where
5063 occurrences across the corpus
The Babylonian Talmud
Everyone, who does not respect the glory of his Maker, it would have been a mercy for him that he had not come into the world. What is the case here meant? R. Abba said, This is the man who gazes into the rainbow. R. Joseph said, This is the man who commits a transgression secretly. In support of the explanation that it means the man who gazes into the rainbow, it is written, "As the appearance of the bow that is in the cloud in the day of rain, so was the appearance of the brightness round about" (Ezek. i. 28). This is the appearance of the likeness of the glory of the LORD. R. Joseph said, The explanation that this is the man who commits a transgression secretly, agrees with the view of R. Isaac, for R. Isaac said, Every one who committeth a transgression secretly is as though he jarred the feet of the Shechinah, as it is said, "Thus saith the LORD, the heaven is my throne, and the earth is my footstool" (Is. lxvi. 1). Is it so? and yet R. El'a the elder said, If a man sees that his evil nature is mastering him, let him go to a place where they do not know him, and let him put on black garments, and cover himself with black, and do what his heart desireth, but let him not profane the name of God openly. There is no difficulty. The one is the case of a man who has found a means of checking his evil nature, the other of a man who has not found a means of checking his evil nature.
But, you may say, there is a difficulty, where we place common food against common food. There is no difficulty. The one case has to do with eating, the other with touching.
In hallowed things. What is the reason of the prohibition? R. Ela said, Because the weight of the vessel interposes. But seeing that in a later case it is on account of the interposition, the first case cannot be on account of an interposition. For we are taught in the later case, And the manner of the heave-offering is not as the manner of the hallowed things. For in the case of hallowed things one looses a knot and wipes and cleanses and afterwards ties up again, but in the case of a heave-offering he ties up and afterwards cleanses. Nay, but both the earlier and later cases are because of interposition, and it was necessary that they should be separately mentioned, for if he had taught us the first only, I should say, This is the reason for the prohibition with reference to the hallowed things, viz., because of the vessel's weight, which actually exists. But in the latter case, where the vessel's weight is not an element, I should say, In regard to hallowed things also there is in this case no disqualifying interposition. And if he had taught us the latter only, I should say, This is the reason for the prohibition with reference to hallowed things, because
Men may eat dry food with ceremonially unclean hands etc. There is a Baraitha, viz., R. Chănina ben Antigonus said, Does such a question as whether a thing be dry or wet exist as regards hallowed things? Nay, does not love for the hallowed things make men careful where they are concerned? Yea, every one will admit that it was not necessary to say this. But this is the case supposed, viz., that a man's companion put a piece of the hallowed things into his mouth, or he put it into his own mouth with a spindle or with a skewer, or attempted to eat along with these an onion or garlic taken from unconsecrated things. Our Rabbis decided that this should be the case for hallowed things; for the heave-offering our Rabbis decided that it should not be the case.
And so too the thieves, who have restored the vessels. But against this I adduce the following Baraitha, viz., In the case of the thieves who have gone into the midst of the house, only the place where the thieves' feet trode is unclean. R. Phinehas said in the name of Rab, They are to be believed only in case they have repented. You can even press it out from the language of the Mishnah, for the teaching is, Who have restored the vessels. Learn it thence.
R' Ulah said Where is there a hint to the laws of false witnesses in the Torah? A hint to the laws of false witnesses?? It is written [explicitly] And you shall do to him as he plotted... No, a hint for the forty lashes It is written And you shall exonerate the innocent and condemn the guilty and if the wicked deserves to be beaten because they [the court] exonerated the innocent party and they condemned the guilty party (in a case of civil dispute), the guilty deserve to be beaten?
R' Papa said, no. Everybody agrees that it is atonement, where they disagree is that, one explains the value is according to the victim, and one explains the value is according to the owner
And they are not sold as Hebrew slaves. R' Hamnuna held here it applies when the accused thief has money, since they would not be sold. Here also they [witnesses] would not be sold. But in the case where the accused does not have money, the witnesses are sold, even though they have money.
Rava said, maybe it's in the case of the lending on collateral, or if he gives documentation to the court As we have learnt, a loan on collateral or where documentation is given to the court is not cancelled [by the Sabbatical].
R' Akiva says, No. This isn't the source, rather it's from the fact that there is no forbidden action, and a sin without an action has no lashes [as a punishment]. It seems from what R' Yehudah explained that a sin without action, there are lashes. From where is this?
They use it to drive a scriptural warning for false witnesses. And from where does Rabbi Meir derive the scriptural warning for false witnesses? Rebbi Yermiah says, he derives it from the verse (Deuteronomy 19, 20) "The remaining ones should hear, fear, and do no more evil".
