declares
469 occurrences across the corpus
The Jerusalem Talmud
“And Rebbi Joshua [follows] the House of Hillel.” For the House of Hillel say, even if she burned his food. Therefore, he says it is optional. If he wants to declare his jealousy, he declares his jealousy; if he wants to divorce her, he divorces her.
It was stated: “Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah says in the name of Rebbi Eliezer, he declares his jealousy by the testimony of one witness or his own testimony; he takes her to drink on the testimony of two witnesses.” It is said here: “For he found in her a word of nakedness”; “finding” anywhere has to be validated by witnesses. How does Rebbi Eliezer explain “a word”? A circumstance that brings into the habit of nakedness. May a single witness let him take her to drink? His own testimony can never obligate him to swear in money matters but it will let him take her to drink, a single witness who will obligate him to swear in money matters not so much more? May a relative bring her to drink? Who is a closer relative than her husband? May a hearsay witness bring her to drink? What is the difference between him and a relative? A relative may be disabled today but he might be enabled later, a hearsay witness is not acceptable either today or later.
They answered on the words of Rebbi Yose ben Jehudah: If so, there is no end to it. If he is believed, he declares his jealousy (before two) [by himself], brings witnesses that she was in a secluded place and disables her from receiving the ketubah. Rebbi Yose said, what business did she have in a secluded place? But it refers to the statement in the Mishnah. Is he believed to declare formally his jealousy and then say that she was in a secluded place and disable her from receiving her ketubah? Rebbi Mana said, even for that other Tanna it is [a] valid [objection], following him who says that he may declare his jealousy in respect to her father or her son. Is he believed to declare his jealousy with respect to her father and her son, can he then bring witnesses that she was in a secluded place with them and disable her from receiving her ketubah? If you ask, what business did she have in a secluded place? The Torah permitted her to be in a secluded place, since Rebbi Joḥanan said in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Ioḥai, it is written: “If your brother, your mother’s son, incites you, etc.,” Your daughter, in secret; your mother, in secret; a man may be alone with his mother and dwell with her, with his daughter and dwell with her, with his sister but may not dwell with her.
There, we have stated: “One does not make the proselyte drink, etc. But the Sages say, one makes her drink.” Where do we hold? If about an Israel who married a proselyte, it already is written: “The sons of Israel” (not proselytes). If about a proselyte who married a Jewish girl, it already is written: “The man has to bring his wife to the Cohen.” But we must hold about a proselyte who married a proselyte. What is the reason of Rebbi Aqiba? “The children of Israel”, not proselytes. What is the reason of the Sages? “You shall say to them”, to add everything written in that paragraph. What is written in that paragraph? “A man slept with her”. His lying with her makes her forbidden, then her husband declares his jealousy and makes her drink.
HALAKHAH: “It would have been logical: Since the first testimony,” etc. The first testimony is about being in a secluded place; the last testimony is about impurity. The Mishnah follows Rebbi Joshua, since Rebbi Joshua says, “he declares his jealousy and warns her by the testimony of two [witnesses], and makes her drink by the testimony of two [witnesses].” Rebbi Mana said, it even follows the Tanna, about whom was stated: “Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah says in the name of Rebbi Eliezer: He declares his jealousy before one witness or by himself, but makes her drink by the testimony of two [witnesses].”
HALAKHAH: “It would have been logical: Since the first testimony,” etc. The first testimony is about being in a secluded place; the last testimony is about impurity. The Mishnah follows Rebbi Joshua, since Rebbi Joshua says, “he declares his jealousy and warns her by the testimony of two [witnesses], and makes her drink by the testimony of two [witnesses].” Rebbi Mana said, it even follows the Tanna, about whom was stated: “Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah says in the name of Rebbi Eliezer: He declares his jealousy before one witness or by himself, but makes her drink by the testimony of two [witnesses].”
Rebbi Eleazar said to him: Is not the dough widow qualified but her daughter is disqualified? He said to him, whoever declares her to be qualified, declares her daughter to be qualified. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, did he not say “whoever declares her to be qualified”? This implies that there is another who disqualifies! Who declares qualified? Rebbi Meïr. Who disqualifies? The rabbis. As we have stated: What is qualified dough, anyone about whom there is [no suspicion of descent from] a desecrated, a bastard, or a Gibeonite. Rebbi Meïr says, the daughter of any woman not tainted with one of these is qualified for thepriesthood. But about a family in which a disability had disappeared, Rebbi Meïr says he checks up to four mothers and marries, but the Sages say, he checks forever.
Rebbi Eleazar said to him: Is not the dough widow qualified but her daughter is disqualified? He said to him, whoever declares her to be qualified, declares her daughter to be qualified. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, did he not say “whoever declares her to be qualified”? This implies that there is another who disqualifies! Who declares qualified? Rebbi Meïr. Who disqualifies? The rabbis. As we have stated: What is qualified dough, anyone about whom there is [no suspicion of descent from] a desecrated, a bastard, or a Gibeonite. Rebbi Meïr says, the daughter of any woman not tainted with one of these is qualified for thepriesthood. But about a family in which a disability had disappeared, Rebbi Meïr says he checks up to four mothers and marries, but the Sages say, he checks forever.
Rebbi Eleazar said to him: Is not the dough widow qualified but her daughter is disqualified? He said to him, whoever declares her to be qualified, declares her daughter to be qualified. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, did he not say “whoever declares her to be qualified”? This implies that there is another who disqualifies! Who declares qualified? Rebbi Meïr. Who disqualifies? The rabbis. As we have stated: What is qualified dough, anyone about whom there is [no suspicion of descent from] a desecrated, a bastard, or a Gibeonite. Rebbi Meïr says, the daughter of any woman not tainted with one of these is qualified for thepriesthood. But about a family in which a disability had disappeared, Rebbi Meïr says he checks up to four mothers and marries, but the Sages say, he checks forever.
Rebbi Eleazar said to him: Is not the dough widow qualified but her daughter is disqualified? He said to him, whoever declares her to be qualified, declares her daughter to be qualified. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, did he not say “whoever declares her to be qualified”? This implies that there is another who disqualifies! Who declares qualified? Rebbi Meïr. Who disqualifies? The rabbis. As we have stated: What is qualified dough, anyone about whom there is [no suspicion of descent from] a desecrated, a bastard, or a Gibeonite. Rebbi Meïr says, the daughter of any woman not tainted with one of these is qualified for thepriesthood. But about a family in which a disability had disappeared, Rebbi Meïr says he checks up to four mothers and marries, but the Sages say, he checks forever.
Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira had a different version: Rebbi Eleazar asked Rebbi Joḥanan, what is the rule about a dough widow? He said to him, she is qualified. What about her daughter? He said to him, the one who declares her to be qualified, declares her daughter to be qualified. They wanted to say, according to Rebbi Eleazar, a child of unknown paternity is disqualified; according to Rebbi Joḥanan, a child of unknown paternity is qualified. Rebbi Joḥanan also holds that in some cases a child of unknown paternity is disqualified; he answered [Rebbi Eleazar] following the latter’s reasoning: Since you reason that the child is simply of unknown paternity, we find that a child of unknown paternity can be High Priest! How is this possible? A group of Cohanim was passing by, one of them came and had sexual relations; it turns out that the child of unknown paternity can be High Priest.
Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira had a different version: Rebbi Eleazar asked Rebbi Joḥanan, what is the rule about a dough widow? He said to him, she is qualified. What about her daughter? He said to him, the one who declares her to be qualified, declares her daughter to be qualified. They wanted to say, according to Rebbi Eleazar, a child of unknown paternity is disqualified; according to Rebbi Joḥanan, a child of unknown paternity is qualified. Rebbi Joḥanan also holds that in some cases a child of unknown paternity is disqualified; he answered [Rebbi Eleazar] following the latter’s reasoning: Since you reason that the child is simply of unknown paternity, we find that a child of unknown paternity can be High Priest! How is this possible? A group of Cohanim was passing by, one of them came and had sexual relations; it turns out that the child of unknown paternity can be High Priest.
