animal
1216 occurrences across the corpus
The Babylonian Talmud
as R. Yitzchak said in the name of R. Yohanan: It is forbidden to eat from an animal from which the priestly dues have not been taken out; and R. Yitzchak further said: To eat from an animal from which the priestly dues have not been taken out is like eating untithed produce. The halakhah does not follow him.
as R. Yitzchak said in the name of R. Yohanan: It is forbidden to eat from an animal from which the priestly dues have not been taken out; and R. Yitzchak further said: To eat from an animal from which the priestly dues have not been taken out is like eating untithed produce. The halakhah does not follow him.
They made him as one unclean through touching a dead animal. But regard it thus. Such an unclean thing will not make a man unclean by touching him. Perhaps it will not, you will say. But then to what purpose is the Baraitha, viz., He that cuts it and dips it, needs dipping? Or was it that they made him as one who is unclean by touching a dead man? If so, this would require the purifications of the third and seventh days. To what purpose is the Baraitha, He that cuts it and dips it, needs dipping? Dipping, yes; but the purifications of the third and seventh days, no. But was it that they made him as one who is unclean by touching a dead man on his seventh day? But lo, there is a Baraitha, viz., They absolutely refrain from making any new ordinance in the case of the heifer. But Abai said, They do not say that a spade makes unclean when used as a seat, according to the teaching, "And he that sitteth upon the vessel" (Lev. xv. 6). I might have thought, If he were to turn a two gallon measure upside down, and sit upon it, or a peck measure, and sit upon it, he would be unclean. But no; I should have been wrong, for the teaching says, "And he that sitteth upon the vessel, upon which there sitteth—" (ibid.), shall be unclean. But it must mean, that which is intended for sitting, and the other is excepted, for if he sit upon it, he will be told, Stand up and let us do our work.
And [we find a] similar [rule] with regard to paying a fine. If two [witnesses] come and say that a person stole [an animal], and slaughtered or sold it on Sunday, and two [other witnesses] come and say that you [the first group] were with us on Sunday, but the person did steal the animal and slaughter or sell it on Monday,
And [we find a] similar [rule] with regard to paying a fine. If two [witnesses] come and say that a person stole [an animal], and slaughtered or sold it on Sunday, and two [other witnesses] come and say that you [the first group] were with us on Sunday, but the person did steal the animal and slaughter or sell it on Monday,
and even if they [the second group of witnesses] say that the person stole [the animal] and slaughtered or sold it on [the previous] Friday, they [the first group of witnesses] are found liable to pay [the intended fine as zomemim] because at the time that they testified, the man [the accused] was not yet found liable to the fine.
If two [witnesses] come and say, A person stole [an animal], slaughtered or sold it, and had a [guilty] verdict on Sunday, and two [other witnesses] come and say that you [the first group] were with us on Sunday, but the person did steal the animal, slaughter or sell it, and receive a [guilty] verdict on [the previous] Friday, and even if they [the second group of witnesses] say that the person stole [the animal], slaughtered or sold it, and received a [guilty] verdict on Monday, they [the first group of witnesses] are not found liable to pay [the intended fine as zomemim] because at the time that they testified, the man [the accused] was already found liable to the fine.
If two [witnesses] come and say, A person stole [an animal], slaughtered or sold it, and had a [guilty] verdict on Sunday, and two [other witnesses] come and say that you [the first group] were with us on Sunday, but the person did steal the animal, slaughter or sell it, and receive a [guilty] verdict on [the previous] Friday, and even if they [the second group of witnesses] say that the person stole [the animal], slaughtered or sold it, and received a [guilty] verdict on Monday, they [the first group of witnesses] are not found liable to pay [the intended fine as zomemim] because at the time that they testified, the man [the accused] was already found liable to the fine.
If two [witnesses] come and say, A person stole [an animal], slaughtered or sold it, and had a [guilty] verdict on Sunday, and two [other witnesses] come and say that you [the first group] were with us on Sunday, but the person did steal the animal, slaughter or sell it, and receive a [guilty] verdict on [the previous] Friday, and even if they [the second group of witnesses] say that the person stole [the animal], slaughtered or sold it, and received a [guilty] verdict on Monday, they [the first group of witnesses] are not found liable to pay [the intended fine as zomemim] because at the time that they testified, the man [the accused] was already found liable to the fine.
“Without awareness” (Deuteronomy 19:4) excludes intentionality. Intentionality is obvious! He is liable for death!? Rabbah said: This excludes [when] he intends to kill an animal and kills a person, [when he intends to kill] a Cutite and kills a Jew, [when he intends to kill] a stillbirth and kills a viable infant.
And they [Rav Hisda and Rava] go according to their principles, as it was stated [in an Amoraic teaching]: He thought that it was an animal and [after he killed him] it was found to be a person, or if he thought it was a non-Jew and it was found to be a resident foreigner, Rava says: He is liable. One who says it was permitted is [a case of] gross negligence. Rav Hisda says: He is exempt. One who says it was permitted is [a case of] freak accident.
According to the opinion that it is invalid [the reason is] that the Torah says (Exodus 13, 9) "In order that the Torah of God should be in your mouth" which compares the whole Torah to Tefillin. Just as Tefillin is a law from Moshe at [Mt.] Sinai to tie them with sinews, so too the whole [Torah] has to be tied with sinews. And the other [opinion holds], in what aspect was it compared? That it must be [from an animal] permitted to the mouth. For the rest of it's laws, it wasn't compared.
Or one who slaughtered and brought up an animal outside [the Temple]. One who ate chometz on Pesach, one who ate or did work on Yom Kippur, One who replicated the anointing oil, one who replicated the ketoras, one who anointed himself with the anointing oil, one who ate carcasses, treif animals, insects, or reptiles.
And from where does Rebbi Yitzchak learn [re'shia bar re'shia]? He learns it out from a kal v'chomer (fortiori), That it was taught in a barasia, Rabbi Akiva says, I asked Raban Gmaliel ad Rebbi Yehosua [while] in the meat market of Iemus, (that they had traveled to to purchase an animal for the wedding feast of Rabban Gamliel's son), If one had [inadvertently] cohabited with his sister, who was his father's sister, who his mother's sister, what would the halacha be? Would he only be liable one sacrifice for all of them, or would he be liable [a separate sacrifice] for each one?
Rava asked, (Deuteronomy 14,6) "And any animal that has split hooves and has the hoof completely split into two and chews its cud,among the animals that you may eat". "That" you may eat, but a different animal you may not eat. And if it is as you say then why do I need (Deuteronomy 14,7) "This you may not eat"?
Rava asked, (Deuteronomy 14,6) "And any animal that has split hooves and has the hoof completely split into two and chews its cud,among the animals that you may eat". "That" you may eat, but a different animal you may not eat. And if it is as you say then why do I need (Deuteronomy 14,7) "This you may not eat"?