510 occurrences across the corpus

The Jerusalem Talmud

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 9:2

HALAKHAH: “Gentiles cannot vow as nazir,” etc. Israelites can vow as nazir, Gentiles cannot vow as nazir. Since you say, “a man”, why does the verse mention “a man”? To include Gentiles, who make vows and offer voluntary gifts like Israelites! Why should one not say the same here? There is a difference, for it is written “He shall atone for him.” This refers to one to whom atonement applies. It excludes Gentiles, to whom atonement does not apply.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 4:13

Rav Huna said, I asked before Rebbi Jacob ben Aḥa: Following him who says tithes are from their words. But following him who says tithes are from the Torah, does Hillel institute anything against the words of the Torah? Rebbi Yose said, from the moment that Israel was exiled to Babylonia, did they not become free from all commandments connected with the Land, but the remission of debts applies both in the Land and outside the Land from the words of the Torah? Rebbi Yose turned and said, (Deut. 15:2) “this is the word of the abandonment, remit” as long as abandonment is followed in the Land as a word of the Torah, remission of debts applies both in the Land and outside the Land from the words of the Torah, but when abandonment is followed in the Land as their word, remission of debts applies both in the Land and outside the Land from their word. There, they say that even one who holds that tithes are from the Torah will hold that the Sabbatical is from their word. (Deut. 15:2): “This is the word of the remission, remit!” Rebbi says, two remissions are the Sabbatical and the Jubilee. As long as the Jubilee is operative, the Sabbatical is from words of the Torah. If the Jubilees are abolished, the Sabbatical is operative from their words. When were the Jubilees abolished? (Lev. 25:10) “For all its inhabitants.” In the time when they lived on it, not when they went from it into exile. If they lived on it but did (not) intermingle, the tribe of Judah in Benjamin, and the tribe of Benjamin in Judah, I could think that the Jubilee was operative. The verse mentions its inhabitants, “All its inhabitants;” you find that when the tribes of Reuben, Gad, and half the tribe of Manasseh went into exile, the Jubilees were disestablished.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 4:13

Rav Huna said, I asked before Rebbi Jacob ben Aḥa: Following him who says tithes are from their words. But following him who says tithes are from the Torah, does Hillel institute anything against the words of the Torah? Rebbi Yose said, from the moment that Israel was exiled to Babylonia, did they not become free from all commandments connected with the Land, but the remission of debts applies both in the Land and outside the Land from the words of the Torah? Rebbi Yose turned and said, (Deut. 15:2) “this is the word of the abandonment, remit” as long as abandonment is followed in the Land as a word of the Torah, remission of debts applies both in the Land and outside the Land from the words of the Torah, but when abandonment is followed in the Land as their word, remission of debts applies both in the Land and outside the Land from their word. There, they say that even one who holds that tithes are from the Torah will hold that the Sabbatical is from their word. (Deut. 15:2): “This is the word of the remission, remit!” Rebbi says, two remissions are the Sabbatical and the Jubilee. As long as the Jubilee is operative, the Sabbatical is from words of the Torah. If the Jubilees are abolished, the Sabbatical is operative from their words. When were the Jubilees abolished? (Lev. 25:10) “For all its inhabitants.” In the time when they lived on it, not when they went from it into exile. If they lived on it but did (not) intermingle, the tribe of Judah in Benjamin, and the tribe of Benjamin in Judah, I could think that the Jubilee was operative. The verse mentions its inhabitants, “All its inhabitants;” you find that when the tribes of Reuben, Gad, and half the tribe of Manasseh went into exile, the Jubilees were disestablished.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 4:13

Rav Huna said, I asked before Rebbi Jacob ben Aḥa: Following him who says tithes are from their words. But following him who says tithes are from the Torah, does Hillel institute anything against the words of the Torah? Rebbi Yose said, from the moment that Israel was exiled to Babylonia, did they not become free from all commandments connected with the Land, but the remission of debts applies both in the Land and outside the Land from the words of the Torah? Rebbi Yose turned and said, (Deut. 15:2) “this is the word of the abandonment, remit” as long as abandonment is followed in the Land as a word of the Torah, remission of debts applies both in the Land and outside the Land from the words of the Torah, but when abandonment is followed in the Land as their word, remission of debts applies both in the Land and outside the Land from their word. There, they say that even one who holds that tithes are from the Torah will hold that the Sabbatical is from their word. (Deut. 15:2): “This is the word of the remission, remit!” Rebbi says, two remissions are the Sabbatical and the Jubilee. As long as the Jubilee is operative, the Sabbatical is from words of the Torah. If the Jubilees are abolished, the Sabbatical is operative from their words. When were the Jubilees abolished? (Lev. 25:10) “For all its inhabitants.” In the time when they lived on it, not when they went from it into exile. If they lived on it but did (not) intermingle, the tribe of Judah in Benjamin, and the tribe of Benjamin in Judah, I could think that the Jubilee was operative. The verse mentions its inhabitants, “All its inhabitants;” you find that when the tribes of Reuben, Gad, and half the tribe of Manasseh went into exile, the Jubilees were disestablished.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 5:11

“For a woman’s ketubah with lowest quality.” Rebbi Jeremiah said, they taught only for a ketubah of a mina or 200 [zuz], but a ketubah of a thousand denar she collects from average quality. Rebbi Yose said, even a ketubah of a thousand denar she collects only from lowest quality. It turns out that this disagreement parallels the following disagreement: “While she lives in her father’s house, she always can collect her ketubah; if she lives in her husband’s house, she can collect her ketubah for 25 years.” Rebbi Simon in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: One stated this only for the ketubah of a mina or 200 [zuz]. But a ketubah of 1’000 denar she collects forever. Rebbi Abbahu quoted in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Even a ketubah of 1’000 denar she can collect only up to 25 years. It turns out that Rebbi Yose follows Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Jeremiah Rebbi Joshua ben Levi. As we have stated there: “If somebody signs over his property to his sons and signs over some real estate to his wife, she loses her claim to ketubah.” Rav said, if he sells through her. Samuel says, if he distributes in her presence. Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, they stated here a relaxation of the laws of ketubah. Rebbi Abba said, the reason of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina is that it applies not only to a ketubah of a mina or two hundred, but even regarding a ketubah of one thousand denar they proclaimed a relaxation of the laws of ketubah.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 5:22