Rebbi Ḥinena said before Rebbi Mana: Even if Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish thought the entire Mishnaiot were Rebbi Meïr’s, does the verse agree with Rebbi Meïr? Is it not written (Lev. 22:14): “If a person ate consecrated food in error”? But Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish must hold that the fifth is a sacrifice. But even if he holds that the fifth is a sacrifice, can the principal be a sacrifice? Rebbi Yudan bar Shalom said, the Mishnah declares that the principal is a fine, as we have stated: “He does not pay in heave but in totally profane food which is turned into heave.” If he had to pay from what he ate, it would be fine. And it was stated: “If he ate impure heave, he has to pay in pure profane food, but if he paid in impure profane, he discharged his obligation.” Does he not owe him the price of wood? That shows that the principal is a fine and since the principal is a fine, the fifth also is a fine. But Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish follows his own opinion. Just as Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, there, everybody was under the obligation of (Ex. 20:16) “Do not become a false witness against your neighbor”, but this one was treated separately, (Deut. 19:19) “do to him what he intended to do to his brother”, to pay money; also here, everybody was under the obligation of (Lev. 22:10) “no outsider shall eat holy [food],” but this one was treated separately, (Lev. 22:14) “if somebody should eat holy [food] in error,” to pay money.
“I did not vow as a nazir,” he is permitted. “I already had been a nazir,” he is forbidden. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Avina, Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Yose bar Ḥanina: If somebody says, I am like ‘orlah juice, he did not say anything. The colleagues say, that follows Rebbi Simeon in a disagreement. As we have stated there: “If somebody said, an oath that I shall not eat, but he ate carcass or torn meat, abominations or crawling things, he is guilty. But Rebbi Simeon declares him free from prosecution.” Rebbi Ze‘ira said, they disagree if it is an inclusive statement. But if it is a detailed statement, everybody agrees that no oath can be applied to prohibitions. And here, we consider an inclusive statement. Rebbi Yudan said, one is about vows, the other about oaths. Vows can be applied to prohibitions but no oaths can be applied to prohibitions.
Does the Mishnah follow Rebbi Simeon? For “Rebbi Simeon declares him free, because his offering was not according to the way of offerers.” And Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said, there is a difference because he reserved shaving. Rebbi Jeremiah asked: If it is because he reserved shaving, does not the following state “it is forbidden to him, but Rebbi Simeon permits.” Did he not reserve shaving [and] impurity but Rebbi Simeon frees him? There is a difference, because of an opening for the vow. If it was because of an opening for the vow, does not the following state “he is permitted but Rebbi Simeon forbids”? Rebbi Simeon does not recognize it as an opening for the vow but the rabbis recognize it as an opening for the vow. Why? Because he connects his vow with his life. One understands, to drink wine. The defile oneself for the dead? It is his profession to bury the dead.
If he left and re-entered, Rebbi Ṭarphon frees him from prosecution, Rebbi Aqiba declares him guilty. Rebbi Ṭarphon said to him, what did this one add to his desecration? Rebbi Aqiba said, as long as he was there, he was defiling himself by the impurity of seven days. When he left, he was defiling himself by the impurity of evening. When he re-entered, defiling himself by the impurity of (evening). Rebbi Ṭarphon told him, Aqiba! Any who leaves you is as if he left his life.
The following is obvious: If her husband did not dissolve for the first [woman] and she transgressed her vow, she is whipped. Can the second be whipped? Rebbi Yose said, since one is whipped, the other also is whipped. Rebbi La said, this follows Rebbi Simeon. Can the second not be considered like one who said, I am a nezirah after twenty days? Rebbi Simeon follows his own opinion; for Rebbi Simeon declares him free, because his offering was not according to the custom of offerers.
Do stillbirths generate “decay”? For him who says that their blood induces impurity by a quartarius they generate “decay”; for him who says that their blood does not induce impurity by a quartarius, do they generate “decay”? Let us hear from the following: “Why is the dust from small heaps impure? Because women bury there their stillbirths.” Rebbi Yudan, the father of Rebbi Mattaniah, said: Would it not be reasonable otherwise, that lepers bury their limbs there? You must say that it is because of “decay”, not because a bone the size of a lentil, since it was stated: “If he took some dust from it and replaced it, [the small heap] is pure.” Explain it following Tannaïm, as it was stated: If one removed it, it remains impure; Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel declares it pure.
HALAKHAH: “If a person said to two nezirim,” etc. Not only if he said to one of them, “I saw one of you becoming impure but I do not know which one of you it was,” but even if he said, “I saw one of you vowing to be a nazir but I do not know which one of you it was,” both of them have to follow the rules of nazir because of his testimony. If they do not contradict him. But if they contradict him, this does not apply. If both of them contradict, it parallels the following: “If one witness says, he became impure, but he says, I did not become impure, he is pure. If two witnesses say, he became impure, but he says, I did not become impure, the two are believed more than he is, the words of Rebbi Meïr. But the Sages say, everybody is believed about himself.” Rav Jehudah in the name of Rav: So is the Mishnah: Rebbi Meïr declares impure, Rebbi Jehudah and the Sages declare pure. Rebbi Joḥanan said, so is the Mishnah: Rebbi Meïr declares impure, Rebbi Jehudah declares pure. The rabbis’ words support Rebbi Joḥanan, since Rebbi Gurion said in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: Rebbi Jehudah said this only about an old impurity, for he can say to them, I had been impure but I purified myself, and we have stated: The same holds for eating suet; the same holds for entering the Sanctuary. Should they not accept his position for impurity? Because of the impurity of a nazir, could they not say, where is the sacrifice which you brought? Then should they not accept his position for heave? So far the questions of Rebbi Ḥanina.
HALAKHAH: “If a person said to two nezirim,” etc. Not only if he said to one of them, “I saw one of you becoming impure but I do not know which one of you it was,” but even if he said, “I saw one of you vowing to be a nazir but I do not know which one of you it was,” both of them have to follow the rules of nazir because of his testimony. If they do not contradict him. But if they contradict him, this does not apply. If both of them contradict, it parallels the following: “If one witness says, he became impure, but he says, I did not become impure, he is pure. If two witnesses say, he became impure, but he says, I did not become impure, the two are believed more than he is, the words of Rebbi Meïr. But the Sages say, everybody is believed about himself.” Rav Jehudah in the name of Rav: So is the Mishnah: Rebbi Meïr declares impure, Rebbi Jehudah and the Sages declare pure. Rebbi Joḥanan said, so is the Mishnah: Rebbi Meïr declares impure, Rebbi Jehudah declares pure. The rabbis’ words support Rebbi Joḥanan, since Rebbi Gurion said in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: Rebbi Jehudah said this only about an old impurity, for he can say to them, I had been impure but I purified myself, and we have stated: The same holds for eating suet; the same holds for entering the Sanctuary. Should they not accept his position for impurity? Because of the impurity of a nazir, could they not say, where is the sacrifice which you brought? Then should they not accept his position for heave? So far the questions of Rebbi Ḥanina.
HALAKHAH: “If a person said to two nezirim,” etc. Not only if he said to one of them, “I saw one of you becoming impure but I do not know which one of you it was,” but even if he said, “I saw one of you vowing to be a nazir but I do not know which one of you it was,” both of them have to follow the rules of nazir because of his testimony. If they do not contradict him. But if they contradict him, this does not apply. If both of them contradict, it parallels the following: “If one witness says, he became impure, but he says, I did not become impure, he is pure. If two witnesses say, he became impure, but he says, I did not become impure, the two are believed more than he is, the words of Rebbi Meïr. But the Sages say, everybody is believed about himself.” Rav Jehudah in the name of Rav: So is the Mishnah: Rebbi Meïr declares impure, Rebbi Jehudah and the Sages declare pure. Rebbi Joḥanan said, so is the Mishnah: Rebbi Meïr declares impure, Rebbi Jehudah declares pure. The rabbis’ words support Rebbi Joḥanan, since Rebbi Gurion said in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: Rebbi Jehudah said this only about an old impurity, for he can say to them, I had been impure but I purified myself, and we have stated: The same holds for eating suet; the same holds for entering the Sanctuary. Should they not accept his position for impurity? Because of the impurity of a nazir, could they not say, where is the sacrifice which you brought? Then should they not accept his position for heave? So far the questions of Rebbi Ḥanina.
HALAKHAH: “He shall declare him impure.” The certain case he declares impure, he does not declare the doubtful case impure. Forever he is in his impurity until he is known to be pure. “He shall purify him.” The certain case he declares pure, he does not declare the doubtful case impure. Forever he is in his purity until he is known to be impure.