GEMARA: From where is this known [that lashes can not be divided]? Abaye says, The word "rasha" (wicked person) is said by the laws of lashes (Deuteronomy 25, 2) and the word "rasha" is said by the laws of the death penalty (Numbers 35, 31). Just as there is no half of a death penalty, so too there is no half of lashes.
He answered him, You taught us, our rebbi, that one cannot derive a punishment from a fortiori. We see this in a beraisa [From what the Torah says,] (Leviticus 20, 17) "If a man should take his sister, the daughter of his father, or the daughter of his mother", I can only derive [that a person is forbidden from] the daughter of his father who isn't the daughter of his mother [half-sister from the father] and the daughter of his mother who isn't the daughter of his father [half-sister from the mother]. From where can I derive [the prohibition for] the daughter of his father and the daughter of his mother [his full sister]? The Torah teaches us this with the words ערות אחותו גילה.
We see [the source for being unable to derive] punishment [from a fortiori], but from where do we derive [the rule of not being able to derive] a scriptural warning [from a fortiori]? The Torah says (Leviticus 18,9) "ערות אחותך בת אביך או בת אמך". [From this] I can only derive [a scriptural warning against] the daughter of his father who isn't the daughter of his mother [half-sister from the father] and the daughter of his mother who isn't the daughter of his father [half-sister from the mother]. From where can I derive [the scriptural warning against] the daughter of his father and the daughter of his mother [his full sister]? The Torah teaches us this with the words (Leviticus 18,11) "ערות בת אשת אביך מולדת אביך אחותך היא".
We see [the source for being unable to derive] punishment [from a fortiori], but from where do we derive [the rule of not being able to derive] a scriptural warning [from a fortiori]? The Torah says (Leviticus 18,9) "ערות אחותך בת אביך או בת אמך". [From this] I can only derive [a scriptural warning against] the daughter of his father who isn't the daughter of his mother [half-sister from the father] and the daughter of his mother who isn't the daughter of his father [half-sister from the mother]. From where can I derive [the scriptural warning against] the daughter of his father and the daughter of his mother [his full sister]? The Torah teaches us this with the words (Leviticus 18,11) "ערות בת אשת אביך מולדת אביך אחותך היא".
From where do we learn this rule [that zomemim aren't liable if the victim had no verdict] by lashes? The Torah uses a gezariah shava of Rasha Rasha
From where do we learn this rule [that zomemim aren't liable if the victim had no verdict] by exile? The Torah uses a gezariah shava of Rotzaich Rotzaich
MISHNA: (Deuteronomy 17,6) "By the mouth [the testimony] of two witnesses or three witnesses the [perpetrator] shall surely be put to death." If the testimony can be established with two [witnesses], why does the Torah specify three? Rather, the Torah is juxtaposing (three to two). Just as three [witnesses] can make two [witnesses] into zomemim, so too two [witnesses] can make three [witnesses] into zomemim. And from where do we know [that two witnesses can] even [make] one hundred [witnesses into zomemim]? The Torah teaches us this with the word "Witnesses".
Rebbi Shimon says, Just as two [witnesses] aren't executed unless they are both zomemim, so too three [witnesses] aren't executed unless all three of them are zomemim. And from where do we know even one hundred [witnesses all must be zomemim for any to be executed]? The Torah teaches us this with the word "Witnesses".
And just as by two [witnesses] if one is found to be relative or disqualified, the whole testimony gets dismissed, so too by three [witnesses] if one is found to be relative or disqualified, the whole testimony gets dismissed. And from where do we know that even [the testimony of] one hundred [witnesses can be dismissed if one is found to be relative or disqualified]? The Torah teaches us this with the word "Witnesses".
Rebbi Akiva says the third on didn't come etc. and just as by two [one could disqualify the group] etc. Rav said to Rav Papa But now, let the victim [who is a witness to his own murder] save [the murderer from being executed]? [The case] is where he was killed from behind.
Let the sodomized man save the sodomizer? Where he was sodomized from behind.
MISHNA: If there were two [witnesses] observing from this window, and two [witnesses] observing from this window, and one warner in the middle, In a time where some of them [the witnesses] saw one another, it is considered one [group] of witnesses. And if [they do] not [see one another] then it is considered two [groups of] witnesses. Therefore, if one [of the two groups of witnesses] becomes zomemim, then he [the murderer] and they [the zomemim] are executed, but the second [group of witnesses] are exonerated.
GEMARA: Rav Zutra bar Tuvia said in the name of Rav, From where is it derived that a individual testimon[ies i.e separated]] isn't valid? That the Torah says (Deuteronomy 17, 6), "he shall not be executed by the mouth of one witness". What does the Torah mean with the word "one"? If it meant literally one witness, then I would know that from the beginning of the verse which says, "by the mouth of two witnesses". rather what does "one" mean? One and one. [separated]
Rav Pappa asked Abayi, Now that we've established that they [the witnesses] do not combine [in the case of] one [witness] from this window and one [witness] from this window where this [witness] observed the entire action and this [witness] observed the entire action, Do we need to say [the case of] one [witness] after the other [from the same window] where they each only observed half of the action? He answered him, We only need it for [the case of witnesses to] a cohabitation.
