intentionally
191 occurrences across the corpus
The Jerusalem Talmud
It was stated: “A woman should not fill a pot with ˋassisiot and lupines and put them into the oven at the start of the Sabbath, at nightfall. If she did, they are forbidden after the end of the Sabbath until the time they could have been done.” Rebbi Aḥa said: intentionally, following Rebbi Meïr; Rebbi Yose said: unintentionally, following Rebbi Jehudah. Rebbi Mana said, what my teacher Rebbi Yose said is correct: “He who is planting on the Sabbath, if unintentional, he may keep it, if intentional, he must tear it out. In the Sabbatical year, he must tear it out whether [planting was] unintentional or intentional. Rebbi Jehudah says, it is the other way around. If he was planting on the Sabbath he must tear it out whether it was unintentional or intentional; in the Sabbatical, if unintentional, he may keep it, if intentional, he must tear it out. Why? Because the profit of the Sabbath [is forbidden] to him.” And here, since you say that after the end of the Sabbath he has to wait until the time it could have been done, he did not gain anything from the Sabbath. What is the reason of the rabbis? People are suspected about the Sabbatical but not about the Sabbath. Another explanation: One counts Sabbaticals, one does not count Sabbaths. What is this about? If somebody planted less than thirty days before the Sabbatical and now it is the Sabbatical, if it is because of suspicion, there is no suspicion; if it is for counting, it is not counted. Less than thirty days before the eighth year and now it is the eighth year, if it is because of suspicion, there is suspicion; if it is because of counting, there is counting. It follows him who says because of suspicion, but for him who says because of counting they fined the unintentional because of the intentional.
Now Rebbi Zeˋira in the name of Rav Ḥisda, Rebbi Ila in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, both of them say, he asked him about intent regarding the Sabbath but error regarding works. Can anybody become liable intentionally? You superimpose the error regarding works over the intent regarding the Sabbath. Similarly, in case of error regarding the Sabbath but intent regarding the work you superimpose the error regarding the Sabbath over the intent regarding works to hold him liable for each single occurrence. Does Rebbi Eliezer not accept one, to obligate for each one separately? It was found stated in the name of Rebbi Eliezer: An adult who was abducted among Gentiles is liable for each single one.
HALAKHAH: 6 So is the Mishnah: “he acted intentionally.” This is difficult. If somebody shot an arrow intending to kill a person, he was warned, and changed his intention; is that anything? Finally you have to say that it was intentional.
Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, unintentionally a prohibition, intentionally a prohibition. Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said, unintentionally extirpation, intentionally extirpation. Rebbi Simeon ben Yoḥai stated, a support of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: He blasphemes the Eternal and will be extirpated. Think of it; even if he was intentional in a matter of extirpation and he was warned and is being flogged, may he bring a sacrifice? Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If he was unintentional about fat but intentional about the purification sacrifice one warns him and he is flogged.
Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, unintentionally a prohibition, intentionally a prohibition. Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said, unintentionally extirpation, intentionally extirpation. Rebbi Simeon ben Yoḥai stated, a support of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: He blasphemes the Eternal and will be extirpated. Think of it; even if he was intentional in a matter of extirpation and he was warned and is being flogged, may he bring a sacrifice? Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If he was unintentional about fat but intentional about the purification sacrifice one warns him and he is flogged.
HALAKHAH: 6. It is difficult for Rabban Gamliel. If one harvested the volume of a dried fig in the morning and the volume of a dried fig in the evening in one oblivion, would he not be liable? Since oblivions do not divide, so they should not combine! Rebbi Mana said it without attribution, Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The reason of Rabban Gamliel there is that there is no awareness for half a work, and similarly, there is no intent for half a work. If one ate half the volume of an olive intentionally and half the volume of an olive in error, would this combine?
HALAKHAH: Paragraph. “If somebody left with permission,” etc. For otherwise what would we say? That he should be treated like somebody who left by compulsion and he should have only four cubits. Therefore it was necessary to say, “he has 2’000 cubits in each direction.” Rav Ḥuna says, only if four cubits each intersect with the domain of Tiberias and with the domain of Magdala. Rebbi Ḥuna in the name of Rav Ada bar Aḥawa, Rebbi La in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. Even if he went to Magdala and returned he is as if he had not left. Rebbi Joshua the Southerner asked: So far if he left in error. Even if he left intentionally? Rebbi Phineas said, the Mishnah says so: “for all those who leave to save may return to their place.”
Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Eleazar, they disagree about ceding rights. Rebbi Meïr says, he may cede rights, but the rabbis are saying, he may not cede rights. Rebbi Meïr says, he may cede rights, and you are saying, “be quick”? Even though Rebbi Meïr says, he may cede rights, he agrees that they may lay claim to the alley beforehand. It was stated thus: Because he may cede rights like a Jew, the words of Rebbi Meïr. “Whether in error or intentionally, he forbids.” So is the baraita: he does not forbid. Rebbi Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Ḥinena: Everybody agrees that he may cede rights. Where do they disagree? To change his mind. Rebbi Meïr says he may cede his rights and retract it, but the rabbis say, he may cede his rights and cannot retract it. Rebbi Meïr says he may cede his rights and retract it, and you are saying, “be quick”? Even though Rebbi Meïr says, he may cede rights, he agrees that they may lay claim to the alley beforehand. It was stated thus: Because he may cede rights like a Jew, the words of Rebbi Meïr. “Whether in error or intentionally, he forbids.” So is the baraita: he does not forbid.
Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Eleazar, they disagree about ceding rights. Rebbi Meïr says, he may cede rights, but the rabbis are saying, he may not cede rights. Rebbi Meïr says, he may cede rights, and you are saying, “be quick”? Even though Rebbi Meïr says, he may cede rights, he agrees that they may lay claim to the alley beforehand. It was stated thus: Because he may cede rights like a Jew, the words of Rebbi Meïr. “Whether in error or intentionally, he forbids.” So is the baraita: he does not forbid. Rebbi Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Ḥinena: Everybody agrees that he may cede rights. Where do they disagree? To change his mind. Rebbi Meïr says he may cede his rights and retract it, but the rabbis say, he may cede his rights and cannot retract it. Rebbi Meïr says he may cede his rights and retract it, and you are saying, “be quick”? Even though Rebbi Meïr says, he may cede rights, he agrees that they may lay claim to the alley beforehand. It was stated thus: Because he may cede rights like a Jew, the words of Rebbi Meïr. “Whether in error or intentionally, he forbids.” So is the baraita: he does not forbid.
MISHNAH: When may one start giving away rights? The House of Shammai say, as long as it is daylight, but the House of Hillel say, when it gets dark. If somebody gave away his rights and then brought out, whether in error or intentionally, he forbids, the words of Rebbi Meïr. Rebbi Jehudah says, intentionally he forbids, in error he does not forbid.
MISHNAH: When may one start giving away rights? The House of Shammai say, as long as it is daylight, but the House of Hillel say, when it gets dark. If somebody gave away his rights and then brought out, whether in error or intentionally, he forbids, the words of Rebbi Meïr. Rebbi Jehudah says, intentionally he forbids, in error he does not forbid.
“If somebody gave away his rights and then brought out.” So is the Mishnah: If somebody ceded his rights, “whether in error or intentionally, he forbids.” So is the Mishnah: He does not forbid.