HALAKHAH: “He shall declare him impure.” The certain case he declares impure, he does not declare the doubtful case impure. Forever he is in his impurity until he is known to be pure. “He shall purify him.” The certain case he declares pure, he does not declare the doubtful case impure. Forever he is in his purity until he is known to be impure.
HALAKHAH: So is the Mishnah: Rebbi Neḥemia declares him not prosecutable but the Sages declare him guilty since it is not unsubstantiated. The Sages say, two estimations have precedence over one estimation; Rebbi Neḥemiah says, the intermediate estimation has precedence over the two. What is Rebbi Neḥemiah’s reason? “ ‘If he gets up and walks outside on his cane, the attacker is exonerated.’ Could you think that this one walks in the market and the other is executed because of him? But even if he died according to the first estimation he cannot be prosecuted.” What is the rabbi’s reason? “If he does not die but is bedridden.” Would we not know that even if he does not die that he will be bedridden? But if they estimated that he would die. If they estimated that he would die, that is what is written: “If he gets up and walks outside on his cane.” Therefore, if he does not get up, [the attacker] is guilty. But if they did not estimate that he would die? If they did not estimate that he would die, that is what is written: “But he has to pay for his disability.” Rebbi Ila in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: It is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he has to pay. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: It was an erroneous estimation. What is the difference between them? If his state improved. For him who says, it is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he has to pay; if he paid, he paid. If he did not pay, the verse makes him pay. A baraita supports one and a baraita supports the other. A baraita supports Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: If they estimated that he would die, when does he have to pay him? From the moment he improves. For him who says, it was an erroneous estimation; if he did not pay one does not order him to pay. If he paid, can he take it back? This supports Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: If they estimated that he would live but he died. From when does one have to pay him? From the moment he turns worse. Rebbi Yose said, it does not say here, “from the moment he turns worse” but “from the moment he turns better.”
MISHNAH: If somebody brings a bill of divorce from overseas and says, “it was written before me,” but not “it was signed before me,” or “it was signed before me” but not “it was written before me”, “it was written before me but signed only partially before me”, “it was partially written before me but signed completely before me”, it is invalid. If one said “it was written before me” and another “it was signed before me”, it is invalid; if two people say, “it was written before us” but only one says, “it was signed before me,” it is invalid; but Rebbi Jehudah declares it valid. If one says, “it was written before me” but two say, “it was signed before us,” it is valid.
Rebbi Immi said, where do they disagree? If the document is presented by him personally. But if it is presented by another person, even the rabbis will agree that it is valid. Rebbi Ḥananiah agrees with Rebbi Immi. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, where do they disagree? If the document is presented by another person. But if it is presented by him personally, even Rebbi Jehudah will agree that it is invalid. Rebbi Ze‘ira objected to Rebbi Immi: If the document is presented by him personally, does Rebbi Jehudah declare it valid even in the first case? Rebbi Immi brought his father-in-law Rebbi Jonah who stated for him: If one said “it was written before me” and another “it was signed before me”, it is invalid, but Rebbi Jehudah declares it valid. Rebbi Abin said, the formulation of a baraita supports Rebbi Ze‘ira: In that case, Rebbi Jehudah declares it valid. But it is difficult following Rebbi Ze‘ira: If the document is presented by another person, that is when they do not treat the messenger as two. When do they treat him as two? When he testifies to both writing and signing.
Rebbi Immi said, where do they disagree? If the document is presented by him personally. But if it is presented by another person, even the rabbis will agree that it is valid. Rebbi Ḥananiah agrees with Rebbi Immi. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, where do they disagree? If the document is presented by another person. But if it is presented by him personally, even Rebbi Jehudah will agree that it is invalid. Rebbi Ze‘ira objected to Rebbi Immi: If the document is presented by him personally, does Rebbi Jehudah declare it valid even in the first case? Rebbi Immi brought his father-in-law Rebbi Jonah who stated for him: If one said “it was written before me” and another “it was signed before me”, it is invalid, but Rebbi Jehudah declares it valid. Rebbi Abin said, the formulation of a baraita supports Rebbi Ze‘ira: In that case, Rebbi Jehudah declares it valid. But it is difficult following Rebbi Ze‘ira: If the document is presented by another person, that is when they do not treat the messenger as two. When do they treat him as two? When he testifies to both writing and signing.
MISHNAH: If it was written during daytime and signed during daytime, in the night and signed in the night, in the night and signed during daytime, it is valid. During daytime and signed in the night it is invalid. Rebbi Simeon declares it valid since Rebbi Simeon says that all documents which were written during daytime and signed at night are invalid except for women’s bills of divorce.
MISHNAH: One does not write on anything connected to the ground. If he wrote on anything connected, detached it, signed, and delivered it, it is valid, but Rebbi Jehudah declares it invalid unless both writing and signing took place when it was detached. Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra says, one writes neither on erased papyrus nor on διφθέρα because these can be falsified but the Sages declare valid.
After it was delivered to her, could it not be considered as if written in her name from the start? Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi [Abin bar Ḥiyya]: It follows Rebbi Simeon, as it was stated: “If one said to a craftsman, make me two bells, one for the ground and one for an animal, make me two mats, one to sit on and one for a tent, make me two sheets, one to lie on and one for [a pattern], only if he designated them in purity. Rebbi Simeon declares them pure unless he designated them for impurity.” As he said there, only if it was a utensil from the start, so he says, unless it was a divorce in her name from the start.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody writes formulaic texts of bills of divorce,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said, writing the essential text with the formula is valid. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, writing the essential text with the formula is invalid. The Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If somebody writes formulaic texts of bills of divorce he has to leave space for the man, the woman, and the time.” He explains it, with the essential text. It is difficult for Rebbi Joḥanan: Do the Sages declare valid in case he wrote the essential text with the formulaic text? Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira: From its invalidity you learn its validity. If he wrote everything in her name but the husband’s and the wife’s names not in her name, would that be valid? Similarly, if he wrote everything not in her name but the husband’s and the wife’s names in her name, it is valid. Rebbi Yose asked Rebbi Jeremiah: Think of it, if it was paired? He said, so said his teacher Rebbi Ze‘ira to him: Since pairing is infrequent, even if there was pairing it is as if there was no pairing. Then it is difficult for Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Even if he did not write the essential text in the formula, Rebbi Jehudah declares invalid! Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Ze‘ira: Rebbi Jehudah refers to something else; it follows what Simeon bar Abba said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: An empty space of two lines about one subject is invalid in any case.
MISHNAH: If somebody transports a bill of divorce overseas and falls sick, he assembles a court to send it and declares before them: “it was written and signed before me.” The later messenger does not have to say: “it was written and signed before me,” but he says: “I am an agent of the court.
Simeon bar Abba in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If a slave fled from the kidnappers to his master, the master may not enslave him but has to write him a bill of manumission. Rebbi Abbahu said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If somebody declares his slave as ownerless he can neither enslave him nor write him a bill of manumission. Rebbi Ze‘ira said to him, everybody says that he needs one; do you say that he does not need? Would he hinder him from eating the Passah [sacrifice]? As it was stated: “The slave of any man, acquisition of his money, if you circumcise him.” Anytime he serves his master, he prevents his master from eating the Passah; if he does not serve his master, he does not prevent his master from eating the Passah.
MISHNAH: If somebody says, deliver this bill of divorce to my wife at place X and he delivered it at another place, it is invalid. But if he said, she is at place X, and he delivered it at another place, it is valid. If a woman says, accept my bill of divorce at place X, and he accepted it at another place, it is invalid, but Rebbi Eleazar declares it valid. Bring my bill of divorce from place X and he brought it from another place, it is valid.
Rebbi Joḥanan said, the practice follows Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar, since Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar said it never is a bill of divorce unless he declares at the moment of delivery: “This is your bill of divorce.” Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Yannai: There is not even a hint of invalidity on her. Cahana said, this implies that they did not worry. If they did worry, might he not have said “you are permitted to any man” when it was still in her hand? Rebbi Aḥa said, this implies that they did worry. If they did not worry, could he not divorce by any power he has to divorce?
Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa, Rebbi Simeon bar Abba in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: If somebody sell a cistern, when he handed over its pail [the buyer] took possession. Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If somebody sell a house, when [the buyer] stored there, he took possession. Rebbi Jehudah ben Pazi asked, what if he handed over the key? Rebbi Zachariah, son-in-law of Rebbi Levi, said: This is a disagreement between Rebbi Simeon and the Sages, as we have stated there: “If somebody hand over the key to his house to an ‘am ha’areṣ, the house is pure since he handed to him only the guarding of the key.” It was stated: “Rebbi Simeon declares impure.”
Even though Rebbi Simeon ben Jehudah said in the name of Rebbi Simeon: If a Gentile or a slave came to a daughter of Israel, the child is acceptable; they agree that if she was female, she is blemished for the priesthood. Even though Rebbi Joshua said, the child of him who sleeps with his sister is acceptable, he agrees that if the child was female she would be blemished for the priesthood. A man came to Rav and said, since the children of this man’s mother are from an Aramean? He said, acceptable. Rav Ḥama bar Guria said to him, let your feet carry you away before Samuel comes and declares you blemished. Even though Rav said, if a Gentile or a slave came to a daughter of Israel, the child is acceptable, he agrees that if it was a female, she would be blemished for the priesthood.
Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa presented traditions: Of Rebbi Ḥanina and Rebbi Joshua ben Levi, one declares permissible and the other admits. He who declares permissible admits. But he who admits does not declare admissible. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Naḥman: Babylonia, as far as family pedigree is concerned, extends up to the yzq canal. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, of Rav and Samuel, one said up to the yzq canal, the other said up to the Wani canal. Rav Jehudah said, between the rivers is like Nahardea as far as family pedigree is concerned. Rebbi Ḥanina ben Beroqa in the name of Rav Jehudah: The people of Moesia are questionable only because of doubts of desecrated women. The Cohanim amongst them did not care about divorcees. There they said, Moesia is dead, Media sick, Elam and gbby dying. The maritime district is the purple-blue of Babylonia. Šny’,gbby’,and ṣrry are purple-blue of the maritime district.
Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa presented traditions: Of Rebbi Ḥanina and Rebbi Joshua ben Levi, one declares permissible and the other admits. He who declares permissible admits. But he who admits does not declare admissible. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Naḥman: Babylonia, as far as family pedigree is concerned, extends up to the yzq canal. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, of Rav and Samuel, one said up to the yzq canal, the other said up to the Wani canal. Rav Jehudah said, between the rivers is like Nahardea as far as family pedigree is concerned. Rebbi Ḥanina ben Beroqa in the name of Rav Jehudah: The people of Moesia are questionable only because of doubts of desecrated women. The Cohanim amongst them did not care about divorcees. There they said, Moesia is dead, Media sick, Elam and gbby dying. The maritime district is the purple-blue of Babylonia. Šny’,gbby’,and ṣrry are purple-blue of the maritime district.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody empowered his agent,” etc. It was stated: “If a man and a woman come from overseas; he says, she is my wife, and she says, he is my husband. One will not execute anybody because of her being a married woman. If they become generally known, one will execute because of her being a married woman.” How long does it take to be generally known? Rebbi Jonah, Rebbi Abba, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Up to thirty days. There, we have stated: “A toddler who is found near cake-dough with a piece of dough in his hand, Rebbi Meïr declares pure but the Sages declare it impure, for toddlers will slap their hands on cake-dough.” Does one burn because of general knowledge? Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira: Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagree. Rebbi Joḥanan said, one executes because of general knowledge. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, one does not execute because of general knowledge. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira: Everybody agrees that one executes because of general knowledge. Where do they disagree? About burning. Rebbi Joḥanan said, one executes because of general knowledge but one does not burn because of general knowledge. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, since one executes because of general knowledge, one also burns because of general knowledge. And from where that one executes because of general knowledge? Rebbi Samuel, the son of Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, it is written: “He who hits his father or his mother shall be put to death.” But is it certain that this one is his father? Is it not only general knowledge that he is his father? But it says, one executes. So here also one executes.
HALAKHAH: “If his jar was broken in the public domain,” etc. Rebbi Eleazar said, they disagree at the moment of the accident. But after the accident everybody agrees that he must pay. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the disagreement is both at the moment of the accident and afterwards. Rebbi Joḥanan objected to Rebbi Eleazar: If he does not have to pay at the moment of the accident, is it not an inference de minore ad majus afterwards? Why should he be free at the moment of the accident? For a person declares his damaged property in the public domain as ownerless. A baraita supports both of them, as it was stated: “The Sages agree with Rebbi Jehudah that somebody who puts down his stone or his load in the public domain does not have to pay if another person stumbled over it, for on this condition did Joshua distribute the Land.” Therefore, if Joshua had not distributed the Land on this condition, he would have to pay. In the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan, if he intended use of the potsherds. In the opinion of Rebbi Eleazar, if he intended to cause damage. Rebbi Ze‘ira and Rebbi La both say that Rebbi Jehudah agrees with the Sages that one has to pay if he declares his bull who gored in the public domain ownerless. Stationary damage cannot be compared to walking damage.
HALAKHAH: “If his jar was broken in the public domain,” etc. Rebbi Eleazar said, they disagree at the moment of the accident. But after the accident everybody agrees that he must pay. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the disagreement is both at the moment of the accident and afterwards. Rebbi Joḥanan objected to Rebbi Eleazar: If he does not have to pay at the moment of the accident, is it not an inference de minore ad majus afterwards? Why should he be free at the moment of the accident? For a person declares his damaged property in the public domain as ownerless. A baraita supports both of them, as it was stated: “The Sages agree with Rebbi Jehudah that somebody who puts down his stone or his load in the public domain does not have to pay if another person stumbled over it, for on this condition did Joshua distribute the Land.” Therefore, if Joshua had not distributed the Land on this condition, he would have to pay. In the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan, if he intended use of the potsherds. In the opinion of Rebbi Eleazar, if he intended to cause damage. Rebbi Ze‘ira and Rebbi La both say that Rebbi Jehudah agrees with the Sages that one has to pay if he declares his bull who gored in the public domain ownerless. Stationary damage cannot be compared to walking damage.
HALAKHAH: “A bull belonging to a woman, a bull belonging to orphans,” etc. What is Rebbi Jehudah’s reason? “It was testified to before its owners and they did not watch it;” those have no owners who could be responsible for damages. Rebbi Hoshaia stated: In matters of damages, Rebbi Meïr declares liable but Rebbi Jehudah declares not liable. What about weregilt? Rebbi Pedat in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia: Everybody agrees that he is liable for weregilt. But some say, Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Just as they disagree for damages so they disagree for weregilt. Rebbi Jeremiah asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: How does one actually act? He said to him, following Rebbi Hoshaia that in matters of damages, Rebbi Meïr declares liable but Rebbi Jehudah declares not liable; therefore, in matters of weregilt everybody agrees that he is liable.
HALAKHAH: “A bull belonging to a woman, a bull belonging to orphans,” etc. What is Rebbi Jehudah’s reason? “It was testified to before its owners and they did not watch it;” those have no owners who could be responsible for damages. Rebbi Hoshaia stated: In matters of damages, Rebbi Meïr declares liable but Rebbi Jehudah declares not liable. What about weregilt? Rebbi Pedat in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia: Everybody agrees that he is liable for weregilt. But some say, Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Just as they disagree for damages so they disagree for weregilt. Rebbi Jeremiah asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: How does one actually act? He said to him, following Rebbi Hoshaia that in matters of damages, Rebbi Meïr declares liable but Rebbi Jehudah declares not liable; therefore, in matters of weregilt everybody agrees that he is liable.
HALAKHAH: “A bull belonging to a woman, a bull belonging to orphans,” etc. What is Rebbi Jehudah’s reason? “It was testified to before its owners and they did not watch it;” those have no owners who could be responsible for damages. Rebbi Hoshaia stated: In matters of damages, Rebbi Meïr declares liable but Rebbi Jehudah declares not liable. What about weregilt? Rebbi Pedat in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia: Everybody agrees that he is liable for weregilt. But some say, Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Just as they disagree for damages so they disagree for weregilt. Rebbi Jeremiah asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: How does one actually act? He said to him, following Rebbi Hoshaia that in matters of damages, Rebbi Meïr declares liable but Rebbi Jehudah declares not liable; therefore, in matters of weregilt everybody agrees that he is liable.