Rav Pappa asked Abayi, Now that we've established that they [the witnesses] do not combine [in the case of] one [witness] from this window and one [witness] from this window where this [witness] observed the entire action and this [witness] observed the entire action, Do we need to say [the case of] one [witness] after the other [from the same window] where they each only observed half of the action? He answered him, We only need it for [the case of witnesses to] a cohabitation.
MISHNA: One has had a verdict and then flees and comes before a different court, we do not retry his case. Any circumstance where two witnesses get up and say that they testify about a certain man that he had his verdict in this-and-this court and so-and-so and so-and-so were his witnesses, that person gets executed.
GEMARA: Only before the same court is when his case is not retried, but brute a different court his case is retried. But the latter part of the mishna teaches, "Any circumstance where two witnesses get up and say that they testify about a certain man that he had his verdict in this-and-this court and so-and-so and so-and-so were his witnesses, that person gets executed."?
Abaye answered, It isn't a contradiction. Here [where we retry the case] is in Israel; here [where we do not retry the case] is in Diaspora.
Abaye answered, It isn't a contradiction. Here [where we retry the case] is in Israel; here [where we do not retry the case] is in Diaspora.
We establish courts...etc.: From where do we derive these words? That the rabbis thought in a beraisa, (Numbers 35,29) "And these should be for you as laws for your generations". This teaches us that courts are established both in Isreal and in Diaspora.
Gemara: From where is it derived [that downward motion that kills someone is punished by exile]? Shmuel said that the verse said: “And he cast it upon him, and he died” (Numbers 35:23) [meaning] until it falls in the way of falling.
“When a person comes upon his friend in a forest” (Deuteronomy 19:5) Just as in a forest it is permitted for the perpetrator and the victim to enter there [because it is public space], so too [the same rules apply in] any [place where it is] permitted for the perpetrator and the victim to enter there.
R' Abahu asked R' Yohanan a question: If a person was ascending a ladder and a rung broke under him and it fell and struck someone below and killed him, is this a situation of ascent [where he would be exempt] or descent [where he would be held liable]? He said to him: You've already touched on this [in an earlier baraita]—in a case of descending for the purpose of ascent [here, we mean that the rung is going downward for the purpose of the person ascending].
R' Abahu asked R' Yohanan a question: If a person was ascending a ladder and a rung broke under him and it fell and struck someone below and killed him, is this a situation of ascent [where he would be exempt] or descent [where he would be held liable]? He said to him: You've already touched on this [in an earlier baraita]—in a case of descending for the purpose of ascent [here, we mean that the rung is going downward for the purpose of the person ascending].
He challenged him "This is the general rule: anything that is within a downward movement, [that person] is sent to exile. Anything not in a downward movement [that person who initiated the act] is not exiled." And what does this "anything not in a downward movement include?" Does it not include this case?! [where the rung is downward and you are moving up, where, according to this general rule, that person would not be culpable for the rung falling]. But according to your reasoning, [the rule that] anything that is in the way of descent includes what?!
He challenged him "This is the general rule: anything that is within a downward movement, [that person] is sent to exile. Anything not in a downward movement [that person who initiated the act] is not exiled." And what does this "anything not in a downward movement include?" Does it not include this case?! [where the rung is downward and you are moving up, where, according to this general rule, that person would not be culpable for the rung falling]. But according to your reasoning, [the rule that] anything that is in the way of descent includes what?!
Here [where he would be liable for the person standing before him but exempt if he were behind him] is when the knife is descending in front of him and ascending behind him. Here [where he is he is exempt for the person standing before him but liable for the person standing behind him] is when the upward motion is in front of him but the downward motion is behind him.
Here [where he would be liable for the person standing before him but exempt if he were behind him] is when the knife is descending in front of him and ascending behind him. Here [where he is he is exempt for the person standing before him but liable for the person standing behind him] is when the upward motion is in front of him but the downward motion is behind him.
Here [where he is liable in both situations] is when the downward motion is both in front of him and behind him. And here [where he is exempt in all cases] is when the upward motion is both in front of him and behind him.
Here [where he is liable in both situations] is when the downward motion is both in front of him and behind him. And here [where he is exempt in all cases] is when the upward motion is both in front of him and behind him.