What is the situation of grandchildren? Rebbi Mana said, grandchildren are like children. Rebbi Yose said, grandchildren are not like children. Rebbi Samuel, son of Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Ḥanina and Rebbi Mattaniah were sitting together. They wanted to say, the same situation applies to grandchildren here as there. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Ḥanina said to them, inheritance by biblical law jumped on grandchildren.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 5:23

There, we have stated: “You have in your hand a mina of my father’s; you have to get from me only 50 denars. He does not have to swear since he is like a person who returns a find.” Rebbi Eleazar said, in this case they instituted a regulation as they instituted for a find, as we have stated: “The finder of a lost object shall not swear because of the public good.” Rebbi Abba said, this Mishnah [applies] when he said to him, you found my two oxen. But if he said, I found your two oxen and returned both of them, but the other said, you returned only one, in that case they did not institute the rule. Rebbi Pedat in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: In this case they did institute. But in the first case, it is a word of the Torah, as it was stated: I could think that if he said to him, you found my two oxen, but the other said, I found only one, should he be obligated [to swear]? The verse says, “or if he found a find and disowned it;” that excludes this one who did not disown. But if he said to him, I was standing on my roof when I saw you dragging away two tied oxen, two tied oxen you dragged away from me, and he says, only one I dragged away; in that case they made no regulation. Similarly: “I was standing with my father when he was dying and he claimed from you a mina and you agreed to it,” and the other says, “I agreed only for 50;” in that case they made no regulation.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 5:40

“The law of siqariqon always applies in Galilee.” The law of siqariqon does not apply to movables. It was stated: “The law of siqariqon does not apply to foreclosures for a debt and for tenant fees. [A foreclosure for nonpayment of] tenant fees waits twelve months for the owners.” Rebbi Judah ben Pazi said, after twelve months one announces on four consecutive Sabbaths. He explained it in two ways. If he took it from a tenant and gave it to a tenant and the first wants to foreclose, he says to him, are you not a tenant? Leave it for me and what you cut, you cut. If he took it from the owner and gave it to a tenant, the [owner] wants to foreclose, he tells him, what use do you have if you take it from me and he will take it from you, but what I can afford I shall give to you.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 7:18

There, we have stated: “If somebody writes his property over to his sons, he has to write: From today and after death. Rebbi Yose says, this is unnecessary.” What is Rebbi Yose’s reason? The date of the document is its proof. The colleagues in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: This is no condition. Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It applies neither to bills of divorce nor to gifts. Rebbi Ila said, for a gift; since he said “from today”, the gift is irrevocable. Why did he write “after death”? To reserve the yield to himself. But in bills of divorce, since he wrote “from today” in the bill, it would be a separation. Why did he write “after death”? To reserve her body to himself. Rebbi Bibon bar Cahana said before Rebbi Ilai, not to reserve her earnings for himself? He answered, we do not find a woman married to one man and her earnings belonging to another. Rebbi Ze‘ira praised him for this and called him “son of the Torah.”

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 8:9

MISHNAH: The same applies for preliminary marriages and for [liquidation of] debts. If he said to him, throw to me what you owe me and he threw it close to the lender, the borrower is acquitted, close to the borrower, the borrower remains obligated, in the middle both of them must share it. If she was standing on top of her roof and he threw it to her, as soon as it reached the roof’s airspace she is divorced. If he was on top and she below, once it left the domain of the roof she is divorced even if it was blotted out or burned.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 8:10

HALAKHAH: “The same applies for preliminary marriages”, etc. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish in the name of Abba Cohen Bar Dalaia: A person acquires a find within four cubits of himself. What is the reason? (1Chr. 22:14) “Look, in my poverty I prepared for the House of the Eternal 100’000 kikkar of gold, 1’000’000 kikkar of silver, bronze and iron unweighed because it was so much; I prepared wood and stones, and you should add to them.”

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 8:15

Rebbi Zeïra objected before Rebbi Yasa: But did we not state: The same applies to marriage? He answered him, divorce documents and marriage contracts have the same rules. But did we not state: The same applies to debt? He said to him, because if he said to him: Throw it into the sea and your debt will be forgiven, it would be forgiven. But if that is true, even if it fell down close to the debtor, the debtor should have the benefit! But we have stated, if it falls down close to the debtor, the debtor is still obligated. For he said to him, throw it so that it will enter my domain, but it did not yet enter his domain. Rebbi Abbahu said, all those objections that Rebbi Zeïra raised before Rebbi Yasa, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish raised before Rebbi Joḥanan. Did he accept them from him? He solved them with those same solutions.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 8:15

Rebbi Zeïra objected before Rebbi Yasa: But did we not state: The same applies to marriage? He answered him, divorce documents and marriage contracts have the same rules. But did we not state: The same applies to debt? He said to him, because if he said to him: Throw it into the sea and your debt will be forgiven, it would be forgiven. But if that is true, even if it fell down close to the debtor, the debtor should have the benefit! But we have stated, if it falls down close to the debtor, the debtor is still obligated. For he said to him, throw it so that it will enter my domain, but it did not yet enter his domain. Rebbi Abbahu said, all those objections that Rebbi Zeïra raised before Rebbi Yasa, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish raised before Rebbi Joḥanan. Did he accept them from him? He solved them with those same solutions.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 8:37

Rebbi Joḥanan said, the Mishnah applies if one witness is missing, but only if there are three or more. Two or three at the beginning is invalid, one below the three is valid. Rebbi Mana asked: That is, if they are continuous. If they are with interruptions? As one says, they are considered like testimony at a distance, they only serve to certify the testimony. And so it is here. If there were nine, can he untie two and have two sign? Or are two witnesses on a knotted document nothing? If there were five, it is obvious that he unties one and has it signed. It turns out that his untying permits it following Rebbi Ḥananiah ben Gamliel, for Rebbi Ḥananiah ben Gamliel says, the essential part is what validates, even if he ties and signs after that. That is, if he ties all knots and after that the first three [witnesses] did sign. But if he tied the first three and had them signed, even if he makes many ties and lets many sign it is valid. Practice is that a knotted document is first knotted and then signed. If he made the first knots and had them signed right away, it is obvious that the first two did not sign the knotted document.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:78