HALAKHAH: “A bull belonging to a woman, a bull belonging to orphans,” etc. What is Rebbi Jehudah’s reason? “It was testified to before its owners and they did not watch it;” those have no owners who could be responsible for damages. Rebbi Hoshaia stated: In matters of damages, Rebbi Meïr declares liable but Rebbi Jehudah declares not liable. What about weregilt? Rebbi Pedat in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia: Everybody agrees that he is liable for weregilt. But some say, Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Just as they disagree for damages so they disagree for weregilt. Rebbi Jeremiah asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: How does one actually act? He said to him, following Rebbi Hoshaia that in matters of damages, Rebbi Meïr declares liable but Rebbi Jehudah declares not liable; therefore, in matters of weregilt everybody agrees that he is liable.
MISHNAH: Just as there is cheating in trade so there is cheating by words. One should not say to another: how much for this object, if he is not interested in buying. If somebody was a repentant sinner, one should not say to him: remember your earlier deeds. If somebody was the son of a proselyte, one may not say to him: remember the deeds of your forefathers, for it is written: “A sojourner you may neither cheat nor oppress, for you were sojourners in the Land of Egypt.” One does not mix produce, not even new with new; no need to say new with old. In truth they permitted to mix strong wine with weak since it improves it. One does not mix wine lees with wine but one delivers the lees with the wine. If water became mixed with somebody’s wine, he should not sell it in the store unless he declares it, and not to a trader for that one would only use it to trick people; at a place where they usually put water into the wine they may do so. The trader may buy from five threshing floors and put into one chest, wine from five wine presses and put into one barrel, on condition that he not intend to mix. Rebbi Jehudah says, a store owner should not distribute roasted kernels and nuts to children because he induces them to come to him, but the Sages permit. He should not reduce the price, but the Sages say, may he be remembered as a benefactor. He should not clean the groats following Abba Shaul, but the Sages permit it. However, they agree that he may not clean the upper layer of the chest since that gives a dishonest impression. One may not put makeup on humans, animals, or vessels.
MISHNAH: One judges neither a tribe, nor a false prophet, nor the High Priest, except by the court of 71 [judges]. One may start a war of choice only by the court of 71 [judges]. One may add to the City or to the Temple courtyards only by the court of 71 [judges]. One appoints high courts for the tribes only by the court of 71 [judges]. One declares a town as deviant only by the court of 71 [judges]; one does not declare a border town as deviant, nor three together, but one may declare one or two.
“One only declares a town to be deviant.” Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia: Three Amoraïm, one says, one makes one but not two. The other said, clusters one makes, dispersed ones one does not make. The other said, dispersed one does not make at all, lest Gentiles spread and come to the Land of Israel; some want to say that enemies should not spread and lay waste.
In civil suits one declares the judgment as definitive [but in criminal suits one does not declare the judgment as definitive.] The greatest among the judges declares the judgment as definitive .
In civil suits one declares the judgment as definitive [but in criminal suits one does not declare the judgment as definitive.] The greatest among the judges declares the judgment as definitive .
HALAKHAH: “One who gives any of his descendants to the Moloch.” From where a warning not to give any of his descendants to the Moloch? Do not give any of your descendants to the Moloch. Extirpation from where? For he gave one of his descendants to the Molochand shall be extirpated. Punishment from where? Each one of the Children of Israel, or of the sojourner in Israel, who would give any of his descendants to the Moloch shall be made to die; the people of the Land shall smash him with stones. Do not give any of your descendants, I could think that he was guilty if he handed over but did not make him pass; the verse says: Do not give any of your descendants to pass through. I could think that he was guilty if he handed over and made him pass through but not for the Moloch; the verse says: Do not give any of your descendants to pass through for the Moloch. I could think that he was guilty if he handed over and made him pass through for the Moloch but without fire; the verse says: among you, nobody should be found to make his son or his daughter pass through fire. Passing through, passing through as an equal cut. Since “passing through” mentioned there is through fire, so “passing through” mentioned here also is through fire. You have to say that he is not guilty unless he handed over and made him pass through fire for the Moloch. Rebbi Nasa in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: He is guilty only if he hand him over to the priests, takes him, and makes him pass. What if he lets him walk normally? It was stated: one was drawing him and made him pass through. It was stated: if he made him walk through on his feet he is not prosecutable. Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon declares him guilty. Whether for the Moloch or for any other foreign worship; Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon says, he is guilty only for the Moloch, he is guilty only for his descendants. Rebbi Joḥanan said, Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon’s reason is from here: It shall not be found in you, from your body you should not be found making pass through. I shall extirpate him … from among his people. To include all other foreign worship for extirpation. From where punishment? Of his descendants he gave to the Moloch, death he shall be made to die, if he made him pass through himself. Does he not pass through on his feet? Because he made him pass through himself, but if he was drawing him and made him pass through, he is guilty. What does Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon mean, if he made him walk through on his feet he is not prosecutable? He has to make him pass through jumping.
MISHNAH: One who desecrates the Sabbath by something which if performed intentionally makes him liable to extirpation, or to a purification sacrifice if in error. But he who curses father or mother is guilty only of he cursed them by the Name. If he cursed them by a substitute name, Rebbi Meïr declares him guilty but the Sages free him from prosecution. One who has sexual relations with a preliminarily married adolescent is only liable if she was an adolescent, a virgin, and preliminarily married, in her father’s house. If two [men] had relations with her, the first one is stoned, the second is subject to strangling.
MISHNAH: A murderer who attacked someone with a stone or an iron, or forced him under water or into fire so he could not escape from there and died, is [criminally] liable. If he pushed him into water or fire and he could have escaped from there by himself but died, he is not [criminally] liable. If he provoked a dog or a snake against him, he is not [criminally] liable. If he let a snake bite him, Rebbi Jehudah declares him [criminally] liable but for the Sages he is not [criminally] liable.
MISHNAH: If somebody injures another person by a stone or with his fist and they expected him to die, but he got better and only afterwards deteriorated and died; he is [criminally] liable. Rebbi Neḥemiah declares him not liable since it is not unsubstantiated.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody injures another person,” etc. So is the Mishnah: “Rebbi Neḥemiah declares him not [criminally] liable but the Sages declare him [criminally] liable since it is not unsubstantiated.” The Sages say, two estimations have precedence over one estimation; Rebbi Neḥemiah says, the intermediate estimation has precedence over the two. What is Rebbi Neḥemiah’s reason? If he gets up and walks outside on his cane, the attacker is exonerated. Could you think that this one walks in the market and the other one is executed because of him? But even if he dies according to the first estimation, he cannot be prosecuted. What is the rabbi’s reason? If he does not die but is bedridden. Would we not know that even if he does not die that he will be bedridden? But if they did not estimate that he would die. If they did not estimate that he would die, that is what is written: If he gets up and walks outside on his cane, the attacker is exonerated. Therefore, if he does not get up, [the attacker] is [criminally] liable. But if they estimated that he would die? If they estimated that he would die, that is what is written: But he has to pay for his disability and the medical costs. Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: It is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he has to pay. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: It was an erroneous estimation. What is the difference between them? “But he got better and only afterwards deteriorated and died; he is [criminally] liable. Rebbi Neḥemiah declares him not liable since it is not unsubstantiated.” For him who said, it is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he has to pay; if he paid, he paid. If he did not pay, does he have to pay? For him who said, it was an erroneous estimation; if he did not pay, one does not order him to pay. If he paid, can he take it back? A baraita supports one and a baraita supports the other. A baraita supports Rebbi Yose bar Ḥanina: If they estimated that he would live but he died, from when does one count for him? From the moment he turns worse. This implies that the estimate was wrong. If you would say, it is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he has to pay, he should pay from the first moment. A baraita supports Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: If they estimated that he would die but he lived, from when does one count for him? From the moment he turns worse. Rebbi Yose said, it does not say here “from the moment he turns worse” but “from the moment he turns better.” That means, it is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he has to pay. But if you say, it was an erroneous estimation, he has to pay until [the victim] dies.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody injures another person,” etc. So is the Mishnah: “Rebbi Neḥemiah declares him not [criminally] liable but the Sages declare him [criminally] liable since it is not unsubstantiated.” The Sages say, two estimations have precedence over one estimation; Rebbi Neḥemiah says, the intermediate estimation has precedence over the two. What is Rebbi Neḥemiah’s reason? If he gets up and walks outside on his cane, the attacker is exonerated. Could you think that this one walks in the market and the other one is executed because of him? But even if he dies according to the first estimation, he cannot be prosecuted. What is the rabbi’s reason? If he does not die but is bedridden. Would we not know that even if he does not die that he will be bedridden? But if they did not estimate that he would die. If they did not estimate that he would die, that is what is written: If he gets up and walks outside on his cane, the attacker is exonerated. Therefore, if he does not get up, [the attacker] is [criminally] liable. But if they estimated that he would die? If they estimated that he would die, that is what is written: But he has to pay for his disability and the medical costs. Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: It is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he has to pay. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: It was an erroneous estimation. What is the difference between them? “But he got better and only afterwards deteriorated and died; he is [criminally] liable. Rebbi Neḥemiah declares him not liable since it is not unsubstantiated.” For him who said, it is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he has to pay; if he paid, he paid. If he did not pay, does he have to pay? For him who said, it was an erroneous estimation; if he did not pay, one does not order him to pay. If he paid, can he take it back? A baraita supports one and a baraita supports the other. A baraita supports Rebbi Yose bar Ḥanina: If they estimated that he would live but he died, from when does one count for him? From the moment he turns worse. This implies that the estimate was wrong. If you would say, it is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he has to pay, he should pay from the first moment. A baraita supports Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: If they estimated that he would die but he lived, from when does one count for him? From the moment he turns worse. Rebbi Yose said, it does not say here “from the moment he turns worse” but “from the moment he turns better.” That means, it is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he has to pay. But if you say, it was an erroneous estimation, he has to pay until [the victim] dies.