Rebbi Isaac Ḥaqula in the name of Rebbu Jehudah the Prince: One forcibly makes an eruv for a person. It was stated thus: “The dwellers in an alley force one another to install lath or beam,” and it was stated: If they told him to make an eruv and he does not object. If he objects does one force him? Rebbi Yudan said, the baraita is Rebbi Meïr’s. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, one may explain it according to everybody if he is a Sadducee. But was it not stated: “If one forgot and did not make an eruv, whether in error or intentionally he forbids, the words of Rebbi Meïr. Rebbi Jehudah says intentionally he forbids, in error he does not forbid.” Intentionally he forbids; may one not make eruv for him forcibly? But it must be a fine. Then he should be forbidden but everybody else permitted. Since they could make an eruv and did not make it one fines him. But does Rebbi Meïr not hold that one may make something in favor of another person without his knowledge, only one may not impose a disadvantage on him? Rebbi Meïr holds that this is not a favor; a person does not want that a neighbor may come to his house except on his invitation.
Rebbi Isaac Ḥaqula in the name of Rebbu Jehudah the Prince: One forcibly makes an eruv for a person. It was stated thus: “The dwellers in an alley force one another to install lath or beam,” and it was stated: If they told him to make an eruv and he does not object. If he objects does one force him? Rebbi Yudan said, the baraita is Rebbi Meïr’s. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, one may explain it according to everybody if he is a Sadducee. But was it not stated: “If one forgot and did not make an eruv, whether in error or intentionally he forbids, the words of Rebbi Meïr. Rebbi Jehudah says intentionally he forbids, in error he does not forbid.” Intentionally he forbids; may one not make eruv for him forcibly? But it must be a fine. Then he should be forbidden but everybody else permitted. Since they could make an eruv and did not make it one fines him. But does Rebbi Meïr not hold that one may make something in favor of another person without his knowledge, only one may not impose a disadvantage on him? Rebbi Meïr holds that this is not a favor; a person does not want that a neighbor may come to his house except on his invitation.
Rebbi Isaac Ḥaqula in the name of Rebbu Jehudah the Prince: One forcibly makes an eruv for a person. It was stated thus: “The dwellers in an alley force one another to install lath or beam,” and it was stated: If they told him to make an eruv and he does not object. If he objects does one force him? Rebbi Yudan said, the baraita is Rebbi Meïr’s. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, one may explain it according to everybody if he is a Sadducee. But was it not stated: “If one forgot and did not make an eruv, whether in error or intentionally he forbids, the words of Rebbi Meïr. Rebbi Jehudah says intentionally he forbids, in error he does not forbid.” Intentionally he forbids; may one not make eruv for him forcibly? But it must be a fine. Then he should be forbidden but everybody else permitted. Since they could make an eruv and did not make it one fines him. But does Rebbi Meïr not hold that one may make something in favor of another person without his knowledge, only one may not impose a disadvantage on him? Rebbi Meïr holds that this is not a favor; a person does not want that a neighbor may come to his house except on his invitation.
MISHNAH: Somebody who eats leavened heave on Passover, if in error pays its value and a fifth, if intentionally is not liable for restitution even as value of wood.
Rebbi Yose asked, if somebody benefited from Temple property less than the value of a perutah, is he liable for reimbursement? (He said to him.) Let us hear from the following: What he appropriated from sancta he has to repay, except what is less than the value of a perutah. There are Tannaim who state, to add. (He who said except, for) [he who said “except what is less than the value of a perutah” for reimbursement and] sacrifice. He who said “to add”, for reimbursement. As you are saying there, intentionally less than the value of a perutah, even though he does not pay the fifth and a reparation sacrifice he has to pay to the tribe, one says the same here. The colleagues said before Rebbi Yose, is that not a Mishnah? “Somebody who eats leavened heave on Passover, if in error pays its value and a fifth, if intentionally he is not liable for restitution even as value of wood”? He told them, there it is impossible to complete, but here it is possible to complete.
Rebbi Yose asked, if somebody benefited from Temple property less than the value of a perutah, is he liable for reimbursement? (He said to him.) Let us hear from the following: What he appropriated from sancta he has to repay, except what is less than the value of a perutah. There are Tannaim who state, to add. (He who said except, for) [he who said “except what is less than the value of a perutah” for reimbursement and] sacrifice. He who said “to add”, for reimbursement. As you are saying there, intentionally less than the value of a perutah, even though he does not pay the fifth and a reparation sacrifice he has to pay to the tribe, one says the same here. The colleagues said before Rebbi Yose, is that not a Mishnah? “Somebody who eats leavened heave on Passover, if in error pays its value and a fifth, if intentionally he is not liable for restitution even as value of wood”? He told them, there it is impossible to complete, but here it is possible to complete.
HALAKHAH: “He who was impure,” etc. Impure by a corpse, I not only have impure by a corpse, from where forced or in error? The verse says, every man, [it added]. So far following Rebbi Aqiba; following Rebbi Ismael? Rebbi Ismael stated, impure by a corpse is not equal to a far-away trip, nor is a far-away trip equal to impure by a corpse, what is common to them is that he did not make the First and shall make the Second; also I am adding those forced or in error who did not make the First that they shall make the Second. Intentional from where? Rebbi Zeˋira said, but the man, to add the one acting intentionally. We have stated; “if in error or by force;” Rebbi Ḥiyya stated, “if in error, or by force, or intentional.” Rebbi Yose said, the Mishnah implies this, “because these are not liable for extirpation but those are liable for extirpation;” who is subject to extirpation if not intentional?
Are not minor sins positive commandments and prohibitions; are not serious ones extirpations and capital crimes? Rebbi Jehudah said, so is the Mishnah: “Minor or serious ones. Those minor ones, whether he committed them intentionally or did not commit them intentionally. Those severe ones, whether he obtained knowledge of them or did not obtain knowledge of them. The following are minor sins: positive commandments and prohibitions. Severe ones, extirpations and capital crimes. Just as the he-goat whose blood is brought inside atones for intentional infractions and suspends for the unintentional ones in cases where a sacrifice is required, also the scapegoat atones in the same way.”
Are not minor sins positive commandments and prohibitions; are not serious ones extirpations and capital crimes? Rebbi Jehudah said, so is the Mishnah: “Minor or serious ones. Those minor ones, whether he committed them intentionally or did not commit them intentionally. Those severe ones, whether he obtained knowledge of them or did not obtain knowledge of them. The following are minor sins: positive commandments and prohibitions. Severe ones, extirpations and capital crimes. Just as the he-goat whose blood is brought inside atones for intentional infractions and suspends for the unintentional ones in cases where a sacrifice is required, also the scapegoat atones in the same way.”
