting the whole. But if he ruled first, the Court then ruled following him, and afterwards they reversed themselves. Nevertheless is it for him the equivalent of uprooting the whole, or because he ruled first, but his ruling was overturned by their ruling, for him it should not be the equivalent of uprooting the whole? If the Court ruled and he ruled following them, it is obvious that he is not liable if he ate according to the ruling of the Court. But after the Court reversed itself, he is liable. Rebbi Yose said, is that not the Mishnah? “If he ruled for himself [and acted for himself], it is atoned for himself.” Because he ruled for himself and acted for himself. “But if he ruled with the public and acted with the public, it is atoned for him with the public.” Because he ruled with the public and acted with the public, but “if he ruled for himself [and acted for himself], it is atoned for himself.”
HALAKHAH: “If he ruled for himself,” etc. The Court ruled, he ruled following them, and then changed. It is obvious that for him it is the equivalent of uprooting the whole. But if he ruled first, the Court then ruled following him, and afterwards they reversed themselves. Nevertheless is it for him the equivalent of uprooting the whole, or because he ruled first, but his ruling was overturned by their ruling, for him it should not be the equivalent of uprooting the whole? If the Court ruled and he ruled following them, it is obvious that he is not liable if he ate according to the ruling of the Court. But after the Court reversed itself, he is liable. Rebbi Yose said, is that not the Mishnah? “If he ruled for himself [and acted for himself], it is atoned for himself.” Because he ruled for himself and acted for himself. “But if he ruled with the public and acted with the public, it is atoned for him with the public.” Because he ruled with the public and acted with the public, but “if he ruled for himself [and acted for himself], it is atoned for himself.”
HALAKHAH: “If he ruled for himself,” etc. The Court ruled, he ruled following them, and then changed. It is obvious that for him it is the equivalent of uprooting the whole. But if he ruled first, the Court then ruled following him, and afterwards they reversed themselves. Nevertheless is it for him the equivalent of uprooting the whole, or because he ruled first, but his ruling was overturned by their ruling, for him it should not be the equivalent of uprooting the whole? If the Court ruled and he ruled following them, it is obvious that he is not liable if he ate according to the ruling of the Court. But after the Court reversed itself, he is liable. Rebbi Yose said, is that not the Mishnah? “If he ruled for himself [and acted for himself], it is atoned for himself.” Because he ruled for himself and acted for himself. “But if he ruled with the public and acted with the public, it is atoned for him with the public.” Because he ruled with the public and acted with the public, but “if he ruled for himself [and acted for himself], it is atoned for himself.”
HALAKHAH: “If he ruled for himself,” etc. The Court ruled, he ruled following them, and then changed. It is obvious that for him it is the equivalent of uprooting the whole. But if he ruled first, the Court then ruled following him, and afterwards they reversed themselves. Nevertheless is it for him the equivalent of uprooting the whole, or because he ruled first, but his ruling was overturned by their ruling, for him it should not be the equivalent of uprooting the whole? If the Court ruled and he ruled following them, it is obvious that he is not liable if he ate according to the ruling of the Court. But after the Court reversed itself, he is liable. Rebbi Yose said, is that not the Mishnah? “If he ruled for himself [and acted for himself], it is atoned for himself.” Because he ruled for himself and acted for himself. “But if he ruled with the public and acted with the public, it is atoned for him with the public.” Because he ruled with the public and acted with the public, but “if he ruled for himself [and acted for himself], it is atoned for himself.”
HALAKHAH: “They are liable only for forgetting,” etc. Rebbi Zeˋira in the name of Rav Jeremiah. The Mishnah is Rebbi Meïr’s or has inferences like Rebbi Meïr. Rebbi Yose said, Rebbi Meïr who said, it is an obligation of the Court. Rebbi Mana said, following Rebbi Meïr. There, it was stated: If the Court ruled and the public acted. If a member of the Court died, they are not liable. If a member of the public died, they are liable. Rebbi Meïr told them, if he relieves others of their liability, not so much more for himself? They told him, he can relieve others of their liability since they have where to hang on; he cannot relieve himself of liability since he has nothing to hang on.
“And black, like ink-stone.” How do you check that? Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav Jehudah: One takes the ink-stone and puts in on white leather. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, on colored leather. Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of the rabbis: Black like a raven, black like a grape berry, black like asphalt are pure. The colleagues in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Black like liquid ink is pure. Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Like a felt hat imported from overseas is impure. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Immi: Are all these facts to be acted upon? He answered him, yes. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, all of them, if they are lighter than the standard they are pure, darker than the standard impure. Rebbi Joḥanan said, all of them, if they are lighter than the standard they are pure, darker than the standard pure except for black. The Mishnah supports Rebbi Joḥanan, as we have stated: “And black like ink-stone is impure, lighter than that is pure.” Therefore, darker than that is impure, but only black was mentioned in that connection. Therefore, all others, even if they are darker than the standards, are pure. The town of Rav Jehudah followed Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish but Rav Jehudah himself followed Rebbi Joḥanan. Bar Qappara stated a support for Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish but one does not follow him in practice, since Rebbi Ḥanina mixed wine for Bar Qappara and asked him, if it is like that, what is its status? He answered, impure. He lightened it, then he answered, pure. He said to him, peace shall be on him who erred with his mouth but not with his eyes. They wanted to say that he who says pure, refers to when it was polished. But he who says impure , if it is not polished. Let us hear from the following: It happened that a woman from the Patriarchate had a discharge of black blood. The case came before Rebbi Jacob bar Zabdi and Rebbi Isaac bar Ṭabelai; they wanted to declare her impure. Rebbi Ḥelbo told them: So says Rav Huna in the name of Rav: Black which penetrates is pure, that which polishes is impure. He said that only about black. Therefore, all others are pure even if they polish.