Rebbi Ze‘ira and Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It is reasonable that a slave be able to accept a bill of manumission since a bill of manumission applies to him. But he should not be able to accept a bill of divorce since a bill of divorce does not apply to him. If you say, is that not a baraita? “Your are a slave but your child is free; if she was pregnant, she acquired for him.” They considered her fetus as one of her limbs. Rebbi Abba bar Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It is reasonable that a slave be able to accept a bill of manumission but he should not be able to accept a bill of his equal. If you say, the preceding baraita? “You are a slave but your child is free; if she was pregnant, she acquired for him.” They considered her fetus as one of her limbs.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:136

HALAKHAH: “Any commandment which does not refer to the Land,” etc. It is written (Deut. 12:1): “These are the statutes and the rules of law which you will be required to follow in the Land.” In the Land you are required to follow them but not outside the Land. Still we say obligations depending on the Land only apply in the Land, but we might think that obligations not depending on the Land also should only apply in the Land. The verse says (Deut. 11:16–18) “Be careful, lest your heart be seduced … and the Eternal’s rage be inflamed against you, etc. Put these words on your hearts,”. Even if you are exiled. (Deut. 11:18) “Put these words on your hearts and your persons.” You have to say, for example tefillin and the study of Torah. Just as tefillin and the study of Torah do not depend on the Land and apply both in the Land and outside the Land, so everything not depending on the Land applies both in the Land and outside the Land.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:140

“Rebbi Eliezer says, also new grain.” What is the reason of Rebbi Eliezer? (Lev. 23:14) “In all your dwelling places,” both inside and outside the Land. How do the rabbis explain the reason of Rebbi Eliezer, “in all your dwelling places”? New grain from here which was exported. Rebbi Jonah asked: Why did we not state ḥallah with these? Rebbi Yose said to him, our Mishnah only deals with something which applies to Israel and the Gentiles. But ḥallah only applies to Israel, not to Gentiles. What is the reason? (Num. 15:20): The first of your dough,” not of Gentiles.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:140

“Rebbi Eliezer says, also new grain.” What is the reason of Rebbi Eliezer? (Lev. 23:14) “In all your dwelling places,” both inside and outside the Land. How do the rabbis explain the reason of Rebbi Eliezer, “in all your dwelling places”? New grain from here which was exported. Rebbi Jonah asked: Why did we not state ḥallah with these? Rebbi Yose said to him, our Mishnah only deals with something which applies to Israel and the Gentiles. But ḥallah only applies to Israel, not to Gentiles. What is the reason? (Num. 15:20): The first of your dough,” not of Gentiles.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 3:5

Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: “This animal shall be an elevation sacrifice after thirty days.” If he sold it within the thirty days, it is sold; its dedication sanctifies. If he bought it back within the thirty days, the dedication as elevation sacrifice applies to it. After thirty days, the dedication as elevation sacrifice no longer applies. But an elevation sacrifice cannot be compared to a woman! Could an elevation sacrifice be compared to a woman? Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Ada said, explain it that the second man died but he had a brother. Since she is a candidate for levirate, the preliminary marriage of the first cannot be valid. Could an elevation sacrifice be compared to a woman? Rebbi Mattania said, explain it that he dedicated an animal with a permanent defect. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: There you say, my promise to Heaven is like my delivery to a private person, and here, you say so? He answered him: there, immediately, but here if he says, after thirty days.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 3:5

Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: “This animal shall be an elevation sacrifice after thirty days.” If he sold it within the thirty days, it is sold; its dedication sanctifies. If he bought it back within the thirty days, the dedication as elevation sacrifice applies to it. After thirty days, the dedication as elevation sacrifice no longer applies. But an elevation sacrifice cannot be compared to a woman! Could an elevation sacrifice be compared to a woman? Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Ada said, explain it that the second man died but he had a brother. Since she is a candidate for levirate, the preliminary marriage of the first cannot be valid. Could an elevation sacrifice be compared to a woman? Rebbi Mattania said, explain it that he dedicated an animal with a permanent defect. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: There you say, my promise to Heaven is like my delivery to a private person, and here, you say so? He answered him: there, immediately, but here if he says, after thirty days.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 4:22

HALAKHAH: Rebbi Jeremiah said, as a matter of principle, an Israel with an injured testicle may marry a female bastard. Rebbi Yose said, it applies only to family disabilities, not to bodily defects. The strength of Rebbi Yose comes from the statement of Rebbi Ḥilqiah, Rebbi Simon in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: One did state this only for an Israel with an injured testicle, but not a Cohen, since, as you say there, if he is certainly a Cohen he is forbidden to marry a convert; here also, he is certainly an Israel and forbidden to marry a female bastard.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 1:17

New paragraph. “Properties of people of the Covenant,” excluding cattle of a Jew which gored cattle of a Gentile. “Private property,” excluding ownerless property. “Except for property belonging solely to the person responsible for the damage” who cannot be sued. “But [the rules] apply to property common to the person suffering the damage and the person responsible for the damage.” Rebbi Jeremiah said, if it were stated “except for property belonging solely to the person responsible for the damage” and had stopped, I would have said that [responsibility applies] both to a common courtyard and to a courtyard belonging to neither party. Why did it state: “[the rules] apply to property common to the person suffering the damage and the person responsible for the damage”? [To indicate] that it applies to the unpaid trustee, the borrower, the paid trustee, and the renter. Rebbi Yose said, since it stated “except for property belonging solely to the person responsible for the damage”, would we not know that “[the rules] apply to property common to the person suffering the damage and the person responsible for the damage”? Why was it stated that “[the rules] apply to property common to the person suffering the damage and the person responsible for the damage”? To exclude a courtyard belonging to neither of them. Some Tannaїm state: A condominium courtyard is obligated, a courtyard belonging to neither of them is free. Some Tannaїm state: Even a courtyard belonging to neither of them is obligated. He who says, a condominium courtyard is obligated, a courtyard belonging to neither of them is free, for it is written: “the best of his fields.” But he who says, even a courtyard belonging to neither of them is obligated, for it is written: “It ravages another person’s field.”