Rebbi Matthew ben Ḥarash asked Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah in the Academy. He said to him, did you hear the four types of Atonement which Rebbi Ismael explained? He answered him, there are three in addition to repentance. One verse says, return, naughty children. But another verse says, for on that day He shall atone for you. And another verse says, I shall visit their crime with the rod, etc. And another verse says, the iniquity of this people shall not be atoned for until you die. How is this? If somebody violates a positive commandment and repents, before he moves from there it will be forgiven to him. About this one it says, return, naughty children. If one transgresses a prohibition and immediately repents, repentance suspends judgment, and the Day of Atonement atones. About this one it says, for on that day, He shall atone for you. If one intentionally transgressed {sins punishable by} extirpations or death penalties, repentance and the Day of Atonement atone half, and sufferings during the other days of the year atone half. About this one it says, I shall visit their crime with the rod, and their iniquities with plagues. But by whom the Name of Heaven was desecrated, there is no power in repentance to suspend judgment, nor in the Day of Atonement to pardon, nor in sufferings to scour; but repentance and the Day of Atonement atone one third, sufferings atone a third, and death scours with sufferings. About this one it says, the iniquity of this people shall not be atoned for until you die. From this we learn that death scours.
A woman after her period who was immersed by accident, Rebbi Shammai in the name of Rav: she is pure for her house but impure for purities. Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina, she is impure both for her house and purities. What is the reason? It should be washed a second time and will be pure. Since the first time it was intentionally, also the second time it must be intentionally. And from where that the first time it was intentionally? The Cohen has to order that they should wash. Intentionally. And we see that rabbis are early for intercalations. Rav Naḥman in the name of Rebbi Mana: It is an obligation to be early, to hasten in commandments.
A woman after her period who was immersed by accident, Rebbi Shammai in the name of Rav: she is pure for her house but impure for purities. Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina, she is impure both for her house and purities. What is the reason? It should be washed a second time and will be pure. Since the first time it was intentionally, also the second time it must be intentionally. And from where that the first time it was intentionally? The Cohen has to order that they should wash. Intentionally. And we see that rabbis are early for intercalations. Rav Naḥman in the name of Rebbi Mana: It is an obligation to be early, to hasten in commandments.
A woman after her period who was immersed by accident, Rebbi Shammai in the name of Rav: she is pure for her house but impure for purities. Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina, she is impure both for her house and purities. What is the reason? It should be washed a second time and will be pure. Since the first time it was intentionally, also the second time it must be intentionally. And from where that the first time it was intentionally? The Cohen has to order that they should wash. Intentionally. And we see that rabbis are early for intercalations. Rav Naḥman in the name of Rebbi Mana: It is an obligation to be early, to hasten in commandments.
A woman after her period who was immersed by accident, Rebbi Shammai in the name of Rav: she is pure for her house but impure for purities. Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina, she is impure both for her house and purities. What is the reason? It should be washed a second time and will be pure. Since the first time it was intentionally, also the second time it must be intentionally. And from where that the first time it was intentionally? The Cohen has to order that they should wash. Intentionally. And we see that rabbis are early for intercalations. Rav Naḥman in the name of Rebbi Mana: It is an obligation to be early, to hasten in commandments.
Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: All forbidden things, if one added to them in error it is permitted, intentionally it is forbidden. Is that not the Mishnah, “if it was in error it is permitted, if intentional it is forbidden”? The Mishnah is about addition to heave, he comes to tell you about other things. Rebbi Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Jonathan: Just as one has a duty to instruct about actions that should be done so one has a duty to instruct negatively about actions that should not be done. Rebbi Eleazar said, just as it is forbidden to declare the impure as pure, so it is forbidden to declare the pure as impure. Rebbi Abba bar Jacob in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If a practical case comes before you and you do not know whether to suspend or to burn, always try to burn rather than to suspend since there is nothing in the Torah more distinguished than burned bulls and burned rams, and they are burned. Rebbi Yose asked, is it possible to infer from something whose commandment is thus for something whose commandment is not so?
HALAKHAH: “One which never had been used for work,” intentionally, “which never had drawn under a yoke,” intentionally or unintentionally. Rebbi Jonah explains the Mishnah: “One which never had been used for work,” intentionally, “which never had drawn under a yoke,” intentionally or unintentionally, if it actually had drawn. Rebbi Yose explained the Mishnah: Intentionally even if it had not drawn, unintentionally if it actually had drawn. It turns out that Rebbi Jonah follows Rebbi Ismael and Rebbi Yose the rabbis. Rebbi Jonah follows Rebbi Ismael, since Rebbi Ismael says, anything which was in a set and left the set to teach leaves its set and stands in its new meaning. Therefore, he has to spell out “one which never had been used for work,” intentionally, “which never had drawn under a yoke,” intentionally or unintentionally, if it actually had drawn. Rebbi Yose follows the rabbis, since the rabbis say, anything which was in a set and left the set to teach remains in its set and in its new meaning. Therefore, he has to spell out: intentionally even if it had not drawn, unintentionally if it actually had drawn.
HALAKHAH: “One which never had been used for work,” intentionally, “which never had drawn under a yoke,” intentionally or unintentionally. Rebbi Jonah explains the Mishnah: “One which never had been used for work,” intentionally, “which never had drawn under a yoke,” intentionally or unintentionally, if it actually had drawn. Rebbi Yose explained the Mishnah: Intentionally even if it had not drawn, unintentionally if it actually had drawn. It turns out that Rebbi Jonah follows Rebbi Ismael and Rebbi Yose the rabbis. Rebbi Jonah follows Rebbi Ismael, since Rebbi Ismael says, anything which was in a set and left the set to teach leaves its set and stands in its new meaning. Therefore, he has to spell out “one which never had been used for work,” intentionally, “which never had drawn under a yoke,” intentionally or unintentionally, if it actually had drawn. Rebbi Yose follows the rabbis, since the rabbis say, anything which was in a set and left the set to teach remains in its set and in its new meaning. Therefore, he has to spell out: intentionally even if it had not drawn, unintentionally if it actually had drawn.
HALAKHAH: “One which never had been used for work,” intentionally, “which never had drawn under a yoke,” intentionally or unintentionally. Rebbi Jonah explains the Mishnah: “One which never had been used for work,” intentionally, “which never had drawn under a yoke,” intentionally or unintentionally, if it actually had drawn. Rebbi Yose explained the Mishnah: Intentionally even if it had not drawn, unintentionally if it actually had drawn. It turns out that Rebbi Jonah follows Rebbi Ismael and Rebbi Yose the rabbis. Rebbi Jonah follows Rebbi Ismael, since Rebbi Ismael says, anything which was in a set and left the set to teach leaves its set and stands in its new meaning. Therefore, he has to spell out “one which never had been used for work,” intentionally, “which never had drawn under a yoke,” intentionally or unintentionally, if it actually had drawn. Rebbi Yose follows the rabbis, since the rabbis say, anything which was in a set and left the set to teach remains in its set and in its new meaning. Therefore, he has to spell out: intentionally even if it had not drawn, unintentionally if it actually had drawn.
HALAKHAH: “One which never had been used for work,” intentionally, “which never had drawn under a yoke,” intentionally or unintentionally. Rebbi Jonah explains the Mishnah: “One which never had been used for work,” intentionally, “which never had drawn under a yoke,” intentionally or unintentionally, if it actually had drawn. Rebbi Yose explained the Mishnah: Intentionally even if it had not drawn, unintentionally if it actually had drawn. It turns out that Rebbi Jonah follows Rebbi Ismael and Rebbi Yose the rabbis. Rebbi Jonah follows Rebbi Ismael, since Rebbi Ismael says, anything which was in a set and left the set to teach leaves its set and stands in its new meaning. Therefore, he has to spell out “one which never had been used for work,” intentionally, “which never had drawn under a yoke,” intentionally or unintentionally, if it actually had drawn. Rebbi Yose follows the rabbis, since the rabbis say, anything which was in a set and left the set to teach remains in its set and in its new meaning. Therefore, he has to spell out: intentionally even if it had not drawn, unintentionally if it actually had drawn.