MISHNAH: And one who kidnaps a person from Israel is not punishable unless he bring him into his property. Rebbi Jehudah says, unless he bring him into his property and use him, as it is said, and enslaved him or sold him. One who kidnaps his own son, Rebbi Joḥanan ben Beroqa declares punishable but the Sages make him not prosecutable. One who kidnapped a person half slave and half free Rebbi Joḥanan ben Beroqa declares punishable but the Sages make him not prosecutable.
MISHNAH: And one who kidnaps a person from Israel is not punishable unless he bring him into his property. Rebbi Jehudah says, unless he bring him into his property and use him, as it is said, and enslaved him or sold him. One who kidnaps his own son, Rebbi Joḥanan ben Beroqa declares punishable but the Sages make him not prosecutable. One who kidnapped a person half slave and half free Rebbi Joḥanan ben Beroqa declares punishable but the Sages make him not prosecutable.
An androgynus who saw whitish [effluent] and entered the Sanctuary is not liable. If he saw red [effluent] and entered the Sanctuary, he is not liable. If he saw simultaneously whitish and red and entered the Sanctuary, he is liable. There is a Tanna who states: he is not liable. Rebbi Joḥanan said, this is Rebbi Simeon, as it was stated: “Two paths, one pure and one impure. He walked on one of them, entered the Sanctuary on the first one, sprinkled repeatedly, immersed himself, on the second one and entered; he is liable. Rebbi Simeon declares him not liable in this case. Rebbi Simeon ben Jehudah in the name of Rebbi Simeon declares him not liable in all cases.” One understands the androgynus, for whitish [effluent] you declare him to be a woman, for red [effluent] you declare him to be a man. But here there is no known impurity. Rebbi Samuel bar Sosartai said, explain it if he forgot the first. Rebbi Yose asked, where do we hold? If he forgot it forever, it is one path. If he forgot repeatedly, there are two paths. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, Rebbi Simeon parallels Rebbi Eliezer in the interpretation of Ḥizqiah. Just as Rebbi Eliezer said there, until he knows whether he did become impure by a crawling animal or a corpse, so Rebbi Simeon says here, until he knows whether he did become impure by red [effluent] or by whitish. One understands there since he said, a doubt of awareness is awareness. But here, since he saw whitish and red together, it is certain knowledge.
An androgynus who saw whitish [effluent] and entered the Sanctuary is not liable. If he saw red [effluent] and entered the Sanctuary, he is not liable. If he saw simultaneously whitish and red and entered the Sanctuary, he is liable. There is a Tanna who states: he is not liable. Rebbi Joḥanan said, this is Rebbi Simeon, as it was stated: “Two paths, one pure and one impure. He walked on one of them, entered the Sanctuary on the first one, sprinkled repeatedly, immersed himself, on the second one and entered; he is liable. Rebbi Simeon declares him not liable in this case. Rebbi Simeon ben Jehudah in the name of Rebbi Simeon declares him not liable in all cases.” One understands the androgynus, for whitish [effluent] you declare him to be a woman, for red [effluent] you declare him to be a man. But here there is no known impurity. Rebbi Samuel bar Sosartai said, explain it if he forgot the first. Rebbi Yose asked, where do we hold? If he forgot it forever, it is one path. If he forgot repeatedly, there are two paths. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, Rebbi Simeon parallels Rebbi Eliezer in the interpretation of Ḥizqiah. Just as Rebbi Eliezer said there, until he knows whether he did become impure by a crawling animal or a corpse, so Rebbi Simeon says here, until he knows whether he did become impure by red [effluent] or by whitish. One understands there since he said, a doubt of awareness is awareness. But here, since he saw whitish and red together, it is certain knowledge.
MISHNAH: An oath that I shall not eat; when he ate inedible food and drank undrinkable fluids, he is not liable. An oath that I shall not eat; when he ate carcass or torn meat, abominations or crawling animals, he is liable; Rebbi Simeon declares him not liable. If he said, a qonam that my wife may not benefit from me if I had eaten today, if he had eaten carcass or torn meat, abominations or crawling animals, his wife is forbidden benefits.
HALAKHAH: “An oath that I shall not drink,” etc. In this case, Rebbi Simeon declares not liable. Rebbi Simeon follows his own opinion, as we have stated there: “How much does he have to eat from ṭevel to be liable? Rebbi Simeon says, anything; but the Sages say, the volume of an olive. Rebbi Simeon told them, do you not agree that one who eats an ant is liable? They told him, because it is a creature. He answered them, also a grain of wheat is a creature.” In Rebbi Joḥanan’s opinion, why does Rebbi Simeon declare not liable? Rebbi Ze`ira said, Rebbi Simeon follows his own opinion. It was stated in the name of Rebbi Simeon: You shall deprive yourselves, of what is permitted to you, not of what is forbidden to you.
Should a relative be found guilty of a blurted oath? Does it follow what Rebbi Abba said in the name of Samuel: “An oath that X gave to Y,” and it turns out that X had not given; since there is nothing in the future there is nothing in the past. Or the following: “Where is my ox?” He responded, “I do not know what you are referring to.” Rebbi declares him not liable for a keeper’s oath but liable because of a blurted oath. Rebbi Joḥanan said, since it is a religious duty to appease him, he is not liable because of a blurted oath. In the rabbis’ opinion, is there no religious duty to appease him? One appeases with truthful statements, not with lies.
MISHNAH: “I put an oath upon you, I command you, I bind you,” these are liable. “By Heaven and Earth,” they are not liable. “By א-ד, by י-ה, by the Almighty, by Sabaoth, by the Gracious and Merciful, by the Forbearing and Most Benevolent,” and all substitute names, they are liable. One who curses by any of these is liable, the words of Rebbi Meїr; but the Sages declare him not liable. One who curses his father or mother by any of these is liable, the words of Rebbi Meїr; but the Sages declare him not liable. One who curses himself or another person by any of these violates a prohibition. “May God punish you, so may God punish you,” this is the imprecation mentioned in the Torah. “May He not punish you, may He bless you, may He do well with you,” Rebbi Meїr declares liable but Rebbi Jehudah declares not liable.
MISHNAH: “I put an oath upon you, I command you, I bind you,” these are liable. “By Heaven and Earth,” they are not liable. “By א-ד, by י-ה, by the Almighty, by Sabaoth, by the Gracious and Merciful, by the Forbearing and Most Benevolent,” and all substitute names, they are liable. One who curses by any of these is liable, the words of Rebbi Meїr; but the Sages declare him not liable. One who curses his father or mother by any of these is liable, the words of Rebbi Meїr; but the Sages declare him not liable. One who curses himself or another person by any of these violates a prohibition. “May God punish you, so may God punish you,” this is the imprecation mentioned in the Torah. “May He not punish you, may He bless you, may He do well with you,” Rebbi Meїr declares liable but Rebbi Jehudah declares not liable.
Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai, as our Mishnah. But some say, Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, so is our Mishnah: “Rebbi Meïr declares liable but Rebbi Jehudah declares not liable.” Rebbi Meїr follows his own opinion and Rebbi Jehudah follows his own opinion, as we have stated: “If he cursed them by a substitute name, Rebbi Meїr declares him guilty but the Sages free him from prosecution.”
Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai, as our Mishnah. But some say, Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, so is our Mishnah: “Rebbi Meïr declares liable but Rebbi Jehudah declares not liable.” Rebbi Meїr follows his own opinion and Rebbi Jehudah follows his own opinion, as we have stated: “If he cursed them by a substitute name, Rebbi Meїr declares him guilty but the Sages free him from prosecution.”
Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai, as our Mishnah. But some say, Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, so is our Mishnah: “Rebbi Meïr declares liable but Rebbi Jehudah declares not liable.” Rebbi Meїr follows his own opinion and Rebbi Jehudah follows his own opinion, as we have stated: “If he cursed them by a substitute name, Rebbi Meїr declares him guilty but the Sages free him from prosecution.”
MISHNAH: “You are holding for me a kor of grain;” “I am holding for you only a letek of legumes;” he is not liable. “You are holding for me a kor of produce;” “I am holding for you only a letek of legumes;” he is liable since legumes are subsumed under produce. If one sued for wheat and the other acknowledged barley, he is not liable, but Rebbi Simeon declares him liable. Somebody who sued for amphoras of oil and the other admitted to pitchers, Admon says since he admitted of the kind of the claim he has to swear. But the Sages say, the admission is not of the kind of the claim. Rabban Gamliel said, I see the words of Admon. If somebody sued for both vessels and real estate; if [the other] admitted the vessels but denied the real estate, or the real estate and denied the vessels, he is not liable. If he admitted part of the real estate he is not liable. Part of the vessels he is liable since non-guaranteed property obligates guaranteed property to be sworn about.
HALAKHAH: “You are holding for me a kor of grain;” etc. Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Our Mishnah if he sued him for wheat and he admitted barley; but if he sued him for two kinds and he admitted one of them, everybody agrees that he is not liable. Rebbi Abbahu said about that of Rebbi Immi: Why did we state, “Rabban Gamliel declares him liable”? It comes to inform you of the power of Rabban Gamliel, how far he declares liable. Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Not only if he claimed wheat and he admitted barley to him, but if he claimed two kinds and he admitted one of them, the words of the Sages are that he is not liable. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, it is only if he claimed two kinds and he admitted one of them, but if he sued for wheat and he admitted barley according to everybody he is liable. Following Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: A person went to court before Rav: When he claimed from another wheat, barley, and spelt. Rav told him, wait until he charged you with anything he has to charge, and in the end you will swear one oath about everything. Rebbi Abbahu said, so argued Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish against Rebbi Joḥanan: In your opinion, since you say that if he claimed two kinds and he admitted one of them, according to the Sages he is not liable, did we not state “if he claimed vessels and real estate; if he admitted the vessels and denied the real estate, the real estate and denied the vessels”? For vessels about vessels he is liable, not so much more for vessels and real estate? He answered him, to transfer an oath to him by the following Mishnah, “since guaranteed property obligates non-guaranteed property to be sworn about.” This does not even disagree with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. But did we not state: “Somebody who sued for amphoras of oil and he admitted to vessels”? How do we hold? If he sued him for vessels and oil, and he admitted one of them, everybody agrees that this refers to the claim. But if he sued him for vessels and he did (not) admit oil, everybody agrees that what he admitted did not refer to the claim. Rebbi Ze`ira and Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Samuel: If he sued for vessels full of oil, one said vessels but not oil, the other said oil but not vessels. (Thrown) vessels but not oil. Oil but not vessels? Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Abin formulates it as oil buckets. Can one not ask him? If he was paralyzed.
HALAKHAH: “You are holding for me a kor of grain;” etc. Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Our Mishnah if he sued him for wheat and he admitted barley; but if he sued him for two kinds and he admitted one of them, everybody agrees that he is not liable. Rebbi Abbahu said about that of Rebbi Immi: Why did we state, “Rabban Gamliel declares him liable”? It comes to inform you of the power of Rabban Gamliel, how far he declares liable. Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Not only if he claimed wheat and he admitted barley to him, but if he claimed two kinds and he admitted one of them, the words of the Sages are that he is not liable. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, it is only if he claimed two kinds and he admitted one of them, but if he sued for wheat and he admitted barley according to everybody he is liable. Following Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: A person went to court before Rav: When he claimed from another wheat, barley, and spelt. Rav told him, wait until he charged you with anything he has to charge, and in the end you will swear one oath about everything. Rebbi Abbahu said, so argued Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish against Rebbi Joḥanan: In your opinion, since you say that if he claimed two kinds and he admitted one of them, according to the Sages he is not liable, did we not state “if he claimed vessels and real estate; if he admitted the vessels and denied the real estate, the real estate and denied the vessels”? For vessels about vessels he is liable, not so much more for vessels and real estate? He answered him, to transfer an oath to him by the following Mishnah, “since guaranteed property obligates non-guaranteed property to be sworn about.” This does not even disagree with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. But did we not state: “Somebody who sued for amphoras of oil and he admitted to vessels”? How do we hold? If he sued him for vessels and oil, and he admitted one of them, everybody agrees that this refers to the claim. But if he sued him for vessels and he did (not) admit oil, everybody agrees that what he admitted did not refer to the claim. Rebbi Ze`ira and Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Samuel: If he sued for vessels full of oil, one said vessels but not oil, the other said oil but not vessels. (Thrown) vessels but not oil. Oil but not vessels? Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Abin formulates it as oil buckets. Can one not ask him? If he was paralyzed.
MISHNAH: About the following one does not swear: slaves, and documents, and real estate, and gifts to the Temple. Not about double restitution, nor quadruple or quintuple; the unpaid trustee does not swear, the paid trustee does not pay. Rebbi Simeon says, one swears about things for which he is responsible if they be alienated, but does not swear if he is not responsible if they be alienated. Rebbi Meїr says, there are things which are like real estate and they are not like real estate but the Sages do not agree with him. How is this? “Ten bearing vines did I hand over to you,” but the other says, “they are only five.” Rebbi Meїr declares liable for an oath but the Sages say, anything connected to the ground is like ground.
Rebbi Immi said, those who write, “on condition that I have the right to seize movables,” cannot collect. Rebbi Mana said, if he writes and declares, “even though the Court will not enforce,” he collects.
HALAKHAH: : “The following are exiled,” etc. Rebbi Jehudah declares him not liable unless the entire rope falls from his hand. Rebbi Simeon declares him not liable unless he let go the trowel completely. What Rebbi Simeon said refers to breaking of the rope. What Rebbi Jehudah said, was about letting the trowel go.
HALAKHAH: : “The following are exiled,” etc. Rebbi Jehudah declares him not liable unless the entire rope falls from his hand. Rebbi Simeon declares him not liable unless he let go the trowel completely. What Rebbi Simeon said refers to breaking of the rope. What Rebbi Jehudah said, was about letting the trowel go.
MISHNAH: If the Court gave an instruction; then they realized that they erred and reversed themselves; whether they brought their atonement or they did not bring their atonement, another person went and acted on their instructions, Rebbi Simeon declares him not liable, but Rebbi Eliezer says, it is in doubt. What is the doubt? If he remained at home, he is liable; if he went overseas he is not liable. Rebbi Aqiba said, I agree in this case that he is closer to not being liable than being liable. Ben Azzai asked him, what is the difference between him and the one staying at home? For one who stays at home might be informed but the other one could not be informed.
Rebbi Abba bar Cahana went to a certain place where he found Rebbi Levi installed and preaching: A man to whom God gives riches, and properties, and honor,and nothing is missing of anything he might desire, but God does not let him take possession to eat from it, for a stranger will eat from it.Riches, that is Scripture. Properties, these are practices. And honor, these are the additions. And nothing is missing of anything he might desire, these are the great Mishnah collections, such as the Mishnah of Rebbi Ḥuna, the Mishnah of Rebbi Hoshaia, or the Mishnah of Bar Qappara. But God does not let him take possession to eat from it, that is the master of Aggadah who neither prohibits nor permits, neither declares impure nor pure. For a stranger will eat from it, that is the master of Talmud. Rebbi Abba bar Cahana got up and kissed him on his head, saying, just as you were worthy to preach this standing, may you be worthy preaching this sitting.