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 1:17

New paragraph. “Properties of people of the Covenant,” excluding cattle of a Jew which gored cattle of a Gentile. “Private property,” excluding ownerless property. “Except for property belonging solely to the person responsible for the damage” who cannot be sued. “But [the rules] apply to property common to the person suffering the damage and the person responsible for the damage.” Rebbi Jeremiah said, if it were stated “except for property belonging solely to the person responsible for the damage” and had stopped, I would have said that [responsibility applies] both to a common courtyard and to a courtyard belonging to neither party. Why did it state: “[the rules] apply to property common to the person suffering the damage and the person responsible for the damage”? [To indicate] that it applies to the unpaid trustee, the borrower, the paid trustee, and the renter. Rebbi Yose said, since it stated “except for property belonging solely to the person responsible for the damage”, would we not know that “[the rules] apply to property common to the person suffering the damage and the person responsible for the damage”? Why was it stated that “[the rules] apply to property common to the person suffering the damage and the person responsible for the damage”? To exclude a courtyard belonging to neither of them. Some Tannaїm state: A condominium courtyard is obligated, a courtyard belonging to neither of them is free. Some Tannaїm state: Even a courtyard belonging to neither of them is obligated. He who says, a condominium courtyard is obligated, a courtyard belonging to neither of them is free, for it is written: “the best of his fields.” But he who says, even a courtyard belonging to neither of them is obligated, for it is written: “It ravages another person’s field.”

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 3:24

MISHNAH: If the carrier of the beam was first and the carrier of the amphora last. If the jar broke on the beam, he is not liable; but if the carrier of the beam stopped walking, he is liable, except that he is not liable if he said to the carrier of the amphora: stop! If the carrier of the amphora was first and the carrier of the beam last. If the jar broke on the beam, he is liable, but if the carrier of the amphora stopped walking, he is not liable, except that he is liable if he said to the carrier of the beam: stop! The same applies if one carries fire and the other flax.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 7:1

MISHNAH: The obligation to make double restitution is more frequent than that of paying quadruple or quintuple restitution since the obligation to make double restitution applies both to living things and to inanimate objects; but the obligation of paying quadruple or quintuple restitution only applies to oxen and sheep, as it is said: “If a man steal an ox or a sheep,” etc. He who steals from a thief does not pay double restitution, nor does the one who slaughters or sells after a thief pay quadruple or quintuple restitution.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 7:1

MISHNAH: The obligation to make double restitution is more frequent than that of paying quadruple or quintuple restitution since the obligation to make double restitution applies both to living things and to inanimate objects; but the obligation of paying quadruple or quintuple restitution only applies to oxen and sheep, as it is said: “If a man steal an ox or a sheep,” etc. He who steals from a thief does not pay double restitution, nor does the one who slaughters or sells after a thief pay quadruple or quintuple restitution.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 9:20

HALAKHAH: “He who robbed at least a peruṭa’s worth from a fellow man,” etc. So is the Mishnah: Until the last fifth becomes less than a peruṭa’s worth. Rebbi Jonathan said: By handing over the fifth, the fifth becomes capital. This only applies with witnesses and at the time of sacrifices.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Metzia 4:14

HALAKHAH: “Cheating is four obols,” etc. Rav said, this is the rate; Rebbi Joḥanan said, it is not the rate. Rav said, if somebody trades on condition that the rules of cheating not apply to him, the rules of cheating do apply to him. Rebbi Levi stated: Cheating applies to a peruṭah, cheating can be by a peruṭah. But what is the status of cheating? It was stated: The item was acquired, he returns the overcharge, the words of Rebbi Jehudah the Prince; Rebbi Joḥanan said, the sale is annulled.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Batra 8:33

HALAKHAH: “One who writes his properties over to his sons,” etc. Rebbi Simeon ben Yaqim brought a case before Rebbi Joḥanan. “From today after his death,” his gift is a gift. “From today and after death” it is no bill of divorce. The colleagues say, so he told him: this is no condition. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, so he told him: It applies neither to bills of divorce nor to gifts. Rebbi La said, for a gift; since he said “from today”, the gift is clear. Why did he write “after death”? To reserve the yield to himself. But in bills of divorce, since he wrote “from today” in the bill, it would be a separation. Why did he write “after death”? To reserve her body to himself. Rebbi Abun bar Cahana said before Rebbi La, not to reserve her earnings for himself? He answered, we do not find a woman married to one man and her earnings belonging to another. Rebbi Ze‘ira confirmed him and called him “son of the Torah.”

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 1:45

They preferred an old man to Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish for intercalation but had to remove him by the other door. He said, this is their reward. Did he not hear what Rebbi Crispus said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It happened that the year was intercalated by three cow hands. One said, in Adar, early and late grain sprout together. One said, in Adar the ox will die naked and try to strip off his hide under the fig tree. One said, if in Adar the East wind blows, open your jaws and go towards it. And we see that this year nothing of these applies. They intercalated the year on their word. Rebbi Ḥelbo said, because the Court agreed with them. Rebbi Zeˋira said, but they all have to agree to the same reason. But since they all agree with one another it was that they all agreed as to the reason.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 4:13

HALAKHAH: “In civil suits, one who argued for credit,” etc. Rebbi said, if they only miss saying, Mr. X, you are acquitted, or you are convicted; it does not apply to the discussion. Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, it also applies to the discussion.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:53

MISHNAH: A blurted oath applies to men and women, relatives and unrelated persons, qualified and disqualified persons, before a court or out of court, from his own mouth. For intentional violation one is liable to flogging, for unintentional [to bring] a variable sacrifice. A vain oath applies to men and women, to relatives and unrelated persons, to qualified and disqualified ones, in court and out of court, and by his own words. For intentional violation one is liable to flogging, for unintentional he is not prosecutable. In both cases, one who is sworn to by another person can be liable. How is this? One said, “I did not eat today, I did not put on phylacteries today.” “I want you to swear to it,” if he said “Amen” he is liable.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:53

MISHNAH: A blurted oath applies to men and women, relatives and unrelated persons, qualified and disqualified persons, before a court or out of court, from his own mouth. For intentional violation one is liable to flogging, for unintentional [to bring] a variable sacrifice. A vain oath applies to men and women, to relatives and unrelated persons, to qualified and disqualified ones, in court and out of court, and by his own words. For intentional violation one is liable to flogging, for unintentional he is not prosecutable. In both cases, one who is sworn to by another person can be liable. How is this? One said, “I did not eat today, I did not put on phylacteries today.” “I want you to swear to it,” if he said “Amen” he is liable.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 4:1

MISHNAH: An oath about testimony applies to men but not to women, to unrelated persons but not to relatives, to qualified but not to disqualified ones; it applies only to those admitted to testify, in court and out of court, and by the person’s own words. By the words of others they only become liable if they renege before a court, the words of Rebbi Meїr. But the Sages say, whether by the person’s own words or by the words of others they only become liable if they renege before a court. They are liable both for intentional [violation of the] oath and for erroneous one, and for intentional [refusal of] testimony, but one is not liable unintentionally. What is one liable for if intentional? A variable value sacrifice.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 4:1