HALAKHAH: “One which never had been used for work,” intentionally, “which never had drawn under a yoke,” intentionally or unintentionally. Rebbi Jonah explains the Mishnah: “One which never had been used for work,” intentionally, “which never had drawn under a yoke,” intentionally or unintentionally, if it actually had drawn. Rebbi Yose explained the Mishnah: Intentionally even if it had not drawn, unintentionally if it actually had drawn. It turns out that Rebbi Jonah follows Rebbi Ismael and Rebbi Yose the rabbis. Rebbi Jonah follows Rebbi Ismael, since Rebbi Ismael says, anything which was in a set and left the set to teach leaves its set and stands in its new meaning. Therefore, he has to spell out “one which never had been used for work,” intentionally, “which never had drawn under a yoke,” intentionally or unintentionally, if it actually had drawn. Rebbi Yose follows the rabbis, since the rabbis say, anything which was in a set and left the set to teach remains in its set and in its new meaning. Therefore, he has to spell out: intentionally even if it had not drawn, unintentionally if it actually had drawn.
HALAKHAH: “One which never had been used for work,” intentionally, “which never had drawn under a yoke,” intentionally or unintentionally. Rebbi Jonah explains the Mishnah: “One which never had been used for work,” intentionally, “which never had drawn under a yoke,” intentionally or unintentionally, if it actually had drawn. Rebbi Yose explained the Mishnah: Intentionally even if it had not drawn, unintentionally if it actually had drawn. It turns out that Rebbi Jonah follows Rebbi Ismael and Rebbi Yose the rabbis. Rebbi Jonah follows Rebbi Ismael, since Rebbi Ismael says, anything which was in a set and left the set to teach leaves its set and stands in its new meaning. Therefore, he has to spell out “one which never had been used for work,” intentionally, “which never had drawn under a yoke,” intentionally or unintentionally, if it actually had drawn. Rebbi Yose follows the rabbis, since the rabbis say, anything which was in a set and left the set to teach remains in its set and in its new meaning. Therefore, he has to spell out: intentionally even if it had not drawn, unintentionally if it actually had drawn.
HALAKHAH: “One which never had been used for work,” intentionally, “which never had drawn under a yoke,” intentionally or unintentionally. Rebbi Jonah explains the Mishnah: “One which never had been used for work,” intentionally, “which never had drawn under a yoke,” intentionally or unintentionally, if it actually had drawn. Rebbi Yose explained the Mishnah: Intentionally even if it had not drawn, unintentionally if it actually had drawn. It turns out that Rebbi Jonah follows Rebbi Ismael and Rebbi Yose the rabbis. Rebbi Jonah follows Rebbi Ismael, since Rebbi Ismael says, anything which was in a set and left the set to teach leaves its set and stands in its new meaning. Therefore, he has to spell out “one which never had been used for work,” intentionally, “which never had drawn under a yoke,” intentionally or unintentionally, if it actually had drawn. Rebbi Yose follows the rabbis, since the rabbis say, anything which was in a set and left the set to teach remains in its set and in its new meaning. Therefore, he has to spell out: intentionally even if it had not drawn, unintentionally if it actually had drawn.
HALAKHAH: “One which never had been used for work,” intentionally, “which never had drawn under a yoke,” intentionally or unintentionally. Rebbi Jonah explains the Mishnah: “One which never had been used for work,” intentionally, “which never had drawn under a yoke,” intentionally or unintentionally, if it actually had drawn. Rebbi Yose explained the Mishnah: Intentionally even if it had not drawn, unintentionally if it actually had drawn. It turns out that Rebbi Jonah follows Rebbi Ismael and Rebbi Yose the rabbis. Rebbi Jonah follows Rebbi Ismael, since Rebbi Ismael says, anything which was in a set and left the set to teach leaves its set and stands in its new meaning. Therefore, he has to spell out “one which never had been used for work,” intentionally, “which never had drawn under a yoke,” intentionally or unintentionally, if it actually had drawn. Rebbi Yose follows the rabbis, since the rabbis say, anything which was in a set and left the set to teach remains in its set and in its new meaning. Therefore, he has to spell out: intentionally even if it had not drawn, unintentionally if it actually had drawn.
There, we have stated: “If somebody eats heave intentionally, he pays the principal but not the fifth.” And we have stated: “The following are flogged.” Here you say, he is flogged, and there you say, he pays. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the Mishnah is two-sided: If he was cautioned, he is flogged; if he was not cautioned, he pays. Rebbi Joḥanan is of the opinion that in a case where there is flogging or restitution, when he pays he is not flogged. Why should he not be flogged and have to pay? (Deut. 25:2) “Corresponding to his guilt.” You sentence him for one offence but you may not sentence him for two offences. The verse speaks of one who may incur two punishments (Deut. 25:2): “The judge shall have him laid down and flogged in his presence a number [of times] because of his guilt.”
Our Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish! “If somebody eats heave intentionally he pays the principal but not the fifth.” In the opinion of Nathan bar Hoshaiah who said he pays, it is understandable. In the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan who said, if he was cautioned he is flogged, but if he was not cautioned he pays, he explains it as intentional without cautioning. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish there is no difference between intentional and unintentional, between cautioned or not cautioned. He explains following Rebbi Meïr who says, he is flogged and he pays.
Rebbi Phineas asked before Rebbi Yose, why did we not state it with the leniencies of the House of Shammai and the stringencies of the House of Hillel? He said to him, the Mishnaiot apply only to circumstances that are either stringent on both sides or lenient on both sides. But here it is a stringency on one side and a leniency on the other side. But did we not state: “The House of Shammai say, property abandoned to the poor [is abandoned]?” Is this not lenient for the poor and stringent for the householder, and it was stated! He said to him, it is lenient for the poor and not stringent for the householder, since he intentionally abandoned it. He said to him, did we not state: “If the sheaf that was near a closure, a stack, cattle, or vessels was forgotten,” is this not lenient for the householder and stringent for the poor, and it was stated! He said to him, it is lenient for the householder but not stringent for the poor, because they did not acquire it yet. You may also say here, it is lenient for the woman and not stringent for the husband since he did not yet acquire property rights to it. He said to him, since he became betrothed to her, the inheritance fell to both of them.
“That is more restrictive for oaths than for vows. What is more restrictive for vows than for oaths?” “Or a person who swears to lightly express with his lips for bad or for good.” Just as doing good is a matter of choice, so doing bad is a matter of choice; that excludes any prohibition which is a commandment. They wanted to say, inadvertently, but not intentionally. It was found stated: Rebbi Ismael says, “anything that comes out of his mouth he shall do,” not what comes out of Heaven’s mouth. Should we say that this is the same for vows of sanctification? Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Hila: For a man may vow his sukkah to Heaven.