MISHNAH: Five kinds of blood are impure from a woman: Red, black, like saffron stigma, and like earth water, and like mixed wine. The Hause of Shammai say, also like fenugreek water and like roast beef juice, but the House of Hillel declare these pure. The green Aqabia ben Mahalalel declares impure but the Sages declare it pure. Rebbi Meïr said, if it does not cause impurity as a stain, it causes impurity as a body fluid. Rebbi Yose says, neither one nor the other.
The Babylonian Talmud
The other declares : Those are to be considered chastenings of love which do not involve neglect of prayer; as it is written, "Blessed be God, Who hath not turned away my prayer, nor His mercy from me" (Ps. lxvi. 20)
[He declares] that its purpose is to exclude the following night ; for it might have occurred to thee to say that since the Paschal offering belongs to the class of things holy in a minor degree, and peace offerings are in the same category, as the peace offerings might be eaten within two days and a night, so also the Paschal offering might be eaten two nights instead of two days, and therefore might be eaten any time during two nights and one day ! Therefore it informs us "in that night," i.e. it must be eaten that night and no other.
That is quite right according to Rab who declares that a benediction which does not contain the Divine Name is no benediction. But, according to R. Johanan who holds that a benediction which does not contain a reference to the Divine Kingship is no benediction, what is there to say?
Here is a self-contradiction ! The first clause declares such a man to be exempt from the obligation, and the latter imposes the obligation upon him !
Is there none in the Mishnah ? Yes, there is ; for there is a Mishnaic teaching : If one has cut [a portable earthenware oven] into layers and placed sand between each layer, R. Eliezer declares it clean, but the Sages declare it unclean ; and this is what is known as "the oven of the serpent."
MISHNAH A Ba'al Keri meditates upon [the wording of the Shema'] in his heart and says neither the benediction before nor after. At his meal, he says the Grace after [in his heart] but not the Grace before. R. Judah declares : He says Grace before and after.
It is different with Tefillah, because it contains no reference to the Kingdom of Heaven. But in the Grace after meals there is also no reference to the Kingdom of Heaven, and yet our Mishnah declares : At his meal, he says the Grace after but not the Grace before ! Quite so ; but the reading of the Shema' and the Grace after meals are ordained by the Torah, whereas Tefillah is ordained by the Rabbis.
R. Judah declares : He says Grace before and after. That is to say that R. Judah is of the opinion that a Ba'al Keri is permitted to study Torah. But lo, R. Joshua b. Levi has said : Whence is it that a Ba'al Keri is forbidden to study Torah? As it is said, "Thou shalt make them known unto thy children and thy children's children" (Deut. iv. 9) and it continues, "The day that thou stoodest before the Lord thy God in Horeb" (ibid. v. 10) — as those who were Ba'al Keri were forbidden [in the assembly at Horeb], so are they forbidden [to occupy themselves with Torah].
If he had gone down to bathe, should he have time to ascend, clothe himself and read [the Shema'] before sunrise, he must ascend, clothe himself and read. It is possible to say that the Mishnah states the law anonymously in agreement with R. Eliezer who declares: He may finish it any time until sunrise. Thou mayest even say that it is in agreement with R. Joshua and perhaps it is here like the Wetikin ;
It is in accord with him who declared that the evening-Tefillah is voluntary; for Rab Judah said in the name of Samuel: As for the evemng-Tefillah, Rabban Gamaliel declares it to be obligatory, but R. Joshua declares it to be voluntary. Abbai said : The Halakah is in agreement with him who declares it to be obligatory ; but Raba said : The Halakah is in agreement with him who declares it to be voluntary.
It is in accord with him who declared that the evening-Tefillah is voluntary; for Rab Judah said in the name of Samuel: As for the evemng-Tefillah, Rabban Gamaliel declares it to be obligatory, but R. Joshua declares it to be voluntary. Abbai said : The Halakah is in agreement with him who declares it to be obligatory ; but Raba said : The Halakah is in agreement with him who declares it to be voluntary.
It is in accord with him who declared that the evening-Tefillah is voluntary; for Rab Judah said in the name of Samuel: As for the evemng-Tefillah, Rabban Gamaliel declares it to be obligatory, but R. Joshua declares it to be voluntary. Abbai said : The Halakah is in agreement with him who declares it to be obligatory ; but Raba said : The Halakah is in agreement with him who declares it to be voluntary.
It is in accord with him who declared that the evening-Tefillah is voluntary; for Rab Judah said in the name of Samuel: As for the evemng-Tefillah, Rabban Gamaliel declares it to be obligatory, but R. Joshua declares it to be voluntary. Abbai said : The Halakah is in agreement with him who declares it to be obligatory ; but Raba said : The Halakah is in agreement with him who declares it to be voluntary.
MISHNAH What benediction do we say over fruit ? Over the fruit of trees, one says, "[Blessed art Thou, O Lord our God, King of the universe] Who Createst the fruit of the tree," except over wine ; for over wine ons says, "...Who createst the fruit of the vine." Over the fruits of the earth one says : "... Who createst the fruit of the ground," except over bread; for over bread one says, "...Who bringest forth bread from the earth." Over vegetables one says, "... Who createst the fruit of the ground" ; but R. Judah declares : "... Who createst divers kinds of herbs."
Surely it is required [to teach as follows :] First, that the All-merciful declares [the owner] must redeem it and then eat it ; and second, only those things which require "a song of praise" require redemption, but if they do not require "a song of praise," redemption is unnecessary ! This is according to the statement of R. Samuel b. Nahmani in the name of R. Jonathan who said : [not translated] Whence is it that we say "a song of praise" only over wine ? As it is said, "And the vine said unto them, Should I leave my wine which cheereth God and man?" (Judges ix. 13). If it cheereth man, how does it cheer God ? Hence it is to be inferred that we have "a song of praise" only over wine.
we pronounce the benediction "...Who createst various kinds of food" only over the five species. Moreover Rab Huna said : [The quoted Mishnah means,] Whoever declares "Everything that nourishes [I forbid] myself" —
The teacher stated : "He who chews wheat should say the benediction '...Who createst the fruit of the ground'." But there is a teaching: [He should say] "...Who createst divers kinds of seeds"! There is no contradiction; the latter being the opinion of R. Judah, the other of the Rabbis. For our Mishnah teaches : Over vegetables one says : "...Who createst the fruit of the ground" ; but R. Judah declares: "...Who createst divers kinds of herbs."
and is not a kind of corn, or if a kind of corn it has not been made into bread, Rabban Gamaliel declares three benedictions [are required after partaking thereof], but the Sages declare: Only one benediction. And any food which does not belong to the seven species and is not a kind of corn, for instance, bread of rice or millet, Rabban Gamaliel declares: One benediction which is an abstract of three, but the Sages declare : None at all.
and is not a kind of corn, or if a kind of corn it has not been made into bread, Rabban Gamaliel declares three benedictions [are required after partaking thereof], but the Sages declare: Only one benediction. And any food which does not belong to the seven species and is not a kind of corn, for instance, bread of rice or millet, Rabban Gamaliel declares: One benediction which is an abstract of three, but the Sages declare : None at all.
It has been reported : If pieces of bread and whole loaves were set before them, Rab Huna declares that the benediction is to be pronounced over the pieces and it is not necessary over the loave. R. Johanan declared : [To say the benediction over] the whole loaf is the best way to perform the religious duty ; but should there be a piece of wheaten-bread and a loaf of barley-bread, all agree that the benediction should be pronounced over the former and is unnecessary over the latter.
But R. Judah declares : "...Who createst divers kinds of herbs." R. Zera (another version : R. Hinnana b. Pappa) said : The Halakah is not in accord with R. Judah. R. Zera (another version: R. Hinnana b. Pappa) also said: What is R. Judah's reason? The Scriptures state, "Blessed be the Lord day by day" (Ps. Ixviii. 20) — are we to bless Him by day and not by night ! Nay, it means to tell thee : Day by day give Him the appropriate blessing ; so here also, for every species of food give Him an appropriate benediction.