[Now we return back to the debate between R' Abahu and R. Yohanan about the case of the fallen rung]. Let us say this same issue was the matter of a Tannaitic debate: One who is ascending a ladder and a rung falls. One tanna taught that he is liable and another taught that he is exempt. Was it not about this that they were disagreeing? One of them held that it was a case of descent [where he is liable] and one of them holds that he is ascending [where he is exempt].
[Now we return back to the debate between R' Abahu and R. Yohanan about the case of the fallen rung]. Let us say this same issue was the matter of a Tannaitic debate: One who is ascending a ladder and a rung falls. One tanna taught that he is liable and another taught that he is exempt. Was it not about this that they were disagreeing? One of them held that it was a case of descent [where he is liable] and one of them holds that he is ascending [where he is exempt].
No [that's wrong], everybody agrees that it is a case of ascent. And this is not a problem [they still have a disagreement]. Here [one is talking about the issue of] damages [where he would be obligated to pay the compensation for damages caused] and the other [is talking about the issue of] exile [from which he would be exempted].
If you want, say that both cases are talking about exile and there is [still] not a difficulty. They are disagreeing about it being rotten. Here, [where he would be obligated for exile] is when (the rung) is rotten. Here [where he would be exempt from exile] is when it is not rotten.
If you want, say that both cases are talking about exile and there is [still] not a difficulty. They are disagreeing about it being rotten. Here, [where he would be obligated for exile] is when (the rung) is rotten. Here [where he would be exempt from exile] is when it is not rotten.
And if you want, say that they both agree that the wood was not rotten and it is [still] not a difficulty: Here [where he would be exempt from exile] is when the rung has been fastened. Here, [where he would be liable] is when he did not fasten it.
And if you want, say that they both agree that the wood was not rotten and it is [still] not a difficulty: Here [where he would be exempt from exile] is when the rung has been fastened. Here, [where he would be liable] is when he did not fasten it.
Rav Pappa said: One who threw a clod of dirt at a palm tree, and [the clod of dirt] knocked dates, and the dates fell and killed someone—[in this case] we have arrived at the disagreement between Rebi and the Sages! But this is obvious! Since you might have said that [the death in this instance is] like a case of secondary force, therefore this teaches you that this is not the case [and that this is a case where the death is a result of primary force, and therefore this case is parallel to the Mishnah].
However, where can we find a case where Rebi [would exempt someone from exile] in an instance of secondary force? This is like [a case where] someone threw a clod of dirt and it struck a twig and the twig then went and hit a cluster of dates and the dates then fell and killed.
However, where can we find a case where Rebi [would exempt someone from exile] in an instance of secondary force? This is like [a case where] someone threw a clod of dirt and it struck a twig and the twig then went and hit a cluster of dates and the dates then fell and killed.
However, where can we find a case where Rebi [would exempt someone from exile] in an instance of secondary force? This is like [a case where] someone threw a clod of dirt and it struck a twig and the twig then went and hit a cluster of dates and the dates then fell and killed.
The one who threw a stone into his courtyard and he killed [someone], if there was permission for the victim to enter there, [the thrower] is exiled. And if [the victim does] not [have permission], he is not exiled. As it was said: “When a person comes upon his friend in a forest” (Deuteronomy 19:5). Just as in a forest it is permitted for the perpetrator and the victim to enter there [because it is public space], so too [the same rules apply in] any [place where it is] permitted for the perpetrator and the victim to enter there, except the courtyard [in which] the owner has not given permission to the victim (or the perpetrator) to enter there.
Rav Ada bar Ahavah said to Rava: "Is every case where it's written 'when (asher)' an optional action? From this [reasoning], 'When (asher) anyone has become impure fails to purify himself [they will be cut off from their people]' (Numbers 19:20)—if he wants to [touch a corpse], he can be impure, and if he doesn't want to he isn't impure; and a mitzvah corpse (of an unknown stranger) where it is not possible that [the finder] would become impure—would he be exempt [from the penalty of entering the Sanctuary while impure]?"
Rav Ada bar Ahavah said to Rava: "Is every case where it's written 'when (asher)' an optional action? From this [reasoning], 'When (asher) anyone has become impure fails to purify himself [they will be cut off from their people]' (Numbers 19:20)—if he wants to [touch a corpse], he can be impure, and if he doesn't want to he isn't impure; and a mitzvah corpse (of an unknown stranger) where it is not possible that [the finder] would become impure—would he be exempt [from the penalty of entering the Sanctuary while impure]?"
A certain Rabbi asked Rava: From where do you know (really R. Yishmael) that this plowing is voluntary? Maybe it is plowing for the Mitzvah of the Omer and even in this case, God said, "you shall desist." He said to him: If he were to find the (field) already plowed, then he would not have to plow again.(Therefore), plowing is not a Mitzvah.