MISHNAH: An oath about testimony applies to men but not to women, to unrelated persons but not to relatives, to qualified but not to disqualified ones; it applies only to those admitted to testify, in court and out of court, and by the person’s own words. By the words of others they only become liable if they renege before a court, the words of Rebbi Meїr. But the Sages say, whether by the person’s own words or by the words of others they only become liable if they renege before a court. They are liable both for intentional [violation of the] oath and for erroneous one, and for intentional [refusal of] testimony, but one is not liable unintentionally. What is one liable for if intentional? A variable value sacrifice.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 5:1

MISHNAH: An oath about a deposit applies to men and women, unrelated persons and relatives, qualified and disqualified persons, before a court or out of court, from his own mouth. From the mouth of another he is liable only if he denies in court, the words of Rebbi Meїr. But the Sages say, whether by his own mouth or the mouth of others, from the moment that he denies, he is liable. He is liable for intent about the oath, or error about it with intent about the deposit, but he is not liable for error about the latter. What is he liable for in case of intentional violation? A reparation offering in the value of two Šeqalim.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 5:3

Rebbi La: Both Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both are saying, there is no ”witnesses “here. Why? Because they might die. But might not a document be lost? Therefore, the reason can only be that they might forget their testimony. There, we have stated: “Where is my ox? He told him, it is lost. I want you to swear, he said, Amen. But witnesses testify that he ate it. He has to pay the value. If he confessed himself, he has to pay the value, and the fifth, and the reparation sacrifice.” The Mishnah [applies] if he does not know that there are witnesses. He comes to tell you, even if he knows that there are witnesses. Rebbi Yose said, the Mishnah says so: “If there were two groups of witnesses, if the first group reneged and after this the second, both are liable.” One understands that the first group becomes liable. Why the second? Not because they might forget their testimony? [Here also, because they (are commanded) to forget their testimony.]

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 5:19

HALAKHAH: “Give me the deposit, the loan,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said, Rebbi Simeon implies that if it turns out that he had no wheat, he is not liable for the rest. Rebbi Abba said, even Rebbi (Yasa) will agree with this. If it turns out that he had no wheat, does [the oath] refer to the other kinds? The colleagues said, it does not. Rebbi Ze`ira said, it does. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, a baraita supports what the colleagues said. “A woman made a vow as a nazir and her friend heard it and said, ‘so am I’; the first woman’s husband heard it and dissolved [the vow] for her; the first one is permitted and the second forbidden. If she said, ‘my intention was only to be like her,’ both are permitted.” Because she said, “to be like her, in her state”. Therefore, if she did not say “to be like her, in her state”, the first is permitted and the second forbidden. Since there, where the essence is not an oath, you say it applies, here, where there was an original oath, not so much more? What Rebbi Joḥanan said, Rebbi Simeon implies if it turns out that he had no wheat, he is not liable for the rest, if he connects: If he says, [my obligation for] barley shall be like that for wheat; [my obligation for] spelt shall be like that for wheat.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 8:21

“He said to the recipient of a fee,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said, one who claims before his neighbor a claim of thief in a case of loss is liable. “Where is my lost object?” He told him, “it was stolen.” Rebbi Joḥanan said, one who claims before his neighbor a claim of thief is liable only after an oath. What is the reason? It is said here “grabbing” and it says there “grabbing.” Since “grabbing” mentioned there only applies after an oath, so also “grabbing” mentioned here only applies after an oath. Rebbi Joḥanan said, one who claims a claim of loss, swore to him, and afterwards claimed a claim of thief is not liable. Rebbi Joḥanan asked: May one be liable for a blurted oath in case of an oath regarding a claim of thief? The argument of Rebbi Joḥanan seems to be inverted. There he said, if he claimed a claim of loss, swore to him, and afterwards claimed a claim of thief is not liable. And here he says so? There it is obvious to him, here it is problematic for him. What is problematic for him? He saw and found it simple. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Joseph said, one who claims before his neighbor a claim of thief is liable only after he denied in court. Where do we hold? If about him who already owes an oath to his neighbor, even if he was swearing out of court he is liable. But we must hold about him who saw them coming. They wanted to make him swear but he jumped in and swore. Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: When it was standing at his feeding trough. Rebbi Ze`ira asked: how was it said? “If it was standing” or “even if it was standing”? If you say “even if it was standing,” it makes no difference. If you say “if it was standing,” then the argument of Rebbi Joḥanan is inverted. There, he said, if he claimed before him a claim of loss, had been swearing to him, selected a sacrifice, and then claimed a claim of duress, he is not liable. But here you are saying so? Rebbi La said, there is a difference since he absolved himself of confession by the oath. They objected to the opinion of Rebbi Ze`ira: “‘Where is my ox?’ He told him, ‘it was stolen.’ ‘I want you to swear;’ he answered ‘Amen’. Witnesses testify that he stole it: he has to pay double restitution. If he confessed himself he pays the value, and a fifth, and a reparation sacrifice.” But here when he moved it by claiming that it was lost. Afterwards he claimed a claim of thief and is not liable. Explain it that he swore to him but slaughtered it afterwards. The students of Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Julianus say, explain it that he slaughtered it when it was lying down. Is there slaughter without sale? Following Symmachos who said, there can be slaughter and sale without theft. Samuel said, if there came no witnesses of the theft, but there came witnesses of the slaughter; he is liable.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 8:21