Rebbi Mana understood it from the following: “They told him, if he wishes, he says that he did it intentionally.” What can he say for an assigned slave girl? In error, he is obligated; intentionally, he is obligated! He can tell him, I touched her but did not finish, or as Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, I was forced to it by the spell she put on me. For a nazir what can you say? In error, he is obligated; intentionally, he is obligated; forced, he is obligated! “Suddenly”, to include in error, “suddenly”, to include intentionally. “There was a condition in my mind that if I should become impure, my nezirut should burst away from me and a new nezirut would fall on me”; in any case he was not obligated to be a nazir until now. (“There was a condition in my mind that if I should become impure, my nezirut should burst away from me and a new nezirut would fall on me”; in any case he was not obligated to be a nazir until now.) What do you have in case of an oath? In error, he is obligated; intentionally, he is obligated! A condition may apply to words; there is no condition for oaths! It follows what Rebbi Abba said, Rav Jehudah: For error, its sacrifice, for intention, its sacrifice. But if he said, I thought that this was no oath, he is free. Therefore, all these subjects cannot be stated, but the following can be stated.
Rebbi Mana understood it from the following: “They told him, if he wishes, he says that he did it intentionally.” What can he say for an assigned slave girl? In error, he is obligated; intentionally, he is obligated! He can tell him, I touched her but did not finish, or as Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, I was forced to it by the spell she put on me. For a nazir what can you say? In error, he is obligated; intentionally, he is obligated; forced, he is obligated! “Suddenly”, to include in error, “suddenly”, to include intentionally. “There was a condition in my mind that if I should become impure, my nezirut should burst away from me and a new nezirut would fall on me”; in any case he was not obligated to be a nazir until now. (“There was a condition in my mind that if I should become impure, my nezirut should burst away from me and a new nezirut would fall on me”; in any case he was not obligated to be a nazir until now.) What do you have in case of an oath? In error, he is obligated; intentionally, he is obligated! A condition may apply to words; there is no condition for oaths! It follows what Rebbi Abba said, Rav Jehudah: For error, its sacrifice, for intention, its sacrifice. But if he said, I thought that this was no oath, he is free. Therefore, all these subjects cannot be stated, but the following can be stated.
Rebbi Mana understood it from the following: “They told him, if he wishes, he says that he did it intentionally.” What can he say for an assigned slave girl? In error, he is obligated; intentionally, he is obligated! He can tell him, I touched her but did not finish, or as Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, I was forced to it by the spell she put on me. For a nazir what can you say? In error, he is obligated; intentionally, he is obligated; forced, he is obligated! “Suddenly”, to include in error, “suddenly”, to include intentionally. “There was a condition in my mind that if I should become impure, my nezirut should burst away from me and a new nezirut would fall on me”; in any case he was not obligated to be a nazir until now. (“There was a condition in my mind that if I should become impure, my nezirut should burst away from me and a new nezirut would fall on me”; in any case he was not obligated to be a nazir until now.) What do you have in case of an oath? In error, he is obligated; intentionally, he is obligated! A condition may apply to words; there is no condition for oaths! It follows what Rebbi Abba said, Rav Jehudah: For error, its sacrifice, for intention, its sacrifice. But if he said, I thought that this was no oath, he is free. Therefore, all these subjects cannot be stated, but the following can be stated.
Rebbi Mana understood it from the following: “They told him, if he wishes, he says that he did it intentionally.” What can he say for an assigned slave girl? In error, he is obligated; intentionally, he is obligated! He can tell him, I touched her but did not finish, or as Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, I was forced to it by the spell she put on me. For a nazir what can you say? In error, he is obligated; intentionally, he is obligated; forced, he is obligated! “Suddenly”, to include in error, “suddenly”, to include intentionally. “There was a condition in my mind that if I should become impure, my nezirut should burst away from me and a new nezirut would fall on me”; in any case he was not obligated to be a nazir until now. (“There was a condition in my mind that if I should become impure, my nezirut should burst away from me and a new nezirut would fall on me”; in any case he was not obligated to be a nazir until now.) What do you have in case of an oath? In error, he is obligated; intentionally, he is obligated! A condition may apply to words; there is no condition for oaths! It follows what Rebbi Abba said, Rav Jehudah: For error, its sacrifice, for intention, its sacrifice. But if he said, I thought that this was no oath, he is free. Therefore, all these subjects cannot be stated, but the following can be stated.
Rebbi Mana understood it from the following: “They told him, if he wishes, he says that he did it intentionally.” What can he say for an assigned slave girl? In error, he is obligated; intentionally, he is obligated! He can tell him, I touched her but did not finish, or as Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, I was forced to it by the spell she put on me. For a nazir what can you say? In error, he is obligated; intentionally, he is obligated; forced, he is obligated! “Suddenly”, to include in error, “suddenly”, to include intentionally. “There was a condition in my mind that if I should become impure, my nezirut should burst away from me and a new nezirut would fall on me”; in any case he was not obligated to be a nazir until now. (“There was a condition in my mind that if I should become impure, my nezirut should burst away from me and a new nezirut would fall on me”; in any case he was not obligated to be a nazir until now.) What do you have in case of an oath? In error, he is obligated; intentionally, he is obligated! A condition may apply to words; there is no condition for oaths! It follows what Rebbi Abba said, Rav Jehudah: For error, its sacrifice, for intention, its sacrifice. But if he said, I thought that this was no oath, he is free. Therefore, all these subjects cannot be stated, but the following can be stated.
MISHNAH: If someone causes impurity, or dema‘, or libation wine, if it was unintentional he is free, intentional he is obligated. If Cohanim in the Temple intentionally made [a sacrifice] piggul, they have to pay.
HALAKHAH: Rebbi Yudan did not go to the assembly. He was standing with Rebbi Mana and asked him, what new was said? He said: So says Rebbi Yose, a person causing impurity does not have the status of a perpetrator, fromthe following: “Heave which became impure.” He answered: Explain it, if it became impure by itself; then you cannot infer anything, because of a Mishnah: “If somebody judged, absolved the guilty and obligated the innocent, declared the pure impure and the impure pure.” For Rav Jeremiah said in the name of Rav: If he touched it with his hand. Samuel said: If he touched it with his hand. Rebbi Jehudah ben Rebbi says, it should have been logical that even intentionally he should have been free. Why did they say that he is obligated? That he should tell. And Rebbi Joḥanan said, it should have been logical that even unintentionally he should have been obligated. Why did they say that he is free? Because of a fine. The strength of Rebbi Joḥanan comes from this: “If someone causes anything to become impure, or dema‘, or libation wine, if it was unintentional he is free, intentional he is obligated,” and Rebbi Joḥanan said, he pays a fine. A baraita supports Rebbi Joḥanan: “A person who puts a yoke on another’s cow is free in human law but guilty in Heaven’s law.”
So far if he thought that it was profane. If he knew that it was heave but he thought that it was permitted to make it impure? Let ushear from the following: “If Cohanim in the Temple intentionally made [a sacrifice] piggul, they have to pay.” Could the Cohen think that it was profane? Is there piggul of profane things? But we must hold that he knew that it was holy but thought that it was permitted to make piggul of sacrifices. And here, if he knew that it was heave but thought that it was permitted to make it impure.
MISHNAH: If somebody uses his portion either from most holy or simply holy sacrifices for preliminary marriage, she is not preliminarily married. From Second Tithe there is no preliminary marriage whether unintentionally or intentionally, the words of Rebbi Meïr. Rebbi Jehudah says, intentionally he performed preliminary marriage, unintentionally he did not perform preliminary marriage. From Temple property, intentionally he performed preliminary marriage, unintentionally he did not perform preliminary marriage, the words of Rebbi Meïr. Rebbi Jehudah says, unintentionally he performed preliminary marriage, intentionally he did not perform preliminary marriage.