Ravina challenged Rava (all the cases to follow are where the person is in pursuit of a Mitzvah so they would not be punished with exile): This excludes the case of a father who strikes his son (and kills him inadvertently), and the teacher who rebukes his student (and inadvertently kills him) and the court agent (who inadvertently killed). So, why (is this a mitzvah to hit one's son, etc?). Let us say that since he was already learned (the son), it's not actually a Mitzvah to strike him (again) so here too, it is also not a Mitzvah. (Rava:) There, despite the fact that he's already learned, it is still a Mitzvah to hit him, as it is stated, "rebuke your son and he will bring you rest."
This works out well if a slave or Samaritan is exiled by way of an Israelite or lashed. [He is exiled in a case where] he killed him [accidentally] and lashed [in a case where] he cursed him. But an Israelite who is exiled or lashed by way of Samaritan?! It works well with exile [in a case where] he killed him [accidentally]. But lashing, why? [If you say] because he cursed him, "the chieftain of your people do not curse" (Exodus 22:27)! [I.e. a Samaritan is not on of your people and thus this prohibition for which the punishment is lashes should not apply in this case]
This works out well if a slave or Samaritan is exiled by way of an Israelite or lashed. [He is exiled in a case where] he killed him [accidentally] and lashed [in a case where] he cursed him. But an Israelite who is exiled or lashed by way of Samaritan?! It works well with exile [in a case where] he killed him [accidentally]. But lashing, why? [If you say] because he cursed him, "the chieftain of your people do not curse" (Exodus 22:27)! [I.e. a Samaritan is not on of your people and thus this prohibition for which the punishment is lashes should not apply in this case]
This works out well if a slave or Samaritan is exiled by way of an Israelite or lashed. [He is exiled in a case where] he killed him [accidentally] and lashed [in a case where] he cursed him. But an Israelite who is exiled or lashed by way of Samaritan?! It works well with exile [in a case where] he killed him [accidentally]. But lashing, why? [If you say] because he cursed him, "the chieftain of your people do not curse" (Exodus 22:27)! [I.e. a Samaritan is not on of your people and thus this prohibition for which the punishment is lashes should not apply in this case]
Rather, Rav Aha son of Yaakov said: It's a case where he [the Israelite] testified against him [the Samaritan that he would be liable for lashing] and he was found guilty of falsely testifying [so whatever punishment he tried to give the Samaritan, he would suffer]. Similarly regarding a slave who testified against [an Israelite that would be punished with lashes] and was found to be a false witness—can a slave even give testimony?! [Therefore, this solution must be wrong because this half of the baraita doesn't make sense]. Rather, Rav Aha son of Rav Ika said: Here is what we are dealing with [where slave and Samaritan are lashed because of Israelite]: a case where he struck him with a wound
Rather, Rav Aha son of Yaakov said: It's a case where he [the Israelite] testified against him [the Samaritan that he would be liable for lashing] and he was found guilty of falsely testifying [so whatever punishment he tried to give the Samaritan, he would suffer]. Similarly regarding a slave who testified against [an Israelite that would be punished with lashes] and was found to be a false witness—can a slave even give testimony?! [Therefore, this solution must be wrong because this half of the baraita doesn't make sense]. Rather, Rav Aha son of Rav Ika said: Here is what we are dealing with [where slave and Samaritan are lashed because of Israelite]: a case where he struck him with a wound
Rather, Rav Aha son of Yaakov said: It's a case where he [the Israelite] testified against him [the Samaritan that he would be liable for lashing] and he was found guilty of falsely testifying [so whatever punishment he tried to give the Samaritan, he would suffer]. Similarly regarding a slave who testified against [an Israelite that would be punished with lashes] and was found to be a false witness—can a slave even give testimony?! [Therefore, this solution must be wrong because this half of the baraita doesn't make sense]. Rather, Rav Aha son of Rav Ika said: Here is what we are dealing with [where slave and Samaritan are lashed because of Israelite]: a case where he struck him with a wound
"Everyone gets exiled for killing an Israelite accidentally, and vice versa] except through [killing accidentally] a foreign resident." Therefore, a foreign resident is [considered] an idol worshiper! But read the end [of the Mishnah]! "A foreign resident is exiled on account of [killing accidentally] a foreign resident [which would imply that they aren't like idol worshipers as they actually get exiled]! Rav Kahanah said: This is not a difficulty. Here [where the punishment is exile] is where a foreign resident kills a foreign resident, and here [where he does not get exile] is where a foreign resident kills an Israelite.
"Everyone gets exiled for killing an Israelite accidentally, and vice versa] except through [killing accidentally] a foreign resident." Therefore, a foreign resident is [considered] an idol worshiper! But read the end [of the Mishnah]! "A foreign resident is exiled on account of [killing accidentally] a foreign resident [which would imply that they aren't like idol worshipers as they actually get exiled]! Rav Kahanah said: This is not a difficulty. Here [where the punishment is exile] is where a foreign resident kills a foreign resident, and here [where he does not get exile] is where a foreign resident kills an Israelite.