“He said to the recipient of a fee,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said, one who claims before his neighbor a claim of thief in a case of loss is liable. “Where is my lost object?” He told him, “it was stolen.” Rebbi Joḥanan said, one who claims before his neighbor a claim of thief is liable only after an oath. What is the reason? It is said here “grabbing” and it says there “grabbing.” Since “grabbing” mentioned there only applies after an oath, so also “grabbing” mentioned here only applies after an oath. Rebbi Joḥanan said, one who claims a claim of loss, swore to him, and afterwards claimed a claim of thief is not liable. Rebbi Joḥanan asked: May one be liable for a blurted oath in case of an oath regarding a claim of thief? The argument of Rebbi Joḥanan seems to be inverted. There he said, if he claimed a claim of loss, swore to him, and afterwards claimed a claim of thief is not liable. And here he says so? There it is obvious to him, here it is problematic for him. What is problematic for him? He saw and found it simple. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Joseph said, one who claims before his neighbor a claim of thief is liable only after he denied in court. Where do we hold? If about him who already owes an oath to his neighbor, even if he was swearing out of court he is liable. But we must hold about him who saw them coming. They wanted to make him swear but he jumped in and swore. Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: When it was standing at his feeding trough. Rebbi Ze`ira asked: how was it said? “If it was standing” or “even if it was standing”? If you say “even if it was standing,” it makes no difference. If you say “if it was standing,” then the argument of Rebbi Joḥanan is inverted. There, he said, if he claimed before him a claim of loss, had been swearing to him, selected a sacrifice, and then claimed a claim of duress, he is not liable. But here you are saying so? Rebbi La said, there is a difference since he absolved himself of confession by the oath. They objected to the opinion of Rebbi Ze`ira: “‘Where is my ox?’ He told him, ‘it was stolen.’ ‘I want you to swear;’ he answered ‘Amen’. Witnesses testify that he stole it: he has to pay double restitution. If he confessed himself he pays the value, and a fifth, and a reparation sacrifice.” But here when he moved it by claiming that it was lost. Afterwards he claimed a claim of thief and is not liable. Explain it that he swore to him but slaughtered it afterwards. The students of Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Julianus say, explain it that he slaughtered it when it was lying down. Is there slaughter without sale? Following Symmachos who said, there can be slaughter and sale without theft. Samuel said, if there came no witnesses of the theft, but there came witnesses of the slaughter; he is liable.

Jerusalem Talmud Avodah Zarah 5:50

And the birds of the sufferer from skin disease. Any pure bird you may eat, this is the living bird. But the following you may not eat of them, that is the slaughtered one. Or the other way around? Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Ismael: The Torah has no prohibition of usufruct which applies to any living thing.

Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 2:5

MISHNAH: They are liable only for forgetting a topic with action in error; the same applies to the Anointed. Also for idolatry only for forgetting a topic with action in error.

Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 2:8

MISHNAH: They are liable only for something which when intentional is punishable by extirpation and when unintentional by a purification sacrifice. The same applies to the Anointed. Also for idolatry only for something which when intentional is punishable by extirpation and when unintentional by a purification sacrifice.

Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 2:15

MISHNAH: They are not liable for hearing a sound, or expression of the lips, or the impurity of the Temple and its sancta. The same applies to the Prince, the words of Rebbi Yose the Galilean. Rebbi Aqiba says, the Prince is liable for all of them except the hearing of a sound since the king does not judge, nor may one judge him; he does not testify, nor may one testify against him.

The Babylonian Talmud

Babylonian Talmud Berakhot 1:66

R. Abba b. Kahana said : This applies only to words of Torah ; but as for worldly matters we can have no objection.

Babylonian Talmud Berakhot 1:67

Another version is : R. Abba b. Kahana said : This applies even to words of Torah ; how much more so to worldly matters !

Babylonian Talmud Berakhot 1:222

Abbai said : This applies only to one who does not turn his face towards the Synagogue ; but if he does that, we can have no objection.

Babylonian Talmud Berakhot 1:346

Abbai said: This only applies when the building has no other entrance ; but should it have another entrance, we can have no objection ; further it applies only when there is no other Synagogue [in the town], but should there be another Synagogue, we can have no objection ; further it applies only to one who is not carrying a load, or is not running, or is not wearing Tefillin ; but in any of such cases, we can have no objection.

Babylonian Talmud Berakhot 1:346

Abbai said: This only applies when the building has no other entrance ; but should it have another entrance, we can have no objection ; further it applies only when there is no other Synagogue [in the town], but should there be another Synagogue, we can have no objection ; further it applies only to one who is not carrying a load, or is not running, or is not wearing Tefillin ; but in any of such cases, we can have no objection.

Babylonian Talmud Berakhot 1:346

Abbai said: This only applies when the building has no other entrance ; but should it have another entrance, we can have no objection ; further it applies only when there is no other Synagogue [in the town], but should there be another Synagogue, we can have no objection ; further it applies only to one who is not carrying a load, or is not running, or is not wearing Tefillin ; but in any of such cases, we can have no objection.

Babylonian Talmud Berakhot 2:6

R. Joshua b. Karhah said: Why does the section "Hear, O Israel" precede "And it shall come to pass if ye shall hearken"? So that a man shall first receive upon himself the yoke of the kingdom of heaven, and afterwards receive upon himself the yoke of the commandments. And why does "And it shall came to pass if ye shall hearken" precede "And the Lord spake" ? Because the former applies both during the day and night, but the latter during the day only.

Babylonian Talmud Berakhot 2:26

There is a further teaching: "And these words... shall be" means one must not read [the sentences of the Shema'] out of order. "Upon thine heart" — R. Zotra says: Up to here the law of Kawwanah applies, but from here onward the commandment to recite applies. R. Josiah says : Up to here the commandment to recite applies, but from here onward the law requiring Kawwanah applies.

Babylonian Talmud Berakhot 2:26

There is a further teaching: "And these words... shall be" means one must not read [the sentences of the Shema'] out of order. "Upon thine heart" — R. Zotra says: Up to here the law of Kawwanah applies, but from here onward the commandment to recite applies. R. Josiah says : Up to here the commandment to recite applies, but from here onward the law requiring Kawwanah applies.

Babylonian Talmud Berakhot 2:26

There is a further teaching: "And these words... shall be" means one must not read [the sentences of the Shema'] out of order. "Upon thine heart" — R. Zotra says: Up to here the law of Kawwanah applies, but from here onward the commandment to recite applies. R. Josiah says : Up to here the commandment to recite applies, but from here onward the law requiring Kawwanah applies.

Babylonian Talmud Berakhot 2:26

There is a further teaching: "And these words... shall be" means one must not read [the sentences of the Shema'] out of order. "Upon thine heart" — R. Zotra says: Up to here the law of Kawwanah applies, but from here onward the commandment to recite applies. R. Josiah says : Up to here the commandment to recite applies, but from here onward the law requiring Kawwanah applies.

Babylonian Talmud Berakhot 2:27

What is the distinction that from here onward the commandment to recite applies ? Because it is written, "talking of them." But in the first Parashah it is likewise written "and shalt talk of them" !

Babylonian Talmud Berakhot 2:28

What he means to say is, Up to here the law of Kawwanah and reciting applies, but from here onward, reciting without Kawwanah is sufficient.