MISHNAH: If somebody uses his portion either from most holy or simply holy sacrifices for preliminary marriage, she is not preliminarily married. From Second Tithe there is no preliminary marriage whether unintentionally or intentionally, the words of Rebbi Meïr. Rebbi Jehudah says, intentionally he performed preliminary marriage, unintentionally he did not perform preliminary marriage. From Temple property, intentionally he performed preliminary marriage, unintentionally he did not perform preliminary marriage, the words of Rebbi Meïr. Rebbi Jehudah says, unintentionally he performed preliminary marriage, intentionally he did not perform preliminary marriage.
MISHNAH: If somebody uses his portion either from most holy or simply holy sacrifices for preliminary marriage, she is not preliminarily married. From Second Tithe there is no preliminary marriage whether unintentionally or intentionally, the words of Rebbi Meïr. Rebbi Jehudah says, intentionally he performed preliminary marriage, unintentionally he did not perform preliminary marriage. From Temple property, intentionally he performed preliminary marriage, unintentionally he did not perform preliminary marriage, the words of Rebbi Meïr. Rebbi Jehudah says, unintentionally he performed preliminary marriage, intentionally he did not perform preliminary marriage.
MISHNAH: If somebody uses his portion either from most holy or simply holy sacrifices for preliminary marriage, she is not preliminarily married. From Second Tithe there is no preliminary marriage whether unintentionally or intentionally, the words of Rebbi Meïr. Rebbi Jehudah says, intentionally he performed preliminary marriage, unintentionally he did not perform preliminary marriage. From Temple property, intentionally he performed preliminary marriage, unintentionally he did not perform preliminary marriage, the words of Rebbi Meïr. Rebbi Jehudah says, unintentionally he performed preliminary marriage, intentionally he did not perform preliminary marriage.
Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Pedaiah: Intentionally desecrated Temple property becomes profane without redemption. But did we not state: “In error,” that excludes intention? That you say for the additional fifth and the sacrifice, but profaned it is. Rebbi Ḥama bar Uqba in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: The excluded well-being offerings become profane without redemption. But did we not state: “From the sancta,” not all sancta? That you say for the additional fifth and the sacrifice, but profaned it is.
MISHNAH: A human is always notorious: Whether in error, or intentionally, whether awake, or sleeping, if he blinded another person or broke vessels, he pays full damages.
MISHNAH: If his jar was broken in the public domain and another person slipped on the water or was hurt by one of its shards, he must pay. Rebbi Jehudah said, if intentionally, he has to pay; if unintentionally, he is free.
Rebbi Yasa said, I heard something from Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac in this matter, but I do not remember what it was. Rebbi Ze‘ira told him, maybe it was the following: At the start the discussion refers to the tame animal. It added weregilt for the notorious. Then it added damages for both of them. I could think that as it added damages, it added the payment for the slave; the verse says “but the owner of the bull is free;” free from paying for a slave. Rebbi La said, everywhere you are more restrictive for a slave than anything else since even if he is scabbed one pays thirty tetradrachmas; I would have said also (for his father and his mother) the same; the verse says “but the owner of the bull is free;” free from paying for fetuses. Everywhere you are more restrictive for a notorious than for a tame one, would you be more restrictive here for a tame one than for a notorious? But it must be so: Men who act unintentionally are liable; bulls who act unintentionally are not liable. Does this mean that if they acted intentionally, they were liable? The verse says, “but the owner of the bull is free;” free from paying for a slave. Another Tanna stated: “But the owner of the bull is free;” free from paying for a slave. But is it not written: “If people quarrel”, people but not bulls. Rebbi Ḥaggai said, so is the baraita: Men who act unintentionally are liable; bulls who act unintentionally are not liable. Does this mean that if they acted intentionally, they were liable? The verse says, “but the owner of the bull is free;” free from paying for a slave. But is it not written: “When they quarrel,” “when they brawl”. Is not quarrel the same as brawl? Since there the act was intentional, so here the act was intentional; or since here the act was unintentional, so here the act was unintentional. What about this? As Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac said, at the start it treats the tame animal, etc.
Rebbi Yasa said, I heard something from Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac in this matter, but I do not remember what it was. Rebbi Ze‘ira told him, maybe it was the following: At the start the discussion refers to the tame animal. It added weregilt for the notorious. Then it added damages for both of them. I could think that as it added damages, it added the payment for the slave; the verse says “but the owner of the bull is free;” free from paying for a slave. Rebbi La said, everywhere you are more restrictive for a slave than anything else since even if he is scabbed one pays thirty tetradrachmas; I would have said also (for his father and his mother) the same; the verse says “but the owner of the bull is free;” free from paying for fetuses. Everywhere you are more restrictive for a notorious than for a tame one, would you be more restrictive here for a tame one than for a notorious? But it must be so: Men who act unintentionally are liable; bulls who act unintentionally are not liable. Does this mean that if they acted intentionally, they were liable? The verse says, “but the owner of the bull is free;” free from paying for a slave. Another Tanna stated: “But the owner of the bull is free;” free from paying for a slave. But is it not written: “If people quarrel”, people but not bulls. Rebbi Ḥaggai said, so is the baraita: Men who act unintentionally are liable; bulls who act unintentionally are not liable. Does this mean that if they acted intentionally, they were liable? The verse says, “but the owner of the bull is free;” free from paying for a slave. But is it not written: “When they quarrel,” “when they brawl”. Is not quarrel the same as brawl? Since there the act was intentional, so here the act was intentional; or since here the act was unintentional, so here the act was unintentional. What about this? As Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac said, at the start it treats the tame animal, etc.
It was stated: Rebbi Simeon ben Ioḥai said, by the mouth of two witnesses shall the dead die. Does he die when dead? But to tell him by which kind of death he will be executed. It was stated: Rebbi Jehudah ben Rebbi Illai said, and if a man intentionally kill his neighbor knowingly; they shall inform him by which kind of death he will be executed.
MISHNAH: One who desecrates the Sabbath by something which if performed intentionally makes him liable to extirpation, or to a purification sacrifice if in error. But he who curses father or mother is guilty only of he cursed them by the Name. If he cursed them by a substitute name, Rebbi Meïr declares him guilty but the Sages free him from prosecution. One who has sexual relations with a preliminarily married adolescent is only liable if she was an adolescent, a virgin, and preliminarily married, in her father’s house. If two [men] had relations with her, the first one is stoned, the second is subject to strangling.
HALAKHAH: “One who desecrates the Sabbath,” etc. From where warning for the desecrator? Do not perform any work. From where extirpation? For any who would perform work on it would be extirpated. From where punishment? Its desecrator shall be made to die the death. Should we not state 37 kinds of extirpation in the Torah? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, because if he performs all of them, intentionally on the Sabbath and intentionally for the work, he is liable for each one singly.
HALAKHAH: “One who desecrates the Sabbath,” etc. From where warning for the desecrator? Do not perform any work. From where extirpation? For any who would perform work on it would be extirpated. From where punishment? Its desecrator shall be made to die the death. Should we not state 37 kinds of extirpation in the Torah? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, because if he performs all of them, intentionally on the Sabbath and intentionally for the work, he is liable for each one singly.