"Everyone gets exiled for killing an Israelite accidentally, and vice versa] except through [killing accidentally] a foreign resident." Therefore, a foreign resident is [considered] an idol worshiper! But read the end [of the Mishnah]! "A foreign resident is exiled on account of [killing accidentally] a foreign resident [which would imply that they aren't like idol worshipers as they actually get exiled]! Rav Kahanah said: This is not a difficulty. Here [where the punishment is exile] is where a foreign resident kills a foreign resident, and here [where he does not get exile] is where a foreign resident kills an Israelite.
"Everyone gets exiled for killing an Israelite accidentally, and vice versa] except through [killing accidentally] a foreign resident." Therefore, a foreign resident is [considered] an idol worshiper! But read the end [of the Mishnah]! "A foreign resident is exiled on account of [killing accidentally] a foreign resident [which would imply that they aren't like idol worshipers as they actually get exiled]! Rav Kahanah said: This is not a difficulty. Here [where the punishment is exile] is where a foreign resident kills a foreign resident, and here [where he does not get exile] is where a foreign resident kills an Israelite.
Some say that they contrasted the two verses together. It's written: "For the children of Israel, and for the foreign resident in your midst there shall be six cities" (Numbers 35:15). And it is written: "There shall be for you all cities of refuge" (Numbers 35:12)—for you—not for the resident foreigners! Rav Kahanah said: This is not a difficulty. Here [in the second verse] is where a resident foreigner killed an Israelite, and here [in the second verse] is where a resident foreigner killed a resident foreigner.
Some say that they contrasted the two verses together. It's written: "For the children of Israel, and for the foreign resident in your midst there shall be six cities" (Numbers 35:15). And it is written: "There shall be for you all cities of refuge" (Numbers 35:12)—for you—not for the resident foreigners! Rav Kahanah said: This is not a difficulty. Here [in the second verse] is where a resident foreigner killed an Israelite, and here [in the second verse] is where a resident foreigner killed a resident foreigner.
Rav Hisda said: This is not a difficulty! Here [where he is exiled] is where he killed in a downward motion, and here [where he is not exiled] is where he killed in an upward motion. [I.e:] If [he killed him] in a downward motion, [in which case] an Israelite would be exiled, then exile should be enough for the [resident foreigner] as well. If [he killed him] in an upward motion, [in which case] an Israelite is exempt, then the resident foreigner is put to death.
Rav Hisda said: This is not a difficulty! Here [where he is exiled] is where he killed in a downward motion, and here [where he is not exiled] is where he killed in an upward motion. [I.e:] If [he killed him] in a downward motion, [in which case] an Israelite would be exiled, then exile should be enough for the [resident foreigner] as well. If [he killed him] in an upward motion, [in which case] an Israelite is exempt, then the resident foreigner is put to death.
Rav Hisda said: This is not a difficulty! Here [where he is exiled] is where he killed in a downward motion, and here [where he is not exiled] is where he killed in an upward motion. [I.e:] If [he killed him] in a downward motion, [in which case] an Israelite would be exiled, then exile should be enough for the [resident foreigner] as well. If [he killed him] in an upward motion, [in which case] an Israelite is exempt, then the resident foreigner is put to death.
Rav Hisda said: This is not a difficulty! Here [where he is exiled] is where he killed in a downward motion, and here [where he is not exiled] is where he killed in an upward motion. [I.e:] If [he killed him] in a downward motion, [in which case] an Israelite would be exiled, then exile should be enough for the [resident foreigner] as well. If [he killed him] in an upward motion, [in which case] an Israelite is exempt, then the resident foreigner is put to death.
Rather, Rava said: [This is an instance where the resident foreigner] said that it was permitted. Abaye said to him: Someone who said that it was permitted is [a case of] a freak accident?! He said to him: I say that someone who said that it was permitted is [a case of] gross negligence.
Mishnah: "To where are they exiled? To the cities of refuge—to the three that are across the Jordan, and to the three that are in the land of Canaan. As it is said, 'The three cities you will make across the Jordan and the three cities you will make in the land of Canaan' (Numbers 35:14). While they hadn't chosen the three [cities] in the land of Israel, the three across the Jordan were not effective at providing refuge, as it is said: 'Six cities of refuge will be for you' (Numbers 35)—when there are all six, they are effective at providing refuge as one.
The main [text]: "Those cities [of refuge]—make them neither small villages nor large cities but medium-sized towns. And don't set them up except in a place of water; if there is no water, then bring to them water. And don't set them up except in a place of market streets. And don't set them up except in a place [where there are] guard legions; if the legions get reduced, add to them. If the residencies get reduced, bring to them priests, Levites and Israelites.