Babylonian Talmud Berakhot 2:29

And what is the distinction that up to [the end of the first paragraph] the law of Kawwanah and reciting applies ? Because it is written "upon thine heart" and "and shalt talk of them." But in the next paragraph it is likewise written "Upon your heart" and "talking of them" !

Babylonian Talmud Berakhot 2:31

The teacher stated above : "R. Josiah says : Up to here the commandment to recite applies, but from here onward the law requiring Kawwanah applies. " What is the distinction that from here onward the law requiring Kawwanah applies ? Because it is written "upon your heart." But in the first Parashah it is likewise written "upon thine heart" !

Babylonian Talmud Berakhot 2:31

The teacher stated above : "R. Josiah says : Up to here the commandment to recite applies, but from here onward the law requiring Kawwanah applies. " What is the distinction that from here onward the law requiring Kawwanah applies ? Because it is written "upon your heart." But in the first Parashah it is likewise written "upon thine heart" !

Babylonian Talmud Berakhot 2:31

The teacher stated above : "R. Josiah says : Up to here the commandment to recite applies, but from here onward the law requiring Kawwanah applies. " What is the distinction that from here onward the law requiring Kawwanah applies ? Because it is written "upon your heart." But in the first Parashah it is likewise written "upon thine heart" !

Babylonian Talmud Berakhot 2:32

What he means to say is, Up to here the law of reciting and Kawwanah applies, but from here onward Kawwanah without reciting is sufficient.

Babylonian Talmud Berakhot 2:33

And what is the distinction that up to [the end of the first paragraph] the law of reciting and Kawwanah applies ? Because it is written "upon thine heart" and "thou shalt talk of them." But in the next paragraph it is likewise written "upon your heart" and "talking of them"!

Babylonian Talmud Berakhot 2:38

Rab Nathan b. Mar 'Ukba said in the name of Rab Judah : "Upon thine heart" [should be recited] standing. Dost thou imagine that applies only to the words "Upon thine heart"? No ; but say, [From the commencement of the Shema'] up to "upon thine heart" is to be recited standing, but not from there onward. R. Johanan said : The whole paragraph should be recited standing ;

Babylonian Talmud Berakhot 2:101

He answered : Well has he spoken ; for is it written, "I will wash with water"? No; it is written, "I will wash in cleanliness," i.e. with anything that cleanses. And lo, Rab Hisda cursed anyone who went about in search of water at the time of prayer. This, however, applies only to the reading of the Shema', but for the Tefillah one may go for water.

Babylonian Talmud Berakhot 2:102

How far may one go for it ? A Parsah. But this applies only in front of him ; in the rear he may not go even a Mil, [from which it is to be deduced] he may not go in the rear a Mil, but less than that distance is permissible.

Babylonian Talmud Berakhot 2:158

R. Johanan said to him : This latter only applies if he has not started "That your days may be multiplied" ; but should he have commenced that sentence, [he may assume that] he followed on from force of habit.

Babylonian Talmud Berakhot 3:16

Our Rabbis have taught : He who is removing bones from one place to another must not put them into a saddle-bag and set them upon an ass and ride upon them, because this is disrespectful treatment ; but if he is afraid of heathens or robbers, he may do so. What they say of bones applies also to a scroll of the Torah.

Babylonian Talmud Berakhot 3:157

R. El'ai says : The law of the first-shorn wool applies only in the [Holy] Land.

Babylonian Talmud Berakhot 3:163

R. Jannai said : I have heard that some take a lenient view and others a stricter view ; but whoever applies the stricter rule to himself, his days and years will be prolonged for him.

Babylonian Talmud Berakhot 3:178

And one of the first pair is at variance with one of the second pair on the latter part of the teaching. One says : The statement, "R. Judah says that in every case forty Saot are required" is intended to apply only [to water found] in the ground, but not [to water] in vessels. The other says : It applies even [to water] in vessels.

Babylonian Talmud Berakhot 3:179

It is quite right for him who says, "It applies even [to water] in vessels," for that is what has been stated, viz. : "R. Judah says that in every case forty Saot are required" ; but for him who says, "In the ground, yes, but in vessels, no," what does the phrase "in every case" include?

Babylonian Talmud Berakhot 3:198

Our Rabbis have taught: When one is about to enter a privy, he should divest himself of the Tefillin at a [minimum] distance of four cubits and then enter, Rab Aha b. Rab Huna said in the name of Rab Sheshet: This teaching applies only to a regular privy, but with an occasional one, he may divest himself [of the Tefillin] and at once proceed to relieve himself; and when he comes out, he walks a distance of four cubits and relays them, because he has [by his use thereof] made it a regular privy.

Babylonian Talmud Berakhot 3:206

R. Jacob b. Aha said in the name of R. Zera : This teaching only applies when there is still sufficient time left in the day to relay them; but if not, he should make for them a kind of bag, a handbreadth in size, and place them therein.

Babylonian Talmud Berakhot 3:208

Abbai said : This teaching only applies when the bag is reserved for that purpose ; but if it is not reserved for that purpose, it may be even less than a handbreadth in size.

Babylonian Talmud Berakhot 3:263

[The teacher stated above:] "He who makes his voice heard during prayer is of the small of faith." Rab Huna said : This teaching applies only to one who is able to direct his heart when whispering [the words of prayer] ; but if he is unable to do so, he is permitted [to pray aloud]. And this holds good only of one praying alone ; but with a congregation it would cause disturbance to others.

Babylonian Talmud Berakhot 3:284

There is a teaching in agreement with Rab Hisda : A man should not read the Shema' opposite the excrement of a human being, or of dogs, or pigs, or poultry ; nor opposite the filth of a dunghill which gives forth a bad odour. If there be a place ten cubits higher or lower, he sits down at the side and reads the Shema'; but if not, he removes himself as far as he can see it. The same rule applies to the Tefillah. "If there is a foul odour for which there is a cause [present], he removes himself a distance of four cubits from the place of the odour and reads the Shema'."

Babylonian Talmud Berakhot 3:319

Rab Nahman said : The difference of opinion applies only to [where the vessel contained urine and into which water has been poured] afterwards ; but if originally [the vessel contained water, and urine was then poured into it, then all agree] that any small quantity of water will suffice.