Rebbi Matthew ben Ḥarash asked Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah in the Academy. He told him, did you hear the four types of Atonement which Rebbi Ismael explained? He answered him, there are three in addition to repentance. One verse says, return, naughty children, I shall heal your waywardness. But another verse says, for on that day, He shall pardon you, to cleanse you. And another verse says, I shall visit their crime with the rod, and their iniquity with plagues. And another verse says, the iniquity of this people shall not be atoned for until you die. How is this? If somebody violates a positive commandment and repents, immediately before he moves from there the Holy One, praise to Him, would forgive him. About this one it says, return, naughty children, I shall heal your waywardness. If one transgresses a prohibition, repentance suspends judgment, and the Day of Atonement pardons. About this one it says, for on that day, He shall pardon you, etc. If one intentionally transgressed [sins punishable by] extirpations or death penalties, repentance and the Day of Atonement pardon half, and sufferings pardon half. About this one it says, I shall visit their crime with the rod, etc. But by whom the Name of Heaven was desecrated, there is no power in repentance to suspend judgment, nor in the Day of Atonement to pardon, nor in sufferings to scour; but repentance and the Day of Atonement pardon a third, and suffering a third, and death scours a third. About this one it says, the iniquity of this people shall not be atoned for until you die. From this we learn that death scours.
And from where that it speaks only about the impurity of the Sanctuary and its sancta? He warned and punished about impurity and required a sacrifice about impurity. Since punishment and warning spelled out later on refer to impurity of the Sanctuary and its sancta, also when He made liable for a sacrifice it is about impurity of the Sanctuary and its sancta. Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob says, since it says, I did not eat from it in my deep mourning, I could think that an Israel who ate tithe in deep mourning should bring a sacrifice. The verse says, from thes e. For some of these he is liable, for some of these he is not liable. I will exclude tithe which is not a deadly sin but will not exclude heave which is a deadly sin as it is said, they would die from it for they desecrated it. The verse says from thes e; for some of these he is liable, for some of these he is not liable. Or since there [one speaks about] heave, also here heave. But did you not learn it from foreign worship? Since foreign worship teaches about all transgressions in the Torah, to say that as foreign worship is special that one is liable for extirpation if done intentionally and for a sacrifice if done unintentionally. This excludes heave which only is a deadly sin.
Are not minor sins [positive commandments and] prohibitions; are not serious ones extirpations and capital crimes? Rav Jehudah said, so is the Mishnah: “Minor or serious ones. Those minor ones, whether he committed them intentionally or committed them unintentionally. Those intentional ones, whether he obtained knowledge of them or did not obtain knowledge of them. The following are minor sins: positive commandments and prohibitions. Serious ones, extirpations and capital crimes. Just as the he-goat whose blood is brought inside atones for intentional infractions and suspends for the unintentional, the same holds for the scapegoat.”
Rebbi Matthew ben Ḥarash asked Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah in the Academy, did you hear the four types of Atonement which Rebbi Ismael explained? He answered him, there are three in addition to repentance. One verse says, return, naughty children, etc. But another verse says, for on that day, He shall pardon you, etc. And another verse says, I shall visit their crime with the rod, etc. And another verse says, the iniquity of this people shall not be atoned for until you die. How is this? If somebody violates a positive commandment and repents, before he moves from there it will be forgiven to him. About this one it says, return, naughty children, etc. If one transgresses a prohibition and immediately repents, repentance suspends judgment, and the Day of Atonement pardons. About this one it says, for onthat day, He shall pardon you. If one intentionally transgressed [sins punishable by] extirpations or death penalties, repentance and the Day of Atonement atone half, and sufferings atone half. About this one it says, I shall visit their crime with the rod, and their iniquities with plagues. But by whom the Name of Heaven was desecrated, there is no power in repentance to suspend judgment, nor in the Day of Atonement to pardon, nor in sufferings to scour; but repentance and the Day of Atonement suspend, and death scours with sufferings. About this one it says, the iniquity of this people shall not be atoned for until you die. From this we learn that death scours.
HALAKHAH: “Together Israel, Cohanim,” etc. But we did not state “the Anointed.” Why did we not state “the Anointed”? If you say that we are discussing things which do not imply the obligation of a sacrifice, it is correct not to state “Anointed”. If you say about things which imply the obligation of a sacrifice, why do we not state “Anointed”? It was found stated “also the Anointed Priest.” This implies that we are discussing things which do not imply the obligation of a sacrifice. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, even if you say, about things which imply the obligation of a sacrifice, if it was done intentionally. As you say, intentionally it needs atoning and the atoning of the Day of Atonement, here also it needs atoning and the atoning of the Day of Atonement.
HALAKHAH: “Together Israel, Cohanim,” etc. But we did not state “the Anointed.” Why did we not state “the Anointed”? If you say that we are discussing things which do not imply the obligation of a sacrifice, it is correct not to state “Anointed”. If you say about things which imply the obligation of a sacrifice, why do we not state “Anointed”? It was found stated “also the Anointed Priest.” This implies that we are discussing things which do not imply the obligation of a sacrifice. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, even if you say, about things which imply the obligation of a sacrifice, if it was done intentionally. As you say, intentionally it needs atoning and the atoning of the Day of Atonement, here also it needs atoning and the atoning of the Day of Atonement.
Their roasted egg, Bar Qappara permitted, Ḥizqiah forbade. So far if it was roasted intentionally. If it was roasted unintentionally? Let us hear from the following: There was a fire in an under-growth of reeds and a swamp of date palms where there were locusts which were roasted. The case came before Rebbi Mana, who forbade them. Rebbi Abbahu said, because of admixture of impure locusts. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, and this is of the stringencies of Rav. Rav returned there and saw them taking things lightly and was restrictive with them. A man was carrying meat while walking on the market. There came a vulture, seized it from his hand, and it dropped off under him. He went and wanted to sell it. Rav told him, it is forbidden to you, for I am saying that it was carrying carcass meat, dropped it and took the other instead. A man went to wash a piece of meat in the river. He forgot it and left. Then he went and wanted to sell it. Rav told him, it is forbidden to you, for I am saying the other one was carried away by the river and it brought another piece of carcass meat in its place.
MISHNAH: The father is exiled for his son, and the son for the father. Everybody is exiled for an Israel, and an Israel for everybody except a sojourner. A sojourner is exiled for a sojourner. A blind person is not exiled, the words of Rebbi Jehudah; Rebbi Meïr says, he is exiled. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah says, the hater is executed for he is as if notorious. Rebbi Simeon says, there is a hater who is exiled and one who is not exiled. In any case where one can say that he killed intentionally, he is not exiled; unintentionally, he is exiled.
“And a single person went and acted inadvertently following their pronouncement.” Is there an intentional inadvertent action concerning an instruction by the Court? Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Our Mishnah, for example, if Simeon ben Azzai was sitting before them. Where do we hold? If he knows the entire Torah but does not know this detail, he is not Simeon ben Azzai. If he knows this particular subject but not the entire Torah, he is Simeon ben Azzai for this particular subject. But we must hold that he knows the entire Torah and knows the particular subject, but he errs to believe that the Torah said, after them, after them. If he errs to believe that the Torah said, after them, after them, he is not Simeon ben Azzai. As we have stated, I could think that if they tell you about right that it is left, and about left that it is right, you should listen to them? The verse says, “to go to the right or to the left;” that they should tell you about the right that it is right, and about the left that it is left. What about it? Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Hila: Because everywhere for an inadvertent sin one is not liable but for an intentional one is liable, and here even intentionally he is not liable.