Rabbi Yohanan: "The teacher that is exiled—they exile his yeshiva with him." Is this so?! But Rabbi Yohan said: "From where [do we learn] that the words of Torah are effective at providing refuge? As it is said: 'Betzer in the wilderness...' (Deuteronomy 4:43), (and afterwards it is written) 'And this Torah' (Deuteronomy 4:44)"?! [I.e., why is a teacher being exiled at all? Why don't the words of Torah protect him?].
Not a difficulty. This one [the second statement] is [a case where] he is currently occupied with it [the Torah], and that one is [a case where] he is currently not occupied with it.
Not a difficulty. This one [the second statement] is [a case where] he is currently occupied with it [the Torah], and that one is [a case where] he is currently not occupied with it.
From where do we derive these words [that the murderer gets released by three types of high priests]? Rav Kahana says, That the Torah says (Numbers 35, 25) "and he shall dwell there until the death of the high priest", and the Torah says (Numbers 35, 28) "for in the city of refuge he shall dwell until the death of the high priest", and the Torah also says, (Numbers 35, 28) "and after the death of the high priest".
Rav Yehuda says in the name of Rav, A curse of a sage even if in vain will be fulfilled. From where [is this derived]? From Achitofel. That at the time when Dovid was digging the foundation [for the beis hamikdash], the [water of the] deeps rose up and threatened to destroy the world. [Dovid] asked, Is it permissible to write [God's] name on a shard and throw it into the deeps in order that [the water] should remain in its place? There was no one who said anything to him. [Dovid] said, Whoever knows this matter and doesn't speak shall strangle by their throat.
Rebbi Abahu says, The curse of a sage, even on an [unfulfilled] condition will be fulfilled. From where [is this derived]? From Eli. That Eli said to Shmuel (Samuel 1 3, 17) "So will God do to you and so will he add on if you withhold from me anything". And even though it is written (Samuel 1 3, 18) "And Shmuel related to him all of the matter and did not withhold from him", it is still written (Samuel 1 8, 3) " And his sons did not follow in his ways etc.".
Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav, A ban made conditionally needs to be annulled. From where [is this derived]? From Yehuda. That the Torah says (Genesis 43, 9), "If you do not bring him back to me etc.". And Rav Shmuel bar Nachmani said in the name of Rebbi Yonason, What is the meaning of the verse (Deuteronomy 33, 6), "Let Reuvan live and not die etc. And this is for Yehuda?!"?
If before his verdict was finalized, etc.: From where are these words derived [that he can go out with the new high priest's death]. Rav Kahana says, That the Torah says (Numbers 35, 25), "And he shall dwell there until the death of the high priest that he appointed with the holy oil". And did he [the murderer] appoint him? Rather, [the verse is referring to] this [high priest] that was annointed during his lifetime.
If his judgment was finalized and subsequently the [high] priest was found to be the son of a divorcee or the son of a woman who received chalitzah, the matter is subject to a dispute between Rebbi Ami and Rebbi Yitzchak Nafkah. One says, [It is comparable to a case where] the priesthood died, and one says, [It is comparable to a case where] the priesthood got disqualified [retroactively].
If his judgment was finalized and subsequently the [high] priest was found to be the son of a divorcee or the son of a woman who received chalitzah, the matter is subject to a dispute between Rebbi Ami and Rebbi Yitzchak Nafkah. One says, [It is comparable to a case where] the priesthood died, and one says, [It is comparable to a case where] the priesthood got disqualified [retroactively].
And what do Rebbi Yossi and Rebbi Akiva and derive from (Numbers 35, 12) "until he stand before a court for judgement"? that [verse] is needed for [that which is taught] in a baraisa, Rebbi Akiva says, From where is it derived that a court which witnesses a murder cannot execute him [the murderer] until he stands before a different court? The Torah says "until he stands before a court for judgment" [which means] until he stands before a different court.
The Rabbis taught [in a baraisa], (Numbers 35,36) "If the killer shall surely go out" [from this] I can only derive [that he may be killed if he left] intentionally, from where [can I derive that he may also be killed if he left] inadvertently? The Torah says "if he shall surely go out" (יצא יצא) [the word go out is repeated, which implies that he may be killed] in any event [even if he left inadvertently].
GEMARA: The Rabbis taught [in a baraisa],... (Exodus 21, 13) "And I have set aside for you a place etc." "And I have set aside for you" [implies] during your lifetime. "A place" [implies] from your place. "where he shall flee to" This teaches us that when Jews where exiled [while] in the wilderness, they would be exiled to the Levite camp.