The Babylonian Talmud
He replied, "I have acted according to the teaching of Bet Hillel, and thou according to the teaching of Bet Shammai. Not only that, [I sat up] lest the disciples see this and fix the Halakah for future generations."
Rab Ezekiel taught : If a man acted in accordance with the view of Bet Shammai, he has done [rightly] ; if in accordance with the view of Bet Hillel, he has done [rightly].
Rab Joseph said : If he acted in accordance with the view of Bet Shammai, he has done nothing at all. For there is a Mishnaic teaching : If the head and greater part of a man's body be in a Sukkah and his table inside his house, Bet Shammai pronounce it invalid, but Bet Hillel declare it valid.
Rab Nahman b. Isaac said : If one acted according to the view of Bet Shammai, he is worthy of death ; for we have learnt in our Mishnah: R. Tarphon said: I was once journeying by the way and I reclined to read [the Shema'] according to the view of Bet Shammai, and I placed myself in danger on account of robbers. They said to him : Thou didst justly incur a penalty for thyself, in that thou didst transgress the view of Bet Hillel.
But there is a difficulty in the matter of expectoration! No, there is no difficulty; for it may be [that Rabbi acted] according to the teaching of Rab Judah who said : If one is standing in prayer and his spittle collected in his mouth, he may empty it into his Tallit, and if his Tallit is costly, he may empty it into his underwear. Rabina was once standing before Rab Ashe [during prayer], and the spittle collected in the latter's mouth, and he expectorated behind him. Rabina said to him, "Does not the master hold the opinion of Rab Judah that one should empty his spittle into his underwear?" He replied, "I am fastidious [in this matter]."
On the contrary, from the fact that Rab Huna and the Rabbis did not say the [Sabbath]- Tefillah until it was night, conclude that the Halakah is not in agreement with R. Judah. Since it has not been reported whether the Halakah accords with either, he who acted in agreement with the one did rightly, and he who acted in agreement with the other did rightly.
On the contrary, from the fact that Rab Huna and the Rabbis did not say the [Sabbath]- Tefillah until it was night, conclude that the Halakah is not in agreement with R. Judah. Since it has not been reported whether the Halakah accords with either, he who acted in agreement with the one did rightly, and he who acted in agreement with the other did rightly.
The Rabbis act according to our Miahnah ; Rab Ashe acted according to the Baraita.
Raba bent the knee at the beginning and end of the "Thanksgiving," The Rabbis asked him, "Why has the master acted so?" He replied, "I saw Rab Nahman bend the knee, and I saw Rab Sheshet do it.
Abbai said : Many acted in accord with the teaching of R. Ishmael and it proved efficacious ; but he who acted in accord with R. Simeon b. Johai did not find it so.
Abbai said : Many acted in accord with the teaching of R. Ishmael and it proved efficacious ; but he who acted in accord with R. Simeon b. Johai did not find it so.
then he would have informed us of the explanation and also intimated that the Halakah is in accord with the Rabbis. But since he said mosi', what does he wish us to infer?" But Rab Zebid acted thus to exclude himself from the divergence of opinion,
The people of Nehardea acted according to R. Hiyya, but the Rabbis acted according to Raba. Rabina said : My mother told me, "Thy father acted according to R. Hiyya, for R. Hiyya maintained that the benediction must conclude with [the breaking of] the bread ; but the Rabbis acted according to Raba." The Halakah is in agreement with Raba who maintained that one should say the benediction and afterwards break the bread.
The people of Nehardea acted according to R. Hiyya, but the Rabbis acted according to Raba. Rabina said : My mother told me, "Thy father acted according to R. Hiyya, for R. Hiyya maintained that the benediction must conclude with [the breaking of] the bread ; but the Rabbis acted according to Raba." The Halakah is in agreement with Raba who maintained that one should say the benediction and afterwards break the bread.
The people of Nehardea acted according to R. Hiyya, but the Rabbis acted according to Raba. Rabina said : My mother told me, "Thy father acted according to R. Hiyya, for R. Hiyya maintained that the benediction must conclude with [the breaking of] the bread ; but the Rabbis acted according to Raba." The Halakah is in agreement with Raba who maintained that one should say the benediction and afterwards break the bread.
The people of Nehardea acted according to R. Hiyya, but the Rabbis acted according to Raba. Rabina said : My mother told me, "Thy father acted according to R. Hiyya, for R. Hiyya maintained that the benediction must conclude with [the breaking of] the bread ; but the Rabbis acted according to Raba." The Halakah is in agreement with Raba who maintained that one should say the benediction and afterwards break the bread.
Mar Zotra acted in accord with Rab Isaac b. Abdemi, and Rab Shimi b. Ashe in accord with R. Isaac. (A mnemonic for thee is : One in accord with two and two in accord with one.)