MISHNAH: If the Court ruled in error and the public acted in error, they have to bring a bull; intentionally but they acted in error, they bring a female sheep or goat; in error but they acted intentionally, they are not liable.
MISHNAH: If the Court ruled in error and the public acted in error, they have to bring a bull; intentionally but they acted in error, they bring a female sheep or goat; in error but they acted intentionally, they are not liable.
HALAKHAH: “If the Court ruled in error,” etc. Does this not disagree with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? Since Rebbi Immi said in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Our Mishnah, for example, if Simeon ben Azzai was sitting before them. “Intentionally but they acted in error.” Is there intentional misdeed or error with respect of an instruction by the Court? The colleagues in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: If not most of the public accepted it. Rebbi Zeˋira in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, if they rebelled against their instruction. What is the difference between them? If they first accepted and then rebelled. In the opinions of the colleagues, since they rebelled, they are not liable. In the opinion of Rebbi Zeˋira, since at the first moment they accepted it, those are liable.
MISHNAH: If the Anointed Priest ruled for himself in error and acted in error, he brings a bull. If in error but he acted intentionally, or intentionally and he acted in error, he is not liable since the ruling of the Anointed Priest for himself is like the ruling of the Court for the public.
MISHNAH: If the Anointed Priest ruled for himself in error and acted in error, he brings a bull. If in error but he acted intentionally, or intentionally and he acted in error, he is not liable since the ruling of the Anointed Priest for himself is like the ruling of the Court for the public.
The Babylonian Talmud
R. Isaac said in the name of R. Johanan: With whom are we here dealing? With one who intentionally omitted [the Shema' or Tefillah].
If one ate and forgot to say Grace, etc. Rab Zebid (another version : Rab Dimai b. Abba) said : The dispute is only in the case of one who has forgotten ; but if he omitted it intentionally, all agree that he must return to his place and say Grace.
Thou mayest, however, argue that the same thing applies to one who omitted it intentionally and the statement "he forgot" is only intended to show the extreme view of Bet Shammai ; therefore he informs us.
Ola said that Resh Lakish said, If a man set apart ten beasts for his Chagigah, he may bring five on the first high holiday, and may again bring five on the second high holiday. R. Jochanan said, When he has finished, he cannot bring again. R. Abba said, But they do not really differ. The one is the case where he keeps silence, the other where he declares his intention. This expression, When he keeps silence—explain it. Perhaps there was not time in the day to bring them. In that case they are not brought, because there was not time in the day. But perhaps he has none to eat with him. In that case they are not brought, because he has none to eat with him. No; this is not such a case; and so far as this goes, it is necessary that he should bring them. For there is time in the day, and he has people to eat with him. Inasmuch as he did not bring them at the earlier time, learn from this that he left them behind intentionally; and this also is the purport of the story, how when Rabbin came, R. Jochanan said, If a man set apart ten beasts for his Chagigah, he may bring five on the first high holiday, and may again bring five on the second high holiday. They are in appearance difficult to reconcile, but in reality not. For learn from this that the one is the case when he keeps silence, the other when he declares his intention. Learn from this that the point has been also distinctly settled. R. Shemen bar Abba said that R. Jochanan said,
R' Yochanan says A fortiori, if the one that intentionally acted is not exiled then the one that did not act [i.e. he spoke], even though he did it intentionally, should not be exiled.
R' Yochanan says A fortiori, if the one that intentionally acted is not exiled then the one that did not act [i.e. he spoke], even though he did it intentionally, should not be exiled.
That should be proof. The one that intentionally acted is not exiled because we do not give atonement. The accidental murderer we exile for the sake of atonement. Rather we follow R' Lakish
According to Rabbi Shimon who says strangulation is more severe than decapitation [in the realm of punishment]. So, for the unwitting sin [in which, if he committed it intentionally, he would be punished with] beheading, he is given atonement [through exile]. But, an unwitting sin [which, if were done intentionally, would be punished with] strangulation, is not given atonement [through exile].
According to Rabbi Shimon who says strangulation is more severe than decapitation [in the realm of punishment]. So, for the unwitting sin [in which, if he committed it intentionally, he would be punished with] beheading, he is given atonement [through exile]. But, an unwitting sin [which, if were done intentionally, would be punished with] strangulation, is not given atonement [through exile].
For the Rabbis who say beheading is more severe than strangulation: one who inadvertently kills his father, this is inadvertent sin [that would be punished, if done intentionally, with] beheading, so such an inadvertent sin would be given atonement [through exile—so this is the opinion of our Mishnah].
Rava says:... [This case of non-exile for a son] is when he just hits [wounds] his father inadvertently. Since, you may have thought that if he would have killed him intentionally, he would be executed, then let him also be so in a case of inadvertent striking, this comes to teach us [that no, in fact, exile is specifically in cases of inadvertent killing and not striking/wounding].
"Rabbi Yose says: The hater is killed." etc. But they didn't warn him? [In order to be executed in Jewish law, one has to be warned that their action is punishable by death by two witnesses]. Our mishnah is Rabbi Yose bar Yehudah, as it is taught [in a baraita]: Rabbi Yose bar Yehudah says: "A colleague does not need warning because warning was only given to distinguish between accidental and intentional." [And we assume that colleagues know the law and are thus, if sinning, sinning intentionally].
Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish began a sermon on this section from here: "'If he didn't lie in wait, and God guided his hand' [and he ends up killing accidentally] (Exodus 21:13). 'As the ancient proverb says, "from the wicked comes wickedness"' (1 Samuel 24:14). What is this verse referring to? With two people that killed someone—one killed accidentally, and one killed intentionally—but for neither of them were there any witnesses,
the Holy Blessed One arranged one marketplace. The one who killed intentionally sits beneath the ladder, and the one who killed accidentally is descending the ladder, and he falls on him and kills him [the murderer]. That one who killed intentionally is killed, and that one who killed accidentally is exiled."
the Holy Blessed One arranged one marketplace. The one who killed intentionally sits beneath the ladder, and the one who killed accidentally is descending the ladder, and he falls on him and kills him [the murderer]. That one who killed intentionally is killed, and that one who killed accidentally is exiled."
The Rabbis taught [in a baraisa], (Numbers 35,36) "If the killer shall surely go out" [from this] I can only derive [that he may be killed if he left] intentionally, from where [can I derive that he may also be killed if he left] inadvertently? The Torah says "if he shall surely go out" (יצא יצא) [the word go out is repeated, which implies that he may be killed] in any event [even if he left inadvertently].
But contrast that with a baraisa, [If he left] intentionally he is executed, [if he left] inadvertently he is [re-]exiled. It is not a difficulty, this [baraisa that says only an intentional leaving is penalized] is like the opinion that the Torah sometimes speaks in the vernacular, while this [baraisa that says only an inadvertent leaving is also penalized] is like the opinion that the Torah does not speak in the vernacular.