GEMARA: The Rabbis taught [in a baraisa],... (Exodus 21, 13) "And I have set aside for you a place etc." "And I have set aside for you" [implies] during your lifetime. "A place" [implies] from your place. "where he shall flee to" This teaches us that when Jews where exiled [while] in the wilderness, they would be exiled to the Levite camp.
If so then not performing a positive commandment should also [be liable to malkus, something which we know isn't true]? "If you do not guard yourself (תשמור)" was written, and [Rav Yitzchak holds] like what Rebbi Avin said in the name of Rebbi Illui, that Rebbi Avin said in the name of Rebbi Illui any place where the Torah uses the words, "השמר", "פן", or "אל", it's referring to a negative commandment.
And from where does Rebbi Yitzchak [who uses kares b'achoso to teach us that kares is not subject with malkus] derive the principle of separating? He derives it from (Leviticus 18,19) "And to a woman (אשה) impure by her uncleanliness", to make one liable for each and every woman.
And from where does Rebbi Yitzchak learn [re'shia bar re'shia]? He learns it out from a kal v'chomer (fortiori), That it was taught in a barasia, Rabbi Akiva says, I asked Raban Gmaliel ad Rebbi Yehosua [while] in the meat market of Iemus, (that they had traveled to to purchase an animal for the wedding feast of Rabban Gamliel's son), If one had [inadvertently] cohabited with his sister, who was his father's sister, who his mother's sister, what would the halacha be? Would he only be liable one sacrifice for all of them, or would he be liable [a separate sacrifice] for each one?
They responded, This [case] we have not heard, but we have not heard, but we have heard that one who cohabits with five woman who are niddahs in one lapse of unawareness is liable [a separate offering] for each and every one, and it would appear that these [two] cases form a kal v'chomer, and just if [by the case of five] niddah[s] which is one prohibition, one is liable for each and every one, then here [by re'shia bar re'shia] where there are three separate prohibitions is it not more so?
And [as for where Rebbi Yitzchak derives the principle against deriving punishments] you can either say that he derives [the principle against deriving] punishment from [the principle against deriving] scriptural warnings, or you can say that he learns it out from
And [where does Rebbi Yitzchak learn to separate the two]? He holds like what Rebbi Elezar said in the name of Rebbi Hoshiah. That Rebbi Elezar said in the name of Rebbi Hoshiah, any place that you find two prohibitions with one kares, they are separated with regards to [bringing] a sacrifice [for an inadvertent transgression].
And the Rabbis need that verse to teach Rebbi Yochanon's ruling, that Rabbi Yochanon said in the name of Rebbi Shimoen ben Yochai, from where do we know that a woman is not made impure until the flux exits through the ervah? That the Torah says (Leviticus 20, 18) "And if a man shall lie with a woman sick and he uncovers her ervah". This teaches us that a woman is not made impure until the flux exits through the ervah.
And an impure person who ate sacrificial food: [Receiving malkus by] enters the Temple while impure is understandable as both the punishment and the scriptural warning are written in the Torah. The punishment is written (Numbers 19,13) "The Tabernacle of G-d he has defiled and he shall be cut off". The scriptural warning is written (Numbers 5,3) "And he shall not defile the camps". But as for an impure person who ate sacrificial [meats] the punishment is easily understandable as it is written (Leviticus 7,20) "And the soul that eats meat from the alter of the Sh'lamim that are for G-d while his impureness is upon him will be cut off", only from where is the scriptual warning derived?
And then where does Reish Lakash derive a scriptual warning for Terumah [if he uses b'chol kodesh lo sigah to teach against eating sacrificial meats]? He derives it from (Leviticus 22,4) "Any man from the seed of Ahron, who is a lepor or zav". What is fit [only] for the seed of Ahron? You must say that this is referring to Terumah. And what does Rebbi Yochanon use that verse for [if he learns Terumah from elsewhere]? That verse is for consuming [Terumah while one is impure] and this verse [b'chol kodesh lo sigah] is for touching [Terumah while one is impure].
Reish Lakash says that he is liable to malkus because of b'chol kodesh lo sigah, [which teaches] that it makes no difference if it was before z'rikas hadam or after z'rikas hadam. and Rebbi Yochanon says that he is not liable to malkus because Rebbi Yochanon is saying according to his own reasoning. That the Torah says [the g'zaira shava] of טומאתו טומאתו and where is "טומאתו" written? It is written after z'rikas hadam. [Therefore one would not be liable for eating before z'rikas hadam according to Rebbi Yochanon.] [Nevertheless we see that Reish Lakash uses b'chol kodesh lo sigah to teach before z'rikas hadam and not to teach the scriptural warning for consuming sacrificial meats while one is impure. How do we resolve this contradiction?] That law is learned from "In all meats". [the extra word "all" is what teaches us even before z'rikas hadam.]