Babylonian Talmud Berakhot 3:320

But Rab Joseph said : The difference of opinion applies only to [where there was water] originally [and urine had afterwards been added] ; but where [water has to be added] afterwards, all agree that a fourth [of a Log] is necessary. Rab Joseph said to his attendant, "Bring me a fourth [of a Log] in accordance with the opinion of R. Zakkai."

Babylonian Talmud Berakhot 3:330

Abbai said : This teaching applies only to a receptacle which is not used expressly for that purpose ; but if it is used for that purpose, even ten receptacles are only to be considered as one. Raba said : A cloth

Babylonian Talmud Berakhot 3:332

To what distance must he remove himself from it and excrement [if he wishes to read the Shema'] ? Four cubits. Raba said in the name of Rab Sahorah in the name of Rab Huna : This teaching applies only to [excrement which is behind him ; but if it is in front of him, he must remove himself as far as the eye can see it. Similarly is it with the Tefillah.

Babylonian Talmud Berakhot 4:85

Rab Iwya was ill and did not attend Rab Joseph's discourse. The next day when he arrived, Abbai wished to set Rab Joseph's mind at rest ; so he said to him, "For what reason did not the master attend the discourse?" He replied, "My heart was faint and I could not." He asked him, "Why didst thou not eat something and come?" He answered, "Does not the master agree with the opinion of Rab Huna who said : It is forbidden a man to eat anything before praying the additional Tefillah?" He replied, "Then the master should have said the additional Tefillah by himself and eaten something and attended." He said to him, "Does not the master agree with the opinion of R. Johanan who declared : A man is forbidden to anticipate the congregational Tefillah by praying alone?" He replied, "But has it not been reported in this connection : R. Abba said : This teaching applies only when he is with the Congregation?"

Babylonian Talmud Berakhot 4:117

It was different with him, because he had already commenced it. For Rab Judah in the name of Rab (another version : R. Joshua b. Levi) said : This teaching applies only to one who has not commenced it ; but if he had commenced it, he may finish it.

Babylonian Talmud Berakhot 4:138

Rab Pappa the son of Rab Aha b. Adda said : The statement "If he had concluded the Tefillah, he must recommence it" only applies should he have moved his feet ; but if he has not done so, he returns to the sixteenth benediction.

Babylonian Talmud Berakhot 4:140

Rab Nahman b. Isaac said : The statement that if he had moved his feet he must recommence the Tefillah applies only to one who is not accustomed to offer personal supplications at its conclusion ; but if that be his practice, he returns to the sixteenth benediction.

Babylonian Talmud Berakhot 4:141

Another version is : Rab Nahman b. Isaac said : The statement that if he had not moved his feet, he returns to the sixteenth benediction applies only to one who is accustomed to offer personal supplication at the conclusion of the Tefillah ; but if that be not his practice, he goes back to its commencement.

Babylonian Talmud Berakhot 4:179

He replied, "Has it not been reported in this connection : R. Johanan declared that this teaching applies only to a Congregation?"

Babylonian Talmud Berakhot 4:183

Amemar said : It is probable that Rab's statement applies to a full month ; but in the case of a detective month, we require him to repeat it.

Babylonian Talmud Berakhot 5:127

Rab Joseph said : This teaching applies only to the Israelite kings ; but for the kings of other peoples he must stop.

Babylonian Talmud Berakhot 5:134

And though a serpent is wound round his heel, he must not interrupt. Rab Sheshet said : This teaching applies only to a serpent, but if it be a scorpion he may interrupt.

Babylonian Talmud Berakhot 5:138

It has been taught in the name of R. Meir : Even when the ox has its head in the [fodder-] basket, go up to the roof, and remove the ladder from under thee. Samuel said: This applies only to a black ox in the days of Nisan, because Satan then dances between its horns.

Babylonian Talmud Berakhot 6:55

If he had specified wheaten-flour, I might have thought that it applies only to wheat, but barley requires no benediction at all ; therefore he mentioned it for us.

Babylonian Talmud Berakhot 6:65

Then let him say : The Halakah is in agreement with R. 'Akiba outside the Land; for everyone who takes the lenient view within the Land, the Halakah is in accord with him outside the Land ! If he had stated that, I might have said : This applies to the tithe of trees which within the Land is a Rabbinical ordinance ; but with regard to 'Orlah, which within the Land is ordained by the Torah, I must suppose that likewise outside the Land we must apply it ! Therefore he informs us.

Babylonian Talmud Berakhot 6:196

The portion of the Sotah, the declaration concerning the tithe, the Shema', Tefillah and the Grace after meals! [Nevertheless Rab's statement] was necessary ; for it might have entered thy mind to say that this only applies when one utters the benediction in a non-holy language exactly as the Rabbis ordained it in the holy tongue ; but should he not say it in the non-holy language exactly as the Rabbis ordained it in the holy tongue, I am to declare that he has not [complied]. Therefore he informs us [that the benediction is valid even when the wording does not exactly conform to the Hebrew original].

Babylonian Talmud Berakhot 6:244

GEMARA Rabbah b. Bar Hannah said in the name of R. Johanan : The teaching applies only to Sabbaths and Festivals, for then a man arranges his meal with wine; but on other days of the year, a benediction is to be said over each cup of wine.

Babylonian Talmud Berakhot 6:245

It has been similarly reported : Rabbah b. Mari said in the name of R. Joshua b. Levi : The teaching applies only to Sabbaths and Festivals and the time when one comes from the bath-house and the meal after blood-letting, for then a man arranges his meal with wine; but on the other days of the year, a benediction is to be said over each cup of wine.

Babylonian Talmud Berakhot 6:258

If they were reclining, one may say Grace for all. Rab said : This teaching applies only to bread for which reclining is necessary, but for wine reclining is not necessary. R. Johanan, however, said : Even for wine likewise reclining is needed.

Babylonian Talmud Berakhot 6:259

(Another version : Rab said : This teaching applies only to bread where it is beneficial to recline, but with wine it is not beneficial to recline. R. Johanan, however, said : Even with wine it is likewise beneficial to recline.)

Babylonian Talmud Berakhot 6:261

According to one version of Rab's statement, viz. : "This teaching applies only to bread for which reclining is necessary, but for wine reclining is not necessary," the first part [of this Baraita] is in disagreement!

Babylonian Talmud Berakhot 6:263

And according to the other version of Rab's statement, viz. : "This teaching applies only to bread where it is beneficial to recline, but with wine it is not beneficial to recline," the latter part [of the Baraita] is in disagreement !